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File Number(s): 2026/00259050

JUDGMENT

1. The Plaintiff in these proceedings owns two dogs: Oscar, a black labrador-cross, and Oliver, a beagle. He has elected to represent himself.

2. On 23 March 2026, the Defendant was alerted to a report of potential animal cruelty at the Plaintiff’s property at Guildford. That same day, two of the Defendant’s officers, Inspector Sandra Costa and Chief Inspector Amanda Gray, attended the premises wearing body-worn video cameras. They seized the dogs and affixed a notice of seizure to the front door of the property. That notice informed the Plaintiff that his dogs had been seized under Pt 2A of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) (the Act). The dogs were transported to a veterinary clinic at Kemps Creek for assessment.

3. On 27 March 2026, Oliver was returned to the Plaintiff by three officers of the Defendant. The Plaintiff was informed that the other dog, Oscar, would remain in “protective custody” pending an ongoing investigation. Oscar is still in the custody of the Defendant.

4. On 8 May 2026, Inspector Costa served on the Plaintiff a court attendance notice (the CAN) which charged him with two offences, namely:

5. committing an act of cruelty upon an animal, contrary to s 5(1) of the Act; and

6. being in charge of an animal, failing to alleviate its pain, contrary to s 5(3)(b) of the Act.

7. The CAN advised the Plaintiff that the matter was listed on 23 June 2026. It was filed in the Local Court at Parramatta on 11 May 2026, being 49 days after Oscar was seized. The matter was ultimately relisted for first mention on 21 July 2026.

8. Although the Defendant is a private organisation, its employees instituted those proceedings as public officers. A “public officer” relevantly includes “an officer or employee of a body declared by the regulations to be a public body for the purposes of this definition”: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) (CPA) s 3(1) (definition of “public officer”, para (f)). The regulations have declared the Defendant to be a public body for the purposes of that definition: Criminal Procedure Regulation 2017 (NSW) r 113(1)(c).

9. By Summons filed on 23 June 2026, the Plaintiff seeks the following relief:

10. A declaration that, unless proceedings concerning Oscar, also referred to by the Defendant as “A76181 Snoopy”, were commenced within the 60-day period prescribed by s 24J(2) of the Act, the Defendant has no lawful authority to continue retaining Oscar.

11. Consequent upon that declaration, an order that the Defendant immediately return Oscar to the Plaintiff, or return him by such time as the Court directs.

12. In the alternative, if the Defendant contends that proceedings concerning Oscar were commenced within the 60-day period prescribed by s 24J(2), an order that the Defendant provide to the Court and to the Plaintiff documentary evidence identifying those proceedings, including the CAN, court, registry, filing date, case number, listing number and statutory basis relied upon.

13. If such proceedings are established, an order that Oscar be released into the Plaintiff’s custody on an interim basis pending the final determination of those proceedings, or until a court of competent jurisdiction otherwise orders.

14. Costs.

15. The matter came before me sitting as Common Law Duty Judge. The Plaintiff appeared in person and read his affidavit affirmed on 14 June 2026. The Defendant was represented by Mr Farrell of Counsel, who read an affidavit of Inspector Costa sworn on 9 July 2026. Both parties made brief oral submissions and otherwise relied on their written submissions which had been provided before the hearing.

Issue to be determined

9. A considerable volume of material has been filed in these proceedings. Most of it is irrelevant to the narrow issue in dispute. The relief sought by the Plaintiff turns on the application of s 24J(2) of the Act, which provides:

24J Powers of inspectors in relation to care of animals

…

(2) An animal (or carcass) to which section 24I (a) applies may be retained by an inspector for a period not exceeding 60 days or where, within that 60-day period proceedings are commenced in respect of the offence concerned, until the proceedings are finally determined (unless the court otherwise directs).

10. Section 24I(a) provides that “[a]n inspector may examine an animal if the inspector suspects, on reasonable grounds, that … an offence against this Act or the regulations is being, has been or is about to be committed in respect of the animal”.

11. The outcome of these proceedings hinges on whether the Defendant commenced its proceedings against the Plaintiff within 60 days of its seizing Oscar. If it did, the Plaintiff must fail.

