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[2026] NSWSC 868
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-07-22
Williams J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: NHB Enterprises Pty Ltd v Corry [2026] NSWSC 868
Hearing dates: 17 July 2026
Date of orders: 22 July 2026
Decision date: 22 July 2026
Jurisdiction: Equity - Applications List
Before: Williams J
Decision: See orders at [35].
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Pleadings – Application for leave to file proposed further amended third cross-claim – Failure to plead material facts relied on in support of proposed claims against proposed fifth to seventh cross-defendants – Leave granted in respect of proposed claims against proposed first to fourth cross-defendants and refused in respect of proposed claims against proposed fifth to seventh cross-defendants – No question of principle.
Legislation Cited: Australian Consumer Law ss 18, 237, 241
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) rr 14.7 14.14, 15.3
Cases Cited: Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New
South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256; [2006] HCA 27
Burner v Sanctuary Homes Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 294
Corry v NHB Enterprises Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 768
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
Lucantonio v Benscrape Pty Ltd [2020] NSWSC 579
Sea Culture International Pty Ltd v Scoles (1991) 32 FCR 275
Nadinic v Drinkwater (2017) 94 NSWLR 518; [2017] NSWCA 114
Category: Procedural rulings
Parties: Alexander Corry (First Defendant / Proposed Cross-Claimant)
Medicina Pty Ltd (Second Defendant / Proposed First Cross-Defendant)
Dharmit Kaushik Goradia (Fourth Defendant / Proposed Second Cross-Defendant)
Nishnil Singh (Third Defendant / Proposed Third Cross-Defendant)
Rimon Ghaly (Fifth Defendant / Proposed Fourth Cross-Defendant)
Nicholas Bova (Proposed Fifth Cross-Defendant)
NHB Enterprises Pty Ltd (First Plaintiff / Proposed Sixth Cross-Defendant)
Finn Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd (Second Plaintiff / Proposed Seventh Cross-Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
Alexander Corry (Self Represented) (Proposed Cross-Claimant)
Mr R Size (Proposed First to Fourth Cross-Defendants)
Ms Steinhoff (Proposed Fifth to Seventh Cross- Defendants)
Solicitors:
Hall & Wilcox Lawyers (Proposed First to Fourth Cross-Defendants)
HWLE Lawyers (Proposed Fifth to Seventh Cross-Defendants)
File Number(s): 2019/54125
Publication restriction: N/A
These reasons concern an application made by the first defendant/proposed cross-claimant, Mr Alexander Corry by notice of motion filed on 26 June 2026 for leave to file a further amended third cross-claim in the form of the document that is Annexure E to his affidavit sworn on 25 June 2026.
The application is made in the context of the history of these proceedings, which was described by Stewart J in Corry v NHB Enterprises Pty Ltd [2026] FCA 768 at [7]-[27]. His Honour’s description accords with my review of the court file and the judgments that have been delivered to date in these proceedings, and with my own knowledge of the matter since March 2026. I respectfully adopt his Honour’s description of the history.
The proposed further amended third cross-claim represents Mr Corry’s fourth or fifth attempt to formulate the third cross-claim in these proceedings. The Chief Judge in Equity struck out the last filed iteration of the pleading on 15 May 2026, and made directions facilitating the present application, expressing the view that Mr Corry should have one last chance. At the hearing before me on 17 July 2026, Mr Corry candidly accepted that his application for leave to file the proposed further amended third cross-claim is his last chance. Mr Corry did not seek leave to file a further application in the event that, or to the extent that, his present application fails.
Mr Corry is the sole cross-claimant in the proposed further amended third cross-claim.
The proposed first to fourth cross-defendants are Medicina Pty Limited, Mr Goradia, Mr Singh and Mr Ghaly. Together with Mr Corry, Mr Goradia, Mr Singh and Mr Ghaly were directors of, or were involved in the management of, Medicina Pty Limited, at the time of the mediation on or about 5 June 2019 that has given rise to the third cross-claim. They were in dispute with Mr Corry. Medicina had filed a cross-claim in these proceedings against Mr Corry and companies associated with him, which included claims for statutory damages or equitable compensation for alleged breaches of Mr Corry’s duties as a director of Medicina on the basis that any liability of Medicina to the plaintiffs in these proceedings for alleged breach of a deed of settlement and consent orders made in earlier proceedings commenced in 2017, or for alleged misuse of the plaintiffs’ confidential information, was attributable to Mr Corry’s alleged breaches of his duties as a director. This was the first cross-claim filed in these proceedings. The second cross-claim was filed by Mr Goradia, Mr Singh and Mr Ghaly making the same claim against Mr Corry on the basis that any liability that they may be found to have to the plaintiffs in these proceedings was attributable to Mr Corry’s breaches of his duties as a director of Medicina. It is convenient to refer to the first to fourth cross-defendants collectively as the Medicina parties.
