Attorney General of New South Wales v Anthony Gilbert Martin

Supreme Court of NSW|2013-03-04|Before: Hidden J

Judgment 1HIS HONOUR: In these proceedings, commenced by summons, the Attorney General sought orders under s 8(7)(a) and (b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 against the defendant, Anthony Gilbert Martin. The Attorney was represented by Ms McWilliam of counsel. Mr Martin appeared unrepresented, and informed me that he did not wish an opportunity to obtain representation. I heard the matter on 4 March 2013, and made the orders sought by the Attorney the following day. These are my reasons for that decision. 2At the outset of the hearing Mr Martin submitted that the Attorney had no standing to pursue the proceedings and that, in any event, this court had no jurisdiction to entertain them. He informed me that, against the possibility (apparently, in his view, the probability) that I would reject these arguments, he had prepared a notice of appeal against my decision in respect of them. If that were the outcome, he said, he would proceed to the lodgement of his appeal and was content that I hear the proceedings against him in his absence provided that I had regard to two affidavits which he had filed. 3Both arguments were indeed rejected. As to the Attorney's standing, Mr Martin relied upon an e-mail he had sent to the Premier, the Attorney, and the Minister for Resources and Energy on 2 December 2012, in which he appears to have questioned the propriety of the conduct of the Department of Resources and Energy in relation to the granting of mining exploration licences and in which reference is made to the Attorney's application which was before me. As will be seen, the application was based in large part on proceedings brought by Mr Martin in New South Wales arising from his failure to secure the issue or renewal of mining exploration licences. 4The Department of Premier and Cabinet responded by letter of 25 January 2013, informing Mr Martin that if he had evidence of any corruption by public authorities or officials he should place that material before ICAC and that, as the matter he had raised concerned the administration of both the Minister for Resources and Energy and the Attorney General, a copy of his correspondence had been forwarded to those Ministers' offices for their information. 5It is on this material that Mr Martin submitted that the Attorney had no standing to bring the present proceedings. His other submission was that this court did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter and that only the High Court could do so, relying on s 75(iv) of the Constitution conferring original jurisdiction on the High Court in matters "between States, or between residents of different States, or between a State and a resident of another State ... ." Both arguments were without substance, and I rejected them for brief reasons which I gave at that time. 6Following this ruling, as anticipated, Mr Martin left the court. Before doing so, both Ms McWilliam and I emphasised that it would be in his interests to remain as the application would proceed forthwith and he was entitled to be heard in opposition to it. He was clearly aware that that was his right. Nevertheless, he left after being assured that I had his two affidavits. The hearing proceeded and he did not return before it was completed.

The relevant law 7By s 8(1)(a) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, a court is empowered to make a vexatious proceedings order against a person if it is satisfied that that person "has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia ... ." The Attorney General (among others) may apply for such an order: subs (4). "Vexatious proceedings" is defined in s 6 to include: (a) proceedings that are an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal, and (b) proceedings instituted to harass or annoy, or cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose, and (c) proceedings instituted or pursued without reasonable ground, and (d) proceedings conducted in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose. Paragraph (b) is not relied upon in the present case. Section 4 defines "proceedings" broadly, encompassing a wide variety of processes in courts or tribunals. All the proceedings giving rise to this application fall within that definition. 8As I have said, the orders against Mr Martin were made pursuant to s 8(7)(a) and (b), which empowers the Supreme Court to make the following vexatious proceedings orders in relation to a person: (a) an order staying all or part of any proceedings in New South Wales already instituted by the person, (b) an order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings in New South Wales ... . The effect of this provision is that the order of this court affects the continuation or institution of proceedings in any court (or tribunal) in this State. By s 8(2), in considering an application the court may have regard to proceedings in any Australian court or tribunal and any order made by that court or tribunal. As will be seen, the Attorney relies on proceedings originating in this State and also in the Australian Capital Territory. 9A helpful summary of the principles governing an application under the Act is to be found in the judgment of Adamson J in Attorney General v Chan [2011] NSWSC 1315. After considering the categories of vexatious proceedings set out in s 6, her Honour continued at [33] ff: "[33] These categories are not discrete, since each of the sub-paragraphs (b)-(d) could properly be regarded as an abuse of process of a court or tribunal. Furthermore, the difference between sub-paragraph (b), which connotes a subjective intention on the part of the Defendant, and sub-paragraph (d), which does not, and is concerned with effect and consequence, rather than motive or design, relieves the Court of the obligation of determining whether the respondent to such an application intends the consequences of his or her actions, or does not. [34] The term "proceedings" is defined by s 4 of the Act to include interlocutory proceedings as well as appeals. This means that the Court can have regard to baseless applications or appeals: Attorney General (NSW) v Wilson [2010] NSWSC 1008 ( Wilson ) at [15]. Repeated oral applications with no proper basis are relevant: Wilson at [16]. The manner in which the person speaks or acts in the courtroom is relevant: Wilson at [16]; Attorney General in and for the State of NSW v Gargan [2010] NSWSC 1192 (Attorney General v Gargan) at [7]. ... [35] The purpose of an order is not to impose punishment for past litigious misdeeds, but to shield both the public and the Court itself: Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Gargan (No 2) [2009] FCA 398 at [3], cited with approval in Attorney General v Gargan at [8]. [36] It is a serious thing to deprive litigants of their access to the courts: Wilson at [11]. [37] The term "frequently" is relative; it must be looked at in the context of the litigation being considered: Wilson at [12]; Attorney General v Croker [2010] NSWSC 942 at [22]; Attorney General v Gargan at [7]; Siteberg v Maples [2010] NSWSC 1344 at [31]-[32]. ... ... [39] While the Court needs to form its own view about each piece of litigation relied on by the Attorney General, the Court is entitled to have regard to the result of the proceedings, and where appropriate, the findings of, and views expressed by, the various judicial officers who dealt with them: Wilson at [22]; Attorney General v Croker [2010] NSWSC 942 at [125]; Attorney General v Gargan at [7]. [40] As to the exercise of discretion, Perram J said in Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Gargan (No 2) [2009] FCA 398 at [12], cited with approval in Attorney General v Gargan at [8]: '... the considerations germane to the exercise of that power are unconfined. However, the factors which will be relevant are informed by the protective purpose which the order serves. Where a litigant displays insight into their previous litigious history this will, no doubt, be relevant for it will suggest - although not determine - a diminution in the risk posed to the public. On the other hand, the manner in which a litigant conducts herself in her affairs generally is also capable of throwing light on whether the commencement of further vexatious proceedings is likely. Those general affairs include the litigant's defence to the proceedings by which the order restraining him is sought. Because of the protective nature of the jurisdiction it is also relevant to know the extent of the damage and inconvenience the litigant's forays into the courts have caused, pecuniary or otherwise.'"

