1. The Tribunal affirms the decision under review regarding documents 4, 5, 10-15, 17, 19, 23, 25, 27-29, 31, 32 and 36-38.

2. The Tribunal varies the decision under review regarding documents 1, 3, 6, 7, 18, 21, 22, 30 and 35 and directs that the names of officers of the Respondent be disclosed and the decision regarding these documents is otherwise affirmed.

3. The Tribunal varies the decision under review regarding documents 2 and 33 and directs that the four lines at the bottom of page four of document 2 and at the bottom of document 33 be disclosed.

4. The Tribunal varies the decision under review regarding document 8 and directs that it be disclosed but for the name and signature of the writer.

5. The Tribunal varies the decision under review regarding document 9 and directs that it be disclosed but for the name of the addressee.

6. The Tribunal varies the decision under review regarding documents 16 and 24 and directs that they be disclosed but for the name of the addressee, the name of the person in the fist line of paragraph three and the signature and telephone number of an officer of the Respondent.

7. The Tribunal varies the decision under review regarding documents 20 and 26 and directs that they be released but for the final paragraph and the contact details of the Respondent's officer.

8. The Respondent is directed to give notice of this decision to the officers whose personal affairs information it is directed by this order to release.

9. Liberty for 28 days to the officers referred to in order 8 to intervene to seek a stay of these orders and liberty to the parties to apply.

10. The directions in these orders for documents to be disclosed take effect 28 days from today.

Mr David Mond ("the Applicant") complained to Consumer Affairs Victoria about an incorporated association, Caulfield Hebrew Congregation "CHC". The Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria is the registrar of incorporated associations and the registrar has monitoring and regulatory functions regarding incorporated associations under the Associations Incorporation Act 1981. Consumer Affairs Victoria is a part of the Department of Justice and for the sake of convenience I refer in this decision to Consumer Affairs Victoria and to that Department both as "the Respondent" as in this case nothing turns on the distinction.

Mr Mond's complaint was first made in 2003 and there may have been complaints earlier than that. The Respondent gathered information and communicated with various people. Then in 2004 Mr Mond made a further complaint about use of CHC's funds by its Board members to pay costs ordered against them in litigation where Mr Mond was the opposing and apparently successful party.

Mr Mond made a request under the Freedom of Information Act 1981 ("the FOI Act") for documents from the Respondent on 21 September 2004. After a process of release of some documents, internal review and some further release, Mr Mond applied to the Tribunal on 16 February 2005 for review of the Respondent's decision to withhold some documents. Subsequently, the Respondent released further documents with the consent of a third party. By the time of the hearing, only 38 documents remained in dispute and some of them duplicated others.

The Respondent withheld the documents in dispute claiming exemptions by various sections of the FOI Act. The Tribunal's task was to decide whether the exemptions were properly claimed. Exemptions were claimed for all or part of documents pursuant to sections 14, 30, 31, 33, 34 and 35 of the FOI Act. Some documents fell within multiple claimed exemptions.

In considering the exemptions claimed under sections 30, 31(1), 34 and 35 of the FOI Act, the question of whether disclosure of the document is in the public interest arises, in terms which are different for each section. In addition, under section 50(4), the Tribunal may grant access to an exempt document if the Tribunal consider that the public interest requires it.

The Respondent filed a statement of the public interest grounds upon which it relied in claiming the exemptions. In summary, the Respondent said that the documents came its possession during an investigation it conducted in the administration of the Associations Incorporation Act 1981. The Respondent claimed that members of the public must have confidence complaints will be treated confidentially and persons or entities complained about must have confidence they can produce material to investigators knowing it will be used for the investigation without automatic publicity. Further, the Respondent said, it would be contrary to the public interest to release produced information when an investigation is still in progress.

The Applicant argued that the investigation was not continuing, that there had been a number of requests for investigation of Caulfield Hebrew Congregation Inc ("CHC") but no investigation had occurred. Both parties gave evidence about the investigation and since the question is fundamental to the submissions made about the public interest it was necessary for me to find whether there was an investigation.

