Le v Angius; Angius v Angius - [2024] NSWSC 924 - NSWSC 2023 case summary — Zoe

NSWNSWSC

Le v Angius; Angius v Angius

[2024] NSWSC 924

Supreme Court of NSW|2023-10-20|Before: Richmond J

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of NSW

Decision date

2023-10-20

Before

Richmond J

Catchwords

[2014] NSWCA 392 Chisak v Presot [2022] NSWCA 100 Dridi v Fillmore [2001] NSWSC 319 Estate of Laura Angius
Angius v Angius [2013] NSWSC 1895 Et-China.com International Holdings Ltd v Cheung (2021) 388 ALR 128
[2021] NSWCA 24 Fairbairn v Radecki (2022) 275 CLR 400
[2022] HCA 18 Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

[2014] NSWCA 392 Chisak v Presot [2022] NSWCA 100 Dridi v Fillmore [2001] NSWSC 319 Estate of Laura AngiusAngius v Angius [2013] NSWSC 1895 Et-China.com International Holdings Ltd v Cheung (2021) 388 ALR 128[2021] NSWCA 24 Fairbairn v Radecki (2022) 275 CLR 400[2022] HCA 18 Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118[2016] FCAFC 5 NSW Trustee and Guardian v McGrath [2013] NSWSC 1894 Page v Page [2017] NSWCA 141 Petersen v GregoryEstate Glen Alfred Petersen [2007] NSWSC 8 Piras v Egan [2008] NSWCA 59 Plunkett v Bull (1915) 19 CLR 544the Estate of Zaheer [2023] NSWSC 468 Smoje v Forrester [2017] NSWCA 308 Spata v Tumino (2018) 95 NSWLR 706[2018] NSWCA 17 Steinmetz v Shannon (2019) NSWLR 687[2019] NSWCA 114 Sulliman v Sulliman [2002] NSWSC 169 Tarbes v Taleb [2023] NSWSC 565 Tobin v Ezekiel (2012) 83 NSWLR 757[2012] NSWCA 285 Vaughan v Hoskovich [2010] NSWSC 706 Warner v Hung (No 2) (2011) 297 ALR 56

Judgment (96 paragraphs)

[1]

[7]

Table of Contents The claims Rulings on supplementary evidence Factual chronology Events from the 1990s to Laura's death in 2012 Events from 2012 to John's death in 2022 The deceased's testamentary intentions The deceased's estate Statutory regime Principles relevant to each plaintiff's claim that she is an eligible person De facto relationship Wholly or partly dependant - s 57(1)(e) Close personal relationship - s 57(1)(f) Factors warranting Approach to evidence General observations on credit Ms Le and witnesses called by her Natalie and witnesses called by her Jenny and the witnesses called by her The evidence of witnesses called by Ms Le Ms Le's evidence Lisa Reid Matthew Reid Alvin Johnson Lesley Johnson Austin Smith Kolena Denis Neil Johnston Evelyn Moses Jacqueline Varela Ba Duc Hoang Ba Thang John Hoang Recordings of conversations The evidence of witnesses called by Jenny Kevin Batten Nick Pappas Jason Bates Medical records The evidence of witnesses called by Natalie Natalie's evidence Silvana Salvatore Domenic Dodaro Francis Devine Determination of Ms Le's Eligibility Plaintiff's submissions Defendant's submissions Consideration De facto relationship (a) The duration of the relationship (b) The nature and extent of their common residence (c) Whether a sexual relationship exists (d) The degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, between them (e) The ownership, use and acquisition of property (f) The degree of mutual commitment to a shared life (g) The care and support of children (h) The performance of household duties (i) The reputation and public aspects of the relationship Close personal relationship Factors warranting Ms Le's application Determination of Natalie's eligibility Provision to be made Relevant principles Consideration Consideration of s 60(2) matters for Ms Le's claim The relationship between Ms Le and the deceased: s 60(2)(a) The nature and extent of any obligations or responsibilities owed by the deceased to Ms Le or to any other claimant or to any beneficiary: s 60(2)(b) The deceased's estate: s 60(2)(c) Ms Le's financial resources and needs (including earning capacity) and age: s 60(2)(d), (e) and (g) Any physical, intellectual or mental disability of Ms Le: s 60(2)(f) Any contribution (financial or otherwise) by Ms Le to the deceased's estate or his welfare: s 60(2)(h) Any provision made for Ms Le by the deceased during his life or from his estate: s 60(2)(i) The deceased's testamentary intention, including evidence of statements made by him: s 60(2)(j) Whether Ms Le was being maintained by the deceased: s 60(2)(k) Whether anyone else is liable to support Ms Le: s 60(2)(l) Ms Le's character and conduct: s 60(2)(m) Conduct of any other person before and after the deceased's death: s 60(2)(n) Conclusion regarding Ms Le's claim for provision Consideration of s 60(2) matters for Natalie's claim The relationship between Natalie and the deceased: s 60(2)(a) The nature and extent of any obligations or responsibilities owed by the deceased to Natalie, to any other person in respect of whom an application for family provision has been made or to any beneficiary: s 60(2)(b) The deceased's estate: s 60(2)(c) Natalie's financial resources (including earning capacity) and needs, and age: s 60(2)(d), (e) and (g) Any physical, intellectual or mental disability of Natalie: s 60(2)(f) Any contribution (financial or otherwise) by Natalie to the deceased's estate or his welfare: s 60(2)(h) Any provision made for Natalie by the deceased during his life or from his estate: s 60(2)(i) The Deceased's testamentary intention, including evidence of statements made by him: s 60(2)(j) Whether Natalie was being maintained by the deceased: s 60(2)(k) Whether anyone else is liable to support Natalie: s 60(2)(l) Natalie's character and conduct: s 60(2)(m) Conduct of any other person before or after the deceased's death: s 60(2)(n) Any other matter considered relevant: s 60(2)(p) Conclusion regarding Natalie's claim for provision Conclusion and orders

[8]

JUDGMENT

These proceedings concern two claims brought under the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) (the Act) for provision from the estate of the late Giovanni (John) Angius (John or the deceased). In proceeding 2022/41064, the plaintiff is Thi Quy Le (Ms Le) and she claims provision on the basis that she was, at the time of the death of the deceased, living with him in a de facto relationship or, alternatively, in a close personal relationship. In proceeding 2023/31399, the plaintiff is Natalie Angius (Natalie), a granddaughter of the deceased and she claims provision on the basis that she was wholly or partly dependent on him. The common defendant to both proceedings is Gianna (Jenny) Angius (Jenny), who is the deceased's daughter, the administrator of his estate and the sole beneficiary under his last will.
Although the two claims were brought in separate proceedings, they were heard together with evidence in one to be considered evidence in the other. For convenience and without intending any disrespect, I will refer to the members of the Angius family by their first names as was the course adopted during the hearing.
The nature of the claims brought by the plaintiffs require analysis of a significant portion of the deceased's personal life and the broader family dynamics of the Angius family. Unfortunately, this means that private aspects of the lives of the deceased, the plaintiffs, the defendant, and other actors are canvassed in this judgment.
The structure of these reasons is that I will first outline the nature of the claims brought by each plaintiff, explain certain rulings on evidence made during the hearing, set out by way of background certain uncontroversial facts, and then outline the statutory regime that governs the plaintiffs' claims. Following this I will deal with the evidence led by each of the plaintiffs and the defendant. I will then turn to determine the issues concerning each plaintiff's eligibility and the quantum of any order for provision to be made.

[10]

Rulings on supplementary evidence

Ms Le called evidence from a number of witnesses who deposed that they considered the deceased and Ms Le to be in a de facto relationship. Evidence of this kind is relevant to the public aspects of the relationship between a claimant and the deceased: McCarthy v Tye [2017] NSWCA 284 at [49]. Having ruled as inadmissible statements by a number of witnesses of that kind where the basis of the opinion was unexplained, I indicated to Mr Ellison SC, senior counsel for Ms Le, that I would give him leave to adduce oral evidence from each witness setting out the basis for the opinions subject to proper notice in writing being given to Ms Painter SC, senior counsel for the defendant, as to the nature of that supplementary evidence. Mr Ellison SC indicated that he would provide supplementary statements for the relevant lay witnesses to Ms Painter SC by Sunday, 15 October 2023.
Nine supplementary statements were provided by that time, prior to the cross-examination of the relevant witnesses, and those supplementary statements were admitted without objection.
At the end of the sixth day of the hearing (Monday, 16 October 2023), Mr Ellison SC indicated that he was proposing to rely on a further supplementary statement from each of the plaintiff's two sons who had already provided affidavits, being Ba Duc Hoang (Duc) and Ba Thang John Hoang (Thang). They had each previously prepared an affidavit filed in the proceedings which included a statement 'I know that my mother was in a de facto relationship with John Angius', but with no basis given for this statement in the affidavit. Each statement had been objected to and ruled inadmissible by me on the basis that it was unfounded opinion evidence. The proposed supplementary statements were said by Mr Ellison SC to set out the basis of their opinions.
Ms Painter SC objected to Mr Ellison SC seeking to rely on the proposed supplementary statements as she had not been provided with them (even in draft form) by the end of Sunday 15 October 2023, and I indicated I would uphold her objection, but would read back in the original statements by each son (that 'I know that my mother was in a de facto relationship with John Angius') if Ms Painter SC agreed not to press her original objection, which she did agree to. Mr Ellison SC then acknowledged that the leave that he may have had was withdrawn (T397).
On the seventh day of the hearing (Tuesday 17 October 2023) when Thang was called to give evidence, Mr Ellison SC handed up a two-page statement made by the witness dated 17 October 2023 which was marked for identification but not admitted into evidence. On the next day, when Duc was called to give evidence, Mr Ellison SC handed up a two-page statement by the witness dated 17 October 2023 which was also marked for identification but not admitted into evidence. My reasons for not admitting the two supplementary statements are as follows.
Ms Le commenced these proceedings by summons on 11 February 2022. At a directions hearing on 25 March 2022, the orders made by Sackar J noted that the plaintiff's evidence in chief was complete. On 29 April 2022 a direction was made for the plaintiff to have leave to file further evidence by 13 May 2022. On 8 September 2022, the matter was set down for hearing. On 7 September 2023, there was a pre-trial directions hearing before me at which directions were made for Natalie to adduce further evidence of a medical nature. No mention was made in that directions hearing that Ms Le wished to file further evidence in her case. It would have been apparent to Ms Le's legal representatives at that time that the affidavits of Duc and Thang filed in the proceedings were defective in failing to set out any basis for the opinions stated in them about their mother being in a de facto relationship.
No attempt was made to cure that obvious defect until the end of the sixth day of the hearing, at a time when Ms Painter SC was fully engaged in cross-examining Ms Le's remaining witnesses and then moving immediately to cross-examine the witnesses in Natalie's case. The terms of the leave to rely on additional statements by Thang and Duc previously given by me had not been taken advantage of. There was clear prejudice to Ms Painter SC in expecting her to deal with the new evidence to be relied on in the two statements which were only served on the defendant after the conclusion of the sixth day of the hearing. The only person responsible for the failure to remedy the defect in the evidence for Ms Le on this topic was her legal representatives. Further, the delay in leading evidence of a similar nature from nine other witnesses was part of the reason why the case suffered from a significant overrun in hearing time. In light of these matters, I considered it to be inconsistent with the just, cheap and quick resolution of the proceedings to allow the two further statements to be relied on.

[12]

Events from the 1990s to Laura's death in 2012

John operated a smash repair business from commercial premises he owned at 6 Allen Street, Waterloo under the name 'Waterloo Smash Repairs'.
Next door to John's smash repair workshop, but located on the same land, was a mechanical work repair shop operated by Nick Pappas under the name 'Advance LPG'. Both premises were closed in 2008 when the land at 6 Allen Street, Waterloo was redeveloped and Mr Pappas relocated to Roseberry. Mr Pappas gave evidence in these proceedings.
As at January 2008, John and Laura were the registered proprietors as joint tenants of 6 Allen Street, Waterloo and John also owned the adjoining property at 2-4 Allen Street, Waterloo. They both entered into a joint venture agreement with a third party in January 2008 to redevelop those parcels of land and the adjoining land at 8 Allen Street, Waterloo owned by a third party for the construction of retail/commercial premises and residential apartments on the land, which was undertaken over the period from that date to August 2010: Angius v Salier [2019] NSWSC 184 at [15]; CB 947.
Ms Le first met John in around 2000 while taking her car for repairs at his smash repair business and they became friends. Ms Le who is Vietnamese, was born on 3 March 1963 and gives evidence that she and John commenced an intimate relationship in March 2003 (when she was 40 years old and John was 67 years old). Ms Le's previous marriage was dissolved in October 2001.
On 3 June 2001, Ms Le entered into a Residential Tenancy Agreement for premises owned by the NSW Government at 75 Philip Street, Waterloo (which will be referred to as the Redfern property). She benefited from a governmental rental subsidiary and paid a rent of $300 per week. She retained this residential tenancy agreement until June 2021.
In the period from around September 2005 to early 2008, Ms Le managed a pool hall business at premises located at Alfreda Street, Coogee. It appears that the premises were jointly owned by John and Laura.
In February 2007, an altercation occurred at the pool hall premises which, according to the police report, involved an argument between John and Laura in which Laura alleged that John was having an affair with Ms Le.
On 30 March 2007, there was another argument between John and Laura regarding Laura's allegation that John was having an affair with Ms Le. This occurred at the Coogee property and involved Laura suffering injuries as a result of a fall in the kitchen. Laura alleged that John had assaulted her which he denied. An apprehended violence order (AVO) was granted to Laura against John, and the police charged John with assault. It appears from the statement made by a Detective Chief Constable for the purposes of the inquest into Laura's death that John was found guilty of the assault, but no conviction was recorded.
On 10 April 2007, Laura saw a family law solicitor, Ms Cathie Blanchfield of Blanchfield Nicholls Partners. Jenny was at the meeting. Laura told Ms Blanchfield of her concerns regarding Ms Le. Ms Blanchfield advised Laura to make a new will to protect her children if she died before John and drafted one for her to sign which she did on 13 April 2007 (although later, on 27 April 2007, she re-signed it following advice from Ms Blanchfield that the first execution was invalid). Under this will, Laura appointed Jenny and Robert as her executors and after payment of just debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, Laura left the residue of her estate to Jenny and Robert as tenants in common in equal shares: Estate of Angius; Angius v Angius [2013] NSWSC 1895 at [83]. Ultimately, Hallen J determined in those proceedings that a later undated document prepared by Laura was her last will.
On 13 April 2007, there was another incident at the pool hall in which Laura again alleged that John was having an affair with Ms Le. The police report indicates that Ms Le 'admitted to being involved in a relationship' with John.
On 12 May 2007, an incident occurred at John's smash repair business at 6 Allen Street, Waterloo. According to the police report, while Ms Le was having her car serviced at the premises, Robert approached Ms Le and said 'Get out of the shop in Coogee. If you don't get out, I'll put you in the ground'. As a result of this incident, an AVO was granted to Ms Le against Robert.
On 7 June 2007, Ms Le was granted an interim AVO against Laura, which became a final order for a period of two years on 19 November 2007.
On 6 November 2007, Laura's solicitor, Ms Blanchfield, sent a letter to John's solicitors which stated relevantly: Our client instructs us that the parties are considering entering into a joint venture for the development of the properties at Allen Street Waterloo. We understand that a request has been made for Mrs Angius to attend your office tomorrow to sign a document for that development to proceed, although we are uncertain of the exact nature of that document. We are instructed to advise you that our client will only agree to the execution of that document on the following conditions: 1. That on 1 February 2008 Mr John Angius ("the husband") will serve a Notice to Quit on Mrs Lee to vacate the pool hall premises at Alfreda Street, Coogee, with the period in which Mrs Le is to vacate being 4 weeks from that date. Thereafter neither Mrs Le nor any member of her family is to be involved in the business of the pool hall. 2. That on the 30th of each month, the husband and the wife shall be entitled to draw a cheque in the sum of $10,000 each. In addition the wife shall be entitled to a further cheque in the sum of $3,150 being one half of the rent on the pool hall, with additional condition that the husband sign that cheque. 3. That the parties share the expenses for 2 and 46 Denning Streets, and the costs of Gabrielle's education at St Clare College, equally. 4. In the event the pool hall business is sold, the wife shall be entitled to one half of the sale proceeds. 5. In relation to the Waterloo property, upon completion of that development: 5.1 the husband and the wife shall retain an independent valuer to value each of the apartments and shops ("the units") in that development; 5.2 the wife shall be entitled to one half of the parties' interest (the whole of which is represented, as we understand it, by 12 apartments and 4 shops) based on the value of the respective units, and the husband and the wife will do all things necessary to transfer those units to her; 5.3 thereafter the wife shall be entitled to those units absolutely and may deal with them as she pleases. 6. Upon completion of the Waterloo property, the wife shall be entitled to one half of the gross rental income from all other properties and shall be liable to pay from her share of the rental income one half of the outgoings including mortgage repayments, and her tax. We understand these terms have been discussed and agreed between our respective clients and it may only require appropriate formal documentations. In the first instance however we request an acknowledgment of your client's acceptance of these terms signed by him by return facsimile. Upon receipt of same our client will execute the documents you hold. In the event there is no such agreement we are instructed our client will approach the Court for appropriate orders by way of property settlement pursuant to the Family Law Act. Please let us have your response by 12 noon tomorrow Wednesday.
The copy of the letter of 6 November 2007 in evidence indicates that John signed it. It can be inferred from the terms of this letter, the very strained relationship between Laura and John at this time, and the fact that the development of the properties at Allen Street, Waterloo (Waterloo development) commenced in 2008, that Ms Le had ceased to manage the pool hall business in Coogee by early 2008.
On completion of the Waterloo development in around August 2010, John and Laura became the registered proprietors of a number of the residential units and retail/commercial properties at 8 Allen Street, Waterloo including Shop 3 referred to below: Angius v Salier [2019] NSWSC 184 at [15].
On 27 February 2011, Jenny and Robert had an argument at John's office at Shop 4, 8 Allen Street, Waterloo in which (according to the police report) Robert punched Jenny in the mouth, causing a cut to her bottom lip during an argument about the sale of a family property.
On 10 May 2011, a separation agreement was executed by John and Laura, recording that they had separated on 30 September 2010. On 6 October 2011, John and Laura entered into another separation agreement, which was varied on 15 and 16 November 2011. These agreements set out arrangements for the sale of their respective interests in the properties resulting from the Waterloo development so that they would ultimately each own particular properties solely in their own names.
On 19 November 2011, Ms Le was granted an AVO against Laura at Waverley Local Court.
On 3 December 2011, Jenny and Jacqueline had an argument in front of Laura, which (according to the police report) involved a claim by Jenny that Jacqueline was trying to get Laura's money and Jenny allegedly scratched Jacqueline. An AVO was granted to Jacqueline against Jenny.
From 2011, Laura and John lived apart: Laura at the Coogee property and John at Unit 23, 8 Allen Street, Waterloo (referred to by the parties as the 'penthouse apartment') (Waterloo apartment). John ultimately sold the Waterloo apartment in 2016.
From around 2007 or, at the latest, the time of the separation, there was a significant rift in the Angius family between those supporting Laura and those supporting John. Jenny and her family were aligned to John's side in this dispute, and Robert and his family were aligned to Laura.
On 1 August 2011, John and Laura (as lessors) executed a lease of Shop 3, 8 Allen Street, Waterloo (Shop 3) in favour of Ms Le (as lessee) for a term of five years commencing on 1 August 2011 and terminating on 31 July 2016 at a rent of $26,000 per annum (including GST), subject to adjustment, with an option to renew for a further five year term. The lease was registered. On 26 August 2011 Ms Le registered a business name 'Waterloo Laundry Mat' showing the principal place of business as Shop 3R, 8 Allen Street, Waterloo, the address of service of documents in relation to the business name was shown as the Redfern property. Ms Le conducted a laundromat business from Shop 3 throughout the period from 2011 to John's death. It is not in dispute that Ms Le did not, and was never required to, pay the rent under this lease. It is also not in dispute that John gifted to her the fit out of the premises.
In September 2011, Laura commenced proceedings against John and Jenny (2011 proceedings) which related to the Coogee property and another property in the same street in which Jenny lived. The 2011 proceedings were resolved by a Deed dated 15 November 2011. Final orders determining the 2011 proceedings were made, by consent, on 18 November 2011: Estate of Laura Angius; Angius v Angius [2013] NSWSC 1895 (Estate of Laura Angius) at [56].
Laura died on 4 January 2012 at the Coogee property. Robert alleged that his father was involved in her death, and wrote to the coroner regarding his suspicions: Estate of Laura Angius at [20]-[22]. There followed protracted litigation regarding Laura's estate and other family matters between Robert and John: see eg. Estate of Laura Angius; Robert Angius v John Angius [2018] NSWSC 1772.
On around 31 January 2012 John and Laura, as lender, and Ms Le as borrower entered into the instrument entitled 'Security interest in goods' securing a loan of $41,000 made to Ms Le, secured over certain equipment used in the premises.

