Defines what counts as a "terrorist act" for the purpose of the Act (including acts that cause serious physical harm, death, damage to property or disruption to critical systems) and excludes ordinary protest, dissent or industrial action that is not intended to cause serious harm (s 3).
Gives police special, time-limited powers to prevent or investigate terrorist acts when an authorised police officer reasonably believes a terrorist act has occurred, is occurring or could occur soon. An authorisation must be given by the Commissioner, a Deputy Commissioner or, in urgent cases, a senior officer (ss 5–8). Authorisations normally require the concurrence of the Police Minister and must be time‑limited and recorded (ss 9–11, 14B).
Under a valid authorisation, police may require people to state their identity (s 16), stop and search people (s 17), vehicles (s 18) and premises (s 19), establish cordons and roadblocks (s 19A), seize and detain items connected to terrorism or serious indictable offences (s 20), and use reasonable force to carry out those powers (s 21). Obstructing those powers is an offence (s 22). A person searched may request a written statement confirming the search under the Act (s 23).
The Act allows the Commissioner (or Deputy) to make short-term public assembly restriction declarations in an area tied to an authorisation or to a police declaration of an ongoing terrorist incident (Division 3A; ss 23A–23G). Those declarations can start immediately, run for up to 14 days and be extended up to limits set in the Division; they require Police Minister concurrence except in urgent situations (ss 23B–23F). Declarations must be published (s 23E).
Mechanically, the Act creates a statutory framework that expands and organises a range of police powers and judicial procedures directed at preventing, responding to and investigating terrorist acts. The principal components in the text supplied are:
A statutory definition of "terrorist act" that sets out threshold acts and excludes ordinary advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action that do not carry specified harmful intentions (s 3).
Short-term executive authorisations that permit the exercise of special powers in a named target area, vehicle or against a named or described person, where a senior police officer is satisfied of reasonable grounds for a terrorist act having occurred, being likely to occur in the next 14 days, or having been committed in the immediate period, and where the exercise of powers will substantially assist in prevention or investigation (ss 5-7, 11).
A non‑warrant regime under those authorisations allowing police to stop, search and enter premises, stop and search persons and vehicles, seize and detain things, set cordons and use reasonable force while executing powers (ss 14, 16-21, 19A, 20).
A non‑challenge rule for authorisations and ministerial decisions under the special powers division (s 13).
A specific regime for police use of force during an ongoing terrorist act declared by the Commissioner, authorising force (including lethal force) reasonably necessary as perceived by the officer to defend persons threatened or to prevent or terminate unlawful deprivation of liberty, and providing a good‑faith shield from criminal liability (Part 2AAA, ss 24A-24B).
Investigative detention powers allowing police to arrest a "terrorism suspect" without warrant for investigative detention for an initial maximum period ending at 4 days, subject to senior police review every 12 hours, with extensions to 14 days by detention warrants issued by an eligible Judge (Part 2AA, ss 25A-25I, 25H-25I, 25J). The regime includes limits on questioning, monitoring of communications, limited legal contact rights and safeguards on humane treatment (ss 25G, 25L, 25MD, 25MC).
Current sections
Direct links to the current provisions in Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002.
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Official source available
Zoe has indexed the source text for search and analysis. Use the official register for the original document and download formats.
For incidents where police are responding to an ongoing or likely terrorist act, the Commissioner may declare that a special use‑of‑force regime applies. That regime authorises police to direct or use force, including lethal force, that is reasonably necessary as the officer perceives the circumstances, and provides that officers acting in good faith do not incur criminal liability for such actions (Part 2AAA; ss 24A–24B).
The Act creates two kinds of detention powers aimed at investigation or prevention:
Investigative detention (Part 2AA): police may arrest a "terrorism suspect" without warrant for investigation (defined in s 25B) if recent or imminent terrorist activity is suspected. Initial investigative detention is limited (initially short, up to 4 days; extendable by a judicially issued detention warrant up to a total not exceeding 14 days). Regular senior‑officer reviews and judicial warrant processes apply for extensions; questioning and rest breaks are regulated; access to lawyers is available but for specified purposes (ss 25A–25I, 25H, 25I, 25G, 25MD). Reporting and safeguards (including monitoring of contacts) are required (ss 25L, 25P, 25MA–25MC).
Preventative detention orders (Part 2A): the Supreme Court can make orders authorising short periods of custody to prevent an imminent terrorist act (likely within 14 days) or to preserve evidence of a recent terrorist act (within 28 days). Applications are made to the Supreme Court, can be urgent (interim orders), and detention under orders is subject to multiple safeguards (limits on questioning, rights to contact defined people, legal assistance rules, humane‑treatment obligations). The maximum aggregate period for preventative detention is 14 days; special rules apply for juveniles and vulnerable persons. There is a statutory sunset for these orders (ss 26A–26ZS, notably 26D, 26K, 26ZK, 26ZC, 26ZG, 26E, 26ZS).
The Act provides for covert search warrants (Part 3): eligible police may seek warrants from designated "eligible Judges" allowing entry and search of premises without the occupier's knowledge, impersonation, operation and seizure of electronic equipment, copying or downloading of data (including data not stored on the premises where reasonably believed relevant), temporary removal of items for examination, and related powers. The issuing Judge must be satisfied of reasonable grounds and records must be kept; occupier notices are prepared and given after execution (ss 27A–27OB, 27O, 27OB, 27U–27V, 27S).
The Act includes reporting and oversight requirements: the Commissioner must report annually on the exercise of these powers (multiple sections: s 14B, s 24, s 25P, s 26ZN, s 27ZB), and the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission is tasked with monitoring particular parts of the Act and preparing periodic reports (ss 26ZO, 27ZC). Some information may be withheld from review bodies subject to specified security-related conditions (ss 26ZO(2A), 27ZC(2A)).
Miscellaneous: rules for return or disposal of seized property (ss 27–28), protection for police acting under authorisations against challenge for irregularity (s 29), coordination with Commonwealth agencies and other laws (ss 29A, 30), and standard regulation‑making powers (ss 31–33, 36).
Who this affects
People who are suspected of being involved in terrorism (may be searched, arrested or detained under investigative detention, preventative detention orders, or searched under covert warrants) (ss 25B, 26D, 27G).
Occupiers of premises and persons present in declared target areas (subject to cordons, stop‑and‑search powers, covert entry and later notice) (ss 4B, 7, 19, 19A, 27U).
