Vaughan v R

Catchwords

[2014] NSWCCA 297 Kentwell v The Queen (2014) 252 CLR 601[2014] HCA 37 Kerr v R [2016] NSWCCA 218 McIntosh v R [2015] NSWCCA 184 Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610Mr B Mawassi (Applicant) Mr B Hatfield (Respondent)

Judgment (6 paragraphs)

[1]

The Applicant's Subjective Circumstances

The Applicant was born in November 1973. He was 41 years old at the time of the offences and 44 years old at the time of sentence. The Applicant has no prior criminal history.
The Applicant gave evidence on sentence and a number of documents, including testimonials and psychiatric reports, were tendered in the defence case. Psychiatric reports tendered included reports from Dr William Rowe dated 19 July 2013, Dr Bruce Westmore dated 1 September 2015, Dr Richard Furst dated 11 March 2016 and 8 November 2017 and Professor David Greenberg dated 14 August 2016.
In addition, a presentence report dated 3 November 2017 was tendered together with a report of Dr Gary Nicholls of Justice Health dated 9 November 2017.

[2]

The Sole Ground of Appeal - Claim of Error in the Notional Accumulation of Indicative Sentences in Determining the Aggregate Sentence Submissions of Applicant

The narrow ground of appeal advanced in this Court relates to the concept of notional accumulation of the sentence indications for the purpose of the fixing of an aggregate sentence.
Mr Lange submitted that, regardless of how the indicative sentences might be accumulated in this case, it is simply not possible to arrive at a sentence consistent with the aggregate sentence imposed by the sentencing Judge. He submitted that, if the sentence on Count 1 was accumulated upon the sentence for Count 3, a non-parole period of 14 years results in a head sentence of 19 years and six months. Conversely, it was submitted, a head sentence of 21 years yields a non-parole period of 15 years and six months. Counsel submitted that either sentence would be consistent with his Honour's finding of special circumstances with the two sentences having a ratio between head sentence and non-parole period of 71.8% and 73.8% respectively.
Mr Lange submitted that the provisions allowing aggregate sentencing in New South Wales, as introduced in 2010, were intended to make a limited modification only to the principles in Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610; [1998] HCA 57, with the modification confined to removal of the requirement to include commencement and conclusion dates for the sentence indications. He submitted that the approach of the sentencing Judge in the present case served to "mask error" in the sense described in Pearce v The Queen at [45].
Counsel submitted that a sentencing Judge is required to undertake mental calculations as part of this process in the form of a "shadow exercise" to be undertaken with the sentence indications and the aggregate sentence in compliance with the requirements of Pearce v The Queen (T16, 16 October 2019). None of this, he submitted, was removed by the 2010 amendments providing for aggregate sentencing.
Counsel submitted that analysis of the indicative sentences in this case demonstrates error, notwithstanding the fact that any appeal must be against the aggregate sentence and not the indicative sentences: R v Brown [2012] NSWCCA 199 at [17].
Counsel submitted that the alleged error in this case is analogous to that considered in R v Rae [2013] NSWCCA 9, where Button J (Macfarlan JA and Price J agreeing) said at [42]-[46]: "42 It is true that, pursuant to the new procedure, a single aggregate sentence was imposed reflecting the criminality of all three offences. Therefore to speak of questions of partial accumulation is perhaps not entirely apt. 43 However, I consider that Parliament called for sentencing judges and magistrates to indicate the sentences that would have been imposed with regard to individual charges or counts so that an analysis of the kind that the Crown has asked this Court to undertake is available. 44 It may be that there was, with respect, perhaps some misunderstanding as to the relationship that an aggregate head sentence must have to indicative head sentences. It is noteworthy that, as I have said, his Honour imposed an aggregate head sentence that is identical with the longest indicative head sentence in circumstances in which both parties accepted that there must be partial accumulation. 45 Of course, the newly available option of aggregate sentencing will free sentencing judges and magistrates from the laborious and complicated task of creating a cascading or 'stairway' sentencing structure when sentences for multiple offences are being imposed and partial accumulation is desired. That will be especially beneficial in cases where an offender is to be dealt with for a very large number of offences. However, merely because an offender is to receive an aggregate sentence does not mean that considerations of accumulation, whether partial or complete, need no longer be taken into account. 46 In all of the circumstances outlined by me above, I consider that the submission of the Crown has force. I consider that it was an error for the aggregate head sentence not to reflect some degree of cumulation as between the three offences. In particular, I consider that the conclusion is unavoidable that the separate and serious criminality encompassed by the first offence should have led to some implicit accumulation upon the indicative head sentence expressed for the second offence, and that accumulation should have been reflected in the aggregate head sentence."
