Troyanovsky v The Owners – Strata Plan No 1260 [2025] NSWCATAP 322 | Case summary

This is an internal appeal filed under s 80 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act) in respect of the procedural directions and orders of the Consumer and Commercial Division of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal) as follows:

(1) of 29 May 2025 in proceedings 2025/00036988 and proceedings 2025/00126110:

(a) that proceedings 2025/00126110 and proceedings 2025/00036988 be heard together with evidence in one being evidence in the other (Order 1);

(b) that the appellant's application to summarily proceedings 2025/00126110 be dismissed (Order 2);

(c) that the appellant's interim application filed on 5 May 2025 seeking to stay proceedings 2025/00126110 be dismissed (Order 3);

(d) extending the leave granted by the Tribunal on 7 April 2025 for all parties to be legally represented in proceedings 2025/00036988 and proceedings 2025/00126110 (Order 4);

(e) that the appellant's points of claim must set out the orders sought including the material facts, the legal basis and the statutory provisions under the Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW) (SSMA) on which the appellant relied (Order 5); and

(2) of 15 July 2025 in proceedings 2025/00036988 and 2025/00126110 ordering the appellant to pay the costs of the respondent of and incidental to the appellant's application to transfer application 2025/00036988 to the Local Court of NSW (Order 6).

(1) the application to extend the time for filing the Notice of Appeal in relation to Orders (1) to (5) is refused, and the appeal otherwise dismissed;

(2) to the extent that the appellant raises a question of law in respect of Order (6), the appeal is dismissed;

(3) to the extent that the appellant raises some other error in respect of Order (6), leave to appeal is refused and the appeal is otherwise dismissed.

In our final orders, we will set a timetable for submissions (and if necessary, evidence) as to costs.

The appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on 24 July 2025. This is a bundle of 150 pages of material.
Attached to the Notice of Appeal (pp 1-7 of 150) are the appellant's Grounds of Appeal (pp 8-16 of 150). Thereafter are 135 pages of documents (pp 17-151) including but not limited to copies of various orders of the Tribunal; correspondence between the parties; correspondence with the Registry; strata records including minutes of general meetings; and a statutory declaration of Max Nikandrov dated 27 March 2025 relating to the fire safety measures in the common areas of the strata scheme.
By way of brief summary, the appellant submits that:

(1) Orders (1) to (5), raise questions of law and public policy, and are contrary to:

(a) ss 36, 38, 60, 62, 72 and Pt 3 of Sch 4 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act); which sections require:

(i) the fair, just, quick and cheap resolution of disputes; and

(ii) written reasons when dismissing applications;

(b) ss 37, 59, 103 and 105 of the NCAT Act, which sections regulate the lawful engagement of solicitors and the disclosure of legal costs;

(c) rr 74, 176, 178 and 179 of the Legal Profession Uniform General Rules 2015 (NSW) (LPUGR);

(2) Orders (1) to (5), are inconsistent with ss 103 and 105 of the SSMA and cl 176 of the LPUGR;

(3) Order (2), failed to address the issues of public policy raised by the appellant;

(4) in relation to Orders (1) to (6), the appellant was denied procedural fairness;

(5) Order (1) was attended by procedural irregularity and an apprehension of bias;

(6) Order (6) was illogical and unjust, attended by bias and amounted to arbitrary decision making;

(7) all the Orders were not fair and equitable.

The appellant filed submissions in support of his appeal on 3 September 2025. These submissions are five pages in length.
Accompanying the submissions was an affidavit of the appellant affirmed 29 August 2025. The affidavit was 8 pages in length to which was annexed a further 70 pages of documents. At the appeal hearing, the respondent submitted that the appellant should not be permitted to rely on the affidavit as it included evidence that was not before the Tribunal.
This affidavit principally comprises a procedural chronology of the two proceedings and includes materials which we assume had been filed in the two proceedings, some of which are not relevant to the Tribunal's determination of the orders now under appeal. The affidavit also includes what are really submissions (which we will treat as such), and other materials which were not before the Tribunal, as they post-date the dates of the orders under appeal,
We will deal with all the new evidence sought to be relied on by the appellant later in these reasons.
The appellant also filed a bundle of materials titled "Appellant's Reply Submissions" on 15 October 2025. This bundle consists of submissions (pp 2-10), which are accompanied by 77 pages of further documents, again some of which appear to have been before the Tribunal; other which were not. For instance, included in those materials was an email from Randwick City Council dated 11 September 2025.
In addition to all these documents, the appellant provided us with an Outline of Submissions at the appeal hearing. The Outline confirms that the appellant wishes to rely on what he describes as "significant fresh evidence" which warranted the appeal being allowed.
We noted at the appeal hearing that we were not provided with a transcript of the Tribunal hearing, as directed by the Appeal Panel at a directions hearing. The appellant said that he did not have time to have a transcript prepared. Procedural direction (3) made at the callover on 6 August 2025 clearly stated that if there were oral reasons and/or the appellant was relying on what happened at the hearing at first instance, a typed transcript of the relevant parts of the hearing had to be provided.
The callover directions gave the appellant four weeks to comply with this direction which would have been sufficient time to obtain the recording, and also prepare the relevant transcript. No extension of time was sought to provide the written transcript.

Accordingly, the appeal proceeded without the benefit of any written transcript of the hearings held on 29 May and 15 July 2025. Submissions in reply

On 15 October 2025, the appellant filed submissions in reply to the respondent's submissions. The appellant's reply submissions are nine pages in length, to which are attached 78 pages of documents, including an affidavit of the appellant dated 29 August 2025.
The submissions amount to a lengthy rebuttal of the respondent's position. Where relevant we will refer to the appellant's reply submissions below.
But we note that the appellant submitted that the Tribunal gave no reasons for making Orders (1) to (5), contrary to s 62(3) of the NCAT Act, and the principle in Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak [2013] HCA 43; (2013) 252 CLR 480.

On 5 August 2025, the respondent filed its Reply to Appeal.
In summary, the respondent submits that:

(1) the appeal was filed out of time;

(2) the appellant requires leave to appeal, which should not be granted;

(3) the appeal lacks substance and there is no reason to disturb any of the Tribunal's orders.

On 1 October 2025, the respondent filed a 190 page folder of submissions and relevant documents, including its evidence before the Tribunal.

We think it appropriate to set out the relevant procedural matters which took place in proceedings 2025/00036988 and proceedings 2025/00126110. We say relevant. For instance, we have not included steps taken by the appellant to have summonses issues by the Tribunal, and his challenges to decisions not to issue summonses.
On 29 January 2025, the appellant filed proceedings 2025/00036988 (Appellant's Application). The appellant sought the following orders:

(1) an order pursuant to s 106 of the SSMA requiring the respondent to complete repairs and maintenance to the common property of the strata scheme;

(2) an order pursuant to s 237 of the SSMA for appointment of a compulsory appointment of a strata managing agent to take on all functions of the respondent under s 57 of the SSMA;

(3) orders pursuant to ss 24 and 25 of the SSMA to "invalidate resolution or election of the owners corporation & to nullify resolution of owners corporation on ground that person was denied vote or notice was not given";

(4) an order pursuant to s 87 of the SSMA to alter the amount of contributions, or the manner of payment of contributions;

(5) an order pursuant to s 232 of the SSMA for any costs sustained by the appellant during the necessary repairs to common property to be "covered" by the respondent;

(6) an order pursuant to s 232 of the SSMA exempting the appellant "from any financial contribution that may arise from the legal representation of the [respondent] in responding to the [respondent's Cross Application] to NCAT & any penalty sustained by the owners corporation for breaching the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 as well as any other applicable legislation".

The reasons for seeking those orders were stated as (paragraph breaks added for ease of understanding):

Order 1 - Pursuant to Section 106 of the Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 The Owners Corporation of Strata Plan 1260 must, within 14 days:

A. Replace defective windows in Unit 7 per quote #10132 from Gasper Maintenance Services, complying with Australian Standards, Codes, and Laws.