Ms Denise Parvakis an officer of the Respondent, provided a statement dated 3 October 2005 and gave evidence. She said she was aware Mr Mond had complained against CHC and that she had been one of the investigators involved in investigating the complaint, in 2003. She said she had perused the documents in dispute and that they arose from that investigation, that she herself was the author of some documents but she could also identify the handwriting of other investigators. Ms Parvakis said she was advised by the General Manager Compliance and Enforcement at the Respondent that the investigation was not yet finalised, although she herself was not presently assigned to it.

The Applicant produced a letter he had sent to the Deputy Registrar of Incorporated Associations on 15 February 2005, complaining that CHC had seriously contravened the Associations Incorporation Act 1981. He produced a letter he had received from the Respondent dated 28 April 2005, which said in effect that investigation of the complaint in Mr Mond's letter was being considered. He also produced a letter dated 30 June 2005 signed by Dr Gary Frydman, CHC's then Treasurer requesting the Respondent to recover money from members of the previous Board of CHC. The letter said the money had been raised by CHC using a mortgage of its property to pay the personal debts of Board members which were owed as costs to Mr Mond following a legal proceeding.

Mr Mond said the letter dated 30 June 2005 had been delivered to the Respondent's General Manager Compliance and Enforcement, at a meeting on 30 June 2005. Mr Mond said no action had been taken about the complaint in the letter. He said Mr Hiland had mentioned that the matter would be investigated as resources allowed, but nothing had happened over the ensuing three months. Mr Mond said that at the meeting he "understood it would take a couple of weeks".

This was the entire evidence about whether the investigation of CHC is in progress. In my view this evidence and the documents in dispute show an investigation was on foot in 2003. I find no evidence that the investigation is finalised. I accept Ms Parvakis' evidence that it is continuing. Her evidence was supported by Mr Mond's evidence of the June meeting. Whether or not the Respondent has failed to do what it should have done or been tardy in investigating the issues raised or in informing Mr Mond or Mr Frydman about progress is not the question before me.

Mr Mond suggested that the Respondent was embarrassed by its failure to act on complaints so that it would be inappropriate for the Tribunal to allow it to rely on the existence of an investigation to deny access to documents which would reveal such failure to act. He suggested it was in the public interest for people to know of any mismanagement by the Respondent. Having read the documents in dispute I can see nothing in the documents to suggest mismanagement.

The documents in dispute have dates ranging from 29 July 2002 to 24 October 2004. None of them therefore established whether any investigation was continuing to the time of the hearing. I noted that section 50(2) of the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 provides that proceedings for any offence against the Act may be commenced within three years of the commission of the alleged offence, so the fact that a complaint was made in 2003 would not preclude the investigation from leading to proceedings. It follows that I found no public interest sufficient to override the exemptions successfully claimed by the Respondent.

The complaint made by CHC's Treasurer in the letter of 30 June 2005 refers to action taken by CHC's former board when, according to that letter, "the Board contravened section 29A of the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 as the Board purchased a bank cheque from monies borrowed from BankWest to pay $771,000 to David Mond in November 2004, in satisfaction of their personal liability for those costs".

Mr Mond agreed when cross-examined at the hearing that he had originally complained in 2003 and earlier about CHC's failure to hold meetings and maintain a register of members and other matters. He agreed that the complaint about expenditure of CHC funds on legal costs was added later. The documents in dispute deal for the most part with the earlier complaints. Mr Mond referred to them as 'historical' documents and said he now wanted to see them as they might provide assistance for action against the previous board.

Thus it appears that the Respondent's investigation has changed in character and the documents in dispute mostly deal with the earlier part of the investigation. However, I am satisfied that there was an investigation concerning CHC in progress when the documents in dispute were created and I am further satisfied that the investigation continues to be open. There was no evidence as to the current level of activity in that investigation.

I will deal with the claimed exemptions by category according to the sections of the Act.

Exemption was claimed under this section for one document. Section 14 of the FOI Act relevantly provides:

(1) A person is not entitled to obtain access under this Part to -

(a) a document which contains information that is open to public access, as a part of a public register or otherwise, in accordance with another enactment, where that access is subject to a fee or other charge.

