Attorney General of New South Wales v Martin

Supreme Court of NSW|2015-02-17|Before: Simpson J

The application

Section 8 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act relevantly provides: "8 Making of vexatious proceedings order (1) When orders may be made An authorised court may make an order under this section (a vexatious proceedings order) in relation to a person if the court is satisfied that: (a) the person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia, or (b) … (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an authorised court may have regard to: (a) proceedings instituted or conducted in any Australian court or tribunal (including proceedings instituted or conducted before the commencement of this section), and (b) orders made by any Australian court or tribunal (including orders made before the commencement of this section). (3) … (4) Orders may be made on court's own motion or on application An authorised court may make a vexatious proceedings order of its own motion or on the application of any of the following persons: (a) the Attorney General, (b) … (c) … (d) a person against or in relation to whom another person has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings, (e) a person who, in the opinion of the court, has a sufficient interest in the matter. (5) An application for a vexatious proceedings order may be made by a person referred to in subsection (4)(e) only with the leave of the authorised court. (6) … (7) Orders that may be made by Supreme Court The Supreme Court may make any one or more of the following vexatious proceedings orders in relation to a person: (a) an order staying all or part of any proceedings in New South Wales already instituted by the person, (b) an order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings in New South Wales, (c) any other order that the Court considers appropriate in relation to the person. (8) … (9) …"
"Proceedings" is widely defined in s 4, as follows: "(a) any cause, matter, action, suit, proceedings, trial, complaint or inquiry of any kind within the jurisdiction of any court or tribunal, and (b) any proceedings (including any interlocutory proceedings) taken in connection with or incidental to proceedings pending before a court or tribunal, and (c) any calling into question of a decision, whether or not a final decision, of a court or tribunal, and whether by appeal, challenge, review or in another way."

