//
© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2026] NSWSC 869
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-07-22
Roberts J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: State of New South Wales v Farzad (Final) (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 869
Hearing dates: 1 – 2 July 2026
Date of orders: 22 July 2026
Decision date: 22 July 2026
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Roberts J
Decision: (1) An order to pursuant sections 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (“the Act”) that the defendant be subject to an Extended Supervision Order (“the Extended Supervision Order”) for a period of 2 years from the date of the order.
(2) An order pursuant to s 11 of the Act directing the defendant, for the period of the Extended Supervision Order, to comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule annexed to this judgment.
(3) An order that access to the Supreme Court’s file in respect of any document shall not be granted to a non-party without the leave of a judge of the Court and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, the parties are to be notified by the Registrar so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application for access.
Catchwords: HIGH RISK OFFENDERS — Extended supervision orders — Application — Previous history of violent sexual offending including sexual assault upon 13 year old girl after administering stupefying drug — Whether unacceptable risk of committing a serious sexual offence — Where serious sexual offences committed 20 years ago — Subsequent offending not amounting to ‘serious’ offences — No breach of existing ESO — Where competing mental health diagnoses — Risk increased by untreated mental illness — Multiple risk factors remain — Relevance of particular conditions to risk — ESO made — Electronic Monitoring condition removed
Legislation Cited: Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004 (NSW)
Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW)
Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2006 (Tas)
Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), ss 3, 5(1), 5B, 9(1)(a), 9(3)
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 38, s 60A(1), 61J(2)(d), 61M(3)(b) (repealed)
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 474.17(1)
Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW) (repealed), ss 32, 33
Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW)
Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (NSW), ss 14(1)(b), 14(2)
Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW), s 11C(1)
Cases Cited: Arthur Fairwell v Senior Sergeant Luke Moore [2019] TASSC 44
Attorney General of NSW v Doolan by his tutor Jennifer Thompson (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 107
R v Arthur Fairwell [2006] NSWDC 18
State of New South Wales v Farzad (also known as Arthur Fairwell) (Final) [2024] NSWSC 265
State of New South Wales v Farzad (Preliminary) (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 301
State of New South Wales v Farzad (Preliminary) [2023] NSWSC 1207
State of New South Wales v JC (Preliminary) [2023] NSWSC 31
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Arash Farzad (Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
M Dalla‑Pozza (Plaintiff)
W de Mars (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (NSW) (Plaintiff)
Legal Aid NSW (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2025/00493648
By Amended Summons filed in court on 1 July 2026, the State of New South Wales (the plaintiff), seeks an order under ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (“the Act”), that the defendant, Arash Farzad, [1] be subject to an Extended Supervision Order (“ESO”) for a period of 2 years.
The procedural history has some complexity, but a brief summary will suffice by way of introduction. The original offences which exposed the defendant to orders under the Act were committed on 19 May 2004. They involved using a stupefying drug with intent to commit sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault and indecent assault of a child. The defendant pleaded guilty on 30 May 2006 and was sentenced by Murrell SC DCJ on 8 September 2006 to a total effective sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 6 years. Ultimately, for reasons addressed further below at [23]–[24], the defendant served the total term and remained in custody in respect of other matters until first released on 28 August 2015. The defendant was charged with further offences in Tasmania and subsequently in NSW, and was convicted of some of those offences, leading to further periods in custody; also detailed further below at [26]–[39].
On 8 September 2023, the plaintiff filed its first application in this Court for orders under the Act in respect of the defendant, seeking that he be subject to a Continuing Detention Order (“CDO”), later amended to include an ESO in the alternative. On 15 March 2024, following the final hearing, Hamill J refused the application for a CDO but ordered that the defendant be subject to a 2-year ESO: State of New South Wales v Farzad (also known as Arthur Fairwell) (Final) [2024] NSWSC 265. That ESO commenced on 24 April 2024 after the defendant was released from custody.
The defendant is presently subject to an Interim Supervision Order (“ISO”) following a hearing on 25 March 2026 and orders made on 31 March 2026 granting interlocutory and interim relief: State of New South Wales v Farzad (Preliminary) (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 301.
The defendant did not attend the preliminary hearing and was not legally represented. The Court was satisfied that the defendant was aware of the Summons and had made a choice not to attend nor instruct lawyers to appear on his behalf (State of New South Wales v Farzad (Preliminary) (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 301 at [3]–[20]). In those circumstances the interim relief sought was not opposed. An ISO was ordered, and following extensions, is in place until its expiry on 23 July 2026. In accordance with those interim orders, the defendant was examined by Dr Jeremy O’Dea, forensic psychiatrist, on 14 May 2026, and Dr Carollyne Youssef, clinical and forensic psychologist, on 8 May 2026, each of whom provided reports to the Court.
The present application for final relief was heard on 1 and 2 July 2026. The Court received a two-volume court book, containing relevant materials and reports. The parties filed an agreed statement of facts and issues (“Agreed Facts”) on the first day of hearing, supplemented by an addendum to the Agreed Facts by leave of the Court following the hearing. Drs O’Dea and Youssef were called to give oral evidence and be cross-examined. Counsel for the plaintiff and defendant each provided written and oral submissions.
The plaintiff contends that based on the defendant’s history, the expert opinions, and upon analysis of the necessary matters under the Act, the Court would be satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious sexual offence if not kept under supervision under the order.
The defendant opposes the orders sought. There was no dispute that the statutory preconditions for the making of the orders had been satisfied, nor that the defendant met the “formal” statutory requirements for the making of an order. The defendant submitted that the Court would not be satisfied that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a further serious sexual offence if not subject to supervision. In the alternative, the defendant submitted that even if so satisfied, the Court would not make the orders sought for discretionary reasons.
3 Objects of Act
(1) The primary object of this Act is to provide for the extended supervision and continuing detention of high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders so as to ensure the safety and protection of the community.
(2) … to encourage high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders to undertake rehabilitation.
5B Making of extended supervision orders—unacceptable risk
The Supreme Court may make an order for the supervision in the community of a person (an extended supervision order) if—
(a) the person is an offender who is serving (or who has served) a sentence of imprisonment for a serious offence either in custody or under supervision in the community, and
(b) the person is a supervised offender (within the meaning of section 5I), and
(c) an application for the order is made in accordance with section 5I, and
(d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.
For the purpose of s 5B(a), the defendant is an “offender” as defined in s 4A because he is over 18 years of age and has been sentenced to full-time imprisonment following a conviction for a “serious offence”. A “serious offence” means either a “serious sex offence” or a “serious violence offence” (see s 4). The offences of aggravated sexual intercourse with a person under 16 and of aggravated indecent assault of a person under 16 are “serious sex offences” as defined in s 5(1)(a) of the Act, as they are offences under Division 10 of Part 3 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), being against a child, and punishable by imprisonment for 7 years or more. The offence of cause person to take a stupefying drug with intent to commit an indictable offence (sexual assault) contrary to s 38 of the Crimes Act is a “serious sex offence” under s 5(1)(b) of the Act.
For the purpose of s 5B(b), the defendant is a “supervised offender” within the meaning of s 5I(2)(b) as he was subject to an existing ESO at the time the present application was made on 19 December 2025. [2]
For the purpose of s 5B(c), the requirements in s 5I are met, as are the requirements of s 6(1), as the application was made in the last 9 months of the defendant’s supervision, being after 23 July 2025, and before the ESO’s expiry on 23 April 2026.
The primary issue to be determined is whether the Court is satisfied, to a high degree of probability, that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision: s 5B(d).
In State of N**ew S**outh W**ales v JC (Preliminary) [2023] NSWSC 31, Chen J observed the following in respect of the test in s 5B(d) of the Act:
“46 The concept of an “unacceptable risk” has, unsurprisingly, been the subject of considerable judicial consideration, which establishes the following:
(1) The phrase is to be given its everyday meaning within its context having regard to the objects of the Act: Lynn at [55]-[58] (Beazley P).
(2) What the Court must find to be unacceptable is the risk that the offender poses of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision; that is, an assessment of the likelihood in the absence of any supervision: Lynn at [51] and [55] (Beazley P); State of N**ew S**outh Wales v Donovan [2015] NSWCA 280 at [24] (Beazley P, Macfarlan and Leeming JJA). That finding provides the basis for imposing control on the offender: Lynn at [127] (Basten JA).
(3) The interests of the offender to liberty and privacy are not relevant to the assessment of whether there is an “unacceptable risk”, but can be taken into account when considering whether to make, under s 9 of the Act, an ESO or to dismiss the application: Lynn at [44] (Beazley P), [143] (Basten JA), and [148]-[149] (Gleeson JA).
(4) Unacceptability of risk “involves considerations of both likelihood of the risk eventuating, and the gravity of the risk that may eventuate”: State of N**ew S**outh Wales v Simcock (Final) [2016] NSWSC 1805 at [71] (Wilson J) (‘Simcock’); State of N**ew S**outh Wales v Chaplin [2019] NSWSC 471 at [15] (Rothman J). The nature of the risk “posed had to be assessed by reference to past conduct, the seriousness of the possible future conduct and the period over which the risk may come to fruition”: Lynn at [126] (Basten JA).
(5) An offender may pose an unacceptable risk, even where the likelihood of committing another serious offence is low, if the likely consequences of such an offence are very grave: State of N**ew S**outh Wales v Kamm (Final) [2016] NSWSC 1 at [41] and [43] (Harrison J); Golding at [16] (R A Hulme J); State of N**ew S**outh Wales v Devaney (Final) at [73] (Dhanji J).”
The following summary of the defendant’s social, criminal and medical history and other background is largely taken from the Agreed Facts filed by the parties on 1 July 2026. Some additional relevant detail is provided by the history set out by Hamill J in State of New South Wales v Farzad (also known as Arthur Fairwell) (Final) [2024] NSWSC 265 at [43]–[72], and from the materials tendered.
