R v Alley; NSW Plumbers & Gasfitters Employees' Union, Ex p

The prosecutors seek prohibition in relation to some 1,992 New South Wales persons and entities found by the Commission to be parties to an interstate industrial dispute extending to New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland on the grounds that they are not parties to that dispute and that there was no evidence before the Commission showing them to be parties. The prosecutors also seek mandamus requiring the Commission to make an appropriate finding as to parties.

The practical importance of the contest between the parties is that the Commission is proposing to proceed to the making of an award which will regulate relations between employers and employees in the plumbing industry in New South Wales when the industry has been regulated in the past by a State award, the Plumbers and Gasfitters (State) Award made by the Plumbers and Gasfitters (State) Conciliation Committee on 28 November 1979. Both the N.S.W. union and the Association are opposed to the making of a federal award, the initiative for that development having been taken by the federal union.

According to an affidavit sworn by George Robert Crawford, the General Secretary of the federal union, the federal union on 22 June 1979 served a letter of demand and an attached log of claims by post on a large number of persons and entities in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory. It seems that most if not all the New South Wales names and addresses were obtained from New South Wales telephone directories under the heading of "Plumbers and Gasfitters". The log related to remuneration and conditions of employment. The log was accompanied by a letter of demand asserting that the terms of the log applied to "all employees in your employ, whether members of" the N.S.W. union "or not".

Unless within seven days of the service of this Log you comply with the demands contained in it the Union will regard the matters set out in the Log of Claims as in dispute and will proceed accordingly under the provisions of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1975 to seek an Award in the terms of the Log of Claims in settlement of the said industrial dispute.

On 24 July 1979 each person and entity served with the log of claims was duly notified by a Deputy Industrial Registrar of the time and place of hearing of the industrial dispute. The notification stated:

Take notice that you are alleged to be a party to an Industrial Dispute in relation to the following industrial matters, i.e., the several matters claimed against you in a Log of Claims served on you in the manner prescribed by the federal union.

If you do not satisfy the Commission within fourteen days after service on you of this notification or within the time between that service and the conclusion of the hearing of the Industrial Dispute that you are not a party to the Industrial Dispute, you will be bound by any award made by it in settlement of the dispute.

The Association sent a questionnaire to recipients of the log of claims in New South Wales asking them whether they employed relevant labour. Those who replied that they did not were excluded by Alley J. from the finding of a dispute made on 25 March 1980. Other persons were excluded or placed on a "reserve list". However, Alley J. included in the parties to the dispute 1,992 persons and entities on whom the log of claims and letter of demand had been served and who failed to reply to the notification of dispute or to the questionnaire. He did so relying on s. 61(c) of the Act.

The prosecutors appealed from that part of the decision to the Full Bench of the Commission. They argued that the jurisdiction of the Commission to conciliate and arbitrate interstate industrial disputes can extend only to parties to the dispute who are established as employers of relevant labour or, if not, as persons who usually employ such labour and that as such employers they are in dispute upon the log of claims. If they are not shown to be employers then they cannot be disputants because the condition necessary for the existence of a dispute, the employment of labour, is not satisfied, so it was argued.

It was conceded that, of the 1,992 persons served who did not respond to the log of claims and questionnaire, some probably employed labour and some did not. As those who did could not be distinguished from those who did not, none of the 1,992 were parties to the dispute or could be named as parties to it.

The majority of the Full Bench (Coldham J. and Commissioner Paine, Staples J. dissenting) thought that s. 61(c) provided an answer to the argument. They read the section as identifying the persons whom it is appropriate to include as parties to a dispute which the Commission otherwise has jurisdiction to arbitrate. They rejected the contention that s. 61(c) should be interpreted as referring to "parties to the dispute" who are alleged to be parties, are then shown to be parties and have not satisfied the Commission that they are not parties. They therefore concluded that Alley J. found that the 1,992 parties in question were parties to the dispute.

The majority considered that Mr. Crawford's statement in his affidavit of service that the log of claims and letter of demand had been served on employers in each State was not acceptable evidence that the 1,992 were employers, the more so because the prosecutors were refused permission to cross-examine Mr. Crawford.