The plaintiffs in these proceedings – NHB Enterprises Pty Limited and Finn Pharmaceuticals Pty Limited – are the proposed sixth and seventh cross-defendants to the proposed further amended third cross-claim. The proposed fifth cross-defendant is Mr Nicholas Bova, who was the managing director of NHB Enterprises and a director of Finn Pharmaceuticals at the time of the mediation that has given rise to the third cross-claim. It is convenient to refer to them collectively as the Bova parties.
Mr Corry’s proposed claims against the Medicina parties and the Bova parties as articulated in this latest and final iteration of the proposed third-cross claim may be summarised as follows.
As I have already mentioned, Mr Corry’s proposed claims arise of out a mediation which was held on or about 5 June 2019. The mediation culminated in the Medicina parties, NHB Enterprises and Finn Pharmaceuticals entering into Terms of Settlement, and Mr Corry and the Medicina parties entering into a Heads of Agreement. Those factual matters are pleaded in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the proposed further amended third cross-claim. Both documents, which were tendered at the hearing of Mr Corry’s application before me, bear the date 5 June 2019.
Relevantly, the Terms of Settlement between NHB Enterprises, Finn Pharmaceuticals and the Medicina parties provided that the Medicina parties would pay the sum of $1,000,000 in full and final settlement of the claims made against them by NHB Enterprises and Finn Pharmaceuticals, for which payment the Medicina parties were jointly and severally liable. The Terms of Settlement provided for the sum of $1,000,000 to be paid in instalments over a period of approximately eight months, and permitted the final instalment to be reduced by the value of any stock of Medicina that NHB Enterprises and Finn Pharmaceuticals wished to purchase at a price agreed between the parties. The first instalment of the $1,000,000 settlement sum was payable 28 days after the date of the Terms of Settlement.
Mr Corry was not a party to the Terms of Settlement, and had no obligation under the Terms of Settlement to contribute to the payment of $1,000,000 to NHB Enterprises and Finn Pharmaceuticals. The Terms of Settlement did not provide for the settlement of the claims of NHB Enterprises and Finn Pharmaceuticals against Mr Corry. However, the Terms of Settlement included an agreement by the Medicina parties to immediately cease conducting any part of Medicina’s business that involved veterinary compounding, and obliged the Medicina parties to take all reasonable steps to permanently prohibit Mr Corry from accessing Medicina’s premises.
The Heads of Agreement between Mr Corry and the Medicina parties recorded their agreement to settle the first and second cross-claims on terms that Mr Corry was to resign as a director of Medicina, Mr Corry was not to attend Medicina’s premises without the express written consent of Mr Singh, Mr Goradia or Mr Ghaly, and Mr Corry was to effect a transfer his shares in Medicina to Mr Singh, Mr Goradia and Mr Ghaly. The Heads of Agreement contained mutual releases in respect of any and all claims directly or indirectly connected with Medicina or these proceedings.
Mr Corry’s case as articulated in the proposed further amended third cross-claim is that he entered into the Heads of Agreement as a result of alleged misleading or deceptive conduct on the part of the Medicina parties and on the part of the Bova parties during the mediation, that he would not have entered into the Heads of Agreement at all (or, alternatively, he would have entered into an agreement on materially different terms) if he had not been misled, and that the Heads of Agreement should be set aside in part (without disturbing the release granted by the Medicina parties in Mr Corry’s favour, which he contends is of no value). Mr Corry claims to recover from the Medicina parties and the Bova parties damages for the alleged misleading or deceptive conduct, being the value of his shares in Medicina that he transferred to Mr Singh, Mr Goradia and Mr Ghaly for no consideration other than the release under the Heads of Agreement and, subject to one qualification, the value of debts that he claims Medicina owed to him to which the release given by Mr Corry in favour of the Medicina parties under the Heads of Agreement applied. Mr Corry claims that the amount of those debts at the time of the mediation was $533,627.33, being $161,634.94 for services rendered by Mr Corry to Medicina for which he has not been paid, loans made by Mr Corry to Medicina totalling $261,992.69 which have not been repaid, and $110,000 paid by Mr Corry on behalf of Medicina in respect of its legal fees for the 2017 proceedings for which Medicina has not reimbursed Mr Corry. The qualification is that, if the Court upholds Mr Corry’s claim to set aside the Heads of Agreement in part, Mr Corry seeks to recover those debts from Medicina rather than including them in any award of damages for misleading or deceptive conduct.