It was submitted that support for the Applicant's ground of appeal could be found in the judgment of this Court in JM v R (2014) 246 A Crim R 528; [2014] NSWCCA 297 at 39-(8).
Mr Lange submitted that the statutory requirement to give sentence indications allows the Court to engage in an analysis of the correctness of the aggregate sentence. He submitted that, whilst the sentencing Judge had complied with the requirement under s.53A(2)(b), as well as the requirement to specify the respective non-parole periods in accordance with ss.44(2B) and 54B Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, an error had occurred in the application of the principle of totality.
Counsel submitted that the alleged miscalculation was of significance and may well have affected the aggregate sentence to the detriment of the Applicant so that it was necessary for the Court to exercise the sentencing discretion afresh for the purpose of s.6(3) Criminal Appeal Act 1912: Bao v R [2016] NSWCCA 16 at [45]. Submissions of the Crown
The Crown submitted that a fundamental flaw in this ground of appeal is that it wrongly equates indicative sentences with real or substantive sentences, whereas the relevant provisions of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 make it clear that there is no requirement for the sequential accumulation of indicative sentences. It was emphasised that s.53A(2) makes clear that the sentencing Judge is to "indicate to the offender" the sentence that would have been imposed, but not to fix a sentence for each offence.
The Crown submitted that the Applicant contends incorrectly that sentencing courts are obliged to accumulate or partially accumulate indicative sentences upon one another in a sequential or cascading fashion, in order to reach a matching aggregate head sentence and aggregate non-parole period, whereas the long-standing difficulty with this cascading approach (which was required as a matter of practicality by Pearce v The Queen) was precisely why s.53A Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 was enacted.
The Crown submitted that it is clear that what are referred to regularly by the courts as "indicative sentences" are not, in reality, substantive sentences of imprisonment, with this being a shorthand term for what is indicated to the offender of what is comprised within the aggregate sentence. Nothing in the legislation requires these nominal sentences to have starting or finishing dates or to be accumulated as if they were actual terms of imprisonment.
It was submitted that the Applicant's approach amounted to an attempt to return to sentencing in accordance with Pearce v The Queen, contrary to the statutory scheme for aggregate sentencing now contained in the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.
The Crown submitted that there was clearly a significant degree of notional concurrency, as well as a degree of notional accumulation, in arriving at the aggregate sentence imposed by the sentencing Judge.
The Crown submitted that there was no requirement for his Honour to accumulate the sentence indications in a sequential or uniform way.
It was submitted that, if anything, it appears that when the sentencing Judge arrived at the aggregate non-parole period, there was a greater reduction for special circumstances for the aggregate sentence (to a ratio of 66.6%) than for the sentence indications (which had ratios of 71.8% and 73.8% respectively). The Crown submitted that it was essentially this perceived anomaly about which the Applicant now seeks to complain, when the suggested anomaly provided a generous reduction to the Applicant in the non-parole period which formed part of the aggregate sentence.
Even if the arithmetical approach raised for the Applicant was applied in this case, the Crown submitted that an understanding of the sentencing outcome contained in the aggregate sentence in fact flowed from the sentence indications for the two offences.
The Crown submitted that this Court has consistently interpreted the aggregate sentencing legislation to allow sentencing Courts a wide discretion: Kerr v R [2016] NSWCCA 218 at [114]; JM v R at [8]; Cullen v R [2014] NSWCCA 162 at [25]-[26]; McIntosh v R [2015] NSWCCA 184 at [135]-[137].
It was submitted that none of the authorities relied upon by the Applicant assisted this ground of appeal.
The Crown referred, as well, to the second reading speech in support of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment Act 2010 where the Minister explained the rationale for introducing a system of aggregate sentencing (to which reference will be made later in this judgment).
The Crown submitted that no error had been demonstrated as asserted in the ground of appeal. Decision
In my view, the Applicant's submissions in support of this ground of appeal are based upon a misconception concerning the operation of the statutory provisions providing for aggregate sentencing in this State.
