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[2026] ACTSC 245
Supreme Court of the ACT
2026-07-21
Mossop J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: DPP v Job (No 3) Citation: [2026] ACTSC 245 Hearing Date: 21 July 2026 Decision Date: 21 July 2026 Before: Mossop J Decision: See [23] Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – sentence – breach of good behaviour obligations – whether non-parole period may be set where suspended sentence is imposed – where offender already sentenced for further offending – where offender has newborn child – offender resentenced to imprisonment Legislation Cited: Corrections Management Act 2007 (ACT), s 132 Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT), ss 85, 110 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 64, Pt 5.2 Cases Cited: Barron v Laverty [2019] ACTSC 198 DPP v Job [2024] ACTSC 367 DPP v Sheather (No 5) [2025] ACTSC 318 R v Antonovic (No 4) [2021] ACTSC 280 Parties: Director of Public Prosecutions Darren David Job (Offender) Representation: Counsel L Taylor (DPP) E Wallis (Offender) Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Legal Aid ACT (Offender) File Numbers: SCC 54 of 2023 SCC 55 of 2023 MOSSOP J: Introduction
The offender (Darren David Job) is before the court to be dealt with in relation to breaches of a good behaviour order (GBO) associated with some suspended sentences. The breaches arise from failing to accept supervision and fresh offending.
The background to the matter is as follows.
On 20 February 2024, the offender was sentenced by Refshauge AJ in relation to eight offences. Relevantly, the offender received sentences of imprisonment for four of those offences, with an aggregate sentence of 22 months and three weeks’ imprisonment. This was suspended immediately upon him entering into an undertaking to comply with his good behaviour obligations for a period of two years from 20 February 2024 until 19 February 2026.
On 15 November 2024, following a breach, I cancelled the GBO imposed by Refshauge AJ and resentenced the offender for the four relevant offences: DPP v Job [2024] ACTSC 367. I imposed the following sentences: (a) On the charge of attempted theft (CAN 6436/2022), the offender was convicted and sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment commencing on 20 June 2023 and ending on 19 August 2024. (b) On the charge of possessing an article with intent to use in the course of theft (CAN 1521/2023), the offender was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for six months commencing on 20 July 2024 and ending on 19 January 2025. (c) On the charge of driving while disqualified as a repeat offender (CAN 1514/2023), the offender was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for two months and seven days commencing on 20 January 2025 and ending on 26 March 2025, with 24 months driver licence disqualification starting on 20 February 2024. (d) On the charge of driving with a drug in his oral fluid (CAN 1515/2023), the offender was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for one month and 14 days commencing on 27 March 2025 and ending on 10 May 2025 with a 12-month driver licence disqualification starting on 20 August 2024.
This resulted in an aggregate sentence of 22 months and 21 days’ imprisonment commencing on 20 June 2023 and ending on 10 May 2025, which was wholly suspended upon the offender entering into an undertaking to comply with his good behaviour obligations under s 85 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentence Administration Act) from 15 November 2024 until 19 February 2026, with the following additional conditions: (a) that he be on probation subject to the supervision of the Director-General responsible for ACT Corrective Services and obey all reasonable directions of the person supervising him; and (b) that any sample provided after 29 November 2024 pursuant to a direction of the person supervising him must not test positive for a drug within the meaning of s 132 of the Corrections Management Act 2007 (ACT).
On 25 August 2025, Ms Beth Hobbs of ACT Corrective Services affirmed an affidavit stating the offender had breached the conditions of his good behaviour order by not accepting the supervision of ACT Corrective Services from 1 July 2025.
On 6 February 2026, the offender was arrested on a charge of burglary alleged to have been committed on 5 July 2025 (CAN 6105/2026). He was remanded in custody. He pleaded guilty to a charge of minor theft in the Magistrates Court. On 6 July 2026, Chief Magistrate Taylor sentenced him to four months’ imprisonment from 6 February 2026 to 5 June 2026.