It is convenient to mention at this point that I raised with Mr Corry during the hearing the question whether his proposed pleading was beset by a fundamental internal inconsistency in that his primary case is a no transaction case, yet he seeks to set aside the Heads of Agreement only in part, retaining the benefit of the release given by the Medicina parties in his favour. My questions about this prompted counsel for the Medicina parties to submit that Mr Corry’s claim to set aside the Heads of Agreement only in part was so untenable that it could not possibly succeed. On reflection, the inconsistency is not a pleading deficiency, given that Mr Corry expressly pleads that the release in his favour is of no value. The issue goes to the strength or weakness of the case rather than the pleading itself. Mr Corry relies on ss 237 and 243 of the Australian Consumer Law, which empower the Court to set aside a contract between a plaintiff and defendant in whole or in part as a remedy for a contravention of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law. I reject the Medicina parties’ submission that the claim to set aside part of the Heads of Agreement only is so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed.
I now turn the detail of the allegations of misleading or deceptive conduct articulated in the proposed further amended third cross-claim against the Medicina parties and the Bova parties.
In paragraph 22, Mr Corry pleads that, during the mediation on 5 June and before Mr Corry executed the Heads of Agreement, Mr Bova said to Mr Goradia and Mr Singh words to the effect that the Bova parties wanted to “get Corry out of compounding”. Mr Corry pleads that Mr Bova said those words with the intention of procuring or directing Mr Goradia and Mr Singh to take steps to bring about that result.
In paragraphs 23 and 24, Mr Corry pleads that, by the statement pleaded in paragraph 22, Mr Bova “directed, encouraged or procured [Mr Goradia and Mr Singh] to procure [Mr Corry’s] exclusion from the management, operation and compounding business of [Medicina], and his resignation, share transfer and debt forgiveness”. Mr Corry pleads that Mr Bova did so on the footing that this would achieve for NHB Enterprises and Finn Pharmaceuticals the benefits that they did achieve under the Terms of Settlement later executed, including Medicina ceasing its veterinary compounding activities.
In paragraph 25, Mr Corry pleads that, during the mediation on 5 June and before Mr Corry executed the Heads of Agreement, the legal representatives for the Medicina parties made two representations to Mr Corry’s solicitor. Those two alleged representations are central to the proposed misleading or deceptive conduct case against the Medicina parties and the Bova parties.
The alleged first representation pleaded in paragraph 25(a) is that Medicina would “solely bear the liability for the $1,000,000 settlement of the Plaintiffs’ claims”. It is pleaded in paragraphs 27 and 29 that the first alleged representation was made orally to Mr Corry’s solicitor with the intention that it would be conveyed to Mr Corry, and that it was indeed later conveyed to Mr Corry personally (presumably by his solicitor).
It is pleaded in paragraph 30 that the alleged first representation was a representation of existing fact or a representation as to a future matter made without reasonable grounds. Contrary to the submissions made on behalf of the Medicina parties opposing the present application, the alleged first representation pleaded in paragraph 25(a) is capable of being characterised in one of those two ways, and the pleading of it as such is not deficient. Those potential characterisations arise from the substance of the alleged first representation. Those characterisations do not become untenable merely because the alleged representation is said to have been made during settlement negotiations.