An evidentiary issue

At the outset of the proceedings, a question arose concerning the admissibility of some of the evidence tendered on behalf of the Attorney General. Section 91 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) provides as follows: "91 Exclusion of evidence of judgments and convictions (1) Evidence of the decision, or of a finding of fact, in an Australian or overseas proceeding is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that was in issue in that proceeding. (2) Evidence that, under this Part, is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact may not be used to prove that fact even if it is relevant for another purpose."
Counsel for the Attorney General submitted that the Attorney General was entitled to rely upon the "findings" in these judgments because none of the earlier proceedings dealt with the question of whether the claims made by Mr Martin are "vexatious" within the meaning of s 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act. That, in my opinion, implies too broad a test. Whether s 91 operates to exclude the use of any of the decisions and judgments will depend upon an analysis of three things - (i) what facts were in issue in those proceedings; (ii) what facts were found in the decisions; and (iii) the use to which the Attorney General seeks to put those judgments - that is, what facts she seeks to prove by their use.
The use that may, in an application under s 8 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, be made of the findings and conclusions of the court that heard and determined the proceedings that give rise to the application has been considered on a number of previous occasions. Only one of those was at appellate level: Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 8) [2014] NSWCA 125. The Court of Appeal said: "50 Secondly, a number of decisions have held that it is necessary for the Court considering an application under the VP Act to form its own judgment about each proceeding said to satisfy the definition of 'vexatious proceedings', but that in doing so the Court may take into account the findings and views expressed by the judicial officers who resolved each of the proceedings: Attorney General of New South Wales v Croker [2010] NSWSC 942 at [125] (Fullerton J) (following the views expressed by Patten AJ in Attorney General v Bar-Mordecai [2005] NSWSC 142 at [5] in relation to s 84 of the [Supreme Court] Act [1970]); Attorney General v Chan [2011] NSWSC 1315 at [39] (Adamson J) (and other cases cited there); Attorney General of New South Wales v Martin [2013] NSWSC 442 at [9] (Hidden J) (citing Attorney General v Chan at [39]). 51 Section 8(1)(a) of the VP Act requires the authorised court to be satisfied that the person against whom an order is sought has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia. To be so satisfied, the court must identify the vexatious proceedings that have been instituted or conducted by that person and make a finding as to whether he or she has instituted or conducted such proceedings 'frequently'. A necessary element in this process is making a finding as to whether each of the proceedings relied on (or a sufficient number of them) satisfies the definition of 'vexatious proceedings' in s 6 of the VP Act. 52 Section 6 does not specify the matters that the court dealing with the application under the VP Act should take into account in determining whether particular proceedings were, for example, an abuse of the process of the court (s 6(a)) or instituted without reasonable ground (s 6(c)). There is nothing in the language of s 6 to indicate that a finding by the court in the earlier proceedings that they were an abuse of process or instituted without reasonable grounds is determinative on an application under the VP Act. Equally, there is nothing to indicate that a finding made or view expressed by the court in the earlier proceedings is to carry no weight on an application under the VP Act. 53 Ordinarily, the court that heard and decided the earlier proceedings will have been best placed to determine whether they were an abuse of process or instituted without reasonable grounds. It would be an odd result if such a determination simply has to be ignored by a court hearing an application under the VP Act. The oddity of the result is reinforced by the likelihood that an application under the VP Act would be prolonged if the findings made and views expressed in the earlier proceedings could not be taken into account. Indeed there would be a real risk that the court would be burdened with relitigation of issues of the very kind that the legislation is designed to avoid. 54 On the other hand, the seriousness of the consequences of making a vexatious proceedings order supports a construction of ss 6 and 8 of the VP Act that leaves it open to the court hearing an application for a vexatious proceedings order to depart from the findings made in the earlier proceedings. However, in the ordinary course it would require very persuasive material to justify such a departure."
Two things are to be observed about these passages. First, there is no indication that the Court was referred to s 91, and that provision did not play any part in the approach to the question of the evidence available to support an application under s 8. Second, the Court did not reach (or state) any concluded view concerning the admissibility of the judgments to prove, in the Vexatious Proceedings Act proceedings, the facts found by the court that decided the proceeding in question. The Court merely expressed the view that exclusion of those findings would be "an odd result", and antithetical to the purposes of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.
A number of other decisions (some of them identified in [50] of Teoh (No 8)) upon which the Attorney General placed reliance similarly did not refer to s 91: Croker, Bar-Mordecai (both referred to in [50]); Attorney General v Wilson [2010] NSWSC 1008; Attorney General in and for the State of NSW v Gargan [2010] NSWSC 1192; Attorney General in and for the State of NSW v Potier [2014] NSWSC 118 and Attorney General in and for the State of NSW v Markisic [2014] NSWSC 1596.
In Chan (one of the decisions referred to in Teoh (No 8)), the attention of Adamson J was drawn to s 91. Her Honour accepted a submission that evidence of the judgments relied upon to prove that the defendant had frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in that case was adduced to establish matters other than facts in issue in the proceedings: "namely, the outcome of the proceedings and the course they had taken". She noted a further submission that: "… in so far as they contained judicial statements that reflected the views of judicial officers of the Defendant's conduct or the merit of the proceedings, they were relevant for the reasons set out in the authorities referred to above." The "authorities referred to above" included Wilson, Croker, and Gargan. As to those authorities, Adamson J said: "39 While the Court needs to form its own view about each piece of litigation relied on by the Attorney General, the Court is entitled to have regard to the result of the proceedings, and where appropriate, the findings of, and views expressed by, the various judicial officers who dealt with them …" Her Honour concluded: "47 … The judgments establish the procedural matters and the outcome of various applications made by, and against, the Defendant, in the proceedings relied upon by the Plaintiff. Furthermore, they also record the Defendant's conduct in the course of the proceedings. These matters do not constitute findings of facts in issue in the proceedings. Whether such judgments contain statements which express judicial views on the merit, or otherwise, of the Defendant's stance in proceedings, the judgments are the best, if not the only, evidence of such views. Accordingly, I admitted the evidence tendered by the Plaintiff, notwithstanding the Defendant's objection on that basis. Nonetheless I am cognisant of s 91(1) and have not used such judgments for the proscribed purpose."
In Markisic, Schmidt J adopted a similar approach.
In Potier, McCallum J noted that the judgments in question were admitted without objection, and that neither party had addressed as to the provisions of s 91. Nevertheless, her Honour said: "19 I do not know whether the application of that section has been considered in any proceedings for orders under the Vexatious Proceedings Act. As already stated, neither party addressed me on that issue. Noting that circumstance, the proper approach would appear to be to take care not to rely upon any finding of fact recorded in the decisions tendered by the Attorney General as evidence of any fact to be established in the present application where that was a fact in issue in the proceeding reported in the relevant judgment."
As I have indicated above, in my opinion whether the judgments upon which the Attorney General relies can be used for the purpose for which she seeks to use them will depend upon an analysis of the facts that were in issue in the proceedings giving rise to each judgment and the findings of fact made in the judgments.
It is convenient here to note an alternative submission made on behalf of the Attorney General, against the possibility that evidence of the judgments on which reliance was placed was rejected under s 91. That alternative submission was that I order, pursuant to s 190(3)(b) of the Evidence Act, that s 91 does not apply to the evidence. Section 190(1) empowers the court (where the parties consent) to dispense with the application of various provisions of the Evidence Act, including "Parts 3.2 to 3.8". Section 91 is contained in Pt 3.5. Section 190(3)(b) permits an order that any one or more of those provisions does not apply to that evidence if their application would cause or involve unnecessary expense or delay.
I reject the submission. The facts sought to be proved by the evidence (in those cases where I reject it) is fundamental to the issues to be determined. Section 192(2) must be considered. The considerations identified in pars (b), (c) and (d) militate against the use of s 190(3)(b) for the purpose proposed.
The Attorney General has identified approximately 50 proceedings in which Mr Martin has been involved. Annexure A to Mr Baril's first affidavit lists 49 such matters. Of those Mr Martin is named as the moving party in all except four. In two of those four, the moving party was a company (Individual Homes Pty Ltd) of which, it was suggested, he was a Director and shareholder. (Mr Martin disputed this.) Annexure A does not contain any information about the nature of the proceedings, or, importantly, their outcome. Far from all of those proceedings are relied upon on behalf of the Attorney General as vexatious proceedings for the purposes of the application. That Mr Martin has initiated, or been involved in the initiation of, a large number of proceedings of itself tells little, if anything, relevant to s 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.
To know more about the proceedings it will be necessary to go to the two volumes of documents exhibited to Mr Baril's affidavit.
In written submissions, followed by oral submissions, counsel for the Attorney General identified 16 "proceedings" upon which particular reliance was placed. Not all of these were relied upon as "vexatious proceedings" within the meaning of s 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act; in the case of at least three (and possibly five) reliance was placed upon those judgments as "context" evidence. However, the position adopted on behalf of the Attorney General in this respect was a little unclear. Although reliance upon those proceedings as "vexatious" within s 6 was expressly disclaimed, nevertheless s 6(d) was invoked. The position of the Attorney General appeared to be that she could rely upon a pattern of conduct in various proceedings in such a way as to come within s 6(d).
Having regard to the definition of "proceedings" in s 4 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, I doubt that that position can be accepted. However, I have no doubt that the conduct of discrete proceedings, even those that do not fit neatly into any of the s 6 categories, is available to be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion to make an order under s 8(7). That discretion, of course, does not arise unless and until the first and second conditions have been satisfied - that is, that Mr Martin instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings, and that he did so frequently.

The evidence

The evidence shows that Mr Martin has filed (at least) five separate proceedings in the Land and Environment Court of NSW. They were given the numbers, respectively, 80004 of 2009, 80002 of 2010, 80004 of 2010, 80006 of 2010, and 80001 of 2011. All appear to raise issues concerning applications by Mr Martin for exploration licences under the Mining Act 1992 (NSW), or such licences granted to other individuals. In each case, interlocutory applications were made, either by Mr Martin, or by those named as defendants in the proceedings.
Mr Martin has also filed a number of appeals to the Court of Appeal, and applications in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, and, in one case, an application to the High Court of Australia.
It is now necessary to deal with each of those proceedings upon which the Attorney General relies to prove that Mr Martin has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings within s 6. In each case, a preliminary question will be whether the judgment is admissible having regard to the provisions of s 91 of the Evidence Act.

