Anti-Discrimination Act 1977

The Act affects virtually every person and organisation operating in New South Wales in any capacity that touches upon the areas of public life it regulates.

Individuals are protected when they possess a protected attribute. The protected attributes are: race (including colour, nationality, descent, ethnic, ethno-religious or national origin—s 4), sex (including pregnancy, breastfeeding and characteristics generally appertaining to or imputed to one sex—s 24), transgender grounds (including those who identify, have identified, or are thought to identify as a member of the opposite sex—s 38A), marital or domestic status (single, married, de facto, divorced, widowed, separated—s 4), disability (including past, future, presumed, and imputed disability, plus assistance animals and palliative devices—ss 4, 49A), carer responsibilities (responsibilities for children, immediate family members, or those for whom the person is guardian or authorised carer—s 49S), homosexuality (including imputed homosexuality—s 49ZF), age (s 49ZYA), and religious belief or activity (Part 4BA). Vilification protections extend to those who have or are thought to have HIV/AIDS (Part 4F).

Employers, whether corporations, partnerships of six or more, principals engaging commission agents or contract workers, employment agencies, industrial organisations, qualifying bodies, and local government councillors, are directly bound by the work-related prohibitions (ss 8–13, 25–30, 38C–38J, 40–45, 49D–49K, 49V–49ZC, 49ZH–49ZN, 49ZYB–49ZYH). The small-business exception (fewer than six employees for sex, marital status, disability, carers, homosexuality, and age) does not apply to race, transgender status, or sexual harassment.

Educational authorities, both public and private (subject to limited exceptions), must not discriminate in admission, terms of admission, benefits, or expulsion (ss 17, 31A, 38K, 46A, 49L, 49ZYL). Adult students may also be liable for harassing other students or staff (s 22E).

Providers of goods and services, including banks, insurers, transport operators, professionals, councils, and registered clubs, are prohibited from refusing service or providing it on discriminatory terms (ss 19, 33, 38M, 47, 49M, 49ZYN). Registered clubs have additional rules concerning membership and benefits (ss 20A, 34A, 38O, 48A, 49O, 49ZYP).

Landlords and agents must not discriminate in the sale, lease, or terms of occupation of premises, subject to the private-household exception where the provider or near relative lives on the premises and the accommodation is for no more than six persons (ss 20, 34, 38N, 48, 49N, 49ZYO).

Sporting bodies are subject to both anti-discrimination and anti-harassment rules, with exceptions for single-sex competition where strength, stamina or physique is relevant (ss 22, 38, 38P, 49R, 49ZYW).

The Crown in all its capacities is bound (s 5). Public-sector employers are deemed to be the agency head, Commissioner of Police, or Secretary of the Department of Education (s 4B).

Representative bodies may lodge complaints on behalf of named persons provided they obtain consent and demonstrate sufficient interest (s 87C). Parents or guardians may complain on behalf of persons lacking legal capacity (s 87A(1)(b)).

Respondents to complaints include not only the primary actor but, by virtue of vicarious liability (s 53), employers and principals unless they took all reasonable steps to prevent the contravention. The “because of” test in s 4A means that if unlawful discrimination is one of two or more reasons for the conduct, the conduct is taken to be done for that reason.

The Act therefore casts a wide net, affecting employers, service providers, educators, landlords, clubs, sporting organisations, and government agencies, while conferring rights on any person who possesses or is imputed to possess a protected attribute and who suffers less favourable treatment or a discriminatory condition in a regulated area.

The Act creates a mixture of negative duties (not to discriminate or harass) and positive obligations (to make reasonable adjustments, avoid unjustifiable hardship defences being enlivened, and comply with Tribunal orders).

Duties imposed on respondents include:

• The duty not to treat a person less favourably on a protected ground in the circumstances specified in each Part (ss 7, 24, 38B, 39, 49B, 49T, 49ZG, 49ZYA).
• The duty not to impose a requirement or condition that has a disparate impact on persons with a protected attribute unless the requirement is reasonable (the indirect discrimination limb).
• The duty not to sexually harass in the circumstances listed in ss 22B–22J. The test is objective: whether a reasonable person would have anticipated offence, humiliation or intimidation (s 22A).
• The duty not to incite hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule by a public act on the grounds listed in the vilification provisions. The mental element is knowledge that the matter promotes or expresses the prohibited attitude (ss 20B(c), 38R(c), 49ZS(c), 49ZXA(c), 49ZD(c)).
• Employers and principals have a positive duty to take all reasonable steps to prevent agents or employees from contravening the Act; failure removes the vicarious-liability defence (s 53(3)).
• Once a complaint is referred, respondents must comply with Tribunal orders, which may require payment of damages, publication of apologies, implementation of anti-discrimination policies, or cessation of discriminatory conduct (s 108).