The defendant was born in Tehran, Iran on 18 August 1966 making him 59 years old at the time of the present application. His family relocated to the United States when he was approximately 1 year old, and later emigrated to Australia when he was approximately 15 years old. He suffers several health conditions including cardiac difficulties (a stent was implanted in 2023), sleep apnoea, diabetes and arthritis. The defendant also suffers from prostatomegaly (enlarged prostate) and incomplete bladder emptying and has been advised that he may require surgery for this. The defendant has a complex mental health and personality profile with previous diagnoses of psychotic illness and antisocial personality disorder. The defendant has limited familial supports beyond contact with his elderly mother and aunt. The defendant is also currently supported by the National Disability Insurance Scheme (“NDIS”) and has access to support workers through the scheme who assist him up to 2 days a week with domestic tasks, meal preparation and transport to appointments.
Before the May 2004 offences, the defendant was convicted of several relatively minor offences, including driving offences, dishonesty and property offences, breaching an apprehended violence order and minor offences of violence. He was charged with an offence of “peep or pry” in 1997. This charge was withdrawn and dismissed. Some of his offences were disposed of under ss 32–33 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW) (repealed). On 26 May 1999, he committed an offence of wilful and obscene exposure near a public place or school.
On 30 May 2006, the defendant pleaded guilty to the following six offences committed on 19 May 2004:
Cause RD to take a stupefying drug (benzodiazepines) with intent to sexually assault her daughter, LD (s 38 Crimes Act).
Cause LD to take a stupefying drug (benzodiazepines) with intent to sexually assault her (s 38 Crimes Act).
Aggravated attempt to have sexual intercourse with LD (place penis into mouth) without her consent, knowing that she was not consenting – she being under 16 years old (s 61J(2)(d) Crimes Act).
Aggravated attempt to have sexual intercourse with LD (rub penis on vagina) without her consent, knowing that she was not consenting – she being under 16 years old (s 61J(2)(d) Crimes Act).
Aggravated indecent assault on LD (licking breast) – she being under 16 years old (s 61M(3)(b) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (repealed)).
Aggravated sexual intercourse with LD (licking vagina with some penetration) without her consent, knowing that she was not consenting – she being under 16 years old (s 61J(2)(d) Crimes Act).
The agreed facts for sentence are set out in Murrell SC DCJ’s sentencing judgment (R v Arthur Fairwell [2006] NSWDC 18):
“16 In early April 2004, RD contacted the offender through a telephone chatline. Subsequently, they discussed meeting. The offender said that his name was Peter and that he may be able to arrange weekend work for RD in his shop.
17 The couple agreed to meet at RD’s house on the evening of Wednesday, 19 May. The offender asked RD to obtained a bottle of Southern Comfort and some Coke. At about 6 p.m., the offender arrived. He brought three plastic containers of custard.
18 RD, LD and the offender had a drink. The offender poured Southern Comfort for LD, saying that it was Coke. LD realised that was not. The offender encouraged LD to consume a custard. He encouraged RD to consume alcohol.
19 After examining some family photographs, the offender spoke to LD about computers. All three went upstairs to the spare room, where LD’s computer was located. They stayed there for about 30 minutes. On two occasions, RD left the room briefly. At one stage, the offender left the room to obtain another drink for RD. RD thought that the drink was particularly potent.
20 RD began to feel light-headed. Her next recollection is waking up in hospital.
21 LD began to feel dizzy and tired. The offender asked to accompany her to her bedroom. He asked her to put on her pyjamas, but she refused. He closed the door. He tried to dance with LD, then held her hand and pushed her onto the bed.
22 The offender held LD down by the shoulders, threatened her, felt her breasts on the outside of her clothing, and played with her hair and legs. (First matter on the Form 1.)
23 The offender said that, if LD did not comply with his wishes, he would kill her. She started screaming. He covered her mouth. She had difficulty breathing. He told her to shut up. She kicked and punched in an endeavour to escape, but he held her down. The offender said that he would not hurt her mother as long as she allowed him to do as he wished.
24 The offender appeared to hear something. He put on his pants and ran downstairs. LD followed, screaming for her mother. As she was dizzy, she fell down the stairs. The offender told her to shut up, threatening that, if she did not, he would “cut her “effin” throat”. He said that he had a knife, but LD realised that he did not.
25 The offender pulled LD into her mother's room and pushed her onto the bed. He ripped off her clothes and removed his pants. LD screamed and cried. The offender told her to “do it” and to shut up or he would kill her.
26 The offender tried to make LD suck his penis. LD spat, fearing that the offender might ejaculate. (Count 3.)
27 The offender rubbed his penis against LD's vagina and played with it while he tried to insert it. LD kicked and cried. (Count 4.)
28 The offender removed LD’s bra and licked her breast as she tried to push him off. (Count 5)
29 The offender told LD to rub his testicles. When she refused, he grabbed her hand and forced her to do so. This activity continued for a couple of seconds. (Second matter on the Form 1.)
30 The offender spread LD’s legs. She tried to hold his head away, but he licked her once, slightly penetrating her vagina with his tongue. LD was not aware of the penetration. (Count 6)
31 During the assault, LD’s older sister telephoned the household. The offender instructed LD that she was not to answer the telephone, but LD managed to reach the telephone and inform her sister that she was being sexually assaulted. While LD was on the telephone, the offender pulled on his pants and ran outside.
32 LD’s sister rang 000. LD’s brother-in-law went straight to the house, where he found RD and LD in an apparently drug-induced state. When RD and LD were medically examined, each was found to have consumed three forms of benzodiazepine. […]”
On 8 September 2006, the defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 6 years. His earliest possible release date was 7 June 2010. The total effective head sentence did not expire until 7 June 2014.
While in custody for the 2004 offences, the defendant was charged with offences of sexual intercourse without consent, common assault, assault with an act of indecency and aggravated sexual assault of a woman he met through a telephone dating service. These offences were alleged to have occurred in 2002 but there was an extensive delay due to ongoing questions over his fitness. In 2009, qualified findings of guilt were entered for three charges under applicable mental health legislation. Subsequently, it appears the defendant was found fit to be tried, and on the two charges that eventually proceeded on indictment, he was found not guilty by verdict on 28 August 2015.
After the acquittal, the defendant was released from custody. He was subject to a Forensic Community Treatment Order (“FCTO”). He also signed a Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW) (“CPOR Act”) Notice as a “registrable person”, which was for a period of 15 years.
It appears that there were no recorded convictions or charges between the date of his release in August 2015 until the offences committed in Tasmania in 2018.
On 2 March 2017, the defendant moved to Tasmania where he was entered onto the Tasmanian Community Protection Register. A perusal of the defendant’s Tasmanian criminal history reveals the following.
In 2018 and 2019, the defendant breached his reporting obligations by conduct including:
Communicating with adult women, via online dating websites (“Plenty of Fish” and “Tinder”), using a fake profile name.
Having three undisclosed email accounts.
Failing to report to Tasmanian police his new mobile phone number and email password as required.
(collectively, the Tasmanian reporting offences).
On 3 July 2019, Tasmanian police seized the defendant’s laptop, mobile telephone, and external storage devices. The internet search history revealed searches for images of “13 year old girls”, “9 year old girl”, “little girls vagina”, “young girls vagina”, “cute little boys in underwear”, “young boys in tight underwear”, and “little boys peeing”. Police located 43 child exploitation images. The defendant admitted viewing the images on his laptop, that he had a sexual problem and to masturbating to some (but not all) images. He admitted an interest in children aged 13 years up. Investigators considered the children depicted were aged between 3 and 13, two being young boys and the remainder young girls (the CAM offences).
On 12 September 2019, after pleading guilty to the Tasmanian reporting offences, the defendant was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment. The defendant successfully appealed his sentence on 9 November 2019, and the matter was remitted for resentence. On 28 November 2019, at the same time as the resentence for the Tasmanian reporting offences, the court also sentenced the defendant for a number of further offences to which he had pleaded guilty. These included the CAM offences, and three instances of failing to report his use of further email addresses. He was fined, sentenced to 9 months’ imprisonment, and a forfeiture order was made over his telephone and laptop.
On 10 June 2020, a Community Protection Order (“CPO”) was made under the Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2006 (Tas) (the 2020 CPO).
On 9 December 2020, the defendant was sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment for further reporting offences committed in 2020, including failing to report an email address and phone number, and breaches of the 2020 CPO (according to the prosecution facts document this included attending internet centres and searching internet sites “essentialkids.com.au” and “aussiesexoffenders.wordpress.com”). The sentence commenced on 6 September 2020 and was suspended forthwith (with an 18-month good behaviour bond). In addition, an 18-month Community Corrections Order (“CCO”) was imposed, commencing 9 December 2020.
The defendant was released from custody in Tasmania on 9 December 2020 and remained subject to the CCO until June 2022, as well as the 2020 CPO.
The defendant returned to NSW in June 2022, after meeting a woman through an online dating site. From 17 June 2022 to 20 June 2022, the defendant lived with the woman and her 4-year-old daughter. During this time, he did not disclose his return to NSW to police, or his living situation with a minor, as required. On 21 June 2022, the defendant relocated to his mother’s house. On that day, he reported to Kogarah Police Station where he notified police of his return to NSW, but did not disclose his travel to the woman’s residence nor his contact with her daughter.
On 23 June 2022, the defendant contacted the St George Child Protection Registry Office and advised he may have contravened his reporting obligations by his contact with the woman’s daughter. He was taken into custody on 24 June 2022.
On 16 February 2023, the defendant was sentenced for contravening his prohibition order under the Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004 (NSW) (a failure to comply with reporting obligations under the CPOR Act was taken into account on a Form 1) to 16 months’ imprisonment, with an 8-month non-parole period. He was released to parole on 22 February 2023.