Proceedings in the Land and Environment Court of NSW

(i) Martin v NSW Department of Industry and Investment [2009] NSWLEC 1447

By Summons filed in the Land and Environment Court on 24 September 2009, Mr Martin sought orders as follows: "1 Renewal and Restoration of NSW Exploration Licence EL 6355 to Anthony Gilbert Martin 2 Damages to Anthony Gilbert Martin 3 Cancellation of Exploration Licences granted to third parties, who obtained confidential intellectual property contrary to law." I will refer to these as "the principal proceedings".
The Summons named the NSW Department of Industry and Investment as first defendant, and 11 named individuals as second to twelfth defendants.
On 11 November Mr Martin sought leave to file an Amended Summons. The proposed Amended Summons expanded the orders sought to include several claims concerning mining exploration licences, and, additionally: "5 Dr Richard Sheldrake, Mr Bradley W Mullard, Mr Lindsay Gilligan, Mr John Leeks, Mr Rodney George and Mr Stephen Hughes to show cause why they should not be charged with contempt of court." and: "6 Cancellation of Exploration Licences Application ELA 3759 applied for by Central West Scientific Pty Ltd. 7 Penalties under the Mining Act 1992L against defendants 1-12 8 Damages under the Mining Act 1992 to Anthony Gilbert Martin or Sue Dolores Martin or Anthony Gilbert Martin and Sue Dolores Martin …" The individuals named in prayer 5 were among the twelve defendants to the Summons. The proposed Amended Summons substituted Mr Sheldrake as the first defendant, and named Central West Scientific Pty Ltd as the twelfth defendant.
At about the same time, the first defendant filed a Notice of Motion seeking to have the proceedings struck out under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (NSW) 13.4. Both Notices of Motion constituted or gave rise to "proceedings" within the definition in s 4(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.
On 11 December 2009 those interlocutory proceedings came before Commissioner Dixon, who delivered an extempore judgment on the same day. The Commissioner first dealt with the first defendant's application under UCPR 13.4.
UCPR 13.4 provides as follows: "13.4 Frivolous and vexatious proceedings (1) If in any proceedings it appears to the court that in relation to the proceedings generally or in relation to any claim for relief in the proceedings: (a) the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, or (b) no reasonable cause of action is disclosed, or (c) the proceedings are an abuse of the process of the court, the court may order that the proceedings be dismissed generally or in relation to that claim. (2) The court may receive evidence on the hearing of an application for an order under subrule (1)." The facts in issue were, accordingly, (i) whether the principal proceedings were frivolous or vexatious (ii) whether the Summons commencing the proceedings disclosed any reasonable cause of action, and, (iii) whether the proceedings were an abuse of the process of the court.
The Commissioner noted that Mr Martin had relied upon an affidavit and a "bundle of documents filed in court". The judgment includes the following: "11 … Therefore, I have decided that the proceedings are to been [sic] dismissed under s [sic] 13.4(1) on the grounds of; (a) the proceedings would be vexatious and frivolous if they were to proceed further than today; (b) no reasonable cause of action (c) the proceedings are an abuse of process if I were to allow them … … 14 I find no reasonable cause of action against the defendants disclosed in any of the documentation that has been filed by the applicant or anything that he has said to me during the course of the day to clarify his claim … … 20 I have considered for some hours this morning and this afternoon the applicant's allegations and found no reasonable cause of action alleged in the original summons or the amended summons attached to the notice of motion. 21 Accordingly, I have had regard to the dictates of justice and have decided to dismiss the application under s [sic] 13.4 of the UCPR 2005 together with the application for injunction made in Court on the same grounds because there is no reasonable cause made out, to support the application."
The Attorney General relied upon this judgment to establish that the principal proceedings were vexatious within the definition of "vexatious proceedings" in ss 6(a) and 6(c) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act - that is, that the proceedings were an abuse of process of the Land and Environment Court, and that they were instituted or pursued without reasonable ground.
That is, in substance, precisely what Commissioner Dixon found. In other words, the Attorney General seeks to rely upon the factual findings of Commissioner Dixon to establish the existence of the relevant facts for the purposes of s 6. That the proceedings before Commissioner Dixon disclosed "no reasonable cause of action" is a finding of fact that the proceedings were instituted "without reasonable ground". That is the very fact that the Attorney General seeks to prove in order to establish that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(c). Commissioner Dixon also found that the proceedings were an abuse of process. That is the very fact that the Attorney General seeks to prove in order to establish that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6(a).
Accordingly, s 91 of the Evidence Act precludes reliance upon Commissioner Dixon's findings of fact for the purpose of proving that the proceedings were vexatious.
Since the Attorney General may not rely upon those findings of fact by Commissioner Dixon to establish the facts she seeks to establish for the purposes of s 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, it is appropriate, if the evidence permits, that I make that judgment myself, without recourse to the findings of fact of Commissioner Dixon: see Teoh (No 8) at [51]; Chan at [39]. In this instance, that is not possible. All that is before me is the Summons and the proposed Amended Summons; there was, as indicated above, affidavit and documentary evidence before Commissioner Dixon which appears to have been material to her determination. Although both the Summons and the proposed Amended Summons contain some prayers for relief that are, perhaps, questionable, I am not in any position to determine that they come within any of the paragraphs of s 6. That conclusion could only be reached by having recourse to the judgment of Commissioner Dixon.
Absent reliance on the findings of fact by Commissioner Dixon, I cannot find that the principal proceedings were vexatious.