In summary, following the resentencing in November 2024, there was a period of engagement with the supervision required under the good behaviour order up until July 2025 after which he failed to report. That coincided with the further offending which occurred on 5 July 2025. He was arrested on 6 February 2026 and has remained in custody since that date. There was no evidence of any offending between 5 July 2025 and his arrest on 6 February 2026. The period of detention up until 5 June 2026 was accounted for by the four-month sentence of imprisonment imposed for the further offending.
Evidence
For the purposes of determining what action to take in relation to the breaches the prosecution tendered two tender bundles. The first was one which was before me on 15 November 2024. The second was an updated tender bundle taking into account events since then.
The offender relied upon four letters. One was from his current partner, one was from his mother, one was from his partner’s grandmother and one was from the offender himself. Submissions
The prosecution, quite reasonably, submitted that the sentence of imprisonment that was suspended ought to be imposed. Subject to backdating to take into account time spent in custody attributable to these offences, that would result in a sentence of imprisonment of 22 months and 21 days. As part of its submissions, the prosecution submitted, once again quite reasonably, that having regard to his history the court should conclude that the offender would not be able to comply with any community based order designed to assist his rehabilitation and for that reason, notwithstanding that there is no presumption in favour of imposing the original sentence, the original sentence should be imposed.
The submissions on behalf of the offender raised four issues: (a) the possibility that the operation of s 110 of the Sentence Administration Act may preclude the court from setting a non-parole period if it acts pursuant to s 110(2)(a) of the Act; (b) the nature and timing of the breach, in particular that the further offending was at the lower end of criminal offending and the period during which there was no breach of his supervision obligations; (c) the offender’s different subjective circumstances when compared with those at the time of the earlier resentence, including the fact that he has a young child and has made some rehabilitative efforts while in custody; (d) the hardship to the offender’s dependents if the sentence was simply imposed, namely his partner and their young baby and his mother who has emphysema.
The facts relevant to these submissions are as follows: (a) I resentenced the offender on 15 November 2024. Between that date and 24 June 2025, the limited evidence indicates that he was required to engage with a counsellor from Karralika and had been engaging “pretty well”. It was only after that date that he failed to comply with supervision requirements. (b) He now has a long-term partner and a child who was born in late 2025, after the most recent offending. The child is now eight months old. His partner reports positive changes in his attitude, priorities and commitment to his family. So too does his mother. While it is difficult to assess the weight to be given to such a supportive statement from a partner or mother who has obvious incentives to have him released from custody, the fact of having a long-term partner and a young child has, as a matter of human experience, a potential to alter the outlook on life even of somebody with such a long history of criminal conduct as the offender. (c) He has provided assistance to his mother who suffers from emphysema, her condition not appearing to be substantially different to that in November 2024 but also now suffering from an additional condition which affects her capacity to manage daily life.
Disposition
As I observed in my earlier decision, none of the options available to the court are particularly satisfactory. There is a sound basis for the imposition of the suspended sentence. The offender has had plenty of opportunity to take advantage of the leniency of the earlier sentences but has failed to do so. Either his drug use or his ingrained habits of criminal conduct have resulted in him being unable to comply with the relatively modest obligations of the suspended sentences.
Counsel for the offender submitted that the option of imposition of the suspended sentence pursuant to s 110(2)(a) of the Sentence Administration Act should not be adopted because that provision does not permit a court to set a non-parole period. That was based upon remarks of Christensen AJ in DPP v Sheather (No 5) [2025] ACTSC 318 at [9]-[11]. The argument is based upon the fact that where a person is sentenced to imprisonment, but that sentence of imprisonment is fully suspended, a non-parole period may not be set: Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act) s 64. Then, so the argument goes, the imposition of the suspended sentence has been held not to be a fresh exercise of judicial power: Barron v Laverty [2019] ACTSC 198 at [65]-[66]. Therefore, where there is no specific reference in s 110 of the Sentence Administration Act or Pt 5.2 of the Sentencing Act to the setting of a non-parole period, no such non-parole period could be imposed. Counsel for the offender submitted that given that limitation, to impose the whole sentence without any non-parole period would be a disproportionate sentence.