The application 10At the hearing of the application the Attorney was represented by Ms McWilliam of counsel. She relied on two affidavits of her instructing solicitor, Aaron David Baril, an employed solicitor in the office of the Crown Solicitor, of 25 July 2012 and 7 September 2012. Annexed to those affidavits are judgments in fifty proceedings in which Mr Martin had been involved. 11For the most part these were proceedings instituted in the Land and Environment Court, together with proceedings by way of appeal from decisions of that court: a number of appeals or applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, and two applications for special leave to appeal to the High Court. These are the proceedings arising from Mr Martin's failure to secure the issue or renewal of mining exploration licences. In addition to that complaint he also challenged the issue of licences to others. The judgments concerning these proceedings were given over the period between 2009 and 2012. 12Otherwise, the Attorney relied upon unrelated proceedings in the Australian Capital Territory. These concerned the possession of property in the Territory, and comprised proceedings in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal of the Territory, together with an unsuccessful attempt to commence proceedings by summons in the High Court. The relevant judgments extend over the period from 1988 to 2011. 13An adequate summary of these judgments is to be found in the written submissions filed on behalf of the Attorney, and that summary is attached to this judgment. Most of the judgments are contained in an exhibit to Mr Baril's August affidavit, and the summary identifies them by reference to tabs in that exhibit. The last two judgments are annexed to the September affidavit. 14It will be seen that one of the judgments (no 24) and one aspect of another judgment (no 28), where Mr Martin enjoyed a measure of success, were included for completeness but were not relied upon for the purpose of the application. The two applications to the High Court for special leave to appeal (nos 49 and 50) were dismissed on the basis that Mr Martin's written submissions raised no question of law which would justify the grant of special leave and that an appeal to that court would have no prospect of success. 15Ms McWilliam brought my attention to another judgment in which Mr Martin was partly successful: Martin v State of New South Wales [2012] NSWLEC 182, a decision of Lloyd AJ. This was supplied to me as an annexure to a supplementary affidavit of Mr Baril of 4 March 2013. In that matter Mr Martin had sought judicial review of the refusal by the relevant government department of his applications to renew a number of exploration licences. The decision to refuse one of those licences was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the responsible Minister, on the basis of a denial of procedural fairness. However, the State had conceded that that order should be made, because the decision to refuse the application had been made while the matter was still under discussion between Mr Martin and the department. Lloyd AJ had no occasion to consider the merit of the decision. Those proceedings were otherwise dismissed. 16The summaries in the attachment of the large number of proceedings, substantive and interlocutory, relied upon by the Attorney speak for themselves. In all of them Mr Martin was unsuccessful, and the judgments in each of them demonstrate that they were doomed to fail. The category of vexatious proceedings in s 6(c), that the proceedings were instituted or pursued without reasonable ground, looms large. No purpose would be served by a further examination of all of them, but Ms McWilliam took me to the first eleven of the matters in the attachment to exemplify the application of s 6(c) and other categories in the section. I shall refer to those matters by the numbers which they bear in the attachment. 17All eleven matters attract s 6(c). For example, in judgment no 1 Dixon C summarily dismissed Mr Martin's claim in respect of a number of licences on the ground that there was "no reasonable cause" to support it: [21]. In judgment no 2 Pain J dismissed an appeal against the decision of Dixon C on the basis that the initiating summons "does not identify an error of law such that no reasonable cause of action is disclosed:" [7]. Judgment no 6 related to one of the matters in which Mr Martin challenged the grant of a licence to a particular company. As to the joinder of Mr and Mrs Savas, Sheahan J found that none of the material before him "discloses any cause of action, relevant to this Court's jurisdiction," against them: [6]. 18Other judgments to which Ms McWilliam took me raise issues in addition to s 6(c). As noted in the summary, in judgment no 5 Biscoe J roundly condemned an attempt by Mr Martin to obtain orders against the State in an interlocutory proceeding from which the State had been excused from attendance, saying that in those circumstances it would be "entirely inappropriate ... to entertain an informal application for summary judgment which would be dispositive of the proceedings": [5]. There is force in Ms McWilliam's submission that that attempt by Mr Martin amounted to an abuse of the process of the court: s 6(a). 19Judgment no 8 relates to a matter in which the State was one of a number of defendants. As noted in the summary, Mr Martin sought summary judgment against the State at a time when, to his knowledge, it had entered a submitting appearance. This was fairly characterised by Ms McWilliam as the conduct of proceedings in a way so as to harass or annoy the State: s 6(d). 20These early cases are sufficient to demonstrate the pattern to be discerned in the other cases in the attachment. Three other judgments are worthy of mention. Judgment no 11 reveals that one of the matters Mr Martin argued was the validity of the delegation of the ministerial power to a particular departmental officer, an argument which he had mounted unsuccessfully in an earlier matter: judgment no 3. Two other judgments highlight the delay occasioned by Mr Martin's approach to the litigation. In no 7 Dixon C referred at [3] to the "number of lengthy interlocutory applications during the course of the proceedings." In no 33, an ACT matter, Miles CJ noted at [28] that the proceedings had been commenced more than eleven years previously and that the matter "must be prepared for trial on the merits and firm directions are to be given to that end forthwith." 21The summary of judgment no 7 notes that Mr Martin had left the hearing before counsel for the respondent had completed her final submissions, and he had been granted the indulgence of being provided with a copy of the transcript of those submissions and invited to respond to them. I did not see it as necessary or appropriate to grant the same indulgence in the present case. 22I considered Mr Martin's affidavits, of 27 August 2012 and 5 October 2012. They did not assist him. 23In the first affidavit he denied having ever conducted any vexatious litigation in this country. He noted that he had never initiated an action in this court (apart from proceedings in the Court of Appeal), and that there were "no judgments or findings" that he had conducted any vexatious litigation in Australia. All that is true, but is not to the point. As I have observed, the Attorney General's application can be based upon proceedings instituted in any court or tribunal in New South Wales. I accept that this was the first time an application of this kind had been made against him, but it fell to be determined on its merits. 