[13]

Events from 2012 to John's death in 2022

On 13 May 2012, John filed a Notice of Death and became the sole proprietor of the Coogee property. Ms Le deposed that from around this time until May 2017, when he was required to vacate the property John lived in the Waterloo apartment and not at the Coogee property. Jenny disputes that John lived solely at the Waterloo apartment in this period and says that he divided his time between the Waterloo apartment and the Coogee property. In the period from May to August 2017 he appears to have lived principally at the Burradoo property referred to below.
On 14 September 2012, John made a will (see [73] below). Ms Le was not a beneficiary under this will, but Natalie was.
On 3 December 2012, John purchased 21 Links Road, Burradoo (Burradoo property). He appears to have treated this property as essentially a holiday home. John and Ms Le spent Christmas 2012 at the Burradoo property and were joined there by Jenny and her family.
On 21 December 2012, John commenced proceedings (2012/396544) in which he sought to set aside the consent orders and the deeds which had resolved the 2011 proceedings (2012 proceedings). There were also contested probate proceedings in relation to Laura's estate which were heard and determined in December 2013 by Hallen J (see Estate of Laura Angius) and contested proceedings relating to the construction of Laura's will, determined by Ball J (see Gordon Salier v Robert Angius [2015] NSWSC 853).
On 1 April 2014, an independent solicitor, Mr Gordon Salier (Mr Salier), was granted letters of administration in relation to Laura's estate with a copy of the will annexed. The estate was given a value in excess of $23 million.
On 4 November 2015, Hallen J made orders in the 2012 proceedings which included an order pursuant to s 66G of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) that Mr Salier and another person be appointed joint trustees to affect the sale of the Coogee property by auction. After contested proceedings by the trustees to obtain possession of the Coogee property, John vacated the property on 1 May 2017, and it was sold by the co-trustees at auction. John was the successful bidder paying $6 million for the property and settlement of the purchase occurred on or around 2 August 2017.
In an affidavit sworn by him on 26 October 2014 in the 2012 proceedings, John said (emphasis added): 181. I live by myself at the Matrimonial Home but I have been sleeping at unit 23, where I slept when completing building works to the units, as I can no longer bring myself to sleep in the Matrimonial Home and a continuing desire to reduce the debt secured against family assets has led me to wish to sell the Matrimonial Home but I anticipate no balance remaining after costs of the sale, discharge of the mortgage and reimbursement to me of money I advanced to reduce the mortgage prior to sale. 182. I continue to give financial assistance to my two children in the form of accommodation in family owned properties free of payments of rent or mortgage and allowing them to collect rent from family owned properties. This is so even where such properties having been purchased by money I placed in my and Laura's names and where I continue to pay the bills for these properties. I also provide money to Robert and his children and Jenny and her children when they need it and from time to time by giving them cash or paying their bills. I have not exercised any right to demand payment under the mortgages in my favour over the properties I placed in their names. My children have the use of properties and businesses which Laura and I provided without Laura and I receiving any or adequate consideration.
It is not in dispute that the 'Matrimonial Home' is a reference to the Coogee property.
In 2015, John made a gift to Ms Le of a second hand Toyota Aurion motor vehicle.
On 11 January 2016, John entered into a new lease of Shop 3 in favour of Ms Le for a term of five years which included an option to renew for two further periods of five years each (with a maximum period of the tenancy under the lease and permitted renewals being 15 years). The rent payable remained unchanged. It is not in dispute that Ms Le did not, and was never required to, pay the rent under this lease.
In August 2016, John sold the Waterloo apartment and moved back to live permanently at the Coogee property. Ms Le says that she lived there with him from that time, but this is disputed by Jenny.
Having vacated the Coogee property in May 2017, as noted above, John lived at the Burradoo property during the period from May to August 2017, and then moved back to the Coogee property in August 2017 and remained living there until his death. Ms Le deposed that she lived with John both at the Burradoo property from May to August 2017 and then at the Coogee property until his death, but Jenny disputes this.
On 31 May 2018, Robert was joined as a defendant to proceedings brought by John in 2016 against Mr Salier and various companies of which John and Laura had been directors which owned a number of income-earning properties. The joinder of Robert was permitted because the orders which were sought by John would directly affect his rights as the principal beneficiary of Laura's estate. Robert subsequently filed a cross-claim against John which involved an allegation that John caused the defendant companies' funds in excess of $4 million to be paid into account which he controlled.
Following the appointment by the Court of a tutor for John, the substantive claims in the proceedings were settled in May 2020, apart from certain issues arising under Robert's cross-claim which were deferred until the taking of accounts by the receiver of the defendant companies: see Angius v Salier (No 5) [2023] NSWSC 678 at [28]-[34], [76]. Robb J records at [45] that the receiver's amended report of 22 September 2020 disclosed that the total amount of some $2.89 million had been paid by the company defendants to John.
There was other litigation between John and Robert after Laura's death: see Robert Angius v John Angius [2018] NSWSC 1772. There was also a family provision claim brought by Jenny in 2013 against Laura's estate for which Mr Salier as administrator of Laura's estate was the defendant which was ultimately resolved by orders made in 2019.
On 21 April 2021, John made his last will (see [69] below). Neither Ms Le and/or Natalie were a beneficiary under this will.
On 8 June 2021, Ms Le had a conference with AKN & Associates, the solicitors representing her in these proceedings, seeking advice regarding her 'situation' in relation to the deceased. On the same day, Ms Kolena Denis (a witness for Ms Le in these proceedings) signed a statutory declaration at the offices of AKN & Associates supporting Ms Le's claim that she was in a de facto relationship with John. Shortly after this, Ms Le relinquished her subsidised tenancy of the Redfern property and changed her nominated address for her bank accounts, credit card statements, insurance, driver's licence and car registration, taxation office and mail from the Redfern property to the Coogee property.
John spent lengthy periods in hospital in 2021 for issues related to his heart, including in January (admitted on 26 January and stayed seven days), March (admitted on 28 March and stayed nine days), June (admitted on 15 June and stayed two days), July (admitted on 19 July and stayed one month) and September (admitted on 6 September and stayed three days and also on 28 September). The admission on 19 July 2021 was to Royal Prince Alfred Hospital (RPA) for heart surgery.
On 24 June 2021, John was taken by Jenny for a consultation with Associate Professor Tuly Rosenfeld, a consultant geriatrician and physician following a brain scan which he had organised for John. Professor Rosenfeld saw John on his own, with Jenny remaining in reception throughout the consultation. Relevant parts of the report prepared by Professor Rosenfeld are set out later in these reasons.
On 6 November 2021, John's drivers' licence was suspended.
On 20 December 2021, John met with a solicitor, Mr Francis Devine, at his home during which he gave instructions for the preparation of an enduring power of attorney and the appointment of an enduring guardianship, but ultimately, they were not signed.
John spent Christmas Day 2021 at the Coogee property and had Christmas there with Jenny and her partner, Kevin Batten, and her children, Gabrielle and Sean. Ms Le spent the day with her family at the Bankstown property, although she deposed that she returned to the Coogee property in the evening of Christmas Day and had dinner with John there alone with him.
John tested positive to COVID-19 on 23 January 2022 and died on 31 January 2022, aged 85 years. His funeral was on 5 February 2022. Both plaintiffs attended.
On 10 February 2022, Jenny arranged for Mr Jason Bates, an asset manager, to go to the Coogee property, to remove Ms Le and her son, Duc, who were staying there.
On 11 February 2022, six days after the funeral, Ms Le commenced her proceedings by summons, supported by her first affidavit sworn on the same day.
On 30 January 2023, Natalie commenced her proceedings by summons.

[14]

The deceased's testamentary intentions

John left a will dated 21 April 2021 naming Jenny as his executor and sole beneficiary. If Jenny did not survive the deceased, he directed that any of her children who attained the age of 25 years should share equally in his estate.
The 2021 will did not name any other persons, and in particular made no provision for Ms Le (or any other of the deceased's employees or caregivers), nor did he make any provision for his son Robert, or Robert's children, including Natalie.
The 2021 will was made after the conclusion of the Supreme Court proceedings brought by Robert concerning Laura's estate, as a result of which Robert was the sole beneficiary of her estate, net distributable value of which was estimated by Mr Salier (the Administrator) to be in excess of $13 million but by Robert to be considerably larger: see Gianna (Jenny) Angius v Gordon Albert Salier [2018] NSWSC 995 at [23] and [30].
Natalie gave evidence that John said to her when she visited him in hospital on 16 June 2021 that he had recently changed his will because he didn't want her father, Robert, 'to have any more control over anything', that this new will had been 'rushed through', that it was 'temporary' and 'I need to change it'. There is some further evidence regarding John's testamentary intentions in the last months of his life referred to later in these reasons.
The deceased had only one previous will, executed on 14 September 2012. By that will he appointed as executors his daughter Jenny Angius and his granddaughter Gabrielle Angius. In summary, the substance of the will was as follows: 1. he gave the family vault and his interest as tenant in common in 46 Denning Street, South Coogee to Jenny (cll 5 and 6); 2. he gave the benefit of any loan payable to him at the date of his death by Jenny or Robert to Jenny or Robert (cl 7); 3. he made seven pecuniary legacies. Each of the pecuniary legacies was indexed (cl 8): 1. $200,000 to each of Sean Batten, Stephany [sic] Navarro, Natalie Navarro [sic], Melissa Navarro [sic], Jacqueline Navarro [sic]; 2. $1,000,000 to Gabrielle; and 3. $1,000,000 to Robert. 1. he gave the balance of his estate in equal shares to Jenny and Gabrielle (cl 9).
The 2012 will gave a legacy to Natalie and each of his other grandchildren (except for Robert's children with Jacqueline) but did not mention Ms Le and made no provision for her.

[16]

Statutory regime

Chapter 3 of the Act governs the making of a 'family provision order' being an order made by the Court 'in relation to the estate or notional estate of a deceased person to provide from that estate for the maintenance, education or advancement of life of an eligible person' (s 3(1)).
Persons eligible to apply for family provision orders are set out in s 57(1) of the Act, which provides as follows: (1) The following are eligible persons who may apply to the Court for a family provision order in respect of the estate of a deceased person - (a) a person who was the spouse of the deceased person at the time of the deceased person's death, (b) a person with whom the deceased person was living in a de facto relationship at the time of the deceased person's death, (c) a child of the deceased person, (d) a former spouse of the deceased person, (e) a person - (i) who was, at any particular time, wholly or partly dependent on the deceased person, and (ii) who is a grandchild of the deceased person or was, at that particular time or at any other time, a member of the household of which the deceased person was a member, (f) a person with whom the deceased person was living in a close personal relationship at the time of the deceased person's death. Note - Section 60 sets out the matters that the Court may consider when determining whether to make a family provision order, and the nature of any such order. An application may be made by a tutor (within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Act 2005) for an eligible person who is under legal incapacity. Note - 'De facto relationship' is defined in section 21C of the Interpretation Act 1987.
Ms Le relies on s 57(1)(b) and, in the alternative s 57(1)(f). Natalie relies on s 57(1)(e).
In relation to s 57(1)(b), s 21C of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) is relevant, which provides: (1) Meaning of "de facto partner" For the purposes of any Act or instrument, a person is the de facto partner of another person (whether of the same sex or a different sex) if - (a) the person is in a registered relationship or interstate registered relationship with the other person within the meaning of the Relationships Register Act 2010, or (b) the person is in a de facto relationship with the other person. (2) Meaning of "de facto relationship" For the purposes of any Act or instrument, a person is in a de facto relationship with another person if - (a) they have a relationship as a couple living together, and (b) they are not married to one another or related by family. A de facto relationship can exist even if one of the persons is legally married to someone else or in a registered relationship or interstate registered relationship with someone else. (3) Determination of "relationship as a couple" In determining whether 2 persons have a relationship as a couple for the purposes of subsection (2), all the circumstances of the relationship are to be taken into account, including any of the following matters that are relevant in a particular case - (a) the duration of the relationship, (b) the nature and extent of their common residence, (c) whether a sexual relationship exists, (d) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, between them, (e) the ownership, use and acquisition of property, (f) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life, (g) the care and support of children, (h) the performance of household duties, (i) the reputation and public aspects of the relationship. No particular finding in relation to any of those matters is necessary in determining whether 2 persons have a relationship as a couple. (4) Meaning of "related by family" For the purposes of subsection (2), 2 persons are related by family if - (a) one is the child (including an adopted child) of the other, or (b) one is another descendant of the other (even if the relationship between them is traced through an adoptive parent), or (c) they have a parent in common (including an adoptive parent of either or both of them). (5) Subsection (4) applies - (a) even if an adoption has been declared void or is of no effect, and (b) to adoptions under the law of any place (whether in or out of Australia) relating to the adoption of children. (6) Subsection (4) applies in relation to a child whose parentage is transferred as a result of a parentage order, or an Interstate parentage order, within the meaning of the Surrogacy Act 2010 in the same way as it applies in relation to an adopted child, even if the parentage order is discharged or otherwise ceases to have effect. For that purpose, a reference in that subsection to an adoptive parent is to be read as a reference to a person to whom the parentage of a child is transferred under such a parentage order.
Applications for family provision orders must be made within 12 months of the date of the death of the deceased: s 58 of the Act. This is not in issue in either proceeding.
Family provision orders may be made pursuant to s 59, which provides relevantly: (1) The Court may, on application under Division 1, make a family provision order in relation to the estate of a deceased person, if the Court is satisfied that - (a) the person in whose favour the order is to be made is an eligible person, and (b) in the case of a person who is an eligible person by reason only of paragraph (d), (e) or (f) of the definition of eligible person in section 57 - having regard to all the circumstances of the case (whether past or present) there are factors which warrant the making of the application, and (c) at the time when the Court is considering the application, adequate provision for the proper maintenance, education or advancement in life of the person in whose favour the order is to be made has not been made by the will of the deceased person, or by the operation of the intestacy rules in relation to the estate of the deceased person, or both. (2) The Court may make such order for provision out of the estate of the deceased person as the Court thinks ought to be made for the maintenance, education or advancement in life of the eligible person, having regard to the facts known to the Court at the time the order is made. Note - Property that may be the subject of a family provision order is set out in Division 3. This Part applies to property, including property that is designated as notional estate (see section 73). Part 3.3 sets out property that may be designated as part of the notional estate of a deceased person for the purpose of making a family provision order.
Therefore, Natalie must demonstrate that there are 'factors warranting' her claim for provision in accordance with s 59(1)(b), and Ms Le must only demonstrate that there are 'factors warranting' her claim in respect of her alternative claim for eligibility under s 57(1)(f).
Under s 60(1), the matters to be considered in determining whether there are 'factors warranting' the claim and also whether to make an order and the nature of any such order, are set out in s 60(2) which provides: (2) The following matters may be considered by the Court - (a) any family or other relationship between the applicant and the deceased person, including the nature and duration of the relationship, (b) the nature and extent of any obligations or responsibilities owed by the deceased person to the applicant, to any other person in respect of whom an application has been made for a family provision order or to any beneficiary of the deceased person's estate, (c) the nature and extent of the deceased person's estate (including any property that is, or could be, designated as notional estate of the deceased person) and of any liabilities or charges to which the estate is subject, as in existence when the application is being considered, (d) the financial resources (including earning capacity) and financial needs, both present and future, of the applicant, of any other person in respect of whom an application has been made for a family provision order or of any beneficiary of the deceased person's estate, (e) if the applicant is cohabiting with another person - the financial circumstances of the other person, (f) any physical, intellectual or mental disability of the applicant, any other person in respect of whom an application has been made for a family provision order or any beneficiary of the deceased person's estate that is in existence when the application is being considered or that may reasonably be anticipated, (g) the age of the applicant when the application is being considered, (h) any contribution (whether financial or otherwise) by the applicant to the acquisition, conservation and improvement of the estate of the deceased person or to the welfare of the deceased person or the deceased person's family, whether made before or after the deceased person's death, for which adequate consideration (not including any pension or other benefit) was not received, by the applicant, (i) any provision made for the applicant by the deceased person, either during the deceased person's lifetime or made from the deceased person's estate, (j) any evidence of the testamentary intentions of the deceased person, including evidence of statements made by the deceased person, (k) whether the applicant was being maintained, either wholly or partly, by the deceased person before the deceased person's death and, if the Court considers it relevant, the extent to which and the basis on which the deceased person did so, (l) whether any other person is liable to support the applicant, (m) the character and conduct of the applicant before and after the date of the death of the deceased person, (n) the conduct of any other person before and after the date of the death of the deceased person, (o) any relevant Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander customary law, (p) any other matter the Court considers relevant, including matters in existence at the time of the deceased person's death or at the time the application is being considered.

[18]

De facto relationship

Ms Le relies on s 57(1)(b) which requires that she was living with the deceased in a de facto relationship at the time of his death. Two persons will be in a de facto relationship at a particular time if they have a relationship as a couple living together, and whether that is so is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances, including the matters listed in s 21C(3) of the Interpretation Act. As noted by Hallen J in Sheen v Hesan; the Estate of Zaheer [2023] NSWSC 468 at [485], there are nine circumstances referred to, which may be grouped in to 'private' ((c), (d), (e) and (f)) and 'public' ((a), (b), (g), (h) and (i)) factors. None of these factors are exclusive. In Piras v Egan [2008] NSWCA 59, Campbell JA (Giles and Tobias JJA agreeing) said at [146]: It should be recalled that the list of 'circumstances' in section 4(2) [of the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW)] are reminders of matters that possibly might be relevant in deciding whether two people are in a de facto relationship, but do not state its essence. The essence is to be found in the definition in section 4(1) [of the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW)]. If two people do not 'live together as a couple' they do not satisfy the definition of being in a de facto relationship, regardless of what might be the situation concerning the various 'circumstances' listed in section 4(2) [of the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW)].
The 'circumstances' to which reference is made in this passage are the same as the circumstances listed in s 21C(3) of the Interpretation Act, set out above.
The concept of 'living together' as a couple, which is the essence of a de facto relationship, does not require that two persons share the same residence exclusively or on a full-time basis. In NSW Trustee and Guardian v McGrath [2013] NSWSC 1894, Young AJ said: [13] Human relationships cover a wide spectrum. The cases show that there have been many situations other than the situation where a man and a woman share the one residence and live as if they were man and wife for the whole week where a de facto relationship has been held to be made out…. [18] However the concept of living together does not relate to sharing a particular residence but rather what Murphy J said in Jonah v White whether a couple manifests a relationship of "coupledom" which involves the merger of two lives.
In Vaughan v Hoskovich [2010] NSWSC 706, White J (as his Honour then was) said at [53]: In my view, the fact that they lived together only for a small part of each week does not mean that they cannot be said to have lived together as a couple. Whether they lived together as a couple, must of course take into account all of the circumstances, including those listed in subs (2). But it seems to me that the maintenance of separate residences is not inconsistent with the parties living together as a couple, provided that there is sufficient shared residence over a long enough period to amount to "living together". Parties can live together for part of a week and also live apart, for part of a week. Although living apart for some periods, they can still live together as a couple if all the circumstances indicate that they are "a couple". I accept that the phrase "living together as a couple" connotes that the persons will live together in a place which can be said to be their home, but a person can have more than one home (Cardiacos v Cooper Consulting and Constructions Services (Aust) Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 938 at [27]-[29] and cases there cited.) In the present case, as indicated in paras [10] and [12], the parties treated the plaintiff's Turramurra property as one of the deceased's homes.
In Smoje v Forrester [2017] NSWCA 308 at [42] Meagher JA (Basten and Macfarlan JJA agreeing) said: Whilst the state of living "together" does not require that the living occur at and from a single place, or that the two adults spend all of their time together at the same time, it will ordinarily include elements of interaction and sharing whilst engaging in activities associated with occupying the same place. Repeated visits for a singular purpose, without more, do not satisfy that description.
In Fairbairn v Radecki (2022) 275 CLR 400; [2022] HCA 18 the High Court considered the meaning of 'living together' in the context of the expression 'a relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis' in s 4AA(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), which is in the same terms as s 21C of the Interpretation Act. The Court said at [33] and [39] (footnotes omitted, emphasis added): Living together for the purposes of s 4AA(1) will often, perhaps usually, mean cohabitation of some residence by a couple for some period of time. But cohabitation of a residence or residences is not a necessary feature of "living together". That phrase must be construed to take account of the many various ways in which two people may share their lives together in the modern world. Two people, for any number of reasons, may not reside in the same residence, but nonetheless be in a de facto relationship in the sense required by s 4AA. … The language of s 4AA of the Act and its reference to "living together" requires no different approach to determining whether a relationship exists of the kind defined. "Living together", consistently with authority, should be construed as meaning sharing life as a couple. Section 4AA does not prescribe any way by which a couple may share life together. Its language is sufficiently broad to accommodate the great variety of ways a de facto relationship may exist. That conclusion is supported by the varied factors listed in s 4AA(2). In a given case, some of the factors listed in s 4AA(2) may be relevant and some may be irrelevant; inevitably some may have greater prominence than others. A conclusion that a de facto relationship has ended may also arise because of factors not listed in s 4AA(2). Such a conclusion is mandated by s 4AA(3) and (4). In particular, s 4AA(4) is a statutory recognition that what may constitute a genuine de facto relationship is not be determined in the same way in every case by reference to rigid criteria that must always be satisfied. In that respect, the language of s 4AA(2)(b) does not assume that every de facto relationship must have a "common residence" to some "extent" and of some "nature". Such a construction is entirely denied by s 4AA(3).
An important factor in determining the question whether two persons share life as a couple, and hence can be said to live together as a couple, is whether they have a mutual commitment to a shared life. In Petersen v Gregory; Estate Glen Alfred Petersen [2007] NSWSC 8 at [11], Barrett J said the following regarding the expression 'living together as a couple': It is nevertheless pertinent to remember that, as Windeyer J pointed out in Hooper v Winten [2002] NSWSC 1071, de facto relationships, like marriages, will not be perfect all the time. While the romantic characteristic to which Gzell J referred will typically exist at inception, a diminution in its intensity in a shared residential setting will not of itself mark the end of living "together as a couple". The central concept is one of personal commitment that is mutually acknowledged and of an emotional kind transcending the mere fact of the shared residential setting. It is that which causes two persons residing under the same roof to be living "together as a couple". This central concept has recently been explored by McLaughlin AsJ in Delany v Burgess [2006] NSWSC 1420.
Barrett J's observation regarding the central concept of a de facto relationship was endorsed by McColl JA (Beazley JA agreeing) in Hayes v Marquis [2008] NSWCA 10 at [83].
As Barrett J noted in the above passage, the required commitment to a shared life as a couple does not require emotional or romantic love: see also Vaughan at [49] and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Angkawijaya (2016) 236 FCR 303; [2016] FCAFC 5 at [3].
Basten JA in Robson v Quijarro [2009] NSWCA 365 (Ipp and McColl JJA agreeing) made the following observations at [59] regarding the relevance of a mutual commitment to a shared life to the existence of a de facto relationship: Although, in accordance with s 4(3), a degree of mutual commitment to a shared life is not an essential element of a de facto, it is difficult to envisage two persons living together as a couple without some degree of mutual commitment to a shared life. Thus, in most cases, satisfaction of that criterion, at least to some degree, will be a significant factor in the overall assessment of the relationship. However, the concept of a commitment to a shared life is not one which is rigidly defined and clearly may need to be applied with a degree of flexibility, depending on the circumstances. Similarly, the concept of "mutual" commitment is one which can accommodate a degree of flexibility and variation over time and having regard to the relevant circumstances.
It is necessary to keep in mind that 'relationship as a couple living together' is a composite expression or concept which should not be dissected into discrete elements: Hayes v Marquis [2008] NSWCA 10 at [73] per McColl JA (Beazley JA agreeing). What is required is an evaluative assessment of all the relevant circumstances.
The following observations of Hallen J in Sheen v Hesan [2023] NSWSC 468 at [504] and [514] are apposite: Common sense dictates that a relationship may change, or develop, over time. Thus, its legal character at one point may not represent its character at another. Furthermore, in assessing the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life, it is not essential that there be entire harmony, entire fidelity, entire satisfaction with the relationship, or entire commitment; the degree of commitment may be high even though there are qualifications. Dissatisfactions, infidelities, expressed complaints, grievances, and less than entire commitment are often found in personal relationships, including marriages, and are not inconsistent with a relationship of two parties having a relationship as a couple living together, but not married to one another. … It can be seen, from what has been set out above, that the concept of a de facto relationship is complex. It should not be construed on "narrow, formal, pedantic, or merely geographical criteria, but should be considered taking into account the human reality of the personal, emotional and cultural complex": Dow v Hoskins [2003] VSC 206 at [32]. Yet, it should be distinguished from the relationship of two people, who live apart, but who have a sexual relationship, and who sleep over at one another's house; and also, from the relationship of two people, who share a house, but who do not have a romantic commitment to each other and who have other sexual partners. The fact that one provides the other, on occasions, with financial, or other, assistance, such as accommodation, to alleviate hardship does not mean that they are in a de facto relationship. In this way, a de facto relationship is different from friendship, or courtship, which has not matured into the commitment where there is a merging of lives so that there is a mutual commitment to a shared life. It is also different from simple companionship. But it is not to be judged only against the static model of persons living together full-time, sharing fully domestic, financial, and other responsibilities.