The alleged second representation pleaded in paragraph 25(b) is that Mr Corry’s resignation as managing director, the transfer of his shares in Medicina for nil consideration, and his forgiveness of the debts owed to him by Medicina “were a fair and proportionate contribution referable to that liability, and would be recognised as such”. It is pleaded in paragraphs 27 and 28 that the alleged second representation was made orally, or alternatively was implied from the provision to Mr Corry’s solicitor of the draft Heads of Agreement at some unspecified time during the mediation which provided for Mr Corry’s resignation and transfer of shares and contained the mutual releases to which I have earlier referred, in the context of the alleged first representation, and in the context of a statement made by Mr Corry to the Medicina parties prior to the commencement of the mediation to the effect that any proposal for him to exit Medicina would be conditional on an in-principle arrangement concerning funds owing to him and agreed equity valuations. It is pleaded in paragraph 29 that the alleged second representation was made to Mr Corry’s solicitor with the intention that it would be conveyed to Mr Corry, and that it was indeed later conveyed to Mr Corry personally (presumably by his solicitor).
It is pleaded in paragraph 30 that the alleged second representation was a representation of existing fact or a representation as to a future matter made without reasonable grounds. The submission made on behalf of the Medicina parties that the alleged second representation was merely a statement of the Medicina parties’ negotiating position, and a representation or law, fact or opinion that was capable of being misleading or deceptive, has considerable force. However, assuming that the submission was accepted attrial, Mr Corry’s proposed pleaded case is that the statement of negotiating position which he accepted by entering into the Heads of Agreement was inextricably linked to the alleged first representation. The potential characterisation of the alleged second representation as a statement of negotiating position does not render the proposed misleading or deceptive conduct case untenable, but it does illustrate that the alleged first representation is of critical importance to Mr Corry’s proposed misleading or deceptive conduct case as a whole.
Counsel for the Medicina parties submitted, and Mr Corry candidly accepted, that the alleged first representation as now articulated by Mr Corry in the proposed further amended third cross-claim that is the subject of the present application differs from the terms in which that alleged representation was articulated in a previous iteration of the cross-claim served by Mr Corry on 10 June 2026. The 10 June iteration of the cross-claim, which was in draft form and was not verified, was considered by Stewart J in Corry v NHB Enterprises Pty Ltd, in the matter of Corry [2026] FCA 768. It pleaded an alleged representation made by the Medicina parties to Mr Corry’s solicitor, and passed on to Mr Corry, that the claims of NHB Enterprises and Finn Pharmaceuticals in the proceedings would be settled by the Medicina parties paying the sum of $1,000,000. As Stewart J observed in his reasons for judgment, any representation in those terms would be wholly consistent with the Terms of Settlement which I have described above. In the present iteration of the proposed further amended third cross-claim, Mr Corry has revised the terms of the alleged first representation to plead that it was represented that Medicina would be solely liable for the sum of $1,000,000. That revision is critical to the basis on which Mr Corry now contends that the alleged first and second representations were misleading. Paragraph 34 of the current iteration of the proposed further amended third cross-claim pleads that, by making the alleged first and second representations without disclosing certain matters to Mr Corry, the Medicina parties and the Bova parties conveyed to Mr Corry the “false impression” that Medicina would solely bear the liability of the $1,000,000 settlement of the claims of NHB Enterprises and Finn Pharmaceuticals, and that Mr Corry’s resignation, transfer of his shares, and forgiveness of debts were a fair and proportionate contribution to that liability, “when in truth the liability for the $1,000,000 settlement sum was imposed on the [Medicina parties] jointly and severally, and [Medicina] in fact paid only approximately $100,000.” It is pleaded that, in those circumstances, Mr Corry’s resignation, transfer of shares, and debt forgiveness were not a fair or proportionate contribution referable to any liability in fact paid by Medicina, and that the alleged first and second representations, together with the alleged non-disclosure of certain matters, were misleading or deceptive.
During the hearing of Mr Corry’s application, I raised with him the question whether the significant change to his pleading of the alleged first representation, which appears on the face of it to have been in response to the problem identified by Stewart J, constituted an abuse of process in that Mr Corry was changing the substance of allegations about matters that must be known to him personally and that the 10 June iteration and the present iteration of the alleged first representation cannot both be true. Mr Corry denied that it was an abuse of process. On reflection, I do not consider that the promulgation of the two inconsistent unverified pleadings of the alleged first representation in the course of seeking leave to file the second of iteration of that proposed pleading constitutes an abuse of process. The 10 June iteration was a communication by Mr Corry to the proposed cross-defendants of substance of the claim that he then proposed to seek leave to file if the cross-defendants did not consent to its filing, and the alleged material facts on which that proposed cross-claim was grounded. Mr Corry has not made inconsistent allegations about the alleged first representation in verified pleadings, and the inconsistency in the draft pleading of the alleged first representation in the 10 June and the present unverified iteration of the proposed further amended third cross-claim will not lead to Mr Corry making two inconsistent allegations of fact by way of the same verified pleading. [1] The inconsistency in the formulation of the alleged first representation in the unverified iterations of the proposed further amended third cross-claim will no doubt be the subject of cross-examination of Mr Corry at any trial, following which there may be room for debate about the significance of the inconsistency having regard to any evidence adduced about the circumstances in which it occurred. I reject the submission made on behalf of the Medicina parties that the inconsistency permits the Court to conclude at this stage that Mr Corry’s claims are so obviously untenable that they cannot succeed. [2] The inconsistency is therefore not a basis for refusing leave to amend.