On 29 June 2023, the defendant voluntarily attended Kogarah Police Station, where he was arrested and charged with offences of assaulting a law officer (a Community Corrections Officer); using a carriage service to menace, harass or offend; being in custody of a knife in a public place; and stalking, harassing or intimidating a law officer. His parole was revoked and he served the balance of term until its expiry on 23 October 2023. He was not released from custody on that date. The defendant remained in custody on the Interim Detention Order (“IDO”) made by Dhanji J on 3 October 2023, [3] and also pending resolution of the 2023 charges. Those charges remained extant on 15 March 2024, when Hamill J made final orders for a 2-year ESO under the Act.
The alleged conduct underlying these charges was towards a Community Corrections Officer. The Officer conducted a home visit to assess if an address to which the defendant proposed moving would be appropriate. It was determined that the residence was not appropriate. Two other Officers attended the defendant’s premises to notify him, at which time the defendant made reference to harming the victim, mimicked decapitation and stated, “there are bodies in the sea and underground”. The defendant stated “[the Officer] doesn’t know who he is fucking with, and I have already made calls to a hit man. I am not afraid to go to prison for this”. The Officer then received a number of text messages from the defendant suggesting that he did not commit the sexual offences for which he had been convicted.
On 24 April 2024, the defendant appeared before Penrith Local Court. The charges of assaulting a law officer and using a carriage service to menace/harass/offend were withdrawn. The charges for stalking and being in custody of a knife were dismissed and the defendant was discharged conditionally under s 14(1)(b) of the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (NSW) (“MHCIFP Act”) provided he attend any community mental health unit as directed by his Departmental Supervising Officer (“DSO”) for treatment. The defendant was required to obey all reasonable directions of any authorised officer of the community mental health team, take medications as prescribed, abstain from alcohol and illicit drugs, comply with his CTO dated 17 April 2024 and comply with the conditions of the ESO. The defendant was released from custody.
As noted by the parties, consistently with s 14(2) of the MHCIFP Act, the orders made did not constitute a finding that these charges against the defendant were proven or otherwise.
On 18 April 2024, the Mental Health Review Tribunal (“MHRT”) made a FCTO, after the defendant had been remanded in custody for the charges laid in June 2023. This was converted to a Community Treatment Order (“CTO”) on 20 May 2024 once the defendant was released to the community. A further 6-month CTO was made on 1 May 2025 and extended on 31 October 2025 for 6 months. It expired on 30 April 2026 and has not been renewed. The reasons for and consequences of this assumed some significance in the hearing and are discussed below.
The defendant was prescribed an antipsychotic (paliperidone) administered by monthly depot injection and an antidepressant (fluoxetine) administered orally. The defendant repeatedly requested that the dosage of his antipsychotic be reduced or ceased, stating that the medication caused various side-effects such as lethargy to the point that he was unable to complete daily tasks, breathlessness, and suicidal ideation. The paliperidone was reduced over time and ceased in January 2026, which is also further discussed below.
It was agreed between the parties that on some occasions in 2024, notes by persons engaging the defendant suggest they had observed behaviour inconsistent with his self-reported side-effects, although they found support in notes about his difficulties completing daily activities such as cleaning and showering. There are notes indicating a lack of motivation to engage in activities and leave his unit, that the defendant presented as flat and lacking energy, and “extremely down”. In July 2024, the defendant’s mental health review found he had a history of poor adherence to treatment and medication and lacked insight and judgment, however he was still engaging and happy with a recent reduction in paliperidone dosage. In April 2025, his treating team advised the defendant that a renewal of the CTO would be sought due to his lack of insight into his need for medication.
The dosage of his antipsychotic was progressively reduced and subsequently ceased in January 2026. The defendant’s CTO expired on 30 April 2026 and no application was made for its renewal.
Following the hearing and in response to some matters which arose during submissions, the parties prepared an agreed chronology of matters arising from Local Health District Notes. The following is derived from that document.
The transfer of the defendant’s care to Bankstown Community Health Centre’s (“BCHC”) “Assertive Outreach Team” occurred on 24 April 2024. Dr Tanveer Ahmed is the consultant psychiatrist under whose care the defendant has been managed since the transfer. The initial plan was for fortnightly face-to-face meetings with health care professionals. Clinical review meetings were held at approximately 3-month intervals at which Dr Ahmed participated. The clinical notes also indicate that Dr Ahmed had several in-person consultations with the defendant, including on 30 October 2024 (when there was a trial reduction of paliperidone to 100mg monthly); and 6 May 2025 (when the paliperidone was reduced to 50mg monthly).
Throughout their engagement with the defendant, members of the Assertive Outreach Team maintained regular contact with the defendant and regularly recorded “mental state examinations” and other observations concerning his reported mental and functional state through his attendances at BCHC, phone calls to him, and through home visits. Contact with the defendant generally occurred at 2-week intervals and often more frequently. Approximately monthly home visits occurred during 2024.
On 31 October 2025 at a CTO renewal hearing, the MHRT was advised that the treating team wanted to trial the defendant on reduced medications and potentially off the depot, and that as at the date of the hearing they wanted a CTO in place as a safety net in case of deterioration. The last monthly paliperidone injection was given on 13 January 2026.
Notes made by Ms Lobb of the Metropolitan Extended Supervision Team in relation to a case conference held with the defendant’s treating team, including Dr Ahmed, on 1 April 2026 (“the 1 April case conference”), include the following:
The treating doctor advised that both on and off the depot medication, the defendant did not display any signs of paranoia or psychosis and that no acute mental health concerns have been identified since the depot ceased.
The doctor further advised that the defendant was undermedicated in relation to his depression, and a review is planned of whether to increase the defendant’s antidepressant medication.
The Mental Health team advised that the defendant would remain under the care of the Mental Health service for a minimum of 6 months, during which his behaviour and any changes in mental state will be closely monitored.
Under the heading “CTO Discussion”, Ms Lobb’s notes state:
“Due to Arash not being medicated by DEPO it is MH [opinion] even if they proceeded with CTO application it would not be granted.
Discussed behaviours that would trigger consideration for a further CTO or reapplication of a CTO, including: An increase in paranoia beyond Arash’s current baseline
Mental Health”
“Dr advised that he is not convinced Arash meets the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia and instead considers Arash’s presentation more consistent with a personality disorder,
Medication compliance was discussed, noting that: Arash’s medication is oral and cannot be directly monitored Medication is provided in a Webster pack
Compliance can be indirectly checked by DSO during home visits.”
The defendant has not been charged with any breaches of the ESO. He participated very minimally in interventions or activities apart from attending appointments for his medication to be administered. The case notes consistently describe the defendant’s difficulties in completing daily activities such as obtaining food, cleaning and showering. The following matters were agreed between the parties as matters established on the case notes and relevant to the defendant’s engagement or otherwise with intervention and treatment, and his conduct while subject to the ESO:
In around November 2024, the defendant was referred to the Treatment Rehabilitation Clinic (“TRC”) to determine if he would be willing to take antilibidinal medication to address his risk of sexual offending. He was not willing, and this was not pursued further. The defendant initially advised his DSO that he was upset about being referred to the TRC to address his sexual offending as he did not believe he was a risk stating the index offence “was over 20 years ago”. He was advised that in order to address his risk factors a referral to the TRC was required. The defendant stated that he is not a risk as “after 50 years old [he] loses his ability to be sexual anyway”. Though the defendant minimised his offending and his need for a referral, he ultimately accepted the rationale for engaging the TRC and did not challenge it further;
In February 2025, the defendant was referred to the Forensic Psychology Service (“FPS”) to undertake one-on-one sessions with a psychologist directed at risk management and addressing his criminogenic risk factors. The defendant attended several sessions, which primarily focussed on encouraging him to leave his house and attend to his hygiene. The sessions were suspended on 4 June 2025 until the defendant could demonstrate increased motivation and was able to meet his basic needs. The defendant expressed concerns that his ESO would be extended if the sessions ceased. FPS advised that the defendant could re-refer once he received NDIS support to help with self-care and showed motivation for behavioural change, such as in prosocial activities;
The defendant was allocated a female support worker through the Extended Reintegration Service (“ERS”). On 5 May 2024, the defendant advised his DSO that he had described the ERS support worker as “wife material” whilst on a phone call to his mother. The defendant’s DSO reminded him that his ERS support worker was a professional support only. The defendant stated, “I am the safest guy” and “I would never harm her”.
In June 2024, the defendant reported to his DSO with concerns that someone was underneath the floorboards of his house sleeping and watching movies. The ESO team investigated this and reassured the defendant that they could not see evidence of this occurring;
In June 2024, the ESO team raised concerns about the defendant’s ability and fitness to live in the community noting that he was urinating on himself and there had been a decline in his mental health. The defendant was taken to Bankstown Hospital for an assessment but was discharged after he advised the doctors that he was fine. He later asserted that his health issues were a result of his depot medication. The ESO team made repeated notes that the defendant’s residence smelt of urine;
On 8 August 2024 the defendant was moved from his flat to temporary hotel accommodation after he reported being threatened and called a “paedophile” by two males in the vicinity of his flat, who he said tried to break in, causing him to flee. He returned to his flat a week later but reported being frightened. The defendant’s brother also reported concerns that the defendant had left his accommodation on a number of occasions due to safety concerns, although the brother was unable to identify “how much of the concerns raised are fact and what portion are attributed to [the defendant’s mental health]”. When encouraged to report such incidents to the police the defendant expressed the view that the police would not assist him because of his 2004 offending;
On 19 October 2024 the defendant contacted 000 and asked to be scheduled because “he had been staring at his ceiling for the past 10 months and his depot had been giving him side effects” and “[h]e feels like his life is over.” He went to the hospital and returned home the same day.
In December 2024, the defendant made inappropriate comments about women when he was on an outing to Circular Quay with a support worker stating, “look at her ass” and “you know what I’d do to her”.
In November 2025, during discussion with a support worker about strip clubs, the defendant gave a particularly graphic sexual description of women dancing on poles. The defendant also stated, “I like them young” and indicated that he would like to have girls call him “daddy” whilst he engaged in oral sex with them. The support worker also said that the defendant had often looked at women in public and commented on them.