[19]

Wholly or partly dependant - s 57(1)(e)

Natalie relies on s 57(1)(e) under which, as a grandchild of the deceased, she must establish that she was at a particular time wholly or partly dependant on the deceased.
It is clear that the word 'dependent' in s 57(1)(e)(i) is an ordinary English word and the question of whether a person is wholly or partly dependent on another is a question of fact in light of the whole relationship between them: Spata v Tumino (2018) 95 NSWLR 706; [2018] NSWCA 17 at [68].
In Tobin v Ezekiel (2012) 83 NSWLR 757; [2012] NSWCA 285 Meagher JA (Basten JA agreeing) said at [109]-[110]: Dependency in this context means actual reliance on someone else for the total or partial satisfaction of some need. It is not limited to purely financial or material matters: Petrohilos v Hunter (1991) 25 NSWLR 343 at 346-347. Nor is it restricted to requirements of basic necessity and the standard or measure of satisfaction of any need is not to be determined by reference to any minimum or subsistence standard. In each case, the measure is the standard set by the parties: Ball v Newey (1988) 13 NSWLR 489 at 492. Dependency may exist irrespective of whether the dependent person is financially or physically able to support himself or herself: Ball v Newey at 492. However, the reasons for and circumstances of the dependency are relevant when considering what claims the dependent has on the bounty of the testator…
In Page v Page [2017] NSWCA 141 Sackville JA (Leeming JA agreeing) set out a summary of the relevant principles regarding the construction of s 57(1)(e) at [101] (footnotes omitted): 1. The word "dependent" is an ordinary English word and whether a person is wholly or partly dependent on another is a question of fact. 2. The factual question can be complex and involve consideration of many elements. Accordingly, different minds might well differ in their approach. 3. While a common form of dependence is dependence on another for the material necessities of life, this is not the only form recognised by s 57(1)(e) of the Succession Act. For example, where a parent or step-parent provides a child who has no independent financial resources with services essential to well-being, the child might be found to have been wholly or partly dependent on the parent or step-parent. 4. Dependency involves the satisfaction of a need, but the need is not restricted to the requirements of basic necessities or sustenance. 5. The word "partly" in the definition of "eligible person" is a word of "some elasticity". It does not necessarily mean "substantially", but rather "more than minimally" or perhaps "significantly". 6. Dependency is not necessarily correlative with a legal duty to maintain, although such a duty is a factor to take into account. Nor are dependency and actual support necessarily correlative. Hence there may be cases where support has been provided without dependency, for example where the support is provided for a short time or for a particular purpose or where an adult child provides occasional domestic assistance to an aged parent.
In Chisak v Presot [2022] NSWCA 100, White JA (Macfarlan and Gleeson JJA agreeing) said at [47] that the phrase 'partly dependent' means at least 'more than minimally' and added at [57]: I respectfully doubt that it is legitimate to read into s 59(1)(e) a requirement that partial dependency be "significant" rather than "more than minimal". Section 57(1)(e) is merely a gateway for the court to consider whether there are factors that warrant the making of an application for provision by a grandchild out of his or her grandparent's estate (s 59(1)(b)), and if so, whether provision ought to be ordered (s 59(1)(c)). The degree of dependence for a particular period of time will no doubt be relevant to those issues. With due deference to the reasons of Palmer J in Simons v Permanent Trustee and Re: Sherborne Estate and Basten JA in Page v Page , I do not think it appropriate to conflate questions relevant to those issues, such as whether the degree of dependence was such that the grandparent assumed parental responsibility for the grandchild, with the factual question of whether the grandchild did depend on the deceased for particular periods of time. I do not accept the primary judge's reasons on this issue at J [329] quoted above.

[20]

Close personal relationship - s 57(1)(f)

Ms Le relies on s 57(1)(f) under her alternative claim. This requires that she was a person with whom the deceased was living in a close personal relationship at the time of his death.
The expression 'close personal relationship' is defined in s 3(3) of the Act to mean 'a close personal relationship (other than in marriage or a de facto relationship) between two adult persons, whether or not related by family, who are living together, one or each of whom provides the other with domestic support and personal care'. Under s 3(4)(i), a close personal relationship is taken not to exist between two persons where one of them provides the other with domestic support and personal care for fee or reward.
It will be seen that there are three requirements in order for s 59(1)(f) to be satisfied. First, the two people must be adults who are living together in a close personal relationship (other than marriage or a de facto relationship); second, one or each of them must provide the other with domestic support and personal care; and third, that domestic support and personal care must not be provided for fee or reward. In relation to the first two requirements, Macready M said in Dridi v Fillmore [2001] NSWSC 319 at [102]-[106]: … So far as the first requirement is concerned since we are not concerned with concepts applicable to couples the requirement would be met if the parties shared accommodation together. For example, a boarder in an elderly widow's home would qualify. It may not be necessary for there to be a sharing of food or eating arrangements together. In the present case this is not important as it seems that the parties ate together when they were both at home. The second requirement is cumulative. There must be both domestic support and personal care. In this case there is evidence of domestic support as the defendant provided for the plaintiff free accommodation and meals, which he cooked for the plaintiff when the plaintiff was at home. There are other matters, not present in this case, which could be domestic support, eg. shopping for both parties, washing clothes etc It is the provision of "personal care" which provides the clue to the meaning of the composite expression "domestic support and personal care". Some of the primary meanings of "personal" include:- (a) Of or pertaining to concerning of affecting the individual person or self; individual; private; one's own. (b) Of or pertaining to one's person body or figure; bodily." Accordingly, personal care connotes care taken in connection with such matters…
In Hayes v Marquis [2008] NSWCA 10, McColl JA (Beazley JA agreeing) said at [84]-[87]: The question of whether or not one adult provides the other with domestic support and personal care sufficient to satisfy s 5(1)(b) will also turn on the nature and extent of that assistance. Thus if two adults lived together fulltime and one provided domestic support and personal care to the other only once or twice a year, it would be difficult to say that a close personal relationship had been established. While Ms Bridger conceded the respondent provided domestic support, she challenged the proposition that the evidence disclosed that either the appellant or the respondent provided the other with "personal care" within the meaning of s 5(1)(b). She drew attention to Dridi v Fillmore [2001] NSWSC 319 (at [105]-[106]) where Master Macready said that personal care connoted care taken with respect to such matters as pertained to, concerned or affected the individual person or self or pertained to one's person, body or figure. She did not explain why the sort of care the respondent provided did not fall within that description. Master Macready commented (at [108]) that he would not have thought that matters such as "emotional support" would "by themselves" fall within the expression "domestic support and personal care". Clearly each case will turn on its own facts. The Second Reading Speech contemplated that personal care services may encompass ensuring the physical and emotional support of one or both parties for the other. For my part I have difficulty with an argument that parties accepted to be in a loving sexual relationship, as the primary judge found here, are not providing each other with personal care. And there may be cases where emotional support of itself will suffice. Society recognises the importance emotional support can play in an individual's well being. Psyche is just as much a personal attribute requiring sustenance as one's physical self. The notion of "personal care" should not be confined to matters relating to physicality.
The third requirement that the domestic support and personal care must not be provided 'for fee or reward' was considered in Saravinovski v Saravinovska [2017] NSWCA 85 in the context of s 5(2)(a) of the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW). It may be noted that s 5(1)(b) and s 5(2)(a) of that Act are identical (following the amendment made to the Act in 2018) to s 3(3) and s 3(4) of the Act.
At first instance, Kunc J said of the words 'for fee or reward' (see [2016] NSWSC 964 at [375]-[376]): I respectfully agree (to this extent) with Bryson AJ's conclusion in White that on its proper construction the expression '… provides … domestic support and personal care … for fee or reward' requires a 'direct relation' between the fee or reward and the provision of support and care. The factual question for the Court, to adopt Bryson AJ's language, is whether 'the fee or reward is produced by the provision of support or care'. The relationship must be causative or, putting it another way, be a quid pro quo. This requirement was captured in the observation of Mason J in Charles Moore (at 476) that 'But for the expectation that it would receive a valuable benefit in the form of reciprocal reports, a department store would not provide a competitor with information about a customer'. For the foregoing reasons, a party wishing to rely on s 5(2)(a) must satisfy the Court that there is a direct connection in the nature of an immediate and intentional exchange of the provision of domestic support and personal care for the purpose of eliciting the identified fee or reward. So understood, such an arrangement might be seen as the origin of, or motive for, what would otherwise be a close personal relationship under the PRA. It is to be contrasted with the situation where the provision of domestic support and personal care is an indicium or incident of the close personal relationship.
Leeming JA (Beazley ACJ agreeing) in the Court of Appeal approved these observations and then added at [36]-[41]: The contrast drawn by the primary judge may be illustrated by the distinction between, on the one hand, a nurse or housekeeper who lives with an aged or disabled person and is compensated (in money or board or both) and, on the other hand, a niece or nephew who lives with an older relative who is no longer self-sufficient. Even if it is made clear that the niece or nephew will receive free board and lodging and may have an expectation of an inheritance if the relative predeceases him or her, if the purpose of doing so is primarily based on family ties, then he or she will not be living together with his or her relative "for fee or reward". Those examples are more clear-cut than some of the relationships which will arise in real cases (an example is the family friend who was treated as a son considered in Ye v Fung [2006] NSWSC 243). It is to be expected that there will be many cases where domestic support and personal care are provided for motives that have elements of affection or familial duty, but also elements of an expectation of some benefit in return. However, it is not necessary in order to resolve this appeal to address cases where the position is more nuanced. The appellant seized upon the words "direct relation" or "direct connection" in the primary judge's formulation reproduced above, and contended that on the findings of fact made by his Honour, there was the requisite relation or connection. But there is, in one sense, a direct relation or direct connection between the provision of accommodation to both the nurse or housekeeper and to the niece or nephew in the examples mentioned above. It would however be wrong to disentitle a person merely because it could be shown that there was some causal connection between the fee or reward and the provision of domestic support and personal care. That is the point made by the primary judge in the passages reproduced above, with which I respectfully agree. There is another matter to bear in mind. These questions will only arise if the two people are "living together" and not married or in a de facto relationship. If the purpose of the living together is primarily based on bonds of family or friendship, then it is likely that the provision of domestic support and personal care will not be "for fee or reward". If the purpose of living together is primarily remunerative, then the provision of domestic support and personal care is likely to be "for fee or reward". There has been an understandable tendency to take the imprecise words of the statute and to impose glosses upon them. Thus it was said in Re Filomena Rodi (dec'd) [2016] NSWSC 1696 at [53] that "in context the expression 'for fee or reward' implies a commercial arrangement". In White v O'Neill [2010] NSWSC 1193 at [47], there was reference to "a contractual arrangement in which the fee or reward is produced by the provision of support and care". It may be helpful to ask whether a relationship is properly characterised as "commercial" or "contractual". If the relationship be "commercial" then it is likely that the domestic support and personal care will be provided for fee or reward. But ultimately the statutory language requires an examination of a question of fact: why did the person provide domestic support and personal care? I respectfully agree with the observation of the primary judge at [378] that placing a gloss upon the statute may ultimately distract from the task of applying the words of s 5(2)(a) themselves. I appreciate, of course, that there will be cases where the reason for providing domestic support and personal care is contestable. Motivations may be mixed, and may vary over time, as the facts in Ye v Fung demonstrate. Here, as Emmett AJA has observed, the board and lodging which Maria received were an incident of her close personal relationship with her father-in-law Chris, but were not the reason for her caring for him. It follows that there was no error in the primary judge's conclusion that she was not disentitled by s 5(2)(a).
It follows from Saravinovski that in order for the exclusion in s 3(4) of the Act to apply the benefit which is said to constitute the relevant 'fee or reward' must have a causal nexus with the provision of the domestic support and personal care.

[21]

Factors warranting

If s 57(1)(e) (in the case of Natalie) or s 57(1)(f) (in the case of Ms Le) is satisfied, then it becomes necessary to determine if there are factors warranting the making of the application within the meaning of s 59(1)(b). In Re Fulop Deceased (1987) 8 NSWLR 679 at 681, McLelland J (as his Honour then was) said that these 'factors' are 'factors which when added to facts which render the applicant an "eligible person" give him or her the status of a person who would be generally regarded as a natural object of testamentary recognition by a deceased'.
In Lodin v Lodin [2017] NSWCA 327, Sackville AJA (Basten and White JJA agreeing) said at [114] (by reference to the examples of a former spouse or grandchild): Consistently with the analysis in Re Fulop, the starting point for applying of s 59(1)(b) of the Succession Act is that an eligible person such as a former spouse or grandchild of the deceased is not normally regarded as a natural object of testamentary recognition by the deceased. In order to satisfy s 59(1)(b) an applicant must therefore establish that there are circumstances that justify regarding him or her as a natural object of testamentary recognition by the deceased. Those circumstances must go beyond the bare fact of a familial (or, in the case of a former spouse, a previous familial) relationship. The factors relied on must be such as to demonstrate a social, domestic or moral obligation on the testator to make some provision for the claimant.
Sackville AJA went on to observe at [126] that 'care must be taken not to impose rigid constraints on the circumstances that might constitute factors warranting' the claim of a particular applicant (in that case a former spouse), but '[s]omething more is ordinarily needed for the claimant to show that he or she was a natural object of testamentary recognition'. His Honour added at [129] that a 'significant matter is likely to be the nature of the relationship between the claimant and the deceased. In particular, it may be very important to determine whether there were (or are) features of that relationship that can be said to create a moral obligation on the deceased to make testamentary provision for the claimant'.
In the case of a grandchild, Hallen AsJ in Bowditch v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2012] NSWSC 275 at [113] stated the following 'general principles' which his Honour recognised at [117] are merely guidelines, where the statutory provisions are being applied to a claim by a grandchild: In relation to a claim by a grandchild, the following general principles are, in my view, relevant and should be remembered: (a) As a general rule, a grandparent does not have a responsibility to make provision for a grandchild; that obligation rests on the parent of the grandchild. Nor is a grandchild, normally, regarded as a natural object of the deceased's testamentary recognition. (b) Where a grandchild has lost his, or her, parents at an early age, or when he, or she, has been taken in by the grandparent in circumstances where the grandparent becomes in loco parentis, these factors would, prima facie, give rise to a claim by a grandchild to be provided for out of the estate of the deceased grandparent. The fact that the grandchild resided with one, or more, of his, or her, grandparents is a significant factor. Even then, it should be demonstrated that the deceased had come to assume, for some significant time in the grandchild's life, a position more akin to that of a parent than a grandparent, with direct responsibility for the grandchild's support and welfare, or else that the deceased has undertaken a continuing and substantial responsibility to support the applicant grandchild financially or emotionally. (c) The mere fact of a family relationship between grandparent and grandchild does not, of itself, establish any obligation to provide for the grandchild upon the death of the grandparent. A moral obligation may be created in a particular case by reason, for example, of the care and affection provided by a grandchild to his, or her, grandparent. (d) Generosity by the grandparent to the grandchild, including contribution to the education of the child, does not convert the grandparental relationship into one of obligation to provide for the grandchild upon the death of the grandparent. It has been said that a pattern of significant generosity by a grandparent, including contributions to education, does not convert the grandparental relationship into one of obligation to the recipients, as distinct from one of voluntary support, generosity and indulgence. (e) The fact that the deceased occasionally, or even frequently, made gifts to, or for, the benefit of the grandchild does not, in itself, make the grandchild wholly, or partially, dependent on the deceased for the purposes of the Act. (f) It is relevant to consider what inheritance, or financial support, a grandchild might fairly expect from his, or her, parents.
These observations were approved by the Court of Appeal in Chapple v Wilcox (2014) 87 NSWLR 646; [2014] NSWCA 392 at [21] per Basten JA and at [65]-[67] per Barrett JA (Gleeson JA agreeing). Basten JA also noted at [20] that the 'principles' are relevant to both the question whether there are factors warranting the application and, if so, what if any provision should be made. See also to the same effect Gleeson JA at [150].

[22]

Approach to evidence

The Court is required to determine on the balance of probabilities whether each plaintiff has proved the different elements of her case. So far as the proof of facts is required, the Court must feel an actual persuasion of the occurrence or existence of that fact before it can be found, which does not involve a mere mechanical comparison of probabilities, independent of any belief in reality: Warner v Hung (No 2) (2011) 297 ALR 56; [2011] FCA 1123 at [48].
Each plaintiff's claim to eligibility under s 57 of the Act turns on their relationship with the deceased and requires a detailed assessment of facts relevant to that relationship. Each plaintiff gave extensive evidence about that relationship and called witnesses corroborative of their evidence. However, of course, a key person in the assessment of the relevant evidence is the deceased who cannot give evidence.
In these circumstances, there is a need for caution and careful scrutiny of the evidence of conversations had with and actions of the deceased, bearing in mind the self-interest of each plaintiff and the vagaries of human memory: Plunkett v Bull (1915) 19 CLR 544 at 548, 549; [1915] HCA 14. In Zahra v Francica [2009] NSWSC 1206, Bryson AJ said at [1]: In these proceedings the plaintiff makes claims against the deceased's estate and the facts that he alleges depend for proof very largely upon his own evidence. In approaching his evidence and making findings on a matter he alleges, I bear in mind the need for careful scrutiny to which evidence in such a case should be subjected. This need is well established and was stated clearly by Isaacs J in Plunkett v Bull (1915) 19 CLR 544. Two more modern statements appear in the judgment of McLelland CJ in Eq in Eyota Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACSR 785 at 789 in a passage which was cited with approval in the judgment of Sheller JA in Eggins v Robinson (2000) NSWCA 61 at [26]: … in a claim based on communications with a deceased person the Court will treat uncorroborated evidence of such communications with considerable caution, and will regard as of particular significance any failure of the claimant to bring forward corroborative evidence which was, or ought to have been, available.
In relation to the fallibility of human memory where reliance on conversations is concerned reference may be made to the well-known observations of McLelland CJ in Eq in Watson v Foxman (1995) 49 NSWLR 315 at 319: … human memory of what was said in a conversation is fallible for a variety of reasons, and ordinarily the degree of fallibility increases with the passage of time, particularly where disputes or litigation intervene, and the processes of memory are overlaid, often subconsciously, by perceptions or self-interest as well as conscious consideration of what should have been said or could have been said. All too often what is actually remembered is little more than an impression from which plausible details are then, again often subconsciously, constructed. All this is a matter of ordinary human experience.
These matters dictate that greater weight is placed on contemporaneous documents, objectively established facts and the apparent logic of events: Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22 at [31]; Et-China.com International Holdings Ltd v Cheung (2021) 388 ALR 128; [2021] NSWCA 24 at [25]-[29].
Where the dispute concerns whether a de facto relationship existed with a deceased, it is necessary to bear in mind the following observations of Windeyer J in Quijarro v Robson [2008] NSWSC 818 at [36]: As in many of these matters the evidence adduced by either side, although it seems to some extent contradictory, is often generally truthful. It is just that people see things partly as they want to see them or as they think they should see them and partly in accordance with statements made to them by the persons involved in a relationship. It is usually not possible to reject the evidence of witnesses of one side and accept the evidence of witnesses of another in coming to a decision as to whether or not a de facto relationship has been established. It is also necessary to bear in mind it is incorrect to think that perfection and harmony is a necessary requirement in de facto relationships but not in married relationships: Bar-Mordecai v Hillston [2004] NSWCA 65. Nevertheless for a de facto relationship to continue to exist it is necessary for there to be a sense of commitment on both sides.
While his Honour's decision was overturned on appeal, this statement was cited with apparent approval by Basten JA: see [2009] NSWCA 365 at [15].