However, the majority, noting that the names had been obtained from the heading "Plumbers and Gasfitters" in the telephone directory, inferred that they had "inserted their names at their own instigation and are probably plumbers and gasfitters". They pointed also to the statement in the first paragraph of the log of claims:

This log relates to the employment of employees whether members of the Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees' Union or not who are employed or usually employed in executing any plumbing, gasfitting, pipefitting or domestic engineering work In these circumstances it was thought proper to conclude that the 1,992 were "alleged to be parties to the dispute" and that s. 61(c) in conjunction with s. 24(1) entitled, and indeed obliged, Alley J. to include them as parties to his finding.

Section 61 is one of a series of provisions dealing with the form, effect and operation of awards. It is not to be found in the earlier provisions of the Act which regulate the procedure and powers of the Commission in proceedings leading to the making of an award. It is remote from s. 24 which imposes on the Commission the duty of determining whether there is an industrial dispute and, if so, who are the parties and what are the matters in dispute. As its place in the scheme of things suggests, it is not designed to prescribe the procedure binding the Commission in making findings under s. 24 or in making an award. All that it seeks to do is to describe or list the persons or classes of person on whom an award once made is binding. Paragraphs (d), (e) and (f), in referring to persons who are not parties to the proceedings, make it clear that the role of s. 61 is to identify the persons bound by an award and that it does not prescribe the procedure to be applied by the Commission in making findings as to parties under s. 24.

However, the Commission is entitled in the exercise of its discretion to determine its own procedure: s. 40(1)(a). It can, if it so chooses, adopt the s. 61(c) rule as a rule of procedure or apply the rule which it embodies as a basis for deciding who are the parties to a dispute. It is a sensible rule which might well have been applied by the Commission even if it had not been expressed in s. 61(c).

In one sense the interpretation of s. 61(c) is immaterial to the issues which this Court has now to decide. Whether s. 61(c) is given the construction which I favour or the one which I reject, it cannot affect or qualify the exercise by this Court of its jurisdiction to determine whether the Commission is exceeding its power to arbitrate a dispute falling within s. 51(xxxv) of the Constitution. It has been repeatedly affirmed by this Court that it has to determine independently for itself whether in a particular case the Commission has or lacks jurisdiction and that in reaching its decision this Court will apply the ordinary rules of evidence:Federated Engine-Drivers' and Firemen's Association of Australasia v Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. [10] ; R. v Blakeley; Ex parte Association of Architects, etc., of Australia [11] . There are several reasons why this is so. The Commission is not a court. It is not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks just: s. 40(1)(b). Conversely, it may apply, or by bound to apply by virtue of the statute, a specific rule of evidence or procedure which has no application to the High Court. And it is at least doubtful whether Parliament could legislate so as to qualify by a rule of evidence (not being an onus of proof provision) the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under s. 75(v) to determine whether an interstate industrial dispute exists: see Milicevic v Campbell [12] .

1. (1911) 12 C.L.R. 398, at pp. 415-416, 444, 453-454. 2. (1950) 82 C.L.R. 54, at pp. 69-71, 73, 91-92. 3. (1975) 132 C.L.R. 307, at pp. 318-319.

In passing I note the comments of Fullagar J. in Blakeley [13] . His Honour, though maintaining the doctrine that this Court must determine for itself questions on which the jurisdiction of the Commission depends, drew a distinction between questions of law and questions of fact. He said that if the jurisdiction depends on matters of fact, considerable weight is attached to the decision of the court. He was, of course, referring to the old Arbitration Court. His remarks have equal application to the Commission. He concluded by saying [14] , after referring to the remarks of Isaacs J. in Caledonian Collieries Ltd. v Australasian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation [No. 1] [15] : "It may be more correct to say that, as to fact, a doubt as to error is resolved in favour of the decision of the inferior tribunal." The weight to be given to the Commission's decision will depend on the circumstances. If the evidence remains the same, if the Full Bench on appeal has confirmed the decision at first instance and if the issue of fact is one in the resolution of which the Commission's knowledge of industry specially equips it to provide an answer, greater weight will be accorded than in cases in which one or more of these factors is absent.

