White Pointer Investments Pty Ltd v Creative Academy Group Pty Ltd - [2023] NSWSC 817 - NSWSC 2023 case summary — Zoe

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White Pointer Investments Pty Ltd v Creative Academy Group Pty Ltd

[2023] NSWSC 817

Supreme Court of NSW|2023-03-22|Before: Rees J

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of NSW

Decision date

2023-03-22

Before

Rees J

Catchwords

(1992) 175 CLR 353 Director of Public Prosecutions for Victoria v Le [2007] HCA 52 Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton [2012] HCA 7
[2003] FCA 5 Ghazal v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1992) 29 NSWLR 336 Gnych v Polish Club Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 144
[2015] HCA 23 Grant v John Grant and Sons [1954] HCA 23
(1954) 91 CLR 112 Guan v Lui [2021] NSWCA 65 Haigh v Brooks (1839) 10 Ad & El 309

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

(1992) 175 CLR 353 Director of Public Prosecutions for Victoria v Le [2007] HCA 52 Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton [2012] HCA 7[2003] FCA 5 Ghazal v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1992) 29 NSWLR 336 Gnych v Polish Club Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 144[2015] HCA 23 Grant v John Grant and Sons [1954] HCA 23(1954) 91 CLR 112 Guan v Lui [2021] NSWCA 65 Haigh v Brooks (1839) 10 Ad & El 309[2002] 1 Qd R 49 John Holland Pty Ltd v Kellogg Brown & Root Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 451 Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8[2019] NSWCA 127 Sultana Investments Pty Ltd v Cellcom Pty Ltd (No 1) [2008] QCA 357

Judgment (40 paragraphs)

[1]

Aztech Science v Atlanta Aerospace (Woy Woy) [2005] NSWCA 319 B J McAdam Pty Ltd v Jax Tyres Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 1438 Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council [2001] NSWCA 61; (2001) 53 NSWLR 153 Breusch v Watts Development Division Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 311 Challenger Group Holdings Ltd v Concept Equity Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 801 Challenger Group Holdings Ltd v Concept Equity Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 120 Commissioner of State Revenue v Viewbank Properties Pty Ltd [2004] VSC 127 David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1992] HCA 353; (1992) 175 CLR 353 Director of Public Prosecutions for Victoria v Le [2007] HCA 52 Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton [2012] HCA 7; (2012) 246 CLR 498 Freehold Land Investments Ltd v Queensland Estates Pty Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 418 GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty Ltd (2003) 128 FCR 1; [2003] FCA 5 Ghazal v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1992) 29 NSWLR 336 Gnych v Polish Club Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 144; [2015] HCA 23 Grant v John Grant and Sons [1954] HCA 23; (1954) 91 CLR 112 Guan v Lui [2021] NSWCA 65 Haigh v Brooks (1839) 10 Ad & El 309; (1839) 113 ER 119 Hawk Australia Pty Ltd v George Ambrose Commercial Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1150 Integrated Computer Services Pty Ltd v Digital Equipment Corp (Aust) Pty Ltd (1988) 5 BPR 11,110 International Harvester Co of Australia Pty Ltd v Carrigan's Hazeldene Pastoral Co (1958) 100 CLR 644 Jenkins v Kedcorp Pty Ltd [1999] QCA 452; [2002] 1 Qd R 49 John Holland Pty Ltd v Kellogg Brown & Root Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 451 Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298 JR Consulting & Drafting Pty Ltd v Cummings (2016) 239 ALR 625 Kennedy v De Trafford [1897] AC 180 Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361; [2011] HCA 11 Larkin v Girvan (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 365 Lendlease Real Estate Investments Ltd v Charter Hall Retail Management Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1624 Lym International Pty Limited v Marcolongo (2011) 15 BPR 29,465; [2011] NSWCA 303 Mathews Capital Partners Pty Ltd v Coal of Queensland Holdings Ltd [2012] NSWSC 462 Newitt v Leitch (1997) 6 Tas R 396 Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191 Persad v Singh [2017] UKPC 32 Peterson v Moloney (1957) 84 CLR 91 Queensland Phosphate Pty Limited v Korda and Shepard (as joint and several liquidators of Legend International Holdings Inc (in liq)) [2017] VSCA 269 R v Thiyagarajah [2019] SASC 84 RHG Mortgage Ltd v Rosario Ianni [2015] NSWCA 56 Rogers v Kabriel [1999] NSWSC 3 Ryde Developments v The Property Investors Alliance [2017] NSWSC 436 SAS Realty Developments Pty Ltd v Kerr [2013] NSWCA 56 Schwartz v Hadid [2013] NSWCA 89 Scott v Davis (2002) 204 CLR 333 Searle v Commonwealth of Australia (2019) 100 NSWLR 55; [2019] NSWCA 127 Sultana Investments Pty Ltd v Cellcom Pty Ltd (No 1) [2008] QCA 357; [2009] 1 Qd R 589 Sunlink Group Pty Ltd v Lui [2019] NSWSC 803 The Property Investors Alliance Pty Ltd v C88 Project Pty Ltd (in liq) [2022] NSWSC 1081 Watson v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315 Wigan v Edwards (1973) 1 ALR 497 Williams v ATM & CPA Pty Limited [2015] NSWSC 703 Texts Cited: Ian Jackman, Varieties of Restitution (Federation Press, 2nd Edition) J W Carter, Contract Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 7th Edition) K Mason, J W Carter and G J Tolhurst, Restitution Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th Edition) N C Seddon and R A Bigwood, Cheshire & Fifoot Law of Contract, (LexisNexis Butterworths, 11th Australian Edition) Category: Principal judgment Parties: White Pointer Investments Pty Ltd (Plaintiff) Creative Academy Group Pty Ltd (First Defendant) Wonderschool (Conder) Pty Ltd (Second Defendant) Wonderschool (Dickson) Pty Ltd (Third Defendant) Wonderschool (Taylor) Pty Ltd (Fourth Defendant) Wonderschool (Throsby) Pty Ltd (Fifth Defendant) Wonderschool (Woden) Pty Ltd (Sixth Defendant) Simon Larcombe (Seventh Defendant) Representation: Counsel: Mr I Pike SC / Mr CE Bannan (Plaintiff) Mr R Newlinds SC / Mr PD Reynolds (First to Seventh Defendants)

[4]

Evidentiary matters

The plaintiff relied on the evidence of its director, Hilton Hedley, who was cross-examined. Mr Hedley appeared an intelligent and straightforward person. He did make some unsolicited negative comments about his former friend, Mr Larcombe, and was clearly annoyed about the events which had unfolded. Mr Hedley was entitled to feel badly treated by his "mate," who later boasted that he had "smashed" Mr Hedley on fees: see [195].
Mr Hedley's evidence contained some inconsistencies which were not of great moment: see [27]. Of more moment, Mr Hedley down-played the extent of the tasks which he performed for the defendants, presumably in light of the allegation that the plaintiff should have had a real estate agent licence. Mr Hedley was reluctant to accept that he had provided the defendants with advice in respect of whether a particular site was suitable, agreeing that he provided "vague advice on whether the opportunity was a good or a bad one." Likewise, "to the extent that it was a 'cracker' or a 'f'ing cracker' … it'd be limited to that." It is clear from his emails and text messages that Mr Hedley did provide advice from time to time, albeit in loose colloquial terms. The plaintiff's counsel accepted that Mr Hedley's evidence that he did not give advice was wrong. Otherwise, Mr Hedley was generally open and accurate about his role. I consider Mr Hedley to be a generally reliable witness, albeit I have deferred to contemporaneous documents.
In this regard, the parties tendered a very substantial amount of documentary material. Any discrepancies between Mr Hedley's first and second affidavits, or his oral evidence, as to the services the plaintiff provided are resolved by this material. Similarly, whatever concessions were said to have been extracted in cross examination do not override the import of this material. I have in mind Mr Hedley's agreement in cross-examination that he would not introduce a tenant to the landlord's agent if he did not think they would be a good operator; by implication, he was recommending that person as a tenant. At least for the ACT sites, the contemporaneous records indicate that the landlord's agent, Guy Randell, recommended the tenant and not the plaintiff: see for example, at [71].
The defendants called no witnesses. An affidavit had been served by Mr Larcombe, who was not ultimately called to give evidence. The plaintiff submitted that the Court should draw an adverse inference from his failure to give evidence: Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 320-321 (per Windeyer J). The defendants submitted that the Court should simply infer that Mr Larcombe could not offer any cogent evidence as to what was said in conversations six years ago at a "boozy" lunch, and infer that he could not remember with certainty the words that were said. In any event, the plaintiff had also proposed to call Glenn Dumbrell, who was not called, and so a Jones v Dunkel inference would cut both ways.
I readily draw a Jones v Dunkel in respect of the failure to call Mr Larcombe. As explained in Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd [2011] HCA 11; (2011) 243 CLR 361; at [63]: (emphasis added) The rule in Jones v Dunkel is that the unexplained failure by a party to call a witness may in appropriate circumstances support an inference that the uncalled evidence would not have assisted the party's case. That is particularly so where it is the party which is the uncalled witness. The failure to call a witness may also permit the court to draw, with greater confidence, any inference unfavourable to the party that failed to call the witness, if that uncalled witness appears to be in a position to cast light on whether the inference should be drawn. … See likewise RHG Mortgage Ltd v Rosario Ianni [2015] NSWCA 56 at [78] (per McColl JA, Emmett JA and Sackville AJA agreeing, citing Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191 at 201-202 (per Glass JA)).
Mr Larcombe's evidence was relevant not only to the conversations forming the oral agreement but also on the extent of Mr Hedley's role in performing that agreement in the ensuing two years, circumstances surrounding the settlement agreement and whether Mr Larcombe was mistaken when making payments to the plaintiff. I infer that his evidence would not have assisted the defendants' case.
As to Mr Dumbrell, at the time of these events, Mr Dumbrell worked for the defendants. Mr Dumbrell was the executive general manager of Creative Academy, overseeing property acquisition and senior management. An initial question is whether Mr Dumbrell may be regarded as "in the camp" of the plaintiff or "a witness likely to be friendly to the interests of the other party": Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191 at 201-202 (per Glass JA); Ghazal v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1992) 29 NSWLR 336 at 343 (per Kirby P, Mahoney and Clarke JJA agreeing). The fact that Mr Dumbrell swore two affidavits which were served in support of the plaintiff's case suggests that, by the time of the hearing at least, his allegiance had shifted to Mr Hedley. As no explanation was given for Mr Dumbrell's failure to give evidence, I draw the same inference. To some extent, this does have a neutralising effect in respect of the absence of Mr Larcombe, at least in respect of the oral agreement. However, Mr Larcombe is a party to these proceedings. He is a director and, through other corporate entities, a shareholder of the corporate defendants. Mr Larcombe was the decisionmaker in respect of each transaction. His absence from the witness box is significant.

[6]

Mr Hedley and Mr Larcombe meet again

From 2003 until 2006, Mr Hedley worked with Mr Dumbrell at Stockland. Afterwards, they maintained a professional working relationship. Mr Dumbrell generally worked for owners. Mr Hedley predominantly worked for tenants.
Mr Dumbrell and his domestic partner became involved in childcare centres, incorporating Play Academy Australia Pty Ltd in 2016. Play Academy began with one childcare centre in Five Dock ("Happy Little Campers") and, in September 2017, was working towards opening another childcare centre in Croydon Park ("Woodstock"). Whilst Play Academy was owned by Mr Dumbrell and his partner, Mr Dumbrell then wrote that the company had "major financial backing to grow the group to 30 centres over the next five years." This appears to have been a reference to Mr Larcombe and his colleague, Anthony Brooks, who were providing financial support to acquire the Croydon childcare centre.
Likely at this time, Mr Hedley and Mr Dumbrell met at the Woollahra Hotel one evening. Mr Dumbrell said that he and his domestic partner had started up a business managing childcare centres and were looking for investors. Mr Hedley said, "I have so many sites on the go with Kids Club. I am happy to steer them your way as long as you pay me the same fee as Kids Club." Mr Hedley had already mentioned to Mr Dumbrell on a few occasions that he was getting $2,000 per place (plus GST) from Kids Club.
Mr Hedley was then doing some work for the developer of a site in Hurstville. Mr Hedley and Mr Dumbrell discussed the opportunity for a long day care centre in the Hurstville development. On 19 September 2017, Mr Dumbrell sent Mr Hedley an offer, addressed to the developer and Mr Hedley, for Play Academy to lease the childcare premises at Hurstville. Mr Dumbrell also asked to meet to discuss purchase of the site.
Later that evening, Mr Dumbrell reported to Mr Larcombe by text message, describing the Hurstville deal as "golden", where the owner was said to be one of Mr Hedley's "best mates." Mr Dumbrell texted "One of [the] best deals [we have] come across for childcare. And we have [the] inside position." That is, Mr Dumbrell perceived that the relationship with Mr Hedley gave Play Academy an advantage in accessing this childcare site.
The next morning, on 20 September 2017, Mr Larcombe responded, "Brilliant let's do it!!" The same day, the first defendant was incorporated, initially as Croydon Childcare Pty Ltd. (Presumably, the company was then intended to be the special purpose vehicle for Play Academy's upcoming Croydon childcare centre). Mr Larcombe and Giancarlo (Jim) Mascitelli were appointed as directors. Mr Mascitelli is Mr Larcombe's accountant.
On 25 September 2017, Mr Dumbrell sent Mr Hedley a further offer from Play Academy to lease the Hurstville site and asked to meet again and "discuss option as well." On 27 September 2017, Mr Dumbrell provided Mr Hedley with a letter from Mr Mascitelli, confirming the financial capacity of Mr Larcombe and Mr Brooks. Mr Dumbrell emailed "This should [do]. [Is] your client happy." Further, Mr Dumbrell advised "We want to meet and put in an offer for $6.3 million. Subject to [due diligence] and have an option period for six months. Let's discuss with formal offer today [a]t 4.00." Shortly after 4.00 pm, Mr Dumbrell sent Mr Hedley an adjusted offer to lease and purchase the Hurstville site "as we discussed." The offer now noted that, from initial investigations and their meeting, "we would put forward an offer of $6.3 million subject to a due diligence of 4 weeks." The email was copied to Mr Larcombe.
Mr Larcombe emailed Mr Dumbrell, asking for a rough summary of how the deal would work. Mr Dumbrell advised that he would send through a breakdown and simple feasibility. Mr Hedley was copied on these emails. Mr Larcombe added, "And hope your well Hilton mu[st] catch up for lunch when your free." Mr Hedley replied, "G'day Simon … yes long overdue …" Mr Larcombe had gone to school with Mr Hedley's brother. Mr Hedley and Mr Larcombe had known each other for a long time but had not seen each recently. It would appear that, by these email exchanges, Mr Hedley renewed contact with Mr Larcombe.
On 28 September 2017, Mr Hedley emailed Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe, asking whether they were available to meet with the Hurstville owner's builder/architect on the afternoon of 3 October 2017, to go through design and construction costs, gain an understanding of the development application and ask any questions they may have regarding the overall development.
Likely at about this time, Mr Hedley met with Mr Larcombe and Mr Dumbrell at the Woollahra Hotel. Mr Hedley said "it was quick. It was a bit of chit chat." Mr Hedley struggled to recall precise details of the conversation, "I mean, we're going back six years." As described in his affidavit, Mr Hedley told Mr Larcombe, "I have heaps of sites that I am working on for Kids Club. I am more than happy to steer them your way so long as you pay me the same fee as what Kids Club are paying me." Mr Larcombe was keen and asked what Mr Hedley was being paid by Kids Club. Mr Hedley said "$2,000 per place structured over two payments, lease signed and DA approved and the final figure on opening. For example, a 100 place centre equalled a $200,000 fee plus GST."

[7]

A "boozy" lunch

The subject was discussed again when the gentlemen had a "boozy lunch" over a few hours at "Bistro Moncur" in Woollahra. Over lunch, Mr Larcombe said he was part of a group of investors looking at investing in childcare centres and asked what Mr Hedley would charge them to source sites for childcare centres. Mr Hedley said he would charge $2,000 plus GST per placement, with 50% of the fee payable when the lease was signed and development application approved, with the remainder when the childcare centre opened. Mr Larcombe said, "If you source childcare centres for us, we will pay you those fees."
After the lunch, Mr Hedley did not immediately follow up the defendants with an email or letter confirming that he understood that they had an agreement, nor was it Mr Hedley's usual practice to do so, "I've learnt over the years that if someone doesn't want to pay, they won't pay, irrespective of how bulletproof your agreement is, and a lot of it was me going on the trust that [Mr Larcombe had] known me for 30 odd years, that he wouldn't dud me. … He was still good friends with my brother. He was business partners with someone I considered a friend, being Glenn Dumbrell, and in terms of the level of risk …"
Against this, Mr Hedley later said in cross-examination that he did ask Mr Larcombe for an agreement in writing shortly after the lunch at Bistro Moncur, "Yes, absolutely. And it was only because he paid me the full entitled fee for the first deal and the second deal, and I think the third and the fourth. … To me that constitutes an agreement, especially if he pays it. … When someone pays you on the first couple of deals, it doesn't become … as much of an urgency." Mr Larcombe's congratulatory comments and appreciative remarks on the conclusion of each deal "alluded me into thinking that there was no reason to be concerned about ever being not paid." Mr Hedley's answer aggregates events which occurred over a year; he may have been referring to his request for a written agreement in June 2019: see [141]. There is some contemporaneous evidence that Mr Hedley "always wanted an agreement in writing": see [176]. Little turns on this.
Mr Hedley said the fee discussed was the same fee he was being paid by Kids Club Childcare and Little Learning School. Mr Hedley said he would not have done any work for the defendants had he not had an agreement, be it verbal or otherwise. It was Mr Hedley's understanding that the defendants were then unknown in the childcare sector. Given his experience, Mr Hedley understood that the defendants were going to have difficulties securing sites to operate childcare centres. Such sites are usually taken up by established operators with a proven track record. Mr Hedley understood that childcare was a competitive market with many operators. Landlords could be selective about which operator entered into a lease for a site. If Mr Larcombe had not agreed to pay the fee, Mr Hedley would have continued to put other clients forward for childcare sites rather than the defendants. I will return to whether an oral agreement was concluded at [203].

[8]

"Sourcing" sites

Mr Hedley said that leasing and establishing a childcare centre involved a series of chronological steps. First, the plaintiff communicated with the client to see whether they had an interest in a site. If so, a site inspection took place, either with or without the developer. The client carried out due diligence and, if interested, prepared an offer which it forwarded to the developer. The developer and client may comment on offers and exchange correspondence regarding an appropriate offer. When an offer was deemed acceptable, a final letter of offer was signed by the client and forwarded to the developer for execution. The signed letter of offer (or 'heads of agreement') was provided to the parties' respective solicitors, who prepared a disclosure statement and negotiated the terms of an agreement for lease. The agreement for lease was executed, annexing the proposed lease. Progressively, the development application would be approved, the childcare centre marketed and built. Staff for the childcare centre were recruited and the childcare centre opened, with the lease coming into effect.
Mr Hedley said the work he undertook for the defendants was largely limited to early steps in this sequence. That does, broadly, appear to be the case. However, given the defendants' reliance on the Property and Stock Agents Act and the Agents Act, it is necessary to consider precisely what the plaintiff did for the defendants in respect of each of the eight childcare sites. (To assist the reader, I have initially set out the plaintiff's work in chronological order, to the extent that it sheds light on the existence of the oral contract, before drawing together the work done on each site).
The parties also referred to a number of other childcare sites which the plaintiff and defendants sought to progress but which came to nought. As I understood it, these other sites were relied by the plaintiff as post-contractual conduct evidencing the oral contract, while the defendants relied on the plaintiff's work in respect of these sites as evidence that the plaintiff was carrying on business as a real estate agent.
I am reluctant to consider the plaintiff's actions in respect of these other sites for two reasons. First, in support of the contention that the plaintiff was carrying on the business of a real estate agent, the defendants' pleadings did not refer to, or particularise, these other sites but simply relied on the services which the parties alleged had been provided in respect of the eight sites the subject of this judgment.
Second, the allegation that the plaintiff was carrying on the business of a real estate agent without a licence was largely concerned with whether the plaintiff was prohibited from bringing these proceedings to recover its fee. Section 9(2) of the Property and Stock Agents Act provides that a corporation is not entitled to bring proceedings to recover a fee "for any service performed by the corporation as an agent unless the corporation was the holder of a corporation licence at the time of performing the service." Section 23 of the Agents Act is in like terms, disentitling a person from bringing proceedings to recover a fee "for a service provided by the person as an agent if the person was not licensed to provide the service when the service was provided."
Both forms of the legislation require the Court to focus on the service for which a fee is sought to be recovered and whether the plaintiff should have held a real estate agent licence when the service was provided. I consider that whatever services the plaintiff provided for other sites - for which it charged no fee and brings no proceedings - should not be taken into account when determining that question. For example, I think it would be wrong to conclude that, by reason of the plaintiff's efforts to source sites for the defendants in North Sydney or Gungahlin in the ACT (assuming for the moment that those services required a real estate licence) that the plaintiff is precluded from recovering its fee in respect of Hurstville or Red Hill in the ACT (assuming for the moment that the services provided in respect of Hurstville and Red Hill did not require a real estate licence). Where the legislation in question is penal, "one has to be fairly conservative and literal in the way that one approaches the section": Challenger Group Holdings Ltd v Concept Equity Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 801 at [65] (per Young CJ in Eq) (reversed on appeal but not on this issue). For this reason, I have put the evidence in respect of other sites to one side, beyond brief mention to the extent that it may indicate whether the oral contract existed.