B. Appoint OXP Fire Services, an accredited fire safety practitioner, to maintain fire safety measures in accordance with Australian Standard 1851 and the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979.

C. Appoint a CBC-accredited Building Practitioner to replace damaged asbestos eaves.

Order 2 - Appointment of MG Strata & BMC Management P/L as Strata Managing Agent Pursuant to Section 237(1)(a), it is ordered that:

(a) MG Strata & BMC Management P/L (Licence No. 1387235) be appointed as managing agent for two years.

(b) The Owners Corporation delegates to the agent all functions under Section 52(1)(o) of the Act, enabling performance of agreed and additional services as defined in the attached agreement (Schedule "A").

(c) The delegation is subject to conditions in the Agreement.

Order 3 - Annulment of Resolutions from AGM on 18 June 2024 Pursuant to Sections 24 and 25, the resolutions passed at the AGM on 18 June 2024 are annulled.

Order 4 - Adjustment of Levy Contribution Pursuant to Section 87, the levy contribution payable by the applicant is reduced to $4,000 due to: a. Cleaning and painting costs from pressurized cleaning by Dune. b. Loss of one week's rent due to lockout by the Owners Corporation. c. Costs for window replacement, fire safety, and mediation compliance.

Order 5 - Payment of Relocation Costs Pursuant to Section 232, the Owners Corporation must pay reasonable relocation costs for Unit 7 due to window replacement works.

Order 6 - Exemption from Monetary Contribution Pursuant to Section 232, the applicants are exempt from contributing to: a. Legal costs for responding to the applicant's claim. b. Penalties for breaches within any legislation.

On 21 February 2025, the appellant filed an Amended Application. The orders now sought by the appellant were:

Order 1- Pursuant sections 106 of the SSM Act 2015

The owners corporation-strata plan 1260 shall 14 days from the date of this order:

A. Replace 6 defective windows in unit 7 as per scope of works and quote #10132 from Gasper Maintenance Services the in compliance with applicable Australian Standards, Codes, Laws.

B. Appoint accredited fire practitioner OXP fire services to maintain existing fire safety measures in accordance with the requirement of Australian Standard 1851 and Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979.

C. Appoint CBC accredited Building Practitioner to replace damaged asbestos eaves.

Order 2 - Compulsory Appointment of the MG Strata & BMC Management P/L as the Strata Managing Agent SP1260

That pursuant to Section 237(1)(a) of the Strata Schemes Management Act 2015

(a) MG Strata & BMC Management P/L (Licence number 1387235) issued under the Property Stock and Business Agents Act 2002) be appointed as strata managing agent of Strata Scheme No. 1260 for the 2 years term; and

(b) the owners corporation delegate to the agent all of the functions listed in section 52(1)(0) of the Act of:

the owners corporation;

and its chairperson, treasurer, secretary, and executive committee,

Necessary to enable the Agent to carry out the 'agreed services' and the 'additional services' as defined in the written agreement, a copy of which with the letter of consent was attached in Schedule "A" to this submission (Agreement);

(c). the delegation to the agent is to be subject to the conditions and limitations in the Agreement; and any orders that may result in reference to these proceedings

Order 3 - Annul resolutions of Annual General Meeting held on 18 June 2024

That pursuant of sections 24 and 25 of the SSM Act 2015, the resolutions of owners corporation-strata plan 1260 held on 18 June 2024 to be annulled or invalidated.

Order 4 - Adjustment of Levy Contribution

That pursuant of section 87 the SSM Act 2015, levy contributions payable by the applicant to the owners corporation-strata plan 1260 to be reduced to the amount $4,000, being the cost incurred by the applicant for the period of 12 months from the date of the application as the result of the following incidents:

a the cleaning and painting cost due to the damage sustained in interior walls, floor, ceiling and windows occurred as the direct consequence of pressurized cleaning and painting of the external walls undertaken by the owners corporation-SP1260 contractor (Dune) during January-February 2024.

b. Loss of 1 week rent incurred by the applicant due to lock out by the owners corporation-SP 1260 of the applicant's tenant. Loss of enjoyment by the tenant and nuisance.

c. Cost of pursuing replacement of windows, fire safety and compliance with mediation agreement.

Order 4- Payment of the relocation costs due to the windows replacement works

That pursuant of section 232 the SSM Act 2015, the owners corporation-strata plan 1260 shall pay all reasonable cost incurred by owner of unit 7 due to the cleaning, painting. renting, moving the furniture into the storage and back at the conclusion of the window replacement works.

Order 5 - Exemption of the applicants from the requirement to make a monetary contribution

That pursuant of section 232 the SSM Act 2015, the applicants are being exempt from the requirement to make a contribution by way of any special levy or normal strata levy to meet

a. the legal costs that owners corporation might be incurred in engaging solicitor by the owner's corporation in answering the applicant's claim.

b. the cost of paying any penalty that the owners corporation strata plan 5768 might be incurred for breach of Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 and any other applicable legislations.

The reasons stated for seeking those orders were:

1. The respondent contravened mediation agreement dated 19 August 2016.

2. The respondent management structure is persistently not functioning satisfactory for considerably long period of time. This is manifested in breach of mediation agreement dated 19 August 2024, strict absolute statutory duty to repair common property, comply with work health safety and fire safety obligations.

3. Through it conduct and actions referred in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the respondent pose significant risk to the safety of people and property.

On 5 March 2025, a directions hearing was held. The usual orders were made for the filing of evidence, submissions and documents sought to be relied on by both parties; the appellant by 30 April 2025, the respondent by 14 May 2025.
The appellant was also directed to lodge with the Tribunal, and to give to the respondent points of claim by 2 April 2025. The Tribunal explained that points of claim are "a brief summary of the claim, stating in point form the order [sic] that are sought and the reasons for seeking each of those orders".
Points of defence were to be lodged with the Tribunal and given to the appellant by 30 April 2025.
On 20 March 2025, the respondent sought leave to be legally represented in the proceedings. The reasons for that application were stated as:

2. ... the Respondent seeks leave for legal representation on the basis that the proceedings involve complex issues of both law and fact pursuant to paragraph 11(f) of the NCAT Consumer and Commercial Division Guideline for Representation.

3. The Applicant has sought multiple orders under sections 106, 237, 57, 24, 25, 87 and 232 of the Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 which give rise to multiple complex legal issues.

4. It also appears that the Applicant does not have the proper grounds to seek a number of these orders e.g. under sections 24, 25, 87 and 237.

5. Additionally, with some orders sought, such as orders under sections 57 and 106, the Tribunal does not have an order making power under these sections to make the orders sought.\

6. Legal representation will assist the owners corporation in effectively responding to the complexity of the Applicant's claim and, importantly, will aid the Tribunal by narrowing the issues in dispute by clearly articulating the legal basis or lack thereof for the orders sought.

On 28 March 2025, the appellant sought an extension to the timetable ordered on 5 March 2025.
On 31 March 2025, the respondent filed proceedings 2025/00126110 (Cross-Application). The respondent sought orders:

(1) pursuant to ss 132, 229 and 232 of the SSMA, that the appellant pay the respondent's contractors for all costs incurred to remove all unauthorised alterations and additions to the common property carried out by the appellant and to restore the common property to its former state;

(2) pursuant to ss 232 and 241 of the SSMA, that the appellant provide to the respondent within seven days notice of all leases at the appellant's unit in accordance with s 258 of the SSMA;

(3) pursuant to s 60(2) of the NCAT Act that the respondent pay its costs.