1. (1950) 82 C.L.R., at pp. 92-93. 2. (1950) 82 C.L.R., at p. 93. 3. (1930) 42 C.L.R. 527, at pp. 547-548.

Although the decision of Alley J. was confirmed by the Full Bench, other factors in the present case do not suggest that it is one in which great weight should be given to the decision. It rested very much on the s. 61(c) rule and the issue which arose is quite as readily determined by this Court as by the Commission.

As s. 61(c) is immaterial to this Court's resolution of the case I am not inclined to make any final pronouncement as to its validity. I would say, however, that the reference to "all parties" is a reference to "all parties to the proceedings", not to "all parties to the dispute". The contrasting references to "all parties to the industrial dispute" in pars. (a) and (b) and the need to avoid tautology are enough to compel this conclusion. But, for the reasons already given, the provision cannot oust the jurisdiction of this Court to determine jurisdictional questions or, for that matter, the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts to decide in proceedings for breach of an award that the defendant was not bound by it: R. v Kelly; Ex parte Victoria [16] . On the other hand, it is not easy to see how the provision can be regarded, as the Solicitor-General suggested, as one which enacts a prima facie or presumptive rule only.

Section 24(1) imposes a duty on the Commission to make the findings and non-performance of the duty will give rise to relief by way of mandamus in an appropriate case. But I do not accept the prosecutors' submission that the making of correct findings in accordance with the sub-section as to an industrial dispute, as to parties and as to the matters in dispute is a condition precedent to the further exercise of jurisdiction by the Commission in going on to make an award.

Even so this Court is bound to apply the overriding principle that the Commission's jurisdiction is relevantly limited to the prevention and settlement of an actual, threatened or impending industrial dispute extending beyond the limits of a single State. It is common ground that in the present case the Commission is dealing with an interstate industrial dispute which satisfies both constitutional and statutory requirements. The controversy is not whether such a dispute exists, but whether some of the named parties, the 1,992, are parties to it. Nevertheless, the fact that the Commission has jurisdiction to settle the dispute between those who are parties to it does not mean that it has jurisdiction to settle the dispute on the footing that it is a dispute to which 1,992 strangers are also parties. Just as this Court will prohibit the Commission at the instance of a party to a dispute which does not answer the constitutional description from arbitrating it so it will also prohibit the Commission from arbitrating a dispute which answers that description against persons who are not parties to it. The point is that to the extent to which the Commission attempts to arbitrate the dispute against non-parties it exceeds its jurisdiction and is liable to be restrained by prohibition.

What I have said conforms to the well-known decisions of the Court in the "common rule" cases: see particularly the early decisions ofAustralian Boot Trade Employees' Federation v Whybrow & Co. [17] ; George Hudson Ltd. v Australian Timber Workers' Union [18] . In George Hudson [19] Isaacs J. observed that the provision in the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1921 that an award should bind successive assignees and transmittees of the business of any party bound by the award (similar to the present s. 61(d)) made the award effective "throughout the whole period of the operation of the award for and against those who during that period are or voluntarily come within the area of the dispute ". In a later common rule case Kelly the Court, in a passage which I have already cited, said [20] :

A common rule does effect a result which is "foreign to arbitration". The distinction may seem technical, and the practical result of observing it may be, as Mr. Ashburner said, merely to compel the joining of many additional parties as respondents before the court or commissioner - but any parties so joined would not be bound by an award made in relation to the dispute unless they were parties, not only to the proceedings, but also to the dispute. The distinction has been observed and emphasised throughout the whole series of cases, it is a clear and logical distinction, and, in our opinion, it ought to be observed and the power to make a common rule denied. 1. (1910) 11 C.L.R. 311. 2. (1923) 32 C.L.R. 413. 3. (1923) 32 C.L.R., at pp. 440-441. 4. (1950) 81 C.L.R., at p. 82.