On 26 November 2025, a search was conducted of the defendant’s phone. It contained over 1000 photos, including photos of a female child (approximately 4 years of age). The defendant stated that the child was the daughter of his ex-girlfriend. The photos pre-dated the ESO. The defendant said that he did not delete anything from his phone and asked for advice as to whether he was supposed to do so. The officer reported that no items of concern were found during the search of his home.
On 5 December 2025 the defendant was reported to have interacted well with his DSO officers and expressed thanks to them for taking him on an outing, this being his first in months.
On 2 February 2026 the defendant attended his first appointment with a new psychologist arranged by BCHC. He is reported to have been over familiar with her; asking her religion and commenting on her nails. According to BCHC’s Progress Notes, when asked about his therapy goals the defendant responded “absolutely nothing”, followed by “to get my ankle bracelet off”. He then stated that he had been told by his ESO officers that he needed to attend psychology in order to have the Electronic Monitoring (“EM”) bracelet removed. According to those records, BCHC held a psychology services allocation the following day, where the defendant was “[d]iscussed as not suitable for ongoing psychology due to lack of appropriate goals and attendance for secondary gains.” On 5 February 2026 the defendant was notified by phone call that he had been discharged from BCHC’s psychology services. The notes record that the defendant was informed that “when he is ready to work on goals such as depression and anxiety he is welcome to be re-referred to the psychology service at BCHC.”
On 5 February 2026 a planning meeting was held to discuss the defendant’s NDIS package with him. The defendant’s NDIS coordinator asked him to describe a typical day if the defendant was to spend a day with her. He “responded as though he was taking the coordinator out on a date” and advised her that he would take her to Manly for lunch.
On 5 February 2026, the defendant contacted his DSO about whether engagement with psychology was mandatory, who confirmed it was optional but highly recommended. The defendant denied having any mental health issues.
On 13 February 2026, a search was conducted of the defendant’s phone. It was noted that the defendant’s YouTube account indicated he had at some stage viewed a video titled “It’s a girls party”, which displayed young teenagers dancing and performing the splits.
On 19 February 2026, the defendant called his DSO in a heightened state stating that the NDIS provider was only sending him male support workers, whereas he wanted a female support worker as male workers would not give him assistance with showering, were “useless”, and that “it’s a woman’s job”. The defendant indicated that he wanted a female support worker to wash him and shampoo his hair and stated that he “was not sexual”.
On 19 March 2026, the defendant was encouraged by his DSO to make an appointment with his General Practitioner (“GP”) after reporting that his depot medication caused memory loss. The defendant indicated that this issue was now resolved and he had no current concerns. His DSO further encouraged him to attend his GP due to concerns that he may be experiencing symptoms consistent with clinical depression, including reports of sleeping most of the day and lacking motivation. The defendant advised that he recently walked to Woolworths to return some fruit, for which he was commended by his DSO. On 24 March 2026, the defendant was encouraged again to see a GP. The defendant denied he had depression and reported having more energy, however, indicated he had not done anything with this increased energy.
On 1 April 2026, notes made by a DSO record that the defendant’s treating doctor had advised that the defendant did not display any signs of paranoia or psychosis and that no acute mental health concerns had been identified since ending the depot medication. It was noted that the defendant would remain under the care of BCHC’s Mental Health service for a minimum of 6 months to monitor his behaviour and any changes in mental state.
On 29 April 2026, it was noted that the defendant had a recent fall for which he had not sought medical attention, and which he appeared to use as an excuse for not engaging activities like shopping and attending his Behavioural Support Program.
On 6 May 2026, approximately 7 capsules of fluoxetine were observed in a rubbish bin at the defendant’s house. The defendant’s DSO contacted the defendant’s treating team at BCHC who advised that although the defendant has been advised to take the fluoxetine, the defendant was no longer on a CTO and therefore compliance could not be enforced or monitored.
“29 […] In addition to extensive background material and various risk assessment and risk management reports, Hamill J considered the evidence of the two court appointed expert psychiatrists, Dr Gordon Elliott and Dr Calum Smith. The defendant has an extensive and complex psychiatric history. The effect of the evidence of the court appointed experts was summarised by his Honour as follows:
“The court appointed experts
[73] Dr Smith and Dr Elliott were largely in agreement as to the defendant’s diagnoses and the risk that he will commit a serious sexual offence if not detained or supervised. However, they expressed some differing opinions as to the primary risk factors arising from his complicated mental health presentation, and had different views concerning the best way of managing the risk.
[74] Dr Elliott concluded that the defendant has a “severe personality disorder” manifesting in “narcissistic and antisocial traits” with the “predominant characteristic [falling] under the category of a paranoid personality disorder”. The doctor also considered that the defendant has an additional chronic psychotic illness. He preferred to categorise it as a “schizoaffective disorder” which is a chronic psychotic illness with an additional abnormal mood component. His preference for this diagnosis stemmed from an absence of certain features generally associated with schizophrenia. Dr Elliott also diagnosed the defendant with an obsessive-compulsive disorder (“OCD”) although he was suspicious that some of the features of this disorder may have been exaggerated “to avoid an additional diagnosis of a chronic psychotic illness, and possibly for more obscure reasons”.
[75] Dr Smith, who was subjected to a verbal tirade of abuse during his consultation with the defendant, was satisfied that the primary diagnosis was “treatment resistant schizophrenia/schizoaffective disorder”. He placed substantial reliance on the fact that the defendant had responded well to antipsychotic medication in the past when he either voluntarily complied with, or was compelled to comply with, a regime of such medication. Dr Smith also noted that the defendant’s thought processes were “notably disorganised” which was not something that was apparent in the consultation with Dr Elliott. I noted that the interviews took place on the same day and sequentially and wondered, out loud during the concurrent evidence, whether that may have impacted on the defendant’s presentation in the interview and, in turn, the diagnoses. Dr Elliott thought it might, but Dr Smith seemed to disagree saying “my view is … he has a chronic schizophrenic illness”.
[76] Dr Smith also diagnosed the defendant with an antisocial personality disorder with “borderline features”. However, he said there were “limitations in this diagnosis”. He was of the view that the defendant has been “more settled and has not exhibited wider spread antisocial [behaviour]” when medicated for the psychosis. Further possible diagnoses contemplated by Dr Smith were a substance or alcohol use disorder, complex trauma and OCD. Based on the defendant’s history, and in particular the 2004 offences, Dr Smith said that “paraphilia” or “paedophilia” were “strongly suggested”.
[77] Dr Smith said that all these conditions involved a “lifelong diagnosis” but their “impact may vary”.
The psychiatrists’ opinions as to the risk of the defendant committing a serious sexual offence.
[78] Dr Smith and Dr Elliott both concluded that the defendant posed a risk of committing a serious sexual offence. Based on the application of statistical tools, each assessed the risk to be a “well above average” risk compared to other sexual offenders. Dr Elliott emphasised the dangers of making such assessments and said, “[i]t is impossible to accurately predict an individual’s risk for general or sexual recidivist offending.”
[79] The psychiatrists provided different opinions as to the management of risk and whether it could be managed in the community with the imposition of an ESO.””
“39 I have taken into account the risk assessment report of 25 August 2025 to which reference has already been made. The defendant declined to be interviewed by Ms Hill and so her report was prepared based upon a file review. The risk assessment report considered both the defendant’s criminal history and mental health history in detail and the following summary necessarily makes reference only to some of that information. In terms of the defendant’s response to supervision under the 2024 ESO, whilst this had been better than his response to earlier periods of community supervision, he had not demonstrated meaningful engagement in the supervision process.
40 The defendant has a complex mental health presentation which is complicated by his personality pathology. His anger, hostility and paranoid beliefs appear to reduce when he is appropriately medicated. However, and in Ms Hill’s opinion “concerningly”, the defendant continues to deny the need for anti-psychotic medication and lacks insight into the relationship between his mental health and risk.
41 The defendant has a long history of deviant sexual behaviours and continues to demonstrate sexual preoccupation, as well as to minimise, justify or deny his offences. He has not completed offence focused treatment either in custody or during his supervision. The defendant falls within the “well above average” category for sexual offending recidivism. His risk presently appears to be moderated by his restrictions and monitoring as part of his ESO conditions.
42 The defendant’s risk is increased by his lack of social supports and low motivation to engage in pro-social activities. The evidence is that except when taken out by a support worker the defendant essentially spends all of his time in his home. In Ms Hill’s view, a better indication of the defendant’s ability to manage high risk situations would be provided were this situation to change.
43 The defendant has been consistently resistant to engagement with treatment and risk reduction programs. One reason for this is his asserted belief that he does not require such interventions. The defendant appears to attribute his lack of motivation to engage in self-care and pro-social daily activities to the side effects of his anti-psychotic medication. The defendant also reports a reduction in his sex drive which he attributes to his medication. Behaviour revealing persistent sexual preoccupation has been noted throughout the term of the order, including making sexual comments about female support workers; speaking to a male support worker in prurient terms about strippers and expressing a preference for young girls; complaining that his NDIS provider would only send male support workers and demanding a female support worker to attend, specifically to shower him; and a phone search in February 2026 revealed the defendant had apparently viewed a YouTube video displaying young teenagers dancing.
44 Ms Hill concludes that in a scenario where the defendant’s CTO was not extended and his mental health deteriorated, and his supervision conditions were removed, she would hold “significant concerns with [the defendant’s] ability to effectively identify and manage his risk factors”.” (Footnotes omitted)
“46 I have taken into account the Community Corrections Risk Management Report dated 22 September 2025. The author expresses the opinion that the defendant’s response to supervision “remains stagnant”, due to poor mental health and lack of motivation. A referral to Community sex offender programs was closed in June 2024 as the defendant’s mental health was not stable enough for him to engage meaningfully and constructively with the sessions. He was unable to continue with sessions with the Treatment and Rehabilitation Centre due to what was described as a “lack of motivation to address his offending and TRC not being in a position to address risk management”. He was re-referred to Community sex offender programs for individual risk management sessions in February 2025, but in June 2025 his engagement was suspended until he could demonstrate increased motivation and “was able to meet basic needs, such as addressing hygiene”. The Community Corrections report considers that as the defendant is yet to meaningfully engage in risk-related interventions, he remains a risk to the community if supervision were to cease.”