Counsel for the prosecution pointed to the decision of Refshauge AJ in R v Antonovic (No 4) [2021] ACTSC 280 at [57]-[58], a case concerning the equivalent provisions in relation to drug and alcohol treatment orders. In that case, his Honour recognised that to interpret the provisions in a way that precluded the imposition of a non-parole period when imposing a sentence following cancellation of a treatment order would be an interpretation which was “wholly undesirable as parole is, for many good reasons, a very laudable arrangement”. Counsel for the offender recognised that the usual practice of the court when imposing a previously suspended sentence is to fix a non-parole period although there are often fresh offences which means that the obligation to set a non-parole period is uncontroversial.
The argument as to the relationship between the imposition of a suspended sentence and the obligation to impose a non-parole period for sentences greater than 12 months has a logic to it but would produce an outcome which it is hard to imagine that the legislature intended. It would render s 110(2)(a) a highly unattractive option because it would almost always involve imposition of a disproportionate, and hence inappropriate, sentence. This is not a suitable case in which to determine the issue. Even if the submission put on behalf of the offender was correct, it would be open to the court to resentence the offender to the same sentence as originally imposed but subject to a non-parole period. That would involve a more complete exercise of judicial power than simply setting a non-parole period. However, the burden is not significantly greater because, in any event, it is necessary, for the purposes of determining which of the options in s 110 to adopt, to consider all the circumstances of the case.
An important factor in considering how to resentence the offender is the fact that he has spent nine months and 16 days in custody solely attributable to the present offending. That represents just over 40% of his sentence. Further, he has to his credit certain periods which count in his favour: (a) There was a period of three and a half months following his original sentence in which his compliance with his supervision obligations was “borderline satisfactory”. (b) There was also a period following his resentence from November 2024 to June 2025 during which he has complied with his good behaviour obligations of approximately seven months. (c) There was also the period following his reoffending on 5 July 2025 up until his arrest on 6 February 2026 where he is not shown to have committed further offences.
Those facts, combined with the change in his personal circumstances, provide a basis for resentencing which requires him to only serve a relatively brief additional period in custody but leave the balance of the sentence hanging over him. That would both accommodate the fact that he has a young child whilst maintaining an incentive to focus upon his family and stay away from drugs, criminal associates and criminal behaviour. His criminal history and continued offending indicate that this latter incentive may not be sufficient. However, it remains an option which should be attempted as there is no doubt that the longer-term interests of the community will be served if the level of dysfunction experienced by the offender in his own life is not repeated in the life of his child. The costs of that intergenerational dysfunction would be significant, and every incentive must be given for him to avoid that outcome. There remains, at least, the hope that as a result of growing older and having a child, the trajectory of his life can change.
The sentences that I will impose maintain the overall length and structure of the earlier sentences. However, through the setting of the non-parole period ending after nine months and 16 days of custody, he will be in a position immediately to make an application for parole.
It is by a shorter than otherwise appropriate non-parole period that I have taken into account the previous modest periods of compliance with his obligations under earlier orders. I have also taken those periods into account through the imposition of a non-parole period rather than a suspended sentence so that the period during which he is subject to supervision is only the unserved balance of his sentence.
But for those considerations a non-parole period reflecting 70% to 75% of the head sentence would have been appropriate. I accept that his application for parole may take some time to be prepared and put to the Sentence Administration Board but that additional period in custody is not inappropriate having regard to the history of his offending and non-compliance.
Orders
I certify that the preceding twenty-three [23] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of his Honour Justice Mossop. Associate: Date:
DPP
Job (No 3)