[10]

Creative Academy

In January 2018, the first defendant changed its name to Creative Academy Group Pty Ltd. A shareholders agreement was executed between companies associated with Mr Larcombe, his brother Sean Larcombe, Mr Mascitelli, Mr Dumbrell and his domestic partner. (Mr Dumbrell and his partner's corporate entity executed the agreement as a prospective shareholder). Mr Dumbrell's partner became a director of Creative Academy. Creative Academy later registered the business name "Wonderschool." Play Academy was later deregistered. It would appear that, at this time, the defendants made a decision to invest in the childcare business more broadly.
In February 2018, text messages ensued between Mr Hedley, Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe in respect of inspecting sites in Manuka and Tuggeranong. After the site inspection, Mr Larcombe said he would provide Mr Hedley with offers for both sites. Mr Larcombe was then interested in buying Manuka. Neither site went ahead.
On 14 March 2018, Mr Hedley provided Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe with a competing offer to lease the Hurstville site. Mr Dumbrell replied that the offer was made by a company which was under some operational strain, "Please advise your client." Mr Hedley replied, "You're my client." Mr Dumbrell replied, "You know what I mean." As it would appear that Mr Hedley's client was the Hurstville owner, he now appears to have been assisting both sides of this potential transaction. Mr Hedley's reference to the defendants as "my client" also suggests that the plaintiff had been retained by the defendants, supporting the existence of an oral contract as described.
By now, it would appear that the defendants were no longer considering purchasing the Hurstville site, but were still interested in a lease. On 16 March 2018, Mr Dumbrell provided Mr Hedley with a further offer to lease the Hurstville site. Mr Hedley pointed out some errors in the offer which required correction. On 17 March 2018, Mr Hedley provided the Hurstville owner and its solicitor with details for the defendants' solicitor. Mr Hedley advised that signed heads of agreement were expected shortly; the owner's solicitor could then prepare a disclosure statement and lease.
On 19 March 2018, Mr Dumbrell provided Mr Hedley with a further offer to lease the Hurstville site. The proposed lessee was now "Wonderschool Hurstville Pty Ltd." Mr Hedley was asked to "Confirm lessor works and handover date and we will come back to you." In parallel, Mr Hedley was in contact with Mr Randell, "Let me know what days are good for you next week to meet and discuss … Hurstville … I am the introducing agent and will merely be referring the sale on to you." Perhaps Mr Hedley needed another agent to represent the defendants on the transaction, where he was already retained by the Hurstville owner.
On 22 March 2018, the designer for the Hurstville site provided Mr Hedley with details of the landlord works, which Mr Hedley was asked to pass on to "your tenant" with a view to meeting to go through the plans; presumably the designer was referring to the tenant which Mr Hedley had found for property. Mr Hedley forwarded the material to Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe, "We need to meet and go through this so we are all on the same page re: the works etc." Mr Dumbrell advised that he would review and discuss the matter with Mr Larcombe and suggested that they then meet to go through it. Mr Hedley replied, "yep once this is sorted a formal acceptance will come out and leases issued. The deal has in princip[le] been approved. Can you push the needs analysis as urgent please for both you and the owner's peace of mind." (For each potential childcare site, the defendants retained a consultant to prepare a "Childcare Needs Assessment" report, indicating whether there was unmet need for childcare places in the area, such that the childcare centre was likely to be filled).
Mr Hedley, Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe arranged to meet on 26 March 2018. On 28 March 2018, Mr Larcombe emailed Mr Dumbrell and Mr Hedley, noting that the offer did not mention the number of placements, "Needs to be in document so if they don't get us 100 then rent is reduced." Mr Hedley replied, "Yes its prorated on a per place basis."
On 3 April 2018, the Hurstville owner's designer provided an amended Landlord Works Schedule to Mr Hedley and arranged a meeting on 5 April 2018. Mr Hedley informed Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe of the meeting details. On 9 April 2018, the owner's solicitor provided a draft lease to the defendants' solicitor for consideration. On 12 April 2018, Mr Larcombe circulated a revised offer for the Hurstville site for comment, although apparently not to Mr Hedley, "Lets get this deal over the line guys."
On 17 April 2018, Mr Dumbrell provided Mr Hedley with financials and cashflow projections for the Hurstville childcare centre, as requested by the owner's valuer. Further material was provided on 18 April 2018, including a business plan and needs analysis obtained for the site. The information appears to have been provided to Mr Hedley in his capacity as the owner's representative, presumably to satisfy the owner that the defendants would be able to perform their obligations under the proposed lease.
The parties' solicitors continued to communicate in respect of the transaction documents for the Hurstville lease. From time to time, Mr Larcombe instructed Mr Dumbrell to forward these email chains to Mr Hedley, in order to get Mr Hedley to encourage the owner's solicitor to progress the matter. For example, on 4 May 2018, Mr Dumbrell asked Mr Hedley to call as the owner's solicitors "are being not consistent and not commercial." On 7 May 2018, Mr Hedley enquired of the owner's solicitors, "How are you going with the Childcare lease for Hurstville the tenant is driving me nuts wanting to get it signed …"
Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe also kept Mr Hedley informed as to progress. Mr Hedley appears to have liaised between the owner and the defendants. For example, on 7 May 2018, Mr Hedley checked with the owner's solicitors whether they had heard from the defendants' solicitors and, having been provided with an update, informed the owner's solicitor, "I'll go back to the tenant now." Beyond this, there is no evidence that Mr Hedley was involved in negotiating the terms of the agreement for lease or the lease. The defendants' solicitors had the conduct of the matter, with instructions obtained from time to time from Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe.
On 7 May 2018, Mr Hedley passed onto Mr Dumbrell that the owner had been approached by a prospective tenant, being a large chemist who wanted to lease the site. Mr Dumbrell pressed Mr Larcombe and their solicitors to "Keep that to ourselves please" and move quickly to execute the lease. On 15 May 2018, the defendants' architect provided Mr Dumbrell with plans for the Hurstville childcare centre, noting that there was "just enough to provide for 91 children." Mr Dumbrell forwarded this email to Mr Hedley. Mr Hedley replied, "What are the outgoings there? It's 4,400 per place yes + you pay all outgoings?" Negotiations of the terms of the lease continued. On 19 May 2018, Mr Dumbrell forwarded the latest solicitors' email chain to Mr Hedley enquiring, "What's the holdup?" A further email chain was forwarded by Mr Dumbrell on 28 May 2018, "Waiting waiting waiting." Mr Hedley was asked to follow up the owner.
On 30 May 2018, Mr Larcombe forwarded Mr Hedley the latest schedule of landlord works, advising that there were a couple of things to tidy up and then the documents could be executed. Later that day, Mr Larcombe complained to Mr Hedley that the landlord's lawyer "is being a bit difficult." Mr Hedley spoke with the developer and advised Mr Dumbrell that the owner agreed in principle to a late delivery clause.
On 1 June 2018, the transaction documents were provided for execution. Problems emerged with timely execution. On 4 June 2018, Mr Hedley emailed the developer, "R u reading these emails??" Further problems emerged with the exchange of counterparts. On 6 June 2018, Mr Larcombe asked Mr Hedley to "call [the developer] and tell him to get [their solicitor] to deal with asap he's so slow!" The agreement for lease for the Hurstville site was exchanged on 8 June 2018.
On 14 June 2018, Mr Larcombe and Mr Dumbrell exchanged the following text messages: (emphasis added) LARCOMBE: Hilton has agreed mate DUMBRELL: Great work so fee for the 5%? How much cash? LARCOMBE: Mate It was always $2000 per kid. So around $184k Half at execution and DA Other half once open
As I read these text messages, Mr Larcombe and Mr Hedley had spoken and agreed on the fee for sourcing the Hurstville site. The fact that "Hilton has agreed" suggests that there was not already an agreement in place. However, Mr Larcombe's later text suggests that the plaintiff's rate had already been agreed, "It was always $2000 per kid." It may be that what was agreed at this time was the number of places on which the fee would be calculated, or to split the fee into two tranches. I will return to this at [208].
On 15 June 2018, Mr Dumbrell was having problems with the owner's designer and complained to Mr Hedley. Mr Hedley replied, "I'm not sending that." That is, Mr Hedley was not willing to forward Mr Dumbrell's email expressing his concerns. Mr Dumbrell replied, "was not asking you to. Just ask [Mr Larcombe] and [the owner's designer] for a meeting. Making it clear handover aint what she thinks and clearly she is not competent." Mr Dumbrell appears to have been endeavouring to make use of Mr Hedley's role as the owner's consultant to bring its designer to the table.
On 12 July 2018, Mr Dumbrell emailed the defendants' architect and Mr Hedley, noting that the owner was going to lodge a development application for more childcare places, "We agree that 93 is the max within the building envelope … and made clear at last meeting with owners." Mr Hedley forwarded this email to the owner's designer, "Are you aware that the max amount of spaces they will commit to is 93?" Mr Hedley suggested that the designer clarify this with Mr Dumbrell directly. Mr Hedley forwarded the designer's response on to Mr Dumbrell. On 25 July 2018, Mr Dumbrell provided Mr Hedley with revised drawings and the advice from the defendants' architect that 94 places was the maximum which could be achieved. Mr Dumbrell proposed to forward the material to the owner's designer, "Just keeping you updated."
In August 2018, delays were being experienced in the lodgement of the development application for the Hurstville site. On 27 August 2018, Mr Dumbrell advised Mr Larcombe, "Hilton confirmed [the owner] will agree on the rent clause due to delays from them."
On 20 September 2018, Mr Hedley sent an email to Mr Larcombe in respect of an offer to acquire a boarding house, apparently following a discussions with other deal participants. Mr Hedley reported that there was a general consensus that there was a deal there, "We need to collectively discuss a few things and define who would do what etc … If you are open to signing an agreement for their valuation purposes … then assuming we can agree terms, I then suggest we collectively review the business after 12 months and 24 months and set a rent from year three onwards. … They are very mindful that it's not worth your while based on your comments/numbers in your email …" As I read this and subsequent communications on this topic, Mr Hedley appears to have been trying to broker a deal between the Hurstville owners and Mr Larcombe, where Mr Larcombe would purport to buy the site in order to assist the owner to raise finance. The Hurstville owner was considering building a boarding house or apartments above the childcare centre.
On 12 October 2018, Mr Hedley sent a text message to Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe, asking whether they were still interested in buying the Hurstville site. It appears that the owners were considering selling the site 'as is' with development approval.
On 27 October 2018, Mr Larcombe emailed Mr Hedley, seeking confirmation that he could place signage on the Hurstville site. Mr Larcombe also asked whether Mr Hedley had received any feedback in respect of the boarding house, "And any deals worth looking at? Markets in trouble hey." Mr Hedley replied, "I'm expecting a shit load of sites to hit the market." Further, Mr Hedley said that if Mr Larcombe offered $6 million for the Hurstville property "you might be lucky." On 30 October 2018, Mr Hedley advised Mr Larcombe that a heads of agreement was being prepared in respect of the boarding house, "They are keen to finalise this asap and build … boarding house and childcare at the same time … the DA for the childcare is already approved … They reckon … it will be a quick process with council."

[11]

Hurstville fee

On 8 November 2018, Mr Hedley informed Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe that the development application for the Hurstville site had been approved, with 72 places. Building was to commence in February 2019. As "the deal was done on a pro rata basis anyway at $4,400 per licensed place … so no need to enter into a new lease."
On 9 November 2018, the plaintiff rendered an invoice to Mr Larcombe and Wonderschool (Hurstville) Pty Ltd for $72,000 plus GST, with the following description: Re: Consultancy services for Wonderschool Hurstville based on 72 places x $2,000 per place = $144,000 x 50 percent upon lease signed and DA approval = $72,000 The invoice conformed with Mr Larcombe's text message of 14 June 2018, extracted at [52], albeit the total fee was lower as the places approved were less than had been sought in the development application.
On 12 November 2018, Mr Hedley contacted the Hurstville owner and its solicitor, pressing for amendments to the Hurstville lease to be sent to the tenant's solicitors urgently, "I ask because there is now a brand new childcare centre available for lease in Hurstville which is in direct competition … it's urgent and critical that the amendment is issued and signed asap …" Emails ensued between parties' solicitors and their clients in respect of the amended documents. Mr Dumbrell instructed their solicitor that Mr Hedley had advised that the sunset date in the new lease was a mistake. Mr Dumbrell forwarded emails to Mr Hedley from time to time, "Keeping you in loop." On 21 November 2018, the Hurstville owner forwarded Mr Hedley the solicitors' emails regarding the last 'sticking point' in negotiations, which Mr Hedley forwarded to Mr Dumbrell. On 22 November 2018, Mr Dumbrell replied to Mr Hedley, setting out the defendants' position, "It seems [the owner's] lawyer does not understand this."
On 23 November 2018, Mr Dumbrell asked Mr Hedley to forward an email from the defendants' solicitor to the Hurstville owner as "We are getting nowhere." Mr Hedley advised that he had spoken to the owner, "This is being sorted now." Mr Hedley also emailed the owner and its solicitor, asking whether this had been resolved as the tenant wanted to sign the lease that day. Mr Hedley forwarded the response from the owner's solicitor to Mr Dumbrell.
On 26 November 2018, Mr Hedley requested an update from Mr Dumbrell as to whether the Hurstville lease had been signed. The owner then wanted the right to terminate the lease if less than 60 places were approved. In response to Mr Dumbrell's protest, Mr Hedley explained that this was because, if the Department of Education reduced the number of places to 60, "it makes the deal unviable based on the rent being reduced as well. … it's non-negotiable. Given its DA approved for 72 places the risk is almost negligible." Mr Hedley pressed Mr Dumbrell for a resolution. Assuming that the lease was signed on 27 November 2018, Mr Hedley asked "Can u push my payment for this week. Once signed there is no reason not to pay." That is, consistently with Mr Larcombe's text extracted at [52], half of the plaintiff's fee was to be paid once the lease had been executed and the development approval obtained.
Mr Dumbrell replied "Yes you should once executed." However, Mr Dumbrell suggested that the changes sought by the owner meant that the deal remained conditional, where it was possible that the site may not be approved for 60 children and the owner could terminate the lease. Mr Hedley replied that that was beyond everyone's control and highly unlikely, "If he doesn't pay because of that I will lease it to someone else." That is, Mr Hedley did not accept that payment of the first tranche of the fee should be deferred beyond development approval and execution of the lease; if Mr Larcombe sought to defer payment until approval had been obtained from the Department of Education for at least 60 places, then the deal was off.
On 27 November 2018, Mr Hedley pressed Mr Dumbrell for an update, "What did Simon say? This needs to be signed today." Mr Larcombe asked the defendants' solicitor to "Get it done ASAP" and asked Mr Hedley to "please assist thanks mate". Mr Dumbrell asked Mr Hedley whether the owner would consider a break lease cost and Mr Hedley replied, "No mate." Mr Dumbrell instructed the defendants' solicitor to prepare the documents for execution. On 29 November 2018, Mr Hedley pressed the owner's solicitor to have the documents ready for execution that day, "I spoke with [the owner] … and he confirmed that he was happy with the latest clause proposed by the tenant's solicitor." Separately, Mr Hedley pressed Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe to execute the documents.
On 30 November 2018, a deed of variation was executed in respect of the Hurstville lease. Mr Hedley sent a revised invoice to Mr Dumbrell with a $5,000 discount "subject to the invoice being paid in full today upon executing the lease." Further emails between Mr Hedley, Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe that day evidenced no disquiet as to the invoice.
On 2 December 2018, Mr Mascitelli sought instructions from Mr Larcombe "Are you OK for me to pay the commission to Hilton. I did not realise it was that amount, but still value for money …" Mr Larcombe replied, "Yes sorry if hadn't explained that fee. Hold off for the moment thanks." The reason to "hold off" is not evident.
On 3 December 2018, Mr Mascitelli sought further instructions as to whether he could pay the plaintiff, "I am getting phone from Hilton to get his payment". Mr Dumbrell advised Mr Mascitelli, "The figure was the agreed amount for Hurstville even though its sometime away now. I confirm." On 4 December 2018, Mr Larcombe instructed Mr Mascitelli to pay the invoice. On 6 December 2018, the plaintiff's invoice was paid.
The defendants later terminated the agreement for lease for the Hurstville site, in July 2022. The childcare centre never opened. The plaintiff does not claim to be entitled to the second half of its fee for the Hurstville site. The defendants, however, seek to recover the Hurstville fee, either under the settlement agreement or as moneys had and received paid under a mistake, to which I will return in due course.

[12]

ACT sites

In April 2018, Mr Randell had contacted Mr Hedley seeking expressions of interest for a new childcare centre at Dickson in the ACT. The centre would be built for 90 places. The owner/developer was DOMA. Mr Hedley inquired as to how the childcare operator would be selected, whether DOMA was "just chasing the highest possible rent" or whether a boutique operator may be chosen. Mr Randell advised: My expert opinion will shortlist my preferred's based on business plans, previous operations, rating, price (not the determining factor at all) experience, incentives, fitout etc. It could be a boutique or big guy. … They … will go with my recommendations … Also got a few more coming up namely red hill just finalised plans in. Mr Randell also provided Mr Hedley with architectural drawings in respect of a development in Red Hill, "Just make sure not made public." Mr Hedley did not then pass these details on to the defendants.
On 18 September 2018, Mr Randell emailed Mr Hedley again in respect of various childcare opportunities in Canberra coming on to market in the next few weeks, including Red Hill (120 places), Macgregor (150 places but "can be scaled") and Throsby (110 places). Mr Randell was looking for the sites to be packaged together, as all sites were with the same developer (the ACT developer). Mr Hedley was asked to advise if he had any clients with interest.
Mr Hedley forwarded the details to Mr Larcombe, "Can secure all of these for you if you want. All in Canberra. Red Hill is the standout. Let me know ASAP". By securing a site, Mr Hedley said he was referring to using the relationships he had, particularly with Mr Randell, so that the defendants could become the preferred tenants to enter into leases for childcare centres at those sites. Mr Larcombe requested information on all of the sites.
On 22 September 2018, Mr Randell informed Mr Hedley that he had just received another childcare site in Taylor which he would work up over the next month for market. On 8 January 2019, emails ensued between Mr Hedley and Mr Dumbrell in respect of preparing an offer to lease a childcare site at Gungahlin in the ACT. This site did not proceed.