(ii) Martin v NSW Minister for Mineral and Forest Resources [2010] NSWLEC 131

The originating process in respect of these proceedings is not contained in the evidence. The principal proceeding was described by Biscoe J as: "… what appeared to be judicial review proceedings challenging the validity of the respondent Minister's refusal of an exploration licence under the Mining Act 1992."
The proceedings first came before Biscoe J by way of two Notices of Motion, one filed by Mr Martin, and one filed by the Minister. Mr Martin sought summary judgment, interim orders and leave to serve subpoenas. The Minister sought determination of a separate question concerning the jurisdiction of the court to review on its merits a decision under the Mining Act.
In his judgment, Biscoe J recorded three arguments advanced by Mr Martin, each of which he rejected. It is not necessary to record two of those arguments. Biscoe J was able to deal with them in short order. One of Mr Martin's arguments that calls for notice was that the decision he challenged had been made by a person who lacked an appropriate delegation. Biscoe J rejected that argument also. He accordingly rejected Mr Martin's application for summary judgment.
There is no finding of any fact in issue in the proceedings contained within the judgment upon which the Attorney General relies for the purposes of s 6; accordingly, the judgment is admissible as evidence from which inferences may be drawn concerning Mr Martin's conduct of litigation. However, the Attorney General does not contend that these proceedings were themselves vexatious within any of the s 6 categories; rather, she contends that they can be relied upon to establish "context", demonstrating a pattern of behaviour that comes within s 6(d).
In my opinion, this decision is relevant to the exercise of discretion, should the Attorney General succeed in establishing the first and second steps.
Mr Martin appealed against the decision to the Court of Appeal. The appeal was dismissed: Martin v State of NSW (No 9) [2011] NSWCA 286, per Basten JA, Handley AJA. The Court held that the decision of Biscoe J was "clearly correct for the reasons he gave".

(iii) Martin v Minister for Mineral and Forest Resources [2011] NSWLEC 1011

The principal proceedings came before Commissioner Dixon. Mr Martin again raised an issue about the validity of the delegation pursuant to which the challenged decision was made. Commissioner Dixon dealt with that by observing that the same point had been raised before Biscoe J and rejected (in the proceedings mentioned under (ii) above). Commissioner Dixon then dealt with an allegation made by Mr Martin that employees of the Department (other than the delegate) had acted in bad faith in relation to his application; she rejected the submission as "unsupportable". She dismissed a ground in which Mr Martin made an allegation of contempt. Having dealt with other complaints made by Mr Martin, she dismissed "the appeal".
The Attorney General relies upon this decision to establish that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of ss 6(a), 6(c) and s 6(d).
There is no relevant finding of fact that would be excluded by reason of s 91 of the Evidence Act. It is apparent that the proceedings were brought without reasonable cause, and, accordingly, come within ss 6(a) and 6(c) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.

80004 of 2010

The originating process for this proceeding was not in evidence. It can be seen that it was a Summons seeking judicial review of the grant of a mining exploration licence apparently in favour of some other person (presumably Central West Scientific Pty Ltd).

(iv) Martin v State of NSW [2010] NSWLEC 247

By Notice of Motion filed on 22 November 2010 Mr Martin sought a variety of orders, one of which was an order that the State of NSW show cause why it should not be charged with contempt of court. He also sought leave to file summary judgment against the respondents, discovery, and an order that: "the Crown Solicitor (who is acting for the first respondent) file and serve on the applicant his authority from the Attorney General to draft points of defence on behalf of the first respondent."
The Notice of Motion was not in evidence. It is apparent that it named the State of NSW as first respondent and Central West Scientific Pty Ltd as second respondent.
Biscoe J declined to make the orders sought, other than as to discovery, which was not contested. Mr Martin's claim was determined on its merits; there was no fact in issue concerning the nature of the proceedings. Accordingly, there is no preclusion on the use of the judgment by reason of s 91 of the Evidence Act.
It is, however, plain from the judgment that the Notice of Motion had significant deficiencies. As set out in the judgment of Biscoe J, it was procedurally irregular with respect to the contempt claim; the evidence to support the claim for summary judgment was "quite inadequate"; there was no obligation on the Crown Solicitor to provide the authority sought.
I have concluded that, apart from the claim for discovery, the interlocutory proceeding commenced by this Notice of Motion was misconceived. It was, within s 6(a) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, an abuse of the process of the Land and Environment Court; it was, within the meaning of s 6(c), instituted without reasonable cause.

(v) Martin v State of NSW and Central West Scientific Pty Ltd [2011] NSWLEC 50

Mr Martin's Summons came before Preston CJ in the Land and Environment Court for final hearing. Preston CJ summarised Mr Martin's challenges to the decisions of the Minister as (I have paraphrased): (i) use and supply of confidential information; (ii) failure to consider relevant matters; (iii) invalidity of an instrument of delegation; (iv) invalidity of an application for a mining exploration licence by the second respondent; (v) invalidity of the issue of a mining licence; (vi) breach of good faith; (vii) policy considerations; (viii) denial of opportunity to Mr Martin to apply for a licence; (ix) misuse of Mr Martin's confidential intellectual property; (x) preferential treatment accorded to the second respondent; (xi) that the first respondent was motivated by personal monetary gain to issue a licence to the second respondent.
Attention may be drawn to the challenge numbered (iii). Preston CJ noted that that argument, concerning the validity of a delegation, had already been rejected in Martin v NSW Minister for Mineral and Forest Resources [2010] NSWLEC 131. It had also been rejected by Commissioner Dixon in Martin v Minister for Mineral and Forest Resources [2011] NSWLEC 1011 (see (iii) above).
Preston CJ rejected all challenges and dismissed the proceedings. He ordered Mr Martin to pay the first respondent's costs of the proceedings, and the out of pocket expenses incurred by the second respondent (Central West Scientific Pty Ltd) for the purposes of the proceedings.
The Attorney General relies upon this judgment to establish that the proceedings were conducted so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose, within s 6(d) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act. In particular, the Attorney General relied upon [154] of the judgment, in which Preston CJ held: "Mr Martin's eleventh ground of challenge is that EL 7547 was granted by the Minister to CWS to facilitate personal monetary gain by the Minister and senior executives and junior operational level officers of his department. I reject this claim. There is absolutely no evidence at all supporting this claim."
There are no findings of facts in issue in the proceeding within s 91 of the Evidence Act. Rather, from the account given by Preston CJ of the claims made by Mr Martin, the arguments advanced by him, and the dismissal of all challenges, I am able to reach my own conclusions.
I am satisfied that this proceeding was vexatious within the terms of s 6(d) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.

