Thompson v Lane

1. There is no Court Order for administration by respondent to continue after 2 July 2023 and the respondent does not have "rights to continue to administer the bankrupt estate", noting that there is no evidence of what "administration of her bankrupt estate is ongoing"; nor evidence of what administration has occurred since 2 July 2023. 2. The failures of Morgan Lane to act in accordance with the duties of the bankruptcy trustee is apparent basis for the Court to make Orders in reliance upon Division 45-1 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966, as identified in paragraph [30] and [32] of "the Decision"; noting there is no entitlement for the respondent to be paid in such circumstances.

1. In her additional submissions, Ms Thompson also contended:
   1. The definitions of fraud provided in Derry v Peck (1889) 14 AC 33 and Jeeves v Jeeves (No 3) [2010] FamCA 488 confirm that a serious fraud upon the Court has occurred because the Decision Thompson v Lane (trustee) (No3) [2022] FCA 128 (and all subsequent Decisions) rely upon the respondent's false "opinion" that is "directly material" to the Decision made, that has caused "a different picture to be portrayed", and has denied the Applicant natural justice and her legal rights, including since her discharge from bankruptcy on 2 July 2023.

1. As I constitute the Court as a single judge in the present interlocutory application, it is for me to determine whether I should recuse myself on the basis of the reasons provided by Ms Thompson: QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 15; (2023) 279 CLR 148 at [123]- [124] (Edelman J) and [307] (Jagot J).
2. Principles relevant to recusal applications are well established. As explained by McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ in Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; 195 ALR 225 at [30], a judge is disqualified from determining a case if the judge is biased, or a party or a member of the public might reasonably apprehend that the judge is biased.
3. Recently Hespe J reiterated relevant principles in McEwan v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (No 2) [2025] FCA 1392 at [25]- [26] as follows:

The test for apprehended bias is set out in the High Court's decision of Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [6] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), and it is sometimes referred to as the "double might" test. The criterion for apprehended bias is whether "a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide". The double "might" emphasises that the criterion is concerned with "possibility (real and not remote), not probability": QYFM at [37] (Kiefel CJ and Gageler J).

Application of the criterion requires the identification of the factor which it is said might lead a judge to resolve the question other than on its legal and factual merits; an articulation of the logical connection between that factor and the apprehended deviation from deciding that question on its merits; and an assessment of the reasonableness of that apprehension from the perspective of a fair-minded lay observer: QYFM at [38] (Kiefel CJ and Gageler J).

(emphasis added)

1. Ms Thompson identified the following as potential factors which might lead me to resolve the substantive question in this proceeding other than on its legal and factual merits:

(a) my denying the Court awareness of certain documents;

(b) my reliance on "false documents";

(c) general apprehended bias (although I note that no examples were provided);

(d) actual bias demonstrated by my alleged failure to accept that Ms Thompson was never insolvent and that Mr Lane failed to comply with specific duties; and

(e) my alleged failure to provide Ms Thompson additional time for submissions.

1. Ms Thompson has failed to, however, articulate any logical connection between any of the above factors and the apprehended deviation from deciding the substantive question on its merits. In my view there is no possibility that a fair-minded lay observer would consider that any of those factors as contended by Ms Thompson may lead me to make a decision in respect of the proceedings in any way other than on the question of its merits.
2. In respect of factors (a)-(d), Ms Thompson appears to merely point to findings in the 2024 decision with which she was less than satisfied. Ms Thompson submitted, in summary, that I should have taken into account certain documents, and/or should not have taken into account certain documents, and/or should have found that she was, at all material times, solvent. As noted by Wigney J in Edwards v Nine Network Australia Pty Limited (No 9) [2025] FCA 1042 at [19]:

Apprehended bias will not generally be established by "pointing to adverse findings" in the judgment, even where the findings involve strong adverse credit findings: Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen (2016) 332 ALR 128; [2016] NSWCA 88 at [234] (Ward JA, Basten JA and Emmett AJA agreeing). Similarly, the fact that "a judge has not accepted submissions, or has taken a view of evidence in a way that one of the litigants disagrees with or asserts is wrong in principle, is not enough to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias": Knaggs v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2007) 170 A Crim R 366; [2007] NSWCA 83 at [95]; see also SZCOS v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCA 570 at [36]; Spalla v St George Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 416 at [14]; DOQ17 v Australian Financial Security Authority (No 2) (2018) 363 ALR 681; [2018] FCA 1270 at [33]. In Hamod v State of New South Wales (No 11) [2008] NSWSC 967, Harrison J said (at [20]) that unfavourable decisions against a party "are not, and can never be, without more sufficient to support or establish the existence or manifestation of an objective apprehension of bias".

(emphasis added)

1. The Full Court in Doggett v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2019] FCAFC 19 also observed at [11]:

Claims of apprehended bias arise not infrequently, as they have in this appeal, in respect of interlocutory proceedings. The usual position in relation to interlocutory proceedings is that an apprehension of bias is not per se manifested by an unfavourable finding. That is because often there will be instances prior to a final decision where a judge will require steps to be taken or not taken which disappoint one side or another in a proceeding. It is inherent in the interlocutory process that such preliminary decisions are made. Unfavourable findings, in such circumstances, are not to be taken by a fair-minded person as an expression that the judge has other than an impartial and unprejudiced mind in relation to the substantive proceeding...