The reasons for seeking those orders were stated in the Cross-Application as:

(1) the orders have been sought as part of a cross-application in response to the Application;

(2) the respondent sought that Order 1 be made because the appellant carried out the following unauthorised works to his lot: converted his lot from a two-bedroom unit into a three-bedroom unit through installation of a false wall, installed ducted air conditioning, placed an electrical conduit outside the garage, and welded an air conditioning outsource pipe into the drainage system;

(3) the respondent also sought an order be made to direct the appellant to provide details about his lease because this information has not been provided to the owners corporation to date although it is required under s 258 of the SSMA.

On 4 April 2025, the appellant advised the Tribunal that it opposed the respondent's application to be legally represented in the proceedings 2025/00036988.
On 7 April 2025, the Tribunal granted the respondent's application for legal representation, giving written reasons for doing so. However, the Tribunal also granted the appellant leave to be legally represented.
On 16 April 2025, the parties were advised that a directions hearing would be held in both proceedings on 29 May 2025 by video or telephone conference.
On 28 April 2025:

(1) the respondent advised the Tribunal that it objected to the extension of time sought by the appellant;

(2) the appellant filed an application to dismiss the Cross-Application pursuant to ss 55(1)(b) and (d) of the NCAT Act. The appellant asked that his dismissal application be heard before 29 May 2025

On 5 May 2025, the appellant sought an interim stay of the Cross-Application. He submitted that:

On 24 April 2025, the Respondent requested a change in the timetable made on 5th March 2025. As to date, the Respondent provided no response to the Registry request for additional information made via email on 28 April 2025

These circumstances caused prejudice to the Applicant by depriving him from the adequate time and opportunity to adhere with order 3 made on 5th March 2025, which required the Applicant to lodge with the Tribunal, and give to the Respondent by 14 May 2025 the numerous witness statements, expert reports, colour photographs, invoices, quotations, chronology, index of the documents, contracts and expert reports including Scott Schedules.

Allowing a joint hearing on 29 May 2025 would unfairly prejudice the Applicant's substantial application. The Applicant has a fundamental right to an efficient hearing and determination of the substantial application without undue delay which is consistent with the notion of interests of "the just, quick, and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings." stated in the NCAT Act 2013.

The Applicant is forced to a joint hearing of 2 proceedings on 29 May 2025 that would deny the Applicant procedural fairness and a proper opportunity to prepare a defense [sic] to the cross-claim.

Against this background, the Applicant seeking the interim relief and respectfully request the Tribunal to list hearing of interim application as soon as practically possible and before 29 May 2025.

On 7 May 2025, the Tribunal issued the following orders and reasons:

1 All interlocutory issues regarding the proceedings numbered 2025/36988 and 2025/126110 which have the same parties and are in relation to the same strata plan, should are to be raised at the directions hearing on 29 May 2025.

Each party ought provide an outline of issues to the Registry and copied to the other party, to be raised at the directions hearing by 4.00PM on 26 May 2025.

Reasons for decision:

The applicant has filed a submission dated 28 April 2025 seeking orders to dismiss the respondent's cross application 2025/126110 pursuant to s 55(1)(b) and (d) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act NSW 2013 and an order for the respondent to pay the applicant's costs in relation to the cross application proceedings. The respondent when filing its cross application on 31 March 2025 sought to have both matters heard together with evidence in one proceedings being evidence in the other.

Neither party has filed a Miscellaneous Application form setting out the interlocutory orders sought. Both matters are listed at 2.15PM on 29 May 2025 at which time these issues may be raised and the presiding member may make directions regarding the disputed issues or may determine the issues at the hearing. It will be a matter for the presiding member to determine what is appropriate in the time allowed. Currently, no direction has been made for the proceedings to be joined, they are merely listed together for directions on 29 May 2025, as it is the first directions hearing for the cross application.

The parties are reminded that it is appropriate for them to confer before the next directions hearing to ascertain what issues may be resolved by agreement, as well as attempt to agree a set of directions.

On 29 May 2025, the directions hearing took place, following which the Tribunal issued the following relevant directions in both proceedings:

2 JOINT DIRECTIONS IN PROCEEDINGS no. 2025/001261109 and no. 2025/00036988.

1. Proceeding no. 2025/00126110 and proceeding no. 2025/00036988 are to be heard together and evidence in one will be taken to be evidence in the other.

2. Application for order to dismiss proceeding no. 2025/00126110 filed by Mr Troyanovsky on 28 April 2025 is dismissed.

3. Strata and community schemes interim application filed by Mr Troyanovksy on 5 May 2025 seeking to stay proceeding no. 2025/00126110 is dismissed.

...

9. The leave granted by the Tribunal on 7 April 2025 for all parties to be legally represented in proceeding 2025/00036988 is extended to proceeding no. 2025/00126110.

3 The Tribunal makes the following further procedural directions and orders:

(i) The applicant's "points of claim" must set out the orders sought including the material facts, legal basis and statutory provisions under the Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW) on which the applicant relies.

No were written reasons were provided for those orders.
On 4 June 2025, the appellant filed a notice of motion to have both proceedings transferred to the Local Court of NSW (Local Court). On 6 June 2025, the Tribunal issued directions for the filing of documents, and advised the parties that a decision on the transfer would be made "on the papers".
On 4 June 2025, the appellant filed an application seeking a temporary stay of both proceedings pending the outcome of his application to transfer both proceedings to the Local Court.
On 15 July 2025, the Tribunal dismissed the appellant's application to have the two proceedings transferred to the Local Court, giving written reasons for doing so. In addition, the Tribunal ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the respondent of and incidental to the transfer application. Again, the Tribunal gave written reasons for doing so.
We note that while the appellant has appealed in respect of the costs decision, he has not appealed the decision to refuse the transfer application.

Orders (1) to (5) of the Tribunal under appeal were made on 29 May 2025. As the appeal was filed 22 July 2025, the appeal was not filed within the 28 days required by operation of r 25(4)(c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW) (NCAT Rules).
Accordingly, in so far as the appellant wishes to appeal Orders (1) to (5), he requires an extension of time to file his Notice of Appeal Pursuant to s 41 of the NCAT Act. In Jackson v Land and Housing Corporation [2014] NSWCATAP 22, the Appeal Panel at [22] stated that the relevant considerations on exercise of discretion to grant an extension of time under s 41 of the NCAT Act were:

(1) the discretion can only be exercised in favour of an applicant upon proof that strict compliance with the rules will work an injustice upon the appellant: Gallo v Dawson [1990] HCA 30, 93 ALR 479 at [2], Nanschild v Pratt [2011] NSWCA 85 at [38];

(2) the discretion is to be exercised in the light of the fact that the respondent (to the appeal) has already obtained a decision in its favour and, once the period for appeal has expired, can be thought of as having a "vested right" to retain the benefit of that decision: Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516 at [4], Nans_c_hild v Pratt [2011] NSWCA 85 at [39]. In particular, where the right of appeal has gone (because of the expiration of the appeal period) the time for appealing should not be extended unless the proposed appeal has some prospects of success; Jackamarra at [7];

(3) balancing whether strict compliance would work an injustice on the claimant with the opponent's vested right to retain the position or decision after expiry of a relevant time period;

(4) generally, in an application for an extension of time to appeal the Appeal Panel will be required to consider:

(a) the length of the delay;

(b) the reason for the delay;

(c) the claimant's prospects of success, that is, whether there was a fairly arguable case, and

(d) the extent of any prejudice suffered by the opponent.

If the explanation for delay is less than satisfactory or if the opponent is substantially prejudiced, it may be appropriate to investigate if the party seeking the extension can show greater merit than a fairly arguable case: Jackson at [22](4).
As one of the elements of determining whether or not to extend time is the applicant's prospects of success, we will return to this issue after considering the merits of the appeal.