Police decision‑makers and rank‑and‑file: the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioners and senior officers exercise authorisations, make and revoke declarations, and must record and report their decisions (ss 5–11, 8, 9, 14B, 24A, 24B, 26R).
Judges: eligible Judges review applications for detention warrants and covert search warrants and must record grounds for decisions (ss 27B, 25I, 27L).
Lawyers, legal aid bodies, oversight agencies (Law Enforcement Conduct Commission, Attorney General) and Ministers (Police Minister/Attorney General) — all have roles in notification, review, reporting, or possible concurrence (multiple sections: ss 9, 14B, 24, 25P, 26ZN, 26ZO, 27ZC).
Why it matters (stated purpose, then practical implications)
The Act’s stated purpose in parts is to prevent or respond to terrorist acts and to preserve relevant evidence (e.g. object of Part 2AA and Part 2A — ss 25A, 26A). Those are explicit purpose‑claims in the text.
Practical implications and trade‑offs (source‑grounded):
Who decides and when: senior police (Commissioner/Deputy) and, in urgent cases, other senior officers can authorise intrusive powers quickly (ss 5–8, 24A). Ministerial concurrence is required but may be deferred in urgent cases; where concurrence is absent the Minister must confirm within 48 hours or the authorisation/ declaration lapses (s 9; ss 23F(2)–(3)). This structure gives police operational discretion for rapid action but builds in short windows for political oversight (s 9; ss 23F).
Judicial gatekeeping for extended detention and covert search: investigative‑detention extensions and preventative detention orders require a Judge or the Supreme Court (ss 25I, 26I), creating a judicial check for longer detentions. Eligible Judges must record grounds relied on (ss 25J(6), 27L). The Act balances executive speed with judicial review for extensions beyond initial short periods.
Time limits and review cycles: authorisations, investigative‑detention periods and preventative detention orders are strictly time‑limited (e.g. authorisations up to 7 days extendable to 14 days in s 11; investigative detention initial and total limits in ss 25H–25I; preventative detention total limits in s 26K). These limits constrain prolonged detention without judicial authorisation but permit staged extensions subject to conditions and judicial satisfaction.
Information control and secrecy: covert search warrants permit entry without occupier knowledge and delayed notice to occupiers (ss 27O, 27U). Judges may approve postponement of notice up to limits (ss 27U(7)–(9)). Some information may be withheld from suspects or legal representatives where criminal intelligence or national security is determined by a Judge (s 25K). These mechanisms reduce immediate transparency for investigative purposes while requiring later reporting and judicial oversight (ss 27S, 27U, 25K).
Legal‑access and monitoring rules: detained persons are entitled to contact lawyers and certain other categories of people, but the Act sets narrow permitted purposes for legal contact in investigative detention (25MD) and allows monitoring of contact (25L, 26ZI). The Act therefore restricts the content or purpose of consultations during detention and allows monitoring subject to prohibitions on disclosure of protected information (ss 25MD, 26ZI).
Compliance burden and operational cost: police must keep records, produce reports to Ministers and courts, prepare occupier notices, and engage eligible Judges for warrants and detention‑warrant applications (ss 14B, 24, 25P, 27S, 27U). These administrative obligations allocate costs to the police and court systems (multiple sections requiring reporting and records).
Concentrated decision‑making vs dispersed oversight: many intrusive powers are concentrated in senior police hands for prompt action (ss 5–8, 24A), with subsequent reporting to Ministers and legislative oversight through required annual reports and periodic reviews (ss 24, 25P, 26ZN, 27ZB, 36). That design privileges operational speed but depends on effective after‑the‑fact scrutiny.
Risk management and safeguards: the Act embeds a number of safeguards — age limits for detention (no investigative detention under 14; no preventative orders under 16), humane‑treatment offences, requirements to explain rights and entitlements to detainees, periodic senior‑officer reviews and judicial thresholds for warrant extensions (ss 25F, 26E, 25MC, 25MA, 25E(6), 25I(5)). These create legal obligations and potential liability if breached (s 25MC(2), s 26ZC(2)).
Notable statutory design features (mechanical, source‑grounded)
Authorisations are singled out as not open to judicial challenge (s 13) — the text bars courts and tribunals from reviewing authorisations themselves, while still enabling other forms of legal remedy for actions taken under them (s 29 preserves protection for police for defects in authorisations).
Several powers and provisions explicitly cross‑reference and borrow safeguards or procedures from other NSW legislation (for example, the Act applies parts of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act and the Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act with necessary modifications — s 25O), and makes provision for arrangements with Commonwealth agencies (s 29A).
The preventative detention regime includes an express sunset date for applying or making such orders after 16 December 2026 and forces existing orders to end at that date (s 26ZS).
Sections to look at first if you need detail
Definition of terrorist act: s 3
Authorisations and time limits: ss 5–13, 11
Search, seizure and cordon powers: ss 16–21, 19A, 20
Investigative detention (powers, safeguards, warrants): Part 2AA (ss 25A–25P)
Covert search warrants (application, execution, data access, delayed notice): Part 3 (ss 27C–27OB, 27U)
Ongoing incident use‑of‑force declaration: Part 2AAA (ss 24A–24B)
Oversight, reporting and reviews: ss 14B, 24, 25P, 26ZN, 27ZB, 26ZO, 27ZC, 36
This summary describes the Act’s mechanics, who must make decisions, who bears costs and compliance duties, the main checks (judicial warrants, reporting and statutory safeguards) and the practical trade‑offs the text creates between operational speed, secrecy, and later oversight. All quoted section references are to the Act text provided above.
A separate preventative detention order regime in which the Supreme Court may make orders authorising short periods of detention (up to a 14 day maximum overall) for prevention of imminent terrorist acts or for preserving evidence (Part 2A, ss 26A-26L). The Court may make interim orders on affidavit and may issue prohibited contact orders; persons under 16 are excluded from the regime (ss 26D-26L, 26E, 26N).
A covert search warrant regime authorising covert entry, impersonation, seizure, copying, operation of equipment and limited re‑entry, to be issued by an "eligible Judge" to eligible police officers based on reasonable grounds (Part 3, ss 27A-27O, 27OA-27OB). Telephone warrants and expedited procedures are provided for, together with post‑execution occupier notices subject to possible postponement for up to 18 months in exceptional circumstances (ss 27I, 27U, 27V).