The Applicant accepted that document 28 is available to him according to processes of the Supreme Court and disputed this document no further. The decision of the Respondent concerning document 28 is affirmed.

The Respondent claimed exemption under Section 30 of the FOI Act for part or all of 13 of the 38 documents in dispute; documents 1, 2, 4, 18, 19, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37 and 38. Section 30 relevantly provides:

(1) Subject to this section, a document is an exempt document if it is a document the disclosure of which under this Act -

(a) would disclose matter in the nature of opinion, advice or recommendation prepared by an officer or Minister, or consultation or deliberation that has taken place between officers, Ministers, or an officer and a Minister, in the course of, or for the purpose of, the deliberative processes involved in the functions of an agency or Minister or of the government; and

(b) would be contrary to the public interest.

Document 1 comprises 9 pages of handwritten notes, most of which are difficult to decipher. They are undated. The respondent claimed exemption under section 30 for pages 3 to 8 of these. The notes appeared to me to express views or form part of consultations about matters under investigation. The notes have no heading. There was no direct evidence that they were part of any communication or deliberative process, but it is reasonable to assume that they were on the Respondent's file for such a purpose. If the notes were written by one officer and read later by another they would form part of the Respondent's deliberative processes.

Deciding whether disclosure would be contrary to the public interest requires the Tribunal to balance the competing interests of the public in having access to the documents and in protecting the deliberative processes of government. In document 1, the material is almost undecipherable, so there can be little public interest in seeing something conveying little meaning. In addition, pages 3 to 8 do appear to contain expressions of opinion which must of their nature as rough notes be at an early stage of development. Some sentences appeared to refer to information provided by other people.

In Re Al-Hakim and the Ombudsman [2001] VCAT 1972; [2001] 18 VAR 102 Deputy President Davis (as she then was) found (at page 116) that it was -

"not in the public interest for preliminary notes made by investigating officers, which were made as part of the deliberative process of the agency but which do not reflect any concluded view of the agency, to be disclosed, as disclosure in these circumstances would be likely to lead to confusion and unnecessary debate."

In my view, this is a similar case. It is contrary to the public interest to disclose documents containing incomplete views and information recorded in an inconclusive file note in an investigation which is still open and when there is no evidence about the Respondent's concluded views. Accordingly the Respondent's decision regarding pages 3 to 8 of document 1 is affirmed.

In document 2, exemption is claimed under section 30 for the second page and for a few lines on the fourth page of the document. The second page notes a phone call received about CHC, the opinion expressed by the officer (who is not identified in the document) and the fact that the officer offered to check the advice with another officer. In my view it is contrary to the public interest to disclose information about preliminary views recorded for further internal consideration in this way.

However, the relevant few lines on the fourth page of document 2 appear to be simply a note of information provided by a person to an officer of the Respondent.. Notes of interview are not exempt under section 30. For an example, see Re Al-Hakim at page 115 and the list of authorities cited there by the then Deputy President. Nothing in these lines could be described as opinion, advice recommendation, consultation or deliberation. Accordingly, the fourth page of document 2 is not exempted by section 30 from disclosure. The Respondent's decision regarding document 2 is varied to disclose the last four lines of page four.

It contains no opinion advice or recommendation or consultation or deliberation so is not exempt under section 30. However, the exemption claimed unde section 35 succeeds for reasons to follow.

Exemption is claimed under section 30 for the second page of document 18. It appears to be in the same illegible hand as the pages of document 1 considered above. The same considerations apply to this page as to the pages of document 1 and the exemption under section 30 applies for the same reasons. The Respondent's decision regarding page 2 of document 18 is affirmed.

Document 19 is a ministerial briefing dated 23 August 2004, Such a document is of course not automatically exempt. Having had the benefit of reading the document, I am satisfied that it contains opinions and recommendations about the investigation of complaints concerning CHC, including both the earlier complaints and the later one about the Board obtaining a loan to pay legal costs.