[16]

Meeting Mr Randell

On 12 February 2019, Mr Hedley arranged a meeting with Mr Randell in Canberra, where his clients were planning to head down and look at Red Hill, Macgregor and Taylor "and would like to meet with you. I will be with them, the idea being that we finalise the deals on all 3 shortly thereafter." The purpose of the trip was to inspect the sites, "put names to faces and talk through growth strategy, their business, financials, partners etc etc so you have a solid understanding of their business for both these sites and others in the future." The meeting with Mr Randell was arranged for 19 February 2019.
Mr Hedley advised Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe that the aim of the meeting was to secure the three new sites. Mr Hedley asked Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe to review the information memorandum on Macgregor with a view to making an offer, "Whilst the DA is for 150 places you need to assess what is the more realistic number and base your offer on that number (I believe Kids Club have made an offer based on 90 places). Same owner as Red Hill and this one is the key to securing both." Mr Hedley suggested that Mr Dumbrell prepare a business plan for the Canberra sites, with cashflow forecasts on differing scenarios. Whilst offers and leases were being prepared, "I'll keep going with the deals to keep them alive but do that in the background. … I'm happy to assist in any way so let me know what you need." Further, before the meeting with Mr Randell, terms needed to be agreed on Red Hill and offers prepared for Macgregor and Taylor, "We are coming in from behind on all 3 of these as they are way down the path with Kids Club but they are there for the taking."
While preparing an offer for Taylor, Mr Dumbrell asked Mr Hedley what an appropriate market rate per child was in this area, "You done any deals in this market at all?" Mr Hedley replied, "Unfortunately I have not completed any deals in this catchment. I know there is an offer at present at $3k a place but can't comment on where that sits re: market etc … I suggest it's a good starting point." Mr Hedley enquired of Mr Randell, who advised that $3,500 to $3,600 per child would secure the site. Mr Hedley passed this information on to Mr Dumbrell.
On 13 February 2019, Mr Dumbrell provided Mr Hedley with an offer for Macgregor, which Mr Hedley forwarded to Mr Randell. Mr Hedley pressed Mr Larcombe to provide financials and updated Mr Randell on his progress. Mr Hedley also advised Mr Dumbrell to check to make sure there were no other obligations regarding 150 places. While the rent may be based on the 120 places in their offer, the developer would be building for 150 places "so check to see if you as the tenant are required to meet any other obligations based on there being 150 places … even if you cap it at 120."
Later on 13 February 2019, Mr Randell asked Mr Hedley to prepare an updated offer on Red Hill "so I can meet with [the developer] and compare … both sites as a package in our discussions tomorrow." Mr Hedley replied that the Red Hill offer was being updated and sought further information in respect of outgoings. Mr Dumbrell provided an updated offer for Red Hill, which Mr Hedley forwarded to Mr Randell, asking Mr Randell to call after meeting with his client the next day.
On 14 February 2019, Mr Randell provided Mr Hedley with the developer's response to the Red Hill and Macgregor offers, which were generally favourable. Mr Hedley forwarded the details to Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe, "Good news guys." Mr Hedley advised Mr Randell that he would have revised offers for him later that day. Mr Dumbrell described this as "fantastic news. … Great effort gents." A revised offer for Red Hill was provided by Mr Dumbrell to Mr Hedley, and forwarded to Mr Randell.
On 15 February 2019, Mr Randell provided Mr Hedley with a marked-up copy of the defendants' Macgregor and Red Hill offers and asked that he review and amend the offer "for final acceptance of offers … I can then get a draft AFL over asap." Mr Hedley liaised between Mr Randell and the defendants in respect of the amendments. Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe provided the amended offers to Mr Hedley, who provided them to Mr Randell.
Later that day, Mr Randell provided Mr Hedley with updated plans for the Taylor childcare centre, "Just needed to get a draft so we can get some renders done for the market." Mr Hedley provided the plans to Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe. Further, Mr Hedley asked Mr Randell, "Don't go to Market just yet … They will take this one too I'm sure."
On 18 February 2019, Mr Hedley sent a text message to Mr Randell in advance of their meeting the next day, asking whether Mr Randell would be joining them for the site inspections of Red Hill, Macgregor and Taylor, following which they would "finalise the deals and discuss next steps."
On 19 February 2019, Mr Hedley, Mr Larcombe, Mr Dumbrell and Mr Randell inspected childcare sites in Canberra, including Red Hill, Macgregor and Taylor and met the developer. Following the site inspections, Mr Randell provided Mr Hedley with architectural drawings for the Red Hill site, which Mr Hedley provided to Mr Dumbrell. Mr Larcombe also emailed Mr Randell directly, copied to Mr Hedley and Mr Dumbrell, advising that an offer would be made on the Taylor site, requesting bank account details "for the deposit on all 3 sites," and the finishing schedules for Red Hill and Macgregor for review by the defendants' architect. Mr Randell obliged.
On 20 February 2019, Mr Dumbrell provided Mr Hedley with an offer for the Taylor site. Mr Hedley provided the offer to Mr Randell, together with receipts for deposits paid on the three sites. Mr Randell advised Mr Hedley that the Taylor offer needed to be at the level discussed, which was $3,500 per place net, "to not go to market." Mr Hedley passed this information on to Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe. Mr Larcombe agreed to amend the offer. Mr Larcombe emailed Mr Randell directly, advising that the defendants' architect was happy with the finishing schedule, which should be attached to the agreements for lease. In addition, the Taylor offer was being amended, "sorry that was our typo mistake." Mr Dumbrell provided Mr Hedley with an amended offer for the Taylor site. Mr Hedley provided the amended offer to Mr Randell.
Mr Randell replied to Mr Larcombe, advising that agreements for lease would be provided that afternoon and he would take the Taylor offer to the developers that day, "It will take slightly longer for the AFL to be done but we will put a hold on the property and get signed heads [of agreement] returned." To this, Mr Larcombe asked Mr Hedley, "Is he taking Taylor to developers or was that a typo? Get it off the market thanks Hilton." Later that evening, Mr Larcombe asked Mr Hedley to chase up the agreements for lease on Red Hill and MacGregor. Mr Hedley replied, "Will do mate we are all over it."
Later that evening, Mr Hedley also asked Mr Dumbrell to "start doing some numbers" on a childcare centre approved for 100 places in Lane Cove, "This is a belter. … I've got first dibs on it … Will be the perfect compliment to Crows Nest …" Mr Larcombe replied that the defendants "definitely will be all over those centres thanks." This site did not eventuate.

[17]

Direct approach by developer

Later still, the ACT developer emailed Mr Larcombe directly, attaching plans for a second childcare centre on the Throsby site, asking "What are your thoughts on a bit of healthy (unhealthy) competition?" The developer advised that it had already leased a childcare centre, which was under construction, but owned a nearby site which also permitted childcare as a use "and therefore we 'could' develop a childcare centre in that location if, you though it was viable etc." The next morning, Mr Larcombe forwarded the developer's email to Mr Hedley for his thoughts. Mr Hedley advised, "Guy mentioned that the existing Throsby site filled within 1 month. This is reasonably close to Taylor."
Mr Hedley forwarded a text message from Mr Larcombe - advising that the developer "also put his other site to me" - to Mr Randell. Mr Hedley asked Mr Randell to request the developer to send any information on other sites "through you to me and not directly to Simon please … They are talking about a new site together." Mr Randell was unhappy that the developer had approached the defendants directly. Mr Randell replied, "They better not be. … I will find out." Mr Hedley also asked Mr Larcombe to ensure that communications about new sites went through Mr Randell and himself: Hey if [the developer] is talking to you directly about new sites that will cause serious angst for both Guy and myself as its morally the wrong thing to do, and most importantly Guy is absolutely critical to you[r] future success. He is the number 1 agent in childcare and his clients should know better than to call tenants directly … Next time you speak to [the developer] please ask him to send any information he has on new sites through Guy. Guy will then send it through me. It keeps everyone happy, honest and motivated and ensures you will be favourably considered for all future sites (not just [this developer's]). I know you know and completely understand where im coming from
Mr Hedley added "this isn't about you jipping me … I know you would never do the wrong thing by me." Mr Larcombe replied "Agree totally … will make it clear to send things via Guy and then Guy to you etc., we wouldn't think about going around [Mr Randell] or yourself for a second it's not cool and it would be completely stupid!" The same morning, Mr Randell provided Mr Hedley with information in respect of outgoings on the Macgregor site, which Mr Hedley provided to Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe.
On 25 February 2019, Mr Hedley followed up Mr Larcombe regarding the architect's review of the Red Hill and Macgregor plans, as Mr Hedley and Mr Randell "spoke earlier and he is hoping to have these signed by the end of this week.". Mr Larcombe advised that no changes were required to the plans; amendments to the agreements for lease and the leases had been provided "Nothing major should all be able to be sorted with a phone call between lawyers after they review amendments today." Mr Hedley was asked to let Mr Randell know.
On 26 February 2019, Mr Randell provided Mr Hedley with amendments to the Taylor offer. Having met with the developer that morning, Mr Randell advised that the centre would have 120 places. Mr Hedley provided this information to Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe for their immediate review and action. Mr Hedley also requested details for the developer's designer from Mr Randell "so they could start talking" with the defendants' architect. Mr Randell obliged, "We are happy for your designer to lead the design for a guaranteed 120 place centre …" Mr Hedley was asked to send a signed updated Heads of Agreement "and we will get over to the solicitors this afternoon to draft AFLs."
On 27 February 2019, Mr Hedley provided Mr Randell with a revised offer for the Taylor site, as executed by Mr Larcombe and Mr Dumbrell. Mr Hedley forwarded the offer to Mr Randell. The fourth defendant, Wonderschool (Taylor) Pty Ltd was incorporated.
On 28 February 2019, Mr Larcombe obtained a needs report for Macgregor, identifying unmet needs. Mr Larcombe also instructed the consultant to prepare a report for Throsby and other sites which did not proceed, being Gordon and Bungendore.
On the evening of 28 February 2019, Mr Randell updated Mr Hedley, Mr Larcombe and Mr Dumbrell on progress in respect of agreements for lease for Red Hill and Macgregor. Documents were expected to be ready for signing on 4 March 2019. Mr Dumbrell expressed his gratitude to Mr Hedley, "Good year for [you]. Makes me happy for you and for me and my family mate. … That is the quickest turnaround ever mate."

[18]

A new shareholders agreement?

In early March 2019, Mr Larcombe and Mr Dumbrell exchanged emails in respect of a proposal to alter the shareholder agreement for Creative Academy. Mr Larcombe sent Mr Dumbrell a draft document to be circulated to investors for comment. The document outlined the state of each childcare site. In respect of Red Hill, Macgregor and Taylor, Mr Larcombe observed "Hilton introduced us to the site and acting as our agent." Mr Larcombe also stated, "Hilton who is good mates with Glenn is providing us some great opportunities. I've known Hilton 25 years as well and very good to reconnect with him as well."
In commenting on the proposal, Mr Dumbrell considered that his contributions to finding sites should be acknowledged and his equity contribution reduced accordingly, "especially if no agent involved like Hilton. More motivation to cut them out and say that fee we would pay a Hilton or other agent goes towards my equity. Say for a Red Hill deal that's a $240,000 fee. … Same would go for any shareholder if they can bring like that to the table and not pay agent." Mr Larcombe and Mr Dumbrell's comments record that they both perceived Mr Hedley to be acting as an agent. I note also that, where Red Hill had 120 places, Mr Dumbrell's comment acknowledged that the plaintiff's fee was $2,000 per place.
Mr Larcombe did not embrace Mr Dumbrell's suggestion, replying on 3 March 2019: (emphasis added) Put [Mr Hedley] to the side he is getting paid a fee of $2k per pax on all these deals we are doing and has no interest in the business think that's he asked original for 5% with no fee so that what he thought was fair and now gone to straight fee which is simpler for all of us.
Mr Larcombe considered that what was offered to Mr Dumbrell under the proposed deal "fairly rewards for your HH connection … your connection to Hilton has been great (I also know Hilton) … Yes going forward if you bring a site to the table with no fees $2k with no agent involvement that's only fair …" That is, Mr Larcombe clearly acknowledged that there was an agreement with Mr Hedley to pay a fee of $2,000 per placement "on all these deals." It does appear that Mr Hedley may have initially proposed an alternate fee arrangement but had settled on a "straight fee" in this amount.
On 5 March 2019, the defendants' consultant provided Mr Larcombe with a needs assessment for Throsby. On 11 March 2019, Mr Hedley encouraged Mr Larcombe and Mr Dumbrell to improve their corporate presentation with a website and appropriate email addresses, "My relationships will get you through the door and in prime position but all it will take - especially with these property trusts is some mid level asset manager to dig deeper and make life hard to secure the deal … Happy to work on this with you." Mr Dumbrell endeavoured to source images of the proposed developments for a new website; Mr Hedley put him in touch with the architect for the Hurstville site.
On 15 March 2019, Mr Hedley provided Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe with information in respect of a proposed childcare site in North Sydney. This site did not eventuate.

[19]

Invoices for Red Hill and Macgregor

On 19 March 2019, Mr Larcombe asked Mr Hedley and Mr Randell to "get cracking on Taylor." Further, Mr Larcombe texted Mr Hedley "I'll send your details for invoices for entities today." On 21 March 2019, the plaintiff rendered an invoice in respect of the Red Hill site for $120,000 plus GST. The invoice described the fee as follows: Re: Consultancy services for Wonderschool Red Hill based on 120 places x $2,000 per place = $240,000 x 50 percent upon lease signed and DA approval = $120,000
A further invoice was rendered in respect of the Macgregor site for $150,000 plus GST, with the services described in like terms: Re: Consultancy services for Wonderschool McGregor based on 150 places x $2,000 per place = $300,000 x 50 percent upon lease signed and DA approval = $150,000
Mr Mascitelli asked that the invoices be addressed to Creative Academy. Mr Hedley replied, "Is that the only change you require …?" No response is in evidence. Mr Hedley rendered an amended invoice addressed to Creative Academy.
On 25 March 2019, the Commonwealth Bank issued bank guarantees in respect of the Red Hill and MacGregor leases; arrangements were being made for the documents to be executed and delivered to the owner's solicitors. Mr Dumbrell emailed Mr Hedley, "I confirm that you will receive payment of your invoices for the Canberra transactions once the bank guarantee is received. … We would expect anytime between today and [27 March 2019] at the latest."
Following receipt of Mr Dumbrell's email, Mr Hedley sent an email to Mr Larcombe, "Just confirming our discussion of Friday [22 March 2019] that once the bank guarantee is received you will proceed with payment of the invoices for [Red Hill and MacGregor]." Mr Larcombe promptly replied: Yes as discussed $2k per place 25% on [bank guarantee] and notification that they are acceptable most likely Friday and payment Monday so will be in your account Tuesday most likely 25% on [agreement for lease] conditions being met being finance and them get all the[ir] approvals likely within next 6 weeks so payment in that week 50% of us commencing trading All good ?
That is, neither Mr Larcombe or Mr Dumbrell raised any issue with respect to the amount of the fees or the basis on which the fees had been calculated, as described in the invoices. What had been discussed, however, was an alteration to when the fees would be paid, with the initial 50% of the fee now split into two payments of 25% each, payable on different events. The remaining 50% of the plaintiff's fee remained payable when the childcare centres commenced trading.
On 26 March 2019, Mr Larcombe asked Mr Hedley to send through revised invoices to reflect the terms of his email and addressed to Creative Academy. Mr Hedley replied: I acknowledge that the payment schedule is 50 percent o[f] the current invoice of $270k paid now and a further 50 percent once the developer receives his final approvals (albeit this being a formality) and then a further invoice will be sent once you open for a further $270k. So $135k + GST now $135k + GST in circa 4-6 weeks (estimate timeframe only) And then final $270k will be invoiced when you open.
That is, Mr Hedley agreed to the first tranche being paid in two instalments. Mr Larcombe requested that the revised invoices be re-sent and, once exchange was confirmed, "we will pay you 25% fee." Mr Hedley re-sent Mr Larcombe the invoices for Red Hill and Macgregor, which Mr Larcombe forwarded to Mr Mascitelli with the instruction "please pay 25% of total fee." Mr Mascitelli processed the payments on 29 March 2019 and informed Mr Hedley, "Thanks for your great work Hilton." The plaintiff received $82,500 in respect of the Macgregor invoice and $66,000 for Red Hill.
On 28 March 2019, Mr Hedley sent a text message to Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe, advising "I've got a cracker … in North Narrabeen … need to move like lightning to get control of it. … my window for stitching it up is limited. … it's rare these ones come along." (This site did not eventuate). Further, Mr Hedley advised that he had a buyer for the Red Hill, Macgregor and Taylor leases for $4 million, "I know it's not the game plan but at least u know u could walk away tomorrow and pocket that."
On 28 March 2019, agreements for lease were exchanged for the Red Hill and Macgregor sites. At the time, the Macgregor development was approved for 150 places. Red Hill was approved for 120 places. Mr Larcombe reported to investors, including in respect of the offer to acquire the Red Hill, Macgregor and Taylor leases: Decided it's best we keep going … add 4 times earnings they are worth $10m … Paying Hilton his first 25% fee $140k tomorrow … when start building he gets 25% then last 50% fee when we commence trade.
Again, Mr Larcombe acknowledged the defendants' obligation to pay the plaintiff, albeit with the first tranche now split into two portions. Mr Larcombe's description of when the second 25% payment was due differed from his earlier email to Mr Hedley, extracted at [114]. Mr Larcombe now described the event on which payment was due as when construction commenced. I expect this was likely a short-form description by Mr Larcombe to investors rather than reference to a different agreement than earlier described. In any event, the investors were happy, Sean Larcombe noting, "Hilton has certainly shown u some gems."
On 2 April 2019, Mr Hedley communicated further with Mr Larcombe and Mr Dumbrell in respect of the $4 million offer to purchase the Red Hill, Macgregor and Taylor leases. Mr Hedley also informed the defendants of a further childcare site at The Gap and Kambah in the ACT, "I've got sites coming out of my ears hope u can keep up." Later that day, Mr Hedley provided Mr Larcombe and Mr Dumbrell with details for eight childcare sites in Victoria and the ACT, "All off market we have first crack … Can u keep up … Come on …" Mr Dumbrell suggested a meeting, "Just saying we need to be measured and calculated as a new business." (These sites did not eventuate). On 9 April 2019, Mr Dumbrell updated Mr Hedley on his progress with a Wonderschool website.
It appears that the ACT developer had again contacted Mr Larcombe directly. Mr Randell sent an email to Mr Larcombe and Mr Hedley, confirming he had just spoken to the developer about sending sites directly, "he assured me no one was getting cut out and 'just likes talking to Simon'. … Just needed to set the record straight but he was assuring all is kosher and he wasn't trying to cut anyone out. All sorted now and many more opportunities to come." Mr Larcombe agreed.
The parties' solicitors were in the process of negotiating an agreement for lease for the Taylor site. On 15 April 2019, Mr Larcombe emailed Mr Randell and Mr Hedley in respect of negotiating a side agreement, "Guy going to need your help likely on this one mate." Mr Hedley replied that he would speak to Mr Randell and revert.
On 16 April 2019, Mr Larcombe sought Mr Hedley and Mr Randell's comments on a proposed offer for a site at Coombes in the ACT, being (apparently) the site offered by the developer directly. This site did not eventuate.

[20]

Woden site

On 16 April 2019, Mr Hedley texted Mr Randell about a DOMA development in Woden. Mr Randell advised that the Woden site was already on hold for Kids Club, "I won't compete on that one as a lot of work has been done already. … Did that some time ago and we are working on build concepts … If it gets a hint of going bad [Kids Club] is out." Mr Randell advised that any offer would need to be "better than 4800."
Mr Hedley sent Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe a link in respect of the Woden site. Mr Hedley advised that, although an offer had already been accepted for the site, "Guy said he won't screw [the existing offeree] over at this late stage but i have just called the developer who is an old friend … it's a very long shot but it is … a fucking cracker." Mr Hedley called Mr Larcombe and said there was a chance the defendants would be able to secure the Woden site, which had the same owner as the Dickson site. Although there was a deal in place with Kids Club, Mr Hedley might be able to steer it his way. Mr Larcombe said, "Put your foot on it." Mr Hedley texted Mr Randell that he was sending through an offer, "All you u can do is give it to the vendors and let them decide to screw Kids Club."
On 21 April 2019, Mr Larcombe texted Mr Hedley regarding a potential offer for a childcare site in Phillip in the ACT. Mr Hedley outlined the differences between the demographics and strategic considerations of the Phillip and Woden sites, "Either way it's good to let DOMA know we are active." Mr Larcombe asked Mr Dumbrell to prepare an offer. This site did not proceed.
On 23 April 2019, Mr Larcombe provided Mr Hedley with an offer for the Woden site, which Mr Hedley submitted to Mr Randell. Mr Larcombe provided Mr Randell and Mr Hedley with an update on Taylor, noting that an offer had been submitted for Woden and he awaited their advice.
On 24 April 2019, Mr Hedley offered to meet Mr Larcombe and Mr Dumbrell in Canberra and arrange meetings with Mr Randell and other developers including DOMA, to line up any new sites and improve their chances on the Woden and Griffith sites, "plenty going on gents I'd like to meet for further chats (just not in the back bar of the Woollahra half cut)." (The Griffith site did not eventuate). On 29 April 2019, Mr Hedley followed up Mr Randell in respect of Woden. Mr Randell advised that there was "nothing for Woden … there is a wait and see on this." Mr Hedley suggested that Kids Club was experiencing financial stress.
On 30 April 2019, Wonderschool (Taylor) Pty Ltd signed the lease for the Taylor site, on the basis that the site accommodated 110 places.