[23]

Ms Le and witnesses called by her

Ms Le relied on her own evidence, comprising five affidavits, and the evidence of 11 witnesses. The plaintiff gave her evidence in cross-examination through an interpreter. She was cross examined extensively over five days. I found Ms Le's evidence unsatisfactory in a number of respects which are referred to below in dealing with it. As a consequence of those matters, and her self-interest in the outcome of the proceedings, I have treated her evidence with great caution.
Ms Le's sons, Duc (born 16 December 1991) and Thang (born on 20 December 1988) also gave evidence. I do not accept Duc's evidence where it conflicts with that of Mr Bates. I accept Thang's evidence.
The remaining witnesses called by Ms Le were friends of hers who made observations regarding her relationship with John.
Jaqueline Varela is the partner of Robert, John's son, with whom she has been in a relationship since 1997. For reasons I explain when dealing with her evidence, I do not accept it as reliable.
Lisa Reid was employed by John for a short period in his smash repair business and knew both John and Ms Le and regarded them as friends, from around 2010. Her husband, Matthew Reid, gave evidence that he also knew both John and Ms Le from 2010 until John's death. They both gave evidence about their observations of interactions between John and Ms Le. For reasons I explain when dealing with their evidence, I do not accept it as reliable.
Alvin Johnson gave evidence that he had known John since around 1966 and worked for John in his smash repair business. After he retired, he assisted John with gardening and handyman services at the Coogee property, the Burradoo property and other investment properties owned by John. For reasons I explain when dealing with his evidence, I do not accept it as reliable. His wife, Lesley Johnson also gave evidence. She gave every appearance of trying to answer the questions she was asked honestly and to the best of her recollection.
Kolena Denis is a retired nurse and welfare worker who has been a close friend of Ms Le since around 1991. For reasons I explain when dealing with her evidence, I do not accept it as reliable. Her partner, Neil Johnston, also gave evidence and he gave every appearance of trying to answer the questions he was asked honestly and to the best of his recollection.
Evelyn Moses was Ms Le's hairdresser who met both John and Ms Le in about 2006 and deposed that she regularly cut the hair of both John and Ms Le. For reasons I explain when dealing with her evidence, I do not accept it as reliable.
Austin Smith lived in an apartment at 8 Allen Street, Waterloo and met John in about 2012 while John was living in the Waterloo apartment. He saw John intermittently at the building during the period 2012-2016 and also on occasions after John returned to live at the Coogee property in 2017. He last saw him in 2019. He gave every appearance of trying to answer the questions he was asked honestly and to the best of his recollection, but the limited nature of his interaction with John makes his evidence of little assistance.

[27]

Ms Le's evidence

Ms Le gave evidence that she first met John in around 2000 when taking her car to John's smash repair business for repairs and commenced an intimate relationship with him when he took her out to dinner and drinks on 15 March 2003, shortly after her 40th birthday. At that time John was living at the Coogee property and she was living at the Redfern property.
Ms Le deposed that from 15 March 2003 to 2011 John visited her at the Redfern property and stayed overnight there two or three times per week and for the rest of the time he lived at the Coogee property. She did not know in the early stages of their friendship that John was married.
Ms Le deposed that in around 2011, after the Waterloo development was completed, John said to her words to the effect: 'I am going to give you a shop so that you can run your own business. I will help you with the money to set up'. John did not make an outright gift of a shop to Ms Le to run her business, but he did arrange for a lease of Shop 3 to be granted to Ms Le in August 2011 and it is not in dispute that Ms Le was not required to pay the rent provided for under the lease. It is also not in dispute that John funded the cost of the fit-out of Shop 3.
Ms Le deposed that John explained why he did not give Shop 3 to her outright, which was that Laura wanted to give Shop 3 to Robert, whereas John did not, and said to Ms Le that: 'we need to do a lease on the shop so that my wife can't give it to [Robert]. That shop is for you. I will give it to you later, after my wife and I divide the shops and apartments, but for now that's what we have to do.'
Ms Le signed the lease and also paid a security bond. It may be noted that after Laura's death in 2012, John granted a new lease of Shop 3 to Ms Le, rather than gifting it to her. This is addressed below.
Ms Le deposed that from 2011 until he sold the Waterloo apartment in August 2016, John slept either at the Waterloo apartment or at the Redfern property. She deposed that John said to her that he did not want to sleep at the Coogee property because 'things with him and his wife had become very hostile and she had made threats to hurt him in his sleep'. She deposed that she would cook breakfast and lunch for him, clean the apartment and do all his laundry, and that they would always eat out for dinner as that was John's preference. Jenny disputes this evidence and says that John spent time at both the Waterloo apartment and the Coogee property during this period, including while Laura was alive.
Ms Le deposed that in around December 2011, when her daughter became pregnant with her first child, Ms Le moved to live solely at the Waterloo apartment, so that her daughter could live at the Redfern property. I note that John's affidavit referred to at [49] above stated that in October 2014 he 'lived by myself' (at the Coogee property) which appears to contradict her evidence. Ms Le sought to deal with this apparent inconsistency by unsatisfactory evidence about what John meant when he said he 'lived by myself'. She said in her affidavit of 3 June 2022 that on the day Laura's dead body was discovered at the Coogee property she picked John up from the Maroubra police station and 'drove him from the police station to our home in the [Waterloo apartment]', and when they got 'home' they had a conversation in which John said to her: The police think that I killed Laura, but I was with you. You have to tell them! But, you can't tell them that we sleep in the same room, if they know we are together, they will think I killed her because of our relationship. She deposed that she told the police in a subsequent interview that 'I slept in a different room to John in the Waterloo penthouse on the night of Laura's death. I was his alibi. I did this only to help John.' However, neither the police record of John's statement to police on the day he attended Maroubra police station (CB 567) or the statement given by a Detective Senior Constable to the coronial enquiry into Laura's death recording the evidence of all relevant witnesses including John but not Ms Le (CB 593) make any mention of John using Ms Le as his alibi and indeed states, to the contrary, that John did not have an alibi (CB 607). Also, the police record shows that a police constable drove John home to the Waterloo apartment from Maroubra police station on the day Laura's body was discovered (CB 567), which contradicts Ms Le's evidence that she did so. Ms Le states later in the same affidavit that John's use of her as his alibi involved him lying to police. I cannot accept this evidence, which appears to be a desperate, and false, attempt to explain away John's statement in October 2014 that he lived by himself.
Ms Le deposed that John had a heart attack in 2006, and that while he was hospitalised at RPA she visited him every day for a week, looking after him and bringing him food. It appears that Ms Le is mistaken as to the time of these events, as Jenny says the heart attack was in 2007 and that is confirmed by John's medical history as recorded in Professor Rosenfeld's letter dated 24 June 2021. However, Jenny does not dispute that Ms Le may have visited John at the hospital during his recovery.
Ms Le deposed that John had a hip replacement in 2007 at Randwick Hospital and later moved to a hospital in Bondi for rehabilitation and that she visited him every night from 6:00pm to 8:00pm at both hospitals. Again, it appears that Ms Le is incorrect as to the date of the hip replacement surgery. Professor Rosenfeld's letter dated 24 June 2021 states that it took place in 2009, and that is Jenny's recollection. Jenny does not dispute that Ms Le may have visited John at the two hospitals while he was recovering from the surgery, but says that she visited John with her partner Kevin nearly every day and often in the evening and never saw Ms Le.
Jenny deposed that John had another heart attack in 2016 and that during his hospitalisation at RPA, she visited him two to three times per day, helping to clean, shower and dress him and also brought him breakfast, lunch and dinner as he did not like the hospital food.
Ms Le deposed that when John was required to vacate the Coogee property in May 2017, they moved to the Burradoo property and then moved back to the Coogee property when he bought it back in August 2017. She deposed that she thereafter lived with John at the Coogee property. She deposed that in the period they were living at the Burradoo property they would often go to her Redfern property for two to three days per week because John found the Burradoo property to be too cold for him. Again, Jenny disputes this evidence.
Ms Le deposed that John spent a week in hospital in May 2018 and then two months at Camperdown Hospital from November 2018 to January 2019 due to serious illness, including heart failure. She said that in both periods she visited John two to three times per day until he was discharged, helping to clean, shower and dress him and bring him breakfast, lunch and dinner. She deposed that she spent Christmas Day 2018 with him in hospital.
Ms Le deposed that John's health was very poor in this period from 2016 until his death and he was regularly in and out of hospital. She deposed that during all these hospital admissions, she was the primary caregiver for him.
Ms Le deposed that while she was living with John, he took care of all their finances, and she took care of all their domestic matters. He gave her money weekly for all their expenses such as medicine, clothing, groceries and homewares.
Ms Le deposed that in about 2015, John gave her his used Toyota Aurion (which she still drives) and that she then gave her Toyota Corolla to Natalie. Natalie denies that.
It is not in dispute that John employed a cleaner when he moved back to the Coogee property, Yuhua Yan (known as Ms Linda Yan). Ms Le deposed that the reference in Professor Rosenfeld's letter of 24 June 2021 to two women who assisted John with cleaning and housework was to Linda and 'a Thai lady who came to work at [the Coogee property] in 2021'. She said in her affidavit that John told her: 'You are too busy with the laundromat and then you have to look after me after work. I will hire another lady to help Linda with cleaning the house. That is not work for you. You spend time with me.'
Jenny and Gabrielle dispute that John engaged a second person to assist with cleaning and housework (the 'Thai lady' that Ms Le refers to) and say they never observed such a person at the Coogee property. Jenny lived in the same street and was a regular visitor to the Coogee property; it is inconceivable that she would not have been aware that her father had employed another cleaner. Ms Linda Tan did not give evidence.
I do not accept Ms Le's evidence regarding the 'Thai lady'. No witness corroborates Ms Le's evidence that such a person existed. That the reference in the statement to Professor Rosenfeld regarding the two ladies who assist John with cleaning and house care is a reference to Linda Tan and Ms Le is supported by statements to Francis Devine that Ms Le was employed to look after the house as a carer (see [335] below).
Ms Le accepted that John referred to her as 'the Chinesa' or 'Chineso'. It is clear he did so both in speaking to her and in the presence of others. This is confirmed by several witnesses. I consider this to be a derogatory term, noting that Ms Le is Vietnamese and not Chinese as he was clearly aware.
In relation to the relationship between Ms Le and John, there are a number of photographs in evidence which show John and Ms Le being affectionate to each other (including kissing) or being happy in each other's company. Those showing him displaying affection to her were taken in the period 2003 to 2011. There are no photographs in evidence of Ms Le and John together at either the Waterloo apartment or the Coogee apartment.
Ms Le deposed that she became pregnant from John in 2006 and then again in 2007, but on each occasion lost the baby after four to six weeks. She deposed that their sexual relationship continued until the end of John's life.
Ms Le deposed that Jenny and her partner, Mr Batten, spent Christmas 2012 with John and Ms Le at the Burradoo property. This is not in dispute. Ms Le deposed that she thought that her relationship with Jenny and her family improved from this time and the evidence does show that from 2013 she and John went to dinner with Jenny and her family at the South Sydney Juniors Club in Kingsford or the Sydney Portugal Community Club in Marrickville, including to celebrate John's birthdays. There are photographs in evidence showing Ms Le with Jenny and her family at restaurants during the period from 2018 to 2020.
Ms Le also deposed that Jenny and her family stayed with John and Ms Le at the Burradoo property for two weeks over Christmas 2019 and went to restaurants together during that time. There is a photograph in evidence showing them all having a meal at the Mittagong Club on 25 December 2019. Ms Le also deposed that Jenny and her family went to dinner with John and Ms Le at the Coogee property on 19 October 2021 and that Ms Le cooked for everyone. This was not disputed.
On Christmas Day 2021, Ms Le had lunch with her family at the Bankstown property, and John had lunch at the Coogee property with Jenny and her family. She deposed that she prepared the ingredients for the meal which was cooked by Gabrielle. Ms Le deposed that she came home later that evening and had dinner with John, after Jenny and her family had left.
Ms Le also deposed that John often attended special occasions for Ms Le and her family (without Jenny or her family being present). There is a photograph showing John attending a dinner for Ms Le's birthday with members of her family in March 2017.
Ms Le deposed that while John was alive, Gabrielle visited him more than Jenny, and that Jenny visited him irregularly for only about one hour each time, whereas Gabrielle visited regularly after work. Jenny and Gabrielle dispute this. I do not accept Ms Le's evidence on this and accept the evidence of Jenny and Gabrielle that they frequently and regularly visited John, noting that Jenny lived on the same street.
Ms Le deposed that from around 2006 to 2018, John regularly took her on trips to country New South Wales and Victoria, which were either holidays or business trips (as John had an interest in pubs in Windsor and Albury). She deposed that the holidays were taken during the Easter and Christmas period and she would sleep with John either in his motorhome/campervan or in a motel on these trips.
Ms Le deposed that she and John started sleeping in the same bed from the time they first started going out in 2003 and that she shared a bedroom with John from 2011 when she moved into the penthouse apartment. She deposed that she continued to sleep in the bed with him when they stayed at Burradoo in 2017 and from August 2017 when John moved back into the Coogee property, until his death.
Ms Le deposed that John told her when she entered into the Variation of Lease in 2016 that the reason a new lease was necessary was to protect her from Robert. She stated in her affidavit that John said to her at the time the Variation of Lease was entered into in 2016: 'Robert could kick you out of the shop if something happened to me. It is better if you just sign these lease documents so that no one can take the shop from you. You don't actually need to pay any rent, it is free, it is your shop, but this is just to protect you'. She said that she signed the lease document when John told her to because she trusted him.
Ms Le deposed that the reason she kept the Redfern property until 2021, was so that she could support her daughter who became pregnant for the first time in December 2011 and, as a single mother with twins, had nowhere else to live. She also deposed that her daughter lived at the Redfern property from 2011 to 2016, when she obtained her own subsidised accommodation, and that she only stayed with her daughter for short periods to help her. There is no evidence from Ms Le's daughter to corroborate this evidence. Nor does Ms Le explain why she continued to keep the Redfern property after 2016, which is the time that her daughter moved out.
Ms Le deposed that she and Gabrielle went to the hospital on 31 January 2022, when they were informed of John's death. Ms Le returned to the Coogee property and remained there until Jenny required her to leave. This was on the basis that she had no entitlement to be at the Coogee property as it was owned by John.
John's funeral took place on 5 February 2022. Ms Le attended the funeral, although she deposed that she felt offended and hurt that Jenny did not allow her sit in the front few rows which were reserved for family members, and she regarded herself as part of the family.
Ms Le was never given a set of keys to the Coogee property. She deposed that John gave as the reason for that 'I'm always at home to let you in'. She deposed that she obtained the keys from John's belonging when she took them home from the hospital on 31 January 2022.
On 6 February 2022, Gabrielle went to the Coogee property and requested Ms Le to give the keys to the Coogee property to her because the executor (Jenny) required vacant possession of the property, and she had no right to remain there. Ms Le responded that she planned to stay at the property. Ms Le recorded part of the conversation during this visit, and Gabrielle is recorded as having said the following: You look after [John] very well. No-one is saying otherwise, even my mother said that you look after him … My mother said this to me and I can say this to you … Mum said that you did look after him very well and that she was able to spend more time with her father because you probably did extend his life. No-one is denying that, no-one is denying that, we admit that you very well cared for him … absolutely, absolutely …
Ms Le was cross-examined regarding prior engagement of her solicitors in or around May 2021 regarding John's estate. Ms Le's response was that she wanted to understand Australian law regarding her situation if John was to pass away (T72). Ms Le's solicitors obtained a statutory declaration from Ms Le's friend Kolena Denis regarding her relationship with John on 8 June 2021, and other people in July 2021. Ms Le accepted that she had given instructions for this to occur (T74). She did so because she wanted that evidence available before John died (T73).
A significant portion of the cross-examination of Ms Le focused on documents that recorded her address as the Redfern property and not the Coogee property, as she contended.
Ms Le's tenancy of the Redfern property from 2001 to 2021 required her to lodge annual applications with the relevant government department which she signed. Ms Le accepted that she had not been honest on those forms in stating the occupants of the house (T80). Ms Le's evidence was that whilst she kept the tenancy for the Redfern property, she did not reside there from December 2011 onwards, but did occasionally spend nights at the property (T81-82).
Ms Le's evidence regarding her occupation of the Redfern property was unsatisfactory. As noted at [22] above, she had a subsidised tenancy of that property from 2001 to June 2021. She relinquished that tenancy on 21 June 2021 in circumstances where she had completed her annual renewal application only one month earlier, on 25 May 2021 (Ex 19). She gave as her forwarding address Shop 3, and not the Coogee property. She then proceeded to change her mailing address for various third parties to the Coogee property (see [59] above). This all occurred shortly after she received advice from her solicitors, AKN & Associates, regarding a potential claim that she was in a de facto relationship with John.
The evidence establishes that throughout the period from 2001 to June 2021, Ms Le consistently adopted her address as being the Redfern property. She accepted in cross-examination that she knew that it was a condition of her tenancy of that property that she occupy it, and that there were penalties for giving false information (T79, 83-84). Nevertheless, she made annual declarations that she did occupy it when she renewed the tenancy annually.
Particularly telling is the fact that her daughter moved out of the Redfern property in 2016, when she obtained her own subsidised accommodation. Ms Le's renewal applications from this time state that she was the sole tenant and that the household consisted only of herself. Importantly, there was no need for her to keep the Redfern property from 2016 if she really did live with John at one of his residences.
She said in cross-examination that her reason for relinquishing the tenancy of the Redfern property on 21 June 2021 was that her solicitor (AKN & Associates) advised that it was 'wrong' to retain it (T113-115). There is some ambiguity in this answer. I am satisfied that the true position is that she gave up the tenancy in order to improve her case for a claim that she was in a de facto relationship with John, and that in the period before June 2021 she maintained the tenancy of the Redfern property because she did live there.
Ms Le deposed that John made significant financial contributions for her benefit during their relationship. In addition to waiving the rent payable by her under the lease of Shop 3, her affidavit evidence summarises the other benefits she received as follows: 1. Between 2003 and to around 2011, John often gave $1,000 every week as an allowance. From 2011 to the end of John's life, he paid for 'our household groceries, bills, and all expenses for going out to eat, and he also paid for my personal shopping, including for clothing, shoes, cosmetics, medications, toiletries, salon and nail shop visits'. 2. Some bills and expenses John paid directly, for other expenses John regularly gave her between $500-$1,000 per week. 3. John also gave her the money to purchase his medications and any other items he needed from the shops. 4. John paid for her car maintenance expenses including servicing and her car insurance. 5. Many times, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, John paid the laundromat business bills and expenses because the business was not doing well during the lockdown. 6. John also gave her around $2,000-$3,000 approximately 7-8 times per year on special occasions, including Christmas, New Year, Chinese New Year, Valentine's Day, their anniversary (15 March), her birthday, and Mother's Day. She deposed that when he gave her the money he would often say: 'You know I don't like shopping, I never know what to get for you. Go and get yourself something nice from me'.

[28]

Lisa Reid

Ms Reid made a short affidavit and a supplementary statement during the course of the hearing. She was employed by John when he operated what she referred to in her affidavit as his 'mechanic workshop' at Allen Street, Waterloo for around a year to 18 months. She agreed in cross-examination that John operated a smash repair business rather than a mechanic workshop (as it was Nick Pappas who operated a mechanical workshop next door). Her role was to provide quotes for cars to be repaired and work with the assessor who would come to the premises to approve the quote, and then order the parts required to repair the vehicle. It was a full-time job.
Her affidavit evidence contained a number of basic errors. First, she agreed in cross-examination that John operated a smash repair business, rather than a mechanical workshop. Second, she deposed that she started working for John in 2010 and confirmed the date in her cross-examination, but this is incorrect because the evidence indicates that John's smash repair business closed in 2008, when the Waterloo development started. The date of closure was corroborated by Nick Pappas who operated the mechanical repair workshop next door, and his evidence was that both John's business and his own business closed in 2008 (and his business then relocated to Rosebery). Third, Ms Reid deposed that she and her husband had visited John and Ms Le at the Burradoo property in late 2021, which was her only visit to the Burradoo property and was shortly before she signed her first affidavit on 10 February 2022.
In cross-examination she said that this visit was in the period from October to December 2021. However, while she could recall that Jenny and her partner, Mr Batten, were also there, she could not recall when in the period October to December 2021 the visit occurred. Her husband, Michael Reid, said that the visit could have been in 2020. Both Jenny and Mr Batten gave evidence that the visit took place in 2020.
Fourth, Ms Reid said in her affidavit that: 'Whenever I would meet John, Le would be with him'. However, she said in cross-examination that on most of the occasions that she visited John at the Coogee property they occurred around lunchtime and Ms Le was not there because she was working at the laundromat (T338).
Fifth, Ms Reid deposed in her statement that she saw Ms Le's clothes and toiletries at both the Coogee property and the Burradoo property. However, she gave evidence in cross-examination that she did not go into any of the bedrooms or use the toilets on the bedroom level of either the Burradoo property or the Coogee property, or see any toiletries at the Burradoo property.
As a result of these inconsistencies in her evidence, and her unresponsive answers in cross-examination, I do not regard her evidence as reliable. In so far as the general statements she made in her affidavits and statement that she understood that John and Ms Le were a couple, having a domestic relationship and that she thought that they were married, they are too general and insufficiently supported by observations of the nature of the relationship to be reliable.