Sections 53 and 53A Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 provide as follows: "53 Multiple sentences of imprisonment (1) When a court imposes a sentence of imprisonment on an offender in relation to more than one offence, the court must (unless imposing an aggregate sentence of imprisonment in accordance with section 53A) comply with the requirements of this Division by imposing a separate sentence in relation to each offence. (2) The term, and any non-parole period, set under this Division in relation to a sentence of imprisonment is not revoked or varied by a later sentence of imprisonment that the same or some other court subsequently imposes in relation to another offence. 53A Aggregate sentences of imprisonment (1) A court may, in sentencing an offender for more than one offence, impose an aggregate sentence of imprisonment with respect to all or any 2 or more of those offences instead of imposing a separate sentence of imprisonment for each. (2) A court that imposes an aggregate sentence of imprisonment under this section on an offender must indicate to the offender, and make a written record of, the following - (a) the fact that an aggregate sentence is being imposed, (b) the sentence that would have been imposed for each offence (after taking into account such matters as are relevant under Part 3 or any other provision of this Act) had separate sentences been imposed instead of an aggregate sentence. (3) Subsection (2) does not limit any requirement that a court has, apart from that subsection, to record the reasons for its decisions. (4) The term, and any non-parole period, set under this Division in relation to an aggregate sentence of imprisonment is not revoked or varied by a later sentence of imprisonment that the same or some other court subsequently imposes in relation to another offence. (5) An aggregate sentence of imprisonment is not invalidated by a failure to comply with this section."
When imposing an aggregate sentence for two or more offences, a Court may set one non-parole period for all the offences after setting the term of the head sentence: s.44(2A). The balance of term of the aggregate sentence must not exceed one-third of the non-parole period unless special circumstances are found: s.44(2B).
The only operative sentence imposed by the Court is the aggregate sentence under this statutory scheme. The Court is required to indicate sentences for the purpose of understanding the components of the aggregate sentence in general terms. However, the Court does not pass indicative sentences. The periods indicated by the sentencing Court have no practical operation at all.
The principles of sentencing concerning accumulation and concurrency at general law, as explained in Pearce v The Queen, have no application where an aggregate sentence is used by the sentencing Court. The principle of totality has operation with the sentencing Court to undertake that task bearing in mind totality: ZA v R (2017) 267 A Crim R 105; [2017] NSWCCA 132 at [68]-[84].
The seminal explanation of the aggregate sentencing provisions is contained in the judgment of R A Hulme J (Hoeben CJ at CL an Adamson JJ agreeing) in JM v R at [39]-[40]. In the course of explaining the operation and effect of s.53A, R A Hulme J referred to principles in Pearce v The Queen which remain applicable after the introduction of aggregate sentencing. His Honour said at [39]-[49]: "39 A number of propositions emerge from the above legislative provisions and the cases that have considered aggregate sentencing: 1. Section 53A was introduced in order to ameliorate the difficulties of applying the decision in Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; 194 CLR 610 in sentencing for multiple offences: R v Nykolyn [2012] NSWCCA 219 at [31]. It offers the benefit when sentencing for multiple offences of obviating the need to engage in the laborious and sometimes complicated task of creating a 'cascading or 'stairway' sentencing structure' when the principle of totality requires some accumulation of sentences: R v Rae [2013] NSWCCA 9 at [43]; Truong v R; R v Le; Nguyen v R; R v Nguyen [2013] NSWCCA 36 at [231]; Behman v R [2014] NSWCCA 239; R v MJB [2014] NSWCCA 195 at [55]-[57]. 2. When imposing an aggregate sentence a court is required to indicate to the offender and make a written record of the fact that an aggregate sentence is being imposed and also indicate the sentences that would have been imposed if separate sentences had been imposed instead (the indicative sentences): s 53A(2). The indicative sentences themselves should not be expressed as a separate sentencing order: R v Clarke [2013] NSWCCA 260 at [50]-[52]. See also Cullen v R [2014] NSWCCA 162 at [25]-[40]. 