The prosecutors in attempting to establish that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to make an award in respect of the 1,992 persons start with a significant handicap. It is for the prosecutor seeking a writ of prohibition to establish and to establish clearly the facts which show an absence or excess of jurisdiction. Reg. v Foster; Ex parte Commonwealth Life (Amalgamated) Assurances Ltd. [21] is an interesting illustration of the proposition. There an award was made in respect of persons engaged by an industrial and life assurance company to canvass and collect premiums. On its face it was restricted to "employees" of that company. The company sought prohibition on the ground that the award was made without jurisdiction because by an agreement between the parties the persons so engaged were independent contractors or "agents" and not "employees" and that therefore the dispute giving rise to the award was not an industrial dispute because it did not relate to employment or as to any industrial matter pertaining to the relations of employers and employees. The Court held that the evidence failed to show that there was not any industrial dispute because it failed to exclude the possibility that the real relation between some or all of the agents and the company in their work was in fact that of employer and employee despite the provisions of the agreement.

The prosecutor's only case for attacking the jurisdiction to make the award must be that, notwithstanding the log of claims, there could be no industrial dispute because no members of the respondent union in fact were or could be employees of the prosecutor company, so that the paper demand was necessarily without any practical basis. To obtain a prohibition on this ground it is incumbent upon the prosecutor to exclude the possibility of the log having any subject matter by clear proof leading unmistakably to that conclusion. The burden of establishing clearly the facts which show absence of jurisdiction always rests upon a prosecutor seeking a writ of prohibition. Later their Honours said [23] : In the present case the question was raised before the Conciliation and Arbitration Court and that Court passed upon it before making the award. It is true that there appears to have been no independent investigation of the matter and that the Court merely acted upon the information that Webb J. had so decided. At the same time, in the circumstances, the prosecutor, before resorting to prohibition ought in all reason to have made clear to the Court to whose jurisdiction he objected that he sought from it an opportunity of establishing on evidence the absence of its jurisdiction.

Section 32(2) of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1951 provides that a determination or finding of the Court upon any question as to the existence of an industrial dispute shall, in all courts and for all purposes, be conclusive and binding on all persons affected by that question.

It is therefore clear that the policy of the legislature was to leave questions such as that in issue to the Arbitration Court.

1. (1952) 85 C.L.R., at p. 153. 2. (1952) 85 C.L.R., at p. 154.

Their Honours then stated that the presence of s. 32(2) "did not lessen the practical responsibility of the prosecutor in pressing his objection" before the Arbitration Court "and seeking to prove before it the facts upon which the objection was founded" [24] . They then considered the possibility that they should settle an issue for trial and await the finding of a single justice, only to reject it, noting that the question was not foreclosed by an award.

The issue here then is: Do the prosecutors discharge the onus of establishing facts which show an absence or excess of jurisdiction in the Commission, and if so, should prohibition issue at the instance of the prosecutors who, after all, are not (with one exception) the persons against whom the Commission is allegedly exceeding its jurisdiction?

Like the prosecutor in Reg. v Foster , neither the prosecutors here nor the persons in respect of whom they complain attempted to adduce evidence in the Commission to show that they were not employers and that therefore the dispute was not as to "industrial matters" as defined in s. 4. As it is common ground that the probability is that some of the 1,992 are employers and some are not the conclusion is inevitable that the prosecutors are unable to discharge the onus of satisfying this Court that any particular person (except the Association) is not an employer. The question raised is whether the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction by proceeding to arbitrate against persons not parties to the dispute. It is for the prosecutors to show that particular persons are not parties to the dispute. At best all they can show is that there is a probability that an unascertained number of persons whom they are unable to identify are not parties. That certainly does not justify the issue of a prohibition in relation to the entire 1,992 persons. Once that is accepted, it is obvious that prohibition cannot go in relation to persons whose standing and identity cannot be ascertained.