Reporting, oversight and review architecture: annual reports to Attorney General and Police Minister on use of special powers, investigative detention, covert warrants and preventative detention orders (ss 24, 25P, 26ZN, 27ZB), monitoring by the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission with access conditions and redaction rules (ss 26ZO, 27ZC), and statutory reviews of various Parts on fixed schedules (ss 25Q, 36, 36A).
Miscellaneous cross‑cutting rules about return and disposal of seized property (ss 27, 28), relationship with other Acts (s 30), regulations and offences (ss 32-34), and preservation of legal professional privilege (s 26ZQ).
The Act therefore changes legal practice in concrete ways: it authorises short term, area‑based, non‑warrant operations for terrorism prevention or immediate investigation; it provides a judicially‑supervised, but expedited, path to extend investigative detention and to obtain covert warrants; it grants the police Commissioner a declaratory power to trigger a separate use‑of‑force shield; and it sets out detailed, statutory safeguards and reporting obligations. The official rationale visible in the text is prevention and rapid response to terrorist acts, and the preservation of evidence for prosecution or further investigation (see object statements in Parts 2, 2AA, 2A and definition of terrorist act in s 3). Those purpose claims are statutory; the Act also establishes oversight and reporting mechanisms that the Legislature requires be used to inform periodic reviews (ss 25Q, 36, 36A).
Evaluative testing against implementation costs and incentives, drawn from the Act’s mechanics, appears in later sections below. Where the text supplies mitigation measures, such as reporting and LECC scrutiny, those are described and cross‑referenced in the sections that follow (for example ss 26ZO, 27ZC, 24, 25P and 26ZN).
Main concepts
The Act organises multiple legal concepts that lawyers and compliance officers must treat as distinct operational levers, each with specific triggers and consequences.
Definition of terrorist act (s 3). The statutory definition sets a tripartite structure: (1) the action must fall into specified categories of harm (ss 3(1)-(2)), (2) it must be done with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, and (3) it must be done with the intention of coercing or intimidating government or the public. The definition expressly excludes advocacy/protest/industrial action that lacks an intent to cause serious physical harm or endanger others (s 3(3)). The section also clarifies extraterritorial reach for persons and property (s 3(4)) and the note explains threats are excluded in this Act’s uses of the term.
Authorisations under Part 2 (ss 5-13). Two different thresholds let a senior police officer grant authorisation for the special powers: s 5 permits authorisation where there are reasonable grounds to believe a terrorist act could occur in the next 14 days and exercise of powers will substantially assist prevention, s 6 permits authorisation where there are reasonable grounds to believe a terrorist act has been committed and exercise of powers will substantially assist apprehension. Authorisations are time‑limited (s 11) and may be given orally with written confirmation required (s 10). The Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner principally gives authorisations, with an emergency fallback to a senior officer above superintendent (s 8). The Police Minister must concur, or confirm after the fact within 48 hours, in most cases (s 9).
Targeting and powers (ss 7, 14-21, 19A, 20). Authorisations may target identified persons, vehicles or areas (s 7). Once authorised, any police officer may exercise the special powers (s 14). The powers include obtaining identity (s 16), stopping and searching persons (s 17), searching vehicles (s 18), entering and searching premises (s 19), cordons and roadblocks (s 19A), seizure and detention of things for evidentiary or terrorist use concerns (s 20), and use of reasonable force (s 21). Obstruction is an offence (s 22); a statement about searches must be available on request (s 23).
Public assembly restriction declarations (Div 3A, ss 23A-23H). Newly inserted in 2025, this Division allows the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner to declare an area where holding public assemblies is restricted if certain conditions are met following an authorisation under s 6 or a Part 2AAA declaration. Duration, extension limits, publication obligations and ministerial concurrence mechanisms are specified (ss 23B-23F).
Police use of force for ongoing terrorist acts (Part 2AAA, ss 24A-24B). The Commissioner may declare an incident to be a terrorist act to which Part 2AAA applies. Once declared, police action authorising, directing or using force reasonably necessary in the officer’s perceived circumstances to defend persons threatened or to prevent or terminate unlawful deprivation of liberty is authorised. The section provides good‑faith protection from criminal liability where actions are taken in good faith (s 24B(2)-(3)). Declarations can be oral or written and must be notified appropriately (s 24A).
Investigative detention (Part 2AA, ss 25A-25O). The object is to lawfully arrest and detain a terrorism suspect for investigation into recent or imminent terrorist acts (s 25A). A terrorism suspect is defined expansively to include persons reasonably suspected of involvement in future acts or possession of connected things (s 25B). Arrest without warrant is permitted if the act occurred in the last 28 days or could occur in the next 14 days and the detention will substantially assist (s 25E). Initial investigative detention has a statutory maximum (s 25H(1)), senior police must review every 12 hours (s 25E(6)), questioning is limited and rest breaks guaranteed (s 25G), and extensions beyond the initial period require an eligible Judge to issue a detention warrant subject to discrete judicial criteria and possible non‑disclosure of criminal intelligence (ss 25I-25K).
Preventative detention orders (Part 2A, ss 26A-26ZS). These are court orders made by the Supreme Court where there are reasonable grounds to suspect a person will engage in a terrorist act, will possess items connected with preparation, or has been involved in preparation; or to preserve evidence within 28 days (s 26D). There are procedural rules for urgency, interim orders, terms, duration limits including a 14‑day cap on total detention under the Part (ss 26G-26K). The Court can make prohibited contact orders (s 26N), and special contact rules exist for juveniles and persons with impaired intellectual functioning (s 26ZH).
Covert search warrants (Part 3, ss 27A-27ZC). Eligible Judges may issue covert search warrants on application by authorised police where covert entry and search without occupier knowledge is necessary (ss 27C, 27G). Warrants authorise impersonation, covert entry, seizure, operation of equipment and copying or downloading of data, subject to limits and conditions (ss 27O, 27OA, 27OB). Post‑execution occupier notices are required but may be postponed for up to 18 months in exceptional circumstances (s 27U).
Oversight and safeguards. The Act embeds reporting obligations to Ministers and Parliament (ss 24, 25P, 26ZN, 27ZB), LECC scrutiny with conditions on access and permitted redactions or withholding for confidential sources or Commonwealth law constraints (ss 26ZO, 27ZC), humane‑treatment offences with maximum penalties (ss 25MC, 26ZC), and statutory review cycles (ss 25Q, 36, 36A). Legal professional privilege is expressly preserved (s 26ZQ).