[30]

Alvin Johnson

Mr Johnson knew the deceased from the mid to late 1960s and worked for him for more than 10 years as a mechanic at his smash repair business at Allen Street, Waterloo. He gave evidence by two affidavits dated 16 February and 2 June 2022, and a supplementary statement made during the hearing.
Mr Johnson deposed that after he ceased working for John, he assisted him with handyman and gardening tasks at the Coogee property and the Burradoo property. He deposed that he first met Ms Le in about 2000, at a time when John told him 'I got two Chinesa. Which one I choose? Which one do you like?' to which Mr Johnson replied, 'Le is the best one for you'.
He deposed that the conversation took place at the Coogee property. He deposed that he met both Ms Le and the other girlfriend and that after John ceased his relationship with the other girlfriend and commenced his relationship with Ms Le alone, John would often tell him 'I take Le to the club and out for dinner and we play the poker machines'.
Mr Johnson deposed that John had accompanied him on three holidays to the United States. While he could not be precise about the years in which these trips occurred, he recalled that one was before Laura's death in 2012. He deposed that his wife, Lesley, attended two of the trips and that Ms Le did not attend any of them. This evidence was corroborated by Lesley, who also could not recall the years in which the trips occurred. Mr Johnson said that the trips came about because he was a member of a Navy organisation. However, no explanation was provided for why this precluded Ms Le from going on the trips with John had he so wished, given that Alvin's wife accompanied him on two of them.
Mr Johnson deposed that he saw Ms Le assisting in the garden at the Coogee property, doing 'the washing and general housework as any wife would do'. He deposed that she was always part of their social interaction and would sit with John at the table and have lunch with them and chat. He also deposed that he saw Ms Le from time to time affectionately giving John a peck on the cheek and calling him 'honey'. However, he accepted in cross-examination that he never heard John call her 'honey'.
Mr Johnson accepted in cross-examination that the deceased was not a physically affectionate person and did not initiate affectionate gestures, the most Mr Johnson saw the deceased initiate was a pat on the back (T357), and accepted in cross-examination that he never saw John initiate a hug with Ms Le.
He deposed that Laura knew about Ms Le because he had heard Laura say to John: 'You got rid of the other one, now this one?'
Mr Johnson deposed that when John was in hospital on one occasion (although he did not indicate which one this was) John told him in a telephone call that Ms Le was his 'partner' and that later when he visited John in hospital John said to him: 'I told the hospital I have a partner, and my partner is Le. Le always look after me, she will look after me when I am home. She is my wife. Luckily, she fights for me so that the hospital will let me go home with her. Lucky Le wants to take me home.' I do not accept this evidence, given the following exchange in cross-examination by Ms Painter SC (T370-371): Q. You've given some examples of conversations you had with John where he said she - Le - was not a carer, but a partner. I just want to suggest that you are mistaken about those conversations? A. Why do you say that? Q. Because they didn't happen? A. Well, I think she was, she was more than a carer. Q. I just want to make it clear that what I'm suggesting is that the deceased, John, did not tell you that she wasn't his carer, but his partner, or words to that effect? A. He never called her a carer, or he never said she was just a - just his carer. Q. And he never said she was his partner? A. No. Q. That's not his language, so far as you'd know? A. That's right.
Mr Johnson was vague about the dates when he visited the Coogee property after Laura's death in 2012. When asked to focus on the years 2019, 2020 and 2021 he could only recall having visited the Coogee property a few times (he accepted it was probably between two and five times) and had no clear recollection of Ms Le being present on those visits (T362-363). On those visits he did not go upstairs and visit the bedrooms or bathrooms of the Coogee property.
Mr Johnson was cross-examined on a conversation he had with Mr Bates recorded in a file note which Mr Bates made on 15 February 2022. The file note recorded that Mr Johnson said that Ms Le cooked and cleaned, undertook 'personal duties' and was like a 'carer' and that John was not happy as she would 'come and go a lot'. Mr Johnson accepted that he had a conversation with Mr Bates on that day, and that in the course of which he said that Ms Le had undertook 'personal duties' for John, but denied these other statements attributed to him. I am satisfied that the statements recorded in the file note were made by Mr Johnson in the conversation.

[33]

Kolena Denis

Kolena Denis made an affidavit dated 16 February 2022 and a supplementary statement prepared during the course of the hearing.
She deposed that she was a close friend of Ms Le having known her since 1991. She also said that she knew John for around 19 years having first met him when he was her 'mechanic', although she accepted in cross-examination that he was a smash repairer and not a mechanic.
In her affidavit, she deposed that John said to her regarding Shop 3 at 8 Allen Street, Waterloo: 'This shop belongs to Le and she can keep it. I will give it to her'. She also deposed that Ms Le and John resided in the Waterloo apartment from 2011 until it was sold in 2016 and that on the many occasions that she visited the apartment, she could see Ms Le and John's personal belongings including clothing and her makeup in the same bedroom. In her supplementary statement she said that she visited the apartment at least once every two weeks and observed that Ms Le's clothes were around the apartment.
She deposed that around Christmas 2015 she and her partner, Neil Johnston, went on holiday with John and Ms Le for one week. It started with a visit to the Burradoo property and then they travelled in separate vehicles (as John and Ms Le were in a motor home and she and Neil in their own car) to Albury and Gundagai. She also deposed that at Albury, Neil and she rented a room at a motel and John and Ms Le rented a separate room for themselves at the motel. In cross-examination, she contradicted this evidence and said that in Albury John and Ms Le stayed in the motor home and not in the motel. She seemed to prefer to say it was the motor home because 'the motor home got only one bed' (T445.45). In contrast, Mr Johnston was clear that John stayed in a motel room in Albury and not in the motor home.
She deposed that she visited John and Ms Le at the Coogee property from the time they moved there in 2016 until around November 2021 'many times, approximately three times a week' and that she saw that they shared the master bedroom together, and saw their clothing and jewellery in the walk-in wardrobe of his room and their personal care items in the ensuite to the room. In her subsequent statement she said that these visits were at least once every two weeks. She also deposed in her affidavit that she stayed at the Coogee property overnight on two occasions and saw that John and Ms Le would return to their master bedroom and sleep together. However, in cross-examination she accepted that the statement was untrue (T454).
She deposed that John and Ms Le were very affectionate when they were together, even in public and they would walk together, hold hands, kiss, refer to each other as 'honey' and say to each other 'I love you'. She also deposed that John said to her 'on many occasions' words to the effect of 'When I die, I will leave Le a very rich woman'. In her supplementary statement, she stated that when John and Ms Le moved to the Coogee property in 2016 she visited at least once every two weeks, and on these visits she went to the main bedroom and saw Ms Le's clothes and other personal effects there and also saw the wardrobe where clothes of both John and Ms Le's were hanging. However, in cross-examination she accepted that on these visits she did not open the closets or cupboards or drawers in the various bedrooms or bathrooms (T455). In light of this, I cannot accept her evidence about what she saw in the main bedroom as reliable.
In her supplementary statement she recalled a conversation with John during a visit to the Coogee property, in which he said: 'I will leave Le the laundry shop, the childcare in Botany Road, and this house. She will have Coogee house and the laundromat is for her for life. It can bring her income.' In cross-examination she was asked about this evidence and where it occurred, she said the following: Q. Do you remember where you were when you had this conversation? A. We have it all the time. Q. Where were you? A. Sometimes when we, when we in the laundromat, because in the laundromat, I make him to - we make him - we're talking all the time. When you go to restaurant. Any time. So - and he told me. Q. When John said these words, he was in different places? A. What different places? Yeah. Well, he's talking all the same. He's talking all the - and not only once. Q. I just want to suggest that this is more like what Le would say than what John would say. What do you say to that? A. No. Q. And you've been fed‑‑ A. It's not Le told me; John told me. Q. You've been fed this list by Le in the period since you swore your affidavit in February 2022, haven't you? A. No. HIS HONOUR Q. Can I ask you in relation to paragraph (m) how many times John said those words to you? A. Many times. Many times. Q. Can you give me a rough idea how many? A. Many time before he died. Maybe - many times. Q. Can you tell me when? A. When? Sometimes in his office in Waterloo, because he got office in Waterloo. And sometimes in the laundry, sometimes when we go out with - for dinner, sometimes. But it's not only one times he say it; he say it all the time. Most of the time. That make me believe.
I find this evidence implausible, and indicative of the tendency of Ms Denis throughout her cross-examination to tailor her answers to put Ms Le's case in the best light possible.
Ms Denis accepted in cross-examination that she considered that it was very unfair and very wrong that Ms Le was left out of John's will and that was part of her motivation in giving evidence and that part of her motivation for giving evidence was to right what she regarded as an unfair wrong (T420).
Ms Denis said in cross-examination that her affidavit was prepared on 16 February 2022, the same day that she signed it and that she had been to see Ms Le's solicitor before then but could not recall the date or why she did so. She ultimately accepted in cross-examination that she swore a statutory declaration on 8 June 2021 at the offices of Ms Le's solicitors which contained statements substantively the same as those in her affidavit of 16 February 2022. She ultimately accepted that she went to see the solicitor on that occasion because 'I want to help my friend Le' and 'I want to make sure John and Le in a relationship de facto for long time' (T424).
Ms Denis accepted in cross-examination that she knew in 2011 that Ms Le only had a lease of Shop 3 however, she also said that John said to her in 2011 that the shop belonged to Ms Le, that 'John give it to her for her life' and John told her this (T429, 432). In the course of cross-examination about the lease, the following exchange occurred: Q. But you knew that there was a lease? A. There is a lease. Q. And you knew that she was the lessee, the tenant? A. Yes. Q. And she wasn't the landlord? A. No. Q. John was the landlord? A. No, but he give it to her. Q. You know that's not true don't you? A. It is true, she (as said) give it to her, she doesn't pay rent. Q. I'm going to move onto another topic. A. Yes. HIS HONOUR Q. Ms Denis, can I ask you, is the reason why you say he gave the shop to her, because she doesn't pay rent? A. She doesn't pay rent because he was, Le was John wife, de facto, John wife, that's why he (as said) doesn't pay rent, give it to her. He give it to her rent free. PAINTER Q. You know that the reason she didn't pay rent was because it was payment for some of the services that she provided to John? A. What services? Q. Driving, collecting medicines, cooking, cleaning, that was what the rent holiday was for, isn't it? A. I don't accept. Q. You don't think so? A. No. Q. You don't know? A. I don't think so. Q. Why don't you think so? A. Because they are wife and, and husband, de facto. Q. But do you have any actual knowledge of an explanation ever given to you about why the rent wasn't paid by John or by Le? A. Because they are living together.
This evidence and the lengthy exchange which preceded it was characterised by Ms Denis' failure to provide responsive answers to the questions she was asked and her desire to support Ms Le's case that she and John were in a de facto relationship.
Ms Denis accepted in cross-examination that she was in the habit of taking photographs when she was with friends, having fun (T438). However, the only two photographs in evidence taken by her with Ms Le and John were two photographs taken in around 2014 at the Burradoo property. It is surprising given her evidence regarding a number of occasions that she spent with Ms Le and John socialising at the Waterloo apartment, the Coogee property and on holiday that no further photographs are in evidence.

[34]

Neil Johnston

Neil Johnston is the partner of Kolena Denis. He made an affidavit on 16 February 2022 and a supplementary statement prepared during the course of the hearing.
He deposed that he first met John in about 2013 and that he had seen John and Ms Le together when they regularly had dinner at a restaurant in Marrickville and at South Sydney Juniors. He deposed that he had seen them many times on those occasions holding hands, embracing each other, kissing each other and generally being affectionate to each other. He also deposed to visiting John and Ms Le at the Burradoo property in 2015 and going on a trip with them to Gundagai and Albury for around seven days accompanied by his wife, Ms Denis. He also deposed to having visited them at the Waterloo apartment and at the Coogee property.
He deposed that he visited John at the Coogee property about four months before he died and saw Ms Le there caring for him and attending to his needs. He deposed that on at least two occasions when he and Ms Denis had dinner with John and Ms Le at the Portugal restaurant in Marrickville, Jenny attended along with her partner and son. He observed on these occasions John and Ms Le held each others' hands, hugged and kissed. Jenny did not dispute that these dinners occurred, but deposed that she did not see her father acting in a loving and affectionate way with Ms Le.
In his supplementary statement, Mr Johnston deposed that John took him on a tour of the Burradoo property when he and Ms Denis visited it in 2015, and that John showed him a bedroom and said, 'Le and I sleep here' and later that evening he saw Ms Le and John go into that bedroom and did not come out until the morning. It was clear from his evidence in cross-examination that he did not have actual knowledge of the sleeping arrangements at the Burradoo property.
He also deposed to a conversation with John after they were walking to a restaurant in around 2020 saying to him: 'I don't know what I would do without Le'. He deposed that he recalled John and Ms Le referring to one another as 'honey'. However, I note that no other witness (apart from his partner, Kolena) observed John calling Ms Le 'honey' and based on all the evidence it seems unlikely that he would have done so other than on an isolated occasion.
He said in cross examination that he visited John at his Coogee home two or three times and never stayed there overnight. He sat in the open plan living area and did not open the cupboards and drawers for the bedrooms and the bathroom.
Given the generalised nature of Mr Johnston's evidence of his recollections of Ms Le's relationship with John, in my view it is of limited assistance. However, I accept his evidence that John said to him in 2020 words to the effect of 'I don't know what I would do without Le'.

[35]

Evelyn Moses

Evelyn Moses made an affidavit dated 14 February 2022 and a supplementary statement prepared during the course of the hearing.
Ms Moses is a hairdresser and deposed that Ms Le and John were her customers at her hair salon in Redfern from around 2012. She deposed that she closed her salon in March 2020 shortly after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and after that time went to the Coogee property to cut John's hair and dye and/or cut Ms Le's hair. She deposed that she always went there with her sister, Evangeline Neave, as she cannot drive a car and relied on Evangeline to drive her.
She deposed in her affidavit that John told her while she was cutting his hair that he 'loves Le and relies on her to do everything for him'.
In her supplementary statement, she deposed to a number of other conversations with John, including that he showed her around the Coogee property on the first occasion that she visited it and in the course of doing so showed her a bedroom and said, 'this is me and Le's bedroom'. She also deposed in a supplementary statement to a number of other conversations which were said to have occurred during the time that John was her customer, including statements apparently made by John to her a couple of years before COVID-19 which surprisingly were omitted from her affidavit of 14 February 2022.
In cross-examination, Ms Moses accepted that when she prepared her affidavit, she understood that it was important to be careful and accurate and to be complete in describing the events she talked about in the affidavit (T477) and Ms Moses affirmed that she only visited the Coogee property after the COVID-19 restrictions started in 2020 and that she went to the Coogee property every six weeks. She was then asked to estimate how many times she went to the Coogee property to cut John's hair and the following exchange occurred: Q. When you went to the Denning Street, Coogee house to cut John's hair - so this is the period between 2020 and 2021 - was John ever there on his own? A. First, first time when I went there, by himself. Q. What about other times? A. Other times with his partner, Le. Q. How many other times do you think you went to the Denning Street, Coogee house from the beginning of 2020? A. I can't remember. Q. Maybe half a dozen times? A. I can't remember. Q. Does that sound about right? Six or seven times? Or maybe five or six times? A. I can't remember.
In light of Ms Moses' inability to even estimate how many times she went to the Coogee property after the first visit, and the fact that she introduced in her supplementary statement a number of what are clearly highly pertinent conversations with John which did not appear in her affidavit made some 19 months earlier, I am not satisfied that her supplementary statement is reliable in setting out conversations with the deceased which are uncorroborated. However, I accept the evidence in her affidavit of 14 February 2022, which was not challenged, that he told her, at some unidentified time, that he loved Ms Le.

[36]

Jacqueline Varela

Jacqueline Varela is the partner of Robert with whom she has been in a relationship since 1997 and they have two children. She made one affidavit dated 14 March 2022 and a supplementary statement during the course of the hearing. In her affidavit she purported to having visited the Coogee property on one occasion 'in or around early 2021' to discuss a possible settlement for the case involving John and Robert. She then corrected this in her oral evidence as a visit on 1 September 2019, which was based on a handwritten letter which she said John had given her at the meeting. This was not disclosed in her affidavit. In her supplementary statement, she said that she went to the Coogee property on two occasions after Laura's death, being 1 September 2019 and an additional occasion sometime before the COVID-19 restrictions commenced in 2020 but she could not recall the date. In the supplementary statement she said that when she went to the Coogee property on 1 September 2019, John took her around the house to look at new furniture he had bought and said, 'This is Le and my bedroom' and that she could see female items on the dressing table such as perfume and hair brushes. In her statement she said that on the occasion of the other visit, she said that John invited her to join him and Ms Le for dinner and stated that after Ms Le arrived home she asked John 'Do only you and Le live here?' and he responded 'Yes, only Le and I live here'. She also said in the supplementary statement that she saw John and Ms Le kissing and John touching Ms Le's shoulder affectionately. She also, in her statement, recalled an instance when she saw John and Ms Le holding hands and walking which she thought was before 2012 in the Waterloo apartments.
There are a number of difficulties with Ms Varela's evidence. First, she was reluctant to accept in cross-examination that the relationship between the deceased and Robert, and between Robert and his sister Jenny was characterised by hatred, but she did ultimately agree that there was a harsh disagreement between Robert and John during the litigation between them and that there were arguments between them (T496 and 498). Second, she accepted in cross-examination that she had made allegations to the police in 2012 to the effect that either or both of John and Jenny were responsible for the death of Laura and that she had accused both of them of killing Laura. She also accepted that she had told the police in 2012 that John asked her to help him kill Laura and she said no, and that she told the police that she resented John and Jenny for what they did and the way they treated her and for all the problems that arose in the family. As noted earlier, she obtained an AVO against Jenny after a fight between them in December 2011. Jacqueline also said in cross-examination that she no longer had resentment against John or Jenny having forgiven them a long time ago (T512). I find this last piece of evidence to be implausible and do not regard her evidence as being that of a disinterested witness.
Third, Ms Varela was cross-examined regarding her attendances at the offices of Ms Le's solicitors, AKN & Associates, prior to making her first affidavit on 14 March 2022. Her initial evidence was that she only went to the office of AKN & Associates on one occasion. However, it became apparent when she was cross-examined on an itemised fee note provided by AKN & Associates to Ms Le (Ex 25) that she had several conferences with them, including conferences concerning the contents and amendments to a draft affidavit to be provided by Robert (1, 4, 8, 10, 14, 17 and 18 March 2022). When challenged with this record she accepted that the AKN & Associates' record was correct and that her initial answer had been given because she could not remember the number of visits. Again, I find this evidence implausible and particularly concerning that she had had a discussion with AKN & Associates regarding the contents of an affidavit to be provided by her partner, Robert. I note that no solicitor from AKN & Associates was called to give evidence about the matters discussed at these meetings between the firm and Ms Varela.
Ms Varela had a clear motive to give evidence that could harm Jenny, and I do not regard it as being reliable.

[37]

Ba Duc Hoang

Duc is a son of Ms Le, born on 16 December 1991. He gave evidence in three affidavits dated 11 February, 17 February and 2 June 2022 and was cross-examined.
His first two affidavits address the events which occurred at the Coogee property on 10 February 2022 (which was 10 days after John's death). Duc deposed that he was staying at the property because his mother was distraught and he wanted to support her and stay with her at the Coogee property. It is not in dispute that at around 2:00pm on 10 February 2022, Mr Bates, together with others, including a locksmith went to the Coogee property. Duc deposed that Mr Bates introduced himself to Duc as the 'asset manager' and told Duc that he was authorised to take control of the property and that he and his mother must leave immediately. Their accounts of what happened after that are broadly consistent, although there are differences in their recollections of what occurred. For present purposes, I do not regard these differences as material, except for their disagreement as to one conversation.
Duc and Mr Bates gave conflicting accounts of the conversation which they had at the Coogee property on 10 February 2022 about why Duc was at the property.
Mr Bates in his affidavit of 16 February 2022 deposed that the conversation was as follows: Bates: Do you know the owner of the premises and what is your relationship, if any, to this person? Duc: I knew John and my mother was his carer.
Duc denies that he said that Ms Le was John's carer and deposed in his affidavit of 17 February 2022 that the conversation was to the following effect: Bates: What are you doing here? You are not allowed to be here. Duc: I'm staying here with my Mum. Bates: Do you know whose house this is? Duc: Yes, this is John Angius' house. My mum is his partner for 19 years.
I prefer Mr Bates' evidence about this conversation because he has no interest in the outcome of these proceedings in contrast to Duc who does, and the description of Ms Le as John's 'carer' is consistent with their relationship at the end of his life when he was clearly very ill and being cared for by Ms Le.
In his affidavit of 2 June 2022, Duc deposed that he and his siblings knew John well and spent time with him on many occasions, including almost every Mother's Day, Ms Le's birthday, and sometimes their own birthdays. He put into evidence a photograph of an evening spent at a restaurant to celebrate his mother's birthday in 2016. He also deposed that his mother and John were in a relationship since the time that he lived at the Redfern property up until 2011 and he recalled a time when he saw John and her sleeping in bed together at that property. He also deposed that he frequently saw her and John in the morning when he woke up and they were in the living area together. He also deposed that he recalled a conversation with his mother in 2011, when she said to him, 'John asked me to live with him in Waterloo, so Thuy can have my room'. He explained that this was a reference to his sister, Thuy, taking the master bedroom which had previously been his mother's room. The other two bedrooms in the house were occupied by him and his brother. I treat Duc's evidence on these matters with caution given my conclusion in the previous paragraph and his interest in the proceedings in giving evidence in support of his mother's claim to be in a de facto relationship with John.