We turn now to consider the preliminary point of whether the appellant should be allowed to rely on what he describes as "significant fresh evidence". The appellant submitted that this evidence "goes directly to the jurisdictional, procedural, public-interest issues raised in the appeal".
This evidence, which forms part of the appellant's affidavit of 28 August 2025, comprised the following:

(1) an email from Randwick Council to the appellant dated 11 September 2025;

(2) a letter from the respondent's solicitor to the appellant dated 1 August 2025. The appellant describes this letter as a "Letter of Demand";

(3) what is described as "Affidavit of the Property Management Agent (PMA) of 28 August 2025". This appears to be a reference to the appellant's own affidavit of that date.

The appellant also submits, both in relation to the Council email and the other two documents sought to be relied on, that together, these documents meet the admissibility criteria for fresh evidence under cl 12(1)(c) of Sch 4 of the NCAT Act, and collectively establish that the 29 May and15 July 2025 decisions of the Tribunal were infected by error, unfairness, misuse of process; and

(1) confirm the jurisdictional error;

(2) expose misuse of Tribunal process and coercive costs practices (letter of demand); and

(3) provide direct evidentiary support for the appellant's claims of unauthorised legal representation and procedural non-compliance (affidavit).

In brief submissions in response, the respondent submits that the appellant should not be allowed to rely on his affidavit at all, because it "does not contain new evidence that was not reasonably available at the time that Orders (1) to (5) and Order (6) were made.
We reject the submissions that the appellant should not be able to rely on his affidavit at all. As is often the case with affidavits prepared by non-legally trained persons, the affidavit includes what are clearly submissions. In this case, in addition to submissions, the appellant includes the procedural history of the two proceedings. We see no reason why the appellant should not be allowed to rely on that material.
However, the "significant, fresh evidence" stands in a different category.

By way of clarification, Council received the fire certificate and does not concern about the fire safety in your unit. Rather, it concerns alleged unauthorised building works at the premises. In line with Council's statutory obligations under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. Council is required to investigate such complaints to determine whether building or planning controls have been contravened.

Although the current matter is not a fire safety complaint, I note that you have raised issues regarding the maintenance of essential fire safety measures within the building. To ensure these concerns are appropriately considered, I will be referring your correspondence to Council's Fire Safety Team for review and any further investigation that may be warranted under the Environmental Planning and Assessment (Development Certification and Fire Safety) Regulation 2021.

The focus of Council's investigation is not on the complainant but on whether there are breaches of legislation or risks to public safety.

The appellant submits that this email constitutes "new and objective regulatory evidence" unavailable at the time of the 29 May 2025 hearing, arising only after Council commenced investigation under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (EP&AA) and the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) (LGA). The appellant submits that this corroborates his ground of appeal that NCAT has no jurisdiction over issues of "fire-safety" and "building regulations" and establishes that the reasoning for permitting the Cross-Application was fundamentally flawed.

This is a letter from the respondent's solicitor to the appellant dated 1 August 2025. A copy is attached as Annexure V to the appellant's affidavit of 28 August 2025.
Apart from the fact that the letter is headed "without prejudice save as to costs", the letter is clearly an attempt by the respondent to reach an agreement on the amount of costs to be paid to it by virtue of Order (6).

The appellant says that this affidavit provides evidence of attendance at general meetings of the respondent and strata committee meetings on 28 April 2025, and refers to his documents filed on 3 September stating that annexures M1 and M2 of his affidavit of 28 August 2025 confirm that:

(1) there was no general meeting resolution approving the Coss- Application "and legal expenses exist", contrary to s 103 of the SSMA;

(2) the respondent repeatedly refused to disclose "costs & retainer" in breach of s 105 of the SSMA;

(3) the respondent failed to comply with the Tribunal's directions of 5 March 2025 and 29 May 2025.

The appellant's application to rely on these materials on appeal must be refused. This is for the following reasons.
First, while the email may be relevant to the substantive issues between the parties, and thus relevant at the final hearings of the applications (which are yet to be heard), we fail to see how that document has any relevance to the Tribunal's determination of what, on the whole, were matters of practice and procedure.
Secondly, we accept that the "letter of demand" (a characterisation which we do not agree with) has some relevance to the calculation of the transfer application, it has no relevance to the Tribunal's order that costs be awarded, and would have been inadmissible on such an application.
Thirdly, as to the minutes of 28 April 2025, no reason was advanced as to why that material was not reasonably available to the appellant at the time the Orders were determined. As the Appeal Panel stated recently in Ace Homes & Construction Pty Ltd v Su [2025] NSWCATAP 283:

19. ... The usual rule is that the evidence before the Appeal Panel will be limited to the evidence before the Tribunal at first instance. There is an exception to that rule, namely for evidence that was not reasonably available at the time of the Tribunal hearing: Al-Daouk v Mr Pine Pty Ltd t/as Furnco Bankstown [2015] NSWCATAP 111 (Al-Daouk) at [14].

20 In Al-Daouk, the Appeal Panel found that while Mrs Al-Daouk had taken a number of steps to obtain evidence of the type she sought to rely on at the appeal, the issue was whether, objectively, the evidence had arisen since the hearing and was therefore was "not reasonably available" at the time of the hearing.

We reject the appellant's rather exaggerated assertions in par [50] in their entirety as being misconceived.
In conclusion, the application of the appellant to rely on these three documents is dismissed.

Overarching this appeal are what the appellant describes as his "core grounds of appeal".
We note that, while it is the obligation of the Tribunal to set out relevant findings necessary to determine the matter, it is not necessary to make findings on every argument and every submission, particularly where the arguments advanced are numerous and of varying significance, and may not be supported by evidence, and I have not done so: see CEU v University of Technology Sydney [2018] NSWCATAD 13 at [79]; Bajic v Paraskevopoulos [2018] NSWCATAP 192 at [55].
That said, the first "core ground of appeal" is that the appeal raises four issues of public importance, namely:

(1) that the jurisdictional boundaries of the Tribunal overlap with "Statutory Regulations", being the LGA and the EP&AA;

(2) procedural fairness and public confidence in the Tribunal's decision making;

(3) legal representation without authority;

(4) protection against retaliatory and collateral proceedings.

The second "core ground of appeal" is that there was jurisdiction error by the Tribunal.
The third core ground of appeal is that the appellant was denied procedural fairness, in that the respondent did not comply with the timetable ordered for the filing of documents and that the Tribunal failed to enforce its own directions and to dismiss the Cross-Application. The appellant submits that, despite these defaults, the Tribunal dismissed his applications the subject of Orders (2) and (3).
The appellant says that this "unequal treatment" deprived him of a fair hearing and rewarded the respondent's non-compliance, thus breaching s 36(1)(a) of the NCAT Act and the rule in Re Minister for Immigration; ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1.
The fourth core ground of appeal is titled "Error Law". There are a number of components to this submission.
The first component is that there was a "Misapplication of Jurisdiction", namely that:

(1) the Tribunal's "stated reason for allowing the cross-claim - that it concerns fire-safety - demonstrates a misapplication of the legislative framework;

(2) the Tribunal exercised a discretion it did not possess and thereby exceeded its statutory authority.