These concepts are tightly specified, with discrete triggers, time limits, reporting duties, and offences for contraventions. Practitioners should map facts to the correct Part as many powers are overlapping yet distinct in trigger, duration and safeguards.
Who it affects
The Act affects a range of actors, and the statutory text makes clear who bears decision rights, who bears compliance burdens, and who experiences behavioural constraints.
Police and senior police leadership. The Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioners have primary decision‑making authority for authorisations under Part 2 (s 8), for nominating eligible police for covert warrants (s 27D), for declaring Part 2AAA events (s 24A), and for nominating the senior police officer to oversee preventative detention orders (s 26R). The Commissioner also has operational obligations such as furnishing reports to the Attorney General and Police Minister after authorisations expire (s 14B), providing annual reports (ss 24, 25P, 26ZN, 27ZB) and providing information to the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission on request subject to conditions (ss 26ZO(2A), 27ZC(2A)).
Front‑line police officers. Any police officer may exercise special powers under a Part 2 authorisation even if they have not been given a copy of the authorisation (s 14(1)-(2)). Front‑line officers execute searches, seizures, cordons and arrests (ss 16-21, 19A, 20, 25E, 26Q), and are the immediate duty‑holders for humane treatment, informing detained persons of rights and obtaining copies of orders (ss 26ZC, 26Y, 26Z, 26ZB). They must arrange interpreters when required (ss 26ZA, 25MD).
Eligible Judges and the Supreme Court. Judicial officers are gatekeepers for detention warrants extending investigative detention (s 25I), for covert search warrants (Part 3), and for preventative detention orders and prohibited contact orders (Part 2A). The Act defines “eligible Judge” for various warrants (ss 27B, 25D) and requires them to record grounds relied upon (ss 27L, 25J(6)). Judges may determine non‑disclosure of criminal intelligence (s 25K).
Detained persons and suspects. Persons arrested under investigative detention must be informed of certain rights and are subject to limits on questioning and contact (ss 25MA, 25MD, 25G, 25L). Persons subject to preventative detention orders have detailed entitlements to contact one family member, legal counsel for limited purposes, chaplains and special rules for juveniles and those with impaired intellectual functioning (Divisions 3-5, ss 26ZE-26ZH). Persons under investigative detention or preventative detention have statutory protections for humane treatment and prohibited cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (ss 25MC, 26ZC).
Lawyers and legal service providers. Lawyers are affected by monitoring provisions. Contact between detained persons and lawyers may be monitored but the Act limits the purposes for which legal contact is permitted (ss 25MD, 26ZG). The Act permits police to give priority to lawyers with appropriate Commonwealth security clearances (ss 25MD(6), 26ZG(5)) while also preserving a detainee’s right to contact lawyers without security clearance (subject to prohibited contact orders) (ss 25MD(7), 26ZG(6)). Legal professional privilege remains unaffected (s 26ZQ), but monitoring rules and criminal offences for disclosure of protected information constrain how monitored material can be used (s 26ZI).
Government agencies and Ministers. The Police Minister has a concurrence/confirmation role for authorisations and public assembly restriction declarations and a power to direct revocation (ss 9, 23F, 23G). The Police Minister and Attorney General receive reports and must table them in each House of Parliament (ss 24, 25P, 26ZN, 27ZB). Government agencies are required to comply with directions from the Commissioner to facilitate exercise of special powers (s 14A).
Occupiers and the public. Covert warrants permit covert entries and may postpone notice to occupiers for up to 18 months in exceptional cases (s 27U). Persons in target areas may be stopped, asked to disclose identity, searched, and have property seized (ss 16-20). Public assembly rights in specific areas may be restricted by declaration where conditions are satisfied (Div 3A, ss 23B-23G).
Oversight bodies. The Law Enforcement Conduct Commission is given a statutory role to scrutinise the exercise of powers under Part 2A and Part 3, may require information and receive periodic reports, but the Commissioner may require security clearances and impose conditions on disclosure (ss 26ZO, 27ZC). The Independent Commission Against Corruption and the LECC may enter arrangements with Police for staff or facilities in connection with terrorism investigations (s 30A).
Who pays and who benefits? The Act concentrates decision and frontline execution authority with the NSW Police Force and eligible Judges. The benefits (expedited prevention, rapid investigative tools) are concentrated to law enforcement. The costs and constraints are dispersed: individuals in target areas and persons detained bear liberty and privacy costs, occupiers may not be notified for long periods, and defence counsel must navigate monitoring and limited contact regimes. Reporting and oversight obligations impose administrative costs on the Commissioner’s office and on the LECC, though the Act permits conditions and redactions in disclosure to manage those costs (ss 26ZO(2A), 26ZO(2B), 27ZC(2A), 27ZC(2B)).
Key duties and rights
The Act sets out explicit duties for police officers, courts and Ministers, and confers statutory rights on detained persons, occupiers and oversight bodies. The following are the core duties and rights, with statutory citations.
Duties of police and the Commissioner
Give authorisations only when statutory thresholds are met. A police officer giving an authorisation must be satisfied of reasonable grounds about an imminent or recent terrorist act and that exercising powers will substantially assist prevention or apprehension (ss 5-6). The officer must ensure powers are proportionate (s 8(3)).
Seek Police Minister concurrence for authorisations and public assembly restriction declarations, or notify and obtain confirmation within 48 hours where concurrence could not be obtained before exercise (ss 9; 23F(1)-(3)).
Ensure authorisations are put in writing as soon as reasonably practicable if given orally and include required details (s 10).
Furnish a written report to the Attorney General and Police Minister as soon as practicable after an authorisation ceases, describing terms, relied matters, powers exercised and results (s 14B).
Provide annual reports on use of powers under Part 2 and specified other Parts (ss 24, 25P, 26ZN, 27ZB).
Nominate a senior police officer to oversee preventative detention orders and ensure the nominated officer was not involved in applying for the order (s 26R).
In investigative detention, ensure a senior police officer conducts reviews as soon as practicable and every 12 hours after arrest (s 25E(6)).
Provide detained persons with information required under the Act (ss 25MA, 26Y, 26Z, 26ZB), give copies of orders to detainees and lawyers as soon as practicable (s 26ZB(1), (3), (5)), and arrange interpreters where appropriate (ss 26ZA, 25MD(5), 26ZG(4)).
Rights of detained persons and suspects
Entitlement to humane treatment and freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, with breaches an offence carrying imprisonment up to 2 years (ss 25MC, 26ZC).