Pursuant to interim orders made on 31 March 2026, Dr Carollyne Youssef prepared an expert report for the Court dated 24 May 2026. Dr Youssef is a clinical and forensic psychologist with more than 20 years’ professional experience, with experience working in Corrective Services, academia and private practice. Dr Youssef assessed the defendant in person. The defendant was described as actively engaged in the assessment process.
During the assessment, the defendant admitted to Dr Youssef having a sexual interest in girls aged 13 and older. When asked the reason for this, he said that “Ozzy Osbourne was with a 13 year old, I wanted to try it out and see what the hype was about”. He said that while he would still notice a 13 year old wearing “revealing” clothing (and responded in the affirmative when Dr Youssef asked whether he was attracted to particular features of the physique of a 13 year old girl), he claimed he was “impotent”. He linked reduced sexual functioning to his antipsychotic medication, saying that since ceasing the medication he had regained the ability to ejaculate although continued to experience difficulties with ejaculation. He was concerned that he had been “secretly chemically castrated”.
“130. Mr Farzad also described longstanding mental health difficulties that have resulted in differing opinions among treating clinicians and assessors over time. While several professionals have conceptualised his presentation as primarily psychotic in nature, including consideration of a schizophrenia spectrum disorder such as schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder, his overall presentation appears more consistently explained by a severe personality disorder characterised by significant mood dysregulation and pervasive interpersonal dysfunction. This formulation is supported by several factors, including the limited history of substance misuse, inconsistencies in
his reporting of psychotic symptoms across time, evidence suggesting elements of impression management and possible feigning of symptoms for secondary gain, and a longstanding pattern of unstable and conflictual interpersonal functioning characterised by paranoia, emotional dysregulation, mistrust, and volatile interactions with others.
“131. Although a psychotic-spectrum disorder cannot be definitively excluded at this stage (see paragraph 134.2.2-134.2.3), particularly given reports of psychotic symptoms, the available information does not allow for diagnostic certainty regarding the presence of a primary psychotic illness. I concur with previous observations that Mr Farzad presents a diagnostically complex picture that does not fit neatly within a single conventional diagnostic category. It is apparent that he experiences significant psychopathology associated with marked impairment across interpersonal, occupational, and adaptive domains. However, the precise nature and extent of any psychotic process remains unclear, particularly in the context of highly inconsistent historical accounts and a documented history of symptom exaggeration or fabrication. What does remain consistent across assessments, collateral information, and longitudinal records is the presence of severe interpersonal dysfunction, chronic suspiciousness and paranoia, emotional instability, and significant difficulties regulating affect and behaviour. Accordingly, while schizoaffective disorder remains a provisional diagnostic consideration pending further longitudinal symptom clarification/confirmation, the more prominent and enduring features of Mr Farzad’s presentation appear to be consistent with a severe personality disorder with emotional dysregulation (see paragraphs 134.2.4-134.2.5).”
In oral evidence Dr Youssef explained that the defendant met the diagnostic criteria for paedophilic disorder, and for a provisional diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder. However, Dr Youssef considered the defendant’s overall presentation was more consistent with a severe personality disorder characterised by significant mood dysregulation and evasive interpersonal dysfunction. She distinguished between schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder by their clinical presentation; schizophrenia primarily involving symptoms, such as hallucinations and delusions, either with or without mood disturbance, schizoaffective disorder primarily involves mood disturbance with some aspects of psychosis.
Dr Youssef indicated she had some doubt about whether the defendant had a mental health condition involving an element of psychosis, given the inconsistencies over the years in his reported symptoms, and similar issues other clinicians and assessors had in the past in formulating a diagnosis. The lack of information about the defendant’s developmental history did not assist, which she considered important to determining this question. Dr Youssef observed that there did not appear to be any recent indicators of the defendant experiencing positive symptoms of psychosis, nor were any observed in her own interactions with the defendant.
Dr Youssef emphasised that the selection of primary diagnosis did not make a significant difference to her own assessment of risk. While diagnoses had differed, reports of behaviour in which the defendant had engaged had been consistent including “expressing significant grievances towards others, limited insight into his mental health, interpersonal difficulties … mood fluctuations, interpersonal aggression, grandiosity, entitlement, sexualised behaviours and disordered thought.” The key risk factors for the defendant include intimacy deficits (eg poor interpersonal skills, social rejection), emotional dysregulation, difficulties with sexual self-regulation (including sexual interest in underage females, sexual preoccupation) and access to potential victims, with such factors exacerbated by his mental health, particularly where his mental health condition was unmanaged.
Dr Youssef was asked about the significance of the defendant’s self-reported issues with sexual functioning. She accepted that the self-report seemed credible, however was firm in her view that it did not reduce the defendant’s risk of committing further offences. She considered it possible for reoffending to occur even if the defendant did experience erectile dysfunction, observing that his index offending itself involved acts other than penile penetration.
Dr Youssef applied a number of statistical risk calculation tools, first observing the limitations on their use, including that they are a predictor of statistical risk, rather than individual risk, and that they are not tailored to predict the likelihood of committing a “serious sexual offence” but rather address the broad category of “sexual offending”. In her report she explained that the actuarial tools combine static and dynamic risk factors, with the latter being amenable to change; and set out the role of protective factors in reducing the risk of reoffending in “high risk” individuals.
The tools that Dr Youssef applied were:
the STATIC-99R, upon which the defendant’s score placed him in the “well above average” risk of reoffending. In routine samples with the same score, between 27-35/100 offenders will be charged with a new sexual offence after 5 years in the community;
the STABLE-2007, which assesses stable dynamic risk factors (persistent characteristics which remain relatively stable over time but are amenable to change through intervention such as treatment and supervision). The defendant was assessed as having a “high” level of stable dynamic needs. The clinically significant areas of concern were identified as: capacity for relationship stability, hostility toward women, lack of concern for others, poor problem-solving, negative emotionality, deviant sexual preference and co-operation with supervision;
the RSVP-V2 (risk of sexual violence protocol) which assesses a total of 23 factors grouped into “nature of sexual violence” and “perpetrator characteristics”. The items in the first group concern past behaviour, and include ‘chronicity’, ‘diversity’, ‘psychological and physical coercion’, and ‘escalation’. Also taken into account are an offender’s psychological adjustment (in the defendant’s case this included minimisation of the offending, attitudes which condone sexual offending, and emotional and behavioural dysregulation); mental disorders including sexual deviance; problems with social adjustment; and ‘manageability’ (including problems with living situation, treatment or supervision). The defendant scored highly in all domains.
Dr Youssef’s application of the RSVP-V2 was tested in cross-examination in two particular respects concerning the “Nature of Sexual Violence” domain. In her report at [113.1], Dr Youssef stated:
“113.1. Mr Farzad has had multiple offences, against multiple victims, with sexual offending behaviour that spans over more than two decades reflecting chronicity. His offending has shown diversity with contact and non-contact offending, as well as the type of victim being child and adult. Administering a stupefying agent is considered physical coercion and Mr Farzad has also shown evidence of using physical force during his offences. When looking at some of the offences, Mr Farzad does engage in psychological coercion, by way of either attempting to entice victims with the promise of money or through threats. In considering Mr Farzad’s trajectory of charges which is relevant from a risk assessment perspective, it would seem that he has shown an escalation of sexual violence over time.”
It was suggested, and Dr Youssef accepted, that since 2004 the defendant’s offending could be described as “de-escalating”, although Dr Youssef noted this might relate in part to the fact the defendant had spent a significant amount of time in custody since then. Dr Youssef explained that the period of escalation was between the defendant’s first offending up until his offences in 2004. Even so, Dr Youssef considered her risk assessment remained the same, as escalation had not been a central feature of her risk assessment as compared to other factors she took into account.
Regarding chronicity, Dr Youssef considered that the defendant’s CAM charge was a continuation of a form of sexual offending.
Secondly, as to criminal history, Dr Youssef accepted that the tools she used in assessing the defendant’s level of risk took into account charges that had not resulted in a conviction as though they had factually occurred.
Dr Youssef engaged in a structured assessment of protective factors using a tool (the SAPROF-SO) which includes 14 items across three “subscales”: resilience, adaptive sexuality, and prosocial connection and reward. The defendant did not have any fully present protective factors across these domains. The defendant does not show empathy, effective coping with daily life stressors nor positive attitudes toward rules and regulations; he does not have positive or healthy intimate or sexual relationships and continues to have hebephiliac sexual interests. Each of these categories require concentrated effort to change. Prosocial “connection and reward” are dynamic factors which can change as a function of environment and support: the defendant requires support to enhance these factors. In addition, professional risk management factors including treatment, medication, other therapeutic interventions and supervision are relevant. At this stage the defendant is not engaging with these except the supervision provided by virtue of the order.
The defendant lacks insight into his offending. During his interview with Dr Youssef, he gave a detailed description of the 2004 offending conduct which did not acknowledge any wrongdoing, spoke in graphic terms about the complainant, and made claims that she was a consenting participant in the sexual activity. Dr Youssef found:
“132. […] Mr Farzad does not perceive any wrongdoing on his part for his offending behaviour. With regards to the index sexual offence, whilst he concedes he did commit the offence, he expressed no remorse, insight or recognition of the impact of his offending. Evident within his description of the offence in the current interview, is a paraphilia for pubescent females, with a focus on his desire and “mission” to have sex with a 13-year-old, with what seemed to be positive memories of the offence.