The second component to the Error of Law ground is that there was an inconsistency between the 4 March 2025 and 29 May 2025 Decisions. Here the appellant submits that at a directions hearing on 5 March hearing, the Tribunal stated that a cross-claim could not be filed under the NCAT Act, yet on 29 May 2025, the same Member constituting the Tribunal permitted the cross-claim, citing unsupported alleged "fire compliance" issues.
The appellant claims that this was a "manifest" error of law and a denial of procedural fairness: Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378.
The third component to the Error of Law ground relates to the legal authority of the respondent's solicitor; and the Tribunal's failure to consider the fire expert's evidence and making a decision to allow the Cross-Application based on an unsupported statement of the respondent's solicitor.
The fourth "core ground of appeal" is that the Cross-Application was retaliatory and that the Tribunal failed to protect the appellant. The appellant submits:

(1) As the respondent admitted in the Cross-Application that it was filed "in response to" the appellant's substantive application 2025/00036988, this makes a retaliatory and oppressive cross-claim void for want of authority". The appellant submits therefore that the Cross-Application should have been dismissed under s 55(1)(b) of the NCAT Act as misconceived and vexatious. The appellant submits that in McElwanie v Owners - SP75975 [2017] NSWCA 2 it was held that retaliatory strata litigation justifies dismissal;

(2) in accordance with the principle in Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378, the proceedings are oppressive and ought to be dismissed;

(3) dismissal of the appellant's interim "application for protection order" on 29 May 2025 was without consideration and reasoning and at the same time as allowing the unauthorised and retaliatory cross-claim to proceed constituted a substantial miscarriage of justice where the Tribunal adopted procedure departs so far from the rules of natural justice that confidence in the result cannot stand: Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing [2015] HCA 28; (2015) 256 CLR 507;

(4) the Tribunal's failure to protect the appellant from retaliatory litigation breached its statutory duty to ensure the "just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues": NCAT Act, s 3(d)).

The fifth and final "core ground of appeal" is that there has been a miscarriage of justice. The appellant submits that all six Orders under appeal were made contrary to procedural fairness, and inconsistent with the statutory purpose of protecting lot owners and ensuring accountable strata management. The appellant submits that the combined effect of the Tribunal's assumption of non-existent jurisdiction, the Tribunal's disregard of mandatory procedural safeguards; and its acceptance of a baseless factual premise (disproved by the Council email) constitutes a substantial miscarriage of justice within cl 12(1)(a) to (c) of Sch 4 of the NCAT Act as the decisions were not fair and equitable, were against the weight of evidence, and relied on demonstrably false material.
The Outline of Submissions concludes with the submission that, given all these errors, Order (6) also fails, being consequential on the invalid orders of 29 May 2025: Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1996] HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51 at [98].
We turn now to the substance of the appeal.

Order (1) was the order that proceedings 2025/00126110 and proceedings 2025/00036988 be heard together with evidence in one being evidence in the other.
This is an interlocutory decision (as that term is defined in s 4 of the NCAT Act), of the Tribunal relating to a matter of practice and procedure. Where a party appeals an interlocutory order, leave to appeal is required: NCAT Act, s 80(2)(a).
Applications for leave to appeal relating to a matter of practice and procedure must be approached with restraint: Newton v Ellis [2012] NSWCA 106 at [17]; Champion Homes Pty Ltd v Guirgis [2018] NSWCATAP 54 at [35](7).
Leave should not be granted unless a substantial injustice would result and the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by the appeal body. What is sufficient is dependent on the particular case: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-9; Collins v Urban at [84](1) and (2)(b) and (c).
We see no reason why the making of Order (1) disadvantages the appellant in any way. In two strata disputes involving the same parties where the lot owner seeks various orders against the respondent owners corporation, and the respondent in the Cross-Application seeks orders against the appellant, it is clearly consistent with the guiding principle in s 36 of the NCAT Act (namely the facilitation of the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings) that the matters be heard together with evidence in one being evidence in the other.
We consider that this is a frivolous appeal ground lacking any substance.
Our preliminary view is that leave to appeal should be refused in respect of Order 1.

Order (2) was the dismissal of the appellant's application for summary dismissal of proceedings 2025/001261.
There is an initial issue which we raised at the appeal hearing as to whether this was an interlocutory decision (for which leave to appeal was required) or a final decision (for which leave was not required).
As the Appeal Panel observed in Davis v Minister for Health [2022] NSWCATAP 115 at [37]:

In AQO v Minister for Finance and Services (2016) 93 NSWLR 46; [2016] NSWCA 248 at [127]- [128], Basten JA observed that the definitions of ancillary and interlocutory decisions in the NCAT Act, were "potentially confusing". His Honour concluded at [127] that the refusal of a summary dismissal application, even if based on lack of jurisdiction, is "almost certainly an interlocutory decision". (See also Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force v Holmes [2021] NSWCATAP 202 at [23]- [26].) This is an interlocutory decision (as that term is defined in s 4 of the NCAT Act), of the Tribunal relating to a matter of practice and procedure. Where a party appeals an interlocutory order, leave to appeal is required: NCAT Act, s 80(2)(a).

(emphasis added)

As the Appeal Panel noted in YJC v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2025] NSWCATAP 224 at 156, in the recent decision of Houda v Seraphim [2025] NSWCATAP 135 at [31]- [35], the Appeal Panel summarised the principles which govern the exercise of the discretion to grant leave to appeal an interlocutory decision. These principles include:

(1) leave to appeal should only be granted when there are substantial reasons to warrant leave being granted. These reasons include the presence of an error of principle in the decision under appeal, resulting in substantial injustice;

(2) it is only if the decision is affected by sufficient doubt, to warrant its reconsideration on appeal, that leave will be granted; and

(3) usually, it is only appropriate to grant leave where there is an issue of principle, a question of public importance or an injustice which is reasonably clear, and beyond what is merely arguable for leave to be granted.

Again, we do not have the benefit of the Tribunal's reasons making this order. Therefore, we detect no error of principle by the Tribunal, nor is it possible to assess whether the decision to make the order is attended with sufficient doubt, to warrant its reconsideration on appeal.
Our preliminary view is that we would not grant leave to appeal in respect of Order (2).

Order (3) is that that the appellant's interim application filed on 5 May 2025 seeking to stay proceedings 2025/00126110 be dismissed.
We repeat our observations in respect of Order (2). For the same reasons, our preliminary view is that we would not grant leave to appeal in respect of Order (3).

Order (4) is the extending of the leave granted by the Tribunal on 7 April 2025 for all parties to be legally represented in proceedings 2025/00036988 to proceedings 2025/00126110.
Again, we do not have the benefit of the Tribunal's reasons for making this order. Therefore, we detect no error. In any event, it is axiomatic that if the parties are granted leave to be represented in one set of proceedings, they should be granted leave to be represented in another set of proceedings.
We repeat our observations in relation to Order (1).
We consider that this is a frivolous appeal ground lacking any substance.
Our preliminary view is that leave to appeal should be refused in respect of Order 4.

Order (5) was that the appellant's points of claim set out the material facts, the legal basis and the statutory provisions under the SSMA.
As noted, on 5 March 2025, the Tribunal directed the appellant to lodge with the Tribunal, and to give to the respondent points of claim by 2 April 2025. The Tribunal explained in its directions that points of claim are "a brief summary of the claim, stating in point form the order [sic] that are sought and the reasons for seeking each of those orders".
Then on 29 May 2025, the Tribunal made a direction that:

The applicant's "points of claim" must set out the orders sought including the material facts, legal basis and statutory provisions under the Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW) on which the applicant relies.

The appellant appears to be saying that this direction "imposed new requirements to his [points of claim]" and is inconsistent with the 5 March 2025 direction.
We disagree. The two directions were consistent, with the 29 May 2025 direction focusing the appellant's attention on the SSMA.
Again, we do not have the benefit of the Tribunal's reasons for making this order. Therefore, we detect no error.
We consider that this is a frivolous appeal ground lacking any substance.
Our preliminary view is that leave to appeal should be refused in relation to Order 5.