Right to contact a lawyer for specified limited purposes, including advice on investigative detention/detention orders and arranging representation in Supreme Court proceedings, and to receive reasonable assistance to contact lawyers (ss 25MD, 26ZG). Contacts may be monitored, and detained persons and lawyers must be informed that monitoring will occur (ss 25MD(8), 25L(5); 26ZI(4A)).
In preventative detention scenarios, a detained person is entitled to contact one family member and other limited persons for the limited purpose of advising they are safe and detained (s 26ZE), contact the LECC or Ombudsman in specified circumstances (s 26ZF), to contact a chaplain subject to limitations (s 26ZGA), and special additional contacts for juveniles or persons with impaired intellectual functioning (s 26ZH).
Right to be informed of the effect of interim and final preventative detention orders and of entitlements to legal aid and review (ss 26Y-26Z).
The law relating to legal professional privilege is expressly preserved and not affected by Part 2A (s 26ZQ).
Right to request written statement confirming a search was conducted under this Part within 12 months (s 23).
Judicial duties and protections
Judges who are "eligible Judges" must be selected by consent and declared, and they have immunity and protections for functions under the Part (s 27B(1), (4)).
Eligible Judges must keep records of grounds relied on when issuing covert search warrants or detention warrants and can designate particular information as criminal intelligence and withhold it from the suspect or legal representative (ss 27L, 25J(6), 25K).
Judges exercising functions under this Act must handle applications and proceedings in the absence of the public (ss 27Y, 26P(2)) and have statutory discretion to impose conditions, direct postponement of occupier notice and manage non‑publication orders (s 26P(3), 27U(7)).
Ministerial duties and discretions
The Police Minister must be notified and generally must concur in authorisations; the Minister can direct revocation (s 9; 12(1)).
The Police Minister must be notified of Part 2AAA declarations made by the Commissioner (s 24A(4)).
Oversight and disclosure duties
The Commissioner must provide required information to the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission and ensure the LECC is notified of preventative detention orders, custody and revocations; the Commissioner may require conditions on LECC access and may only redact for narrow reasons (ss 26ZO(1)-(3), (2A)-(2B)).
Occupier’s notice obligations after covert searches, including providing a draft to the eligible Judge for approval and giving notices to occupiers as soon as practicable unless postponed (ss 27U(1)-(9)).
Statutory offences and limits
Obstruction of searches and powers is an offence carrying 100 penalty units or 2 years imprisonment (s 22).
False or misleading information to an eligible Judge in applications or reports is an offence with the same maximum penalty (s 27Z).
Certain wrongful uses of photographs, videos or identification material and wrongful disclosure of monitored privileged information attract prison sentences (ss 25GA(3), 25GA(4), 26ZL(2), 26ZM(3), 26ZI(6)-(8)).
The Act thus creates duties primarily on police and the Commissioner to satisfy thresholds, record grounds and report; it creates rights for detained persons to humane treatment, limited legal access, and specified contact; it gives Judges procedural safeguards and discretion to protect criminal intelligence; and it places obligations on oversight bodies to receive information and report (with conditions permitted).
Penalties and enforcement
The Act defines a mix of criminal offences, administrative consequences and protections from liability for police acting under the statute. Enforcement operates across three axes: criminal sanctions for non‑compliance with procedural limits, bar on judicial challenge to executive authorisations, and protections for police acting under authorisations.
Criminal penalties contained in the text
Obstruction and hindrance: A person must not obstruct or hinder a police officer in the exercise of a power under Division 3 (stop and search, search vehicle or premises, seize, detain things). Maximum penalty: 100 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both (s 22).
Failure to disclose identity, or giving false particulars, when required: Under s 16 a person who fails to disclose identity or gives false name/address without reasonable excuse faces 50 penalty units or 12 months imprisonment, or both; under s 26T similar, but lower penalties (20 penalty units) apply for disclosure when assisting execution of a preventative detention order (s 26T).
False or misleading information to an eligible Judge: Anyone who gives information to an eligible Judge in connection with an application for a covert search warrant, a report or an occupier’s notice that is false or misleading in a material particular is liable to 100 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both (s 27Z). That applies also to telephone warrant applications (s 27Z(2)).
Publication and disclosure offences: Intentional or reckless publication of a covert search warrant application, a report under s 27S, an occupier’s notice or information directly derived from them is an offence with a maximum of 50 penalty units or imprisonment for 12 months, or both, unless an occupier’s notice has been given or directions allowed publication (s 27ZA).
Misuse of photographs or recordings of detainees (injury/illness documentation): A person who uses a photograph or recording in contravention of the limited permitted uses (documenting injury/illness or misconduct proceedings) faces imprisonment for up to 2 years (ss 25GA(3), 26ZLA(3)).
Wrongful use of identification material: Use of identification material outside the statutory purposes is an offence with imprisonment up to 2 years (s 26ZM(3)).
Disclosure of protected information by monitors: Monitors (police officers or interpreters) who disclose protected information communicated between detainee and lawyer commit an offence carrying maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment; similar offence applies to lawyers who disclose in those circumstances (s 26ZI(6)-(8)).
Humane treatment offences: Contravention of humane treatment obligations by persons exercising authority is an offence carrying up to 2 years imprisonment (ss 25MC(2), 26ZC(2)).
Protections and non‑challenge clauses
Police acting under authorisations are protected against conviction or liability merely because there was an irregularity or defect in the giving of the authorisation or because the person giving the authorisation lacked jurisdiction (s 29). This supplies a substantive defence against legal challenge for acts done pursuant to authorisations.
An authorisation and any decision of the Police Minister under the authorisation cannot be challenged, reviewed, quashed or called into question on any grounds before any court, tribunal or person in any legal proceedings, or by proceedings in the nature of prohibition or mandamus (s 13(1)). The prohibition extends to internal investigations except under the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016 (s 13(2)).
In Part 2AAA, police officers acting in good faith under a declaration are not criminally liable for taking the authorised use‑of‑force actions for the purposes of a police action plan (s 24B(2)-(3)); the statutory protection continues to apply even if a court later finds a purported declaration invalid, for actions taken before the finding (s 24B(5)).