[21]

Conder site

On 1 May 2019 , Mr Hedley provided the defendants with details of a childcare site in North Strathfield. (This site did not eventuate). On 1 May 2019, Mr Randell provided Mr Hedley with details for a childcare site in Conder in the ACT. Mr Hedley provided the information to Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe, "Note that the brochure … is still a draft hence we get first crack." Mr Randell provided further information in respect of a childcare site in Casey, which Mr Hedley provided to the defendants, suggesting that they do some preliminary due diligence before site inspections. (This site did not eventuate). On 6 May 2019, Mr Hedley provided the defendants with details of a childcare site in Surfers Paradise, "I've got the whole country offering me sites so I'm just sending them through as they come to me …" (This site did not eventuate).
On 6 and 7 May 2019, Mr Randell finalised plans for the defendants to inspect Canberra sites with Mr Hedley, "We have a very full afternoon … with decisions to be made." Sites included Conder and Throsby. On 8 May 2019, Mr Hedley inspected the Conder site with Mr Larcombe, Mr Dumbrell, Mr Randell and the owners. On 13 May 2019, Mr Randell advised Mr Hedley and Mr Larcombe that he was instructed to receive offers on both Throsby sites. Mr Hedley provided his initial thoughts on this opportunity, suggesting that the defendants would need to be happy with the design for the childcare centre being built and acquire a first right of refusal for the second site "That way u have 3 years to fill it."
On 14 May 2019, Mr Dumbrell provided Mr Larcombe with an offer for Throsby for review and execution. Mr Hedley enquired what he wanted to do about the second Throsby site, "Either way we should discuss to ensure you are protected." Mr Larcombe sent the offer to Mr Randell. Mr Randell asked whether the defendants were interested in making an offer for the Conder site. Mr Larcombe informed Mr Randell that he would give Conder a miss, "Throsby I'm keen on." Mr Hedley asked Mr Randell whether the Conder owner would be interested in a deal structured where rent was payable as places were filled.
Separately, however, Mr Hedley advised Mr Larcombe and Mr Dumbrell, "We need to send the message to Guy that you are still expanding in Canberra and keen for more stock. Otherwise you can kiss Woden and Griffith goodbye. We need to play the game carefully please and not put a red line through deals because they will quickly stop coming our way." Mr Hedley said he still wished to explore Conder and believed they could get the deal they wanted "and maybe bring into the equation that if he was to manipulate Woden our way then Conder would be looked on a lot more favourably. .. Give him confidence we are cashed up and ready to keep growing." Mr Larcombe agreed, "Woden and Griffith are worth doing … Maybe Conder I agree".
Perhaps acting on Mr Hedley's advice, Mr Larcombe forwarded a needs assessment for the Throsby site to Mr Randell and Mr Hedley, also advising that Creative Academy was dealing with the Commonwealth Bank to obtain funding. The bank was "very supportive of our business plan and had approved our loan facility … which will enable us to ramp up more and look at freeholds as well." Mr Larcombe was very keen to secure Throsby "so do your best to get this one for us we are ready and willing to execute." It would appear that, now that working relations between the defendants and Mr Randell had become more developed, the parties were communicating directly on occasion, to which Mr Hedley took no objection.
On 16 May 2019, Mr Larcombe provided an offer for the Throsby site to Mr Randell and Mr Hedley for their thoughts. On 17 May 2019, Mr Larcombe emailed Mr Randell and Mr Hedley, setting out the defendants' position on the various childcare sites in Canberra, including Conder ("not for us") and Throsby ("we are keen on this"). Further negotiations ensued in respect of the Throsby site, including directly between the developer and Mr Larcombe, as well as with Mr Randell. Mr Larcombe provided a revised offer to Mr Randell and Mr Hedley on 23 May 2019.
On 28 May 2019, Mr Hedley emailed two invoices to Mr Larcombe for review for Macgregor and Red Hill, "This will conclude all fees on these two until opening." Mr Larcombe replied, "No worries mate we'll get that paid when I confirm the finance and DA conditions have been satisfied." These invoices are not in evidence, but presumably related to the second 25% of the fees for Macgregor and Red Hill. Mr Larcombe also asked Mr Hedley to obtain information in respect of the childcare site in Hurstville.
On 31 May 2019, the ACT developer emailed Mr Larcombe in Mr Randell's absence, seeking to finalise various matters in respect of Throsby's design and fit-out. Mr Larcombe forwarded the developer's email to Mr Hedley, who queried the defendants' budget for fit-out works, noting that Kids Club "got pinched by this before … So please ensure that your builder has this covered, alternatively I suggest u rework them doing the works into the deal. As in pay more rent but they deliver a turnkey. Let me know if you would like me to assist with this but I think for consistency's sake and also Guy's request, only one of us should be communicating with them."
Further emails ensued from Mr Larcombe and Mr Dumbrell on this subject, with Mr Hedley suggesting "Please just make sure your designer and builder are happy with the wording. … I still read it as you providing everything and all they are doing is providing a room and calling it a kitchen." Mr Hedley suggested that they propose the same scope of works as for Red Hill and Macgregor "I would of thought that is the simplest, fairest and also best outcome for u and them." Mr Larcombe provided his comments to the developer, copied to Mr Randell.
On 5 June 2019, Mr Randell informed the defendants, "Woden is looking good now" as Kids Club had withdrawn. Mr Dumbrell replied that Mr Hedley had "said this would occur potentially." Mr Hedley advised Mr Larcombe and Mr Dumbrell, "Woden is one you want to secure asap and will be a good opening for other sites with the same developer." Mr Randell provided Mr Hedley with the latest draft plans and offer. Later that evening, Mr Larcombe submitted a revised offer for the second Throsby site to Mr Randell and the developer, providing a copy to Mr Hedley the next morning.

[22]

Request for written agreement

On 11 June 2019, Mr Hedley emailed Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe: Guys just working through my anticipated fees etc for this year and see that we have [a lot] going on in terms of both our respective businesses. I would like to formalise something regarding our "service agreement" and fees etc … Are you happy for me to send you document for review and comment? It's a simple document that is in line with what I have signed with other clients. Mr Larcombe responded positively. Mr Dumbrell agreed that they would talk about it when they next met. Whether Mr Hedley sent through a document is unclear.
Mr Hedley also suggested that they "hold off" signing the Throsby deal until the ACT developer responded in writing on the exact status of Red Hill and Macgregor, "We cannot allow ourselves to be used (for example, they could be selling those sites off market with our lease and a DA. I'm suggesting [this] more as a way of protecting ourselves than anything else." Mr Larcombe assured Mr Hedley that Macgregor and Red Hill were on track; Mr Larcombe was talking to the developer, who was finalising some items regarding Red Hill and Macgregor.
On 12 June 2019, Mr Hedley emailed Mr Larcombe offering a discount on invoices which were "not currently yet outstanding but due in full next week. I am prepared to offer a discount on moneys owed to me on the basis that it is paid this week." Further: Currently the progress payment owed for Red Hill and McGregor is $135,000 + GST = $148,500 which equates to the next 25 percent as per our agreement (the balance after this is not payable until both these centres open) … I am willing to deduct 10 percent off this subject to it being paid by no later than Friday morning … So that would make it $135,000 including GST, a saving to you of $13,500.00 for bringing the payment 1 week forward.
Mr Larcombe said he would think about it, "I'm ok paying you that but just probably need to see [the ACT developers] next week and find out a bit more". Mr Hedley replied, "I'm happy to commit to anything to say that if for whatever reason Red Hill and Macgregor do not proceed we can deduct those off future fees or repay back in full or whatever makes u comfortable." As the arrangement for the second 25% of the Red Hill and Macgregor fees depended upon the agreement for lease conditions being met, being finance and development approval, presumably these emails were directed to ascertaining whether that was going to happen and, if not, whether the 25% instalment would be refunded. Mr Hedley offered to "drop it by further $5k so that's a $18,500 reduction for u … if paid by [14 June 2019] am." Mr Larcombe asked Mr Hedley to send him an invoice with the reduction noted, and Mr Larcombe would try to get Mr Mascitelli's agreement to pay.
Mr Hedley promptly provided amended invoices for Macgregor and Red Hill, reduced by 10% subject to being paid that day. "So the total for both goes from $148,500 to $130,000 (including GST). The next payment for these two centres will not be payable until each are open and trading." Mr Larcombe instructed Mr Mascitelli to pay the invoices. On 17 June 2019, Mr Mascitelli asked Mr Hedley to re-issue the invoices for Macgregor and Red Hill to the companies which had been incorporated to operate those sites, being Wonderschool (Macgregor) Pty Ltd and Wonderschool (Red Hill) Pty Ltd.
On 18 June 2019, the plaintiff was paid $75,000 in respect of the Macgregor site and $60,000 for the Red Hill site, being the second 25% of the plaintiff's fee. However, there appears to have been some confusion at the time as to which of the plaintiff's invoices had been paid. In what follows, both Mr Hedley and Mr Larcombe appear to have proceeded on the basis that the second 25% of the plaintiff's fee for the Macgregor and Red Hill sites remained unpaid.
On 17 June 2019, Mr Hedley informed Mr Larcombe and Mr Dumbrell of a further childcare site, "No fucking around with this one. This is a game changer." (This site did not proceed). Mr Larcombe arranged to meet with Mr Hedley and Mr Randell to visit sites and see developers. Mr Hedley replied, "I would like to look at Woden and understand that development better (no need to meet DOMA yet Simon I don't think) … Dickson I suspect might be too early." Mr Randell replied, "no one is to approach DOMA at all and we won't meet with them at all (sensitivities here …) I am exclusive agent so everything through me." The Dickson site was "off" as agreements had been signed "but might still hold some option in the near future of which I will put you first in line." Mr Randell offered to take them to visit Woden and a site in Queanbeyan. Mr Hedley agreed in respect of DOMA "yes of course I would only meet them through you." Mr Larcombe also forwarded an email from the defendants' solicitor with comments on the proposed agreement for lease for the second Throsby site, seeking Mr Randell's assistance.
On 18 June 2019, Mr Hedley and Mr Larcombe travelled to Canberra and inspected various sites in Canberra including Conder. Mr Larcombe sent an email to Mr Randell and Mr Hedley following his inspection of Woden and Throsby, with details on the various childcare sites then under consideration. Mr Larcombe advised that he needed to catch up with the developers of the Taylor site and requested an address for the Dickson site so that he could do a drive-by. Mr Randell gave an update for the Taylor site and provided the address for the Dickson site. On 19 June 2019, Mr Hedley and Mr Larcombe continued their site inspections.
On 20 June 2019, Mr Randell texted, "Got a deal to put together in Conder." On 24 June 2019, Mr Larcombe informed Mr Hedley that he was working on offers for Conder, Mitchell and Googong and provided an update on the agreement for lease for Throsby. (Mitchell and Googong did not proceed). Later that evening, Mr Larcombe sent an offer for Conder to Mr Randell, copied to Mr Hedley. On 25 June 2019, Mr Randell provided Mr Larcombe with extensive comments on these offers, copied to Mr Hedley. Noteworthy, Mr Larcombe was now communicating primarily with Mr Randell, rather than exclusively through Mr Hedley.
On 3 July 2019, Mr Randell provided Mr Larcombe and Mr Hedley with revised terms for Conder, which Mr Larcombe accepted and requested final documentation be issued. Later that evening, Mr Larcombe submitted an executed offer for the Conder site to Mr Randell and Mr Hedley.
On 4 July 2019, Mr Hedley provided Mr Larcombe and Mr Randell with an article in the Australian Financial Review, which indicated that the proposed lessee of the Dickson site were in financial trouble. Mr Hedley asked Mr Larcombe, "can you please draft an offer to be ready to send to Guy to lease Dickson … they do not have the capacity to open this centre or any other." Mr Larcombe said he would leave it to Mr Hedley and Mr Randall to discuss, "obviously keen to get this one [as] it's probably the best in [their] portfolio. Mr Randell agreed that there were issues with the current lessee but, "it's a pretty tight lease … there is zero room for negotiations." Mr Hedley asked Mr Randell whether it was "worth putting an offer under the owner's nose as an alternative given all the bad press" about the current lessee.
On 5 July 2019, Mr Larcombe provided Mr Randell with a revised offer for Conder, "amended as requested." Mr Larcombe provided the offer to Mr Hedley the next day. Mr Hedley suggested that Mr Larcombe and Mr Dumbrell send the owners the lease documents that had been agreed for Red Hill, Macgregor and Throsby, to save time and legal fees. On 8 July 2019, Mr Larcombe requested a needs reports for Conder.
On 12 July 2019, the third defendant, Wonderschool (Dickson) Pty Ltd was incorporated. Mr Larcombe executed heads of agreement for Dickson, which he provided to Mr Randell and Mr Hedley. Mr Randell provided Mr Larcombe and Mr Hedley with the plans for Dickson, which Mr Hedley provided to Mr Dumbrell. The needs assessment reports for Conder arrived, which Mr Larcombe provided to Mr Hedley and Mr Randell. Mr Hedley observed, "Conder not as strong but you['re] first to open …". On 15 July 2019 Mr Larcombe provided Mr Randell with an executed offer for the Woden site.
On 18 July 2019, Mr Larcombe communicated with the Throsby developers, asking when the owners "intended to put the second centre to us." The developers advised that it would be likely before the defendants' opened the first Throsby childcare site. Mr Larcombe informed Mr Hilton that this was an issue which they needed to discuss, and Mr Hedley suggested, "if he refuses to budge, agree to his date and then object to his DA and hold it up by 12 months."
On 19 July 2019, the fifth defendant, Wonderschool (Throsby) Pty Ltd was incorporated. The company signed the lease in relation to the first Throsby site, which then had development approval for 110 places.
On 28 July 2019, Mr Larcombe provided Mr Hedley with a draft lease documents for the Dickson site for his comments, which were provided. Mr Hedley noted that the disclosure statement was standard. The outgoings were estimated to be $20,000 per annum, which put the gross rent per place up to $4,622 per person. Mr Hedley said he would review the lease; there is no evidence of any comments provided.

[23]

Throsby and Dickson invoices

On 31 July 2019, Mr Hedley rendered an invoice for the Throsby site for $121,000 including GST, with the following description: Re: Consultancy services for Wonderschool Re: Block 2, section 17, Throsby, ACT, based on 110 places x $2,000 per place = $220,000 + GST 50 percent payable now (signed lease and DA approved)
On 5 August 2019, Mr Hedley rendered an invoice in respect of the Dickson site for $99,000 including GST, with the following description: Re: Consultancy services: Wonderschool Dickson: 90 places x $2000 per place = $180,000 50 percent payable now (lease signed and DA approved)
On 7 August 2019, Mr Larcombe provided a Wonderschool logo to Mr Hedley for his comment, which was forthcoming, "See if she can change the black to another colour." On 12 August 2019, Mr Hedley provided Mr Larcombe and Mr Randell with details of a childcare site in Deakin, "My view on this is that whilst it's close [to Red Hill] … arguably a different market to Red Hill." (This site did not proceed).
On 14 August 2019, Mr Hedley asked Mr Mascitelli to call him about the unpaid invoices for Throsby and Dickson. On 19 August 2019, Mr Mascitelli asked Mr Hedley to reissue the invoices to the respective corporate entities, being the third and fifth defendants. Mr Larcombe emailed Mr Mascitelli, "can you pay Hilton $110k today." The invoice in respect of the Dickson site was paid.
On 21 August 2019, Mr Larcombe was arranging for the childcare sites to be valued for the bank and, by email, introduced Mr Hedley to the valuer and Wonderschool's operations manager, Sarah Wilcox, as "Allied property owner works with all the big childcare players around Australia." Mr Larcombe asked if Mr Hedley could meet with the valuer "and give him your perspective on Canberra childcare and our centres if you have time."
On 9 September 2019, Mr Hedley followed up the defendants for payment of the Throsby invoice, "just wanting it to be paid before I send more invoices out for Conder & Mitchell etc." On 26 September 2019, ACT Education approved the first Throsby site for 80 children. It will be immediately observed that this was less than the 110 places approved by Council, this being the basis on which the plaintiff had rendered its fee. Mr Hedley emailed Mr Mascitelli, advising that Mr Larcombe had confirmed payment of the invoice that day or the next. To this, Mr Larcombe replied: Had a look at payments to date and these ones aren't in bag as yet.. close but no cigar $72k Hurstville no lease no deal $67.5k red hill and Macgregor meant to start construction next month and still no finance approval so conditional When these are unconditional then payments will follow think that fair in both sides as per Dickson payment So that cancels out Throsby invoice for the time being both being reasonable
That is, Mr Larcombe complained that the defendants had paid the first tranche of the plaintiff's fee for Hurstville, Red Hill and Macgregor but those sites were not proceeding according to plan, for differing reasons. Mr Larcombe effectively sought a 'credit' for those payments against the first tranche of the Throsby fee. In short, Mr Larcombe sought to re-negotiate the agreement on fees as evidenced by his text message at [52] and his email at [106]. Mr Hedley did not agree, replying: (emphasis added) Throsby is unconditional and about to open and was invoiced 8 weeks ago. Red Hill and Mcgregor are both DA approved and leases signed which is the basis of our agreement and the commencement of construction is imminent. … Given Conder & Mitchell signings also imminent (and unconditional) Taylor as well are we not able to defer payments on those instead? Also Googong, Woden and Bungendore …"
Mr Larcombe replied that he would call shortly. Apparently following this discussion, Mr Hedley was asked to re-issue the invoice to the fifth defendant, Wonderschool (Throsby) Pty Ltd, "so we can pay $60,000 today as discussed." It is clear from subsequent emails that Mr Hedley agreed with this. Mr Larcombe gave payment instructions for 50% of the invoice, being $60,500. That is, Mr Hedley accepted payment of half of the first tranche of the Throsby fee. Based on a later email from Mr Hedley, it appears that Mr Hedley agreed to defer half of the first tranche of the Throsby fee until additional places at the childcare centre were approved: see [170]. It would appear that the defendants were making efforts to increase the number of approved places from the 80 approved by the Department of Education to something approaching the 110 places in the development approval, being the basis on which the plaintiff had rendered its fees.
On 28 October 2019, Mr Larcombe provided Mr Randell and Mr Hedley with comments by the defendants' architects on the Macgregor plans. Mr Larcombe informed Mr Hedley that he would like to get the architect involved in any design discussions or plans, apparently for the Hurstville site, and asked Mr Hedley to obtain a CAD plan for the Hurstville site.
On 8 November 2019, Mr Larcombe was endeavouring to conclude the documentation for the Conder site and emailed Mr Randell and others in respect of remaining issues. On 25 November 2019, Mr Hedley exchanged text messages with Mr Randell, asking whether the Conder deal was done, and was informed that the documentation had been signed. Mr Hedley enquired "how many places was it again?" and was told it was about 109. On 4 December 2019, Wonderschool (Conder) Pty Ltd's lease commenced.
On 6 January 2020, Mr Hedley received a text message from Mr Randell, who advised that the ACT developers could not get finance without a contract for the Throsby site, "I would be working on convincing Simon to sign a guarantee … or find a buyer … if he signs a guarantee the Red Hill and Macgregor go ahead, if not we have to wait till an acceptable sale. It is what it is now. Hurting everyone. So work it from your end."
Mr Hedley forwarded the text to Mr Larcombe, "Have a think about how to resolve this. I believe them when they say that Red Hill and Macgregor proceeding are subject to Throsby sale. … with 50 places already committed there is little doubt in my mind that it will be a very solid business. … You have already topped [the] performance [of established operators]. … I am prepared to play a part in the [personal guarantee] if it's limited to 12 months … In my mind it's a low risk … I'm happy to be involved with that structure if it eases the burden on you and also secures Red Hill." Mr Hedley also had another childcare site in Manly, "This is a cracker …" (This site did not proceed).
On 5 February 2020, Mr Hedley and Mr Larcombe attended a meeting with Sirius Capital Partners in respect of the potential establishment of a $50 million fund in relation to childcare centres. That evening, Mr Hedley exchanged text messages with Mr Larcombe in respect of payment of his fees. Mr Larcombe advised, "Had the chat [with Mr Mascitelli] and … it was decided when bank loan approved to release funds to you mate. Best thing for long term for business and you to get CBA locked in … and Red Hill and Macgregor started then we can sit down and discuss best way forward with the shares and fees etc … it's not far off mate I'm pushing hard believe me." That is, Mr Larcombe sought to defer payment of the plaintiff's fees until the defendants obtained finance from their bank, and potentially to pay by equity instead.
On 7 February 2020, Mr Larcombe emailed Mr Hedley, "As discussed $50k of your fees due will be paid in March. Apologies for the delay." Mr Hedley texted Mr Larcombe, "Mate your email is ridiculous." Mr Larcombe replied, "Gee mate it was just an email saying you would get paid part in March what's wrong with that? How about you write the email and I'll send it back to you." Mr Hedley replied "okay I'll send it now". Mr Hedley drafted an email for Mr Larcombe to send back, recording the position with payment as follows: Hi Hilton As per our most recent discussion I thought id send an email outlining what has been paid to date and what Is owing to you for deals completed and impending deals relating to Wonderschool. These fees are based on paying the agreed rate of $2k per licensed place. $1k upon lease signed, DA Approval and becoming unconditional, the remaining $1k to go towards equity in the business. Please note that the shareholders agreement outlining equity splits are being drafted and will be sent short[l]y. What has been paid to date is: Dickson: $90k paid (nothing further owed other than equity) Hurstville: $72k (nothing further owned other than equity) Red Hill: $60k (a further $60k is owing once unconditional) + equity M[ac]gregor: $75k (a further $75k is owing once unconditional) + equity Throsby: $55k (A further $55k is owing once the additional places are approved) Conder: $109k owing now + equity We are awaiting further finance from the Commonwealth Bank which we are anticipating will be paid towards the end of February. All outstanding amounts will be paid upon our finance being paid. We also expect Red Hill and McGregor to be unconditional within weeks.
Mr Hedley said that he and Mr Larcombe discussed equity in Creative Academy as a potential alternative to their agreement, but this never eventuated. Mr Hedley's email also records the agreement to defer payment of the second 25% of the plaintiff's fee for Red Hill and Macgregor until conditions in the development consent or agreement for lease had been satisfied. (I note that Mr Hedley's email may have been incorrect where the second 25% of the Red Hill and Macgregor fees had, in fact, been paid in June 2019, following satisfaction of the conditions). Mr Hedley's email also recorded the agreement to defer payment of the second 25% of the plaintiff's fee for Throsby until additional places were approved. Mr Hedley proposed, however, that all outstanding invoices would be paid once the defendants' finance was confirmed.
To this, Mr Larcombe replied: I could redraft [a lot] of this email including Dickson Hurstville red hill and Macgregor all conditional and I've still paid you $300k All good let's catch up properly Canberra next Wednesday it's all good and this years a big one for the group and great your going to be part of it and a big asset [it] is so thanks as always
Notwithstanding Mr Larcombe's suggestion that he could re-draft a lot of Mr Hedley's proposed email, Mr Larcombe sent the email as drafted by Mr Hedley without alteration. That is, Mr Larcombe was prepared to record that the terms of the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendants were as set out in that email, as was the state of payment of the plaintiff's respective invoices. The same can be said for Mr Hedley. Mr Hedley replied, "You know they will all be unconditional. Is Jim paying me $20k today. Please?"
On 11 February 2020, Sirius Capital Partners provided Mr Larcombe with notes following a meeting to discuss establishing a property development fund to develop childcare centres. Mr Larcombe provided the notes to Mr Hedley the next day, advising that the preliminary discussions were going well.
On 19 February 2020, Mr Hedley texted Mr Larcombe in respect of developments, "Also I need some of my invoices paid and still need to invoice you for Conder can you pay anything today please it's now critical." Mr Larcombe replied "been through this before when CBA finance and Red Hill Macgregor unconditional you will get some released …" Mr Hedley said he could not wait: Im told by Guy just now that McGregor is unconditional, and Red Hill has been agreed as well. Also Throsby? Conder? CommBank finance shouldn't be the issue for me not being paid especially when there are funds available.
Mr Hedley asked Mr Larcombe to have a think about funds, "I'm willing to be creative with the overall amounts and equity etc but I can't go another week without a significant payment made." Mr Larcombe replied "not much I can do I paid you close to $500k last year on things that still aren't unconditional so not time to push for any more mate …" Mr Hedley replied: (emphasis added) There is a distinct mis-understanding of how I am supposed to be paid. This is why I have always wanted an agreement in writing, to avoid this. I am supposed to be paid on Lease Signing and DA approval. If things change after the fact, the fee is altered on the back end. That is the payment is split into two parts. You are the only one that tries to pay this way. Not Guardian Not Little Learning School Not Kids Club This is out of my hands now … You talk about unconditional yet I have not even paid for a centre that is trading and one that is about to open. Im truly sorry but you don't seem to understand the way it works. Why would any agent in their right mind agree to deals being unconditional. Where the hell did you get that from. Sorry but I think its all over
In cross-examination, Mr Hedley explained that he was giving Mr Larcombe the benefit of the doubt in suggesting that there was a misunderstanding, "I was trying everything in order to get him to pay me." Certainly, the suggestion that a site was "unconditional" before payment would be made had progressively crept into communications, beginning with Mr Hedley's agreement to defer the second 25% of the plaintiff's fee for Red Hill and Macgregor until conditions in the development approval or agreement for lease had been satisfied. Mr Hedley then agreed to defer the second 25% of the plaintiff's fee for Throsby until additional places were approved for the site. Mr Hedley recorded these specific concessions in his email of 7 February 2020. Mr Larcombe now sought to take this further, suggesting that each site must be "unconditional" before any payment would be made, where the conditions referred to seemed to be anything which stood in the way of the site's opening for trade. Mr Hedley rejected this notion and re-stated the terms of their original agreement.
Mr Larcombe objected, "That's an awful text threatening me mate I don't know why you would do it." Mr Hedley and Mr Larcombe met, following which Mr Larcombe advised that he would be seeing Mr Mascitelli in the morning to approve payment and needed Mr Hedley to meet beforehand "to sort out our ongoing relationship." Mr Hedley agreed to meet.
On 10 March 2020, Mr Hedley went to Mr Mascitelli's offices and met with Mr Larcombe. Mr Larcombe showed him a ledger of invoices and which had been paid. Mr Larcombe said he would come back to Mr Hedley with an agreement in writing as to what was owed after he had spoken with Mr Mascitelli. Mr Larcombe later texted Mr Hedley that he was finalising a document and would have funds to him by the weekend. After attending a board meeting, Mr Larcombe texted, "Ive got to send you a doc which I've got to amend take me 10min then agree and will send you $50k your already in advanced credit by $350k so get off my back." That is, to the extent that payments had been made in respect of a site which remained uncertain for whatever reason, Mr Larcombe now considered these payments to be 'advances' or 'credits'.
On 12 March 2020, ACT Education approved the Conder site for 107 children.