Order (6) was the order of the Tribunal in both proceedings 2025/00036988 and 2025/00126110 of 15 July 2025 ordering the appellant to pay the costs of the respondent of and incidental to the appellant's application to transfer application 2025/00036988 to the Local Court.
We note that the appellant has not sought to appeal the order refusing the transfer application.
Order (6) stands in a different category to Orders (1) to (5) for three reasons.
The first reason is that the appeal in respect of this Order was filed within the time required by the NCAT Rules.
The second reason is that this Order was not an interlocutory decision. That means that the appeal may be brought as of right on a question of law, or otherwise with a grant of leave. Section 80 of the NCAT Act sets out the basis upon which appeals from decisions of the Tribunal may be brought. That section states that an appeal may be made as of right on any question of law or with leave of the Appeal Panel on any other grounds (s 80(2)(b)).
What is a question of law has been considered by the Appeal Panel, notably in Prendergast v Western Murray Irrigation Ltd [2014] NSWCATAP 69 and more recently in Unique Commercial Group Pty Ltd v Cusumano [2024] NSWCATAP 204. In circumstances where the appellant is not legally represented, it is appropriate for the Appeal Panel to approach the issue by looking at the grounds of appeal generally, and to determine for itself whether a question of law has in fact been raised, subject to any procedural fairness considerations that might arise to the respondent (Prendergast at [12]). See the various authorities on this issue referred to in Unique at [28].
As the Appeal Panel noted recently in Hawkins v Nassif [2025] NSWCATAP 300 at [45]:

Where a party is a self-represented non-legally trained appellant, the grounds of appeal may be considered generally by the Appeal Panel (subject to procedural fairness considerations) to determine whether a question of law has been raised: Simjanovska v Dogan [2023] NSWCATAP 69 at [78]; Prendergast at [12].

In a general way, the appellant has said that he was denied procedural fairness when the Tribunal made all of the orders under review, including Order (6). We will return to this point below in relation to Grounds (1) to (5).
A claim of a denial of procedural fairness raises a question of law.
The third reason is that written reasons for the decision were provided by the Tribunal.
The Tribunal stated, in relation to costs:

10. The Owners Corporation has sought its costs of this application under section 60(3)(c) or (e). of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013. The applicant states at [55] of the Reply submissions that the Owners Corporation's costs are without merit. In The Owners - Strata Plan No. 97383 v CLSM Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCATCD 59 at [27] it was stated:

I find that 'untenable' in the context of s 60(3)(c) of the CAT Act means preferably, a substantial disparity between the strength of one claim and the weakness of its competitor. The issue then is whether in considering the Strata Manager's position in response to the OC' case, there was a substantial disparity between strength of the OC's case and the weakness of the Strata Manager's case.'

11 In this transfer application I find that there was a substantial disparity between the strength of the Owners Corporations position and the weakness of the applicant's position. The hallmark of the disparity in strength between the parties' positions lay in the fact that the applicant's case was essentially hopeless because the SSMA specifically conferred jurisdiction on the Tribunal to provide the relief sought by the parties when similar jurisdiction was not conferred on the Local Court and the Local Court had no other source of jurisdiction to make the orders sought by the parties.

We see no error on any question of law, and would dismiss that ground of appeal.
As to whether leave to appeal should be granted, we are not satisfied that this issue involves an issue of principle, a question of public importance, an injustice which is reasonably clear or that the Tribunal has gone about its fact finding process in such an unorthodox manner that it is likely to have produced an unfair result.
In these circumstances, our preliminary view is not to grant the appellant leave to appeal in respect of Order (6).

We have expressed our conclusions above as preliminary ones. We return now to the appellant's core grounds of appeal, some of which overarch the submissions made by the appellant in relation to the individual Orders.
We will briefly consider the core grounds to determine whether we should reconsider our preliminary conclusions in relation to each of Orders appealed from.
We will then consider some additional submissions made by the appellant in respect of the Tribunal's decision making processes, namely that the Tribunal was biased.

The appellant's first core ground of appeal was that he had raised issues of public importance. This had four components.

We see nothing of substance in the first component, namely that the jurisdictional boundaries of the Tribunal under the SSMA overlapped with statutory provisions of the LGA and the EP&AA. But even if they were, the proper place to agitate such matters is at the final hearing of the proceedings, not in a directions hearing considering matters of practice and procedure and case management.
We see nothing in this submission warranting us changing our preliminary view in relation to any of the Orders.

The Tribunal dismissing the applicant's applications without consideration, and overlooking procedural non-compliance of the respondent

The second component was that the Tribunal dismissed the applicant's applications without consideration, and overlooked procedural non-compliance of the respondent.
As to the Tribunal dismissing the applicant's applications without consideration, no reasons were given by the Tribunal for any of Orders (1) to (5). We note that neither party has claimed that the Tribunal gave oral reasons at the hearing on 29 May 2025.
So even if the appellant had provided a transcript of that hearing, which he did not, it probably would not have assisted.
It was open to the appellant to ask the Tribunal to provide written reasons for its orders of 29 May 2025 pursuant to s 62 of the NCAT Act. Section 62 provides that

62 Tribunal to give notice of decision and provide written reasons on request

(1) The Tribunal (including when constituted as an Appeal Panel) is to ensure that each party to proceedings is given notice of any decision that it makes in the proceedings.

(2) Any party may, within 28 days of being given notice of a decision of the Tribunal, request the Tribunal to provide a written statement of reasons for its decision if a written statement of reasons has not already been provided to the party. The statement must be provided within 28 days after the request is made.

However, we note that s 62(2A) provides for exceptions to that rule. This includes "minor procedural decisions that do not have a final or determinative impact on the rights of a party": NCAT Act s 62(2A)(f). We would have thought that a matter to hear two hearings involving the same parties at the same time might fit that description. However, we are not are aware of any considered analysis of s 62(2A)(f) either by the Tribunal or the Appeal Panel. So it may be that the appellant was not entitled to reasons for Orders (1) to (5) in any event. Nevertheless, as things stand, the appellant did not take advantage of the opportunity he had, to ask for written reasons for the making of Orders (1) to (5).
As to the contention of the Tribunal overlooking procedural non-compliance of the respondent, without a transcript, we are not aware whether this issue was even raised by the appellant at the Tribunal hearing.
As the Appeal Panel stated recently in Jiang v Earlcore Pty Ltd [2025] NSWCATAP 292 at [50]:

As this issue was not raised in the proceedings under appeal, it cannot be raised on appeal, As the Appeal Panel stated in Bartel v Ryan [2018] NSWCATAP 231 at [25], the High Court of Australia said in Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33 at [9] that it is elementary that a party is bound by the conduct of their case. Except in the most exceptional circumstances, it would be contrary to all principle to allow a party, after a case had been decided against them, to raise a new argument which, whether deliberately or by inadvertence, the party failed to put during the hearing when they had an opportunity to do so: Palm Homes Pty Ltd v Kav's Constructions Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCATAP 113 at [27].

Secondly, as the Appeal Panel stated in Divola v Natural Solar Power Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCATAP 379:

33 An appeal to the Appeal Panel does not provide a losing party in the Tribunal below with the opportunity to run their case again: Ryan v BKB Motor Vehicle Repairs Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCATAP 39 at [10]. And, as the Appeal Panel stated in Temple v AMR Motors Pty Limited [2017] NSWCATAP 221:

38. ... Any decision to grant leave to appeal must be undertaken in a legally principled manner and not simply because, if we were hearing the matter anew on the evidence led before the Member, we might reach a different conclusion when considering that evidence (although in the present case that would not be so).

39. It is fundamental that an appeal on a question of fact does not provide and is not intended to provide an opportunity for an applicant dissatisfied by the result of a hearing at first instance to re-run the same case before an Appeal Panel. Yet, that is, in effect, what the present Appellants seek to do by identifying what they contend are contestable findings of fact by the Member.

34 To put the matter another way, as indicated in the Tribunal's Guideline 1, Internal Appeals (which can be found on the Tribunal's website):

... an appeal is not an opportunity to have a second go at a hearing.

We see nothing in this submission warranting us changing our preliminary view in relation to any of the Orders.