As pleaded in paragraph 34 to which I have referred above, it is the alleged first and second representations, taken together with the alleged non-disclosure of “undisclosed matters”, that is said to have conveyed the “false impression” that constituted misleading or deceptive conduct on the part of the Medicina parties and the Bova parties.
The “undisclosed matters” pleaded in paragraphs 36 to 42 are that the Terms of Settlement, which were not shown to Mr Corry before he executed the Heads of Agreement, were entered into by the Medicina parties, NHB Enterprises and Finn Pharmaceuticals, contained material terms, releases, benefits and consequences not disclosed to Mr Corry, and were implemented in accordance with those terms, including that:
the amount actually paid or contributed by Medicina to, or for the benefit of, NHB Enterprises and Finn Pharmaceuticals, was approximately $100,000, which was materially less than $1,000,000, “so that the one-third contribution represented to [Mr Corry] was measured against a sum (the represented $1,000,000) that [Medicina] did not solely bear”;
the final instalment of the $1,000,000 settlement obligation was to be reduced by any stock owned by Medicina and purchased by the plaintiffs at a price to be agreed and, in the result, Medicina paid only $100,000;
the $1,000,000 payment obligation was imposed on “the settling defendants*”* (i.e. the Medicina parties) jointly and severally in full and final settlement of the claims of NHB Enterprises and Finn Pharmaceuticals against them;
the Terms of Settlement conferred personal releases or release benefits on the Medicina parties;
the Terms of Settlement conferred on NHB Enterprises and Finn Pharmaceuticals commercial benefits and advantages, including the cessation of veterinary compounding by the Medicina parties and the removal of competing services;
the Terms of Settlement provided for the permanent prohibition of Mr Corry from accessing Medicina’s premises, and for the delivery up or destruction of documents and devices belonging to Mr Corry, on terms not disclosed to him before he acted on the alleged first and second representations.
It is pleaded in paragraph 47 that the Medicina parties knew the “undisclosed matters” by reason of their participation, and their solicitors’ participation, in the negotiations that led to the entry into the Terms of Settlement and Heads of Agreement. It is pleaded in paragraph 48 that, to the extent that the alleged first and second representations were representations as to future matters, the Medicina parties had no reasonable grounds for making them.
It is pleaded in paragraphs 49(a) and (b) that it may be inferred from his role in negotiating, entering into and implementing the Terms of Settlement on behalf of NHB Enterprises and Finn Pharmaceuticals that Mr Bova knew the “undisclosed matters”. It is further pleaded in paragraphs 49(c) and (d) that Mr Bova knew or intended that Mr Corry’s resignation, share transfer and debt forgiveness formed part of “the Settlement”, knew that Mr Corry was being asked to contribute to “the Settlement” by forgiving the debts owed to him and transferring his shares for nil consideration, and knew that the “undisclosed matters” had not been disclosed to Mr Corry. The purported particulars of the allegation in paragraph 49(d) are Mr Bova’s alleged procurement of Mr Corry’s exit from Medicina pleaded in paragraphs 22 to 24, that Mr Corry’s legal representatives “made clear” to the legal representatives for NHB Enterprises and Finn Pharmaceuticals during the course of the negotiations that Mr Corry’s monetary contribution to “the settlement” was to be made by way of the forgiveness of debts owed to him and the transfer of his shares in Medicina for nil consideration, and Mr Bova’s role “and knowledge of” the structure of “the Settlement” (including that the $1,000,000 liability was owed jointly and severally by the Medicina parties and that Medicina in fact only paid $100,000). It is further pleaded in paragraphs 49(f) and (g) that, by entering into and implementing the Terms of Settlement while the “undisclosed matters” were not disclosed to Mr Corry, Mr Bova “personally engaged in the alleged non-disclosure” that conveyed the “false impression” pleaded in paragraph 34, and that the non-disclosure on the part of Mr Bova was “deliberate and not inadvertent”.