24Mr Martin also asserted in this affidavit that the Attorney's application was an abuse of court process, and that he had been "the victim of insistent and persistent abuse of court process for the last 3 years by the State of New South Wales and associated parties." He claimed that the Attorney had issued the summons against him a few days after he had threatened in correspondence to bring a claim against the State for damages in the order of $500,000,000, should the department accede to applications for licences by an energy company and the NSW Aboriginal Land Council. He alleged that these applications were based, directly or indirectly, upon the "illegal use of confidential and intellectual property" of his. He also asserted that the Attorney proceeded against him "with undue haste", suggesting that this was connected to the well known ICAC enquiry into what was suspected to be the corrupt issue of mining licences. 25Neither in the body of the affidavit nor in the annexures to it was there any credible material which could support these claims. They could be relevant only insofar as they tended to establish that the Attorney had brought the present application for an improper purpose. There is no rational basis for such a conclusion. 26Mr Martin also asserted that he was the "victim of criminal conduct by an associated party" of the Attorney. From the annexed material this appears to be a reference to Mr and Mrs Savas, referred to in judgment no 6. Sheahan J had awarded costs in their favour, and Mr Martin claimed that in some way they had been guilty of fraudulent conduct in the process of enforcing that costs order. How they were said to have done so is anything but clear from material annexed to the affidavit and, in any event, the issue is of no relevance for present purposes. 27The second affidavit revisited this costs issue, annexing e-mail correspondence with the costs assessment manager at this court. This material is also irrelevant except, perhaps, insofar as Mr Martin enquired whether the manager, in his capacity as senior deputy registrar, had recommended to the Attorney, pursuant to s 8(6) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, that he consider making an application under the Act. The manager responded that he had not. This also, of course, is irrelevant. The application was made in accordance with the Act, and the question whether it was made upon a recommendation within that provision has no bearing on the outcome. 28Also annexed are copies of e-mail communications with the Premier and the relevant department concerning the subject matter of the litigation, the focus being what Mr Martin described as the theft of his intellectual property. These, he deposed, were among numerous unsuccessful attempts to settle his disputes before and after the litigation began. He claimed that the present application was the last step in a process by which the State and associated parties had "blackmailed" him, through costs orders, steps taken to enforce those orders, and ultimately bankruptcy proceedings. (The bankruptcy proceedings referred to, as I understand it, were brought by Mr and Mrs Savas in pursuit of the costs awarded to them by Sheahan J.) Again, there is nothing in the affidavit lending any credibility to this claim. 29Otherwise, in respect of the New South Wales proceedings, the affidavit annexes Mr Martin's written submissions to the Court of Appeal in respect of the matter in which Mr and Mrs Savas were involved: judgment no 28 in the attachment, together with the documents he filed for the purpose of the special leave applications the subject of judgments nos 49 and 50. The purpose of annexing that material is not clear, unless it were to challenge the outcome in each of those matters. It does nothing to advance his case in opposition to the present application. 30In the affidavit Mr Martin made brief reference to the ACT proceedings which, as is apparent from the judgments summarised in the attachment, involved himself, his wife and a family company. He did no more than assert the justice of their cause, without analysis of the issues involved. However, he claimed that he and his wife were successful on appeal in one matter between them and the liquidator of the company: Martin v Taylor [2000] FCA 1002. That judgment is to be found under tab 44 of the exhibit to Mr Baril's July affidavit. There is no need to examine it in any detail. It is sufficient to say that the Martins appealed against certain findings adverse to them in a proceeding before the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory and the appeal was allowed. However, it was allowed not because they made out any ground of appeal but, rather, because the proceedings at first instance were found to have been incompetent. 31Put shortly, apart from a general denial that his proceedings were vexatious, Mr Martin did not address the issues raised by the present application. He provided no intelligible or meaningful refutation of the Attorney's case. 32As Ms McWilliam pointed out, Mr Martin had brought a large number of proceedings in different courts against a variety of defendants (although primarily the State or the responsible minister). There is no doubt that he can be said to have instituted proceedings "frequently", within the meaning of s 8(1)(a) of the Act. Not only were these proceedings unmeritorious, but in their totality they have been determined and protracted. 33Having regard to the considerations referred to by Perram J in the passage from Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Gargan (No 2) cited above, Mr Martin has not displayed any insight into his previous litigious history. This is clear not only from the proceedings upon which the Attorney relies, but also from his behaviour at the outset of the hearing before me. I was satisfied that he would be likely to institute further groundless proceedings. So much was apparent from his remarkable threat to sue the State for $500,000,000. I have no evidence of the expense these proceedings have visited upon the State and the corporations and individuals involved in them, but it is reasonable to infer that it would have been considerable. 34I was satisfied that the proceedings were vexatious on the various bases put forward by Ms McWilliam and that, in all the circumstances, the orders sought by the Attorney should be made. I arrived at that conclusion with an eye to the protective purpose of the legislation, but also mindful of the serious consequences of those orders for Mr Martin. Accordingly, I ordered that all of the proceedings in New South Wales already instituted by Mr Martin be stayed, with the exception of the outstanding issue of costs in one matter in the Land and Environment Court, and that he be prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales without the leave of the court.