133. Mr Farzad remains untreated and lacks any insight into his offending behaviour. Whilst it would be imperative for him to engage in treatment that would assist him with identifying his risk factors and develop a self-management plan, this will be greatly limited by Mr Farzad’s motivation to engage and his personality traits. At present, his basic quality of life requires support before he can consider meaningful engagement to address his dynamic risk factors, all of which continue to be relevant and unaddressed. As such, and not unsurprisingly, Mr Farzad’s understanding of his risk factors remains undeveloped at best. Mr Farzad also requires a strengthening of his protective factors, which would also serve to offset some of the risks identified.”
“Changes or fluctuations over time, treatment, and likelihood of reoffending
134.3.3. Mr Farzad presents with several dynamic risk factors that could change over time, such as interpersonal difficulties, mental stability, sexual preoccupation, victim access and the management of sexual interests. These factors can fluctuate depending on various influences, including his access to protective supports, his engagement in treatment, his ability to meet his emotional and sexual needs adaptively, and the effectiveness of risk management strategies. Mr Farzad’s risk is likely to increase during periods of social isolation, unmet emotional or sexual needs, a deterioration in mental health, and increased access to potential victims. In particular, risk may escalate when he experiences loneliness, seeks sexual gratification, and has opportunities to engage with women through online platforms, including dating, chat, or social networking sites.
134.3.4. Mr Farzad is most at risk if he is feeling lonely and creates an opportunity to gain access to females, including underage ones usually through online dating sites or phone chat numbers. During these periods, he might spend excessive periods online or on the phone. Long-term risk reduction will depend on Mr Farzad’s ability to develop healthier interpersonal relationships through interpersonal skills development, better manage his psychological needs, and learn ways to better self-regulate. Treatment that addresses these underlying issues could help reduce his risk; however, therapy will need to be delivered in a manner that considers his general responsivity, motivational state as well as his interpersonal and personality style. Improvements to his quality of life and adaptive functioning will need to be prioritised prior to his dynamic risk factors being addressed.”
Dr Youssef opined that a further ESO was necessary to manage the defendant’s risk and allow further attempts to engage the defendant in focused intervention. In particular, she considered that the defendant would ideally improve his basic living situation and needs so that he could engage with treatment and develop strategies for managing his own risk with a psychologist. Dr Youssef supported an ESO of 2 years’ duration.
Asked in cross-examination about alternative forms of external interventions, Dr Youssef accepted that there were measures available to police to regulate the defendant’s access to devices or particular online sites, including reporting obligations and police powers to search arising as a result of relevant child protection legislation. She noted that the measures largely relied upon self-reporting and compliance. Dr Youssef considered the potential deterrent effect of the prospect of police conducting a random search an uncertain and less effective strategy than working on improving protective factors.
When asked about it specifically, Dr Youssef did not consider the proposed condition of EM to play a major role in managing the defendant’s risk, particularly given the defendant did not often leave the house. She considered it would be “short term”, and that it was added as a protective factor, and that reintegration would involve the defendant working towards leaving the house more often. During this time, the monitoring might be considered useful as the defendant engaged in more social activity.
Dr Jeremy O’Dea is a forensic psychiatrist who has long professional experience with the assessment and treatment of offenders with mental illness, with a specialisation in sexual offences. Dr O’Dea reviewed extensive background material, interviewed the defendant on 14 May 2026 for approximately two hours and prepared an expert report dated 28 May 2026. He also gave oral evidence in the hearing on 1 July 2026.
Dr O’Dea noted that the defendant was generally co-operative, and appeared of adequate intelligence, he displayed a somewhat blunted affect and spoke in a somewhat vague, inconsistent, contradictory and defensive manner. He was noted to appear reluctant to discuss his sexuality and sex offending in detail, with limited empathy, remorse or contrition; and limited apparent insight regarding these issues and his overall psychiatric status. The defendant presented with a somewhat paranoid and resistant demeanour. His opinion concerning the defendant’s diagnosis and necessary and appropriate treatment was set out in his report as follows:
“120. Whilst I note the various psychiatric diagnoses that Mr Farzad has attracted over time, I consider that his psychiatric condition would be best understood as a severe chronic treatment resistant schizophrenic illness, with an associated history of repeated offending behaviour since his early twenties, including repeated sex offending behaviours since at least his late twenties.
121. Mr Farzad’s schizophrenic illness has been reportedly characterised over the years [by] a number of symptoms and signs, including; delusions of persecution and reference; command hallucinations; lability of mood, pressured speech, flight of ideas; thoughts to harm himself and others; ritualistic behaviours and other disorganised and/or deviant behaviours, including sexually deviant behaviours; and more general cognitive impairment, including with insight and judgement, and problems with compliance and behavioural control.
122. Whilst I also note Mr Farzad’s history of anxiety, affective disturbance, OCD style symptoms and signs, and personality vulnerabilities; that have at times attracted comorbid psychiatric diagnoses; I would consider that these symptoms and signs would be best incorporated, from a psychiatric perspective, within the psychiatric diagnostic hierarchy of a schizophrenic illness, rather than as separate psychiatric diagnoses.
123. Furthermore, I note Mr Farzad’s history of repeated general and sex offending, with his history of sex offending pointing to his having specific and significant sexual deviance, including with potentially coercive and heterosexual hebephilic and/or paedophilic components to his sexuality.
124. Whilst these sexual deviances, and his problems with controlling these behaviours, may also be understood in the context of his overarching schizophrenic illness; they may also point to Mr Farzad meeting the criteria for a Paraphilic Disorder; and will require specific, assertive, structured and supervised psychiatric treatment as part of the overall specific, assertive, structured and supervised psychiatric treatment of his schizophrenic illness.
125. I also note Mr Farzad’s history of alcohol use that may meet the criteria for the psychiatric diagnosis of an Alcohol Use Disorder, reportedly currently in remission.
126. Schizophrenic Disorders, in particular, severe chronic treatment resistant schizophrenic illnesses, such as in Mr Farzad’s case; are major psychiatric illnesses; that are often manifested by significant, long term and fluctuating problems with cognitive impairment, including at least fluctuating problems with insight and compliance; with affective disturbance; and with behavioural disturbance and control; that can be associated with long term general impairments and disabilities and long term risks of significant physical harm to self and others.
127. Substance Use Disorder is also often a chronic and relapsing condition, even after significant periods of abstinence; requiring long term and assertive commitment by the individual to abstinence from alcohol and illicit substance use and compliance with the overall psychiatric treatment program in the long term.
128. Whilst Mr Farzad’s history of antisocial behaviour; including his extensive criminal history, including whilst under supervision; and his interpersonal history and style; could be considered evidence of an antisocial personality; I consider these traits are better understood in the context of his severe chronic treatment resistant schizophrenic illness, rather than as an independent personality disorder. Nevertheless, these traits would point to ensuring that Mr Farzad remain in assertive, structured, supervised, co-ordinated and long-term community psychiatric treatment under the provisions of mental health legislation to manage his attendant risks.
129. Regardless, and whilst Mr Farzad’s is engaged in a current community psychiatric treatment program; his psychiatric treatment needs and psychiatric risk management issues are long term, complex and significant and require specialised and assertive long term psychiatric treatment and supervision.
130. This psychiatric treatment and supervision program will require assertive, structured, supervised, co-ordinated and long-term psychiatric treatment in the community. It should continue to be organised and implemented by a suitably qualified and experienced community forensic psychiatrist and community forensic mental health team. It should involve optimising Mr Farzad’s psychiatric medications and response to treatment; including consideration of a trail of the antipsychotic medication Clozapine, indicated in treatment resistant schizophrenia; continuing to assist in and ensure ongoing abstinence from alcohol and illicit substance use; and continuing to provide ongoing psychoeducation and psychosocial support.
131. Involvement by the New South Wales, Justice Health and Forensic Mental Health Network, Community Forensic Mental Health Service, including the Treatment and Rehabilitation Clinic (TRC) as part of that Service; and the New South Wales Mental Health Review Tribunal via continuation of the Community Treatment Order; in this long-term process, would be appropriate. This psychiatric treatment program may require inpatient admissions to secure forensic psychiatric facilities as part of this long-term process to optimise Mr Farzad’s response to treatment, to minimise the risk of relapse of his condition, and as such to manage his overall risks
132. Whilst I note that Mr Farzad has been assessed at TRC, he should be re-referred to the TRC for further assessment of his sexual deviance as part of his overall psychiatric condition, with consideration of antilibidinal medication to assist in managing and minimising his risk of engaging in further sex offending behaviours and of committing a further serious sex offence, as defined in the New South Wales Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006.
133. As sexual deviance; including in Mr Farzad’s case, the potential presence of significant coercive and/or paedophilic and/or hebephilic components to his overall sexuality, and therefore the potential presence of a Paraphilic Disorder; would be considered a significant risk factor for Mr Farzad; and notwithstanding Mr Farzad’s schizophrenic illness; I would consider it appropriate from a forensic psychiatric risk management perspective that Mr Farzad take the opportunity to explore in more detail, with a suitably qualified and experienced forensic psychiatrist and or forensic psychologist, his overall sexuality, and his sex offending behaviours in particular; with a view to the judicious use of testosterone lowering (or anti-libidinal) medication (such as Cyproterone Acetate, Androcur®; Medroxy Progesterone Acetate, Depo Provera®, or the GnRH analogue medications, such as Leuprorelin, Lucrin®) being considered in the treatment of these issues as part of Mr Farzad’s overall community psychiatric and psychological risk management program.
134. In addition, Mr Farzad should continue to remain abstinent from alcohol and illicit substance use in the community in the long term in order to adequately and appropriately manage his risk of engaging in further sex offending behaviours in the community in the long term. This program could be provided by the above psychiatrist and/or psychologist, via counselling in the first instance, with consideration of other more formal interventions dependent on his progress.”