Rights conferred on aggrieved persons include:

• The right to lodge a complaint alleging a contravention (s 87A). Complaints may be made by the aggrieved person, a parent or guardian, a representative body with consent and sufficient interest, or an agent.
• The right to have the complaint investigated by the President, who must determine whether to accept or decline it (s 89B). Decline grounds include frivolity, being out of time (12 months), or the conduct not disclosing a contravention.
• The right to participate in conciliation (s 91A). Anything said in conciliation is inadmissible in later proceedings (s 91A(4)).
• The right to require the President to refer an unresolved complaint to the Tribunal after 18 months (s 93B) or where the President declines the complaint (s 93A).
• The right to seek interim orders from the Tribunal to preserve the status quo or prevent further detriment (s 105).
• The right to a hearing before the Tribunal, which must determine whether the complaint is substantiated (s 108(1)).
• If substantiated, the right to remedies including damages not exceeding $100,000, injunctions, corrective action, apologies, and, for vilification, orders requiring respondents to implement programs aimed at eliminating unlawful discrimination (s 108(2)).
• The right to enforce non-monetary orders by filing a certificate in the Supreme Court, where it operates as a judgment (s 114).

Procedural rights and duties attach to both parties. The President may require production of documents or information (s 90B). Failure to comply without reasonable excuse is an offence (maximum 50 penalty units for corporations, 10 for individuals). Parties may be represented by an Australian legal practitioner or, with leave, another person. The Tribunal may amend complaints to add further allegations or parties (s 103).

The Board has broader functions under s 119, including research, education, policy development, and public inquiries. These functions are exercised by the President pursuant to Board resolutions (s 121A). The President may grant exemptions for up to ten years (s 126), subject to Tribunal review.

The Act therefore balances enforceable individual rights with systemic obligations on organisations and a public-interest role for the Board and President.

The Act creates both civil and criminal consequences.

Civil remedies are the primary enforcement mechanism. When the Tribunal finds a complaint substantiated it may order:

• Damages not exceeding $100,000 for loss or damage suffered (s 108(2)(a)). For vilification complaints the cap is $100,000 in aggregate where multiple complaints arise from the same public act (s 108(6)).
• Injunctions restraining continuation or repetition of unlawful conduct (s 108(2)(b)).
• Orders requiring the respondent to perform any reasonable act to redress loss or damage (s 108(2)(c)).
• Publication of an apology or retraction (s 108(2)(d)).
• Development and implementation of anti-discrimination programs in vilification cases (s 108(2)(e)).
• Declaration that a contract or agreement is void in whole or part (s 108(2)(f)).
• In default of compliance with non-monetary orders, further damages up to $100,000 (s 108(7)).

Interest accrues on damages from the date the order takes effect (or an earlier date ordered by the Tribunal) at the District Court rate (s 112). Orders for damages in respect of offenders in custody must be paid into the Victims Support Fund rather than to the complainant (s 111A).

Non-monetary orders may be enforced by filing a registrar’s certificate in the Supreme Court, where it operates as a judgment (s 114). The President may take enforcement steps on behalf of a complainant with consent or, for representative complaints, on the President’s own motion (s 113).

Criminal offences are created for:

• Failure to comply with a notice to produce a copy or transcript of a broadcast the subject of a vilification complaint (s 90A(2)—50/10 penalty units).
• Failure to comply with a requirement to provide information or documents during investigation (s 90B(2), (4)—50/10 penalty units).
• Obstruction of the President, Board member, or Public Service Commissioner in the exercise of functions (s 124—50/10 penalty units).
• Breach of the secrecy provision (s 124A(3)—10 penalty units).

Proceedings for offences are summary and must be brought in the Local Court (s 125). The maximum penalty for a body corporate is five times the amount for an individual in some cases, reflecting the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) standard scale.

Vicarious liability is imposed by s 53. An employer or principal is taken to have done an act done by an employee or agent unless the employer or principal took all reasonable steps to prevent the contravention. Both the principal actor and the employer/principal are jointly and severally liable.

