(c) award of exemplary damages
75Prayer 20 sought, "... an exemplary damage (sic) of $100 million awarded to the applicant against the respondents Nos 1, 2, 3, 4 & 6 and their solicitors". A claim for an award of exemplary damages is incompetent in appellate proceedings where the claim has not been tried at first instance. The claim was neither pleaded nor raised in any of the proceedings in the Court below and, indeed, it is not clear that the Land and Environment Court would have had power in its class 8 jurisdiction to award such damages. A claim for damages in tort cannot be brought for the first time in this Court.
76Mr Martin pressed on the Court the relevance of certain statements made by Heydon J in Edwards v Santos Ltd [2011] HCA 8; 242 CLR 421 at [62]. The statements relied upon will be noted shortly: first, it is necessary to identify the context in which they were made. Although Edwards was a case involving a dispute over mining tenements, both the facts and the procedural background were far removed from the present circumstances. The underlying claim in Edwards was an attempt by a group of registered native title claimants to negotiate an indigenous land use agreement with Santos and its joint venture partner. A sticking point during the negotiations was whether Santos was entitled to production licences under the Petroleum Act 1923 (Qld), pursuant to prospecting authorities which were said to be "pre-existing rights-based acts" for the purposes of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), s 24IB. An attempt to have that issue litigated in the Federal Court was summarily dismissed at first instance. A Full Court refused leave to appeal: Edwards v Santos Ltd [2010] FCAFC 64; 185 FCR 280. There was no appeal from that decision, even by way of special leave, to the High Court. The aggrieved claimants accordingly sought judicial review under s 75(v) of the Constitution.
77The issue which resulted in the comments referred to by Mr Martin was whether, on judicial review, the High Court could make an award of costs in relation to the proceedings in the Federal Court. The Court held it could, French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ expressing their own reasons for that conclusion at [3]-[5]. Hayne J dissented on that point. The conclusion turned on the proper construction of s 32 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Section 32 relevantly provided that the High Court should, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, grant remedies, "so that as far as possible all matters in controversy between the parties regarding the cause of action, or arising out of or connected with the cause of action, may be completely and finally determined, and all multiplicity of legal proceedings concerning any of such matters may be avoided": see s 63 Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW).
78In rejecting the contention that the High Court had no power under s 32 to award costs in the Federal Court, Heydon J stated at [62]:
"The unsatisfactoriness of the precedent which would be created if the arguments of the petroleum defendants and the State of Queensland were accepted flows partly from the equivalent injustice that would arise in future cases. But it also flows from the temptation which it would create for a certain category of litigant. That category comprises wealthy litigants ... who seek to render fruitless litigation which has been commenced against them by less wealthy litigants, not by achieving success on the merits at a trial, but by other means. One technique is to seek to administer knockout blows before trial by means of strike out applications or summary dismissal applications or stay applications. Another technique is to engage in extensive softening up by making as many interlocutory applications as they choose, and resisting à outrance those of the other side. The goal of the second technique is to cause the claimants to become incapable of providing security for costs and funding the litigation, or at least to conclude that they cannot afford the litigation, and thus to cause them to abandon the litigation before trial. Successes obtained by tactics of the former kind are more likely to come under challenge in this Court than those obtained by tactics of the latter kind. But the propensity of those litigants to engage in tactics of either kind would be intensified by the knowledge that if their resort to these tactics succeeds in the first instance and can only be corrected in s 75(v) proceedings in this Court, they will be immune from compensating those who made claims against them for the costs which the claimants were ordered to pay under costs orders which events in this Court reveal ought not to have been made. The temptation to engage in oppressive proceedings, and the likelihood of its being yielded to, would be increased if those who are in a position to engage in oppressive proceedings think that they will enjoy immunity from costs orders in the Federal Court, even if s 75(v) applications in this Court establish that those oppressive proceedings were not soundly based."
79Although other members of the High Court did not join in those statements, this is not relevant for present purposes. Whether the High Court could make orders for the costs of proceedings in the Federal Court when quashing the latter's orders is a far step from awarding exemplary damages here, supposing such a claim could be made good. The conferral, by s 23 of the Supreme Court Act, of the amplitude of power necessary for the administration of justice in the State, is not to be diminished by implied limitations: Owners of the Ship "Shin Kobe Maru" v Empire Shipping Company Inc [1994] HCA 54; 181 CLR 404 at 420-421. On the other hand, those powers must be exercised according to law and not in blithe disregard of the limitations on the Court's powers and jurisdiction: see Reid v Howard [1995] HCA 40; 184 CLR 1 at 8 (Deane J) and 16-17 (Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ). The passage from the judgment of Heydon J in Edwards, read in context, does not support this claim by Mr Martin.
80The claim in prayer 20 must be refused. There being no outstanding claim for relief pursuant to the notice of motion, it should be dismissed.