[24]

A settlement?

On 14 March 2020, Mr Larcombe sent a lengthy email to Mr Hedley, which began: This is the arrangement between yourself personally and White Pointer Investments and Creative Academy Group ( and associated companies being Wonderschool associated companies). Advance payments have been made on below projects and if they don't proceed for any reason funds are to be refunded.
This was the first time that it had been suggested that the plaintiff would refund fees. Mr Larcombe set out the current position on each of the childcare sites. In respect of the Hurstville site: Wonderschool Hurstville proposed 72 pax centre which has not proceeded to date and is still very conditional on them proceeding and drop dead date for us having an acceptable [agreement for lease] to us and construction started on site is 1st January 2021 This has dragged out so $1,500 per place plus GST total fee We paid $79,200 incl GST on the 6/12/18 in advance which shall be refunded if it doesn't proceed Fee to pay 3 months after child care centre is open and trading with 72 pax being $39,600 incl GST
In respect of Macgregor: Wonderschool Macgregor proposed 150 pax centre which has not proceeded to date and is still very conditional on them proceeding and drop dead date for us having an acceptable [agreement for lease] to us and construction started on site is 1st January 2021. This centre is to big for the area and will likely never fill to 150 places so fee will be based on 120 places which is still to big This has dragged out so $1,500 per place total fee plus GST for 120 pax We paid $82,500 incl GST on the 29/3/19 in advance which shall be refunded if it doesn't proceed We paid $75,000 incl GST on the 18/6/19 in advance which shall be refunded if it doesn't proceed Fee to pay 3 months after child care centre is open and trading with min 120 pax being $22,500 incl GST
In respect of Red Hill: Wonderschool Red Hill proposed 120 pax centre which has not proceeded to date and is still very conditional on them proceeding and drop dead date for us having an acceptable [agreement for lease] to us and construction started on site is 1st January 2021 This has dragged out so $1,650 per place total fee plus GST for 120 pax We paid $66,000 incl GST on the 29/3/19 in advance which shall be refunded if it doesn't proceed We paid $66,000 incl GST on the 18/6/19 in advance which shall be refunded if it doesn't proceed Fee to pay 3 months after child care centre is open and trading with min 120 pax being $85,800 incl GST
In respect of Dickson: Wonderschool Dickson proposed 90 pax centre which looks like its proceeding although service approval will not be easy with CECA not liking level 1 child care centres. We are working our way through these issues likely open November/December 2020 No government guaranteed take out for any kids so fee $1,500 per place total fee plus GST for 90 pax We paid $99,000 incl GST on the 19/8/19 in advance which shall be refunded if it doesn't proceed Fee to pay 3 months after child care centre is open and trading with min 90 pax being $49,500 incl GST
In respect of Throsby: Wonderschool Throsby proposed 110 pax centre which is open and have service approval for 80 pax. Been all sorts of building issues with this site which has cost us an extra $250,000 in variations. CECA have said we won't get to 110 pax looks like we will max out at 103 pax Total fee $500 a place plus GST for 103 pax We paid $60,500 incl GST on the 26/9/19 Total fee being $56,650 incl GST so you are credit $3,850
In respect of Conder: Wonderschool Conder proposed 107 pax centre which will is about to open on 30th March 2020 and have service approval. Been all sorts of building issues with this site which has cost us an extra $550,000 in variations Total fee $500 a place plus GST for 103 pax Total fee due being $51,500 incl GST
In respect of Woden and other sites: Other sites that you will be paid a fee are Wonderschool Mitchell, Woden, London Circuit, Vaucluse These sites fee $600 per pax plus GST total fee $300 per pax plus GST when we have satisfactory AFL executed and landlord commences construction on site $300 per pax plus GST 3 months after opening centre and trading
In short, Mr Larcombe proposed that the plaintiff would refund its fees if a site did not proceed, and would receive a reduced fee if it did. Mr Larcombe proposed a reduced fee for each site, ranging from $500 to $1,650 a place. The time for payment of the second 50% of the plaintiff's fee was put back by three months after opening. Mr Larcombe said that each of the sites were "still very conditional" on various matters; he imposed "drop dead" dates for acceptable agreements for lease and construction to begin. Mr Larcombe's email concluded: On a without prejudice basis, This is the full and final settlement sheet You are to exclusively assist us where possible with all these transactions and do everything in your power to promote Wonderschool/Creative Academy brand and businesses and not compete against us on, or introduce directly or indirectly any other person to, any of these sites listed on this email or the owners thereof. These arrangements are absolutely confidential Being we should not have technically been paid for Hurstville, Macgregor or Red Hill you are in advance or credit by the large sum of $366,550 which you currently owe us if any of those deals don't proceed to completed child care centres for us to take over From now on if you bring us off market deals that we don't know about and not associated with Guy Randell then we will pay you a total fee of $1,500 per pax plus GST being $750 on [agreement for lease] execution and terms being acceptable to us thus unconditional [agreement for lease]/Lease and $750 per pax being paid 3 months after we commence trading in a centre Please confirm your acceptance of these terms today so we can make a payment for Conder fee of $51,500 today less the $3,850 credit for Throsby thus payment today total being $47,650 We think this is a very generous offer given the amount of credit we have advanced yourself and are very reluctant to pay anything given this is the case We hope to continue to work with you in the future
Mr Larcombe's proposal was quite extraordinary given the arrangements observed by the parties until then. Unsurprisingly, Mr Hedley replied "I can't agree to this and will not be signing it. You have done nothing but contradict our agreement and broken promises made as recently as yesterday."
Mr Hedley replied 52 minutes later, and thus presumably having had sufficient time to consider Mr Larcombe's email, "Taylor? Bronte?" Twenty minutes later, Mr Larcombe replied, "Taylor same as Throsby. Bungendore no fee bought the land and not involved." To this, Mr Hedley replied eight minutes later, "can u make the payment today please?"
It is clear from the text messages exchanged between Mr Hedley and Mr Larcombe at this time that Mr Hedley was under very significant financial pressure. Mr Hedley said, "By the time this had happened, it was clear to me that unless I agreed to his proposal, I was not going to receive a cent." In parallel with the emails between Mr Larcombe and Mr Hedley were the following text messages from Mr Hedley, the time of each being illegible: U Must be kidding. If i agree to that will u make the payment today ?
Eight minutes later, Mr Larcombe replied to Mr Hedley's initial response to the proposal at [190]: (emphasis added) That's not true we went through each deal and your $350k in advance been paid $500m and still ungrateful Shareholders think this is fair and reasonable deal Conder, Throsby are $15k referrals not $50k or $60k fees which we have agreed to pay That's all I can do mate take it and move forward it's a good deal That is, Mr Larcombe acknowledged that the defendants had previously agreed to pay $50,000 for Conder and $60,000 for Throsby but now considered only $15,000 should be paid for each site.
One minute later, Mr Larcombe sent an email to Mr Hedley in response to his email asking whether payment could be made that day (at [191]), "Sure assume you accept the arrangement?" Mr Hedley immediately replied, "yes please pay thank you." Soon after, Mr Larcombe sent a text message of a screenshot authorising payment of $47,650, "Fee Conder." Mr Hedley agreed that the invoice for Conder was not otherwise due until the end of March 2020.
On 16 March 2020, fellow shareholder, Sean Larcombe congratulated Mr Larcombe on the result. Mr Larcombe replied, "Yes he has been smashed on fees so it's definitely a win for us." This was effectively the end of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants.
Notwithstanding the exchange of emails and text messages on 14 March 2020, Mr Hedley sent Mr Larcombe invoices for Red Hill and Conder sites on 3 April 2020, being $121,000 and $239,800 respectively. The description on the Red Hill invoice stated: Re: Consultancy services for Wonderschool Red Hill based on 110 places x $2,000 per place = $220,000 + GST Remaining 50 percent payment due
The invoice for Conder stated: Fee as agreed 109 places @ $2,000 per place = $218,000 Centre open trading Total payable now $218,000 + GST
There is no evidence of any reply. On 17 April 2020, the plaintiff served a statutory demand on Creative Academy for the invoiced amounts. Mr Hedley affirmed an affidavit, declaring that the monies were due and payable and that there was no genuine dispute about the existence or amount of the debts. This did evoke a response. The defendants' solicitor advised that the parties had reached an agreement on 14 March 2020 regarding the amount payable through an exchange of emails and this amount was then paid. The plaintiff was invited to withdraw the demands but did not do so. Creative Academy filed an application to set aside the statutory demands. Mr Larcombe disputed that the debts were owing, including by reason of a settlement agreement reached by an exchange of emails on 14 March 2020. The statutory demands were set aside.
In February 2021, Mr Randell told Mr Hedley that the Dickson childcare site was completed, with 93 places. In March 2021, approval for the centre was limited to 74 places. In March 2021, development approval was obtained for the Taylor site on the basis of 110 places. On 17 May 2021, the Woden centre opened with 120 places.
On 18 May 2021, Mr Hedley provided Mr Larcombe and Mr Mascitelli with a bundle of invoices and statements of account, issued both to Creative Academy and the relevant special purpose entity. Mr Hedley explained that as long as one of the invoices was paid, the other invoice need not be paid. For each site, an invoice was supplied for the initial fee and final fee, together with a statement of account. These documents were supplied for Conder, Dickson, Hurstville, Macgregor, Red Hill, Taylor, Throsby and Woden. A total of $844,950 was sought by 25 May 2021. There was no evidence of a reply. These proceedings were commenced on 4 June 2021.
On 21 December 2021, the ACT Civil & Administrative Tribunal reviewed the decision granting service approval for the Dickson site, increasing the approval from 72 to 95 children: Wonderschool (Dickson) Pty Ltd v The Australian Capital Territory (as represented by the ACT Education Directorate) [2021] ACAT 127. On 25 March 2020, the plaintiff withdrew the invoices sent on 18 May 2021 in respect of the Dickson site and issued revised invoices in the amount of $110,000 (including GST).
On 8 February 2023, the defendants' solicitors wrote to the plaintiff's solicitor referring to the settlement agreement said to have been reached on 14 March 2020. A summary was provided of the amounts payable or refundable under the agreement and when these payments or refunds were to be made. The plaintiff's conduct since that agreement was said to have amounted to wrongful repudiation, which the defendants did not accept but elected to proceed on the basis that the agreement remained on foot. The maximum amount then payable by the defendants under the agreement was said to be $62,900; the only reason that the defendants had not paid this amount was said to be because of the plaintiff's denial of the agreement. If the Court determined that the agreement was valid, then the defendants would perform it. The defendants offered to immediately pay the $62,900 if the plaintiff confirmed that it was bound by the agreement. In the event that the plaintiff did not obtain judgment in a more favourable sum, then the defendants would seek costs on an indemnity basis.

[26]

Principles

Resolving this issue is made more difficult by the absence of a written contract and the informal setting in which any oral contract was made. As Hammerschlag J observed in John Holland Pty Ltd v Kellogg Brown & Root Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 451, where a party seeks to rely on spoken words as evidence a contract, without reliable contemporaneous records or satisfactory corroboration, a party may face serious difficulties of proof: at [94]. The conversation must be proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the court such that the court must feel an actual persuasion that the words were actually said and were intended by the parties to be legally binding: at [94]-[96].
Further, as McHugh JA observed in Integrated Computer Services Pty Ltd v Digital Equipment Corp (Aust) Pty Ltd (1988) 5 BPR 11,110, "It is often difficult to fit a commercial arrangement into the common lawyers' analysis of a contractual arrangement. Commercial discussions are often too unrefined to fit easily into the slots of "offer", "acceptance", "consideration" and "intention to create a legal relationship" which are the benchmarks of the contract of classical theory": at 11,117. Where a contract is said to be formed by the conduct and conversations, the better question may be what a reasonable person would have thought in all the circumstances as to whether there was a concluded bargain: Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council [2001] NSWCA 61; (2001) 53 NSWLR 153 at 179. In Integrated Computer Services v Digital Equipment McHugh JA also observed at 11,118: Moreover, in an ongoing relationship, it is not always easy to point to the precise moment when the legal criteria of a contract have been fulfilled. Agreements concerning terms and conditions which might be too uncertain or too illusory to enforce a particular time in the relationship may by reason of the parties' subsequent conduct become sufficiently specific to give rise to legal rights and duties. In a dynamic commercial relationship new terms will be added or will supersede older terms. It is necessary therefore to look at the whole relationship and not only at what was said and done when the relationship was first formed.
Of assistance in resolving these issues is post-contractual conduct, which may aid in finding what the terms of a contract were: Lym International Pty Limited v Marcolongo (2011) 15 BPR 29,465; [2011] NSWCA 303 at [124]-[126] (per Campbell JA, Basten JA and Sackar J agreeing). Subsequent conduct may indicate what was important or essential to the transaction and indicate the parties' contractual intention: Queensland Phosphate Pty Limited v Korda and Shepard (as joint and several liquidators of Legend International Holdings Inc (in liq)) [2017] VSCA 269 at [37] (per Tate and Beach JJA and Sifris AJA). Post-contractual conduct may also amount to an admission against interest as to the terms of the contract: JR Consulting & Drafting Pty Ltd v Cummings (2016) 239 ALR 625 at 637; [2016] FCAFC 20 at [54] (per Bennett, Greenwood and Besanko JJ).
As to the defendants' submission that I should attach little weight to Mr Hedley's evidence of what was said at a "boozy" lunch, the consumption of alcohol can affect the capacity for recall and have a significant effect on how someone may perceive the words or actions of another at the time: R v Thiyagarajah [2019] SASC 84 at [30] (per Lovell J). However, beyond Mr Hedley's acceptance that the lunch at which the oral agreement was reached could fairly be described as lengthy and "boozy", there is no evidence as to precisely what that entailed: how much was drunk and by whom, and how affected by alcohol Mr Hedley may have been. By contrast, in ACCC v Bluescope Steel Ltd (No 5) [2022] FCA 1475, an invoice for the meal was tendered and the witness agreed that he consumed two mixed drinks before dinner, shared a bottle of wine during dinner and had a glass of scotch whiskey after dinner. O'Bryan J was not persuaded that the amount of alcohol consumed was likely to have materially impaired the witness' recollection of the discussion at the dinner: at [771]. I have little to go on in this regard and, thus, have not discounted Mr Hedley's evidence on this account.
The passage of time may also exacerbate the general problem that recollections given in the course of legal proceedings may be distorted, albeit innocently, by a desire to succeed: Watson v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315 at 319 (per McLelland CJ in Eq). Here, the conversations occurred 4½ years before Mr Hedley swore his first affidavit in these proceedings, which is not a great length of time in the scheme of litigation, and particularly not where the existence and terms of the agreement were the subject of ongoing correspondence in the intervening period. I have not discounted Mr Hedley's evidence on this account either. What I have discounted Mr Hedley's evidence on, however, is the extent to which it departs from the contemporaneous documents. There are three key differences, considered at [212], [213] and [229].

[27]

Conclusion

I accept that Mr Hedley told Mr Dumbrell that Mr Hedley was sourcing childcare centres for Kids Club for $2,000 per place plus GST and would be happy to source childcare site for the defendants for the same fee.
I attach little weight to Mr Hedley's description of his conversation with Mr Larcombe and Mr Dumbrell at the Woollahra Hotel: see [25]. While Mr Hedley set out this conversation in his affidavit in direct speech, it was apparent from cross examination that his actual recall of the conversation was slight: Kane's Hire Pty Ltd v Anderson Aviation Australia Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 381 at [121]-[129] (per Jackman J); followed in Gan v Xie [2023] NSWCA 163 at [119] (per White JA, Simpson and Basten AJA agreeing).
Turning to Mr Hedley's evidence of conversations at the "boozy" lunch in October 2017, I draw no Jones v Dunkel inference in respect of Mr Larcombe or Mr Dumbrell's failure to give evidence, where the inferences would be drawn in opposite directions. I accept that Mr Hedley, Mr Larcombe and Mr Dumbrell discussed the plaintiff 'sourcing' childcare centres for the defendants.
This brings us to the first point of difference between Mr Hedley's evidence and the contemporaneous documents. Mr Larcombe's text message in June 2018 (at [52]) and his email in March 2019 (at [106]) acknowledged that the plaintiff's fee was $2,000 per place but also record that Mr Hedley had initially proposed to charge 5% (of what is not known) but had gone to "a straight fee", presumably of $2,000 a place, "which is simpler for all of us." An initial but different proposal as described by Mr Larcombe does depart from Mr Hedley's evidence of their conversation in October 2017.
As to the second point of difference, the contemporaneous documents indicate that the parties later agreed that the fee would be paid in two tranches, being in June 2018, as documented by Mr Larcombe's text message (see [52]), rather than at the "boozy" lunch. As I understand Mr Hedley's email of 19 February 2020, this was a more favourable payment arrangement than he usually entertained: at [176]. That this was agreed later also departs from Mr Hedley's evidence of their conversation in October 2017.
I am satisfied, however, that the plaintiff offered to "source" childcare sites for the defendants for a fee. Mr Hedley proposed a fee of 5% (of what is not known) but the parties agreed on "a straight fee" of $2,000 a place. Whether this happened at or after the lunch is unknown and immaterial. The defendants accepted this offer. The parties later agreed that the fee would be paid in two tranches.
Whilst the defendants submitted that what was involved in "sourcing" a site was inherently unclear, this does not appear to have been unclear to Mr Dumbrell, Mr Larcombe or Mr Hedley at the time, nor subsequently. The plaintiff's services were perceived to be of value to the defendants at the time, and recognised as valuable after the deal was struck: see [20], [103], [104], [107], [117], [120]. That is, there was good consideration.
As to whether there was an intention to create legal relations, I do not accept the defendants' submission that this was a loose arrangement between friends. Rather, Mr Hedley made use of his professional relationships to find potential leases which his clients may be interested in securing before the opportunity went to market. Mr Larcombe made use of his relationship with Mr Hedley to access opportunities which may have eluded a new entrant to the childcare market. Neither seemed prone to joking about money. In particular, Mr Hedley was fastidious in rendering invoices and pressing for payment at the earliest opportunity. Mr Larcombe was unrelenting in seeking to defer payment or impose additional conditions before payment would be made. I expect that Mr Hedley would have been astute to be clear and secure agreement on the plaintiff's fee before he introduced the defendants to 'off-market' opportunities gained through his network. Where one party has offered to provide an apparently valuable service for a specific price, the person accepting that offer would reasonably expect that, if the service was provided but the fee was not paid, then the offeror would be entitled to take action to recover its fee. This element is also satisfied.
I note that the lunch occurred at a time when Mr Hedley had already informed Mr Dumbrell of the opportunity for a childcare centre at Hurstville and Mr Dumbrell had already submitted an offer for Play Academy to lease or buy the site. But I am nonetheless satisfied that the oral contract applied to the Hurstville site for, essentially, two reasons. First, the plaintiff's initial dealings in respect of the Hurstville site were between Mr Hedley as the owner's representative and Mr Dumbrell as representative of Play Academy. After what appears to have been something of a lacuna in negotiations, and a decision by the defendants to invest in the childcare sector through Creative Academy in January 2018 (see [38]), the plaintiff and Creative Academy then worked together from March 2018 onwards in relation to the Hurstville site, with Mr Hedley referring to the defendants as "my client": at [40]. That is, the parties and the nature of the transaction changed after the "boozy" lunch. Second, the parties treated the Hurstville site as one to which their oral contract applied. The defendants paid the plaintiff a fee to "source" the site. I have no doubt that the defendants would not have paid this fee absent a clear understanding on their part that there was a binding agreement to pay the fee for the service provided.
I am also satisfied that the parties agreed to work together on this basis, not only for the Hurstville site, but for other sites. As much was acknowledged in Mr Larcombe and Mr Dumbrell's emails exchanged in March 2019 in respect of a new shareholder's agreement for Creative Academy, where Mr Dumbrell acknowledged that the plaintiff's fee for Red Hill was $2,000 per place (see [105]) and Mr Larcombe acknowledged that Mr Hedley was "getting paid a fee of $2k per pax on all these deals": see [106].