(emphasis added)

1. A recusal application is plainly not the forum to raise issues with previous decisions or previous decisions with which a litigant disagrees. Such issues do not support any finding in this case of apparent or apprehended bias.
2. In respect of factor (d), Ms Thompson submitted in her additional submissions filed on 10 October 2025 that I should recuse myself because I denied her procedural rights by not granting her extended time to prepare submissions. Ms Thompson submitted:
   1. At the Hearing on 27 August 2025, and at the Hearing on 7 October 2025, the Applicant identified that she needed additional time to properly prepare these Submissions.

...

1. That Collier J refused to provide additional time to properly prepare these Submissions;

2. is a denial of the Applicant's legal rights; noting that the Applicant's Application for Collier J to recuse herself has not yet been determined and thus there is no urgency pertaining to these Submissions being filed on 10 October 2025; and

3. contrasts with Orders made in other proceedings (to which the Applicant is a party) in which the Judges acknowledged the Applicant's legal rights are being denied because Collier J has refused to make Orders in accordance with law that would;

   1. result in the Applicant's electronic access to her apartment home being restored; and
   2. provide the Applicant with access to her personal possessions and documents she requires to access to properly prepare this Submission.

1. As I noted earlier in these reasons, Ms Thompson was given one month from the date of the first case management hearing to file submissions in respect of the recusal application. In my view, one month to prepare submissions for an interlocutory application is adequate time.
2. In addition, Ms Thompson was granted leave by me to hand up additional submissions on the day of the hearing of her interlocutory application on 7 October 2025. Further, at no point during the hearing on 7 October 2025 did Ms Thompson request further time to file her additional submissions. The additional submissions were handed up at the interlocutory hearing on 7 October 2025 for the first time. The transcript reveals as such:

MS THOMPSON: Two submissions. One identified as additional submissions and emailed today.

HER HONOUR: I'm sorry, I haven't seen that.

MS THOMPSON: I have a copy if you would - - -

HER HONOUR: Sorry. Just a moment. Court Officer, please take this document. The issue now, Ms Thompson, is that you wish to hand up additional submissions. Have you served them on Mr Lane?

MS THOMPSON: Yes, I have.

HER HONOUR: All right. The problem is that you've just - I haven't seen them because they just haven't come through. I'm not sure if Mr Lane has either. So you wish to rely on these additional submissions?

MS THOMPSON: If it's going to delay making a decision, there is abundance - abundant other evidence in support of the application for you to recuse yourself in the other documents already filed. That submission is additional information.

(transcript 7 October 2025, pages 2-3)

...

HER HONOUR: Court Officer - Ms Thompson, if you talk over me, I'm going to ask the court officer to adjourn and I'm leaving. Okay? So when I'm speaking - I had a question I was about to ask you. Please don't talk over me. Now, what I was going to say was you have provided the Court with these additional submissions today. I'm not sure what time you sent them in. Anything there, Associate?

ASSOCIATE: Yes, your Honour. 12.47 today.

HER HONOUR: All right. So that's 12.47. I'm not sure what time you emailed these additional submissions to Mr Lane's lawyers. However - - -

MS THOMPSON: The same time.

(transcript 7 October 2025, page 4, lines 3-11)

1. In the circumstances, I cannot identify any prejudice to Ms Thompson in respect of the filing of submissions. Ms Thompson was given one month to file and serve submissions, from the date she raised with the Court that she would be filing a recusal application. In respect of the additional submissions, there were no orders for Ms Thompson to file additional submissions - her doing so was of her own volition and she was granted leave to file those additional submissions.
2. No factors have been identified by Ms Thompson which give rise to apparent or apprehended bias on my part. It follows that there are no grounds on which I must recuse myself from the proceedings.

1. Ms Thompson has not identified any rule under the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), or otherwise any principles which would provide her with an avenue to have the 2024 decision set aside.
2. Ms Thompson's written submissions appeared to repeat the same arguments as those submitted during the course of the 2024 decision proceedings. The only additional submissions in respect of the interlocutory application were that I should not have taken into account certain documents, and I should have made orders for Mr Lane to provide certain documents during the course of the proceedings.
3. It is well established that a litigant cannot attempt to relitigate issues which have already been determined. To do so may constitute an abuse of process: Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175 at [33] (French CJ); UBS AG v Tyne [2018] HCA 45; (2018) 265 CLR 77 at [39] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ).
4. In circumstances where no avenues were identified by Ms Thompson upon which the 2024 decision could be set aside, it is not necessary for me to consider her submissions in any more depth. No exceptional circumstances have been demonstrated that warrant the setting aside or variation of the orders of the 2024 decision: McEwan v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (No 2) [2025] FCA 1392 at [55].
5. In any event, I note that if Ms Thompson took issue in any respect with the 2024 Decision, the appropriate course would have been for her to seek leave to appeal. In this context I note that, in fact, Ms Thompson did do exactly that. Her applications for both an extension of time and leave to appeal the 2024 decision were dismissed by Vandongen J in Thompson v Lane (No 2) [2025] FCA 951.
6. In the circumstances there is no basis on which the 2024 decision should be set aside by me.

1. The interlocutory application filed on 10 September 2025 should be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding forty-three (43) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Acting Chief Justice Collier.