I heard no evidence about whether the opinions and recommendations in the document had influenced any action by the Respondent. However, if the Respondent acted differently from the views expressed, it is in my view contrary to the public interest to disclose contrary opinions, when the investigation is not finalised. On the other hand, if the Respondent is yet to act on the opinions expressed, it is contrary to the public interest to disclose opinions about matters which could yet be the subject of regulatory or enforcement action.

Disclosure might not be contrary to the public interest if there was any particular public interest in disclosure which outweighed those concerns. However, there was not, in my view. I have considered Mr Mond's suggestion that there is a public interest in disclosing any mismanagement by the regulator of incorporated associations. Neither the evidence before me nor the documents themselves suggested mismanagement. It is true that lapses of time are not all explained by the evidence before me or by the documents, but it was not suggested that I had before me the full history of the complaint and investigation. The whole of document 19 is in my view exempted from disclosure by section 30 and the Respondent's decision regarding it and regarding document 32, which is identical to it, is affirmed.

Document 29 is the same as document 5, for which exemption under section 30 was not claimed. However, since the documents are identical it would be nonsensical to treat them differently. This document, a memorandum about CHC dated 18 December 2003, analyses some material about CHC and makes recommendations for further action. In my view the material headed "Recommendation" on the second and third pages easily falls within the section 30 exemption. It is a recommendation made between officers and appears to be part of the ongoing investigation about which there is little further information. It is in my view contrary to the public interest to disclose part of a process when the information is incomplete and might lead to confusion. I include within this exemption the handwritten notes apparently from one officer to another which are made on this part of the document.

The rest of document 29, although not so obviously "opinion, advice or recommendation" analyses material which has apparently been provided to or gathered by the Respondent. This analysis is essential to the recommendations which follow and is in my view exempt from disclosure for the same reason. The Respondent's decision regarding documents 5 and 29 is affirmed.

Exemption was claimed for paragraph 9 (18 lines) of document 30. This document is the same as document 22, for which the Respondent did not claim exemption under section 30. However, I will treat both documents in the same way, as to do otherwise would not make sense.

Paragraph 9 of document 30 is in my view exempted by section 30 from disclosure . I formed this view for the same reasons as I did for document 19. Paragraph 9 contains recommendations which may or may not have been followed as part of the investigation and either way it is contrary to the public interest to disclose them, in the absence of any outweighing public interest in favour of disclosure. The Respondent's decision regarding paragraph 9 of document 30 (and of document 22) is affirmed.

Document 31 is similar to the pages of document 1 which I have already considered and is in my view exempt under section 30 for the same reasons as those pages. Document 32 is identical to document 19. The Respondent's decision regarding documents 31 and 32 is affirmed.

Document 33 is identical to page four of document 2, in relation to which I have decided to vary the Respondents' decision and order the information be disclosed.

Document 36 is identical to document 4 which I have already considered. Document 37 is identical to page two of document 2 which I have already considered. Document 38, 6 pages, is identical to the pages of document 1 which I have already decided are exempt under section 30. The decision of the Respondent regarding documents 36, 37 and 38 is affirmed.

The Respondent claimed exemption under section 31 of the FOI Act for part or all of 11 documents: documents 5, 16, 17, 19, 20, 24, 26, 27, 29 and 32. Section 31 relevantly provides:

(1) Subject to this section, a document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be reasonably likely to -

(d) disclose methods or procedures for preventing, detecting, investigating or dealing with matters arising out of, breaches or evasions of the law the disclosure of which would, or would be reasonably likely to, prejudice the effectiveness of those methods or procedures; or

(2) This section does not apply to any document that is -

(e) a report prepared in the course of routine law enforcement inspections or investigations by an agency which has the function of enforcing and regulating compliance with a particular law other than the criminal law;

(f) a report on a law enforcement investigation, where the substance of the report has been disclosed to the person who, or the body which, was the subject of the investigation -

if it is in the public interest that access to the document should be granted under this Act.

I have already found document 5 to be exempt in full from disclosure, under section 30.