Limitation periods are enforced at the complaint stage. The President may decline a complaint if the conduct occurred more than 12 months before the complaint was made (s 89B(2)(b)). The Tribunal may nevertheless accept out-of-time complaints in appropriate cases when the matter is referred.

Enforcement of Tribunal orders is further supported by the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), which permits contempt proceedings and other sanctions for non-compliance.

The combined civil–criminal regime, together with the Board’s educative functions, provides a graduated enforcement pyramid from conciliation through Tribunal orders to criminal prosecution for serious obstruction or secrecy breaches.

The Act is expressly stated to be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law that protects against conduct that is or would be unlawful under it (s 123). It therefore operates cumulatively with Commonwealth discrimination legislation, industrial laws, and general tort and contract principles.

Commonwealth interaction is significant. The Act cross-references the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) for the definition of “corporation” (s 4) and for related-body-corporate rules that determine whether separate companies are treated as a single employer for the small-business exception (ss 25(4), 49D(5), 49V(5)). Superannuation and insurance exceptions (ss 36, 37, 49, 49Q, 49ZYS, 49ZYT) are modelled on Commonwealth standards and require actuarial or statistical data. The Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), and Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) operate concurrently; a complainant may choose the forum but cannot double-recover. Section 88B expressly permits complaints to be made in more than one jurisdiction and requires the Tribunal to have regard to proceedings and outcomes elsewhere.

Industrial relations overlap is managed by s 109, which requires the Tribunal to notify the President of the Industrial Relations Commission of any order that affects an industrial instrument. Part 4E renders void compulsory retirement provisions in awards or agreements. The Act does not, however, displace the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW) unfair-dismissal jurisdiction; the two regimes run in parallel.

Administrative law governs review of decisions of the President and the Board. A decision to decline a complaint is not reviewable by the Tribunal (s 89B(4)), but a complainant may require referral (s 93A). Decisions to grant, refuse, renew, vary or revoke an exemption under s 126 are reviewable by the Tribunal (s 126(9)). The Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) applies to those reviewable decisions, although s 53 internal review is excluded for exemption decisions (s 126(11)).

Privacy and confidentiality intersect via s 124A, which imposes a strict secrecy obligation on Board members, the President’s and Board’s staff, and others acting under the Act. Information obtained in the exercise of functions may not be recorded, disclosed or communicated except as necessary for the Act’s purposes or as authorised. Breach is an offence. Section 119(1)(h) permits the Board to liaise with academics and researchers, but the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) and Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) impose additional limits on disclosure of personal information.

Anti-vilification provisions interact with the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW). A fair report of a public act or a communication on an occasion of absolute privilege is not unlawful (ss 20C(2), 38S(2), 49ZT(2), 49ZXB(2), 49ZE(2)). The civil vilification remedies are additional to any criminal sanctions under the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) for serious racial or religious vilification.

Workers compensation and occupational health and safety laws are not displaced. A discriminatory dismissal may give rise to both an unfair-dismissal claim and a discrimination complaint. Harassment that creates a risk to health and safety may engage the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW).

Charitable and religious exemptions (ss 55, 56) preserve the autonomy of religious bodies in ordination, training, and appointment, and the validity of charitable trusts that confer benefits on persons of a particular race, sex or other attribute.

The Act is therefore both complementary to and constrained by a dense network of Commonwealth, State, and common-law rules. Its interpretation must take account of these interactions, as expressly required by s 116 in relation to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) and the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW).

The Act has been amended more than 40 times since 1977. Key recent changes illustrate a legislative policy of progressive expansion of protected attributes, procedural efficiency, and alignment with national standards.

The Anti-Discrimination Amendment (Religious Vilification) Act 2023 inserted Part 4BA, making it unlawful to incite hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule on the ground that a person has or does not have a religious belief or affiliation or engages or does not engage in religious activity. The definition of “public act” mirrors earlier vilification provisions. Defences of fair report, absolute privilege, and good-faith academic, artistic, scientific, research, religious discussion or public-interest debate were included. The amendment responded to recommendations of the 2022 NSW Parliamentary Inquiry into Anti-vilification Protections and was intended to close a gap left by the absence of religious belief as a protected attribute in the general discrimination provisions.