[38]

Ba Thang John Hoang

Thang is one of Ms Le's sons. He made an affidavit dated 17 February 2022.
Thang's evidence was directed to his purchase of the Condell Park property in August 2012. He deposed that he purchased it for $540,000, funded by a borrowing from the ANZ Bank, secured by a mortgage over the property, of $432,000, a contribution from his sister, Thi Kim Lan Hoang, of $68,000 and the balance from his savings. He deposed that since the purchase of the property he made mortgage repayments. He deposed that apart from a contribution from his sister of $68,000 he had been solely responsible for the mortgage payments.
He accepted in cross-examination that as far as he was aware, the contribution of $60,000 came from the sale of a laundromat business in Glebe run by his sister (T487). It was put to him that his mother, Ms Le, owned that business and the contribution of $68,000 came from her, which he denied. It was also put to him in cross-examination that in the period from January 2019 to January 2020, Ms Le transferred from her accounts towards the mortgage the sum of $31,000 and also made further payments in respect of house repairs, insurance, council rates and water rates. Thang did not accept that this was correct.
In my view, while the bank records in evidence indicate that Ms Le may well have made payments to assist her son to service the loan and to pay various expenses referred to in the previous paragraph, the state of the evidence is insufficient to establish that she has a beneficial interest in the Condell Park property by virtue of those payments. It was not put to her in cross-examination that the $68,000 contribution came from the sale of her business, rather than her daughter's and the evidence does not allow any findings to be made as to the source of the $68,000 payment.
Thang did not give any evidence in his affidavit of the living arrangements at either the Waterloo apartment or the Coogee property during the lifetime of the deceased.

[39]

Recordings of conversations

Ms Le relied on recordings of conversations between her and the deceased in 2019 and also in 2021, in the last few months of his life (Ex 21). She explained that she made the recordings to show that she was in a de facto relationship with John (T260).
The recordings in 2019 comprised a short recording made on 12 June 2019 at 2:09am in which John says to Ms Le: 'You sleep on this side next to me. Switch the lights off'. I accept that this is evidence that they were sleeping together at that time, but do not regard the recording as having any other relevance. A second recording is a relatively long recording of a conversation between Ms Le and the deceased on 27 June 2019, starting at 10:43am. I will set out below the parts relied on by Ms Le in support of a submission that John acknowledges his long de facto relationship with Ms Le and her right to be financially taken care of.
During a discussion at the beginning about what John might give her in his will, the following exchange occurs (emphasis added): John: … but some stuff I leave it for you. Some stuff … [unclear] … of course. Le: What you give to me you better you do it. John: I have to write it down. But you deserve it? Le: Hmm? John: Did you deserve it? Le: What mean? John: What I give to you do you deserve it? Le: Yes. Please. John: Okay. What does that mean? Do you deserve my clock, my watch or my rent? Le: I do everything for you. John: What about the furniture? (laughing) Le: You give everything what you give you say it and don't leave for fight. You know in the court always the letter win. John: But you, you better off than me. You better off you, I'll pay the Bowral, I'll pay the flats, up here in, if it become my, in Waterloo because it's close to the shops, and to your shop. Get your shop, Bowral, all the stuff in Bowral because you're getting old, Bowral is a nice place to live there. Because, even Waterloo is nice. Because all the shops. But you get the shop, Bowral, and one unit, and you're done. Plus you get probably some money if there's any left. Le: You give me the, why you don't give me the house? John: What house? This one? 7 million. That's how much it's worth. Double Bay double price. Double package with the…
The deceased appears to be indicating the possibility of making a gift to Ms Le in his will of Shop 3, the Burradoo property, a unit in the Waterloo development to live in and 'probably some money', although he qualifies all of this by the question 'do you deserve it?'. Ms Le then asks 'why don't you give me the house' (by which she means the Coogee property) and do so now. This then leads to the following discussion (emphasis added): John: If I put it on, no you don't understand. If I give it to your name now yes you're going to pay $300,000 plus the cost of the solicitor, maybe $650, to put this house in your name. Okay. Once it's in your name, until I'm alive, you're kicking me out. Le: No I'm not. John: Maybe you don't do it but… you entitled to kicking me out. Le: You think, I stay with you 16 years now, not one day, two day, you understand me very well. John: [You add one year every month.] Listen to me, the situation is this. The moment I put in your name this house, this house is yours. You can kick me out, any time, any day, any hour. If I put this house in a will, they will fight you. So you got these problems… Le: I no fight, who look after you? Your daughter? And your son? Or your granddaughter? Who stay with you… John: If I look after you, if you look after me. If you look after me, and I leave you enough. There will be enough for you to maintain yourself. They won't fight you because they don't throw their money away. But if I leave you half the properties they will fight you. You understand. You finish in court. That's the problem. You finish in court all your life, you die in court. Same as what's happened to me now.
The words attributed to the deceased in square brackets are the defendant's transcription of the recording with which I agree.
In this passage John expresses concern about the stamp duty of around $300,000 which would be payable if he was to make an immediate gift to Ms Le of the Coogee property, and also of the risk that, as the property would be transferred into her name during his lifetime, she could 'kick him out'. That suggests a significant lack of trust in their relationship. He also expresses concern about the potential for litigation between Ms Le and his children (Jenny and Robert) if he were to leave her 'half [his] properties' in his will.
Following this, John says that he needs to 'leave something to them' (by which he means his children), and then the following exchange occurs (emphasis added): Le: No no, of course you give to them. You plenty. Only I ask you, you give me the Botany Road and the shop, two shop and the one house. That's all. And you put what you put the house for me name… John: You got a house, Bankstown. Le: That one not my house. That my son. Don't ask me that, don't talk that rubbish. John: You're very greedy… Le: And you know… John: Anyway, I still alive. Le: I know you're still alive, your heart very danger, sometime I'm very scared. Yesterday morning, you know what you did, you can't drink, lip purple, that one I'm very scared. Le: I know you not come back, you can't do nothing. Your daughter your son very terrible. And you do… The right thing. John: What about what about leave everything to the government. Le: You give everything, you like it. That one in your pleasure, your house. John: I want to find out all these properties, where they're going to go. Le: Now your land, you got Botany Road, and that house in my shop. And that one you do, that one don't need anything. John: Yeah. Botany road I can leave it to you. And the, and the shop. All the [Angius] shops in partnership with all the other fucking bullshit. Le: You give me this house, or 21 Link Road? What you give to me? John: Maybe 21 Links Road. Le: You tell the truth… John: It's $2 million you know there. Le: You tell the truth, give me 21 Links Road. John: You know Link Road, if you sell it it's nearly 2,000,000. They sold next door it's five, it is $2 million, they sold it. You know Links Road, it's more land, what can you do with the land there. Fucking bullshit. Don't worry about it.
The reference to 'Links Road' is to the Burradoo property. There follows further discussion in which Ms Le asks or demands ('you give me…') particular properties, and the deceased then says: John: Bullshit. When the time come, I'll do the will. If you want to fight it, you want it to be a fight.
At this point the recording becomes difficult to follow. The impression left by the recording as a whole is that, as the defendant submits, the deceased was subjected to a sustained barrage of demands from Ms Le leading to his apt observation that she is 'greedy'. While it involves some recognition that he should leave her something in his will, which never eventuated, the precise extent of that recognition is left unclear by the concluding comment in the preceding paragraph, read with the earlier qualification 'do you deserve it?'.
I accept that the recording is some evidence that the deceased had a testamentary intention to benefit Ms Le in his will, but the precise way is left unclear. I do not accept however that it contains any acknowledgement of a de facto relationship.
To the contrary, the deceased explains in the conversation that if he were to put the Coogee property into her name, he would be at risk of being 'kicked out' of his home. Further, he asks during the conversation 'Do you deserve it?'. Both of these statements suggest a lack of the mutual commitment to life as a couple inherent in a de facto relationship, and suggest a lack of trust (of Ms Le), and that what he is contemplating is a gift as a reward for things done for him rather than as a recognition of his relationship with her as (de facto) husband and wife. It is also consistent with the impression which I gained from all the evidence that the deceased viewed all the members of his family, and also Ms Le as having ulterior motives (being that they wanted his money).
There are also recordings of conversations between Ms Le and the deceased on 16, 19 and 23 September 2021. I have listened to each of them again and find the interactions between Ms Le and the deceased incoherent, reflecting the very serious deterioration in his health at that time. It is evident that he had difficulty in breathing (assisted by a machine to deliver oxygen to his lungs, which had been installed by 3 September 2021) and was taking morphine. I do not regard anything said in those recordings as reliable as to his testamentary intentions or his relationship with Ms Le.
The general nature of these conversations in September 2021 is illustrated by a recording of a conversation on 19 September 2021 which starts at 5:12pm, with the following exchange: Le: You make the new Will for me. John: I already made the new Will. That one was in March. Le: How many you give to me? John: The shop. I don't got any other yet. Le: You got this house, and Botany Road and the shop. And Bowral, that one for your land. No one can touch. That one what you can give to me. John: I want more than that. Le: Yeah now, and know only that one before Gabbie to check that. And that one you give to me this house, number 2 Denning St, and the childcare Botany Road. And my shop. That one you give to me? John: You already have that one. Le: You do it and give- John: I can't do anything Le. There follows an exchange over several minutes which is mostly incomprehensible, and then it concludes as follows: Le: You give me that childcare Botany Road, and this house and my shop that one I'm happy. That one you give to me. John: Over 20 million dollars Le: yeah, I'm happy John: Yeah Le: that's all. I'm stay with you 18 years, not short time, very long time, everything I done for you. My son sick, I can't look after him, I look after you. You remember my big boy operation, the same you. I can't look after him. He in Bankstown, I in here. I look after you, I can't, my daughter call- John: I don't care- Le: Yeah, that's why my- That's why I say I love you John: I don't care much about your son. Le: No no, I don't talk about my son. If I can't help him. I can't help him before he sick, he leave me, I can't help. That's what I say. I got you, look after you, I can't move. Three times a day I come to you, look after you. Look after you everything. You see, one month you in hospital, I can't- The Covid, I can't get in, you see you very dirty, you very messy, your body you see that? And before I come, I shower for you every day and make for you clean, look you healthy and you stay here, you dirty everything. That one very hard, you know? No one can do that. John: yeah Le: Your daughter, your granddaughter, can't look after you that. John: listen botany road Le: Yeah, give me Botany Road, my shop number 3- John: No. Le: Number 3, my shop mean number 3 John: Coogee Bay Road they get Le: You give me Coogee Bay Road? John: No, Coogee Bay Road that's for Robert, I give you botany Road Le: Yeah, you give me Botany Road, 2 Denning St and my shop. That one you give to me. John: Yeah. Le: Yeah, that good. Yeah, that one okay. I stay here, I fix the house up. I stay here. John: Put the title in Le: yeah John: realise and put the title, cause tomorrow. Tomorrow what you say, ask them for the Titles. Le: The titles, you ask them for the Gabby. He can tell you. John: It's …. ah eh Le: He don't tell till now see. John: cos it… Le: now she scared something she will not tell you the truth. You understand? John: Yeah. Le: She know the Will not pass. You do another Will not pass, now you do the new Will. That one different. John: I- Le: What you feel now? You feel okay? You feel tired? John: Probably, I'm thirsty. Le: Yeah you thirsty, your heart not work properly. John: Thirsty for water. Le: Yeah, you want the cold water? I give you little bit? John: Yeah, that'd be nice.
There seems to be a recognition here that Ms Le should receive the shop (ie. Shop 3) but beyond this, the recording is inconclusive.
Ms Le also relies on a recording of a conversation with Gabrielle on 6 February 2022 at the Coogee property, referred to at [174] above. I do not accept the submission for Ms Le that this recording is evidence that Jenny and Gabrielle were fully aware of John's de facto relationship with Ms Le. At most, it records an acknowledgement by Gabrielle that Ms Le looked after John 'very well and … probably did extend his life'. I am satisfied on all the evidence that Ms Le did look after John at least in the last six months of his life when he clearly was incapable of looking after himself but that, without more, does not establish a de facto relationship between them.

[41]

Kevin Batten

Mr Batten gave evidence by an affidavit made 27 April 2022 and a further affidavit made on 26 October 2023, which supplemented parts of his first affidavit which were not admitted. He has been the partner of Jenny since 2003 and they have one child together, Sean, born in 2004. Kevin worked at Qantas for a number of years as a shift worker and retired in 2014.
Kevin deposed that he visited John's Waterloo apartment with Jenny roughly once a month while John was living there and when John moved back to the Coogee house in 2017, he would visit him at least weekly as he was retired and lived only a few houses away in the same street with Jenny. He deposed that he often assisted John with repairs and maintenance around the house and was very familiar with it. He deposed that he only observed John's belongings at the Waterloo apartment and also at the Coogee property from 2017.
Kevin deposed that as John became more ill, he observed Ms Le take on more of a carer role along with her cleaning duties. He deposed that John would often say to him words to the effect 'I pay Ms Le to cook and clean' and 'I give her free rent on the shop to help me around the house'.
Kevin deposed that he had never seen John and Ms Le act affectionately towards one another and gave a number of examples where he observed John make disparaging comments to Ms Le and/or ordered her around. He deposed to one conversation during 2021 when the deceased said to Kevin that he wanted to sell the house in Coogee and move to Bowral and when Kevin asked him who was going to help him, he responded 'I'll find someone. I don't want Le coming, she gives me the shits.'
He deposed to having visited the Burradoo house on many occasions, and that Ms Le would also attend as she would drive them there and back, cook lunches while they were there and do all the cleaning and provide additional care to John, such as ensuring his medicine was administered. He deposed that John often told Kevin that 'I pay her extra money to come to Bowral'. While at the Burradoo property he again assisted John with repairs and maintenance on the property.
Kevin deposed to visiting the Coogee property in early 2021 to fix a downlight in the house and that while he was there, he heard John say to Ms Le words to the effect 'You're not my wife. You don't tell me what to do. I don't want another wife.'
Kevin said in cross-examination that his understanding was that John and Ms Le did not sleep together at the Burradoo property. He explained this understanding as based upon John having said to him, on a few occasions, that 'We never slept together'.
Kevin deposed that he had never seen John and Ms Le act affectionately towards each other.

[43]

Jason Bates

Mr Bates is an asset manager who is engaged by Jenny to review the assets of the estate and take steps to secure those assets for the benefit of the estate. His evidence was that he worked in asset management and portfolio management for a number of companies, including CBRE and Jones Lang LaSalle and has a diploma in property management. He said in cross-examination that he provided asset management services to Ms Angius on the basis of an hourly rate.
It is not in dispute that Mr Bates attended the Coogee property on 10 February 2022 at around 2:00pm and had a conversation with Duc in which he asked Duc to hand over the keys to the property and asked him to leave and take with him any items on the premises that belonged to him.
He deposed that he asked Duc whether he knew the owner of the premises and what his relationship, if any, was to that person and that Duc replied 'I knew John and my mother was his carer'.
Mr Bates also deposed to a conversation that he had with Mr Alvin Johnson on 15 February 2022 which came about because Jenny asked him to liaise with persons who may have worked on the Coogee property to ascertain the level of maintenance required. He recorded in a file note the following regarding the conversation with Mr Johnson: Call Alvin Johnson re lawns & maintenance. Alvin said "Went to Hawaii w/ Laura & John, been friends since the late 60's. He spoke of Ms Le "The Chinese Hired Help", cooked & cleaned was like she was a carer & personal duties. John wasn't happy as she would come & go a lot. Stated he thinks they were having an affair, Laura thought so too. He said never saw them intimate, kiss, cuddle, share a bed together. John never showed affection, he never did and when he was married to Laura even then he never really saw anything, just occasional. Lawns and odd jobs occasionally completed. End of call.
In his affidavit of 27 April 2022 (made 10 weeks after the file note) he deposed that Mr Johnson told him that 'He believed Ms Le and Giovanni Angius were once in an intimate relationship for a short period of time a few years ago' and said words to the effect 'I never saw evidence of this but had suspicions', and when he asked Mr Johnson to elaborate on this he said 'She cooks and cleans for him so they are in a relationship'.
Mr Bates was cross-examined at length on the file note and his affidavit evidence of the conversation, I am satisfied that none of the cross-examination calls into doubt that it is an accurate record of what Mr Johnson said to Mr Bates. First, Mr Bates has no interest in the outcome of these proceedings. Second, Mr Johnson was very vague in his cross-examination about a number of matters which he ought to have recalled, including the years in which he went on three trips to the United States with the deceased and how many occasions he visited the Coogee property in the last three years of John's life. As indicated above, I am not satisfied that Mr Johnson's recollection of the conversation is accurate. Third, while Mr Ellison SC sought to call into question why it was that Mr Bates would be 'fishing' for information about Ms Le, there is an explanation for it in that he was engaged to find out from Mr Johnson who assisted with the maintenance of the Coogee property and it is not surprising that Mr Johnson would raise her name in that context.

[44]

Medical records

Ms Le relied on hospital records regarding John's admission to hospital over the period from May 2018 to June 2021 (Ex H). Those records describe Ms Le variously as John's 'partner', 'wife' or 'friend'. In my view, these records are not evidence of John's perception of his relationship with Ms Le as they are explicable as being a description which she provided to hospital staff.
Of more significance, in my view, are two other records of what he told his treating doctors. The first is a record on his admission to Prince of Wales Hospital on 28 September 2021 (Ex 29), which states that he told Dr Prendergast in the context of a discussion of his home set-up: 'states Lee is not his partner. Also states is not his carer. Does help with his medications'.
The second is a report made by Professor Rosenfeld, a consultant geriatrician and physician of a consultation with John on 24 June 2021, contained in a letter to John's GP shortly afterwards. This letter states under the heading 'BACKGROUND' (emphasis added): He went on to tell me that his wife died about nine years previously and that he has been well and fully independent since that time. … He has two children Jenny who is married with two children (he told me his grandchildren's names) he has a son called Robert who he described. He denied that he had been a significant smoker. When I indicated that I had seen correspondence that indicated a smoking history he indicated that 'those people must be liars'. He drinks a 'little bit of wine' but has not been a heavy drinker. He lives alone in a house in South Coogee. He said it was worth '$7 million'.
The letter states under the heading 'FUNCTION' (emphasis added): Said that he is not done appear (sic) power of attorney or enduring guardian. He said "I know nothing about this" - when I asked him about whether he would appoint an individual to help him with decisions if he was ill he indicated that his daughter's children would be suitable. He has help from two ladies who assist with cleaning and house care. He eats in a restaurant every night. He said he built his house about 20 years ago. He described various problems in his situation since the death of his wife in 2012 - this has caused him a great deal of upset. He told me of some of the problems, indicated the view that he had been taken advantage of and that he had a lot of money. He is independent in toileting, personal care and ADL. He told me he is still driving "a four-wheel-drive Toyota" and that he has not had problems or incidents in that regard.
The letter states under the heading 'EXAMINATION': On examination he was alert and attentive. He was able to walk unassisted. His gait was a little wide based but he was able to balance without difficulty when he turned. He seemed a little breathless times (sic). Cardiac and respiratory examination was otherwise unremarkable. The neurological examination was unremarkable. The glabellar tap was positive. On cognitive screening with the MMSE he scored 23/30 (he was able to speak in English without difficulty). He made an error with the year. He wasn't aware of the date and could not name the nearby hospital "Randwick hospital". In explanation he said he usually goes to 'RPA where there are more specialists'. He was able to register three items but after a distraction could only recall one of the items - exclaiming at the time his surprise that he could not recall. He made a number of errors on a reverse spelling task as well as serial sevens - score 3/5. Later in the examination he was unable to recall either of the three words despite having practiced them earlier. He wrote a sentence "I like to be a nice person" - he was able to draw a clock face however the orientation of numbers was poor. He wasn't able to indicate time with the hands of the clock making lines on the page.
The letter states under the heading 'SUMMARY - RECOMMENDATIONS' (emphasis added): 1. Mr Angius has a number of medical problems. I am not entirely clear about the history and progress of these issues with the limited history I have so far. Correspondence that you forwarded with your referral from Dr Sean Lai (RPAH Medical Centre) thank you - in May 2021 indicated that he has had a number of admissions to RPAH with heart failure. … 2. The brain scan and my clinical examination indicates the likely presence of microvascular brain disease as well as evidence of a previous infarct. Some cognitive impairment is present. 3. He is receiving help at home on a regular basis but I am not able to tell if this is sufficient for his needs. He said that he goes out to eat each evening to eat - I don't have a great deal of additional information or verification about his function generally. I was not able to complete a detailed history of his function in the time I had with his daughter. 4. I suspect would benefit from additional services and support and in that regard it would be appropriate that he be reviewed by the aged care assessment team at home. … 5. The issue of POA and enduring guardian should be resolved. He has medical problems that are likely to require decision making about care and support. Advanced care planning would presumably have already been addressed with his cardiologist.
The letter is significant in at least three respects. First, while Professor Rosenfeld refers to the brain scan as indicating some cognitive impairment, there is nothing in the letter to suggest that John lacked mental capacity at this time (nor has this been suggested by any party). Second, John said to Professor Rosenfeld that 'he lived alone' at the Coogee property. Third, he said to Professor Rosenfeld that he had help from 'two ladies who assist him with cleaning and house care'. There was a dispute between Ms Le and Jenny as to whether Ms Le was one of the two ladies being referred to. For the reasons given earlier, I do not accept Ms Le's evidence that there was another 'Thai lady' who, along with Linda, provided 'cleaning and home care' and I am satisfied that John was referring to Linda and Ms Le.