The Respondent claimed exemption for document 16 under section 31(1)(d) in its schedule but under 31(1)(b) on the copy document supplied. Nothing in document 16 could be described as a method or procedure of investigation except in a very general sense unlikely to be affected by disclosure. So I assumed the Respondent meant to make the claim under section 31(1)(b). This assumption caused no prejudice to the Applicant as his submissions dealt with public interest issues, not with particular sections or paragraphs. There was no evidence that there is any trial or case going on regarding CHC. Re Barnes v Commissioner for Consumer Affairs (No 2) 1987 1 VAR at 442 suggests this exemption does not apply if there is no case on foot. Even if a potential case were sufficient I was not satisfied that disclosure was likely to prejudice a fair case or trial, if one should eventuate. It is true, as Mr Devlin submitted, that the letter alleges breaches of legislation. However, the allegations are about quite formal matters, easily dealt with by simple evidence, so that no adjudicator is likely to be led astray by them and no opponent given an unfair advantage by their disclosure. Document 16 is therefore not exempted by section 31 from disclosure and the decision of the Respondent is varied to release document 16 (and document 24 which is identical to it).

As with document 16, I assume the Respondent meant to claim exemption for document 17 under paragraph (b) of section 31(1). Document 17 contains comments from the person then writing on behalf of CHC. Mr Devlin submitted that if it was made public it could be used by someone else in subsequent litigation to "lock in" the writer or CHC to a position they might not wish to take in later litigation. I agree. Although there is no trial or case on foot at present, there has been already been litigation and Mr Mond suggested at the hearing that legal action could be considered in future, either by him or CHC. In my view that is sufficiently "particular" to fall within section 31(1)(b). I found no public interest sufficient to enliven sub-section (2). The Respondent's decision regarding document 17 and document 25 which is identical to it is affirmed.

I have already decided that document 19 is exempted by section 30 from disclosure and need not consider whether it is exempt under other provisions.

For the purposes of exemption under section 31(1)(b), most of document 20 (a letter) is similar to document 16 and accordingly most of it is not in my view exempted from disclosure by that section. The last paragraph of the letter however is exempt. Mr Mond said at the hearing that he understood this letter was never sent. This suggested to me that he already had a copy of the letter. However, he may have obtained a copy on terms more restricted than the terms on which a copy would be provided under the FOI Act. The last paragraph of the letter appears to comment critically on the actions of CHC's board of management. As the letter was prepared for the regulator of incorporated associations, it is likely that such a comment would adversely affect the impartial the adjudication of a case in some circumstances, for example if the writer was not available to explain the comment. Accordingly, in my view section 31(1)(b) exempts the last paragraph of document 20 from disclosure. Document 26 is identical to document 20 and should be treated the same way.

The Respondent claimed full or partial exemptions under section 33(1) for 23 of the 38 documents in dispute: documents 1-15, 17, 18, 21, 22, 24, 30, 34 and 35. Section 33 relevantly provides:

(1) A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information relating to the personal affairs of any person (including a deceased person).

"information relating to the personal affairs of any person" includes information -

(a) that identifies any person or discloses their address or location; or

(b) from which any person's identify, address or location can reasonably be determined.

The information claimed to be exempt included the names, initials, contact details, signatures or workplace phone numbers of the Respondent's officers and of people who communicated with the Respondent or were mentioned in letters or memoranda. Some of those people were office- holders of CHC. All of this information was in my view obviously related to the personal affairs of the persons named. The question I had to decide as whether disclosure of this information would be unreasonable.

Deciding whether disclosure would be unreasonable requires a balancing of the interests of the individual's right to personal privacy against the object of the FOI Act - giving the community access to the information held by government. This balancing, thus described in a frequently quoted passage from Re Page and Metropolitan Transit Authority (1988) 2 VAR 243 at 245-246:

"...requires a consideration of all the circumstances including the interest that the applicant has in the information in question, the nature of the information that would be disclosed, the circumstances in which the information was obtained, the likelihood of the information being information that the person concerned would not wish to have disclosed without consent, and whether the information has any current relevance."

That information identifies a person's name or contact details means it relates to personal affairs, but does not necessarily mean its disclosure would be unreasonable. The names and contact details of persons will only be exempt if disclosure would be unreasonable. In Re AB and Department of Human Services, [2001] VCA 2020, his honour Judge Strong observed that the file of a government department is likely to contain the names of many departmental officers and, in the normal course, there will be no justification for deleting their names.