In oral evidence, Dr O’Dea agreed that aspects of the defendant’s presentation aligned with a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, a variant of schizophrenia. Dr O’Dea acknowledged that some assessments of the defendant have pointed to a personality disorder as a primary diagnosis but did not agree with it.
Dr O’Dea agreed that one possible explanation for the defendant’s community mental health team to have ceased his treatment with antipsychotic medication was uncertainty over the diagnosis of psychotic illness. Whilst accepting that there were benefits in the treating psychiatrist’s ability to review the defendant over an extended period, he disagreed that the defendant’s history and presentation meant that a personality disorder was the appropriate diagnosis. He expressed a high degree of confidence in his diagnosis of schizophrenic illness. He considered that the fact that the defendant was experiencing issues with depression and social withdrawal was likely partly connected to his antipsychotic medication, and that it may be that a different medication would be preferable or more effective, but rejected the proposition that the defendant’s illness trajectory or change in symptoms was primarily age related.
Dr O’Dea explained that the relationship between the defendant’s sexual deviance and his schizophrenia was not direct, but the latter had a significant impact upon the defendant’s expression of his deviant sexual urges due to issues with behavioural control, disinhibition, judgment and insight. If the defendant’s schizophrenia was not being adequately managed there was a greater risk of him acting in an uncontrolled or disinhibited manner and therefore expressing his sexually deviant interests. As a corollary, Dr O’Dea stated that treating the defendant’s schizophrenia would likely assist him in managing his sexual urges, fantasies and behaviours.
Dr O’Dea was firm in his opinion that the defendant presented a significant risk of engaging in further offending behaviours in the community in the long term, including of committing a further serious sex offence particularly if his severe chronic treatment resistant schizophrenia did not come under adequate control.
Dr O’Dea explained that “structured and assertive psychiatric risk management” of the defendant in the community would include: regular (at least monthly) psychiatric reviews, additional review additional review by mental health nursing staff and members of his multidisciplinary team (psychologists, occupational therapists, et cetera) in the community; psychological support and social support in the community; supervision; assistance with housing and day-to-day functioning; ongoing psychiatric treatment with medication; and TRC (a State-based service targeting people with mental illness who engage in sex offending behaviours).
Dr O’Dea considered that the defendant’s risk of engaging in further serious sex offending behaviours in the community could be adequately and appropriately managed with the successful implementation of psychiatric treatment in the community as well as abstinence from alcohol and illicit substances, together with a structured and supervised community management plan as provided by an ESO. Dr O’Dea considered that an order of at least 2 years’ duration was appropriate.
Dr O’Dea was taken to a number of matters in cross-examination.
Dr O’Dea considered that the defendant’s account of reduced sexual function was credible at “face value”, considering his age, medical conditions, and prescription medications. Reduced libido (sexual desires, fantasises and interest) as well as reduced erections and ejaculation (sexual functioning) were recognised side effects of the defendant’s antipsychotic and antidepressant medications. It would be expected that by discontinuing them the defendant’s libido would increase to an extent, although it would take several months for the medication to fully leave his system. Dr O’Dea emphasised that the defendant had continued to have significant sexual expression and lack of insight into the impact of his past offending on others. The defendant’s self-reported reduced sexual functioning was a matter which did not change his risk assessment.
A decline in the defendant’s sexual function (whether attributable to health, medication, or a combination) would not necessarily translate to a decrease in risk, as Dr O’Dea explained:
“that doesn’t mean that people are not going to endeavour to instigate sexual [activity] [i]f they're sexually dysfunctional, because, you know, that's really driven by other things, and people with paraphilias, of course it's driven by their deviant urges, not just their ability to complete whatever act it is that they have urges to do […]”
Decline in symptoms over time/illness trajectory
“Q. And so if in the recent past there's been observations generally about Mr Farzad that don't indicate him having experienced delusions and hallucinations but on the other hand do indicate the issues in relation to social withdrawal, that might tend to support a view that there's potentially a likelihood that he's on a trajectory that will continue into the future consistent with that?
A. Yes I do, and I might add, that that's a trajectory that's been going with him having antipsychotic medication. If I understand it that he's no longer on antipsychotic medication the potential trajectory significantly alters, towards him likely to be having more positive symptoms.”
The plaintiff submitted that the evidence before the Court, particularly that of the two court-appointed experts, would satisfy the Court to the requisite standard that there is an unacceptable risk that the defendant will commit a serious sexual offence if not subject to an ESO. In summary, the plaintiff submitted that the factors identified by Hamill J remain in place; in particular, the defendant continues to experience significant mental illness and a high degree of sexual preoccupation and sexually deviant interests; he is unlikely to comply with medical treatment absent any compulsion; and his disengagement has meant that the 2024 ESO has not effectively addressed any of his risk factors.
The defendant submitted that the risk associated with the defendant is not “unacceptable”, focusing (non-exclusively) on five factors, namely: (i) the defendant has not committed any “serious offence” since 2004, and this includes periods of time when he was not in custody; (ii) there has been a de-escalation in seriousness of his offending since 2004 rather than an escalation; (iii) the index offending was not associated with psychosis, and the utility of treatment with antipsychotic medication is unclear (and can in any event be appropriately provided by his community outreach mental health team including under mental health legislation should symptoms reoccur); (iv) the defendant's age, state of ill health and sexual dysfunction reduce his risk of committing a serious “contact” sexual offence; (v) child protection legislation provides existing and additionally available means of supervision by the State in the alternative to an ESO.
The defendant was previously receiving mental health treatment pursuant to a CTO. Since February he is no longer receiving antipsychotic medication, and since late April the CTO has lapsed. His current treating team have no present intention to renew either. The existing position is that the Assertive Outreach mental health team will monitor the defendant, and if his symptoms re-occur or worsen, they will make decisions about the appropriate course.
The defendant pointed out the availability under the Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW) for further application for a CTO, or involuntary detention and assessment powers should these become necessary. The plaintiff submitted that consideration of whether a CTO ought to be made is not focused upon an individual’s risk of offending and is thereby not the appropriate option to address the defendant’s criminogenic risk. The defendant submitted that the exercise of powers under the Mental Health Act 2007 does relevantly incorporate considerations of community safety as well as safety of the individual (with particular reference to the objects of the Mental Health Act 2007, and to the analysis of Adamson J in Attorney General of NSW v Doolan by his tutor Jennifer Thompson (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 107).
An additional alternative regime includes the CPOR Act which already imposes obligations and restrictions upon the defendant and empowers the police to search to verify compliance with these obligations. Additionally, the defendant submits that the State may be able to seek to impose further obligations under the Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Ord**ers) Act 2004 (NSW).
It is apparent from the defendant’s history that he has repeatedly breached similar legislation in two jurisdictions in the past. During the ESO, the defendant has accessed inappropriate material on the internet and made sexualised comments about adult women and girls. It does not appear that any of those matters attracted sanctions under the CPOR Act yet given the defendant’s history they are consistent with his particular “potential risk scenarios”. There is little reason to have confidence that the defendant would voluntarily comply with reporting requirements and other restrictions on his online activity if not regularly monitored under an ESO.
The ability of police to search is an enforcement measure but not a protective factor unless the defendant’s awareness that they may conduct such a search has a deterrent effect upon him. Given that the defendant’s decisions to act upon his deviant sexual interests are to a large extent contributed to by his schizophrenic illness symptoms of poor cognition, impulsivity, poor judgment and reasoning (and against his background of breaching such orders), the existence of the legislative regime is not a significant risk reduction factor.
The other option for reducing risk is as Dr Youssef explained, a focus upon psychological intervention to increase protective factors. This is a longer-term strategy which requires a willingness and ability of the defendant to engage.
The paramount consideration in deciding whether to make an ESO is the preservation of community safety: s 3(1) of the Act. In this matter there is no dispute between the experts that the defendant is at risk of committing a serious sexual offence if he does not remain under supervision under an ESO. However, counsel for the defendant quite properly emphasises that it is both an unacceptable risk and one of a serious sexual offence of which the Court must be satisfied.
The defendant relies upon the lapse of time since his only serious offences of sexual violence, his advanced age, his physical and mental health conditions; his apparent sexual dysfunction, reduced libido, and his low motivation and activity. These features, so it is submitted, render it far less likely that the defendant will commit serious sexual offences or offences of sexual violence. Counsel for the defendant points to the absence of any offending while subject to the ESO or breaches of the ESO, and to the absence of any positive symptoms or signs of a psychotic illness.
These contentions are not without some strength. However, a difficulty is presented by the (unavoidable) timing of this application. The cessation of the defendant’s antipsychotic medication by Dr Ahmed in February 2026 and the lapse of the CTO in April 2026 are both very recent events. There has been insufficient time to be satisfied that this significant change of circumstances has not led to a change in the defendant’s “trajectory”, to adopt Dr O’Dea’s phrasing. Whilst the defendant’s clinical treating team are recorded as being satisfied on 1 April 2026 that the defendant did not show signs or symptoms of psychosis, what the evidence does demonstrate is a persistence of deviant sexual interests and inappropriate expressions of that interest, including in late 2025 and early 2026. The relevant material does not extend beyond May 2026.
Dr O’Dea’s opinion, which I accept, is that the treatment with antipsychotic medication was a significant factor in managing the defendant’s mental health and thereby his risk. There is no direct evidence of the basis of Dr Ahmed’s opinion concerning diagnosis and treatment, and as already explained it cannot be considered beyond what can be inferred or assumed from the notes. Although counsel for the defendant appropriately tested the opinions of Dr O’Dea in cross-examination, he ultimately accepted that there was insufficient evidence to establish or for the Court to find that the defendant has a personality disorder alone with no element of psychotic illness.
The defendant submits that even if the Court accepts Dr O’Dea’s diagnosis, the Court should be satisfied that ongoing engagement and monitoring by the community mental health team, combined with the availability of enforced treatment options should that become necessary, is sufficient to manage the risk associated with a deterioration in the defendant’s mental health (specifically, the re-presentation of the “positive” symptoms of a psychotic illness which would elevate his risk of offending).