3. The indicative sentences must be assessed by taking into account such matters in Part 3 or elsewhere in the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act as are relevant: s 53A(2)(b). There is no need to list such matters exhaustively, but commonly encountered ones in Part 3 include aggravating, mitigating and other factors (s 21A); reductions for guilty pleas, facilitation of the administration of justice and assistance to law enforcement authorities (ss 22, 22A and 23); and offences on a Form 1 taken into account (Pt 3 Div 3). Commonly encountered matters elsewhere in the Act are the purposes of sentencing in s 3A, and the requirements of s 5 as to not imposing a sentence of imprisonment unless a court is satisfied that there is no alternative and giving a further explanation for the imposition of any sentence of 6 months or less. SHR v R [2014] NSWCCA 94 is an example of a case where a sentencing judge took pleas of guilty into account only in relation to the aggregate sentence, and not in relation to the indicative sentence. This was held (at [35]-[43]) to be in breach of the requirement in s 53A(2)(b). Khawaja v R [2014] NSWCCA 80 is another example. Martin v R [2014] NSWCCA 124 is a case in which a sentencing judge was held (at [17]) to have correctly taken into account pleas of guilty in relation to the indicative sentences. In JL v R [2014] NSWCCA 130 at [54] it was said by way of conclusion in an appeal against the asserted severity of a sentence that 'The starting point for the aggregate sentence of 24 years before the allowance of a discount of 25 per cent to reflect the utilitarian value of the early pleas of guilty was not excessive'. This must be understood as a broad assessment within the conclusion rather than indicating that it is the aggregate sentence to which the discount should be applied. Stoeski v R [2014] NSWCCA 161 is anomalous in that at [33]-[34] it rejected a complaint that the sentencing judge had not discounted the aggregate sentence for the plea of guilty rather than rejecting the assertion that the discount applied to the aggregate sentence at all. 4. It is still necessary in assessing the indicative sentences to have regard to the requirements of Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; 194 CLR 610. The criminality involved in each offence needs to be assessed individually. To adopt an approach of making a 'blanket assessment' by simply indicating the same sentence for a number of offences is erroneous: R v Brown [2012] NSWCCA 199 at [17], [26]; Nykolyn v R, supra, at [32]; [56]-[57]; Subramaniam v R [2013] NSWCCA 159 at [27]-[29]; SHR v R, supra, at [40]; R v Lolesio [2014] NSWCCA 219 at [88]-[89]. It has been said that s 53A(2) is 'clearly directed to ensuring transparency in the process of imposing an aggregate sentence and in that connection, imposing a discipline on sentencing judges': Khawaja v R, supra, at [18]. 5. The imposition of an aggregate sentence is not to be used to minimise the offending conduct, or obscure or obliterate the range of offending conduct or its totality: R v MJB, supra, at [58]-[60]. 6. One reason why it is important to assess individually the indicative sentences is that it assists in the application of the principle of totality. Another is that it allows victims of crime and the public at large to understand the level of seriousness with which a court has regarded an individual offence: Nykolyn v R, supra, at [58]; Subramaniam v R, supra, at [28]. A further advantage is that it assists when questions of parity of sentencing as between co-offenders arise: R v Clarke, supra, at [68], [75]. 7. Non-parole periods need not be specified in relation to indicative sentences except if they relate to an offence for which a standard non-parole period is prescribed: ss 44(2C) and s 54B(4); AB v R [2014] NSWCCA 31 at [9]. 8. Specification of commencement dates for indicative sentences is unnecessary and is contrary to the benefits conferred by the aggregate sentencing provisions: AB v R, supra, at [10]. Doing so defeats the purpose of a court availing itself of the power to impose an aggregate sentence: Behman v R [2014] NSWCCA 239 at [26]. See also Cullen v R, supra, at [25]-[26]. 9. If a non-custodial sentence is appropriate for an offence that is the subject of the multiple offence sentencing task, it should be separately imposed as was done in Grealish v R [2013] NSWCCA 336. In my respectful view, there was error involved in Behman v R [2014] NSWCCA 239 where an offence with an indicative, but unspecified, non-custodial sentence was included in an aggregate sentence imposed by this Court. The provision for imposing an aggregate sentence in s 53A appears within Part 4 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act which is headed 'Sentencing procedures for imprisonment', and within Division 1 of that Part which is headed 'Setting terms of imprisonment'. 40 The following further propositions emerge from the cases in relation to appellate review of aggregate sentencing exercises: 10. Another benefit of the aggregate sentencing provision is that it makes it easier on appeal to impose a new aggregate sentence if one of the underlying convictions needs to be quashed: R v Brown, supra, at [51]; FP v R [2012] NSWCCA 182; 224 A Crim R 82 at [327]-[329]; Nykolyn v R, supra, at [58]-[59]; Subramaniam v R at [28]. 11. The indicative sentences recorded in accordance with s 53A(2) are not themselves amenable to appeal, although they may be a guide to whether error is established in relation to the aggregate sentence: R v Brown, supra, at [17]; Nykolyn v R, supra, at [58]; PD v R [2012] NSWCCA 242 at [44]; R v Rae [2013] NSWCCA 9 at [32]-[33], [42]-[43]; Truong v R; R v Le; Nguyen v R; R v Nguyen, supra, at [218], [227]; Subramaniam v R, supra, at [28]; SHR v R, supra, at [40]; R v Clarke, supra, at [56]; Martin v R [2014] NSWCCA 124 at [47]; JL v R [2014] NSWCCA 130 at [17]; Stoeski v R, supra, at [43]; CL v R [2014] NSWCCA 196 at [53]-[55]. 