In my view there is nothing to indicate that disclosure of the names of the Respondent's officers in the disputed documents would be unreasonable. It is unlikely in my view that the officers would object to disclosure - the appearance of their names simply shows them doing their jobs and it is no secret that they are the Respondent's officers. There is no implied criticism of the officers - as I have said, in my view none of the evidence or documents indicates that the Respondent has failed to perform its functions in this matter.

On the other hand, it would not be reasonable to disclose the signatures, hand-written initials or contact telephone numbers of CAV officers. Disclosure under the FOI Act is disclosure to the world and it is possible that signatures be misused and telephone numbers used to approach officers who are not usually available to speak to members of the public. The applicant made clear that he is looking for substantive information, not personal details of officers. In all these circumstances, it would in my view, be unreasonable to disclose signatures, initials or telephone numbers of the Respondent's officers.

For these reasons the Respondent fails in its claim that the names of its officers are exempt from disclosure and accordingly in my view the names of the Respondent's officers in the following documents should be disclosed: documents 1-3, 6-8, 10, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 30 and 35. The Respondent's decision in relation to those documents is varied so that the names of officers be disclosed. Their signatures, initials and telephone numbers are however exempt from disclosure.

The names and signatures and contact details of persons who phoned or wrote to the Respondent or who received letters or phone calls are different however. These persons were participating in an investigation under the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 which, by section 37Q generally maintains the secrecy of information gathered in investigations. That is the context in which these persons communicated with the Respondent. In the absence of counter-vailing reasons for disclosing this information, it would in my view be unreasonable to disclose personal affairs information gathered in such a context. Accordingly in my view, the Respondent succeeds in its claim that the names of persons communicating with it are exempt in the following documents: 1, 2, 6-10, 12-15, 18, 24, 33. The Respondent's decision in relation to that information is affirmed.

The Respondent claimed that documents 8, 9, 10, 11, 17 and 20 were exempt under section 34(1)(b). At the hearing, Mr Devlin said that the Respondent would not persist with the claim for document 9 under that section and the decision of the Respondent is varied to release it.

(1) A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would disclose information acquired by an agency or a Minister from a business, commercial or financial undertaking and the information relates to -

(b) other matters of a business, commercial or financial nature and the disclosure of the information would be likely to expose the undertaking unreasonably to disadvantage.

In document 8, the only information "acquired" by CAV which would be disclosed by release of the document is a reference to items which, Mr Devlin said, "are in fact sold". This was merely a submission that items are sold. There was no evidence before me that the Association would be exposed to any disadvantage or harm to any competitive position by disclosure of this information, so in my view it is not exempted from disclosure by section 34. Accordingly, the Respondent's decision regarding document 8 is varied to release it, except for the information I have held to be exempt under section 33.

In document 10, there is no information I can see which would, if disclosed, expose the Association to any disadvantage. No exemption applies under section 34. However for reasons to follow, the document is exempted from disclosure by section 35.

Document 11 is a "please explain" letter. It contains material of a financial nature, about CHC's financial statements. While it is conceivable that making this information available might disadvantage the Association in some situations there was no evidence before me about it. There was no suggestion that the Association would be at some competitive disadvantage. I am therefore unable to form the view that disclosure would expose the Association unreasonably to any disadvantage. The claim for exemption under section 35 succeeds.

I have already found document 17 to be exempted by section 31(1)(b) from disclosure.

There was no direct evidence that disclosure of document 20 would expose the Association to any disadvantage. The draft letter suggests serious allegations could be made. However t he focus of section 34 is on the competitive position of the undertaking concerned. There was no evidence before me that the Association competes with anyone. In any case, there was no evidence that the information was "acquired...from the...undertaking". In my view, section 34 does not exempt any part of document 20 from disclosure. The decision of the Respondent regarding document 20 is varied to release it except for the final paragraph and for the information held to be exempt under section 33.