Land and Environment Court decisions 1Martin v New South Wales Department of Industry and Investment [2009] NSWLEC 1447 (11 December 2009): see Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit Tab 1. Dixon C dismissed the proceedings under r. 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (UCPR) on the grounds that the summons and proposed amended summons disclosed no reasonable cause of action (see [20]-[21] of the Commissioner's decision). 2Martin v Director General, New South Wales Department of Industry and Investment & Ors [2010] NSWLEC 21 (17 February 2010, an appeal of Commissioner Dixon's decision): see Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit Tab 2.The Court held that the summons did not identify any error of law on the part of Dixon C as required by s. 56A of the Land & Environment Court Act 1979, and the appeal summons was dismissed on the basis that no reasonable cause of action was disclosed: UCPR, r. 13.4(1)(b) (see [7] of Pain J's reasons). 3Martin v NSW Minister for Mineral and Forest Resources [2010] NSWLEC 131 (26 July 2010): see Ex ADB-1 July Affidavit Tab 3. During the proceedings, Mr Martin filed a notice of motion for summary judgment, pressed only on a limited point concerning the validity of the delegation of the Minister's authority. Martin submitted that the officer of the Department who refused the application did not have delegated authority to do so from the Minister. Biscoe J rejected each of the following three arguments advanced by Mr Martin, on the following bases (see [16]-[18]): (a) The argument that the delegation had to be under the version of the Mining Act 1992 (Mining Act) that was current at the time of the refusal was rejected on the basis of s 30(1)(b) of the Interpretation Act 1987 (Interpretation Act); (b) The argument that the instrument of delegation lapsed after the Minister who had signed it ceased to be Minister was rejected on the basis that the delegation was made by the person holding office as the Minister, and did not lapse because the Minister changed); and (c) The argument that the person who refused the application was only acting in the position was rejected on the basis of s 48(2) of the Interpretation Act. 4Martin v State of NSW [2010] NSWLEC 247 (29 November 2010): see Ex ADB-1 July Affidavit Tab 4. This was a motion for contempt, summary judgment, that the Crown Solicitor file an authority from the Attorney General to draft points of defence, and for discovery. Proceedings dismissed save in relation to discovery, (which was not contested). 5Martin v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2010] NSWLEC 271 (29 December 2010): see Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 5.A discovery dispute arising in the proceedings discussed immediately above. Martin disputed the adequacy of the first respondent's discovery and complained that the second respondent had failed to comply with the discovery order against it. The appearanceof the State of NSW was excused (orders were made in relation to the second respondent). The judgment records Mr Martin's submission before Biscoe J that certain of the prayers sought in his summons (a declaration that the relevant exploration licence was null and void under the Mining Act, an order directing the relevant Minister to give effect to the Court's ruling within 14 days, and costs) should be made on that day. His Honour held that:"it is entirely inappropriate in circumstances where only a limited discovery issue has been referred to me, with the first respondent excused from attendance, to entertain an informal application for summary judgment which would be dispositive of the proceedings". 6Martin v State of New South Wales [2011] NSWLEC 126 (13 January 2011):see Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 6. The proceedings sought to challenge a decision by the relevant Minister to grant an exploration licence. The proceedings also alleged misuse and/or disclosure of confidential information against Mr Ross Savasand Mrs KayleneSavas, who filed a motion for summary dismissal of the proceedings insofar as they related to them. Sheahan J made orders as sought in the motion on the basis that none of the material before the Court disclosed any cause of action, relevant to the Court's jurisdiction, against them. His Honour also awarded costs in favour of Mr and Mrs Savas, including partially on an indemnity basis. 7Martin v Minister for Mineral and Forest Resources [2011] NSWLEC 1011 (25 January 2011): see Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 7. This is the principal judgment concerning the proceedings discussed above in relation to the challenge of the validity of the decision by the Minister to refuse Mr Martin's application for an exploration licence.Dixon C held that there was "no evidence" to support a finding that the Minister's decision to refuse the relevant exploration licence application was unlawful, and dismissed the proceedings. Dixon C's judgment also referred to the time taken to hear the matter. The main reason for the delay was said to be the need for an interlocutory judgment in relation to the jurisdictional question raised by Martin (which was dealt with on the hearing of a motion for summary judgment subsequently filed by him). Dixon C also referred to the delay caused by "a number of lengthy interlocutory applications [made by Martin] during the course of the proceedings". This included an application that Dixon C recuse herself on the ground of apprehended bias.The judgment also noted that Martin left the hearing on 18 August 2010 before counsel for the respondent had completed her final submissions. Despite advising the Court that he did not want to hear the balance of the submissions or respond to them, in the interests of procedural fairness he was later provided with a copy of the transcript of the respondents' submissions, and was invited to respond in writing and/or address the Court. Martin then addressed the Court on 13 September 2010, thereby necessitating a further Court attendance. 8Martin v State of New South Wales [2011] NSWLEC 129 (1 February 2011): see Ex ADB-1 July Affidavit, Tab 8. Motion filed by Mr Martin seeking (among other things) summary judgment, orders for discovery, and a stay of the earlier orders made by Sheahan J. Mr Martin's motion also sought an order granting (retrospective) leave to the first respondent, the State of New South Wales, to file the amended appearance it had recently filed without the leave of the Court. (The State had initially filed an active appearance, which it had amended to a submitting appearance.) Pain J made this latter order.Her Honour held that there was "no basis" for ordering summary judgment (Martin had argued that the first respondent's submitting appearance entitled him to a summary judgment). Her Honour also declined to make the discovery orders sought by Martin as these were "premature". The basis for Martin's application to stay the previous orders made by Sheahan J was that he intended to appeal those orders. Pain J declined to order the stay for various reasons, including that no proper basis for a stay had been demonstrated, and because the proposed appeal would not be rendered nugatory if no stay was granted. Pain J also refused an oral application made by Martin following the delivery of her Honour's orders that those orders be stayed, on the basis that no relevant submission in support of granting a stay had been made. 9Martin v State of New South Wales &Anor [2011] NSWLEC 20 (24 February 2011): Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 9. Motion seeking to strike out Mr Martin's points of claim, security for its costs, and an order that Martin be given leave to re-plead conditional upon provision of security. Pain J ordered that the entirety of Mr Martin's points of claim be struck out on the basis of (among other things) lack of standing, no identifiable errors of law pleaded, lack of jurisdiction, embarrassment, and no cause of action disclosed. 