Again, we note that there was no transcript before us, so we do not know whether this matter was raised before the Tribunal.
But, as the Appeal Panel observed in Alta Vale Residential Pty Ltd v The Owners - Strata Plan No. 95693 [2024] NSWCATAP 212, in 2 Elizabeth Bay Road Pty Ltd v The Owners Strata Plan No 73943 [2014] NSWCA 409, the NSW Court of Appeal held at [55] that "the initiation of the legal proceedings without the required authorisation did not render them null or void or otherwise requiring dismissal": per Basten JA at [6]; Barrett JA at [47] and Leeming JA at [89]-[105].
This decision concerned s 80D of the now repealed Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 (NSW), which provided:

(1) An owners corporation or executive committee of an owners corporation must not seek legal advice or the provision of any other legal services, or initiate legal action, for which any payment may be required unless a resolution is passed at a general meeting of the owners corporation approving the seeking of the advice or services or the taking of that action.

(2) The regulations may make provision for or with respect to exempting any type of legal service or legal action from the operation of this section.

Section 103(1) of the SSMA provides:

(1) An owners corporation or a strata committee of an owners corporation must not obtain legal services requiring payment unless a resolution passed at a general meeting of the owners corporation approves the obtaining of the services -

(a) with unlimited costs for the services, or

(b) up to a maximum amount of costs for the services.

Section 80D(1) is sufficiently equivalent to section of the SSMA, namely s 103(1), such that 2 Elizabeth Bay Road Pty Ltd is of guidance to us. In that decision, Leeming JA, with whom Basten JA agreed, explained:

106 The key to the resolution of this appeal is that the prohibition in s 80D is directed to commencing proceedings in a court or tribunal where a body of procedural law applies, whose ordinary operation deals with non-compliances with mandatory requirements. In that context, non-compliance with a mandatory requirement is to be read as engaging familiar procedures relating to stays and summary dismissal within that body of procedural rules, rather than absolute notions of nullity, invalidity, incapacity or mandatory dismissal. Much clearer language than appears in s 80D would be required in order to sustain a construction whereby those procedural rules were displaced by a limitation on jurisdiction or capacity or a qualification on the right to sue.

107 In the exercise of the court's or tribunal's discretion under those procedural rules, the matters that will loom large are (a) whether the breach has been cured, (b) if it has not been cured, will it be cured reasonably promptly, and (c) was the breach inadvertent (because, say, of an irregularity in the approval process) or deliberate. For example, if approval was purportedly given before proceedings had been commenced, but a defect was noticed shortly afterwards, and rectified immediately by a further approving resolution shortly after proceedings had been commenced, then it is difficult to see how a court could properly form the view that the proceedings ought to be stayed or dismissed for a transient non-compliance on which nothing turned.

108 Conversely, it is difficult to see how a court could do other than stay or dismiss proceedings commenced by an owners corporation which was fully aware of the provision, made no effort to comply with it, and had no intention to seek approval at a general meeting. As ever, the extreme cases are straightforward; the intermediate cases may be highly contestable.

We see nothing in this submission warranting us changing our preliminary view in relation to any of the Orders.

Protection Against Retaliatory & Collateral Proceedings

Here the appellant submits that the Cross-Application was filed ''for collateral purposes to frustrate" his action to change the strata manager. He submits that the Tribunal's refusal to restrain the retaliatory conduct is contrary to s 36 of the NCAT Act and established law against abuses of process, citing Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378.
Again, we note that there was no transcript before us, so we do not know whether this matter was raised before the Tribunal.
We see nothing in this submission warranting us changing our preliminary view in relation to any of the Orders.
Even we considered all of the components of the appellant's first core ground of appeal cumulatively, we see no reason to change our preliminary views in relation to any of the Orders.

The second core ground of appeal relates to jurisdictional error and the law of estoppel.
The appellant submits:

9.2. The Appellant sought transfer to the Local Court to avoid multiplicity of actions in reliance on this letter. The Respondent is therefore estopped from raising the identical matters in the NCAT by way of the cross-claim. As held in Cachia v Isaacs (1985) 3 NSWLR 386 - Estoppel prevents re-litigation where conduct amounts to abuse.

9.3 The Respondent did not raise any " fire safety "concerns (in Appellant's unit) prior NCAT proceedings, at the 5 March 2025 hearing nor in the cross-claim. The sound recording of 29 May 2025 hearing provide evidence that the Tribunal permitted a cross-claim only the basis that it concerns "fire-safety" following unsupported allegation raised by the Respondent's solicitor. Under Estoppel, the Appellant entitled to prevent the Respondent's duplicative litigation and ensures finality.

9.4 The Appellant suffers significant injustice from a repetitive and retaliatory proceedings initiated by the Respondent, conduct contrary to public interest. As it held in Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 45; (1981) 147 CLR 589 (Anshun estoppel), a party is barred from raising later a claim that " should have been raised earlier". Anshun estoppel is reinforced in Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing (2015)256 CLR 507 " failure to raise issues earlier can itself constitute abuse of process".

9.5. The NCAT expressly stated it permitted the cross-claim because it "concerns fire-safety allegations" despite this issues falls exclusively under LGA and EP&AA excluded from the NCAT jurisdiction under CATA Sch 4 Pt 3 cl 3.

There is a further submission which we have not set out. That is because it is based on the Council email of 11 September 2025, which we have refused to allow the appellant to rely on in the appeal.
We find these submissions to be confused, and confusing. Again, we have no transcript to support the submission that "the Tribunal permitted a cross-claim only the basis that it concerns "fire-safety" following unsupported allegation raised by the Respondent's solicitor".
We see nothing in this submission warranting us changing our preliminary view in relation to any of the Orders.

The appellant's brief submissions on this third core ground of appeal are summarised at [69] and [70] above.
We see nothing in these submissions warranting us changing our preliminary view in relation to any of the Orders.

The appellant's submissions on this fourth core ground of appeal are summarised at [72] to [76] above.
They concern four components.
The first component is a "misapplication of jurisdiction", and the submission that the Tribunal stated at a directions hearing on 5 March 2025 that a cross-claim could not be filed under the NCAT Act, yet on 29 May 2205 "permitted" the cross-claim "as recorded in the official sound recording".
This component lacks substance, if for no other reason that we do not have a transcript of the sound recording of either hearing.
The second component relates to the alleged lack of legal authority of the respondent's solicitors to act for the respondent. We have dealt with that issue above.
The third component relates to the Tribunal's alleged failure to consider the fire expert's evidence, and gave more weight to unsworn evidence of the respondent's solicitor. Without a transcript, we have no way of assessing this submission.
The fourth "core ground of appeal" is that the Cross-Application was retaliatory and that the Tribunal failed to protect the appellant. We deal with that point below.
Suffice it to say that, even when considered cumulatively, we see nothing in these submissions warranting us changing our preliminary view in relation to any of the Orders.

Retaliatory and Collateral conduct and Failure to Protect Appellant

The fifth "core ground of appeal" is that the Cross-Application was retaliatory and that the Tribunal failed to protect the appellant. The appellant submits:

(1) as the respondent admitted in the Cross-Application that it was filed "in response to" the appellant's substantive application 2025/00036988, this makes a retaliatory and oppressive cross-claim void for want of authority". The appellant submits therefore that the Cross-Application should have been dismissed under s 55(1)(b) of the NCAT Act as misconceived and vexatious. The appellant submits that in McElwanie v Owners - SP75975 [2017] NSWCA 2 it was held that retaliatory strata litigation justifies dismissal;

(2) in accordance with the principle in Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378, oppressive proceedings ought to be dismissed;

(3) dismissal of the appellant's interim "application for protection order" on 29 May 2025 was without consideration and reasoning and at the same time as allowing the unauthorised and retaliatory cross-claim to proceed constituted a substantial miscarriage of justice where the Tribunal adopted procedure departs so far from the rules of natural justice that confidence in the result cannot stand: Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 28; (2015) 256 CLR 507;

(4) the Tribunal's failure to protect the appellant from retaliatory litigation breached its statutory duty to ensure the "just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues": NCAT Act, s 3(d)).