The Respondent claimed exemption under section 35(1)(b) for documents 4, 10, 11, 23 and 36. Documents 4 and 36 are identical. Section 35 relevantly provides:

(1) A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would divulge any information or matter communicated in confidence by or on behalf of a person or a government to an agency or a Minister, and -

(b) The disclosure of the information under this Act would be contrary to the public interest by reason that the disclosure would be reasonably likely to impair the ability of an agency or a Minister to obtain similar information in the future.

Document 4 contains information provided as part of the investigation - it refers to a telephone call between an officer of the Respondent and another person about CHC. There is no mention of confidentiality; however investigations under the Associations Incorporation Act 1981 are protected by section 37Q of that Act from disclosure of information (except for certain stated purposes) so that a person giving information to the Respondent in that context is entitled to expect confidentiality. Releasing such information to the world at large is likely to undermine that expectation, which would be contrary to the public interest in the Respondent being able to obtain such information in future. The Respondent did not claim exemption under section 38 which exempts from disclosure documents which are subject to "secrecy provisions". However, in this instance section 35 achieves the same outcome. If there were public interest considerations outweighing the expectation of confidentiality, then the outcome might be different, but I found no such considerations, so in my view document 4 is exempt from disclosure and the decision of the Respondent about it is affirmed.

Document 10 is a one page covering letter. It refers to other documents but there are none attached. The only information it contains is that it responds to a step in the investigation. However, participation in an investigation occurs in a context of confidentiality and it is in the public interest that people communicate freely with the Respondent in that context. There was no evidence before me to show whether or not the various steps in the investigation had been made confidentially, however if persons or bodies under investigation can not expect confidentiality they are likely to reduce their co-operation in investigations, which would be contrary to the public interest. Therefore document 10 is exempt from disclosure and the decision of the Respondent about it is affirmed.

Document 11 refers to information obtained about CHC and raises issues for response. It is exempted by section 35 from disclosure, for the same reasons as document 10. The decision of the Respondent regarding document 10 is affirmed.

Document 23 is a statement. No evidence was provided about the reason this statement was made. However, in my view statements made to the regulator of incorporated associations are made in the context of secrecy provided by section 37Q of the Associations Incorporation Act 1981. Disclosure of such a statement would in my view be reasonably likely to impede the Respondent's ability to obtain such information in future. Even though the Respondent has power to compel some information (under Part VIIIA of the Associations Incorporation Act 1981), relying on powers of compulsion in an investigation does not serve as well as receiving free co-operation. It is in the public interest that the regulator be able to obtain that sort of co-operation. Accordingly, document 23 is exempted by section 35 from disclosure.

The Respondent provided no evidence about whether it had complied with section 53A of the FOI Act, which relevantly provides:

(a) an agency or Minister makes a decision refusing to grant access to a document; and

(b) a reason for the decision is that the document is an exempt document under section 33(1) because its disclosure would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information relating to the personal affairs of a person; an

(c) an application is made to the Tribunal under section 50(2)(a) for review of the decision -

the agency or Minister, as soon as practicable after being notified of the application, must if practicable, given written notice in accordance with sub-section (2) to the person to whom the information relates.

(a) inform the person to whom it is directed of their right to intervene in the review; and

(b) request the person to inform the Tribunal, within 21 days after the day on which the notice was given, whether or not the person intends to intervene.

(a) the person does not intervene in the review; and

(b) the Tribunal orders that access be granted to the document -

the Tribunal must, if practicable, give notice of the order to the person.

(4) An order referred to in sub-section (3)(b) does not take effect until 28 days after the day on which it is made.

There are a number of persons whose names or signatures or contact details the Respondent has claimed to be exempt from disclosure under section 33(1). It is possible that these persons were not informed by the Respondent of their right to intervene in the review of the Tribunal's decision. Those persons would also have been entitled to notice under section 53A(4) of any Tribunal order that access be granted to the document containing their information. The Tribunal does not have sufficient contact details to give notice to the persons so affected. Instead I have decided that the Respondent give notice to them and that those persons should have liberty to apply to seek a stay of orders granting access to documents which contain information relating to their personal affairs, for a period of 28 days.

Accordingly I make the orders set out above.