10Martin v NSW Minister for Mineral and Forest Resources [2011] NSWLEC 38 (18 March 2011): see Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 10. Costs application against Mr Martin, relied upon because the judgment sets out the procedural history of the matter including: (a) Mr Martin sought an adjournment before Dixon C in order to "research" the distinction between judicial and merits review. (b) Mr Martin permitted the Minister to proceed with the preparation of an application for determination of a separate jurisdictional question, only to then not press the substance of the application when it came to be heard before Biscoe J. (c) It was Mr Martin's decision to not press any merits review claim that caused the Minister to throw away costs in respect of the application. (d) There was a further oral application made by Mr Martin at the commencement of the hearing of the respondent's costs motion that the hearing be adjourned on the basis that he had filed an appeal in the Court of Appeal against the decision and orders of Dixon C. The application was not made by way of notice of motion, no evidence was provided in support of it, and no prior notification of the application had been given to the respondent. Her Honour declined to grant the adjournment, because, inter alia, the appeal was likely to be futile given that appeals from decisions of commissioners are heard by a single judge of the LEC, and not the Court of Appeal. 11Martin v State of New South Wales and Central West Scientific Pty Ltd [2011] NSWLEC 50 (6 April 2011): see Ex ADB-1 July Affidavit, Tab 11. Principal judgment concerning the challenge by Mr Martin to the validity of an exploration licence granted to another party. The Court summarised Mr Martin's grounds of challenge (see Tab 11, p 69), which included: a. Use and supply of confidential information b. Failure to consider relevant matters c. Miscarriage in relation to delegation d. Invalid application by the successful applicant e. Exploration licence not validly executed f. Breach of good will g. Grant of new exploration licence circumvented policy of renewal h. Mr Martin was denied the opportunity to apply for the exploration licence i. Mr Martin had an equitable interest in the exploration licence j. Preferential treatment of the successful applicant k. Grant of the licence for personal monetary gain The proceedings were dismissed. 12Martin v The State of New South Wales [2011] NSWLEC 63 (7 April 2011): Interlocutory decision (in the substantive proceedings, Mr Martin sought16 declarations in relation to the processing of, and/or offers to grant, six exploration licences under the Mining Act.)This judgment dealt with a notice of motion filed by Mr Martin seeking to have a notice to produce served on him by the respondent set aside. Craig J declined to set aside the notice to produce. 13Martin v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2011] NSWLEC 108 (19 May 2011): see Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 13. Motion filed by Mr Martin and two notices of motion filed by the respondent in the matter discussed immediately above. Mr Martin's motion sought, among other things: an order for summary judgment; a stay of the proceedings; the transfer of the proceedings to the Court of Appeal; an order for the joinder of a third party, an order that the respondent provide particulars of its instructions; leave to amend the pleadings; and leave to issue eight subpoenas. Her Honour gave an ex tempore judgment on that day in which she dealt with all but the last of the matters raised in Martin's notice of motion. The Court found it was "simply inappropriate" for it to exercise its discretion to enter summary judgment, that there was no basis for staying the proceedings, there was no direct connection with the third party Mr Martin sought to be joined, there was no basis in the evidence presented why an order requiring particulars of the State's instructions should be made, and leave to amend the summons should be refused. 14Martin v State of New South Wales (No 3) [2011] NSWLEC 88 (23 May 2011): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 14. This judgment concerns the balance of the matters not dealt with in Pain J's judgment of 19 May 2011. Namely,Mr Martin's application for leave to issue eight subpoenas, a notice of motion filed by the respondent to set aside a notice to produce served by Mr Martin, and an application filed by the respondent to strike out parts of Martin's points of claim. Her Honour made the orders sought in the respondent's motions and refused leave to issue all but two of the subpoenas.

Court of Appeal decisions 15Martin v State of New South Wales (No 1) [2011] NSWCA 271 (29 August 2011): see Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 15. Mr Martin filed notices of appeal (and, in two cases, summonses seeking leave to appeal) against several of the Land and Environment Court judgments discussed above, resulting in 10 separate Court of Appeal proceedings: 1. Proceedings 2011/135613, notice of appeal, purporting to appeal the decision of Pain J in [2010] NSWLEC 21. 2. Proceedings 2011/119586, notice of appeal, purporting to appeal the decision of Pepper J in [2011] NSWLEC 38. 3. Proceedings 2011/119605, notice of appeal, purporting to appeal the decision of Craig J in [2011] NSWLEC 63. 4. Proceedings 2011/35561, notice of appeal, purporting to appeal the decision of Sheahan J in [2011] NSWLEC 126. 5. Proceedings 2011/35607, notice of appeal, purporting to appeal the decision of Pain J in [2011] NSWLEC 129. 6. Proceedings 2011/35586, summons seeking leave to appeal the decision of Dixon C in [2011] NSWLEC 1011. 7. Proceedings 2011/13346, summons seeking leave to appeal the decision of Biscoe J in [2010] NSWLEC 131. 8. Proceedings 2011/84040, notice of appeal, purporting to appeal the decision of Pain J in [2011] NSWLEC 20. 9. Proceedings 2011/185491, notice of appeal, purporting to appeal the decision of Pain J in [2011] NSWLEC 108. 10. Proceedings 2011/129207, notice of appeal, appealing the decision of Preston J in [2011] NSWLEC 50. The common respondent to all ten appeals was the State of New South Wales, and it filed objections to competence in five of those ten appeals (being those listed at 1, 2, 3, 6 and 9 above). This judgment (that is, [2011] NSWCA 271) dealt with an oral application made by Mr Martin at the commencement of the hearing of the respondent's motions for an adjournment to a day on which several other of his appeals were listed to be heard. The Court of Appeal refused the adjournment on the basis that there was no reason why the matters should not proceed in the manner originally intended. 16Martin v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 272 (29 August 2011): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 16. Challenge to the decision of Pain J in [2010] NSWLEC 21. The Court of Appeal struck out the appeal as incompetent. 17Martin v State of New South Wales (No 3) [2011] NSWCA 273 (29 August 2011): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 17. Appeal from the judgment of Pepper J in [2011] NSWLEC 38. The Court of Appeal (Basten JA, Handley AJA agreeing) struck out the appeal as incompetent on the basis that leave was required to appeal from a decision of the Court with respect to costs only. 18Martin v State of New South Wales (No 4) [2011] NSWCA 274 (29 August 2011): see Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 18. Appeal from the judgment of Craig J in [2011] NSWLEC 63. The Court of Appeal (Basten JA, Handley AJA agreeing) struck out the appeal as incompetent. 19Martin v State of New South Wales (No 5) [2011] NSWCA 280 (6 September 2011): see Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 19. Oral application by Martin that a partydid not have standing to be heard in respect of Mr Martin's appeals from two judgments of Pain J and one of Sheahan J. The Court of Appeal (Basten JA, Handley AJA agreeing) refused Martin's application on the basis that the party had an interest in the proceedings in that the decision under challenge was made in its favour. 