(vi) Martin v State of NSW [2011] NSWLEC 126

These proceedings were commenced by Summons filed on 13 December 2010. The Summons named the State of NSW as first defendant, Highlake Resources Pty Ltd as second defendant, and Mr and Mrs Ross Savas as third and fourth defendants. Mr Martin sought an order that an identified exploration licence was "null and void under the NSW Mining Act 1992", and a direction that the Minister for Mineral Resources cancel that licence. No relief was sought in the Summons against Mr or Mrs Savas. Mr and Mrs Savas therefore filed a Notice of Motion seeking that the proceedings, so far as they were brought against them, be struck out. Sheahan J, exercising the powers under UCPR 13.4(1)(b), dismissed the proceedings against Mr and Mrs Savas. He held that none of the material before the Court disclosed any cause of action, relevant to the Court's jurisdiction, against those defendants.
Mr Martin appealed against that ruling to the Court of Appeal. The appeal was dismissed: Martin v State of NSW [2011] NSWCA 281.
The finding that the material did not disclose any cause of action was a finding of fact that was in issue in the proceeding before Sheahan J, and upon which the Attorney General now seeks to rely to establish that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of ss 6(a) and 6(c) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.
In accordance with my earlier rulings, the judgment of Sheahan J is not, by reason of s 91 of the Evidence Act, admissible to prove the existence of the facts in issue.
As was the case in respect of the proceedings referred to in item (i) above, it would be open to the Attorney General to seek to establish, by evidence, and independently of the judgment of Sheahan J, that the proceedings were, for example, instituted without reasonable ground. However, that has not been done, and there is no material before me upon which I could make such a judgment.

(vii) Martin v State of NSW [2011] NSWLEC 20

Mr Martin filed Points of Claim in the principal proceedings. The Points of Claim included such assertions as: "2 Highlake Resources is the company [a named individual] uses as the corporate vehicle to apply for exploration licences in NSW based on pilfered valuable intellectual property and commercial information." and: "38 [The named individual and others] like Tellus Resources Limited are using illegally under the NSW Mining Act 1997 [resources] confidentially supplied by Anthony Gilbert Martin …" Tellus Resources was not a party to the proceedings.
The second respondent (Highlake Resources Pty Ltd) filed a Notice of Motion seeking (inter alia) an order that Mr Martin's Points of Claim be struck out or summarily dismissed, pursuant to UCPR 14.6, 14.8 and 14.28.
UCPR 14.28 provides: "14.28 Circumstances in which court may strike out pleadings (1) The court may at any stage of the proceedings order that the whole or any part of a pleading be struck out if the pleading: (a) discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence or other case appropriate to the nature of the pleading, or (b) has a tendency to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceedings, or (c) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. (2) The court may receive evidence on the hearing of an application for an order under subrule (1)."
Pain J held that Mr Martin had no standing to bring the proceedings. Her Honour held that no ground for judicial review was identified in the Points of Claim. She held that the pleading was embarrassing because the Court had no jurisdiction, direct or ancillary, to determine the allegations made (of, for example, theft of intellectual property and misuse of information) in the Points of Claim. With respect to a cause of action alluded to in the Points of Claim concerning the theft of commercial property, she held that: "… the matters as pleaded do not disclose sufficient facts to establish that there is a cause of action."
Ultimately, her Honour held that the Points of Claim should, in their entirety, be struck out, and she ordered accordingly.
Pain J also made an order against Mr Martin for security for costs; that order was the subject of a successful appeal by Mr Martin: Martin v State of NSW (No 14) [2012] NSWCA 46. The Court of Appeal, however, did not interfere with the orders striking out the points of claim. In the appeal, Mr Martin sought to join Tellus Resources, notwithstanding that it had not been a party at first instance. The orders sought in the Court of Appeal were outside the jurisdiction of that Court.
The Attorney General relies upon this judgment as revealing an instance of Mr Martin instituting vexatious proceedings against Tellus Resources, under ss 6(a), 6(c) and 6(d) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act. I am satisfied that such a finding is warranted.

(viii) Martin v State of NSW [2011] NSWLEC 129

By Notice of Motion filed on 25 January 2011, Mr Martin sought orders for summary judgment, discovery, and a stay of the orders of Sheahan J. He also sought ancillary orders for, inter alia, production of documents, and: "7 An order to the effect - The Honourable Chief Judge calls on the parties, listed below, interested in class 8 matters, for the hearing to the Notice of Motion of His Honour about proportionality of cost in class 8 hearings before this Honourable Court …"
Pain J held that no proper basis had been advanced for a stay of the order made by Sheahan J, and declined to make an order disturbing the costs order made by Sheahan J.
Pain J then noted: "19 After the delivery of orders giving effect to this judgment, Mr Martin has made an application that these orders be stayed. I refuse this applications [sic] on the basis that no relevant submission in support of granting a stay has been made."
She declined to make any order in relation to the relief claimed in prayer 7 of the Notice of Motion.
There is no disputed issue of fact found by Pain J, relevant to the relief now sought by the Attorney General. There is, therefore, no reason with respect to s 91 of the Evidence Act, why this judgment should not be accepted as evidence.
The Attorney General relies upon the proceedings as evidence that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of ss 6(a) and 6(c) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, or, in the alternative 6(d).
It is possible to reach a conclusion as to that; I am satisfied that the proceedings commenced by Notice of Motion were an abuse of the process of the Land and Environment Court (s 6(a)); and were instituted and pursued without reasonable ground (s 6(c)).

80001 of 2011

These proceedings were commenced by Summons filed on 21 January 2011. Mr Martin claimed 17 substantive forms of relief, many of them declarations concerning mining exploration licences. He also sought interim injunctive relief preventing the Minister for Mineral Resources taking any further action with respect to six mining exploration leases.