[28]

Pre-incorporation contracts

As to who the contract was with, the conversations which formed the basis of the oral contract were with Mr Larcombe. Creative Academy had then been incorporated but, apparently, as the special purpose vehicle for Play Academy's upcoming Croydon childcare centre: see [21]. Some three months later, Creative Academy became, effectively, the parent company for all subsequently incorporated special purpose vehicles which entered into leases for the eight sites "sourced" by the plaintiff. When each special purpose vehicle was incorporated and had entered into the lease, Mr Mascitelli often (but not always) requested the plaintiff to re-issue its invoices addressed to the special purpose vehicle, and the plaintiff obliged. Some of these invoices have been paid, whether by Creative Academy or the special purpose vehicle is not known.
Given that the special purpose vehicles were not incorporated when the agreement was said to have been reached, the plaintiff sought an order pursuant to section 131 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) that the special purpose vehicles were jointly liable together with Creative Academy and Mr Larcombe. The defendants did not make any submissions in respect of the orders sought under section 131 of the Corporations Act.
Section 131 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides: Contracts before registration (1) If a person enters into, or purports to enter into, a contract on behalf of, or for the benefit of, a company before it is registered, the company becomes bound by the contract and entitled to its benefit if the company, or a company that is reasonably identifiable with it, is registered and ratifies the contract: (a) within the time agreed to by the parties to the contract; or (b) if there is no agreed time - within a reasonable time after the contract is entered into.
Where it is shown that a contract falls within the ambit of section 131(1), but the company does not ratify the contract or enter into a substitute contract, the agent who entered into the contract on behalf of the company may be liable to pay damages, being the amount the company would have been liable to pay had the company ratified the contract and then not performed at all: section 131(2). The court may also order the agent to pay all or part of the damages a company is ordered to pay where the company ratifies the pre-registration contract but fails to perform it: section 131(4).
There is no problem here with ratification. Ratification requires a manifestation by the principal to be bound by the contract, and can be either express or implied: Aztech Science v Atlanta Aerospace (Woy Woy) [2005] NSWCA 319 at [81]-[83] (per Basten JA, Handley JA agreeing). For example, in Persad v Singh [2017] UKPC 32, the Privy Council held that a pre-incorporation lease agreement could be ratified by the payment of rent by the relevant company: at [26]. The fact that the Mr Mascitelli - a director of each special purpose vehicle - requested the plaintiff to re-issue (at least some) of the invoices to the relevant special purpose vehicle, and then to pay (at least some) of these invoices, suffices.
The problem is whether each special purpose vehicle was a company, or a company "reasonably identifiable with" the company, on whose behalf Mr Larcombe contracted with the plaintiff. As the learned authors of Ford, Austin & Ramsay's Principles of Corporations Law observe, the company later coming into existence must be "reasonably identifiable with" the company for whom the agent entered the contract; the contract or the matrix of facts surrounding its making must show that the agent manifested an intention to contract for the company: at [15.280]. It requires that "the company be identified to or be identifiable by the other party to the contract at the time of formation of the contract or at least that what is identified to the other party at that time is reasonably identifiable with the company": Commissioner of State Revenue v Viewbank Properties Pty Ltd [2004] VSC 127 at [50] (per Nettle J). The person said to have initially entered into the contract on behalf of the yet-to-be corporation "should have indicated that it was entering into the contract not for itself but for an unincorporated company": B J McAdam Pty Ltd v Jax Tyres Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 1438 at [23] (per Perram J).
Mr Hedley did not recall discussing what further corporate arrangements Mr Larcombe might put in place to take up childcare centres which the plaintiff "sourced". However, in Mr Hedley's experience, the invariable and standard practice was that leases for childcare centres were entered into by a corporate entity as tenant. It was common for a company to be incorporated for the purpose of taking up a site and operating a childcare centre. It was unusual for the company to be incorporated before the site had been sourced. Whether Mr Larcombe was aware of these practices, as a new entrant, is unknown, albeit the relevant question is how it would have appeared to the plaintiff: Viewbank at [50].
As to what Mr Larcombe did say at the lunch, according to Mr Hedley, Mr Larcombe said "We are a group of investors looking at investing in child-care centres. … If you source child-care centres for us, we will pay you …" It was the case that Mr Larcombe was part of a group of investors, which was then providing financial support to Play Academy to acquire the Croydon childcare centre through Creative Academy, then called Croydon Childcare Pty Ltd: see [17], [21]. A reasonable person in Mr Hedley's position would have understood from Mr Larcombe's remarks that the obligation to pay the fee would be discharged by the investors who he represented, rather than by himself personally. At the time, those investors were pursuing their investment through Creative Academy.
Accepting that the lease for a childcare site would be entered into by a corporate entity as tenant, rather than by Mr Larcombe personally, there was no discussion as to whether that corporate entity would be Creative Academy or a special purpose vehicle. Whilst it may have been common practice to incorporate such a vehicle, Mr Hedley and Mr Larcombe did not talk about whether the investors intended to do so. While Mr Hedley's evidence describes the usual practices in the childcare sector, I do not consider that this is sufficient to meet the requirements of section 131(1).
As such, the only company on whose behalf Mr Larcombe entered into the contract with the plaintiff was Creative Academy, which then existed. No order need be made under section 131(1) of the Corporations Act to ensure that the burden to pay any moneys owing under the oral contract falls on Creative Academy. The fact that Mr Mascitelli, on occasion, later asked the plaintiff to issue, or re-issue, invoices to the special purpose vehicles does not absolve Creative Academy from performing its obligation under the oral contract to pay the plaintiff's fee.

[29]

Variations?

This brings me to the third point of difference between Mr Hedley's evidence and the contemporaneous documents. These documents suggest that the agreement between the parties was not static but may have been varied from time to time, being "a dynamic commercial relationship [where] new terms will be added or will supersede older terms": Integrated Computer Services v Digital Equipment at 11,118. On receipt of the plaintiff's invoices for Red Hill and Macgregor, the parties agreed to split the first tranche of fees into two sub-tranches of 25% each, with the second 25% payable on, apparently, the ACT developer obtaining finance and development approval: at [115]-[117].
By the time the plaintiff rendered invoices for Throsby and Dickson in July 2019, the parties had now been working together for some time over a number of sites. Mr Larcombe had now met and formed a working relationship with Mr Randell and was often communicating with him directly. Mr Hedley was content for this to occur, perhaps because Mr Larcombe had provided a series of assurances that he would not thereby avoid any obligations owed to the plaintiff. What also appears to have developed over time, however, was a perception on Mr Larcombe's part that, having developed a working relationship with Mr Randell, he no longer needed Mr Hedley.
The Dickson invoice was paid but, when Mr Hedley pressed for payment of the Throsby invoice, Mr Larcombe sought to renegotiate the agreement to effectively seek a 'credit' for the first tranche of fees paid for sites which were yet to reach fruition against the first tranche of the Throsby fee. Mr Hedley declined, repeating clearly the terms of the oral contract. But Mr Hedley then agreed to accept half of the first tranche of the Throsby fee, with the balance to be paid once additional places were approved: see [163]-[164]. By an exchange of emails on 7 February 2020, the plaintiff acknowledged that the second 25% of its fee for Macgregor, Red Hill and Throsby was deferred until satisfaction of various conditions: see [170]-[173].
Whether the imposition of conditions on the second 25% of the fee for Macgregor, Red Hill and Throsby were variations of the oral contract is less clear. In order for a variation to have contractual effect, it is necessary to establish the requirements of a valid contract, including consideration: Mathews Capital Partners Pty Ltd v Coal of Queensland Holdings Ltd [2012] NSWSC 462 at [40] (per Black J) citing Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc [2002] HCA 8; (2002) 209 CLR 95 (2002) 187 ALR 92 at 99; GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty Ltd (2003) 128 FCR 1; [2003] FCA 50 at [216] (per Finn J). Whilst Mr Hedley and Mr Larcombe agreed that payment would be deferred until various conditions were satisfied, there is no evidence that Mr Hedley contemplated, or a reasonable person in his position would have contemplated, deriving a benefit from the extension of time for repayment, which would amount to consideration to support a variation of the oral contract: Schwartz v Hadid [2013] NSWCA 89 at [61] (per Basten JA). Rather, the plaintiff simply granted the defendants an indulgence.
That indulgence came to an end in February 2020. By his email of 19 February 2020, Mr Hedley rejected the notion that the sites had to be "unconditional" before payment was due and re-stated the terms of their original agreement: see [176]-[177]. Obviously enough, Creative Academy has not performed its obligations under that agreement, being to pay the plaintiff a fee of $2,000 (plus GST) per place for "sourcing" a site, with 50% payable on execution of lease documentation (either an agreement for lease or lease) and development approval, and the balance when the site opened. Subject to other issues in these proceedings, the plaintiff is entitled to be paid.

[31]

Principles

Generally, the courts will not enquire into the adequacy of consideration, measuring the comparative value of the promise and the act given in exchange for it, nor denounce an agreement merely because it seems to be unfair; the parties best know what they want to exchange: N C Seddon and R A Bigwood, Cheshire & Fifoot Law of Contract, (LexisNexis Butterworths, 11th Australian Edition) at 4.11-4.12. The consideration required by the general law was described by Gummow and Hayne JJ in Director of Public Prosecutions for Victoria v Le [2007] HCA 52 at [43]: (footnotes omitted) When used … in the general law, the term "sufficient consideration" imports a notion of tangible benefit or advantage conferred by the promisor upon the promisee, as in the case of a forbearance to sue, a bona fide compromise of a disputed claim, or the conferral of some other form of practical benefit. In these cases, the "threshold of legal recognition" regarding the consideration turns on the existence of such a real benefit. …
There is no consideration where the promisor promises to do something which they are already bound to do by a prior enforceable contract. As Jordan CJ explained in Larkin v Girvan (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 365 at 368: In order, however that this position may arise, it is necessary that the thing promised or performed should be precisely the thing which the promisor is already bound to do, and no more, and that there should be no dispute that he is bound to do it. If there has been a genuine dispute between the parties as to whether the promisor is bound under his existing contract to do what he promises to do by his new promise, and the new promise is given in an otherwise enforceable agreement which effects a compromise of that dispute, the new agreement constitutes an enforceable contract. Followed in Searle v Commonwealth of Australia (2019) 100 NSWLR 55; [2019] NSWCA 127 at [7] (per Bathurst CJ).
Put another way, the new promise, indistinguishable from the old, is illusory consideration; "it gives no comfort to a party who by merely threatening a breach of contract seeks to secure an additional contractual benefit from the other party on the footing that the first party's new promise of performance will provide sufficient consideration for that benefit": Wigan v Edwards (1973) 1 ALR 497 at 512 (per Mason J).

[32]

Conclusion

As to whether there was a genuine dispute between the parties as to whether the defendants were bound under the oral contract, Mr Hedley said that, until Mr Larcombe's email of 14 March 2020, no one had questioned the basis on which the calculations in the plaintiff's invoices was made or raised any dispute that the monies were owing.
This is not strictly correct. Issues arose from the first invoice for the Hurstville site (see [65]) as to precisely when the first tranche was due, to the extent that the deal then remained conditional in some way. Mr Larcombe gained some traction on this point when negotiating to pay the first tranche of the Red Hill and Macgregor fees in sub-tranches of 25% each, with the second 25% payable once conditions of the agreement for lease had been met, being confirmation of finance and satisfaction of the conditions of development consent: see [114], [137]. Mr Larcombe sought to extend the notion of "conditionality" in September 2019 (see [162]), with some success when Mr Hedley agreed to defer the second 25% of the Throsby fee until additional places were approved. However, Mr Hedley rejected any broader requirement that the sites had to be "unconditional" before payment was due and re-stated the terms of their original agreement in February 2020.
I consider that Mr Larcombe's email of 14 March 2020 was simply another attempt to re-negotiate the oral contract on more favourable terms, rather than an offer to resolve a bona fide dispute. Nor did the defendants offer to perform the same obligation - to pay the fee of $2,000 per place - but a mere shadow of that obligation. The fee offered differed for each site but was invariably less. Rather than be paid 50% when the lease signed and development consent obtained, and the balance when the centre opened, the plaintiff would have to refund the first 50% in a range of circumstances. The second payment was now payable some 3 months after opening. An assistance and non-competition clause was introduced. The fee payable for any future sites was lower and excluded sites which came through Mr Randell.
That is, there was absolutely nothing in this deal which would appeal to the plaintiff. The only temptation was that plaintiff would be paid something at all, being the Conder fee before it was due in the coming weeks, less an adjustment to reflect the 'new deal' proposed in respect of the Throsby site. While this was wholly inadequate on a commercial basis, the question is whether it was nonetheless sufficient consideration under the general law.
As at 14 March 2020, the plaintiff had earlier agreed to defer payment of $60,500 of the Throsby invoice until further childcare places were approved. The indulgence granted was not a variation of the oral contract, for want of consideration: see [232]. That indulgence came to an end in February 2020, when Mr Hedley re-asserted the defendants' obligations as originally agreed. That is, the balance of the Throsby fee of $60,500 was then due and payable.
As for the 'new deal' proposed in respect of the Throsby site, Mr Larcombe stated in his email of 14 March 2020 that 103 places were likely to be approved for the Throsby site. He proposed to pay only $500 a place, instead of $2,000 a place, and then only on 103 places rather than the number of places approved in the development application. By this method, the defendants claimed a 'credit' in respect of the Throsby fee already paid, in the amount of $3,850. This 'credit' was deducted from the Conder fee, producing a net payment in the sum of $47,650.
In short, the plaintiff was then entitled to be paid $60,500 for Throsby and was offered, instead, early payment of $47,650 for Conder. I accept that payment of a sum in advance of the time otherwise contractually due is capable of constituting valuable consideration: SAS Realty Developments Pty Ltd v Kerr [2013] NSWCA 56 at [65] (per Ward JA). Here, payment of the future amount was less than the full amount of the Conder fee and in substitution for a larger amount already due. It is difficult to identify any "tangible benefit or advantage" conferred on the plaintiff: DPP v Le at [43]. I conclude that what was offered was illusory.
The defendants pointed to two other forms of consideration to support the settlement agreement. First, the defendants submitted that there was a distinct benefit to the plaintiff having a written document definitively setting out the payments that the defendants accepted it would pay and when. I accept that this may provide sufficient consideration: Haigh v Brooks (1839) 10 Ad & El 309; (1839) 113 ER 119 cited in Breusch v Watts Development Division Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 311 at 314-5 (per McHugh J, Hope and Glass JJA agreeing). However, I do not accept that this provided sufficient consideration here, where there was already a document answering that description, recently exchanged between the parties in February 2020: see [170]-[173]. What was now on offer was a written document recording an entirely different agreement, being a far inferior bargain from the plaintiff's perspective.
Second, although the defendants were not then aware that there was an issue with the plaintiff's real estate licence, the defendants submitted that the settlement agreement included a release which was said to extend to that matter and was thus also valuable consideration. However, in order for there to be valid consideration, there must be a connection between the promise made and the consideration said to support that promise. In Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1954] HCA 20; (1954) 92 CLR 424, Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ explained at 456-457: … it should be made to appear that the statement or announcement which is relied on as a promise was really offered as consideration for the doing of the act, and that the act was really done in consideration of a potential promise inherent in the statement or announcement. Between the statement or announcement, which is put forward as an offer capable of acceptance by the doing of an act, and the act which is put forward as the executed consideration for the alleged promise, there must subsist, so to speak, the relation of a quid pro quo.
Put another way, the act said to be performed in consideration for a promise cannot simply coincide with the promise. Turning then to whether there was a quid pro quo here, it is necessary to examine the terms of the settlement offer and consider the factual context at the time the settlement offer was made: Australian Woollen Mills at 461.
Assuming for the moment that the settlement agreement had the effect of releasing the plaintiff from claims with respect to the licensing legislation, where there was no issue raised between the parties as to the plaintiff's compliance with the licensing legislation at the time the settlement offer was made, it is difficult to see how there could be a relevant connection between payments made under the settlement agreement and any release of the defendants' claims against the plaintiff with respect to licensing. Consistently with this, general words of a release are limited to what was specifically in the contemplation of the parties at the time when the release was given: Grant v John Grant and Sons [1954] HCA 23; (1954) 91 CLR 112 (per Dixon CJ, Fullagar, Kitto and Taylor JJ). As such, any release of claims against plaintiffs with respect to the licensing issue was coincidental to, rather than in consideration of the settlement offered by the defendants. The settlement agreement was not binding for want of consideration.

[34]