20Martin v State of New South Wales (No 6) [2011] NSWCA 281 (6 September 2011): see Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 20. Appeal from the judgment of Sheahan J in [2011] NSWLEC 126. The Court of Appeal (Handley AJA, Basten JA agreeing) struck out the appeal as incompetent on the basis that the order was interlocutory and hence leave to appeal was required. As for Martin's application for leave to appeal, the Court held that Sheahan J was correct in dismissing Mr and Mrs Savas from the proceedings as the LEC had no jurisdiction to hear the claim against them. The notice of appeal also sought exemplary damages against a third party (which had not participated in the hearing before Sheahan J on the basis that the notice of motion before his Honour concerned dismissal of the case as against Mr and Mr Savas only). The Court of Appeal refused to award such damages on the basis that it had no original jurisdiction to do so in an appeal where that question had not been not litigated below. 21Martin v State of New South Wales (No 7) [2011] NSWCA 282 (6 September 2011): see Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab21. Appeal from the judgment of Pain J in [2011] NSWLEC 129. The Court of Appeal (Handley AJA, Basten JA agreeing) struck out the appeal as incompetent on the basis that all the orders were either interlocutory or dealt with questions of costs, and accordingly leave to appeal was required. The Court refused leave to appeal as: (1) no arguable question arose in relation to the refusal of summary judgment, and her Honour's decision on this point was "plainly correct"; (2) Pain J's decision to defer consideration of the production of documents, and her decision not to stay Sheahan J's earlier costs order were discretionary matters of practice and procedure. There was no reason for the court to interfere with those decisions or to grant leave to appeal from them. 22Martin v State of New South Wales (No 8) [2011] NSWCA 285 (14 September 2011): see Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 22.Application for leave to appeal from the judgment of Dixon C in [2011] NSWLEC 1011. The Court of Appeal (Basten JA, Handley AJA agreeing) refused to grant leave to appeal on the basis that the Court lacked jurisdiction in respect of Dixon C's decision. This was because there was no right of appeal, even with leave, to the Court of Appeal in relation to decisions in class 8 proceedings against an order or decision of the Court made by a Commissioner: see Land and Environment Court Act 1979, s. 57(3). 23Martin v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2011] NSWCA 286 (14 September 2011): see Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 23. Application for leave to appeal and an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal from the decision of Biscoe J in [2010] NSWLEC 131. The Court of Appeal (Handley AJA, Basten JA agreeing) dismissed the summons on the basis that the decision of Biscoe J was "clearly correct" (Judgment at [8]) for the reasons his Honour gave, noting that, whilst Martin's objections to the validity of the delegation could be said to be based on questions of law, each objection was without substance. 24Martin v State of New South Wales (No 10)[2011] NSWCA 287 (14 September 2011) (Martin no. 10): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 24. Appeal from the judgment of Pain J in [2011] NSWLEC 20. The Court of Appeal (Basten JA, Handley AJA agreeing) granted leave to appeal in respect of Pain J's decision.1 25Martin v State of New South Wales (No 11) [2011] NSWCA 288 (14 September 2011):See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 25. This matter involved an appeal from two judgments of Pain J in [2011] NSWLEC 108 and [2011] NSWLEC 88, as well a several procedural directions made by various judges during the course of those proceedings. The Court of Appeal judgment dealt with the appeal from [2011] NSWLEC 108 only, striking out the appeal as incompetent. The Court refused to grant leave to appeal on the basis that no arguable case was raised in respect of any error of principle in relation to Pain J's decision (per Basten JA at [12]) and the proposed appeal did not raise any questions of law, let alone "fairly arguable" questions of law (per Handley AJA at [19]). 26Martin v State of New South Wales (No 12) [2011] NSWCA 289 (14 September 2011):See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 26. This judgment dealt with Mr Martin's appeal from the judgment of Pain J in [2011] NSWLEC 88 and the other procedural directions referred to at [46] above. The Court of Appeal (Basten JA and Handley AJA) struck out the appeal as incompetent on the basis that leave to appeal was required, and it refused to grant leave to appeal, stating: (a) the procedural orders appealed from were no more than directions as to the conduct of the matter, and as such did not raise any issue of principle (per Basten JA at [4]). (b) no arguable basis for granting leave to appeal was raised (per Basten JA at [4]). (c) Mr Martin's challenges to her Honour's orders did not raise any arguable questions of law which would justify the grant of leave to appeal (per Handley AJA at [17]). 27Martin v State of New South Wales (No 13) [2011] NSWCA 296 (19 September 2011):See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 27. This judgment concerned an aspect of Martin's appeal not dealt with in Martin no. 10, namely an application by Tellus Resources to be removed as a party from the proceedings, and an order that Martin pay its costs on an indemnity basis. The Court of Appeal struck out that part of the notice of appeal concerning Tellus Resources with costs, on the basis that Tellus Resources was neither directly affected by the relief sought nor was otherwise interested in maintaining the decision of the Court below (per Basten JA at [4]). 28Martin v State of NSW (No 14) [2012] NSWCA 46 (21 March 2012): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 28. Appeal against the decision of Preston J in [2011] NSWLEC 50. The Court held that Martin had not been able to identify any errors of law that would entitle him to relief in the Court of Appeal, and thus dismissed the appeal. The Court of Appeal also dealt with the appeal from Pain J's security for costs order, in respect of which it had granted leave to appeal in Martin No. 10. That aspect of the appeal was allowed by consent.2 The final matter dealt with in this judgment was a notice of motion filed by Martin in all ten appeal proceedings listed at [32] above. The Court of Appeal heard argument on only three of the orders sought in the motion (see Judgment [65]-[80]): (a) Mr Martin sought a stay of an application for assessment of party/party costs filed in the Supreme Court by Mr and Mrs Savas. The Court refused such relief on the basis that there were no proceedings in the Court of Appeal that could be stayed. (b) Mr Martin sought an order to the effect that the respondents, their solicitors and barristers show cause why they should not be charged with contempt of court. The Court held that it could not entertain such a claim in the absence of such charges being properly formulated and supported by evidence. (c) Mr Martin sought an award of exemplary damages. The Court held that such a claim was incompetent in appellate proceedings where the claim had not been agitated at first instance. The court also noted that, in any event, it was not clear whether the Land and Environment court would have had power to make such an award in its class 8 jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal dismissed Martin's motion. 29Martin v State of NSW (No 15) [2012] NSWCA 47 (21 March 2012): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 29. Motion filed by Martin seeking to have all previous orders of the Court of Appeal set aside under r. 36.15 of the UCPR, (which empowers the Court to set aside a judgment given, entered or made irregularly, illegally or against good faith). The Court held (at [14]) that there was no basis for finding that the orders were made or entered irregularly, illegally or otherwise than in good faith. In relation to the Court's power to reconsider its interlocutory orders (UCPR, r. 36.16(4)), the Court held (at [18]) that Martin had not identified any ground involving legal error in the reasons for judgment of the Court below or the Court of Appeal which could provide an arguable ground for reopening.