12. Even if the indicative sentences are assessed as being excessive, that does not necessarily mean that the aggregate sentence is excessive: PD v R at [44],[82]; BJS v R [2013] NSWCCA 123 at [252]-[254]. 13. A principle focus of determination of a ground alleging manifest inadequacy or excess will be whether the aggregate sentence reflects the totality of the criminality involved: R v Brown, supra, at [37]; R v Rae, supra, at [42]-[46], [62], [69]. This Court is not in a position to analyse issues of concurrence and accumulation in the same way that it can analyse traditional sentencing structures: Truong v R; R v Le; Nguyen v R; R v Nguyen, supra, at [231]; Martin v R, supra, at [33]-[41]. 14. Erroneous specification by a sentencing judge of commencement dates for indicative sentences (such as there being gaps between the expiry of some indicative sentences and the commencement of subsequent sentences) are immaterial and may be ignored as being otiose: AB v R, supra, at [10], [67]. 15. A failure of a judge to specify a non-parole period in the indicative sentence for a standard non-parole period offence will not lead to an appeal being upheld. Failure to do so does not invalidate the sentence: s 54B(7). Setting non-parole periods for the indicative sentences for standard non-parole period offences would have no effect upon the aggregate sentence imposed: Truong v R; R v Le; Nguyen v R; R v Nguyen, supra, at [214]-[218]."
Contrary to the Applicant's submissions, I do not think that the Applicant is assisted by anything said in JM v R. There is no support in JM v R for a sentencing Judge to undertake a "shadow exercise" of the type argued for the Applicant in this case (see [69] above).
Nor do I consider that the Applicant is assisted in this case by the part of R v Rae referred to earlier (at [71] above). The problem in R v Rae was that the sentencing Judge passed an aggregate sentence in identical terms to the indicative sentence for one of the offences for which the offender was to be sentenced. The aggregate sentence encompassed other serious offences for which significant sentences were indicated, but these offences were "not reflected by way of implicit accumulation in the aggregate sentence": R v Rae at [35]. In this context, Button J said at [38]: "It may be accepted that sentencing judges who are dealing with multiple offences have a very wide discretion as to questions of accumulation, concurrence, and partial accumulation and partial concurrence. However, it is not easy to understand how it is that the aggregate head sentence seemingly reflects none of the criminality of, at the least, the first offence, reflecting as that offence did a serious, planned break enter and steal in company that was entirely separate from the second offence, and that was committed by an offender who had previously been sentenced to imprisonment for a property offence."
What occurred in R v Rae was a variation of the problem referred to in JM v R at 39 (see [92] above). The impermissible "blanket assessment" referred to by R A Hulme J in that paragraph was criticised in decisions of this Court before the introduction of aggregate sentencing by reference to the principles in Pearce v The Queen: Porter v R [2008] NSWCCA 145 at [72]-[74].
The present case is far removed from the circumstances referred to in R v Rae and JM v R at 39. Here, a blanket approach was not adopted.
Since the introduction of aggregate sentencing, it has been said that absolute precision in specifying the degree of accumulation would be tantamount to expressing commencement dates for each indicative sentence contrary to one of the rationales for the introduction of aggregate sentencing: Beale v R [2015] NSWCCA 120 at [4]; JM v R at [34]-[40]; ZA v R at [88].
I do not think that the Applicant's submissions are supported by the second reading speech for the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment Bill 2010. In the course of that speech, the Parliamentary Secretary, Mr Veitch, stated that "the bill implements a form of aggregate sentencing to simplify sentencing for multiple offences". Later in the second reading speech, the Parliamentary Secretary said (Hansard, Legislative Council, 23 November 2010): "However, it remains important for a number of reasons for there to be some indication given of the respective sentence that would have been imposed had each offence been dealt with directly. These reasons include: the transparency of the sentencing process, the comfort to victims accorded by an explicit recognition of the level of criminality involved in the specific crimes committed against them, the benefits in publicly recognising the particular aggravating and mitigating factors of an offence as required under the Act, and to assist appeal courts in resentencing offenders after successful appeals or in identifying where errors in the sentencing process may have occurred where such errors may have been 'masked' by