Judicial enforcement and standards for extension of detention
For extension of investigative detention beyond the initial maximum period, an eligible Judge must be satisfied under s 25I(5) that the investigation is being conducted diligently without unnecessary delay, there are reasonable grounds that the suspect continues to be a terrorism suspect, reasonable grounds that a future terrorist act could occur in the next 14 days (or if released), and that extension will substantially assist response or prevention (s 25I(5)(a)-(d)). The Judge must record the grounds relied on (s 25J(6)).
Eligible Judges have discretion to determine that particular information is criminal intelligence and to withhold it from the suspect or legal representative (s 25K). This affects the adversarial process and has enforcement consequences for disclosure.
Administrative enforcement and oversight
Annual reporting obligations (ss 24, 25P, 26ZN, 27ZB) produce administrative accountability; reports are tabled in both Houses of Parliament.
The Law Enforcement Conduct Commission is required to keep under scrutiny the exercise of powers and can require information, subject to the Commissioner’s conditions and narrow redaction grounds (ss 26ZO, 27ZC). The LECC must prepare periodic reports and furnish them to the Attorney General and Minister for Police (ss 26ZO(4)-(5), 27ZC(3)-(4)).
The Supreme Court has powers to make suppression orders and hear preventative detention proceedings in closed session, and it may order legal aid in proceedings relating to detention warrants and preventative detention orders (ss 26PA, 26P, 25MB).
Practical enforcement considerations
The coexistence of strict criminal sanctions for false information or unauthorised publication and broad immunity for police acting under authorisations (s 29) creates a liability asymmetry. Enforcement of statutory limits depends heavily on post‑hoc reporting and LECC scrutiny, and on judicial gatekeeping for detention warrants and preventative detention orders. The Act contains multiple procedural safeguards, but many enforcement mechanisms are administrative or internal rather than enabling routine private litigation, given the non‑challenge clause for authorisations (s 13). The onus of proving reasonable excuse in proceedings for offences under the Act rests on the accused (s 33), which shifts evidential burdens in prosecutions arising under the Act.
How it interacts with other laws
The text maps several explicit interactions with other statutory regimes. These interactions affect the scope of powers, application of safeguards, privilege and judicial oversight.
Commonwealth Criminal Code and definition alignment. The definition of “terrorist act” is adopted in the same terms used in Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code, except that this Act excludes threats since they are unnecessary for the contexts in which the expression is used here (s 3 and accompanying note). That alignment situates the Act in the broader Commonwealth lexical framework for terrorism offences.
Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (LEPRA). The Act expressly imports safeguards from LEPRA into particular parts. For example, Part 15 of LEPRA sets out safeguards relating to the exercise of powers under Division 3 (noted after the Division 3 heading), Division 4 of Part 4 of LEPRA extends to searches conducted under s 17 and s 26V (search of persons), and ss 25O(1)(a) and (b) extend specific LEPRA provisions to Part 2AA so long as they are modified as necessary (s 25O). In other words, LEPRA’s investigative and custodial safeguards are applied, except where this Part creates specific deviations (s 25O).
Evidence Act 1995. The Act notes that Part 3.11 of the Evidence Act sets out circumstances where information obtained from questioning of a detained suspect may be excluded in subsequent criminal proceedings, signalling interaction between admissibility and the investigative detention regime (s 25G note).
Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000. Provisions relating to suspects under that Act extend (subject to Part 2AA) to terrorism suspects arrested under the investigative detention regime (s 25O(2)).
Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999, Children (Detention Centres) Act 1987. If a preventative detention detainee is held at a correctional centre under arrangement with the Commissioner of Corrective Services, relevant provisions of these Acts apply to the detainee as if the detainee were an inmate, subject to inconsistency with this Part (s 26X(2)-(3)). Specific exclusions by regulation are permitted (s 26X(3)).
Commonwealth laws and intergovernmental arrangements. The Minister may enter into arrangements with Commonwealth Ministers for transfer and return of things seized relevant to Commonwealth offences (s 29A). The Commissioner of Police may require security clearances from the Commonwealth as a condition for LECC officers accessing information (ss 26ZO(2A)(a), 27ZC(2A)(a)). The Commissioner may redact or withhold information only in narrowly defined circumstances, including where provision would contravene Commonwealth law (ss 26ZO(2B), 27ZC(2B)).
National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth). Section 26J(2) specifically allows omission from a summary of grounds where disclosure is likely to prejudice national security within the meaning of that Commonwealth Act.
Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016. The Act contemplates LECC oversight and states that certain proceedings against police acting under authorisations may still be the subject of investigation under LECC, but s 13(2) disapplies the authorisation non‑challenge rule to investigations under the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016.
Legal professional privilege. Section 26ZQ expressly preserves the law of legal professional privilege in relation to Part 2A, making the Part non‑derogatory of privilege principles.
Interaction of detention regimes. The Act contemplates arrest or detention under other laws: investigative detention under Part 2AA does not absolve a police officer of the ability to arrest under other laws at termination, and the periods are to be taken into account in assessing reasonableness under other investigative detention statutes (s 25O(4)). Preventative detention and investigative detention regimes have separate triggers but overlapping temporal limits and reporting duties.
Operationally, the Act builds in cross‑reference points so police operations rely on a patchwork of state and federal rules, judicial processes, and administrative oversight. The Commissioner and courts have powers to manage conflicts (for example, withholding material that would contravene Commonwealth law, s 26ZO(2B)). Practitioners must therefore map the Act’s powers against LEPRA and relevant Commonwealth regimes to determine which safeguards apply, where privilege is preserved and how evidence obtained will be treated in later criminal proceedings.
Amendment history
The text contains internal amendment annotations and insertion dates that identify major statutory developments. Using the dates and notes embedded in the text, the following is the reform chronology contained in the source.
Original Act name and commencement: the Act is the Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (s 1-2).
Early amendments and insertions:
Various amendments against specific sections are annotated throughout the text, with early amendments evidenced by notes such as "Am 2004 No 48, Sch 3" for s 5 and other sections.
In 2005, a substantial reorganisation and insertions occurred, including the insertion of Part 3 (covert search warrants) and renumberings. Many sections indicate "Ins 2005 No 54, Sch 1" or Sch 2 for renumbering (see notes on pt 2 and pt 3).
2006-2010 series of amendments:
Amendments to search powers and other provisions are annotated with "Am 2006 No 128, Sch 3", and 2007 amendments are also recorded in the footnotes to sections such as s 18, s 19. The covert powers were refined with amendments in 2007 and 2008 (see 27A notes).
Further changes appear in 2009 and 2010 (for example, s 27B amended 2009 No 77, Sch 1.5; s 27A amended 2010 No 72, Sch 1 [20]).