[46]

Natalie's evidence

It is not in dispute that Natalie suffers from multiple sclerosis, having been diagnosed with this condition in 2014. She also has experienced the following symptoms caused by her multiple sclerosis: foot drop, trigeminal neuralgia and greater auricular neuralgia, optic neuritis in the left eye, severe vertigo and balance issues, bladder issues causing incontinence, difficulty swallowing food, sensation of pins and needles throughout the left side of her body and fatigue. She also suffers from a number of other serious medical conditions including pericarditis and post-inflammatory syndrome having been diagnosed after receiving her COVID-19 vaccine in 2021; various respiratory conditions including asthma (diagnosed in around 2010); sleep apnoea (diagnosed in around 2021) and lung nodules (diagnosed in 2021); carpal tunnel syndrome (diagnosed in 2019); acute complicated appendicitis with perforation and peritonitis and visceral hyperalgesia and motility disorders (diagnosed in 2022), and Hashimoto's disease (diagnosed in January 2023). She put into evidence extensive medical records regarding the diagnosis and treatment of these conditions.
Natalie deposed that the first time that she could recall meeting John, her paternal grandfather, was in 2006 or 2007 when she was 16 years old. Her parents, Silvana and Robert, had divorced in 1997 when she was around seven years old. She deposed that shortly after first seeing John, he gave her a cheque payable to her for $2,000 and not long after that a further cheque for $5,000 saying 'Go and buy yourself a car to learn on'. She deposed that from this time she visited him on average weekly either at the smash repair workshop or at the pool hall in Coogee. She deposed that after John moved into the Waterloo apartment, she visited him there on average weekly, and later, after Laura died in 2012, she visited John at the Coogee property, again on average weekly. She deposed that in the last five to six years before John's death, as her health deteriorated and she was away from work more often, the frequency of her contact with John increased and from 2019 she visited him two to three times per week until his death, except during the COVID-19 lockdown periods.
She deposed that on occasions John would take her to dinner at a few places he frequently visited including the Portuguese Club at Marrickville, South Juniors and Da Mario, and sometimes Jenny, her cousin Gabrielle and Ms Le were also present (although not necessarily together).
Natalie deposed to having a number of conversations with John in the period 2007 to 2011 in which he said to her that he had paid the child support payments which Robert was required to make following the divorce of her parents. The making of these child support payments is a matter dealt with in Silvana's evidence.
Natalie deposed that John provided her with regular financial support when she was an adult including giving her cash when she was not eligible for Centrelink payments; when she was stood down without pay as a customer service agent with IHG Hotels; supplementing her income during 2014 and 2015 when she was relying upon Centrelink payments of around $500 per fortnight; providing cash to her in an average range of $300 to $400 per week after 2019 when she was on workers compensation payments following her diagnosis with carpal tunnel syndrome leading to her leaving her job with Service NSW.
Natalie's evidence was that all these payments were in cash. I accept her evidence that frequent and regular cash payments were made to her by John. It is corroborated by the evidence of Mr Dodaro, which was unchallenged that first, he saw John give cash to Natalie at South Sydney Junior's on more than five occasions' and second that John said to Mr Dodaro in 2016: 'I have grandchildren. I have to look after all my grandkids. My son is no good towards his kids. So I have to look after them'. Mr Dodaro's evidence of this conversation with John is also consistent with evidence Natalie gave as to the statements to her by John as to why he was making cash payments to her.
Natalie deposed that from around 2017 until John's death, she helped him with tasks including shopping, light cooking (although most of the cooking was done either by his cleaner Linda or Ms Le, if she and John were not eating out), paperwork for his court matters, emails to his accountant, and the payment of his various bills, as John was not 'computer literate'.
She deposed that she spent more time with John from 2019, when she ceased working and was placed on Workers Compensation as he did not like to be left alone.
Natalie deposed to having visited John in hospital on 16 June 2021 and having a conversation with him to the following effect: Nonno John: I recently changed my will. Because I don't want your father to have any more control over anything. I rushed one through. I put Jenny everything to her only for now. She pushes me to leave everything for her. She's happy I did the will that way. Its temporary. Big fight. I told her it was temporary. I need to change it. My wife's death. Le showed up with sandwiches so he didn't say anything more. Le said to us words to the effect: Le: I put my name on the hospital note because I pick your grandfather up, take him to hospital, take him home. And Jenny she remove my name each time. She tell nurse, take my name off and not talk to me. I recall when Le was not near us in the room, Nonno John said to me: Nonno John: Don't forget this day. Very important. I need to talk to you. My wife's death.
Natalie deposed that the topic of a new will came up again when she was with John at the Coogee property in or around September or October 2021 during the course of which the following was said: Nonno John: You remember what I said. Natalie What? At the hospital? Nonno John: My will has to be changed. This house goes to Gabrielle and Sean. Natalie: Why? They have a unit in Alexandria each. Nonno John: Yeah, but my wife gave it to them not me and Gabrielle loves the design of this house. I'm proud of this house. I want to give this Chinese lady something. She gets the dry cleaning shop and I give her a few hundred thousand dollars cash to say thank you. She has kids as well. Just to help her out. To say thank you. I give Linda ten thousand dollars to say thank you. The house in Bowral goes to you and your sisters. I wanted to build you the townhouses but the court didn't give me the land back. Your sister Stephanie. I have to think. I have to give her something separate. Your family don't mix with her. Jenny to be taken off as the executor. Her house to be sold as well. Everything left in the companies divide equally to all the grandchildren.
Natalie deposed that John referred to this topic again in subsequent conversations. It appears that the closest John came to acting on the statements that he made was the discussion he had with Francis Devine in the meeting at the Coogee property on 20 December 2021, referred to below. She deposed that the meeting came about because John asked her to arrange a meeting with a solicitor because he wanted to 'make new papers, guardianship and attorney and will'. Natalie deposed that during one of her visits to see John at the Coogee property in early January 2022, he asked her whether Mr Devine had 'finished the papers' and that she followed this up with Bay Legal in early January. However, for the reasons she gave in her affidavit evidence, she was unable to arrange for Mr Devine to meet with John before he tested positive for the COVID-19 virus, and consequently the matter was not taken any further.
Natalie gave evidence in her affidavits about the relationship John had with Ms Le. She said in her affidavit of 21 April 2023: 174. I don't remember what year exactly but I first met Le at the pool hall in Coogee that Nonno John owned. He said that she was a business partner. 175. Le was often at dinners at South Juniors, the Portuguese Club at Marrickville, and Dar Mario at Rosebery. Sometimes Jenny was there and my cousin Gabrielle. I would then also see Le at the Laundromat at Alexandria. Over time she became a carer for my grandfather. I'm not sure of the date but in or around 2014. Nonno John said to me in words to the effect: Nonno John: I give to the Chinese woman the shop rent-free. I don't charge her rent and I give her a bit of cash extra to help me out. 176. After Laura died in 2012, there were multiple court cases involving Jenny, Robert and Nonno John. My grandfather kept fighting for the last ten years of his life. I felt that he had little joy in the final years of his life from fighting in Court. It made him sad and stressed. 177. When I visited Nonno John at the South Coogee home, Le and Linda were also sometimes there.
In her cross-examination by Ms Painter SC, Natalie gave the following evidence on the topic of John's reference to her as a 'carer': Q. You know who Ms Le is, don't you? A. Correct, yes. Q. I think you describe her in your affidavit as your grandfather's carer? A. That's what he said to me. When I first met her, he said she was a business partner, and then she became like a carer. That's what he said. Q. Do you remember when he said that to you? A. I think I first met her, it was around the pool hall. And the first time, he said she was like a business partner. And I don't know, but as time went on, she was, like, the carer. He said "She looks after me. I help her a bit, and she looks after me." Q. When he said "I help her a bit", that was a reference, wasn't it, to the rent that he didn't charge her for the shop where she ran her laundromat, so far as you were aware? A. Correct. Correct. I remember Q. That's what he told you, isn't it? A. Correct. And he said he gave her a bit of extra cash on job, and she helped him. Q. So there were two components that he told you about: the rent, and occasional cash payments? A. He said he gave her a bit of cash as well. Like, just Q. Did he say that to you more than once? A. Once or twice, but Q. But I assume she wasn't a regular topic of conversation between the two of you? A. Look, I saw things, but it wasn't my business to question. And I asked them both questions, and just it wasn't my business. My grandfather was three times my age. It's not my business to tell him what he's doing.
In re-examination by Mr Ellison SC on behalf of Ms Le, Natalie gave the following evidence about what she meant by that last answer: Q. …Can you say what it was you saw that you didn't take any further because it wasn't your business? A. Yeah, it's just a few things, like I knew that first he said she was a business partner, then caring for him, but, like, I'd see her, like, initiate hugging him and stuff, but he was happy, like, I can't - he was happy that she was around. Look, just, there's things I saw, like, way back in the past - and this is when I was at the pool hall. Like, and I don't know, maybe it's nothing. But there was, like, a back office room in the pool hall, and I just remember Le would come out and then he would come out shortly after, and he'd just - he was very red in the face. Like, I don't know. But they spent a lot of time together, and she was so good to him. My grandfather was really sick. She - you couldn't imagine how much she looked after him. She was unbelievable. Like Q. Did those observations start back in the pool hall days? A. Just, I saw that happen once or twice in the pool hall. And I don't know what was going on in the back office. But just she walked out, he walked out after her, and he'd just - he looked very flushed in the face. Like, I, I don't know, but he looked - you know, I'm not stupid, either. Just, I don't know. And he was very sick, and she, she'd be - she would - no one spent more time with him than Le. And he wanted her there. She was, I don't know, like, company. I don't know. Like, I kept him company. But maybe because she was older, I don't know. But - I don't know. Just - does it make sense?
Later in her cross-examination by Ms Painter SC, Natalie gave the following evidence about the help John received from Linda and Ms Le at the Coogee property: Q. I just want to ask you about the things you say about the help your grandfather got from Linda and from Le? A. Yep. Q. I just want to know how you know those things? A. I was in the house a lot, like, I know that, he told me, Linda was there to clean. Le, she cooked, cleaned a bit, like they both shared it. Gabrielle, I remember I visited him, he - Italians, like Haberfield, that's where mum goes to get like proper cheese and olives and stuff, and he used to say "I went with Gabrielle to Haberfield to get stuff like that". Like my family on the other side do that as well. … Q. You observed both of them cooking and cleaning? A. Yep. Q. Then you said "He told me, he told me Linda and Le were there to clean". Is that a reference to something your grandfather told you? A. He just, he said she was the cleaner. Q. About who though? A. About Linda. Q. What did he say to you, if anything, about Le? A. Look, with Le, I just, I remember he said that he gave the shop rent free and a bit of extra cash to help him out and sometimes Le would cook as well. She'd go shopping for him. Q. If we can turn to page 62, just a few pages over. A. Yep. Q. Paragraph 43, right up the top of the page. A. Yep. Q. That first sentence there you say, "I observed my grandfather had a paid carer and cleaner." A. Mm. Q. Just so we're all crystal clear, when you say, "Paid carer and cleaner," who are you making a reference to? A. Both of them ... Q. … When you say, "Both of them," who do you mean? What are their names? A. Linda and Le.
Natalie also said in cross-examination that she did not see John initiate a hug with Ms Le or ever hear him call Ms Le 'honey' and that in conversations with John, he referred to Ms Le as either Le or 'the Chinese lady' (T622).

[47]

Silvana Salvatore

Silvana Salvatore, Natalie's mother, made two affidavits, on 20 April and 8 June 2023. She gave evidence regarding certain payments she received from John after her divorce from Robert in 1999. She and Robert have four children together: Stephanie born in 1985, Melissa born in 1987, Natalie born in 1990 and Lisa born in 1991. She separated from Robert in 1997 and at the time of the divorce in 1999 her four children were aged between six and 12.
She deposed that Robert had a volatile temper (a matter confirmed by Jenny's evidence and that an AVO was issued in favour of Silvana against Robert in around 1997, and which he breached on 18 December 1997 leading to the imposition of a fine). Silvana also deposed that when her children were young, she experienced periods of mental illness requiring hospitalisation on three occasions for two to two and a half months on each occasion, but that her mental health improved markedly after her separation from Robert in 1997. She had one further period of hospitalisation for mental illness in 2008 for around two months, but she deposed that her mental health has improved significantly. I accept her evidence and am satisfied that her periods of mental illness do not affect the veracity of her evidence in these proceedings.
Silvana deposed that the divorce settlement was negotiated by her father, Elio (who died in 2019) and John and involved a payment to her of $206,000 as a property settlement and $25,000 for the benefit of her children, which she accepted as the best outcome she could achieve in the circumstances. This evidence is corroborated by a letter dated 28 May 1998 from Silvana's solicitor to her.
Silvana deposed that John made both payments which is corroborated by her unchallenged evidence of a conversation between her father and John at the time of the settlement negotiations.
Silvana deposed that she opened an account with St George bank in the name of 'Mrs Silvana Angius T-F Stephanie, Melissa, Natalia, Jacqueline' and that John made deposits to this account over the period from 6 July 1998 to 4 March 1999 when it was closed with a closing balance of $10,005.79. She also deposed that John suggested to her that she open the account for costs associated with the children. The passbook for the account is in evidence. There is no direct evidence that John made all the payments, but I accept Silvana's evidence that he either made deposits or was the source of the amounts used to make them. This derives support from her evidence of her conversation between her father and John referred to in the previous paragraph, which indicated that John was taking responsibility for the welfare of Silvana's four children. It is also supported by the fact that no other person has been identified who is likely to have made the payments, certainly not Robert in light of the evidence about his attitude to his parental responsibility to his children at that time: see the statement made by Silvana to police in relation to her AVO application against Robert dated 2 September 1997.
Silvana deposed that all withdrawals made from the account, including the final one, were used to meet expenses for her four children. I accept that evidence.
The evidence establishes that Robert had an obligation to make child support payments of around $250.00 per month for each of their children who were living with Silvana until they turned 18, which in Natalie's case was in June 2008. Silvana deposed that these payments were made wholly or substantially by John.
It is not clear from the evidence whether all the payments were made by John, but I am satisfied based on the evidence, including a conversation which Silvana deposed she had with John in June 2002, that John paid an amount of $3,673.86 in respect of child support payments which Robert was required to, but did not, make to Silvana in the period up to June 2002. Her evidence is corroborated by: (a) a letter dated 30 March 2003, which she sent to the Child Support Agency referring to Robert's failure to make any child support payments in the period from December 2001 to June 2002, and stating that on 13 June 2002 John made a payment of $3,673.86 which was the amount owing by Robert on that date; (b) there are multiple references in the evidence to Robert's unwillingness to support his first family, including the evidence of Jenny that Robert did call Silvana and her children 'bastards and scum' as recorded in a police report dated 25 November 2001 in evidence (T920.4); (c) evidence given by Jenny that John said to her that he was financially supporting Robert (T919-920); (d) evidence given by Natalie that John said to her that he had paid the child support obligations of Robert.
Silvana deposed that after the amount $3,673.86 was paid, all the child support payments required to be made were made. She believes that John made the payments, but does not clearly establish that he did so. It is possible that he did, but ultimately it is not necessary to determine that question for the purposes of these proceedings.
Silvana also deposed that after the child support payments ceased in 2009, when Jacqueline turned 18, John continued to support her and her daughters by giving her cheques and cash three to four times a year (outside Christmas and Easter) in amounts from $2,000-$5,000 as well as cash in smaller amounts. She deposed that John said to her on more than one occasion that these payments were 'for the kids'. I accept this evidence. While she was challenged in cross-examination for having no records to substantiate her evidence that John made the payments, I accept her explanation that 'it never occurred to me to keep records'. There was no suggestion that any bank account statements were available, but had not been produced, for the relevant periods when these payments were made.
While paragraph 29 of Silvana's affidavit of 20 April 2023 contains an apparent inconsistency in stating in the same paragraph that John gave her a cheque for $3,673.86 and that he paid that amount to her bank account, I am satisfied that this is an honest mistake by Silvana and I accept her evidence that John paid the amount by one or other of those methods.

[48]

Domenic Dodaro

Mr Dodaro is a friend of Natalie. He made an affidavit on 5 September 2023 and was cross-examined.
Mr Dodaro deposed that he met Natalie in around 2007 when he was working as a security guard at Westfield Bondi Junction and she at Woolworths. He is around 24 years older than Natalie and deposed that they have been friends since that time, but have never been in any form of romantic relationship. He sees their relationship as in the nature of a father/daughter relationship. He deposed that when she was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, he started to help her more, including driving her to her doctors' appointments of which there were many.
He deposed to having met John at the Coogee Pool Hall, and also at the South Sydney Juniors Club several times per week in the period 2010 to 2016 when he played the poker machines there. He deposed that sometimes Natalie was there with him or with John and that he saw on more than five occasions John hand to Natalie cash notes and on at least three or four occasions, Natalie said to him that John had given her sums in the order of $200 or $300. This evidence was unchallenged.
Mr Dodaro also deposed to a conversation with John at South Sydney Juniors in around 2016, in which John said to him 'I have a family. I have grandchildren. I have to look after all my grandkids. My son is no good towards his kids. So I have to look after them.' This evidence was also unchallenged.
Mr Dodaro gave evidence regarding his gambling activities, including what he referred to as 'link chasing'. He explained how this involved him using Natalie's bank account debit card to access funds for use in the gambling activity on the poker machines at South Sydney Juniors and other clubs that he and Natalie frequented. This resulted in a large number of regular debits and credits to her account. He also deposed that Natalie would, as part of the link chasing activity, sometimes sit on poker machines for him. He also deposed that he gave her small amounts of money from time to time out of his winnings to assist her with her expenses.
In the course of his examination by Ms Painter SC, Mr Dodaro was asked whether he ever met Ms Le and he gave the following evidence (T728): Q. Was she playing the pokies too? A. She yeah, but she wasn't playing the dollar machines. Q. What was she playing? A. The one cent machines. But me and John were playing the dollar machines, we, there was a $10,000 that John got a few times himself. Q. He was a lucky man. A. He used to say he's got golden fingers.
Mr Dodaro's evidence served to explain the large number of deposits and withdrawals to and from Natalie's bank accounts over the relevant period. Mr Dodaro presented as a witness who was responsive to the questions he was asked and was seeking to provide honest answers. I accept his evidence.

[49]

Francis Devine

On 20 December 2021, John had a meeting with Francis Devine, a solicitor, at the Coogee property. The meeting was organised by Natalie at John's request. Natalie and Ms Le were both present at the Coogee property when the meeting began, but did not participate in the meeting. The meeting went for about two hours.
At the time of the meeting, Mr Devine was employed by Bay Legal, but he left that firm in August 2022 and is now employed by a different firm in Gosford. He deposed that John instructed him to prepare enduring power of attorney and enduring guardianship documents (appointing Natalie and Ms Le in the relevant roles), but these were only to go into effect when he lost capacity. After the meeting, he prepared draft documents but due to the time of year he did not send them to John and ultimately they were not executed due to John's death.
Based on Mr Devine's file note and his evidence in cross-examination, I make the following findings regarding this meeting: 1. Though Natalie organised the meeting, John was Mr Devine's client, and neither Natalie nor Ms Le were present during the meeting. 2. The purpose of the meeting was for John to give instructions for the appointment of Natalie and Ms Le as attorneys and guardians, and not the making of a new will. Importantly, their appointment was to be on the basis that their decisions in both capacities would need to be joint. It is likely given that Mr Devines' file note records 'Does not want to go to nursing home' that the genesis of the meeting was John's desire to prevent that occurring. 3. John had no difficulty in identifying his assets and the names of his children and grandchildren. 4. Mr Devine asked a number of questions directed to determining if John had mental capacity to execute the power of attorney and guardianship documents and satisfied himself that he did. His file note records that his reason for that conclusion was that John was aware of his assets, potential beneficiaries, possible claims, the effect of enduring guardian and the separate effect of enduring power of attorney and 'appears to have no abnormality of the mind or defect of reasoning'. 5. Mr Devine asked what was the nature of John's relationship with Ms Le (in the context of his proposed appointment of her as a joint attorney and enduring guardian with Natalie) and John said 'employed to look after [the] house as a carer'. 6. Under the heading 'Client concerns' the file note records the following: Understand his potential intestacy will automatically flow to his two children. Although does not want his children to take all of estate. Does not believe now is the right time to get to (sic) execute will. Thinks his kids might do something to him that warrants cutting them out. Thinks executing a will now is a concession or a curse of him conceding to death. (Some what rational concern/superstition for an Italian man) Wants to consider what charities to give his estate before giving full instructions on Will. Does not want Robert's mistress to take anything from his estate. Would rather his grandchildren take from estate.
The reference to a 'potential intestacy' in the first dot point suggests that at the time of this meeting, John had forgotten that he had previously made a will in April 2021 or simply preferred not to mention it. Mr Devine's recollection of the meeting is that John did not mention that he had made a will in April of that year but could not recall whether John said that he did not have a will. The reference to 'Robert's mistress' appears to be to Jacqueline.
This file note is significant in the present case because John refers to Ms Le as someone 'employed' to look after the Coogee property 'as a carer', and because he recognises a testamentary intention to benefit Natalie (and his other grandchildren).

[53]

(a) The duration of the relationship

The 'relationship' referred to in this factor is not the de facto relationship, but rather a looser notion under which the Court takes into account the duration of what is asserted to be the relationship though also taking into account how the other factors listed in s 21C(3) might have changed during the course of that asserted duration of relationship: Sulliman v Sulliman [2002] NSWSC 169 at [194].
It is clear that there was a continuing relationship between Ms Le and John from around 2003 until his death. Having regard to the evidence of the AVO taken out against Laura and Natalie's evidence of what she observed in the pool hall, I accept Ms Le's evidence that the relationship was from the beginning a sexual one. It is likely that in the early years (up to 2009) that the relationship involved John staying overnight at the Redfern property on occasions, but the evidence does not establish how frequently that occurred. It is not clear on the evidence to what extent the relationship involved Ms Le staying with John at the Waterloo apartment in the period from 2009 to 2016. No objective evidence is put forward by Ms Le dealing with this period. While there are some photographs of her having dinner with John and friends at restaurants in that period, there are no photographs showing them together at the Waterloo apartment.
It is likely that the relationship involved John and Ms Le staying together at the Burradoo property from the period of its purchase in 2012 to 2017 (when he moved back into the Coogee property) but again the objective evidence does not establish the periods of time or the frequency of those visits to the Burradoo property.
Ms Le's evidence is that she lived with John at the Coogee property throughout the period from August 2017 to John's death. The evidence of Jenny and Kevin Batten, who lived on the same street is to the contrary. No objective evidence is put forward by Ms Le to corroborate her evidence that she lived at the Coogee property in this period (or indeed in any other period) and it is contradicted by the evidence that she maintained her residence at the Redfern property until she surrendered her lease in (2021) and did not have keys to the Coogee property.