I am by no means satisfied that this would have been an appropriate case for prohibition in the event that the prosecutors were able to show that some identifiable persons found to be parties by the Commission are not employers. In substance this is an application for prohibition by a stranger; it is not an application brought by the persons against whom it is alleged a tribunal is exceeding its jurisdiction. I do not subscribe to the view expressed on occasions that prohibition issues as of right. Certainly prohibition will issue virtually as of right when a tribunal claims to exercise a jurisdiction against persons for which there is no warrant at all. But before issuing prohibition this Court has to be satisfied that the tribunal is exceeding, or intends to exceed, its jurisdiction. We have to take account of the Commission's power to vary its findings under s. 24: see Reg. v Turbet; Ex parte Australian Building Construction Employees' and Builders Labourers' Federation [25] where the Court refused to grant prohibition on the footing that the Commission would in all probability amend its findings, the Commission having taken possession as here of an interstate industrial dispute. In any event when application for prohibition is made by a stranger the Court has a discretion to grant or refuse it. The discretion will only be exercised when it appears that the tribunal by exceeding its jurisdiction will cause some deteriment to the stranger or others. In this case those in respect of whom complaint is made could, if the prosecutors' allegations were well founded, establish in other proceedings that they are not bound by the award. The prosecutors claim that they will suffer detriment because as things stand a federal award, if made, would appear to have sufficient coverage to justify displacement of the existing State award; aliter, if the 1,992 were not parties to the award. I am not inclined to think that this circumstance would have been enough to warrant the grant of prohibition.

Finally there remains the claim for mandamus. I do not doubt that a refusal by the Commission to perform its duty under s. 24 would warrant the grant of mandamus at the instance of a party to whom the duty was owed and that to my mind would include any party to the proceedings. But I am unable to discern in all that has happened an actual or constructive refusal by Alley J. or the Full Bench to perform the statutory duty. The prosecutors have simply failed to show that the persons in question are not parties to the dispute. That in itself might not dispose of the case for mndamus if it appeared that the Commission had made no real inquiry as to who were the parties. But Alley J. and the Full Bench did make an inquiry. Some criticism can be made of their approach to the application of s. 61(c), but that criticism does not lead to the conclusion that there was no inquiry. In this respect we should recall what Barton J. said in Federated Engine-Drivers' and Firemen's Association of Australasia [26] :

On the other hand, where the jurisdiction is not contested by the party defending, very slight inquiry may be adequate, and many cases will to the mind of the tribunal be so plainly within its competence that it will rightly forego inquiry unless the objection is taken, and the objector tenders proof of facts in its support. 1. (1911) 12 C.L.R., at p. 428.

In the result there is no case for prohibition and mandamus. Although it is now common ground that the Association is not an employer, we should leave it to the Commission to vary its finding, despite the fact that counsel for the federal union consented to the issue of prohibition in respect of the Association.

The onus is on the prosecutor to prove clearly absence of jurisdiction in the person or body sought to be prohibited: R. v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration and Merchant Service Guild of A/asia; Ex parte William Holyman and Sons Ltd. [27] ; Reg. v Foster; Ex parte Commonwealth Life (Amalgamated) Assurances Ltd [28] ;Reg. v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex parte Australian Workers' Union [29] . The prosecutor who seeks prohibition in respect of an excess of jurisdiction, must prove clearly that there is no jurisdiction in respect of that part of the proceedings sought to be prohibited.

1. (1914) 18 C.L.R. 273. 2. (1952) 85 C.L.R. 138, at p. 153. 3. (1957) 99 C.L.R. 505.

Assuming that the case for prohibition would be made out if the prosecutor proved its allegation that some of the 1,992 respondents to the proceedings in the Commission were not employers in the industry, the prosecutor did not prove it. It asserted that probably some were, and some were not, such employers, but did not attempt to prove which were not.

The methods of making claims by separate service upon individual employers (or employees) of logs of claims is primitive, time-wasting and often expensive. Registration of organizations of representative bodies brings some order and coherence into the system of prevention and settlement of disputes. It needs to be supplemented by a simple method of making claims, such as filing of logs of claims with the Commission and service on any organizations concerned and advertisement of the contents of the log or the fact that a log had been filed.

Parliament attempted soon after Federation to provide for declaration of common rules which would be binding upon persons in particular industries. This was declared invalid by this Court: see Australian Boot Trade Employees' Federation v Whybrow and Co. [30] ; R. v Kelly; Ex parte Victoria [31] . Section 49 of the Act now provides for common rules in the Territories only. By providing for simple methods of substituted service of claims, summonses and notices, Parliament might achieve in practice common rules for industries throughout Australia, with probable advantages in uniformity of wages and conditions and diminution of demarcation disputes.

1. (1910) 11 C.L.R. 311. 2. (1950) 81 C.L.R. 64.