2015 onward:
2015 amendments relevant to covert warrants and other parts are recorded (e.g. s 27D repealed 2015 No 45, Sch 1 [4]).
2016 inserted Part 2AA (Investigative detention powers) and associated provisions (s 25A note Ins 2016 No 17, Sch 1 [5]) and provided other amendments.
2017 introduced Part 2AAA (Police use of force,ongoing terrorist acts) as indicated by "Ins 2017 No 24, Sch 1".
2018 amendments refine safeguards and reporting (ins 2018 No 92 references across Part 2 and Part 3 notes).
2020 and 2021 show minor amendments (s 24A amended 2020 No 26, Sch 1.16[1]; s 26ZS amended 2021 No 46, Sch 1.6).
2023 amendments: changes to definitions and various sections are annotated (e.g. s 25D amended 2023 No 39, Sch 5[1]; s 26ZB and related provisions show 2023 changes).
2025 amendments: Division 3A (public assembly restriction declarations) was inserted in 2025 (see s 23A insertion Ins 2025 No 86, Sch 6[2]); s 4 was amended in 2025 (s 4 note 2025 No 86, Sch 6[1]); Schedule 2 also amended 2025 No 86, Sch 6[5].
Notable insertions by year (as recorded in section notes)
2004: Amendments to authorisation provisions (s 5).
2005: Large insertion/renumbering package, including Part 3 on covert search warrants (Ins 2005 No 54).
2006-2008: Amendments refining search, seizure and covert execution processes (various).
2009-2010: Technical and procedural additions, including changes in eligible Judges and covert warrant facilities.
2015-2016: Major additions include Part 2A (Preventative detention orders) in 2005 originally, then Part 2AA (Investigative detention) in 2016 (Ins 2016 No 17), and further refinements.
2017: Part 2AAA (Police use of force,ongoing terrorist acts) inserted (Ins 2017 No 24).
2018: Amendments targeting safeguards and LECC reporting (Ins 2018 No 92).
2020-2023: Ongoing adjustments to detention, reporting and safeguards, including the juvenile contact and identification material rules.
2025: Insertion of Division 3A (public assembly restriction declarations) and other technical changes (Ins 2025 No 86).
The text contains numerous section‑level amendment citations. Practitioners relying on the Act should read the margin notes and insertion/amendment footnotes for each section to reconstruct the immediate antecedent form and the precise amendments relevant to discrete enforcement steps (for example the 2016 insertion of Part 2AA and the 2017 insertion of Part 2AAA are material to detention and use of force regimes).
Litigation history
The supplied text does not name or describe judicial decisions applying the Act. The statute itself contains many provisions that affect litigation , notably:
Section 13, which precludes challenge, review or questioning of an authorisation (and ministerial decisions under that Division) before any court, tribunal or person on any grounds, and limits the scope of investigations except under the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016 (s 13(1)-(2)). This provision has direct litigation consequences by removing judicial review remedies for those authorisations as stated in the Act.
Provisions that require closed proceedings and allow suppression orders in hearings for preventative detention orders or prohibited contact orders (s 26P(2)-(3)), which shape how litigation in the Supreme Court will be conducted in relation to those orders.
Eligible Judges must cause records of the grounds relied on to be made when issuing or refusing covert search warrants and when issuing detention warrants and those records are subject to regulation for keeping and inspection (ss 27L, 25J(6)). This creates a documented record for potential scrutiny while also recognising secrecy in defined circumstances.
The Act provides that a Judge who issues or refuses a detention warrant must record the grounds on which the decision was made (s 25J(6)), and that an eligible Judge who issues a detention warrant is to disqualify himself or herself from presiding in any subsequent trial of the terrorism suspect related to the application (s 25I(8)). Both provisions shape subsequent litigation.
Because the source text contains no cases, no court names or reported decisions are referenced in this material. Any assessment of litigation trends, interpretations, challenge strategies or judicial application of the non‑challenge clause must be undertaken by reference to external case law, which is beyond the supplied source.
Gotchas
Concrete traps, procedural pitfalls and friction points in practice can be read directly from the statutory wording. These are practical items that cause operational or legal risk if overlooked.
Non‑challenge of authorisations (s 13). An authorisation and ministerial decisions under Part 2 are statutorily insulated from challenge, review or quashing before any court "on any grounds whatsoever" (s 13(1)). Practitioners should note that this removes conventional judicial review avenues against authorisations under this Part, albeit investigations under the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016 remain possible (s 13(2)). Implication: remedies that would otherwise be available must be sought through mechanisms outside the authorisation challenge route or rely on LECC oversight.
Police may act without producing the authorisation (s 14(2)). Any police officer may exercise special powers under a Part 2 authorisation whether or not they have a copy of the authorisation or have been notified of all its terms. This means officers on the ground can lawfully act before documentation is circulated, which increases evidential complexity for proof of authorisation in litigation later and raises chain‑of‑command risk.
Minister confirmation window (48 hours) (s 9). Authorisations given without Police Minister concurrence cease to have effect if the Minister has not confirmed within 48 hours in the case of authorisations under s 5 (s 9(3)(b)). Operationally, police must manage the 48‑hour confirmation process; failure to secure confirmation may terminate an ongoing operation and affect evidence collection.
Short statutory durations and tight extension caps. Authorisations under s 5 are limited to 7 days initially, extendable to 14 days total (s 11). Investigative detention initial maximum is 4 days, extendable by detention warrant up to an overall 14 days (s 25H). Preventative detention orders have a 14‑day maximum (s 26K). Practitioners must track clock times precisely; successive orders or warrants may be permitted but subject to statutory caps and judicial scrutiny.
Non‑disclosure of criminal intelligence to suspects (s 25K). The eligible Judge may designate part of the material relied on in a detention warrant application as criminal intelligence and exclude it from disclosure to the suspect or the suspect’s representative. That affects the capacity of counsel to make full representations and complicates adversarial testing of detention warrant grounds.
Monitoring of lawyer contacts and protected information offences (s 26ZI). Contact between detainee and lawyer for permitted purposes can be monitored, and disclosure of protected information by monitors or lawyers is a serious offence with up to 5 years imprisonment. Practitioners must be careful about monitoring notices and confidentiality obligations , and lawyers must be alert to the paradox of being asked to receive disclosed material about whether it is protected, yet risking criminal liability if they disseminate it.