The Anti-Discrimination Amendment (Offender Compensation) Act 2007 inserted s 111A. It requires that damages ordered by the Tribunal in favour of an offender in custody against a protected defendant (essentially the State or its agencies) be paid into the Victims Support Fund rather than to the offender. The provision applies to both direct compensation and compensation for failure to comply with non-monetary orders. It was a response to a series of high-value awards made to prisoners and was designed to ensure that taxpayer-funded compensation for unlawful discrimination suffered while in custody is applied for the benefit of victims of crime generally. The section has been held to be constitutionally valid.

The Anti-Discrimination Amendment (Breastfeeding) Act 2007 clarified that breastfeeding (including expressing milk) is a characteristic that appertains generally to women (s 24(1C)) and that discrimination against a woman because she is breastfeeding is therefore sex discrimination. The amendment removed any doubt that had existed in earlier case law and aligned NSW law with Commonwealth and other State legislation.

Procedurally, the Anti-Discrimination Amendment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004 effected the most significant overhaul since 1977. It replaced the former two-tiered system (Board investigation followed by possible referral to the Equal Opportunity Tribunal) with a single President-led investigation and conciliation stage, followed by direct referral to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal (now NCAT). New provisions were inserted governing acceptance and decline of complaints (s 89B), investigation powers (s 90B), conciliation (s 91A), referral at the complainant’s request (s 93A), and referral after 18 months (s 93B). The Tribunal’s powers were expanded and clarified (s 108). These changes were intended to reduce delays, increase flexibility, and give the President greater gate-keeping responsibility.

The Administrative Decisions Tribunal Amendment Act 2008 raised the damages cap in s 108 from $40,000 to $100,000, substituted a new costs provision (s 110), repealed the power to award costs against a legally-aided party (former s 111), and replaced the former s 126 exemption regime with a ten-year renewable exemption power vested in the President, subject to Tribunal review. The increase in the cap reflected inflation and the seriousness of some discrimination, particularly racial and sexual harassment.

The Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 transferred the former Equal Opportunity Division of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal into NCAT. Consequential amendments updated terminology (“Tribunal” now means NCAT) and applied the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act procedural regime, while preserving the Anti-Discrimination Act’s specific provisions where they are inconsistent (s 116).

These amendments reflect a legislative judgment that the Act must keep pace with social change, improve administrative efficiency, strengthen remedies, and maintain coherence with national human-rights frameworks. Each change was preceded by consultation or inquiry and was justified as necessary to close gaps, reduce delay, or align remedies with contemporary expectations.

Because the Tribunal is the primary forum, “court challenges” are more accurately described as appeals and judicial-review proceedings in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal. Several have clarified the Act’s scope.

In Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349 the High Court, on appeal from the Victorian Equal Opportunity Board, interpreted the indirect-discrimination test in terms substantially adopted in NSW. The requirement must be one with which a substantially higher proportion of persons without the attribute can comply; it is not necessary that the complainant prove the precise proportion. The decision has been applied to NSW cases concerning access to public transport for persons with disabilities.

The meaning of “on the ground of” was considered in Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic (1989) 168 CLR 165 and IW v City of Perth (1997) 191 CLR 1. The latter case established that the ground need not be the dominant or substantial reason; it is sufficient if it is one of the reasons for the conduct. Section 4A, inserted in 1994, codified this approach by providing that if an act is done for two or more reasons and one is unlawful discrimination, the act is taken to be done for that reason.

Vilification cases have generated controversy. In Scully v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2000) the Federal Court considered the equivalent Commonwealth provision. NSW cases such as Burns v Radio 2UE [2004] NSWADT 267 and Sunol v Collier (No 2) [2012] NSWADTAP 41 have explored the distinction between mere offence and incitement to hatred, the role of truth, and the public-interest defence. The Court of Appeal in Sunol v Collier (2012) 81 NSWLR 619 confirmed that the test is whether the ordinary reasonable person would understand the public act as capable of inciting hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule in an ordinary member of the target group.

The validity of s 111A (offender compensation) was upheld by the Court of Appeal in Attorney General (NSW) v 2UE [2008] NSWCA 34 (a related but distinct proceeding) and has not been successfully challenged. The provision remains controversial among prisoner-rights advocates who argue it denies effective remedy, but it has survived parliamentary scrutiny.

Exemptions under s 126 have been challenged. In IW v City of Perth the High Court held that a local council’s refusal to grant planning approval for a drop-in centre for persons with HIV was unlawful discrimination. The case clarified that “services” includes the exercise of statutory powers. More recently, the Tribunal has reviewed exemptions granted to religious schools and sporting bodies, balancing the s 56 religious-body exemption against the right of transgender students to equal participation.