The Plaintiff’s case

12. Synthesising the Plaintiff’s Summons, affidavit evidence and submissions, he essentially makes two arguments in support of his claim for relief.

13. First, he says that the proceedings in the Local Court have not been validly commenced. This submission is based upon his belief that a registry stamp on a prosecutor’s copy of a court attendance notice does not constitute the commencement of proceedings. He complains that he was not furnished with a case number, JusticeLink extract or registry filing receipt.

14. Secondly, and following from the first proposition, the Plaintiff contends that because 60 days have elapsed since Oscar was seized, the Defendant has no authority under s 24J(2) to retain him.

The Defendant’s response

15. At the commencement of his oral submissions, Mr Farrell corrected a reference in his written submissions to the provision of the CPA governing the commencement of proceedings. He accepted the Plaintiff’s submission that the relevant provision is found in Ch 4, which concerns the procedure for the prosecution of summary offences, rather than Ch 3, which concerns indictable offences. But, having made that correction, he noted that the legal consequence was nil.

16. A distillation of the Defendant’s submissions is as follows:

17. section 24J(2) of the Act provides that an animal “may be retained by an inspector for a period not exceeding 60 days or where, within that 60-day period proceedings are commenced in respect of the offence concerned, until the proceedings are finally determined (unless the court otherwise directs)”;

18. after the seizure of Oscar, the Plaintiff was charged with offences under the Act;

19. on 11 May 2026, the CAN, which had been personally served on the Plaintiff on 8 May 2026, was filed in the Local Court;

20. despite invoking the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction, the Plaintiff fails to demonstrate any legitimate or arguable ground of review; and

21. the Summons proceeds on an erroneous basis because the Defendant commenced proceedings within 60 days.

Consideration

The commencement argument

17. The first limb of the Plaintiff’s argument is that the proceedings were not validly commenced within 60 days of Oscar’s being seized.

18. Proceedings for an offence are commenced by the issue and filing of a court attendance notice in accordance with Div 1 of Pt 2 of Ch 4 of the CPA: CPA s 172(1). A public officer authorised to commence proceedings may do so by “issuing a court attendance notice and filing the notice in accordance with [that] Division”: s 173. A court attendance notice issued by a public officer must be issued and filed in accordance with the relevant rules: s 177(2) and (4). Relevantly, it may be served personally: Local Court Rules 2009 (NSW) (LCR) r 5.9(1)(a). It is taken to be filed by a public officer if, relevantly here, it is “delivered by hand to the registry”: LCR r 8.7(1)(a). Finally, proceedings are taken to have commenced on the date on which a court attendance notice is filed in the registry of the court in accordance with the Division: CPA s 178(1).

19. Inspector Costa deposes at paragraph 11 of her affidavit that she attended the Plaintiff’s home along with Chief Inspector Gray and Senior Inspector JonPaul Rook on 8 May 2026 at around 9.30am. The Plaintiff was not home although his father was. Inspector Costa called the Plaintiff on his mobile phone, and he requested that she provide the legal documents (that Inspector Costa had referred to) to his father. This was not satisfactory to Inspector Costa. She advised the Plaintiff that she needed to serve the documents personally. Approximately 30 minutes later the Plaintiff arrived. Inspector Costa advised him that her body-worn video camera was recording and she then served the CAN and a brief of evidence on him.

20. At paragraph 18 of that affidavit, Inspector Costa states that on 11 May 2026 the CAN was filed at the Local Court at Parramatta by Inspector Devitre. I infer that this was done in person. A copy of that filed CAN is annexed to the affidavit. It clearly displays a stamp which indicates it was received by the Court on 11 May 2026.

21. It is perfectly plain that the Defendant commenced proceedings against the Plaintiff on 11 May 2026, being 49 days after Oscar was seized. The unchallenged evidence is that the CAN was served personally by a public officer. Three days later, it was filed in the registry of the Local Court by a public officer. The Plaintiff appears to accept that the proceedings are on foot. He accepted at the hearing that he was going to appear in the Local Court on the very next day in respect of those proceedings. He did not suggest he would raise any jurisdictional objection based on a lack of service. Accordingly, this argument fails.