As to the appellant's reliance on McElwanie v Owners - SP75975, no case with that name or citation appears on NSW Caselaw, and we were provided with no copy by the appellant. Nor does a case with that name and citation appear through a search we conducted on Jade.
As to the appellant's reliance on Walton v Gardiner that decision stands in rather stark contrast to the Orders under appeal. There, the High Court heard three appeals together. They arise out of what the Court described as "the tragic, and now notorious", occurrences at a Sydney psychiatric hospital known as the Chelmsford Private Hospital and give rise to common questions. Each appeal was from the judgment of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Gill v Walton (1991) 25 NSWLR 190. (Gleeson CJ and Kirby P; Mahoney JA dissenting) staying disciplinary proceedings, against the respondents, in the Medical Tribunal of NSW.
The plurality (Mason CJ, Deane J and Dawson JJ) concluded that:

30. It follows from what has been said above that the Department has failed to identify any error of principle or fact affecting the Court of Appeal's decision that the current proceedings in the Tribunal should be permanently stayed. As has been said, that decision was the result of a weighing process involving a subjective balancing of the various factors and considerations supporting or militating against a conclusion that a continuation of the proceedings in the Tribunal would be so unfairly and unjustifiably oppressive of the respondents as to constitute an abuse of the Tribunal's process. As the different conclusions reached by Gleeson CJ and Kirby P on the one hand and Mahoney JA on the other indicate, the comparative weight to be given to particular considerations and factors in that weighing process and the ultimate outcome of it involved a substantial element of individual judgment. In our view, the conclusion reached by the majority of the Court of Appeal was clearly open in all the circumstances of this quite exceptional case. That being so, and in the absence of identified error of law or fact, it is no part of the function of this Court to repeat that weighing process for the purpose of determining whether it would reach the same conclusion as that reached by the majority of the Court of Appeal ...

As to the appellant's reliance on Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd, that was an estoppel case. The appellant, Mr Tomlinson, challenged the holding of the Court of Appeal that he was estopped from asserting in the District Court of NSW proceeding, that Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd was not his employer. The High court unanimously allowed the appeal.
All this to say, to invoke Tomlinson for the proposition advanced by the appellant is drawing a very long "bow" indeed.
We see nothing in the fifth core ground of appeal warranting us to change our preliminary views about the challenge to Orders (1) to (6).

The sixth core ground of appeal was that there had been a miscarriage of justice. Here the appellant submitted that all six Orders under appeal were made contrary to procedural fairness, and inconsistent with the statutory purpose of protecting lot owners and ensuring accountable strata management.
This is a "rolled up" and generalised submission in which we see no substance.
We see nothing in the sixth core ground of appeal warranting us to change our preliminary views about the challenge to Orders (1) to (6).
Even when we consider the core grounds of appeal cumulatively, we see no reason to change our preliminary views about Orders (1) to (6).

There remains to consider the appellant's allegation that Senior Member Goldstein, who made Order (6), was biased. The appellant alleges that this bias was manifested by the Senior Member criticising the "excessive length" of his submissions, and as being "too long", in circumstances where no criticism was made of the 40 pages of submissions filed by the respondent. The appellant also submits that this inconsistent treatment gives rise to an apprehension of bias warranting appellate intervention.
As the Appeal Panel stated in Saurine v Coral Homes Qld Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCATAP 147:

106 The relevant principles in determining whether there is apprehended bias and how they are to be applied were explained by the High Court of Australia in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63 at [6], where the High Court stated:

"Where, in the absence of any suggestion of actual bias, a question arises as to the independence or impartiality of a judge (or other judicial officer or juror), as here, the governing principle is that, subject to qualifications relating to waiver (which is not presently relevant) or necessity (which may be relevant to the second appeal), a judge is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide. That principle gives effect to the requirement that justice should both be done and be seen to be done, a requirement which reflects the fundamental importance of the principle that a tribunal be independent and impartial.

The appellant submits that any fair-minded observer would reasonably apprehend a bias against the appellant by reason of not being represented by a solicitor.
We disagree. The submissions agitated by the appellant lack substance.
The appellant does not appear to be submitting that Senior Member Dr Goldman, who made Orders (1) to (5), was also affected by apprehended bias, although there are one or two suggestions to that effect when the appellant refers to his "unequal treatment" in the Tribunal making orders (1) to (5). For the avoidance of any doubt, if the appellant is (implicitly) making that submission, we reject it.

For the above reasons, we discern no error by the Tribunal in making any of Orders (1) to (6).

We turn now to the form of our orders.
As noted above, the appeal in relation to each of Orders (1) to (5) was not filed within the time required by the NCAT Rules.
We have set out above the relevant matters to consider when deciding whether or not to extent the time for filing an appeal. We will address each factor in turn.
The first is the length of the delay. In matters other than residential proceedings, appeals much be filed within 28 days of the decision. To file an appeal some 23 days after the 28 day requirement is a considerable period, and militates against an extension of time in which to file the appeal.
The second factor is the reason for the delay. The appellant's explanation is set out above. We think that the explanation somewhat favours an extension of time.
The third factor is the appellant's prospects of success, that is, whether there was a fairly arguable case. For the reasons set out above, we found that the appeal grounds, many of which lacked any substance and were misconceived, did not cause us to consider that there was any error attending the making of any Order. In our view, some of the appellant's submissions were not arguable, others barely so.
This factor weighs against strongly against an extension of time.
The fourth factor is the extent of any prejudice suffered by the respondent. Here the respondent submits that it would suffer prejudice because:

(1) the Cross-Application would be dismissed without the Tribunal having had an opportunity to consider the respondent's evidence in support of the Cross-Application (noting that the dismissal was sought at a directions hearing of the Tribunal prior to the Respondent having served any evidence in the matter);

(2) the proceedings before the Tribunal are complex and contain claims under multiple sections of the SSMA. The respondent would be at a disadvantage if it were allowed to have legal representation in the appellant's application but not for the Cross-Application (noting that the 29 May 2025 Orders only grant leave for legal representation in the Cross-Application).

We consider this to be a neutral factor in determining whether or not to extend the time for filing the Notice of Appeal in relation to Orders (1) to (5).
Weighing all these factors, we have decided not to extend the time for filing the Notice of Appeal in relation to Orders (1) to (5).

The appellant has been unsuccessful.
We have included in our orders a timetable for the filing of submissions (and if necessary, evidence) on costs.
We propose to deal with costs on the papers and without a hearing: Westerweller v The Owners Strata Plan No 18482 [2023] NSWCATAP 113 at [85]. Any party opposing that approach must address that issue in their submissions.
Submissions must identify the relevant costs rule, and are to be limited to five pages.

(1) The application to extend the time for filing the Notice of Appeal in respect of what we have described as orders (1) to (5) of the Tribunal of 29 May 2025 in proceedings 2025/00036988 and proceedings 2025/00126110 is refused, and the appeal otherwise dismissed.

(2) To the extent that the appellant raises a question of law in respect of to what we have described as Order (6), being Order (3) of the Tribunal made on 15 July 2025 in proceedings 2025/00036988 and proceedings 2025/00126110, the appeal is dismissed;

(3) To the extent that the appellant raises some other error in respect what we have described as Order (6), being Order (3) of the Tribunal made on 15 July 2025 in proceedings 2025/00036988 and proceedings 2025/00126110, leave to appeal is refused and the appeal is otherwise dismissed.

(4) If the respondent seeks an order for costs, it is to file submissions and if necessary evidence 14 days from the date of these orders.

(5) The appellant may respond 28 days from the date of these orders.

(6) The respondent may reply 35 days from the date of these orders.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

Administrative Tribunal Act 2013

Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014

Planning and Assessment Act 1979

Profession Uniform General Rules 2015

Schemes Management Act 1996

Schemes Management Act 2015

Stock and Business Agents Act 2002

Planning and Assessment (Development Certification and Fire Safety) Regulation 2021

Troyanovsky v The Owners – Strata Plan No 1260

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