(ix) Martin v State of NSW (No 2) [2011] NSWLEC 108

On 13 May 2011, Mr Martin filed a Notice of Motion seeking an order that the Notice of Motion and "associated matters" be heard by the Chief Justice instead of Pain J, and that leave be granted to him to file summary judgment against the State of NSW. In the alternative, he sought a variety of orders, including: "4 This matter be transferred to the New South Wales Supreme Court of Appeal to be heard together with [other matters already filed in that Court.] … 10 [The State of NSW] is ordered to file and serve on the plaintiff its instructions from either the Attorney General or the relevant Minister for Mineral Resources."
Notwithstanding Mr Martin's first application, the Notice of Motion came on for hearing before Pain J. Pain J dismissed the bulk of the Notice of Motion. That included an application for leave to amend the Summons. She deferred ruling on an application to issue certain subpoenas. With respect to an application for summary judgment, she said: "8 … In these circumstances it is simply inappropriate for the Court to exercise its discretion to enter summary judgment …"
The Attorney General relies upon this judgment as evidence that proceedings were conducted in the manner described in s 6(d). There is validity in this position. There was no basis for the application for transfer to the Court of Appeal, and no basis for the claim that the State of NSW provide to him its instructions from either of the Ministers.

(x) Martin v State of NSW (No 14) [2012] NSWCA 46

Mr Martin appealed against the decisions of Preston CJ (item (v) above) and Pain J (item (vii) above). Although he pleaded a number of grounds in the appeal against the decision of Preston CJ, all failed and that appeal was dismissed.
The appeal against the orders of Pain J was partially successful, insofar as it related to orders her Honour had made for security for costs. Mr Martin also filed, in the Court of Appeal, a Notice of Motion in which, inter alia, he sought an order that five of the respondents to the Notice of Motion commenced in those proceedings, together with their legal representatives, "show cause why they should not be charged with contempt of Court". He also sought an order for stay of certain proceedings consequential upon the orders of Sheahan J and Pain J, and an award of exemplary damages of $100,000,000. The Court of Appeal dismissed the Notice of Motion. The Court said: "74 The Court has jurisdiction to deal with contempts committed in the face of the Court, but the jurisdiction to deal with other contempts is properly exercisable in accordance with the procedure provided by Part 55 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW). Private litigants such as Mr Martin have standing to bring such proceedings, but the charges must be formulated with some precision and supported by affidavit evidence: Pt 55 rr 6(2), 7, and 8. The Court cannot entertain the claim in prayer 19."
The Attorney General relies upon this judgment as evidence that, within s 6(d) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, the proceedings were conducted in such a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose. I am satisfied that that claim is made out.

(xi) Martin v State of NSW (No 15) [2012] NSWCA 47

The nature of this proceeding can be discerned from the judgment of Handley AJA (with whom Basten JA agreed). His Honour said: "1 This Court constituted by Basten JA and myself gave judgment in 13 matters between Mr Martin, the State and other parties between 29 August and 19 September 2011. On 26 September Mr Martin applied to set aside all those judgments by a notice of motion which joined the State, Highlake Resources Pty Ltd, Mr and Mrs Savas, Central West Scientific Pty Ltd, Tellus Resources Ltd and Mr Richards as respondents."
Handley AJA said that the Notice of Motion was supported by a nine page affidavit sworn by Mr Martin, with substantial unpaginated annexures. He classified the orders sought into five groups.
In support of that Notice of Motion, Mr Martin relied upon UCPR Pt 36 r 15, which provides: "36.15 General power to set aside judgment or order (1) A judgment or order of the court in any proceedings may, on sufficient cause being shown, be set aside by order of the court if the judgment was given or entered, or the order was made, irregularly, illegally or against good faith."
Handley AJA concluded: "14 There is no substance in any other basis for finding that the orders were made or entered irregularly, illegally, or against good faith within UCPR r 36.15(1). 15 The Court has inherent power to reconsider its interlocutory orders which is preserved by Pt 36, r 36.16(4). As a general rule it will only do so when there has been a change of circumstances or, in cases like these, if the applicant brings forward a new legal argument. … 18 Mr Martin has not identified any ground involving legal error in the reasons for judgment of the Court below, in any of these cases, or in the reasons for judgment of this Court, which could provide an arguable ground for reopening."
The Court dismissed the Notice of Motion.
The Attorney General relies upon this judgment as evidence that the proceeding was vexatious within the meaning of ss 6(a), 6(c) and 6(d).
There is no finding of any fact in issue in the proceedings within s 91 of the Evidence Act which would render this judgment inadmissible. It is admissible as a basis for considering the nature of proceedings brought and pursued by Mr Martin. The finding that there was no basis for finding that the orders came within UCPR 36.15(1) is sufficient to justify a finding that the proceedings were an abuse of the process of the Court and were instituted and pursued without reasonable ground, within the meaning of ss 6(a) and 6(c) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act. I so find.

(xii) Anthony Gilbert Martin v NRMA Insurance Ltd [1998] ACTSC 237

Mr Martin filed a Statement of Claim in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory. Although the Statement of Claim is not in evidence, large portions of it are outlined in the judgment of Crispin J. A Master of the Supreme Court had struck out large portions of the Amended Statement of Claim and refused his application for summary judgment. Mr Martin appealed against that ruling. Crispin J dismissed the appeal. He found a number of the facts pleaded to be irrelevant to any cause of action, and at times embarrassing. He said: "49 In short, I am not satisfied that the Master fell into error in refusing leave for the plaintiff to amend his Statement of Claim by inclusion of the paragraphs to which I have referred or by striking out those paragraphs. On the contrary, I am satisfied that the document was an entirely unsatisfactory pleading which would have given rise to significant potential for embarrassment and confusion."
The Attorney General relies upon this judgment as showing that the proceedings fall within ss 6(a) and 6(c) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act. Alternatively, she relies upon it as evidence of conduct of the kind described in s 6(d).
The findings of Crispin J do not amount to findings of disputed fact of the kind referred to in s 91 of the Evidence Act and this judgment is available for the purpose for which it is relied upon. I am satisfied that the proceedings were an abuse of process (s 6(a)) and instituted without reasonable grounds (s 6(d)).