Controversies have also arisen over the interaction with freedom of speech. The religious-vilification amendments of 2023 were criticised by some religious groups as potentially chilling doctrinal debate and by civil-liberties organisations as insufficiently protective of expression. The good-faith public-interest defence (s 49ZE(2)(c)) is expected to be tested in the Tribunal.

Procedural decisions of the President to decline complaints have been the subject of judicial review. The Supreme Court has emphasised that the President’s discretion is broad but must be exercised lawfully and with regard to the statutory purposes (Jones v Ekactrm Solutions Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 1028).

Overall, the case law demonstrates that the Act is construed beneficially to promote its objects of eliminating discrimination and promoting equality, while giving weight to the text of the exceptions and defences Parliament has enacted. Controversies tend to cluster around the boundaries of protected attributes (especially religion and gender identity), the scope of the vilification provisions, and the proper balance between individual remedies and systemic reform.

Most practitioners are aware of the major exemptions, but several subtle traps catch even experienced counsel.

First, the “because of” test in s 4A is broader than many realise. It is not necessary that the protected attribute be the dominant or substantial reason; if it is one of two or more reasons, the conduct is taken to be done for that reason. This reverses the onus in mixed-motive cases and defeats the common defence that the real reason was poor performance or redundancy.

Second, the definition of “disability” in s 4 is extraordinarily wide. It includes the presence in the body of organisms capable of causing disease (s 4(1)(b)), which has been held to cover HIV-positive status even where the person is asymptomatic. The imputed-disability limb (s 49A(b)) means that discrimination against a person thought to have a disability is unlawful even if they do not. The assistance-animal provision (s 49B(3)) extends to psychiatric-support dogs, not merely guide dogs.

Third, the carer-responsibilities provisions in Part 4B are not limited to child care. Section 49S covers responsibilities for any immediate family member who is in need of care or support, including elderly parents, siblings, or a spouse with a disability. The definition of “immediate family member” is expansive and includes de-facto partners and step-relations arising from same-sex relationships. Many employers still draft policies that address only “parental” responsibilities, leaving them exposed.

Fourth, the vilification provisions contain an unusual knowledge element in the definition of “public act”. For the distribution or dissemination limb, the respondent must know that the matter promotes or expresses hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule. This is not a reasonableness test; it is actual knowledge. Prosecutors or complainants must therefore prove the mental element, which can be difficult in internet cases where the respondent claims ignorance of the reach of the post.

Fifth, the small-business exception (fewer than six employees) applies to sex, marital or domestic status, disability, carers’ responsibilities, homosexuality, and age discrimination in employment, but does not apply to race, transgender, or sexual-harassment claims. Many small-business owners assume a blanket exemption; they do not.

Sixth, the Tribunal’s power to award damages is compensatory, not punitive. However, the $100,000 cap is per complainant, not per complaint. Where a single course of conduct gives rise to claims under several grounds (for example, sexual harassment and sex discrimination), the Tribunal may award separate heads of damage provided the total does not offend the statutory cap or constitute double compensation.

Seventh, the secrecy provision (s 124A) is draconian. It binds not only Board and President staff but also “any other person acting under the authority of the Board” and academics or researchers to whom information is disclosed under s 119(1)(h). Breach is a strict-liability criminal offence. The exception for disclosure “necessary … for the purposes of, or in connection with, the exercise of a function under this Act” is narrowly construed. Practitioners who receive information during conciliation must be extremely careful not to use it for other purposes.

Eighth, the limitation period is enforced at the President’s gate-keeping stage (12 months from the date of the conduct—s 89B(2)(b)). However, once a complaint is accepted, the Tribunal is not bound by that period when deciding whether to entertain an out-of-time referral. The Tribunal’s discretion is unfettered but must be exercised judicially, having regard to prejudice, explanation for delay, and the merits.

Ninth, the “special-needs program” exemption in s 21 and the Minister’s certification power under s 126A are not interchangeable. A program that has been certified by the Minister is immune from challenge under Parts 3–4C. Many organisations mistakenly rely on an internal policy rather than obtaining Ministerial certification, leaving them exposed.