ACT Supreme Court decisions and appeals to Federal Court of Australia 30Individual Homes Pty Ltd v NRMA Insurance Ltd [1989] ACTSC 28 (27 June 1989)(also cited as [1989] ACTSC 120): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 30. These proceedings were brought by Individual Homes, a company of which Martin was a director and shareholder, and on behalf of whom he purported to conduct the proceedings. The substantive proceedings involved a claim in negligence against the NRMA in the exercise of the NRMA's power of sale over certain home units owned by the plaintiff and mortgaged to NRMA. This was an interlocutory application for security for costs application, brought by the NRMA. Security for costs was ordered inter alia on the basis that (at [27]) 'on the present state of the evidence...the plaintiff's action does not have reasonable prospects of success.' 31Anthony Gilbert Martin v NRMA Insurance Ltd [1998] ACTSC 237 (12 June 1998): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 31.3Appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision of a Master of that Court. The Master had struck out large portions of Martin's amended statement of claim, and his application for summary judgment.Crispin J dismissed the appeal from the Master, describing the paragraphs struck out by him as, variously: "irrelevant to any cause of action", "fail[ing] to adequately plead any recognisable causes of action", "embarrassing", disclosing a cause of action that was statute barred, and "not pleaded with sufficient particularity". His Honour held (at [49]) that the amended statement of claim was "an entirely unsatisfactory pleading which would have given rise to significant potential for embarrassment and confusion", and (at [51]) that Martin's application for summary judgment before the Master was made "without legal foundation". 32Martin v NRMA Insurance Ltd[1999] FCA 140 (22 February 1999): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 32. Application by Martin for leave to appeal from the decision of Crispin J [1998] ACTSC 237.In an extempore decision, the Full Court dismissed Martin's application. 33Martin v NRMA Insurance Ltd [1999] ACTSC 143 (22 December 1999): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab33. In this judgment, Miles CJ dealt with two appeals by Mr Martin from interlocutory decisions of a Master given on 26 November 1999, one of which concerned an application by Mr Martin for summary judgment. The Court dismissed the appeals. In the course of giving reasons, Miles CJ stated: (a) (at [3] 'If the notice of motion had been presented by or through a legal practitioner representing the appellant, it would have been struck out.' (b) (at [28]) 'The action was commenced more than 11 years ago. The various amendments to the plaintiff's statement of claim now appear to be complete and the defendant has filed a defence. The case must be prepared for trial on the merits and firm directions are to be given to that end forthwith.' 34Martin v NRMA Insurance Limited [2000] FCA 773: See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 34. Mr Martin sought leave to appeal Miles CJ's above decision. The Full Courtgave an extempore decision, holding(at [8]) that Miles CJ was correct for two reasons, each of which, standing alone, would have been sufficient. The first was that Martin's affidavit clearly did not satisfy the requirements of the relevant Court rule concerning such affidavits. The second was the fact that the case involved considerable complexities and room for dispute, so that it was appropriate to exercise the discretion against entering summary judgment. 35NRMA Insurance Limited v Anthony Gilbert Martin &Ors [1988] ACTSC 31 (9 June 1988): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 35. The substantive proceedings concerned an application by the plaintiff, the registered mortgagee of a property located at Kambah, that Mr Martin, his wife and children, all of whom were mortgagors of the property, and who had all lodged caveats over it, should show cause why their caveats should not be removed. Mr Martin and his family raised a preliminary objection that the plaintiff was not a "registered proprietor" within the meaning of the relevant statutory provision, and therefore had no standing to bring the application. Kelly J held, as a matter of construction of the relevant provision, and on authority, that the defendant's preliminary objection should be dismissed. He also ordered that the relevant caveat be removed and that the defendants be restrained from lodging any further caveats pending the hearing of the application. 36Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Individual Homes Pty Limited [1994] ACTSC 41; (1994) 119 ACTR 1 (4 May 1994): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 36.4These proceedings involved an application by the Commonwealth Bank for an order that Individual Homes be wound up on the ground that company was unable to pay its debts. The decision is relied upon because Miles CJ refers to Individual Homes having filed a document entitled "Notice of Opposition to the Application", which his Honour described as being "unnecessary" and "add[ing] to the length and cost of the proceedings". 37Anthony Gilbert Martin, Sue Dolores Martin and Individual Homes Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1994] ACTSC 64 (23 June 1994): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 37.An application was made by Mr Martin, his wife and Individual Homes against the Commonwealth Bank seeking, initially, relief by way of a declaration that the bank had no "caveat or interest" in the land at Kambah. The Commonwealth Bank applied for summary judgment, or alternatively, an order striking out the plaintiff's claim. The Court concluded that the pleading disclosed no reasonable cause of action and should be struck out. Miles CJ referred to the plaintiffs' case as pleaded as being "utterly untenable", and would have concluded that it was vexatious and an abuse of process, were it not for the fact that Martin and his wife were unrepresented. However, his Honour declined to order summary judgment in favour of the bank on the basis that such relief should only be granted where the Court is appraised of some justiciable issues between the parties in which the plaintiff's case is hopeless. In this case, his Honour held the claim was too confused for any real question to be observable or any cause of action or a justiciable claim to be examinable. 38Anthony Gilbert Martin and Sue Dolores Martin v Barry Anthony Taylor and Individual Homes Pty Limited (In Liquidation) ACN 008 495 761 [1999] ACTSC 52 (27 May 1999):See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 38. Mr Martin and his wife soughtrulings on six "points of law" some of which were determined favourably to the plaintiffs by Higgins J. However, a subsequent appeal by Mr Martin to the Full Federal Court (See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 44, p 311 at [38] and [40]) resulted in a finding that the decision of Higgins J should be set aside, because the only order open to the primary judge was to dismiss the proceeding as incompetent. 39Martin v Purnell [1999] FCA 872 (29 June 1999): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 39. Appeal brought by Martin against from the decision of Higgins J dated 16 October 1998 in ACT Supreme Court proceedings SC87/1998 and SC92/1998 (this decision is not reported or otherwise publicly available). By that decision it was ordered that notices of appeal to the Supreme Court from decisions of the ACT Magistrates Court be struck out. In the ACT Magistrates Court proceedings, Martin laid, or purported to lay, a number of informations against each of four respondents alleging against them offences under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and the Landlord and Tenant Act 1949 (ACT). These informations were dismissed by the Magistrate. Mr Martin achieved partial success,in that the Full Court held that the Magistrate was wrong in law to dismiss the informations without a hearing on the merits, and without giving Martin an opportunity to identify the facts upon which the charges were based. 