Case law library
© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
Australian case law library
Search court decisions by neutral citation, case name, jurisdiction, court, judges, catchwords, and judgment summary.
Case law entry points
Start with judgments that other decisions keep coming back to, then follow the citations through the case graph.
NCAT Appeal Panel | 2014-04-09
Tenants were terminated for non-payment of rent following an uncontested hearing where the landlord's agent gave evidence and the Member recorded findings in hearing notes. The tenants sought leave to internally appeal under s 80(2)(b) but did not raise any question of law; therefore leave required. Clause 12 Schedule 4 requires showing the appellant 'may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice' because the decision was unfair, against the weight of evidence, or there is significant new evidence. The tenants relied on phone logs and asserted contact and willingness to pay. The Appeal Panel found the record disclosed arrears and necessary findings, the phone logs were not fresh or persuasive, and there was no denial of procedural fairness. Leave was refused, the appeal dismissed, and the stay of the original orders lifted.
1,627 case citations
Before: Muston J
Before: Roberts J
Before: Sirtes J
Before: Sirtes J
Before: Muller J
Before: Muller J
Before: Muller J
Before: Williams J
Before: Elkaim AJ
Before: Elkaim AJ
Before: Black J
Before: Slattery J
Before: Parker J
Before: Black J
Before: Richardson J
Before: Kirk JA
The Court of Appeal refused to pause its earlier orders while KLH considered asking the High Court for special leave to appeal. It accepted that ECT proceeding could make a later appeal practically useless. But it found the proposed appeal’s prospects were low and that the consequences of further delay for JTR, including his ongoing distress and worsening condition, outweighed that concern. The decision concerns the stay application, not a fresh determination that ECT must be administered.
Before: Stern JA; Ball JA; Free JA
Keybridge won the appeal on the main point about when its Deed required it to indemnify Mr Bolton for legal costs. The Court then decided that Mr Bolton should pay Keybridge’s costs at first instance. It rejected his arguments that Keybridge had won on a point it had not properly raised earlier and that costs should be divided because Keybridge had also run an unsuccessful argument. The Court considered the substance of Keybridge’s position at trial and on appeal to be the same. It also found no basis to treat the unsuccessful argument as generating significant, separate costs.
Before: Ball JA at [1] Free JA at [2] Harrison AJA at [100]
Westwood sold a property to Portman for $100 million, but Portman did not pay the full deposit and faced substantial stamp duty obligations soon after contracting. Westwood tried to rely on a statutory defence that protects certain parties to voidable transactions, arguing that it had no reasonable grounds to suspect Portman's insolvency. The Court of Appeal held that Westwood had not proved that part of the defence. Westwood's case depended substantially on evidence that its principal had made inquiries and received reassuring information about Portman's funding. The trial judge rejected that evidence because of serious inconsistencies, and the Court of Appeal found no error in that assessment. The Court also clarified that it was not imposing a general duty on property vendors to investigate purchasers' finances. Because the defence failed on the insolvency-suspicion elements, the Court did not decide the disputed good-faith issue. It dismissed the appeal and left the primary orders in place.
Before: Mossop J
Before: Ward P at [1] Ball JA at [2] Griffiths AJA at [58]
The Court of Appeal did not decide that Kedwell had proved his compensation claim. It decided that the trial judge had not resolved one pleaded way in which Kedwell said work contributed to his back condition, and had rejected the separate bathhouse incident case using a medical-causation theory that was not supported by expert evidence or put to Kedwell for an answer. Those were errors of law. The Court therefore set aside the District Court decision and sent the matter back for determination.
Before: Bell CJ at [1] Payne JA at [2] Ball JA at [3]
The Court of Appeal rejected the challenges to criminal record checks for visitors, including lawyers, to EHRR and NSI inmates. It reasoned that the Constitution does not guarantee an absolute right to consult any lawyer a prisoner chooses, and that cl 94 did not materially prevent inmates from obtaining legal services or communicating politically. It also found rational security explanations for disabling tablet calls and withdrawing tablets at the HRMCC. Leave to appeal was granted on the tablet issue but the appeal still failed. Leave was refused on the other grounds, and costs were ordered against the appellant.
Before: Bennett J
Before: Parker J
Before: Pike J
Before: Emmett J
Before: Elkaim AJ
Before: Baker J, Berman and Slattery AJJ
Powell challenged prison sentences for two aggravated burglaries, arguing that they were too severe. The Court of Appeal rejected the appeal. It considered the first burglary serious because a firearm was stolen and never recovered. The second involved a violent entry into a home, where the victim and her young child were injured. The Court accepted that Powell’s childhood trauma and early drug exposure reduced his moral culpability, but said that this did not automatically mean a lower sentence. The Court also considered the offences’ separate victims and timing, the partial overlap between sentences and Powell’s criminal history. It concluded that neither the individual sentences nor the total term and non-parole period were shown to be manifestly excessive.
Before: Leeming JA at [1]; Free JA at [17]; Preston CJ of LEC at [18]
The Court of Appeal decided that the Commissioner was not legally required to approve the parts of a development-consent modification application that she found acceptable or that the Council did not oppose. The power to decide a modification application was discretionary, and the Commissioner could reasonably refuse the whole application after finding that the pergola and raised pool were unacceptable. The Court did not decide whether the statute permits partial approval of a modification application. It did decide that the primary judge went too far by directing the Commissioner not to approve agreed modifications or the garage alone when the matter returned for redetermination. The applicants’ costs challenge failed.