(xiii) Anthony Gilbert Martin, Sue Dolores Martin and Individual Homes Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1994] ACTSC 64

The originating process for these proceedings is not in evidence. It appears that Mr Martin filed a Statement of Claim in the Supreme Court of the ACT, naming himself, his wife, and Individual Homes as plaintiffs, and the Commonwealth Bank as defendant. The Statement of Claim was amended on more than one occasion. It further appears that the proceedings arose out of a winding up order made in 1994 in respect of Individual Homes. By Notice of Motion the defendant sought an order striking out the claim on the ground that it was frivolous or vexatious or disclosed no reasonable cause of action. The Statement of Claim, as finally amended, was described by Miles CJ as: "31 … a highly complex series of allegations against the Bank essentially for negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of trust arising out of the Bank's conduct concerning mortgages and loan transactions relating to the three properties under consideration." His Honour further said: "36 … In none of those paragraphs, either singly or taken in combination with any other paragraph or group of paragraphs, is it possible to discern what material facts are relied upon in support of any recognizable cause of action. I use that term to include any claim in law, equity or under statute."
His Honour then went on to give illustrations of the deficiencies of the further Amended Statement of Claim, and said: "39 I have experienced considerable difficulty in endeavouring to see whether or not the further amended statement of claim might not somewhere amongst its numerous allegations of wrongdoing on the part of the Bank and damage on the part of the plaintiffs disclose a sufficiently coherent set of facts which could constitute a recognizable cause of action. I have simply not been able to do so … 41 After due consideration, I conclude that the further amended statement of claim does not disclose any reasonable cause of action …"
His Honour therefore struck out the Further Amended Statement of Claim.
The facts in issue in the proceeding before Miles CJ was whether the further Amended Statement of Claim was frivolous or vexatious or disclosed no reasonable cause of action. The passages which I have extracted are findings of fact to that effect. They are the very findings of fact upon which the Attorney General seeks to rely in order to establish that the proceeding was a vexatious proceeding within the meaning of s 6(d) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.
By reason of s 91 of the Evidence Act the judgment is not admissible for that purpose.
There is no other basis on which I could reach a conclusion that the proceedings come within s 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act. I exclude this judgment from consideration.

(xiv) Martin v Individual Homes Pty Ltd (In liq) [2001] FCA 91

Again, the originating process relating to these proceedings is not in evidence. The judgment shows that Mr Martin had sought interlocutory orders in relation to proceedings for the possession of property. Drummond J, with whom Dowsett J and Gyles J (the latter with brief additional comments) agreed, described the proceeding as "frivolous or vexatious".
That was the factual issue in the proceedings; by reason of s 91 of the Evidence Act, the judgment is not available as evidence of that fact.
There is no other basis on which I could conclude that those proceedings come within s 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.

(xv) Anthony Gilbert Martin v Insurance Australia Ltd [2005] ACTCA 17

Mr Martin sought to prosecute three appeals against decisions of Connolly J, and an application for leave to appeal against an interlocutory decision of Connolly J. The matter came before the Court of Appeal of the ACT, constituted by Crispin P, Gray and Marshall JJ.
The Court noted that one of the appeals concerned a decision made by Connolly J dismissing Mr Martin's motion to issue a warrant of arrest for the Chief Executive of NRMA Insurance Ltd, to have him charged with contempt of court, and to have a solicitor who had acted for Insurance Australia Ltd also charged with contempt of court. Mr Martin also sought to challenge a decision by Connolly J to refuse to grant him an adjournment of the hearing, and to refuse to disqualify himself.
These were not the only matters which Mr Martin sought to appeal.
The Court, in a joint judgment, said: "18 Whilst some latitude may be extended to an unrepresented appellant, the Court cannot act on notices of appeal that merely convey diatribes of complaint and fail to identify specific grounds of appeal … … 20 We have been unable to discern any appealable error in the approach taken by Connolly J in relation to the matters before us … In this case, the appellant had ample opportunity to proceed to have his claim heard on its merits but maintained an obdurate refusal to take the necessary steps to have it set down for hearing, even in the face of repeated orders requiring him to do so. Indeed, as we have mentioned, he swore an affidavit in which he made it clear that he had no intention of complying with the orders." Each appeal and application for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs.
There is a question in my mind whether the findings I have recorded amount to findings of facts that were in issue in the proceedings. I have concluded that, on balance, they are findings of such facts and the judgment is therefore not admissible for the purpose for which it is tendered.
There is no other basis on which I could properly conclude that the proceedings were vexatious within the meaning of s 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.

(xvi) Re Martin's Application [2001] HCA 41; 180 ALR 453

On a date which is not disclosed in the evidence, Mr Martin sought leave in the High Court of Australia to issue a Summons against Individual Homes (in liq) and the partners of a firm of solicitors who had previously acted for that company.
The matter came before Kirby J on 28 May 2001.
The judgment of Kirby J records the procedural history, and noted a concession by Mr Martin that he now asserted no interest in possession of the property the subject of the application. He said: "24 To grant leave to the applicant to issue the summons could, therefore, only be justified if, on balance, such a grant of leave would have utility and be just and lawful. Despite the endeavours of the applicant, I have not been persuaded that such relief would have utility in the circumstances as I have explained them or that the other requirements would be met."
Accordingly, he refused the application.
The concession made by Mr Martin is strong evidence that the pursuit of the proceedings (if not their institution) were an abuse of the process of the High Court, within the meaning of s 6(a) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, and that the proceedings were, if not instituted, certainly pursued, without reasonable ground, within the meaning of s 6(c). The judgment of Kirby J is admissible for that purpose.
However, the conclusions expressed at [24] are, essentially, findings of facts in issue in the proceedings, that is, that the proceedings were pursued without reasonable grounds. The judgment cannot be admitted for that purpose.
I am, however, satisfied, by reason of the concession made and recorded in [21] that these proceedings come within ss 6(a) and 6(c) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act.

The submissions

The Attorney General submits that, on an analysis of these proceedings, it can be clearly seen:

that Mr Martin has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia; and
that he has done so frequently.

Conclusions

I have, in recounting the facts of the various cases, made findings concerning the nature of various of the proceedings upon which the Attorney General relied. Excluding those in relation to which the only evidence is contained in judgments that cannot be taken into account by reason of s 91 of the Evidence Act, I am satisfied that Mr Martin has both instituted and conducted proceedings that are vexatious. Moreover, I am satisfied that he has done so frequently, and over a considerable period.
In reaching this conclusion, I have sought to take into account any relevant material put before me by Mr Martin. However, it has been impossible to identify anything that he has put before me, by way of evidence or argument, that throws any light on either of those questions. Mr Martin sought to address a range of perceived wrongs; for example, he exhibited to one of his affidavits a copy of a report of the Independent Commission Against Corruption. This had no bearing upon the issues which I had to determine.
The transcript of the argument reveals that, in purporting to make submissions, Mr Martin constantly diverted from the questions in issue, which he never addressed. The transcript reveals that I asked him repeatedly to address the issues, something he intransigently refused to do, or was incapable of doing.