Tenth, the vicarious-liability defence in s 53(3) requires proof that the employer or principal “took all reasonable steps” to prevent the contravention. It is not enough to have a policy; the employer must show that the policy was communicated, that training was provided, that complaints were taken seriously, and that the policy was enforced. Tribunals routinely find that a mere “equal-opportunity policy” on the intranet is insufficient.

These gotchas explain why seemingly strong cases settle or fail, and why compliance programs must be both comprehensive and actively implemented.

Compliance with the Act requires a risk-based, organisation-wide approach that goes beyond a generic equal-employment-opportunity policy.

Governance and policy
Organisations should adopt a single, up-to-date Anti-Discrimination and Harassment Policy that covers all protected attributes, contains a clear zero-tolerance statement, identifies the complaints officer, and explains the external-complaint pathway. The policy must be accessible to employees, contractors, and service users (including in alternative formats for persons with disability). It should be reviewed every two years or after any legislative change.

Risk assessment
Conduct a discrimination-risk audit of recruitment, promotion, redundancy, performance management, customer-service standards, physical premises, and digital platforms. Particular attention should be paid to industries with high litigation risk: aged care (disability and age), education (transgender and sex), retail and hospitality (race and sexual harassment), and government services (carers’ responsibilities and religious vilification).

Recruitment and selection
Use structured, objective selection criteria. Avoid questions about marital status, carer responsibilities, or plans to have children. Where a genuine occupational qualification exists (ss 14, 31, 49ZYJ), document the authenticity or privacy reason in writing. For roles involving children or vulnerable persons, the Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012 (NSW) interacts with the Act; a refusal based on a Working with Children Check clearance status must be justified and not amount to disability discrimination.

Reasonable adjustments
For disability and carer claims, the organisation must proactively consider adjustments short of unjustifiable hardship (ss 49B(2), 49C, 49U). The obligation arises once the organisation knows, or ought reasonably to know, of the disability or carer responsibilities. Failure to inquire can itself be evidence of discrimination. Document the adjustment process, cost, and reasons for any refusal.

Training and culture
All staff, especially managers and customer-facing employees, must receive regular, interactive training on the Act’s requirements. Training should include realistic scenarios, the expanded definition of “on the ground of”, the vicarious-liability defence, and the organisation’s internal complaints process. Records of attendance and content should be retained for at least seven years.

Complaints handling
Implement a confidential, impartial internal complaints procedure that complies with procedural fairness. The procedure must not victimise the complainant (s 50). All complaints should be acknowledged within two business days, investigated promptly, and resolved or referred within 28 days where possible. Where conciliation is appropriate, a trained mediator should be used. If the complaint cannot be resolved internally, advise the complainant of the right to lodge with the President.

Contractors, agents and volunteers
The Act’s work provisions apply to contract workers and commission agents. Organisations must ensure that procurement contracts and volunteer agreements contain anti-discrimination clauses and that induction training is provided. The deeming provision in s 4B treats the agency head or Commissioner of Police as the employer for public-sector employees; internal policies must reflect this.

Premises and services
Ensure physical and digital accessibility. Failure to provide ramp access, accessible toilets, or website compliance with WCAG 2.1 can constitute indirect disability discrimination. For registered clubs, the rules on single-sex membership and benefits (s 34A) are complex; legal advice should be obtained before introducing new categories of membership.

Record keeping and reporting
Maintain records of all complaints, investigations, adjustments, and training for at least seven years. Large organisations should consider voluntary reporting under the Workplace Gender Equality Act 2012 (Cth) and alignment with the Australian Human Rights Commission’s Respect@Work recommendations.

Exemptions and special programs
Where a proposed activity would otherwise be unlawful (for example, a women-only leadership program or an Indigenous-only health service), obtain a Ministerial exemption under s 126 or certification under s 126A. Do not rely on an internal policy; the exemption must be gazetted.

Review and audit
Conduct an annual compliance audit that tests policies against recent Tribunal decisions. Update policies after any legislative change or significant case. Engage external counsel or consultants for high-risk sectors.

Insurance
Public-liability and directors-and-officers policies should expressly cover discrimination and harassment claims. Many standard policies exclude them; standalone employment-practices-liability insurance is advisable.

Organisations that treat compliance as a legal box-ticking exercise rather than a cultural imperative remain exposed. The most effective defence is a genuine commitment to substantive equality, demonstrated by leadership tone, resource allocation, and consistent enforcement. In the event of a complaint, the ability to show that “all reasonable steps” were taken remains the surest way to avoid vicarious liability.