the aggregation of the sentence into a single term of imprisonment. As such, the new provisions require that the court is to give such an indication of the head sentence that would have been imposed, taking into account discounts and other factors, and each offence's relative weight in determining the overall sentence. What will not be required is the need to set the precise commencement and expiry dates of sentences that are to be served partially concurrently or consecutively. It need set only one non-parole period and one overall sentence and comply with the other requirements of the division with respect to that overall sentence. The court will still retain discretion in setting the appropriate length of the overall sentence, taking into account the principle of totality. For the reasons outlined above, the indication with respect to each offence is intended to provide an adequate indication of the criminality attaching to each offence, but it should not be construed by courts as requiring them to give an indication that is so detailed that they are effectively sentencing the offender for each offence separately in any case. The court will also not be required to give an indication of the non-parole period that would have applied to each sentence except, as indicated earlier, when the offence is one to which a standard non-parole period applies. It should be sufficient to indicate what a total sentence for a particular offence would have been taking into account any discounts or other factors that might have applied."
The approach contended for by the Applicant would be inconsistent with the regime of aggregate sentencing now contained in the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. That construction would not promote the purpose or object of the aggregate sentencing provisions: s.33 Interpretation Act 1987. Further, any requirement to undertake, in every case where aggregate sentencing is to be used, a type of "shadow exercise" as submitted by the Applicant (see [69] above) would not only defeat the purpose of aggregate sentencing, but also render more complicated, burdensome and time-consuming the task of sentencing Judges serving in already busy criminal Courts.
The suggested arithmetical or calculation errors contended for by the Applicant are misconceived. It would be wrong to consider the indications of the sentencing Judge and treat them as if they were actual and operative sentences with a view to translating them, in some way, into a total sentence which has been calculated by reference to the principles in Pearce v The Queen.
Further, as the Crown has submitted, a true understanding of the aggregate sentence and the process of notional accumulation which was undertaken by the sentencing Judge in this case must have regard to the actual outcome, whereby a substantial allowance was made following a finding of special circumstances so that the non-parole period comprised 66.6% of the total term of the aggregate sentence, a significantly lower figure than the non-parole periods included in the individual indications.
The sentencing Judge in this case complied with the requirements of ss.53A and 54B. The course taken in this case also served the purposes of the aggregate sentencing provisions as explained in the second reading speech for the 2010 Bill. Sentence indications were given for each offence which complied with s.53A(2)(b). His Honour then applied the totality principle and the special circumstances test in s.44(2B) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 for the purpose of reaching a discretionary determination as to an appropriate head sentence and non-parole period as components of the aggregate sentence. No more was required by way of a suggested "shadow exercise" in determining sentence.
The short answer to the ground of appeal advanced by the Applicant is that no error is demonstrated so that the ground fails. Accordingly, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its function under s.6(3) Criminal Appeal Act 1912.

The Ground of Appeal

By Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal filed on 30 August 2019, the Applicant relies upon a single ground of appeal that, in determining the aggregate sentence, his Honour erred in the notional accumulation of the indicative sentences.
At the hearing before this Court on 18 October 2019, Mr Lange, counsel for the Applicant, made clear that there was no claim that the aggregate sentence was manifestly excessive (T6.11) nor was it contended that the individual sentence indications lay outside the range of discretion for the sentencing Judge in an assessment of sentence for those offences (T6.32-37).
Counsel for the Applicant submitted that the single ground of appeal asserted an "error of process" (T7.1, 9.47) which, if the ground was upheld, would lead the Court to undertake the exercise of independent sentencing discretion for the purpose of determining whether a lesser sentence should be imposed in accordance with s.6(3) Criminal Appeal Act 1912: Kentwell v The Queen (2014) 252 CLR 601; [2014] HCA 37 at [43].

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Judgment (6 paragraphs)

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Cases Cited (34)