Discretion

The remaining question is whether the discretion ought to be exercised in favour of making the orders sought by the Attorney General. Mr Martin has provided no discretionary basis for declining to make the orders. I am satisfied that a strong case exists in favour of the Attorney General's application. I propose to make the orders as sought.
I should note one remaining matter. In allowing Mr Martin's appeal against the previous orders, and remitting the matter for rehearing, Sackville AJA questioned the "dual role" of the Attorney General. This was a reference to s 8(4) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act, which, in par (a) permits the Attorney General to make an application. The question raised by Sackville AJA was whether, since the proposed beneficiary of the orders, if made, would be, essentially, Ministers in the government of which the Attorney General is a member, there was any issue raised by what his Honour called "the dual role" of the Attorney General.
Mr Martin addressed no argument to this question. He did appear to suggest that, if the Attorney General is to bring proceedings, it must be on information from the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court. There is no substance in that suggestion.
For myself, I can see no basis upon which the Attorney General ought to be precluded from bringing an application. In that respect she is in a position analogous to that of any litigant mentioned in s 8(4)(d). That paragraph identifies "a person against or in relation to whom another person has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings" as one of the class of people who may make an application.
Although Mr Martin's proceedings have named as defendants Ministers of at least two departments of the government of NSW, the proceedings, in those cases, have been against emanations of the NSW government. I see no reason why the Attorney General should not bring proceedings on behalf of those Ministers. Moreover, the evidence shows that there have also been proceedings in the ACT and in the High Court. The role of the Attorney General is to act to prevent the unwarranted disruption to the system of justice. I have no difficulty in the proposition that the Attorney General has appropriate standing, or authority, to bring the application.
Finally, I return to the observations of the Court of Appeal in Teoh (No 8), and my conclusions with respect to s 91 of the Evidence Act.
Undoubtedly, the person best placed to determine whether proceedings are vexatious in any of the senses recognised in s 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act is the judicial officer who determines issues raised under, for example, UCPR 13.4 and 14.28. But, on my analysis, those findings are expressly excluded by s 91.
Section 91 constitutes a considerable fetter on proof of the matters necessary to be proved in order to establish that proceedings are vexatious. Given that the Vexatious Proceedings Act has three important objectives - (i) to protect potential defendants against unwarranted litigation; (ii) to protect courts against abuse of their processes; and (iii) to ensure that valuable court time is available for litigation and resolution of genuine disputes, applications thereunder should not be impeded by fetters on the admissible evidence. In its application to the Vexatious Proceedings Act, s 91 is antithetical to those objects.
This is, in my opinion, a clear case for legislative reform. A simple amendment to the Vexatious Proceedings Act could exclude the operation of s 91 for the purposes of proof of the matters necessary to the making of orders.
The orders I make are: (1) That, pursuant to s 8(7)(a) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW), all of the proceedings in New South Wales already instituted by the defendant be stayed; (2) That, pursuant to s 8(7)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008, the defendant be prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales without leave of the Court.

Amendments 18 September 2015 - typographical error in [28], [126], [128] DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 18 September 2015

of NSW (No 2) [2011] NSWLEC 108 Martin v State of NSW (No 9) [2011] NSWCA 286 Martin v State of NSW [2010] NSWLEC 247 Martin v State of NSW [2011] NSWCA 281 Martin v State of NSW [2011] NSWLEC 126 Martin v State of NSW [2011] NSWLEC 129 Martin v State of NSW [2011] NSWLEC 20 Martin v State of NSW [2015] NSWCA 141 Martin v State of NSW and Central West Scientific Pty Ltd [2011] NSWLEC 50 Re Martin's Application [2001] HCA 41; 180 ALR 453 Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 8) [2014] NSWCA 125 Viavattene v Attorney General (NSW) [2015] NSWCA 44 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Attorney General of New South Wales (Plaintiff) Anthony Gilbert Martin (Defendant) Representation: Counsel: V McWilliam (Plaintiff) In person (Defendant)

Judgment

By Summons filed on 12 July 2012 the plaintiff, the Attorney General of New South Wales, seeks orders against the defendant, Anthony Gilbert Martin, under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW). The substantive orders sought are: "1. That, pursuant to s. 8(7)(a) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008, all of the proceedings in New South Wales already instituted by the defendant be stayed. 2. That, pursuant to s. 8(7)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008, the defendant be prohibited from instituting proceedings in New South Wales without leave of the Court."
On 5 March 2013 orders pursuant to ss 8(7)(a) and (b) were made by this Court: Attorney General of New South Wales v Anthony Gilbert Martin [2013] NSWSC 442. On 13 June 2014 those orders were set aside by the Court of Appeal and the matter remitted to this Court for further hearing: Martin v Attorney General for the State of New South Wales [2014] NSWCA 189.
The further hearing took place over a three day period in February of this year. At the conclusion of the hearing, I was advised that there was pending in the Court of Appeal an application by Mr Martin, the outcome of which could affect my decision. I accordingly indicated that I would not deliver judgment until I was notified that that application had been determined. The application was determined on 5 May, and reasons were delivered by the Court of Appeal on 22 May: Martin v State of NSW [2015] NSWCA 141.
On 12 May the Crown Solicitor, acting for the Attorney General, advised that the Court of Appeal had delivered judgment in an unrelated matter, but one that may have had an impact on the submissions in the present case: Viavattene v Attorney General (NSW) [2015] NSWCA 44. I was asked to allow the parties time to make further submissions. I agreed to that course, and a timetable was fixed, permitting the Attorney General to file further submissions by 5 June, Mr Martin to do so by 23 June. In fact, the Attorney General's submissions were received on 17 June, and Mr Martin's on 7 July.
I now turn to deal with the application.

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (26 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (4)

Cases Cited (30)

Cited By (8)