HIS HONOUR: Shelden Vaughan was convicted after pleading guilty to one count of assault causing grievous bodily harm with intent to murder contrary to s 27 of the Crimes Act 1900 (Count 1) and one count of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm contrary to s 33(1)(b) of that Act (Count 3). The victim of Count 1 was Mr Vaughan's former wife, Ms Quintero-Naranjo. The victim of Count 3 was Ms Knox-Haly.
Mr Vaughan was sentenced on 27 April 2018 by Bennett SC DCJ to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 21 years comprising a non-parole period of 14 years commencing on 19 August 2015 and expiring on 18 August 2029, with a balance of term of seven years commencing on 19 August 2029 and expiring on 18 August 2036. In accordance with ss 53A(2)(b) and 54B(4) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (as each offence carried a standard non-parole period), his Honour gave the following sentence indications:
Count 1 - imprisonment for 17 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 12 years;
Count 3 - imprisonment for 11 years and 3 months with a non-parole period of 8 years.
Mr Vaughan sought leave to appeal against the severity of his sentence upon a single ground that, in determining the aggregate sentence, his Honour erred in the notional accumulation of the indicative sentences. His application was heard by the Court of Criminal Appeal on 18 October 2019. The Court refused to grant Mr Vaughan an extension of time to seek leave to appeal: Vaughan v R [2020] NSWCCA 3. It should be noted that Mr Vaughan did not contend in the Court of Criminal Appeal that his aggregate sentence was manifestly excessive or that the individual indicative sentences lay outside the range of the sentencing judge's discretion.
Mr Vaughan now applies under s 78 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 seeking an inquiry into his sentence pursuant to s 79 of that Act. This is Mr Vaughan's second such application. N Adams J refused Mr Vaughan's first application on 8 July 2022: Application by Shelden Patrick Vaughan pursuant to s 78 of the Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) [2022] NSWSC 920.
The documentary material upon which Mr Shelden relies in this application is voluminous, so a familiarity with the published reasons of the Court of Criminal Appeal and N Adams J's earlier decision dealing with Mr Vaughan's first application is assumed for present purposes as a matter of convenience.
The factual and procedural background is set out at [16]-[49] in the decision of N Adams J. However, the following, taken from the Attorney-General's submissions, and referencing the Agreed Facts that were before the sentencing judge, may be taken to be an uncontroversial summary.
On 18 August 2015, Mr Vaughan drove to the carpark at Ms Quintero-Naranjo's workplace at Carramar and parked behind her car. When she attended her car, he called out to her. Ms Knox-Haly, who was Ms Quintero-Naranjo's work colleague, was also in the carpark at that time. Mr Vaughan pulled a knife from his jumper and stabbed Ms Quintero-Naranjo in the chest and on her left arm, which she had raised to try to protect herself. After he had done so, Mr Vaughan turned to Ms Knox-Haly and stabbed her head, causing immediate bleeding. Whilst Ms Quintero-Naranjo was lying on the ground, Mr Vaughan returned to his vehicle and accelerated directly at her. As she attempted to regain her feet, Mr Vaughan reversed into her, crushing her between his vehicle and another parked car. He then drove away.
As a result of the incident, Ms Quintero-Naranjo suffered a 3cm laceration to the left side of her chest, a 4cm laceration to her left arm, a 3cm laceration to her forehead, abrasions and bruising to her face, neck and other areas, multiple fractured ribs, a fracture to her left scapula, several fractured vertebrae and fractures to her pelvis. Ms Knox-Haly suffered a laceration to the top of her head requiring sutures.
Mr Vaughan pleaded guilty in the District Court after he had been committed. He had earlier waived his right to a committal hearing in the Local Court and had signed a waiver document. The waiver was accepted by Degnan LCM on 14 December 2016. On that occasion, his Honour clearly indicated to Mr Vaughan that the charges would be committed, and Mr Vaughan confirmed his understanding of this in open court.
Mr Vaughan was ultimately sentenced on the basis of Agreed Facts which were signed by him. In those circumstances, neither Ms Quintero-Naranjo nor Ms Knox-Haly was required to give evidence in the sentencing proceedings, although they each provided victim impact statements. His Honour expressly disavowed any reliance upon those statements as evidence to be considered in aggravation of the offences or the sentences that he imposed.
[2]
This application
Mr Vaughan's application consists of 843 pages of submissions filed on 15 March 2024, not including appendices and annexures. They contain more than 760 separate so-called grounds upon which he relies. The Attorney-General's submissions were filed on 29 February 2024 and respond to an earlier and shorter version of Mr Vaughan's submissions.
I should observe at the outset that it is clear that Mr Vaughan is extremely bitter about the actions of his former wife, a Colombian national, who he considers married him only in order to assist her fraudulently to secure an Australian visa. Mr Vaughan contends that his former wife has also conspired with a number of people to commit what he describes as "migration fraud". The Crown and members of the legal team that prosecuted Mr Vaughan are also alleged to have joined in these frauds and conspiracies. None of these complaints rises higher than an allegation. None is supported by evidence that goes beyond Mr Vaughan's assertions.
Ground 132 is an example of the type of allegations Mr Vaughan makes against his former wife:
"Ms Quintero has perpetrated serious indictable public justice offences in relation to the falsely fabricated evidence that she intended a genuine and ongoing relationship with [Mr Vaughan], evidence that she presented to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia and remains unprosecuted for these offences. She must now be prosecuted for these offences. Ms Quintero presents an unacceptable risk of harm to the community given the seriousness of these offences."