The nature of these applications to make absolute orders nisi for prohibition and mandamus, the relevant facts and the state of the proceedings in the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission are set out in the reasons for judgment of my brother Mason which I have had the advantage of reading.

I am in general agreement with the reasons and with the conclusion that no case for prohibition is made out. In my opinion the decision of this Court in Reg. v Foster; Ex parte Commonwealth Life (Amalgamated) Assurances Ltd. [32] is fatal to these applications. In that case an award was made in respect of persons engaged by an industrial and life assurance company and its application was in terms confined to employees of that particular company. Prohibition was sought on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because an agreement between the company and those performing the relevant work for it provided that such persons were "independent contractors" or "agents" and not "employees" and that therefore there could be no "industrial dispute" because the alleged dispute could not relate to employment or any industrial matter pertaining to the relations of employer and employee. The Full Court held that the evidence did not exclude the possibility that the real relation between those doing the relevant work and the company was in fact that of employee and employer notwithstanding the agreement. The relevant passages in the joint judgment of Dixon, Fullagar and Kitto JJ. are set out in Mason J.'s judgment. I think it nonetheless proper to repeat one sentence from p. 153, namely, "The burden of establishing clearly the facts which show absence of jurisdiction [i.e., in the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission] always rests upon a prosecutor seeking a writ of prohibition."

In the present case the applicants did not attempt that task but contented themselves with relying on the probability that some of the 1,992 persons whose names appeared in the classified directory under the heading "Plumbers and Gasfitters" were not employers of labour and that some were. No attempt was made to identify individual members of either category (save for the applicant Association which is not an employer) or to provide any estimate of the numbers in either category.

In these circumstances it is clear that the applicants have failed to discharge the onus of proving lack of jurisdiction and that the applications must be dismissed. It does not however follow that the applicants would not be able to offer evidence of the relative numbers of employers and non-employers when the matter comes before the Commission for further hearing. Not only is the Commission empowered to vary its findings under s. 24 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904, cf. Reg. v Turbet; Ex parte Australian Building Construction Employees' and Builders Labourers' Federation [33] , but in the Commission's consideration of the application on the matter resuming before it, evidence as to relative numbers of employers and non-employers among those whose names appeared in the telephone book could be given as relevant to the exercise of the Commission's discretion to refrain from further action pursuant to s. 41(1)(d). That stage has not yet been reached and it is not necessary to do more than mention the possibility.

In the circumstances I do not need to consider the question whether, if there had been proof that some persons served with the log were not employers, prohibition should or would have been refused as a matter of discretion or the extent of the discretion which this Court might possess in respect of the grant of prohibition.

On the question of mandamus, I agree with Mason J. that no case for the grant of that remedy is made out.

I agree that the orders nisi should be discharged. I cannot usefully add to the reasons for that conclusion which have been prepared by other members of the Court.

The jurisdiction of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission to entertain an application to arbitrate an industrial dispute by making a federal award depends upon the anterior existence of an industrial dispute in the constitutional sense: Reg. v Graziers' Association of N.S.W.; Ex parte Australian Workers' Union [34] , per Fullagar J. Whether a particular dispute should be settled by the making of a federal award and, if so, what the terms of the award should be, are questions different from and logically consequent upon the answer to the question whether an industrial dispute exists.

A dispute of the relevant kind may exist although it is difficult or impossible to identify all the disputants: Reg. v Portus; Ex parte McNeil [35] . Although it is not essential to the jurisdiction of the Commission to arbitrate a dispute that the disputants be identified with precision, s. 24(1) of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 Cth directs the Commission to determine "whether there is an industrial dispute and, if so, who are the parties and what are the matters in dispute ". Of course, parties to a dispute and the matters in dispute between them are the very elements of a dispute, and it may be said that in logic a finding of a dispute either depends upon findings as to the parties to the dispute and matters in dispute or imports a present ability to make those findings. But strict logic cannot be pushed so far as to be out of accord with the subject matter to which s. 51(xxxv) of the Constitution and the Act relate. A dispute of the kind to which those provisions relate does not lose its character because of a fluctuation in the disputants: as Starke J. said in Burwood Cinema Ltd. v Australian Theatrical and Amusement Employees' Association [36] , " absolute definiteness of the individuals engaged in the dispute cannot be essential". An industrial dispute in the constitutional sense furnishes the foundation of the Commission's jurisdiction to settle that dispute by arbitration although there are persons who may be parties to the same dispute but whose identity or status as disputants is not known, or is wrongly found.

