[2018] VCAT 630
General information, not legal advice.
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2018-06-21
Original judgment source is linked above.
Freedom of Information Act 1982 - ss 30(1), 32, 33(1), 50(4) - whether correspondence from agency and to media consultant is exempt from release - whether public interest requires disclosure of exempt documents
United Firefighters Union of Australia - Victoria Branch
United Firefighters Union of Australia - Victoria Branch v Country Fire Authority (Review and Regulation) [2018] VCAT 630
Documents 72, 74, 97, 103, 118, 120 and 155 - emails
Names of non-executive staff in the other documents in dispute
The duty of taking superintending and enforcing all necessary steps for the prevention and suppression of fires and for the protection of life and property in case of fire and the general control of all stations and of all brigades and of all groups of brigades shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, so far as relates to the country area of Victoria be vested in the Authority.
In relation to the second limb of section 30, there are numerous decisions of this Tribunal, its predecessor and the courts which indicate that draft documents will, on consideration, generally turn out to be inappropriate for release where the final version was published (see for example Western Mining Corporation v Department of Conservation Forests and Lands (1989) 3 VAR 151 and the authorities cited therein). This is not an absolute proposition, however. Every disputed document must be examined on its own merits.
It is difficult to imagine a world where officers could not collaborate via email toward a final version of a document, without being concerned about the release of the email. That said, the position could be different if the email contained some form of inappropriate content, such that releasing it would not be contrary to the public interest.
(1) A document is an exempt document if it is of such a nature that it would be privileged from production in legal proceedings on the ground of legal professional privilege or client legal privilege.
... a document will be privileged (and thus exempt under s 32(1) of the Act) if :
(a) it contains a confidential communication between the client (or the client's agent) and the client's professional legal advisers that was made for the dominant purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice or is referrable to pending or completed litigation;
(b) it contains a confidential communication between the client's professional legal advisers and third parties that was made for the dominant purpose of pending or contemplated litigation; or
(c) it contains confidential communication between the client (or the client's agent) and third parties that was made for the purpose of obtaining information to be submitted to the client's professional legal advisers for the dominant purpose of obtaining advice on pending or completed litigation.
Document 93 - draft media release related to the FSR
Documents 106 to 109 - Some content of a March 2016 email chain involving Ms McCrohan and a CFA Officer related to the "Red Paper"
Document 113 - draft Fire Services Review communications plan
Document 114 - email from a CFA officer to Ms Nolan, copy to Ms McCrohan, concerning enterprise bargaining
Document 146 - background paper concerning 'presumptive legislation'
Document 147 - issues paper concerning presumptive legislation
Document 149 - CFA Communications and Legal Services Staff Contact List
On the hearing of an application for review the Tribunal shall have, in addition to any other power, the same powers as an agency or a Minister in respect of a request, including power to decide that access should be granted to an exempt document (not being a document referred to in section 28, section 29A, section 31(3), or in section 33) where the Tribunal is of opinion that the public interest requires that access to the document should be granted under this Act.
Relevantly to this appeal, the exercise of the power conferred by s 50(4) requires satisfaction of two conditions. The first is the condition that, as a matter of law, the material before the Tribunal is capable of supporting the formation by it of an opinion that the public interest requires that access to the documents should be granted. That condition may also be expressed as a limitation, namely, that the opinion referred to by the sub-section is an opinion which is such that it can be formed by a reasonable decision-maker who correctly understands the meaning of the law under which that decision-maker acts. The second condition is that the Tribunal actually forms the opinion that the public interest requires that access to the documents should be granted. This is an evaluative and essentially factual judgment. If the Tribunal forms the requisite opinion, its power to grant access is enlivened. In the ordinary case, the exercise of the power will be subsumed in the formation of the necessary opinion.
The FOI Act neither defines nor expressly limits the range of matters relevant to the 'public interest' which may require that access should be granted. As was said in the joint judgment in this Court on the first appeal, "[t]here are obvious difficulties in giving the phrase 'public interest' as it appears in s 50(4) a fixed and precise content". The nature of "public interest" determinations in the exercise of statutory powers was described in O'Sullivan v Farrer:
"the expression 'in the public interest", when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only 'in so far as the subject matter and the scope and purpose of the statutory enactments may enable ... given reasons to be [pronounced] definitely extraneous to any objects the legislature could have had in view".
The power to grant access on public interest grounds is not, in terms, vested in the relevant Minister or agency. By virtue of s 16 they retain their freedom to grant access to exempt documents. Rather, it is a power included in the powers conferred on the Tribunal. In this respect it is unique in freedom of information legislation in Australia. It has been called a "significant and exceptional" power and "a most extraordinary provision". These epithets do not justify its characterisation, propounded by the Secretary, as a power to be exercised only in "exceptional circumstances". Those words are not in the statutory text. Their use may misdirect the inquiry required by s 50(4). They may be taken erroneously to limit the range of matters relevant to the public interest. Nor do they sit easily with the proper approach to the construction of the FOI Act, which is to "further, rather than hinder, free access to information" under it.
Having said that, it must be accepted that the word "requires" which appears in s 50(4) directs the decision-maker to identify a high-threshold public interest before the power can be exercised. It is not enough that access to the documents could be justified in the public interest. The terminology of the sub-section does not define a rule so much as an evaluative standard requiring restraint in the exercise of the power. It is, like many common law standards, "predicated on fact-value complexes, not on mere facts", to be applied by the decision-maker.
The public interest is a term embracing matters, among others, of standards of human conduct and of the functioning of government and government instrumentalities tacitly accepted and acknowledged to be for the good order of society and for the well-being of its members. The interest is therefore the interest of the public as distinct from the interest of an individual or individuals.
It is not necessary here to dwell on the possible circumstances that may cause this discretion to be exercised in favour of an applicant. Clearly the revelation in the documents of iniquities such as illegal or sharp practices detrimental to the welfare of the State and its citizens would be amongst them.
[2] Document numbers refer to the number identifying the relevant document in the Schedule of Exempt Documents provided by the CFA in this proceeding.
[4] Paraphrasing Ms Watson's witness statement, paragraph 60.
[5] Mond v Department of Justice (General) [2005] VCAT 2817 (22 December 2005)
[15] UFU written submissions, paragraph 30.
[16] Johns v Cancer Council of Victoria [2016] VCAT 1596 [243] - [244], per Garde J - Wyman v Monash University (unreported, AAT of Vic, Judge Smith P, 20 August 1991) - Lambert v VicRoads [2008] 850, [38] - Yarra City Council v Roads Corporation [2009] VCAT 2646, [24] and my decisions in Country Fire Authority v Hicks [2017] VCAT 1880, [54], Country Fire Authority v McGregor [2017] VCAT 582, [74] and Coulson v Freedom of Information Commissioner [2016] VCAT 1521, [31 and 36].
[20] A short email which was part of a two email chain forming Document 65 has already been released as has the attachment to the email, which is Document 66.
[21] Section 32 refers to an exemption on the basis of "legal professional privilege" or "client professional privilege". The term "client professional privilege" is a reference to Part 3.10, Division 1 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic). As Nekvapil describes in Victorian Administrative Law, [FOI.32.40], there are minor differences between the scope of client legal privilege and legal professional privilege. They are not material here.
United Firefighters Union of Australia - Victoria Branch
Country Fire Authority
(1999) 201 CLR 49
(2002) 213 CLR 543