40Individual Homes Pty Limited (In Liquidation) v Anthony Gilbert Martin and Sue Dolores Martin [1999] ACTSC 139 (16 December 1999): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 40.The liquidator of Individual Homes filed an application seeking possession of the Kambah property. Higgins J held (at [68]): 'No arguable defence being shown to exist, there will be an order that the plaintiff have leave to enter judgment for possession'. 41Martin v Individual Homes Pty Ltd (in liq) [1999] FCA 1869 (23 December 1999): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 41.Mr and Mrs Martin sought a stayof execution of the judgment of Higgins J referred to immediately above, pending the conclusion of the hearing of an appeal from that decision. While Finn J found that, on the material before him, it was "not obvious" that Martin's appeal from the decision of Higgins J was a strong one, his Honour was not prepared to say that the appeal was totally unarguable. 42Martin v Individual Homes Pty Ltd (in liq) [2000] FCA 795 (18 May 2000) - proceedings A105/1999:See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 42.The substantive appeal from the decision of Higgins J was ultimately dismissed with the Full Court holding that there was no error demonstrated in the conclusions reached by Higgins J. 43Martin v Individual Homes Pty Limited (in liq) ACN 008495 761 [2000] FCA 1073 (19 July 2000):See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 43. Mr Martin and his wife sought a stay of the order for possession and its execution, pending the hearing of Martin's application for special leave to appeal to the High Court. The Court held (at [9], [12] and [13]) that the prejudice to the Martins if they were evicted 'cannot sustain an order staying the legal effect of the order for possession and its execution in the absence of any demonstrated arguable legal foundation for impugning the order for possession or the writ of possession issued to enforce it'. 44Martin v Individual Homes Pty Limited (in liq) ACN 008495 761[2001] FCA 91 (9 February 2001): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 45. Appeal by Mr Martin to the Full Federal Court from an interlocutory decision of Miles CJ. The Full Court held that most of the claims for relief in the notice of motion raised questions which it was no longer open to Martin to raise. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed upon the ground that it was frivolous or vexatious (see [3] of the Judgment at Tab 45 p 316). Gyles J, in his concurring judgment, further noted (at [10] of the Judgment at Tab 45 p 317) that the joinder of Mallesons Stephen Jaques to the proceedings was "plainly an abuse of the process", there being no possible basis upon which they should have been added. 45Martin v NRMA Limited [2004] ACTCA 20 (12 May 2004): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 47. Mr Martin filed a further application following a change in name from NRMA Insurance Limited to Insurance Australia Ltd. The ACT Court of Appeal dismissed the application on the basis that the issue raised had no effect, as a matter of law, upon Mr Martin's rights or any issue involved in his original application. 46Martin v Insurance Australia Ltd, in the matter of Martin[2005] FCA 323 (8 March 2005): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 48. Mr Martin applied to set aside a bankruptcy notice addressed to him and issued by Insurance Australia Ltd (formerly NRMA). Madgwick J held that there was insufficient material before him to indicate that there was any substance to Mr Martin's application and no evidence establishing that Mr Martin had an effective or bona fide claim. 47Martin v Insurance Australia Ltd [2005] ACTCA 17 (10 May 2005): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 49. This judgment concerned the following appeals and applications for leave to appeal: (a) An appeal (ACTCA 46/2003) from decisions made by Connolly J on 14 November 2003 (which are not reported): 1. Dismissing motions to issue a warrant of arrest for the Chief Executive of NRMA, have him charged with contempt of Court and have a solicitor who had been acting for the respondent charged with contempt of Court; 2. Refusing to grant Martin an adjournment of the motion; and 3. Refusing to disqualify himself; (b) An appeal (ACTCA 54/2003) from a decision made by Connolly J on 1 December 2003 (which is not reported) to grant leave for short service of a notice of motion filed by NRMA seeking orders that certain paragraphs from a notice of motion filed by Martin be struck out for want of prosecution and costs; (c) An application for leave to appeal (ACTCA 5/2004) from interlocutory decisions made by Connolly J on 1 April 2004 (these have not been reported): 1 Ordering that the costs of, and incidental to, a motion filed by Martin for leave to amend pleadings by changing the name of the respondent from "NRMA Insurance Ltd" to "Insurance Australia Limited" be costs in the cause; 2 Dismissing a notice of motion filed by Martin (it is not clear from the judgment which motion) that had sought the dismissal of NRMA's motion and other orders; and 3 Dismissing an amended notice of motion filed by Martin seeking various forms of relief, including orders striking out the defence and giving judgment for the appellant in the sum of $715,295.86 as special damages and a further $200 million as general, aggravated and exemplary damages. 4 An appeal (ACTCA 13/2004) from decisions made by Connolly on 29 April 2004 ordering that Martin be given seven days to comply with the orders and directions made on 1 April 2004, that the proceedings be dismissed should he fail to comply with that order, and giving the parties liberty to re-list the matter on the issue of costs. The ACT Court of Appeal recorded the extremely protracted procedural history of the matter, later stating (at [16] Tab 49 p 347): The notices of appeal are also quite inadequate. Many of the assertions relied upon as grounds of appeal are scandalous or vexatious whilst others are vague or expressed in general terms unaccompanied by any attempt to relate the allegations to particular findings or otherwise identify any ground of appeal with sufficient precision to enable it to be sensibly addressed. Ultimately, the Court of Appeal was unable to discern any appealable error in the approach taken by Connolly J (see [20] Tab 49 p 348) in various decisions the subject of the appeal. Accordingly, it dismissed the appeals and the application for leave to appeal.

High Court of Australia proceedings 48Re Martin's Application[2001] HCA 41; (2001) 180 ALR 453 (11 July 2001): See Ex ADB-1, July Affidavit, Tab 46. Kirby J considered an application brought by Mr and Mrs Martin for leave to issue a summons against Individual Homes (In Liq) and the partners of a firm of solicitors who had previously acted for Individual Homes. Callinan J had previously refused to issue the proposed summons and directed that it not be filed without the leave of a Justice. Kirby J recited the procedural history of the matter in some detail, before holding that the relief sought would have no utility, and would not be just or lawful, and on that basis refused the application.

Special Leave Applications in the High Court On 15 August 2012the High Court of Australia made orders: 49(a) dismissing Mr Martin's special leave applications S108 of 2012, S109 of 2012 and S131 of 2012, from Court of Appeal proceedings Martin v State of New South Wales and Anor (No 14) [2012] NSWCA 46: see September Affidavit, Annexures A and B; and 50(b) dismissing Mr Martin's special leave application S 132 of 2012, from Court of Appeal proceedings Martin v State of New South Wales and Ors (No 15) [2012] NSWCA 47: see September Affidavit, Annexures C and D.

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Landlord and Tenant Act 1949(ACT)

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