Limited legal contact purposes and monitored contact (ss 25MD, 26ZG). Legal contact is confined to specific purposes, such as advice about investigative detention or arranging representation in Supreme Court proceedings. Standard legal instructions for defence strategy beyond addressing detention or treatment may be excluded under this limited contact model.
Occupier notices and postponed notice windows (s 27U). After a covert search warrant execution, the occupier’s notice must be drafted, approved by the eligible Judge and given to occupiers as soon as practicable, but the eligible Judge may postpone giving an occupier notice for up to 6 months on a single postponement and up to 18 months in total in exceptional circumstances (s 27U(7)-(9)). Practitioners must monitor clocking for postponements and approvals; prolonged postponement denies occupiers timely notice and complicates rights response.
Publication offence mistakes (s 27ZA). A publication restriction applies to applications, reports and notices associated with covert search warrants. Publication is an offence unless an occupier’s notice has been given or the Judge has permitted publication. Media, lawyers and counsel must ensure compliance before disseminating information derived from covert warrant materials.
Interplay between regimes , double counting of detention periods (s 26K(2)-(3), s 25O(4)). Different detention provisions may reduce maximum detention under other related orders. Practitioners need to account for earlier detention time when seeking further orders or considering reasonableness under other statutes.
Onus of proof of reasonable excuse lies on the accused (s 33). In proceedings for an offence under the Act, the accused bears the onus of proving reasonable excuse. Defence strategy must plan for evidential burdens accordingly.
Child and vulnerable person protections are nuanced. The Act excludes persons under certain ages from different regimes (e.g., no investigative detention under 14, s 25F; preventative detention orders cannot be applied for in respect of under 16, s 26E) and prescribes particular contact rules for under‑18s and persons with impaired intellectual functioning (s 26ZH). Practitioners must apply the correct age cutoff and safeguards.
These "gotchas" are procedural and practical. They create operational pressures, evidential risk and compliance burdens that must be managed in real time. The statute provides many administrative and judicial checks, but the non‑challenge rule (s 13), monitoring and non‑disclosure provisions produce legal asymmetries that require careful planning.
How to comply
Compliance is distributed across police command, frontline officers, judicial applicants and defence counsel. Below are practical, source‑grounded steps and checklists, mapped to the statutory duties and rights, designed for practitioners preparing or advising on operations under the Act.
For police decision‑makers (Commissioner, Deputy Commissioners, senior officers)
Verify statutory threshold before authorising special powers: establish reasonable grounds that a terrorist act could occur within 14 days (s 5) or that one has been committed and that powers will substantially assist (s 6). Document the factual basis and the assessment of "substantially assist" in contemporaneous records for reporting (s 14B).
Follow concurrence and confirmation steps: obtain the Police Minister’s concurrence except in urgent cases where the Minister cannot be contacted; notify Minister as soon as practicable and, for s 5 authorisations given without concurrence, ensure confirmation within 48 hours or risk automatic cessation (s 9(1)-(3)).
Ensure authorisation formality: if oral authorisation is given, confirm in writing as soon as reasonably practicable, and ensure the written instrument states it is given under this Part, describes the threatened act, identifies target, and specifies expiry (s 10).
Time‑limit management: track the start and expiry times of authorisations (s 11), ensure any extension is given with Police Minister concurrence, and never exceed statutory maximum combined periods (s 11(3)).
Reporting and recordkeeping: prepare the required written report to Attorney General and Police Minister after authorisation ceases, setting out terms, grounds relied on, powers exercised and results (s 14B). Ensure annual reports required by ss 24 (Part 2), 25P (Part 2AA), 26ZN (Part 2A) and 27ZB (Part 3) are compiled and tabled.
Direct government agencies when necessary and expect compliance: s 14A authorises the Commissioner to direct government agencies to facilitate special powers; agencies must comply.
Oversee humane treatment and instructions on searching: issue internal operational guidelines to ensure officers comply with humane‑treatment obligations (s 26ZC, s 25MC) and do as little damage as possible when entering premises (s 19(2)).
For front‑line police officers executing powers
If exercising special powers under an authorisation, document why the person/vehicle/area is the target and the reasonable grounds for suspicion (ss 7, 16-19). Although an officer may act without a copy of the authorisation, obtain and keep the written confirmation when available (s 14(2)).
Identity and search powers: require disclosure of identity only where conditions in s 16 are met, and request proof of identity if appropriate (s 16(4)). On searches, follow LEPRA Division 4 safeguards as extended by the Act (s 17(2)); do not detain persons or vehicles longer than reasonably necessary (ss 17(3), 18(2)).
Seizure and evidence chain: when seizing things, record the grounds that the item may be used to commit a terrorist act or provide evidence of a serious indictable offence (s 20). Provide return of seized things where retention is not required and it is lawful for the person to have possession, unless a court order says otherwise (s 27(1)-(2)).
Use of force: ensure any force is "reasonably necessary" and documented, including in Part 2AAA situations where a Commissioner’s declaration has been made (s 21; ss 24A-24B). Ensure actions are in good faith to benefit from the protection in s 24B(2)-(3).
Provision of search statements: ensure searched persons receive written statement on request within 30 days if requested within 12 months (s 23).
Monitoring and contact when detaining: when detaining under investigative or preventative detention regimes, ensure detainees are informed of rights (ss 25MA, 26Y, 26Z), ensure senior police review timelines are adhered to (s 25E(6)), arrange interpreters where necessary (ss 26ZA, 25MD(5)), and inform detainees and persons they contact that monitoring will occur (ss 25L(5), 26ZI(4A)).
For prosecutors and applicants for judicial warrants or orders
Establish and present required statutory particulars: covert search warrant applications must include prescribed information (s 27J(1)). Detention warrant applications (s 25I) must satisfy the eligible Judge on the s 25I(5) criteria (diligence in investigation, reasonable grounds, risk of future acts, substantial assistance).
Affidavit verification and telephone applications: when applying in person, provide verified information under oath or by affidavit (s 27H); for telephone warrants/applications ensure affidavit is supplied within the statutory timeframe and the Judge is satisfied urgency and impracticability exist (s 27I(2)-(6) and s 27J(3)).
Criminal intelligence handling: when seeking a detention warrant, be ready to identify any criminal intelligence and justify non‑disclosure requests under s 25K. Prepare a redacted affidavit and be ready to explain why disclosure would have prejudicial effects (s 25K(1)).
Occupier’s notice process: after execution of covert