It is unnecessary to engage in a formal task of construing particular provisions of the Mental Health Act 2007 with a view to resolving the parties’ competing contentions in that respect (see above at [100]). It is uncontroversial to observe that the approach to diagnosis and treatment in a clinical setting may place different emphasis upon the various matters under consideration than the approach in a forensic setting addressed to the particular statutory questions arising in these proceedings. As a practical matter, what is important is the fact that the defendant’s treating team has determined that compulsory treatment with antipsychotic medication is not presently warranted, unless circumstances change. It is relevant to observe that Dr Ahmed’s opinion that regular monitoring and outreach of the defendant alone (with neither antipsychotic medication nor a CTO) was sufficiently safe was made at a time when the defendant was subject to supervision under the ESO. That supervision incorporates close and regular observation of the defendant by DSOs empowered to require him to cooperate with their observations (and the intrusion that involves). The community mental health team anticipated relying upon DSOs to assist in identifying medication non-compliance and any other behavioural concerns. It is unknown whether Dr Ahmed would have taken any different course in the absence of an ESO, but it is clear that changes in symptoms or behaviour will be important to identify.
Dr O’Dea’s firm opinion was that a schizophrenic illness should be assertively treated. To the extent that the defendant’s response to any non-compulsory medical intervention can be predicted, it is highly probable that the defendant will not voluntarily cooperate. The evidence establishes that the defendant is generally non-compliant with medical advice and treatment with respect to both his mental and physical health. Very shortly after the cessation of the CTO, he ceased taking prescribed oral medication for depression (despite his concerns with depression) and has repeatedly made clear his attitude toward medical treatment. This extends to avoidance of seeing a GP for an apparent ankle injury from an accidental fall. Whilst these may not be uncommon behaviours for a person with the defendant’s mental health presentation, they do mean that it is not possible to rely upon the defendant to recognise or report emerging psychotic symptoms. It is a feature of his illness that he lacks insight. In the absence of treatment or supervision, any discovery of the escalation of symptoms may be too late.
In addition to medication (about which Dr Youssef declined to express an opinion) Dr Youssef, in her different area of speciality, emphasised the role of treatment by psychological intervention to increase protective factors regardless of the defendant’s formal diagnosis. It is clear that there is little prospect of the defendant engaging with any psychological intervention absent some compulsion or strong external motivation to do so. Relatedly, it is clear that the supervision of DSOs is necessary to achieve the preliminary steps required before psychological treatment can be effective.
Both court-appointed experts found that despite his claims of reduced libido and sexual functioning, the defendant continues to exhibit a high degree of sexual preoccupation and sexually deviant interests. Whilst the defendant has not breached his ESO, he has been unable or unwilling to meaningfully engage in interventions to address his criminogenic risk factors. The risks that existed in 2024 from underlying criminogenic factors therefore remain. In Dr O’Dea’s opinion, the defendant’s risk of acting upon his paraphilic disorder and committing a serious sexual offence was managed by treatment for his schizophrenic illness. That treatment has recently ceased, and insufficient time has elapsed since its cessation for there to be any confidence that the symptoms will not reoccur. The defendant’s age and declining physical health has not advanced to the stage that it is a protective or preventative factor of itself. In the absence of both treatment and supervision, the defendant presents an ongoing risk of committing a serious sexual offence. The nature of the defendant’s potential reoffending includes but is not limited to sexual offences against children.
For the reasons above, the Court is satisfied that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk, pursuant to ss 5B and 9 of the Act, of committing another serious offence, namely a serious sexual offence defined in s 5 of the Act, if not kept under supervision under the order.
Having reached that conclusion, I do not consider that there is any discretionary reason to decline to make an ESO. The regular supervision provided under the ESO addresses the defendant’s acute risk (including by closely observing symptoms and behaviour and by restricting the opportunity to offend) and his long-term risk (by continuing to encourage prosocial health and lifestyle improvements, and facilitating engagement in psychological treatment where possible, to in turn improve protective factors).
Turning to the question of conditions, the defendant objected to specific conditions sought by the plaintiff. The conditions finally made are provided in a Schedule annexed to this judgment. These reasons address only the particular conditions which were resisted by the defendant, and the determination in respect of those.
Condition 4: Electronic monitoring (“EM”). The plaintiff relies upon the ability that the EM provides for a DSO to “monitor the defendant’s compliance with scheduling and risk related behaviours”. The defendant accurately points out that there is no evidence of any deviations or identified problematic patterns or movements over 2 years of wearing the EM bracelet. This is unsurprising given the fact that the defendant has essentially remained at home unless required or strongly encouraged to leave his unit. He has had the requirement to submit a schedule removed, because of this lack of activity. Despite the defendant’s strongly expressed dislike for the EM bracelet there is no evidence of tampering or other misuse.
Of all of the conditions of the ESO, the EM is the one that the defendant has (personally) identified as the most problematic for him. He perceives that the visible ankle bracelet has provoked abuse or threats of assault from persons in his unit block or in public by identifying him as a “paedophile”. Whether or not there is an element of paranoia in his concerns, the effect is to further reduce his motivation to go out in public and create fear of his home environment. As has been established, a settled living environment and pro-social activity of some type is essential for the defendant if progress is to be made with his more complex psychological needs. It was confirmed on behalf of the plaintiff that it is within the discretion of the DSOs to vary the defendant’s levels of supervision so that the requirement for the EM bracelet is removed. This discretion has not been exercised, despite the defendant’s compliance, his lack of physical movement, and the potentially counterproductive aspect of its operation. The plaintiff has not established that the EM condition is operating to reduce criminogenic risk overall in the defendant’s particular case. I decline to make this condition.
Condition**s 5*–*7: Schedule of movements. The defendant also opposes the requirement to provide a schedule of movements on the basis that he should be encouraged to participate in pro-social activities and there is no evidence he has attended any problematic locations. I do not consider that these conditions are overly intrusive nor would the scheduling requirement (if re-instated by his DSOs) prevent well planned engagement in supported activities. Particularly given the removal of condition 4, the DSOs should retain the discretion to have some oversight of the defendant’s movements. These conditions should remain.
Condition 11: A**pproval of o**vernight v**isitors: The defendant submits that in this condition, the restriction on unapproved overnight ‘visitors’ should be limited to ‘child’ visitors. I do not agree. In the past the defendant has sought or obtained access to children by means of a relationship with adult women. In addition, young women remain particularly vulnerable. This condition should remain.
*Conditions 13–*14: Place restrictions. Condition 14 will be varied as sought by the defendant to remove ‘national parks’ from the places that the defendant may not go, to allow for participation in NDIS barbeques, which are apparently held in national parks. The overall ability of DSOs to specify a particular place where the defendant may not go should remain (again particularly in light of the removal of condition 4).
Condition 16: R**equired p**articipation in r**ecommended p**rograms including employment or training. The defendant opposes this condition as unnecessary, particularly in light of his age and unlikelihood of gaining employment. There is no suggestion this condition has not been applied with appropriate discretion. Efforts to improve the defendant’s lifestyle are important in risk management. This condition will remain.
Condition 21: Approval to enter licensed premises. The defendant submits this condition is unnecessary and overly restrictive. Dr O’Dea considers that the defendant is in remission from an alcohol misuse disorder; and the plaintiff submits that this condition is directed towards avoidance of high risk environments. The ability to grant approval allows sufficient flexibility if there were a particular reason to enter such premises. The condition will remain.
Condition 22: Attendance at drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs. There is insufficient evidence of the benefit of this condition which is in any event likely covered by broader conditions about program participation. I decline to make this condition.
Condition 25: Association r**estrictions. The plaintiff proposes an addition (as recommended by Dr Youssef) that the defendant must not “associate with any person who he knows or reasonably should know is a parent or guardian of a child or adolescent, without the prior approval of his DSO”. Whilst I understand the intention behind this proposal, I agree with the defendant that it is too broad. It is difficult to comply with, may unreasonably restrict prosocial and professional interactions and exposes the defendant to unintended breach.
Conditions 35 and 37: Restrictions on i**nternet u**se and e**lectronic c**ommunication. The defendant opposes these conditions in their “current form”, as too broad. In the absence of a suggested alternative phrasing, I decline to amend or delete them. The defendant’s risk is very closely related to his internet use; and restrictions and monitoring are appropriate.
Condition 45: Change of appearance. The variation sought by the defendant so that he is required to notify rather than seek prior approval of an appearance change is made.
Conditions 48 and 51: Requirements to take prescribed medication and participate in therapy as directed. The defendant opposes these conditions are unnecessarily intrusive, particularly the medication requirement. In light of the evidence of Dr O’Dea as to the critical contribution of appropriate medication to reduction of risk, I consider it is appropriate that the defendant be required to take prescribed medication. Prescribing decisions will still be left completely to the defendant’s treating doctors. These conditions clearly authorise the DSOs to closely monitor and report any changes and any medication non-compliance, which is of critical importance. These conditions will remain.
Condition 55: disclosure of criminal history to treating healthcare professionals: This condition includes a requirement that the disclosure be “reasonably necessary”. The defendant’s conduct toward women healthcare workers justifies the continuation of this condition.
The Court makes the following orders:
An order pursuant to sections 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (“the Act”) that the defendant be subject to an Extended Supervision Order (“the Extended Supervision Order”) for a period of 2 years from the date of the order.
An order pursuant to s 11 of the Act directing the defendant, for the period of the Extended Supervision Order, to comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule annexed to this judgment.
An order that access to the Supreme Court’s file in respect of any document shall not be granted to a non-party without the leave of a judge of the Court and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, the parties are to be notified by the Registrar so as to allow them an opportunity to be heard in relation to the application for access.
**********
Also known as Arthur Fairwell.
The original Summons was filed on 19 December 2025.
State of New South Wales v Farzad (Preliminary) [2023] NSWSC 1207.
State of New South Wales
Farzad (Final) (No 2)