It is pleaded in paragraphs 31 and 32 that the following circumstances gave rise to a reasonable expectation that the Medicina parties and Mr Bova would disclose those “undisclosed matters” to Mr Corry:
the alleged procurement by Mr Bova of Mr Corry’s exclusion from the management and compounding business of Medicina, the transfer of his shares in Medicina, and his forgiveness of debts allegedly owing to him by Medicina, as pleaded in paragraphs 22 to 24 and referred to at [16] above;
the alleged knowledge on the part of the Medicina parties and the Bova parties that Mr Corry was being asked to resign, to transfer his shares for nil consideration, and to forgive debts owed to him by Medicina on the footing that his contribution was a fair and proportionate one-third share of Medicina’s $1,000,000 liability;
the “undisclosed matters” were known only to the Medicina parties and the Bova parties (and their respective legal representatives) and were not known to Mr Corry;
Mr Corry was not a party to the Terms of Settlement and was not provided with a copy of the Terms of Settlement before he executed the Heads of Agreement;
the impression created by the alleged first and second representations was false or materially incomplete without disclosure of the “undisclosed matters”; and
Mr Goradia and Mr Singh were directors and shareholders of Medicina together with Mr Corry and were dealing with him in respect of his shares, his offices and the debts owed to him.
It is pleaded in paragraphs 33, 49(h) and 51 that Mr Bova’s conduct in failing to disclose the “undisclosed matters” is conduct as a primary contravener and not as an accessory to misleading or deceptive conduct, and that Mr Bova’s conduct is attributable to NHB Enterprises and Finn Pharmaceuticals who are thereby directly liable for the same alleged misleading or deceptive conduct as Mr Bova.
In relation to the proposed case against the Bova parties, there are no facts pleaded or particularised in the proposed further amended third cross-claim that are capable of supporting the allegation in paragraphs 23 and 24 that, by the alleged statement pleaded in paragraph 22, Mr Bova directed, encouraged or procured Mr Goradia and Mr Singh to procure Mr Corry’s exit from Medicina on any particular terms, including the transfer of his shares for what Mr Corry refers to as nil consideration or the forgiveness of the debts that Mr Corry says were owed to him by Medicina. It is not pleaded that such terms negotiated between Mr Corry and the Medicina parties were conveyed to Mr Bova at any stage during the negotiations. Nor is it pleaded that Mr Bova was provided with a copy of the Heads of Agreement that was signed by Mr Corry and the Medicina parties, or any draft version of that document. It is not pleaded that Mr Bova had knowledge that Medicina was indebted or allegedly indebted to Mr Corry. The proposed further amended third cross-claim therefore fails to put the Bova parties on notice of the case that they must meet in relation to the alleged procurement. As demonstrated at [28] above, the alleged procurement is critical to Mr Corry’s case that there was a reasonable expectation that the Bova parties would disclose to him the “undisclosed matters”, and that their failure to do so was misleading or deceptive in the context of the alleged first and second representations.
Further, it is not pleaded that the alleged first and second representations in paragraphs 25(a) and (b) were made in the presence of Mr Bova, or that Mr Bova was informed about the making of the alleged representations and the terms in which they were allegedly made, at any time during the mediation. The proposed further amended third cross-claim does not plead any other material facts that are capable of supporting an inference that the Bova parties had knowledge of the substance of the alleged first and second representations. Such knowledge is asserted in paragraphs 49(c) and (d) to which I have referred at [27] above. The particulars of paragraph 49(d) merely repeat the deficiently pleaded procurement allegation and assert that specified matters were “made clear” by Mr Corry’s legal representatives to the legal representatives for NHB Enterprises and Finn Pharmaceuticals during the course of the negotiations, without identifying the method and terms of the communication or communications or the other events or circumstances by which those matters are said to have been expressly or impliedly “made clear”. Those purported particulars serve no purpose but to obscure the basis on which the Bova parties are alleged to have known of the substance of the alleged first and second representations. This deprives the Bova parties of the ability to understand the case that they must meet in relation to the allegation that they knew the substance of the alleged first and second representations. As demonstrated at [28] above, such alleged knowledge is critical to Mr Corry’s case that there was a reasonable expectation that the Bova parties would disclose to him the “undisclosed matters”, and that their failure to do so was misleading or deceptive in the context of the alleged first and second representations. I accept the submissions to that effect made on behalf of the Bova parties.