Principles

Section 9 of the Property and Stock Agents Act 2002 provides: (emphasis added) 9 Corporations require corporation licence (1) A corporation must not act as or carry on the business of … an agent unless the corporation holds a corporation licence. Maximum penalty - 200 penalty units. (2) A corporation is not entitled to bring any proceeding in any court to recover any commission, fee, gain or reward for any service performed by the corporation as an agent unless the corporation was the holder of a corporation licence at the time of performing the service.
The defendants allege that the plaintiff committed an offence under section 9(1). Obviously, the plaintiff has not been charged with an offence. Determining the plaintiff's guilt would require the application of a different standard of proof than presently engaged. I am only asked to consider this question for the purposes of determining whether the oral contract is void or voidable for illegality or is contrary to public policy, such that the plaintiff is not entitled to keep its fee, either under the general law or by reason of the statutory prohibition in section 9(2).
As to whether a corporation is "carrying on a business", Ball J observed in Williams v ATM & CPA Pty Limited [2015] NSWSC 703 at [70]-[71]: Whether a person carries on business as a real estate agent is a question of fact. In order to carry on business, repetition and continuity of the activities which characterise the business are necessary. However, an isolated activity with the intention of repeating it is sufficient. … Similarly, it seems to me that a person who holds himself or herself out as a person who is in the business of introducing potential buyers to potential sellers of property carries on that business even if the business is not generally successful in the sense that only in isolated instances do the introductions result in a sale.
A plaintiff may be entitled to recover its fee for a "one off" transaction where it was not "carrying on a business" as an agent: Lendlease Real Estate Investments Ltd v Charter Hall Retail Management Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1624 (per Rein J).
Here, whatever services the plaintiff was providing to the defendants in respect of the Hurstville site could not be described as a "one off" transaction but a service provided in the course of carrying on a business conducted since the plaintiff was incorporated in 2015: see [14]. The question is whether that business was of an agent.
Terms used in section 9 are defined in section 3(1) as follows: (emphasis added) agent means - (a) a real estate agent … real estate agent means a person (whether or not the person carries on any other business) who, for reward (whether monetary or otherwise), exercises real estate agent functions in the course of carrying on a business.
Real estate agent functions include "real estate sale or leasing functions" (section 3A(1)(c)), defined in section 3A(2) as: (emphasis added) real estate sale or leasing functions means - … (b) acting as agent for a real estate transaction, or (c) acting as agent for inducing or attempting to induce or negotiating with a view to inducing any person to enter into, or to make or accept an offer to enter into, a real estate transaction or a contract for a real estate transaction, or (d) acting as agent for the introduction, or arranging for the introduction, of a prospective purchaser, lessee or licensee of land to another licensed agent or to the owner, or the agent of the owner, of land … Note - This definition is not limited to the selling of land and extends to an agent acting on behalf of the buyer of land (a buyer's agent).
Real estate transaction is defined in section 3(1) as: (emphasis added) real estate transaction means the purchase, sale, exchange, lease, assignment or other disposal of land, whether or not an auction is involved.
As to whether the plaintiff was acting as, or carrying on the business of, a real estate agent by exercising real estate agent functions, the plaintiff accepted that it fell within sub-paragraph (d) as an introducer. That is, the plaintiff introduced the defendants as a prospective lessee of the Hurstville site to the owner of the land. The only issue then, is whether the plaintiff did so "acting as agent." More specifically was the plaintiff acting as agent for the defendants, where this is the service for which the plaintiff rendered a fee.
Case law bearing on this requirement considered a definition of real estate agent which has since been amended. Section 3(1) then defined real estate agent as a person who "carries on business … as an agent." Today, the requirement that the person be "acting as agent" has been re-located to each sub-paragraph of the definition of real estate sale or leasing functions. I do not consider there to be any difference between the phrase "as an agent" or "as agent." The explanatory note to the Property, Stock and Business Agents Amendment (Property Industry Reform Build) Act 2017 does not suggest that anything was intended to be achieved by this grammatical difference. Rather, the bill reduced the number of licences and certificates of registration and consolidating these with real estate agents. The amendments omitted a number of definitions and inserted new definitions "to give effect to the consolidated licences and certificates of registration and the change of terminology." As such, the case law remains apposite.
In Ryde Developments v The Property Investors Alliance [2017] NSWSC 436, Ball J considered that there was a need to give meaning to the expression "as an agent," where the word "agent" does not have fixed meaning. Rather, its meaning must be ascertained from the context in which it appears, having regard to the legislative purpose of the requirement in which the expression is used: at [88]-[89]. Where the purpose of the Act is to protect the interests of consumers of real estate agency services, the term should not be interpreted narrowly: at [91].
Ryde Developments was followed in Guan v Lui [2021] NSWCA 65, where Meagher JA (Bell P and Basten JA agreeing) considered that "agent" was used in its legal and technical sense in the legislation: at [42]. His Honour considered how the term "agency" had been described in the case law to connote an authority or capacity in one person to create legal relations between their principal and third parties: at [43], citing International Harvester Co of Australia Pty Ltd v Carrigan's Hazeldene Pastoral Co (1958) 100 CLR 644 at 652; Scott v Davis (2002) 204 CLR 333 at 227. His Honour noted the observation of Lord Herschell in Kennedy v De Trafford [1897] AC 180 that no word is more commonly and constantly abused than the word "agent": at [43]. Further, at [44]-[46]: In Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Producers and Citizens Co-operative Assurance Co of Australia Ltd (1931) 46 CLR 41 at 50; [1931] HCA 53, Dixon J repeated those observations of Lord Herschell and added: Unfortunately, too, the expressions "for", "on behalf of", "for the benefit of" and even "authorise" are often used in relation to services which, although done for the advantage of a person who requests them, involve no representation. In this context "representation" describes the acts and conduct of the agent undertaken with the principal's authority and capable of affecting legal relations between the principal and third parties. For example an agent for the introduction of prospective purchasers to an owner of land may make statements, provide information and make an introduction, all whilst representing the owner. The legal relations which may thereby arise between the principal and a third party with whom the agent has dealt include, but are not confined to, contractual relations. … the essence of agency is the consensual representation of one person, the principal, by another, the agent. In the Restatement of the Law Second, Agency (American Law Institute, 1958) agency is similarly defined (at s1) as the "fiduciary relationship which exists between two persons, one of whom expressly or impliedly consents that the other should act on his behalf, and the other of whom similarly consents so to act or so acts".
Meagher JA reviewed authorities which considered when a person may be acting as a real estate agent. In Freehold Land Investments Ltd v Queensland Estates Pty Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 418, the appellant was granted "an exclusive world-wide franchise for the sole right to sell" a piece of land for the vendor respondent. As to whether the appellant was acting as agent for the vendor, Walsh J (Barwick CJ agreeing) concluded at 443: In my opinion one must look to the whole transaction which is on foot. In the present case it was a transaction under which the appellant was authorized to bring about a sale of land which belonged to the respondent …. The appellant was engaged throughout (at least at all times after it had obtained the authority) in the process of seeking to negotiate that sale. Every step which it took which could aid in the achievement of a completed sale was a step in the transaction of negotiating the sale. It was … as an agent for the owner of the land, that the appellant was carrying out the whole of this process of seeking to bring about a completed sale.
In Jenkins v Kedcorp Pty Ltd [1999] QCA 452; [2002] 1 Qd R 49, a telemarketer "found the purchasers and convinced those purchasers to buy the properties," before introducing the interested purchaser to the selling agent: at [53]. The telemarketer was held to be acting as an agent where the joint activity of the telemarketer and the registered real estate agent brought about the sale. In Sultana Investments Pty Ltd v Cellcom Pty Ltd (No 1) [2008] QCA 357; [2009] 1 Qd R 589, a financial planner acting as agent for both the buyer and seller negotiated the sale of apartments for reward. The financial planner thereby acted as agent for the vendor in carrying out those negotiations and representing the vendor.
In Guan v Lui, Mr Lui's activities fell within the definition of real estate agent (now sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of the definition of real estate sale or leasing functions). Ms Guan entered into an agreement with Mr Lui, which required him to identify potential investors and introduce them to the expressions of interest process then underway. Mr Lui was entitled to commission of 2% of the highest bid made by a potential investor that he introduced to the expressions of interest process, whether or not that investor was the ultimate purchaser. Mr Lui used his reputation in the Chinese community to contact potential investors and introduce them to the expressions of interest process. He arranged for a consultant to undertake a study of the land and its development potential. Mr Lui visited the offices of the exclusive selling agent to learn about the sales process and collected copies of an information memorandum to distribute to potential investors. Mr Lui accompanied one potential investor for a site visit and assisted another to complete two expressions of interest bids. Mr Lui introduced the ultimate purchaser to the sales process, but was not involved in any correspondence between the purchaser and the exclusive selling agent.
However, Meagher JA concluded that Mr Lui did not perform these tasks "as an agent" for the vendor, any agent of the vendor, or even purporting to represent Ms Guan: at [58]-[61]. Where Ms Guan was the director and shareholder of the vendor, Meagher JA concluded that Mr Lui was acting in the financial interests of Ms Guan and in his own interests but had no arrangement with, or authority from, the vendor, the mortgagee in possession, the receivers and managers, the exclusive selling agent or any of the prospective purchasers to represent them in any aspect of the process or any negotiation which followed, nor did Mr Lui hold himself out as acting for or representing any of these entities or person: at [56].

[35]

Conclusion

Turning to the case at hand, whether the plaintiff was acting "as agent" for the defendants is, in part, informed by what the plaintiff agreed to do under the oral contract. The plaintiff agreed to "source" childcare sites. As I understood Mr Hedley's description of what this entailed, he searched for suitable leasing opportunities, including off-market options, through his professional relationships. In identifying whether a site was suitable for a particular client, Mr Hedley brought to bear his experience in assessing the type of property, its location, the owner, building vacancy rates, fit-out costs, incentive levels and market conditions.
For the Hurstville site, Mr Hedley was aware of the site because the plaintiff appears to have been already engaged by the owner to find either a purchaser of the site or lessees of the development which the owner proposed to construct. Apparently in the course of that endeavour, Mr Hedley first introduced the Hurstville site to Play Academy. Indeed, analysing the plaintiff's actions is made difficult by reason of the fact that Mr Hedley appears to have been providing services to both the owner and the defendants, making the quality of his actions vis a vis the defendants somewhat ambiguous.
I have earlier described Mr Hedley's actions in respect of the Hurstville site at [36]-[69]. In short, the plaintiff conveyed the defendants' offers to the Hurstville developer, occasionally suggesting that the offer be corrected for apparent errors. The plaintiff also conveyed information from the Hurstville owner to the defendants, including in respect of competing offers for the site. Mr Hedley liaised between the owner's designer and the defendants' architect, with a view to the parties agreeing on the scope of the landlord works, the design of the childcare centre and the number of places that could be accommodated. He explained the process from time to time, including next steps. He pressed the defendants to obtain a needs assessment. He obtained information from the defendants, presumably required by the Hurstville owner, as to the proposed tenant's financial capacity. Mr Hedley liaised between the owner and the defendants' solicitors, encouraging progress and pressing one party or the other to resolve "sticking points" in negotiations. Mr Hedley provided information on outgoings and explained the implications of approval of less places on the proposed lease. Mr Hedley, at one point, liaised between the Hurstville owner and the defendants in respect of assistance to enable the owners to get finance, or for the defendants to buy the Hurstville site "as is."
Primarily, Mr Hedley was acting for the owner to find a purchaser or lessee for the Hurstville site. The defendants effectively exploited their connection with Mr Hedley to secure the site. The plaintiff profited from that exploitation by charging a fee. Presumably, Mr Hedley recommended the defendants to the Hurstville owner as the preferred tenant. As the owner's representative, it likely was part of his job to do so. The question is whether the plaintiff made such a recommendation "as agent" for the defendants.
To be an agent, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to have authority to bind its principal: Peterson v Moloney (1957) 84 CLR 91 at 95. The question is whether the plaintiff's actions were undertaken with principal's authority (in this case, with the defendants' authority) and capable of affecting legal relationships between the defendants and third parties (in this case, with the Hurstville owner) where the legal relations include, but are not confined to, contractual relations: Guan v Lui at [45]. Where the plaintiff had agreed to "steer [sites] your way" for a fee, a representation by the plaintiff to the Hurstville owner that the site should be leased to the defendants is conduct undertaken with the defendants' authority and capable of affecting legal relations between the defendants and the Hurstville owner, as the Hurstville owner may rely on that representation and enter into a lease with the defendants, which is what, in fact, occurred. The fact that the plaintiff may have been acting in a conflict of interest position does not, I think, detract from my conclusion that the plaintiff was acting "as agent" for the defendants when introducing the defendants as a prospective lessee of the Hurstville site to the owner of the land.
The statutory prohibition in section 9(2) on bringing proceedings to recover a fee does not apply here, where the plaintiff has already been paid the first 50% of the Hurstville fee and does not seek the remaining 50% as the childcare centre did not open: see [70]. Whether the plaintiff should have carried a licence remains relevant, however, to the defendants' claim to have the initial 50% of the Hurstville fee repaid. I will return to whether the defendants are entitled to a refund of the Hurstville fee at [313].

[36]

AGENTS ACT 2003 (ACT)

Unlike the Property and Stock Agents Act 2002, the Agents Act 2003 has the same provision for individuals and corporations. Section 8 provides: (emphasis added) 8 Carrying on business as real estate agent (1) A person carries on business as a real estate agent if the person provides, or offers to provide, a real estate agent service for a principal for reward. (2) Each of the following is a real estate agent service: (a) buying, selling (other than by auction), exchanging, leasing, assigning or otherwise disposing of land; (b) negotiating with, or inducing or attempting to induce, a person to - (i) buy, sell, exchange, lease, assign or otherwise dispose of land; or (ii) enter into, or make or accept an offer to enter into, a contract to buy, sell, exchange, lease, assign or otherwise dispose of land; …
While the NSW legislation applies to introducers (sub-paragraph (d), real estate sale or leasing functions extracted at [257]), section 8(2) of the Agents Act 2003 does not. By contrast, introducers are included in section 9(2) of the Agents Act 2003, which provides: (emphasis added) (2) Each of the following is a stock and station agent service: (a) buying, selling … leasing …; (b) negotiating with, or inducing or attempting to induce … (c) introducing a buyer or lessee of rural land to another licensed agent or to the owner, or an agent of the owner, of rural land; … As the plaintiff submitted, the ACT legislature clearly chose not to include introducers within the scope of real estate agent services.
Section 18(1) provides: 18 Real estate agents must be licensed (1) A person commits an offence if - (a) the person is not a licensed real estate agent; and (b) the person - (i) carries on business as a real estate agent; … Maximum penalty: 100 penalty units, imprisonment for 12 months or both.
The defendants allege that the plaintiff committed an offence under section 18, and I repeat what I have said at [252].
Finally, section 23 provides: (emphasis added) 23 Unlicensed agents cannot recover fees etc A person is not entitled to bring a proceeding to recover a commission, fee or reward for a service provided by the person as an agent if the person was not licensed to provide the service when the service was provided.
The parties' submissions focussed on section 8(2)(b). As to what amounts to "negotiating with," Young CJ in Eq construed an earlier version of the NSW legislation and concluded that "negotiation" required more than introducing a party to a proposed transaction. Negotiation meant the arrangement of a sale and purchase, that is, obtaining and finally settling all the terms and conditions and the price: Challenger at [60], citing Re MacGowan [1891] 1 Ch 105; upheld on appeal in Challenger Group Holdings Ltd v Concept Equity Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 120 at [86] (per Macfarlan JA, Allsop P agreeing cf Hodgson JA at [10]).
As what "inducing or attempting to induce" might entail, I have found only two cases which address "inducing or attempting to induce" in the Agents Act 2003 or comparable legislation. In Hawk Australia Pty Ltd v George Ambrose Commercial Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1150, Hawk was looking for a warehouse and retained George Ambrose Commercial to provide advice for a fee of 0.5% of the price of any property bought as a result of its consultancy service. George Ambrose Commercial inspected three properties and recommended a warehouse, which Hawk bought. George Ambrose Commercial had written to the vendor suggesting that, if the vendor insisted on a 10% deposit or delayed settlement, then the price would be the subject of further negotiation. Bell J considered that the letter was an endeavour to persuade the vendor to enter into a contract for a real estate transaction on the terms set out, and amounted to inducing a person to enter into a real estate transaction: at [49]. George Ambrose Commercial was precluded from recovering its fee by section 9(2) of the Property and Stock Agents Act 2002: at [51].
In Guan v Lui is perhaps another example. At first instance, in Sunlink Group Pty Ltd v Lui [2019] NSWSC 803, Walton J found that there was no inducement: at [501]-[502]. There was no evidence that Mr Lui was in any position to offer any inducement to anyone to enter either into the bidding process or the contract of sale. Unlike Hawk, there was no evidence that Mr Lui sought to persuade any party to enter into a contract for a real estate transaction, although he encouraged two parties to engage in the expression of interest process and provided certain information.
On appeal in Guan v Lui, Meagher JA focussed on whether Mr Lui's actions were undertaken "as agent" for the vendor and, in this context, observed "although Mr Lui sought to induce the making of non-binding offers, he did not do so representing or acting as agent for the vendor or its selling agent. Although the services he performed were to the financial advantage of Ms Guan they did not involve or require his acting as her representative in inducing the making of bids or offers": at [50]. As the plaintiff submitted, it is not clear to what extent (if any) this finding reversed the factual findings of the trial judge. As such, the example is equivocal.
Beyond this legislation, "induce or attempt to induce" has been considered in the context of the Consumer and Competition Act 2020 (Cth). Section 76(1)(d) empowers the Court to impose a pecuniary penalty where a person "has induced, or attempted to induce, a person, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, to contravene … a provision". In Trade Practices Commission v Parkfield Operations Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALR 589, Fox J considered, "Inducing a person to contravene a provision envisages success, both because the inducement produces results and because there is the arrangement. Attempting to induce a person to contravene suggests to me conduct which does not amount to inducement because it does not produce results, notwithstanding an arrangement could readily be made. There is no attempt to induce if, despite invitation or exhortation, or threats or promises, there is no arrangement which is in place and can be effected, or can readily be effected. Invitations, however pressing, to start to see if an arrangement can be made, are not in my view within the paragraph": at 594.
Section 96(3)(b) of the Consumer and Competition Act 2020 provides that resale price maintenance includes "the supplier inducing, or attempting to induce, a second person not to sell, at a price less than a price specified by the supplier, goods supplied to the second person by the supplier or by a third person who, directly or indirectly, has obtained the goods from the supplier". In Heating Centre Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1986) 65 ALR 429, Pincus J (Lockhart and Wilcox JJ agreeing) considered that inducement "ordinarily refers to some proffered advantage or disadvantage, promised or threatened, to follow from following or failing to follow a stipulated course of action. There is no reason, however, to read into para (b) a necessity to find that anything is offered in exchange, so to speak, for not discounting; mere persuasion, with no promise or threat, may well be an attempt to induce": at 439.
Section 126 of the Securities Industry (WA) Code makes it an offence to induce or attempt to induce another person to deal in securities by inter alia by dishonest concealment of material facts. In Bond v R (1992) 62 A Crim R 383, Nicholson J considered, "an attempt to induce a dealing in securities would occur where the accused, intending to induce or cause the dealing by a dishonest concealment of material facts, attempted to induce that dealing, or an act which would constitute a dealing in securities by doing something held to be more than merely preparatory to the commission of the completed offence, but did not actually fulfil the intention by inducing or causing a dealing in the securities."
Obviously, cases considering different legislation are of limited assistance in construing section 8 of the Agents Act 2003, as is the extrinsic material. I do note, however, that section 8(1) of the Agents Act 2003 anticipates that the real estate agent is providing a real estate agent service "for a principal for reward." Section 8(2)(a) describes actions which a real estate agent may undertake in effecting a real estate transaction, including buying, selling or leasing land. Section 8(2)(b) describes precursor activities to a real estate transaction, that is, "negotiating with, or inducing or attempting to induce, a person" to enter into such a transaction. Noteworthy, the negotiations are with "a person" rather than "a principal". Likewise, the agent induces or attempts to induce "a person" rather than "a principal". Whilst I accept that "a person" is a sufficiently broad term that it may include "a principal", it makes sense that the "person" is not the principal, where the negotiations and inducement are real estate services provided "for a principal for reward". It is difficult to see how negotiating with, or inducing, one's own principal amounts to providing a service to the principal, being a service for which the agent will receive a reward, no less.
As the real estate agent service is provided "for the principal," I consider that "negotiating with, or inducing or attempting to induce" a person refers to conduct with respect to the proposed counterparty to the real estate transaction. That is, the real estate agent is inducing or attempting to induce the counterparty, rather than their own principal, to enter into a real estate transaction. Thus, in Hawk, the purchaser's agent, George Ambrose Commercial, wrote to the counterparty, being the vendor, seeking to induce the counterparty to sell the warehouse to Hawk. In Guan v Lui, Mr Lui's actions - assuming for the moment that those actions were inducements - were directed to the potential purchasers of the land, where Mr Lui was retained by the director and shareholder of the vendor.
I do not consider that Freehold Land Investments is authority to the contrary. There, the agent accepted that it acted as a real estate agent but disputed that it did so in Queensland. The agent submitted that whenever it was engaged in actions, discussions, or communications with its own principal in Queensland, as opposed to potential overseas purchasers, it could not be carrying on the business of a real estate agent as it was not then doing anything "as an agent for others", being the terms of the Queensland statute. Walsh J rejected this argument and considered that the agent's interactions with its principal could not be excluded when considering whether a person was acting "as an agent for others": at 443. That is, all of the real estate agent's actions could be considered when determining whether it was acting as agent.
As a matter of the law of agency, this is obviously correct. Part of the agent's function will involve reporting to, and seeking instructions from, one's principal. Consistently with this, I note that the Agents Regulation 2003 contains a number of specific obligations, requiring an agent to inform their principal of various matters, such as offers received (regulation 8.22) or each stage of the negotiation of a purchase price when acting as a buyer's agent (regulation 8.27). But Freehold Land Investments does not otherwise assist in construing subsections 8(1) and 8(2)(b), specifically, whether the plaintiff is providing a real estate agent service within the meaning of the ACT legislation.