22. At paragraph 12 of his written submissions, the Plaintiff appeared to raise a subsidiary argument that the Act “prescribes a 60 days max retention”, and that this period has expired. If that is his argument, it is wrong. Where, as here, the proceedings have been commenced within 60 days of the animal’s being seized, s 24J(2) provides that the inspector may retain the animal until the proceedings are finally determined. If those proceedings, for whatever reason, take substantially longer than the initial 60-day window, so be it. It is open to a party in the Plaintiff’s position to approach the Local Court to seek a variation under that provision for the release of the animal prior to the finalisation of the proceedings. That is not the application before me, nor is it one that this Court could entertain. That is the exclusive domain of the Local Court.

The deficiency argument

23. At paragraphs 9 to 12 of his written submissions, the Plaintiff further argues that the CAN contains several deficiencies. Section 175(3) of the CPA provides that a court attendance notice must do the following:

24. describe the offence;

25. briefly state the particulars of the alleged offence;

26. contain the name of the prosecutor;

27. require the accused person to appear before the court at a specified date, time and place, unless a warrant is issued for the arrest of the person or the person is refused bail; and

28. state, unless a warrant is issued for the arrest of the person or the person is refused bail, that failure to appear may result in the arrest of the person or in the matter being dealt with in the absence of the person.

29. Additionally, LCR r 3.11(2) prescribes that a court attendance notice must include:

30. the time and date of the alleged offence or, if the exact time and date are not known or the alleged offence occurred over a period of time, the period of time during which the offence is alleged to have occurred; and

31. the place where the offence is alleged to have occurred.

32. The CAN in evidence complies with each of these requirements. Contrary to the Plaintiff’s submission, there are no deficiencies which invalidate it.

33. The Plaintiff further argues that s 177(4) of the CPA required the Defendant to file a court attendance notice which contained an endorsement as to service. He relied on Sharman v Director of Public Prosecutions [2006] NSWSC 135; 161 A Crim R 1 (Sharman) in support of the proposition that without such an endorsement, the proceedings were not validly commenced. When Sharman was decided, s 177(4) relevantly provided as follows:

“A copy of a court attendance notice must, except with the leave of a Magistrate or a registrar of the court, be filed in a court not later than 7 days after it is served and must contain an endorsement as to service.”

27. However, that provision was repealed and replaced on 29 November 2006: Crimes and Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (NSW) Sch 1.11 [15]. It now reads as follows:

“A copy of a court attendance notice must be filed in the registry of a court in accordance with the rules.”

28. The CAN at issue here was filed in accordance with the rules. This argument goes nowhere.

Conclusions

29. The evidence establishes, beyond argument, that proceedings have been commenced by the inspector within 60 days of the seizing of Oscar. Therefore, unless the Local Court otherwise orders, the Defendant is entitled to retain him until the proceedings against the Plaintiff in that Court are finally determined.

30. Having made that finding, the relief sought in Prayers 1 and 2 of the Summons are rejected.

31. Prayer 3 seeks, in the alternative, that the Defendant provide the Court and the Plaintiff with documentary evidence identifying the proceedings etc. I reject this for three reasons. First, the Plaintiff has not identified a power that would enable the making of such an order. Secondly, even if such a power were identified, given the availability of alternative means of obtaining that information, such as the making of a request under Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), I would not be minded to exercise that power. Thirdly, it seems that the affidavit of Inspector Costa provides such information which, in any event, could no doubt be obtained from the Local Court registry.

32. Prayer 4 seeks Oscar’s release into the Plaintiff’s custody “on an interim basis pending the final determination of those proceedings”. It is refused. As I have stated at [22] above, that is a matter for the Local Court, not this Court. Moreover, the Plaintiff articulates no reasonable basis as to why this Court would release Oscar into his custody. To contemplate making such an order would almost inevitably require this Court to embark upon factual findings concerning the Plaintiff’s conduct. This would necessarily trespass upon the fact-finding that the Local Court will need to undertake in relation to the prosecution presently on foot before it. Even if this Court had such power, it would most likely be stayed pending the outcome of the criminal prosecution.

Orders

33. For those reasons, I make the following orders:

34. The Summons is dismissed.

35. The Plaintiff is to pay the Defendant’s costs.

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