Mr Vaughan also alleges that other frauds and conspiracies gave rise to false and perjured evidence that should not have been relied upon by the sentencing judge. In this respect, Mr Vaughan nominates the psychiatric experts who provided opinions concerning his mental conditions that were tendered at the sentencing proceedings. Mr Vaughan alleges that these frauds and conspiracies meant that the "agreed facts" was a "false instrument" and that this led to a perversion of the course of justice. Mr Vaughan maintains that he was sentenced upon the basis of "fabricated" witness accounts, despite the fact that no witnesses were called to give evidence. Mr Vaughan also raises a series of complaints about his legal representatives, describing his counsel as "inept".
Mr Vaughan complains in addition about the sentencing judge, contending that he failed to take certain matters into account, including the effect of his medication, his childhood sexual abuse and the fact that he was acutely suicidal at the time of his offending. Mr Vaughan also raises the contention that his sentence was manifestly excessive and crushing, a contention that was not, as earlier indicated, argued in his appeal.
The final paragraph of Mr Vaughan's submissions encapsulates his strongly held and persistently articulated conviction that Ms Quintero is the central source of his current predicament. It is in these terms:
"1860. The Crown was blameworthy because they based their entire prosecution case on the fabricated false evidence of Ms Quintero and the Crown failed to do due diligence in investigating whether the claims of alleged historical abuse were either truthful or if they could be substantiated by any other corroborating evidence. The Crown should have determined by doing due diligence if the inventions by Ms Quintero to conceal the earlier migration and financial fraud crimes, were the substantial cause of the psychiatric illnesses that developed in Mr Vaughan to a point where he became acutely suicidal. As part of those investigations the Crown should have interviewed his previous partner, Ms Vallejo to discover if their relationship involved any evidence of historical domestic abuse, which could have helped them discover that the evidence of Ms Quintero was completely fabricated. Mr Vaughan's crimes were intrinsically linked to the fact that he developed psychiatric illnesses to a severe level, as a result of the serious criminality of Ms Quintero."
The Attorney General submitted that Mr Vaughan's application can be characterised as follows:
1. Oppressive by reason of its length.
2. Replete with allegations which have for the most part been comprehensively dealt with by the sentencing judge or by N Adams J.
3. Contain to a significant extent baseless and improper accusations which cannot and could not be substantiated.
4. Is incapable of giving rise to any question or doubt about Mr Vaughan's guilt, irrespective of whether or not the accusations could be established.
Mr Vaughan was the beneficiary of extremely comprehensive, detailed and thorough remarks on sentence from the sentencing judge. So much was confirmed by observations to a similar effect by the Court of Criminal Appeal. His Honour had the benefit of extensive psychiatric opinions from several eminent psychiatrists practising in the field of forensic medicine. His Honour weighed these opinions. The proposition that these independent medical practitioners were somehow involved in a conspiracy or otherwise corrupted by false allegations against Mr Vaughan of domestic violence that found their way from Ms Quintero to the doctors is in my opinion as absurd as it is bereft of support. Mr Vaughan's ad hominem attacks do not advance his application in any respectable or principled way.
It must be remembered that Mr Vaughan was sentenced for an extremely violent attack upon his former intimate partner. Mr Vaughan's assertion that his Honour somehow erroneously described his assault upon her as domestic violence is simply ridiculous. The seriously violent nature of the attacks on the victims was also eloquently encapsulated in the judgment in the Court of Criminal Appeal. As was effectively remarked in that Court, it is unsurprising that the only challenge to the sentences imposed was one limited to a technical criticism of whether the judge erred in the notional accumulation of the indicative sentences, a challenge that was in any event found to be misconceived.
Section 79 of the Act provides relevantly as follows:
79 Consideration of applications
(1) After considering an application under section 78 or on its own motion--
(a) the Supreme Court may direct that an inquiry be conducted by a judicial officer into the conviction or sentence, or
(b) the Supreme Court may refer the whole case to the Court of Criminal Appeal, to be dealt with as an appeal under the Criminal Appeal Act 1912.
(2) Action under subsection (1) may only be taken if it appears that there is a doubt or question as to the convicted person's guilt, as to any mitigating circumstances in the case or as to any part of the evidence in the case.
(3) The Supreme Court may refuse to consider or otherwise deal with an application. Without limiting the foregoing, the Supreme Court may refuse to consider or otherwise deal with an application if--
(a) it appears that the matter--
(i) has been fully dealt with in the proceedings giving rise to the conviction or sentence (or in any proceedings on appeal from the conviction or sentence), or
(ii) has previously been dealt with under this Part or under the previous review provisions, or
(iii) has been the subject of a right of appeal (or a right to apply for leave to appeal) by the convicted person but no such appeal or application has been made, or
(iv) has been the subject of appeal proceedings commenced by or on behalf of the convicted person (including proceedings on an application for leave to appeal) where the appeal or application has been withdrawn or the proceedings have been allowed to lapse, and
(b) the Supreme Court is not satisfied that there are special facts or special circumstances that justify the taking of further action.
(3A) …
I have considered Mr Vaughan's application, and taken account of all of his extensive, albeit significantly repetitive, submissions. The fact that these submissions were lengthy and repetitive is not something for which Mr Vaughan should be criticised and I have not formed my conclusions about the application by reference to those matters. I am satisfied, however, that Mr Vaughan's contentions have previously been dealt with by N Adams J and I am not satisfied that there are special facts or special circumstances that justify the taking of further action.
Finally, I note that Mr Vaughan has signalled his intention to request that the present application be assessed in the alternative under either s 23 or s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970. No meaningful submissions are provided by Mr Vaughan in support of that request which is for obvious reasons difficult to understand. It is unnecessary therefore to consider this request further.
[3]
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Decision last updated: 16 May 2024