[37]

Conclusion

Unlike the Hurstville site, the seven ACT sites were brought to Mr Hedley's attention by Mr Randell, who was retained as the owner's agent in respect of each of those properties. Whatever services the plaintiff was providing to the defendants in respect of the ACT sites, the plaintiff always dealt with the owner's agent. Whilst the ACT developer from time to time communicated directly with Mr Larcombe, Mr Randell - supported by Mr Hedley - insisted that communications between the owner and prospective lessee went through him as the owner's agent, and Mr Larcombe largely obliged.
Again, whether the plaintiff was acting "as an agent" is, in part, informed by what the plaintiff agreed to do under the oral contract, and I repeat [267]. "Sourcing" sites sounds rather like an introducer, where the plaintiff introduced the defendants as prospective lessees of the ACT sites to the owner's agent, Mr Randell. But introducers do not fall within "real estate agent services" under the Agents Act 2003; something more is required.
It may assist to summarise the plaintiff's actions in respect of each of the ACT sites. As a general observation, Mr Hedley did far more for the earlier sites "sourced" for the defendants - where Mr Dumbrell and Mr Larcombe may have been unfamiliar with the process - and less for later sites, where the defendants now appeared to know what they were doing and were also increasingly dealing with Mr Randell directly.
In respect of Red Hill, Mr Hedley obtained information in respect of this site from Mr Randell, including architectural drawings, which were provided to the defendants, noting "Red Hill is the standout." While the defendants were to complete the expression of interest, Mr Hedley suggested "$4,250 per place will put you ahead" of Kids Club: [75]. The defendants prepared an offer, which Mr Hedley forwarded to Mr Randell. Mr Hedley suggested that the defendants visit Canberra to meet with the owner, and gave the defendants some pointers as to what the owner was looking for and how the defendants could put their best foot forward: at [76]. When Mr Randell provide feedback on the offer for the Red Hill site, Mr Hedley made suggestions as to how a revised offer should be presented: at [79]. Mr Hedley provided the revised offer to Mr Randell. Mr Hedley also suggested that the defendants accompany him to Canberra and meet Mr Randell. Mr Hedley arranged this meeting. He liaised between Mr Randell and the defendants for further offers for the site. Mr Hedley inspected the Red Hill site with Mr Randell and the defendants. Documents provided by Mr Randell in respect of the site were forwarded by Mr Hedley to the defendants, while the defendants also requested some documents and information directly: at [92]. Mr Hedley followed up Mr Randell in respect of the agreement for lease and followed up the defendants in relation to their architect's review of plans. The plaintiff then rendered an invoice for the first 50% of its fee. The plaintiff does not appear to have performed any further functions in respect of the Red Hill site, beyond passing on an offer to buy the defendants' leasehold interest in four sites, including Red Hill.
In respect of Macgregor, Mr Hedley obtained information in respect of this site from Mr Randell and provided it to the defendants. Mr Hedley explained to Mr Larcombe that the site was for sale but, with 150 places, this was too many and the site should either be leased in stages or, if purchased, an offer made based on the number of places the defendants were comfortable with: at [80]. Again, Mr Hedley recommended that the defendants meet Mr Randell. Mr Hedley enquired of Mr Randell whether, if the defendants built a smaller centre with 90 places, a new development application would need to be lodged: see [82]. Mr Hedley provided the information thereby obtained to the defendants. Mr Hedley arranged a meeting between Mr Randell and the defendants and encouraged the defendants to make an offer based on a realistic number of places for the site: see [84]. Mr Hedley forwarded the defendants' offer for the site to Mr Randell and suggested the defendants check whether there were other obligations which they would be required to meet in respect of 150 places, notwithstanding that their offer was based on 120 places: at [86]. Mr Hedley passed on the ACT developers' response to the offer, and the defendants' amended offer. He attended a site inspection with Mr Randell and the defendants. He chased up the agreement for lease and obtained information in respect of outgoings. He followed up the defendants in respect of their architect's review of the plans. An invoice was then rendered by the plaintiff. Nothing further was done beyond passing on the offer to buy the defendants' leasehold interest in four sites including Macgregor.
In respect of Throsby, Mr Hedley obtained information in respect of this site from Mr Randell and provided it to the defendants. The ACT developer also approached Mr Larcombe directly in respect of a second childcare centre on the site; both Mr Randell and Mr Hedley encouraged their respective clients to communicate through them rather than directly. The defendants inspected the site with Mr Hedley and Mr Randell. The defendants prepared an offer for Throsby and Mr Hedley provided his thoughts on whether to make an offer for the second Throsby site: at [132]. The defendants provided the offer directly to Mr Randell. Mr Hedley provided comments on the budget for fit-out works: at [138]. Mr Hedley received further revised offers for the Throsby site, often after the offer had been provided directly to Mr Randell. Mr Hedley suggested that the defendants "hold off" signing a deal for the Throsby site until the ACT developer had confirmed the status of the Red Hill and Macgregor sites: at [142]. Mr Larcombe consulted with Mr Hedley when the ACT developer exercised its option to "put" the second Throsby site to the defendants: at [154]. The invoice for the plaintiff's first 50% of the Throsby fee was then rendered. Mr Hedley later communicated with the defendants as to how to progress the Red Hill, Macgregor and Throsby sites, when the ACT developer suggested it could not get finance without a contract for the Throsby site: at [167]-[168].
In respect of the Taylor site, Mr Hedley obtained an information memorandum from Mr Randell, which he provided to the defendants. Mr Hedley suggested that the defendants accompany him to Canberra to meet Mr Randell. When the defendants were preparing an offer for the site, Mr Hedley was asked what an appropriate market rate was per child in the area. Mr Hedley did not know but obtained information from Mr Randell in this regard, which he passed on to the defendants: at [85]. Mr Hedley obtained updated plans for the site from Mr Randell, which he provided to his clients, asking Mr Randell not to go to market as he was sure that his clients would take the site: at [90]. Mr Hedley inspected the site with Mr Randell and the defendants. Mr Hedley forwarded the defendants' offer on to Mr Randell. He also passed on Mr Randell's advice that the offer was insufficient and forwarded an amended offer. Mr Hedley received and forwarded the owner's comments on the defendants' offer, for review and action. He arranged for the owner's designer to "start talking" with the defendants' architect. Mr Hedley forwarded a revised offer for the Taylor site. An invoice was then rendered. Beyond this, Mr Hedley passed on an offer to buy the defendants' leasehold interest in four sites, including Taylor. He also offered to speak to Mr Randell in respect of a side agreement to the agreement for lease.
In respect of the Conder site, Mr Hedley obtained details in respect of this site from Mr Randell, which he provided to the defendants. Mr Randell inspected the site with Mr Hedley, the defendants and the owners. When the defendants were not particularly interested in the site, Mr Hedley explored whether the owner would be open to a differently structured deal. He encouraged the defendants not to "give Conder a miss", where this may harm their chances of obtaining further sites via Mr Randell: at [134]. The defendants agreed to give the site further consideration and inspected the site with Mr Hedley. Mr Larcombe provided an offer to Mr Randell. Mr Randell provided his comments on the offer. By now, communications were often directly between Mr Randell and Mr Larcombe. Mr Hedley suggested that lease documents for the Red Hill, Macgregor and Throsby sites be provided to the Conder owner to save time and legal fees. Mr Hedley commented on the needs report when it arrived, noting that Conder was not as strong as Dickson. The plaintiff then rendered its fee.
For the Dickson site, the plaintiff obtained information from Mr Randell in respect of the site, including how the childcare operator would be selected by the owner. The site was not available for some time, where agreements had already been signed with another lessee. Nonetheless, Mr Hedley and Mr Larcombe did a "drive-by" of the site, having obtained the address from Mr Randell. When Mr Hedley became aware that the proposed lessee was in financial trouble, he provided this information to Mr Larcombe and suggested that an offer be prepared ready to send to Mr Randell. Mr Hedley explored the possibility of leasing the site with Mr Randell, where Mr Larcombe was keen to pursue this opportunity: at [151]. Mr Larcombe executed heads of agreement, which he provided to Mr Randell and Mr Hedley. In turn, Mr Randell provided Mr Larcombe and Mr Hedley with plans for the site. Mr Larcombe provided Mr Hedley with draft lease documents for comments, which were apparently provided: see [156]. The plaintiff then rendered an invoice for the first 50% of its fee. The plaintiff appears to have played no further role in respect of the Dickson site until it was completed in February 2021.
Finally, in respect of the Woden site, Mr Hedley enquired about this site from Mr Randell. The site was then 'on hold' for Kids Club. Notwithstanding this, Mr Hedley suggested that the defendants make an offer, which they submitted to Mr Randell. Mr Randell was not interested, but when Kids Club withdrew from the site, Mr Hedley suggested that the defendants secure Woden as soon as possible. Mr Randell provided Mr Hedley with the latest plans and offer. Mr Hedley inspected the site with Mr Randell and the defendants. Mr Larcombe provided Mr Randell with an offer for the site. Relations between the parties dissolved before the plaintiff had issued an invoice.
Of the series of chronological steps involved in leasing and establishing a childcare, described at [30], Mr Hedley said the work undertaken for the defendants was largely limited to communicating to see whether the defendants were interested in the site and, if so, arranging a site inspection. In addition, the defendants used him as a conduit to pass information between the defendants and landlords. He was not involved in due diligence, determining budgets and cashflows, nor drafting, amending or signing offers. Sometimes Mr Randell provided him with the landlords' requirements for amendments to offers for him to pass on to the defendants, which he did. Mr Hedley either forwarded such emails to the defendants' representatives or, on occasion, provided limited commentary when forwarding this information. Mr Hedley did not provide instructions to the defendants' solicitors or negotiate the terms of the agreement for lease. Mr Hedley had no involvement in the development application process, the design or building of the childcare centres, obtaining approvals from government, marketing, recruiting staff or opening the childcare centre. The plaintiff was not asked to provide opinions on the viability of the sites, although I note that Mr Hedley often commented on whether a site was worth pursuing. Although Mr Larcombe once described Mr Hedley as the defendants' agent - presumably a reference to the document at [104] - Mr Hedley said he had never described himself that way. Mr Hedley's evidence accords with the contemporaneous documents.
Mr Hedley considered that the plaintiff's value to the defendants was that, because of the relationships Mr Hedley had and could establish given his experience, he was able to introduce and recommend the defendants as tenants to landlords or their agents so that they could lease sites on which to operate childcare centres and establish their brand. Without him, Mr Hedley considered that the defendants had little chance of securing sites, particularly those which the plaintiff proceeded to source in the ACT. Some of those sites had already been 'earmarked' for other operators, including Kids Club. Mr Hedley thought that it was only as a consequence of his recommendations that the defendants got the sites. Mr Hedley certainly held this view at the time, as recorded in contemporaneous documents, "My relationships will get you through the door and in prime position."
However, Mr Hedley did not agree that he recommended his clients to the landlord as a preferred tenant; that was the role of the landlord's agent. Mr Hedley said, "to be clear, the advice that I was providing to Wonderschool was what they needed to prepare, and the documents they needed to provide, in order to put them in the most positive light in competing with other operators. … I was putting the tenant's best foot forward to the agent, yes." However, it was the agent acting for the landlord who provided advice to the landlord and recommended whether to proceed with the tenant. I agree; this is what the contemporaneous documents indicate.
I am not satisfied that the plaintiff's services meet the description of "negotiating with … a person to … lease, … or enter into … or accept an offer to enter into, a contract to … lease." At no time was Mr Hedley engaged in any 'horse trading' with Mr Randell - or anyone else - as to the terms and conditions of any lease. All such negotiations were undertaken by Mr Larcombe. On occasion, Mr Hedley passed on useful information to the defendants to inform those negotiations, such as the rent which had been offered by another childcare operator for the site, or the level of rent which was likely to be acceptable to the owner, but beyond forwarding offers prepared and signed by Mr Larcombe, Mr Hedley did not engage in any negotiation for any of the sites.
Turning then to whether the plaintiff "induced or attempted to induce" a person to lease, or enter into or accept an offer to enter into a contract to lease, for the reasons set out at [279]-[288], I consider that section 8(2)(b) is focussed on whether the plaintiff induced or attempted to induce the counterparty, being the owner of the ACT site as represented by Mr Randell. Whilst the defendants pointed to a number of communications between Mr Hedley and the defendants, encouraging them to taken an interest in a particular site, or to think again where the defendants had decided to give the site "a miss," I do not think this is the relevant inducement.
As to whether the plaintiff induced or attempted to induce the owners of the ACT sites, Mr Hedley met some of the owners at site inspections, but there is no evidence that Mr Hedley engaged in such conduct vis a vis the owners. Indeed, Mr Randell was careful to make sure that communications with his clients went through him and Mr Hedley clearly respected that arrangement. Any inducement or attempt to induce could only have been directed at Mr Randell.
There is no evidence that the plaintiff induced the owners via Mr Randell to lease the ACT sites to the defendants. As far as the evidence reveals, Mr Randell discharged his obligations to his clients unaffected by any such inducement.
Did the plaintiff "attempt to induce" the owners via Mr Randell? Using the language in Hawk, did the plaintiff endeavour to persuade the ACT owners to enter into a lease on particular terms or, perhaps, at all? Where Mr Hedley abstained from involvement in the terms of the proposed lease, his actions fall short of any endeavour to persuade the ACT owners to enter into a lease on particular terms. Is the very fact that Mr Hedley put forward the defendants as a proposed tenant an attempt to induce entry into a lease? Whatever kudos the defendants may have enjoyed by having been introduced by Mr Hedley does not appear to meet this description, noting that introducers are excluded from the definition of "real estate agent service." As mentioned, the Agents Act 2003 is penal legislation and, accordingly, "one has to be fairly conservative and literal in the way that one approaches the section": Challenger Group at [65].
Looking then at what may qualify as an "attempt to induce", Mr Hedley asked Mr Randell to delay in taking the Taylor site to market, where the defendants "will take this one too I'm sure": see [90]. (It does not appear that Mr Randell acceded to this request: at [94]).
For the Woden site, Mr Randell was not interested in accepting an offer when it was already on hold for Kids Club. Notwithstanding this, Mr Hedley "called the developer who is an old friend" and encouraged Mr Larcombe to make an offer. Mr Hedley texted Mr Randell that he was sending through an offer, "All you u can do is give it to the vendors and let them decide to screw Kids Club". Mr Larcombe provided an offer to Mr Hedley, who submitted it to Mr Randell. When Mr Hedley pressed Mr Randell for a response to the offer, Mr Randell advised that there was "nothing for Woden … there is a wait and see on this." Mr Hedley persisted, suggesting that Kids Club was experiencing financial stress. This made no difference. Two months later, Mr Randell informed the defendants that the Woden site was available as Kids Club had withdrawn: see [140]. The defendants' offer then submitted was duly accepted.
Mr Hedley also aggressively pursued the Dickson site, where another childcare operator had already taken the site. In July 2019, Mr Hedley provided Mr Randell with a newspaper article indicating that the lessee was in financial trouble. Mr Randell was not persuaded, replying "We do have issues there, but if [the owner] decided to not proceed with [the current lessee], then the terms are full guarantees for the entire length of the lease. It is a pretty tight lease … So if there was an opportunity there is zero room for negotiation. … I met with solicitors for two hours last night on the lease so will follow up today." Mr Hedley asked Mr Randell whether it was "worth putting an offer under the owner's nose as an alternative given all the bad press" about the current lessee. Two weeks later, Mr Larcombe provided Mr Randell with an offer for the Woden site.
Did the plaintiff thereby attempt to induce the owners to lease these sites to the defendants? All Mr Hedley sought to do was persuade the owner to entertain an offer from the defendants to lease the site, where the owner may have already agreed to lease the site to another. Mr Hedley was doing no more than introducing the defendants to the owner for consideration. The usual processes then followed, of submitting offers and revised offers, followed by negotiation of the terms of the transaction. Each of these matters were undertaken by the defendants themselves.
In conclusion, I am not satisfied that the plaintiff's conduct in relation to the ACT sites fell within the description in section 8(2)(b) of the Agents Act 2003. It follows that the plaintiff is not precluded by section 23 from bringing proceedings to recover its fee.
If I am wrong as to the construction of section 8(2)(b) of the Agents Act 2003, then there is no evidence that the plaintiff induced the defendants to lease the childcare sites where Mr Larcombe give not give evidence and it is not otherwise apparent from the contemporaneous documents. As to whether the plaintiff "attempted to induce" the defendants, I have set out each and every step which may fall within that description, should another court take a different view of the meaning of section 8(2)(b).

[38]

ILLEGALITY AND MISTAKE

It remains to be considered whether the plaintiff is obliged to repay the Hurstville fee. The defendants contend that the oral contract was illegal, contrary to public policy, unenforceable and inherently ineffectual. When the Hurstville fee was paid, the defendants believed or assumed that the plaintiff held the necessary licences required to legally provide its services, was entitled to charge for its services, and that the oral contract was legal. These beliefs and assumptions were mistaken. The plaintiff is said to have been unjustly enriched at the defendants' expense as a consequence of this mistaken belief and assumption. Further, the illegal, unenforceable or ineffectual nature of the oral contract resulted in a total failure of consideration.
Recovery under a claim for money had and received requires proof that the defendant was enriched by reason of some qualifying or vitiating factor, including mistake or illegality or total failure of consideration: David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1992] HCA 353; (1992) 175 CLR 353 at 479 (per Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ); Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton [2012] HCA 7; (2012) 246 CLR 498 at [30]. As French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ observed in Equuscorp at [33]: Failure of consideration as a basis for a claim for money had and received may arise from a number of causes. One cause is illegality. Where a payment is made under a contract which is unenforceable for illegality, the unenforceability of the agreement may constitute a failure of consideration which is capable of supporting a claim for recovery of the payment.
Dealing firstly with illegality, I considered this question in The Property Investors Alliance Pty Ltd v C88 Project Pty Ltd (in liq) [2022] NSWSC 1081 in relation to section 49(1) of the Property and Stock Agents Act, which prohibits an agent from obtaining a beneficial interest in the property they are retained to sell. As noted in that judgment, in Gnych v Polish Club [2015] HCA 23; (2015) 255 CLR 414 at [47], French CJ, Kiefel, Keane and Nettle JJ embraced Mason J's observation in Yango Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v First Chicago Australia Ltd (1978) 139 CLR 410 at 423: There is much to be said for the view that once a statutory penalty has been provided for an offence the rule of the common law in determining the legal consequences of commission of the offence is thereby diminished.
As Gageler J explained more fully in Gnych at [63]-[75], a strong presumption of unenforceability has given way to approaching the matter by proper construction of the statute. "An agreement which is not denied legal operation by statutory force may still be unenforceable … by operation of the common law by reference to considerations of public policy. The cases in which that might occur, however, must now be closely confined": at [70]. Further, at [73]: It is not the function of the common law to seek to improve on a regulatory scheme by supplementing the statutory sanctions for its breach. If a statute itself does not operate to deny legal operation to an agreement made in breach of one of its prohibitions, or to render that agreement unenforceable by reason of that breach, the coherence of the law is best served by a court respecting and enforcing that legislative choice.
Considerations of public policy may nonetheless dictate that the contract is unenforceable. Relevant considerations were expounded by Gageler J at [75]: A court examining the application of that consideration of public policy to the enforcement of an agreement made in breach of a statutory prohibition will examine the intention of a person in entering into the agreement and in seeking to enforce the agreement. The court will recognise that, "whilst persons who deliberately set out to break the law cannot expect to be aided by a court, it is a different matter when the law is unwittingly broken". The court will weigh the consequences of withholding a remedy to enforce the agreement in light of the objects or policies which the statute seeks to advance and the means which the statute has adopted to achieve that end [and whether] the consequence of withholding the remedy [are] proportionate to the seriousness of the illegality and not incongruous with the statutory scheme. The moulding of an equitable remedy, if sought, might involve other considerations and permit of greater flexibility.
I note also the observations of Professor Carter in Contract Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 7th Edition) at [25-13]: "it is important to consider whether the intention [of the statute] is to protect the public, or merely to exact a penalty for the benefit of the revenue. If the statute is designed to protect the public, a contract in contravention of it will generally be regarded as prohibited. … However, [this] is merely a factor to be considered, and is not conclusive".
Certainly, the object of the statute is to protect consumers. That said, clients may range widely from 'mums and dads' to sophisticated clients such as, in this case, experienced businesspeople. The value of the property may also range widely from the family home to commercial property worth significantly more. Contracts which contravene the legislation may involve third parties. If such contracts were unenforceable by reason of a contravention of section 9, third parties may be affected. The client may also suffer harm if the contract was a good deal from their perspective. Perhaps for these reasons, the penalties for contravention of section 9 are specific and directed to punishing the agent rather than any broader consequences which may also impinge on the rights of others. I consider that contravention of section 9 does not render an agreement unenforceable per se. Of course, as Gageler J explained in Gnych, considerations of public policy may dictate that an agency agreement is unenforceable in a particular case.
Here, the agreement was with a sophisticated client, with ready access to solicitors. The defendants received a benefit, which they acknowledged at the time. Whilst the legislation prevents the agent from using the processes of the Court to obtain payment on the remaining monies owed under the agreement, I do not consider it to be incongruent with public policy and the purpose of the Act to permit the agent to retain the monies already paid. Where breach of the legislation does not render the oral contract unenforceable per se, it follows that there is no failure of consideration for payments already made, which would qualify as a vitiating factor justifying restitution.
Dealing then with mistake, a distinction may be drawn between mistaken payments made in fulfilment of a contractual obligation and a mere payment made by mistake: Mason, Restitution Law in Australia (4th ed) at [404]. Generally, a payment made pursuant to a valid and enforceable contract cannot be recovered unless the contract is first set aside, on the ground of mistake or otherwise: Jackman, Varieties of Restitution (Federation Press, 2nd Edition, 2017) at 43. Indeed, David Securities is a case where the contractual obligation had been rendered "absolutely void" by the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth).
Both learned texts cite Newitt v Leitch (1997) 6 Tas R 396, where the appellant sought a refund of monies paid to an unlicenced real estate agent under a partnership agreement to operate a real estate business. Whilst it was arguable that the agent had committed an offence under the relevant legislation, Wright J observed that such an offence would not necessarily render the contract illegal or inoperative so far as their mutual rights and obligations under the partnership agreement were concerned, citing Yango Pastoral: at [17]. While the appellant had lost money in the venture, there was no total failure of consideration where he got what he bargained for, being the right to participate in the venture: at [22]-[23]. As to whether the appellant was entitled to recover the funds as paid by mistake, at [27]: … David Securities … provides no authority for the proposition that persons who have entered into contracts whilst labouring under a misapprehension as to relevant facts, may go behind the contract and seek repayment or restitution of moneys or other consideration which they have provided. Before any such course may be undertaken, it is necessary that a determination should be made that the contract pursuant to which the moneys were paid or value provided is unenforceable, void or illegal for some reason. Whilst the contract subsists and until it has been set aside or declared unenforceable, the rights of the parties are derived from the contract. It is only if the contract goes and there is no longer any contractual obligation which can support the payment made, that the necessity may arise to consider whether a total or partial restitution of the consideration provided by the aggrieved party should be made. Whilst the contract subsisted the rights of the parties are governed by the contract …
Here, the defendants paid the Hurstville fee under a contractual obligation. The contract has not been set aside nor rendered void by statute. The defendants are not entitled to seek restitution of the Hurstville fee in these circumstances.
If I am wrong about this, then it would be necessary for the defendants to prove that they were mistaken as to whether the plaintiff needed to have, and had, a real estate agent licence and, further, that such a mistake was causative of the payment: David Securities at 378; Rogers v Kabriel [1999] NSWSC 368 at [165]-[166] (per Young J). Mr Larcombe did not give evidence in this matter. I infer that his evidence would not have assisted the defendants. Further, there is no hint in the extensive contemporaneous documents that the status of the plaintiff's licence was ever mentioned or thought relevant. There is little to suppose that it was a matter of any concern to Creative Academy that the plaintiff was licensed. I am not satisfied that the defendants were mistaken or that any mistake was causative of the payment of the Hurstville fee. The defendants are not entitled to a refund of the Hurstville fee already paid as the settlement agreement is not binding and its action for monies had and received fails.

White Pointer Investments Pty Ltd v Creative Academy Group Pty Ltd

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