I reject Mr Corry’s submissions that the deficiencies referred to at [30]-[31] above (which Mr Corry did not accept were deficiencies) could be addressed by providing further and better particulars after filing of the proposed further amended third cross-claim. Mr Corry is obliged to plead the material facts on which he relies. Provision of particulars will not cure the deficiencies.
For the reasons explained at [30]-[32] above, the proposed further amended third cross-claim fails to serve the basic function of a pleading insofar as the proposed claims against the Bova parties are concerned, because, by failing to plead the material facts on which Mr Corry relies in support of the proposed claims against the Bova parties contrary to r 14.7 and r 14.14 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR), it fails to put the Bova parties on notice of the substance of the case that they would need to meet if leave were granted to file the proposed further amended third cross-claim in its present form. [3] . That failure is all the more egregious in circumstances where the proposed further amended third cross-claim alleges that the misleading or deceptive conduct on the part of the Bova defendants involved Mr Bova deliberately withholding disclosure of the “undisclosed matters” and thereby conveying a false impression to Mr Corry, as referred to at [27] above. As a matter of substance, that is an allegation of fraud, yet no particulars are given of the alleged intention to deliberately withhold disclosure of the “undisclosed matters”, contrary to r 15.3 of the UCPR. [4] Mr Corry cannot avoid those strict pleading requirements merely by framing the alleged fraud as a claim for misleading or deceptive conduct.
For all of those reasons, leave should be granted to Mr Corry to file and serve the proposed further amended third cross-claim in the form of Annexure E to his affidavit sworn on 25 June 2026 to the extent that it pleads claims against the Medicina parties, but leave should be refused insofar as that document pleads claims against the Bova parties. Mr Corry has reached the end of the line in his attempts to plead those claims against the Bova parties.
The orders of the Court are as follows:
Grant leave to the cross-claimant on the third cross-claim (Mr Corry) to file and serve a further amended third cross-claim in the form of Annexure E to his affidavit sworn on 25 June 2026 only to the extent that that document contains claims against the proposed first to fourth cross-defendants (Medicina Pty Ltd, Mr Goradia, Mr Singh and Mr Ghaly).
Mr Corry’s application for leave to file and serve a further amended third cross-claim in the form of Annexure E to his affidavit sworn on 25 June 2026 is refused, and his notice of motion filed on 26 June 2026 is dismissed, to the extent that Annexure E contains proposed claims against the proposed fifth to seventh cross-defendants (Mr Bova, NHB Enterprises Pty Ltd and Finn Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd).
Order that Mr Corry’s costs, and the costs of Medicina Pty Ltd, Mr Goradia, Mr Singh and Mr Ghaly, of the notice of motion filed on 26 June 2026 are to be those parties’ costs in the cause.
Order that Mr Corry is to pay the costs of Mr Bova, NHB Enterprises Pty Ltd and Finn Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd of his notice of motion filed on 26 June 2026 on the ordinary basis in such amount as may be agreed or assessed.
Direct that the third further amended cross-claim in respect of which leave has been granted in order 1 above be filed and served by 7 August 2026.
List the proceedings for directions before the Equity Registrar on 17 August 2026.
Cf Sea Culture International Pty Ltd v Scoles (1991) 32 FCR 275 at 279-280 (French J).
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129-130 (Barwick CJ); Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256; [2006] HCA 27, especially at [43]-[46] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ).
Lucantonio v Benscrape Pty Ltd [2020] NSWSC 579 at [115]-[122] (Ward CJ in Eq, as her Honour then was) and the authorities there referred to.
Burner v Sanctuary Homes Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 294 at [17] (Basten and Leeming JJA, Sackville AJA), referring to Nadinic v Drinkwater (2017) 94 NSWLR 518; [2017] NSWCA 114 at [22] (Leeming JA).
NHB Enterprises Pty Ltd
Corry
[2006] HCA 27
[2026] FCA 768
(2006) 226 CLR 256
(1964) 112 CLR 125
(1991) 32 FCR 275
(2017) 94 NSWLR 518