1. (1961) 105 C.L.R. 537, at p. 545. 2. (1925) 35 C.L.R. 528, at p. 548.

Though the Commission does not have jurisdiction to include in an award made in settlement of a dispute a provision binding a person who is not a disputant (R. v Kelly; Ex parte Victoria [37] ), an erroneous finding that a person is a party to the dispute does not deprive the Commission of jurisdiction to settle the dispute by arbitration. And if the Commission's jurisdiction is invoked, an erroneous finding as to the status of a person or group of persons or disputants does not necessarily establish that the Commission has misconceived the nature of the particular arbitral function which the Act commits to it.

In the present case, it is common ground that there is an industrial dispute extending beyond the limits of one State. It follows that, the Commission's jurisdiction having been invoked, it is empowered to settle that dispute by arbitration. It is submitted, however, that the evidence placed before the Commission thus far is insufficient to enable the Commission to ascertain the identity of those who are or are usually employers of labour among a group of 1,992 gasfitters and plumbers whose names were apparently taken from the telephone book and whom the Commission has found to be disputants. The issue is whether the Commission is empowered to proceed to arbitrate the dispute before it ascertains who are or are usually employers of labour among that group.

The exercise of the arbitral jurisdiction which has been invoked is not conditioned upon the correctness of the Commission's finding on an enquiry under s. 24(1) as to the identity of the parties to the dispute. The Commission must do the best it can with the material before it: see s. 40(1), and error arising from the imperfect nature of the material before the Commission is an inevitable possibility. But it is clear that an error in making a finding on an enquriry under s. 24(1) does not bring the jurisdiction to arbitrate to an end, for a finding as to parties made pursuant to that direction is amenable to subsequent variation or revocation. In the present case, the Commission made a finding as to parties in compliance with the direction given by s. 24(1) and even if that finding were affected by error, the error does not deny the existence of the arbitral jurisdiction or preclude its exercise in hearing and determining the dispute generally. The right of any of the 1,992 who have been found to be disputants to challenge that finding is not presently in issue. Nor does the effect of an award, if an award is made, upon the rights and liabilities of any of the 1,992 arise for present consideration. Section 61 would be relevant to the latter question.

Although the Commission was wrong to regard s. 61(c) as a provision binding it to find that the 1,992 were disputants, I would agree with the Chief Justice that s. 40(1) would enable the Commission to act on the view that a person who was served with a log of claims, and notified of the proceedings, who was then requested to reply to a questionnaire which asked whether he was an employer and who did not reply might prima facie be treated as a party to the dispute if the circumstances did not indicate the contrary. The Commission's mistake as to the operation of s. 61(c) neither affected its finding as to the fact upon which its jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute depended (that is to say, the existence of an industrial dispute in the constitutional sense), nor binds it to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular way. If it adheres to its finding as to the disputant status of the 1,992, as s. 40(1) entitles it to do, it may hear and determine the matter of the dispute in the light of that finding. If it chooses to vary or revoke that finding, it may do so.

I would not grant mandamus to compel the making of a new finding under s. 24(1) simply because the Commission mistook the operation of s. 61(c), since the Commission is entitled to adopt the same approach pursuant to s. 40(1) and may lawfully resolve to do so in adherence to its practice. The Commission's power to vary or revoke its findings under s. 24(1) is sufficient to ensure, in the light of the judgments of this Court, that at any time when the findings might affect the Commission's exercise of its arbitral jurisdiction (and in particular in considering whether pursuant to s. 41(1)(d) it should refrain from further hearing or determining the dispute on one of the grounds therein referred to) the Commission will act upon findings made consistently with the Act.

There is no ground for denying the existence of the Commission's jurisdiction nor for apprehending that its exercise will miscarry. It is unnecessary to make an order absolute merely to ensure that the prosecutor, the Master Plumbers and Mechanical Contractors' Association of New South Wales is excluded from the list of disputants.