[64]

Determination of Natalie's eligibility

Natalie's eligibility to make a claim turns on whether she was wholly or partly dependent on the deceased and, if so, whether there are factors warranting her application. Jenny contends that she was not dependent on the deceased and there are no factors warranting her application.
In relation to dependency, I am satisfied on the evidence that Natalie was partly dependent on the deceased both in her childhood and as an adult. In relation to her childhood, I have accepted the evidence of Silvana that the deceased provided financial support to her and her children (including Natalie) of three kinds: by making a payment to her of a property settlement on behalf of Robert; by making at least some of the child support payments which Robert was required to make; and third, by making regular payments, including amounts between $2,000-$5,000 for the benefit of the kids. This evidence is corroborated by a statement in John's affidavit of 26 October 2014 set out at [47] above. I am also satisfied that he gave significant financial assistance to Natalie, particularly after her diagnosis with multiple sclerosis in 2014.
It was contested by Jenny that Natalie had not proved the making of the cash payments or that John had the financial resources to make significant cash payments of the kind alleged. As to the first point, I am satisfied that the evidence of the payments being made is corroborated both by the deceased's affidavit of 26 October 2014 and the evidence of Mr Dodaro (in the case of the cash payments by John to Natalie).
I am also satisfied that John had the financial resources to make the payments to Silvana and Natalie. It is clear that John received significant amounts from the various companies which he controlled over the period up to 2017 when a receiver was appointed to those companies.
Natalie gave evidence in her affidavit of 21 April 2023 of attending the Commonwealth Bank with John in 2019 or 2020 and seeing a statement showing he had a deposit of $3 million with the Commonwealth Bank, no doubt as a result of the very significant payments received by him from those companies. Further, the fact that he received significant payments from the companies he controlled is confirmed by the orders made by Kunc J on 12 February 2021, recorded in Angius v Salier (No 5) [2023] NSWSC 678 at [5].
Turning now to the question of whether there are factors warranting Natalie's application, it is necessary to have regard to the 'guidelines' in Bowditch, set out earlier. As to (a), while the responsibility to make provision for a grandchild normally rests with the parent (or parents), in the present case Robert did not accept that responsibility following his divorce from Silvana. The deceased took on that responsibility in place of Robert. This is confirmed by the deceased's affidavit to which I have already referred. To the extent that Robert did provide support for Natalie (and her sisters) during her childhood, it was limited to the relatively modest child support payments (some of which he may have made) and did not extend beyond that which is consistent with his attitude towards Silvana and their children (including Natalie) as 'bastards' and 'scum'.
As to (b), while Natalie resided with her mother rather than the deceased, the deceased did assume a role of providing financial support to Silvana to assist her with the financial burden of bringing up her four children (and his grandchildren). This financial support extended beyond the typical support which a grandparent may be expected to provide to a grandchild. This financial support continued and increased after Natalie was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in 2014 and I infer that this was because the deceased recognised the seriousness of her illness and considered it was necessary (given the lack of support from Robert) that he should assist her financially.
As to (c), Natalie provided companionship and assistance to John in the various ways referred to at [300]-[301] above. In relation to (d) and (e), while the generosity of a grandparent to a grandchild is not, of itself, sufficient to convert the grandparent relationship into one of testamentary obligation to a grandchild, there is direct evidence here that the deceased did regard his grandchildren, including Natalie, as a natural object of his testamentary intentions. This is confirmed both by his 2012 will which included his grandchildren as beneficiaries (including Natalie), the deceased's explanation for how he came to make his 2021 will and his statement to Francis Devine in December 2021 that on making a new will his grandchildren would benefit.
In relation to (f) concerning the inheritance or financial support which Natalie might fairly expect from her parents, it is clear from the evidence that Silvana does not have the financial capacity to provide significant financial support to Natalie. In so far as Robert is concerned, I accept the submission made for Natalie that, given the history of Natalie's relationship with him, there is no basis to consider that Robert will support Natalie.
Bearing in mind these matters, and all the circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that Natalie has established that there are factors warranting the making of her application.

[65]

Relevant principles

Section 60(2) of the Act sets out matters to which the Court may have regard for the purposes of determining the questions posed by both s 59(1)(c) (whether adequate provision for the proper maintenance, education or advancement in life of the applicant has not been made in the will) and s 59(2) (if so, what order for such provision ought to be made). This requires an evaluative judgment, taking into account the matters set out in s 60(2).
In Spata v Tumino (2018) 95 NSWLR 706; [2018] NSWCA 17 at [112]-[115], Payne JA (Macfarlan JA and Sackville AJA agreeing) said: In Vigolo v Bostin (2005) 221 CLR 191; [2005] HCA 11 at [74] Gummow and Hayne JJ cited the plurality in Singer v Berghouse (1994) 181 CLR 201; [1994] HCA 40, for the proposition that: [T]he words 'adequate' and 'proper' are always relative. There are no fixed standards, and the Court is left to form opinions upon the basis of its own general knowledge and experience of current social conditions and standards. What is "proper" requires an evaluative judgment that has regard to all relevant circumstances, not merely the parties' financial circumstances. The Court's assessment of what is proper maintenance, education and advancement in life must be made at the time when the Court is considering the application. This does not, however, mean that considerable weight should not be given to the assessment of a capable testator or testatrix who has given due consideration to the claims on his or her estate. In Andrew v Andrew (2012) 81 NSWLR 656; [2012] NSWCA 308 at [12] Allsop P stated: Accepted and acceptable social and community values permeate or underpin many, if not most, of the individual factors in s 60(2) and are embedded in the words of s 59, in particular 'proper' and 'ought'. That such values may be contestable from time to time in the assessment of an individual circumstance, or that they may change over time as society changes and grows can be readily accepted. Allsop P acknowledged that orders made by reference to "perceived prevailing community standards of what is right and appropriate" referred to an imprecise, variable and contestable standard. See also White J in Slack v Rogan; Palffy v Rogan (2013) 85 NSWLR 253; [2013] NSWSC 522 at [125] - [127].
In relation to the evaluation of what is 'proper' by reference to 'perceived community standards of what is right and appropriate' (or 'moral duty' which was the preferred way of expressing the same concept in in Steinmetz v Shannon [2019] NSWCA 114 at [44] and [109]), these are to be ascertained according to the circumstances of the particular case, including the relationships between the applicant and the deceased and other persons who have legitimate claims upon his or her bounty and the circumstances and needs of those other persons: Chapple v Wilcox at [64]. Importantly, as White JA said in Steinmetz v Shannon at [59], 'the court does not ask whether the will was fair and does not have the power to adjust entitlements under the will according to what it considers to be fair'.
In Lalic v Lalic [2022] NSWSC 31 at [48]-[54], Henry J summarised the authorities on the correct approach to the evaluative task required when determining whether the provision in a will is adequate and, if not, whether a family provision order should be made, as follows: Pursuant to s 60(1)(b) of the Succession Act, the Court may have regard to the matters set out in s 60(2) for the purpose of determining whether to make a family provision order and the nature of any such order. Those matters may be relevant both to the question of any inadequacy of provision and, if the provision is found to be inadequate, whether an order for provision should be made and if so to what amount: Chapple v Wilcox (2014) 87 NSWLR 646; [2014] NSWCA 392 at [7]; Chan v Chan [2016] NSWCA 222 at [21]. The Succession Act does not prescribe the circumstances that constitute adequate provision for the proper maintenance, education or advancement in life of a person, nor does it allocate relative weight to any of the various matters set out in s 60(2) to which the Court may have regard. While adequacy is concerned with quantum and the word "proper" prescribes the standard of the maintenance and advancement in life, they are relative concepts with no fixed standards. The Court is left to form opinions on those matters on the basis of its own general knowledge and experience of current social conditions: Vigolo v Bostin (2005) 221 CLR 191; [2005] HCA 11 at [74] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), [114] (Callinan and Heydon JJ); Limberger v Limberger; Oakman v Limberger [2021] NSWSC 474 (Limberger v Limberger) at [423]. A multifaceted evaluative approach that takes account of all the factual circumstances relevant to the application is required in order to determine whether adequate provision was made for the claimant's proper maintenance, education or advancement in life: Sgro v Thompson [2017] NSWCA 326 (Sgro v Thompson) at [6] (Payne JA), [86] (White JA, McColl JA agreeing). The relevant circumstances will include a claimant's needs, although there is a distinction between needs and adequate provision. Whether or not adequate provision has been made is not to be determined simply by a calculation of financial needs. Any assessment of a claimant's needs also requires consideration of the size of the estate and others' claims on it: Chan v Chan [2016] NSWCA 222 at [22]. Thus, the concepts of adequate provision and the proper level of maintenance and advancement are to be assessed in the context of all of the circumstances of the case, including the claimant's financial position, the size and nature of the deceased's estate, the totality of the relationship between the claimant and the deceased, and the relationship between the deceased and other persons who have legitimate claims on the deceased's estate. Attention may also be given to how the claimant lived and might reasonably expected to have lived in the future: Blendell v Blendell [2020] NSWCA 154 at [7]-[8]; Vigolo v Bostin (2005) 221 CLR 191; [2005] HCA 11 at [114]. The determination of what is adequate provision for the proper maintenance, education and advancement in life of a claimant is to be guided by applying the Court's assessment of what is considered to be right and proper according to contemporary accepted community standards or what is considered to be the moral duty of the deceased: Squire v Squire [2019] NSWCA 90 at [10]; Steinmetz v Shannon (2019) 99 NSWLR 687; [2019] NSWCA 114 (Steinmetz v Shannon) at [44] (White JA), [109] (Brereton JA). In appropriate cases, if the deceased was capable of and did give due consideration to what provision for a claimant's maintenance, education or advancement is proper, the Court should give considerable weight to the deceased's testamentary wishes. This approach recognises that a testator or testatrix is in a better position than the Court to make such an assessment, although the application of s 59 of the Succession Act is not confined by notions of reluctance to interfere with freedom of testation. The Court's assessment of whether there has been adequate provision for the claimant's proper maintenance and advancement in life must be made when the Court is considering the application, rather than at the time of the deceased's death or will, and requires an evaluative judgment of all of the circumstances: Megerditchian v Khatchadourian [2020] NSWCA 229 (Megerditchian) at [33], [35] (Payne JA, Macfarlan JA and Emmett AJA agreeing); Steinmetz v Shannon at [52]-[54] (White JA), [96] (Brereton JA); Sgro v Thompson at [86]; Slack v Rogan; Palffy v Rogan (2013) 85 NSWLR 253; [2013] NSWSC 522 at [126]-[127].
Meek J in Tarbes v Taleb [2023] NSWSC 565 at [195]-[222] set out a comprehensive summary of the relevant principles to apply in undertaking that evaluative task to which I have also had regard.
John's estate is on any view a large estate, with a net value of approximately $29.5 million. The significance of the size of the estate, in the present context, is that any order for provision which is made is unlikely to impose any financial hardship, or have a material adverse effect, on the position of Jenny (the sole beneficiary) or other claimant, and this may be said to remove a limiting factor often present in family provision cases where eligibility is made out.
In Tarbes v Taleb [2023] NSWSC 565 at [226]-[233], Meek J dealt with the significance of the size of the estate as follows: In large estate cases, the limited scale of resources available in most estates and the competition for satisfaction of financial needs out of such limited resources cease in fact, to be limiting considerations in the Court's overall assessment of what is adequate provision for the proper maintenance and advancement in life of the applicant. Thus, it has been said that the Court is free to make a more liberal assessment of what is proper provision in the sense that competition for limited resources is much reduced or eliminated and unqualified by competing claims. In Anasson v Phillips, Young J (as his Honour then was) expressed this concept in the following terms (at 20-21): If the estate is a large one the Court has a slightly different approach. The basic principles are the same, that is, the will can only be affected to the extent that it is necessary to discharge the moral duty by making adequate provision for the plaintiffs, but where there is a large estate competition between claimant and claimant, and claimant and beneficiary under the will is much reduced or eliminated. Further, there may be a more liberal assessment of the moral duty owed, to be reflected in what is proper provision for the plaintiffs. In particular, the lifestyle that has been enjoyed by the plaintiffs because they have been associated with a wealthy testatrix is a relevant factor. These principles all, I think, flow from cases such as Re Buckland (1966) VR 404, especially p412. In Lloyd-Williams v Mayfield, Bryson JA at [32] expressed the concept in following terms: 32. It was open to White J and altogether appropriate to look well beyond needs when interpreting and applying community standards to decide what provision the Court ought to order. The concept of advancement in life can take consideration well beyond needs. The purposes White J considered are not concrete projects, but are means of appraising the provision which ought to be made, and of giving dimensions to an exercise which cannot be made highly concrete. Nothing commits the respondent to using the provision in the ways which White J considered. In Estate of Grundy, Lindsay J at [114] expressed the same concept in these terms: The potential availability to a claimant for family provision relief of a large estate, unqualified by competing claims upon it by any living person, may have a gravitational pull on the size of an award of family provision relief, beyond the bare notion of the claimant's "need" for relief (Lloyd-Williams v Mayfield (2005) 63 NSWLR 1 at [29]-[32]), even if (as illustrated by Estate Hemmes; Cameron v Mead [2018] NSWSC 85) respect for the testamentary intentions of the deceased operates as a restraint upon the amount of provision deemed "proper" to award. In a large estate a "proper" provision for maintenance, education or advancement of an eligible person may (but will not necessarily) far outweigh what is necessary for his or her "adequate" maintenance, education or advancement: Wentworth v Wentworth (1995) 37 NSWLR 703 at 737. The inquiry into adequacy is not limited to considering whether the plaintiff has enough to survive or to live comfortably without provision (or further provision, as the case may be) from the deceased's estate: Spiteri v Vassallo at [19] per Williams J. What is adequate in any given case may transcend the necessities of life in a sense of basic requirements for food, clothing and shelter or what is necessary for subsistence. It may extend to consideration of matters that for example make life more comfortable or to advance a person's position in life. This was the point of the discussion by Bryson J (as his Honour then was) in Gorton v Parks in particular addressing remarks to comments in caselaw limiting notions of the need of adult children for maintenance and support by reference to views that moral obligations of parents can be limited or possibly escaped: at 6C-11F. The point was emphasised by Brereton JA in Steinmetz v Shannon, namely, that in assessing what is proper provision to the extent that "needs" are relevant, no narrow view of that notion limited to the necessities or essentials of life is to be taken: at [132].

[79]

Conclusion regarding Ms Le's claim for provision

It is difficult to assess what is the adequate provision for the proper maintenance, education or advancement in life of Ms Le in all the circumstances of the present case. There is evidence of what she considers to be her needs, but the evaluative judgment required is not determined by the plaintiff's needs, and also takes into account all the relevant circumstances including the matters set out in s 60(2) which have been discussed above and the other matters referred to in the authorities cited earlier in the discussion of the relevant principles to be applied. Two important matters to consider are the totality of her relationship with the deceased, and also the Court's assessment of what is considered to be right and proper according to contemporary accepted community standards or, put another way, what is considered to be the moral duty of the deceased. In relation to both matters the picture left by the totality of the evidence is complex.
On the one hand, Ms Le was clearly a divisive figure in the Angius family dynamic. Her affair with John caused or contributed to the acrimonious split in the family in around 2007, with a significant toll on all concerned, not least on Laura who was an entirely innocent party. John's affair with Ms Le appears to have caused Laura considerable distress in the final years of her life. Further, there are a number of aspects of Ms Le's conduct which I regard as unsatisfactory, to which I have referred above.
On the other hand, I am satisfied on all the evidence that John had a romantic (and sexual) relationship with Ms Le at least in the period from around 2003 to 2007. A relationship (which may not have been romantic or sexual) continued after that time until his death, although its precise character after 2007 is difficult to fathom. In particular, it is difficult to know why he refused to recognise her as his partner after Laura's death when there was no apparent impediment to him doing so if she truly was. He was clearly equivocal about their relationship and was disrespectful to her and dismissive of her in various ways (eg. by calling her, and/or describing her to various people, as 'Chinesa' or the 'Chinese lady' or as his carer). But he was also reliant on her for care and support, particularly in the last six months of his life when he was very ill. John had many opportunities to spurn her evident affection for him after Laura's death but, for whatever reason, chose not to do so. Similarly, she was free to leave at any time and while she says she stayed because she loved him, there were clear financial benefits to her in not doing so, including that he did not charge her the rent payable under the lease of Shop 3 (see [182] above).
I have attempted to understand the nature of John's relationship with Ms Le, but have struggled to do so because of the conflicts in the evidence of the witnesses who knew them both. Bearing in mind that without the benefit of evidence from John, it is not possible to fathom the unfathomable, I have paid particular regard to what John said about his testamentary intention regarding Ms Le, and consider the most reliable evidence of this to be what he said to Natalie in September or October 2021 that when he made a new will he would give Ms Le Shop 3 and a few hundred thousand dollars cash to say thank you.
In all the circumstances, particularly the matters referred to in the consideration of the s 60(2) factors set out above, I am satisfied that the deceased made inadequate provision for Ms Le's proper maintenance and advancement in life. I have taken into account the unsatisfactory aspects of her conduct referred to at [391]-[393] above in reaching that conclusion.
Taking into account all of these matters, I consider that a wise and just testator standing in the shoes of the deceased would consider it appropriate to give Ms Le Shop 3 and a sum of $250,000.

[84]

Natalie's financial resources (including earning capacity) and needs, and age: s 60(2)(d), (e) and (g)

Natalie is currently 34 years of age and single. She is no longer employed. She lives in a property owned by her mother, Silvana, and does not cohabit with another person.
Natalie's income at the time of the hearing was $4,069 per month (after tax) in the form of workers compensation benefits relating to a repetitive strain injury. This benefit expired in April 2024. That income was sufficient to meet Natalie's living expenses, but only because Natalie was limiting her consultations with specialists regarding her various medical conditions, and is no longer available to her.
Natalie's assets are minimal comprising a 2006 Lexus GS 300 motor vehicle, with 235,000 km on its odometer, which is expensive to run and maintain in her current financial circumstances, bank accounts with relatively small balances and two superannuation accounts with a balance of $40,223. She has a HECS debt of $22,330. In light of her medical issues, I accept that her asset position is unlikely to improve significantly. I refer to the potential for assistance from her parents, Silvana and Robert below.
Natalie's own assessment of her future needs are set out in one of her affidavits and revised in her closing submissions as follows: (a) a new motor vehicle at a cost of $50,000 (and a modified motor vehicle in the future with a cost of $100,000); a CPAP machine at a cost of $2,500, together with CPAP expendables of $500 per annum; (b) stem cell therapy at a cost of between $100,000 to $300,000; a two bedroom apartment, single level and NDIS compliant at a cost in the range of $850,000 to $900,000 which will need to be modified at a cost of approximately $71,752.
In addition, she seeks a sum based on recommendations of the occupational therapist, Mr Byrnes, on whose report she relied, and Dr Spies to account for her likely future needs comprising the following: 1. Therapy and intervention costs of $12,000 as one-off costs and annual costs of $7,339.20 (there being little doubt that Natalie will require life-long specialist care); 2. In-home assistance starting at 13.76 hours a week now ($810.89 per week) increasing to 50.34 hours per week at stage 2 in 2028 ($2,858.03 per week), and 108.1 hours per week from 2038 ($6,096.96 per week).
These estimates are consistent with the report prepared by the Menzies Institute for Medical Research, 'Health Economic Impact of Multiple Sclerosis in Australia in 2021' (published in February 2023) which estimates that the average direct and indirect costs for a person living in Australia with multiple sclerosis is in the order of $37,439 per annum.
Natalie does not contend that John's estate should meet all the needs described above. Rather, it is submitted that applying a broad brush the Court should, standing in the deceased's shoes, make a provision to significantly improve her life beyond mere survival which could be achieved by $950,000 for a suitably modified apartment, $100,000 for a suitably modified car and a sum sufficient to provide a buffer and income in relation to future medical and care needs.

[85]

Any physical, intellectual or mental disability of Natalie: s 60(2)(f)

Natalie is currently in poor health, principally arising from her multiple sclerosis diagnosis in 2014. As she said in her evidence: 'MS has changed my life completely and left me physically and emotionally distraught and alone'. As indicated earlier, Natalie's evidence contains a large number of documents relating to her various conditions, and there is no suggestion that any of that material is in dispute.
Each of Dr Judith Spies (a neurologist) and Professor Cherry Koh (a colorectal and general surgeon) who are Natalie's treating doctors, provided short reports summarising Natalie's diagnosis and care. Each was cross-examined. There was no suggestion to them that their evidence ought to not be accepted.
Dr Spies is a neurologist who has been treating Natalie since her multiple sclerosis diagnosis in 2014. Her summary (in a report dated 14 August 2023) states that: (a) Natalie has had aggressive multiple sclerosis from the outset, with multiple predictors of long term disability; (b) Natalie has subsequently developed several other medical issues, including pericarditis after the Pfizer Covid vaccine, with ongoing chest pain, severe gastrointestinal dysmotility after a ruptured appendix and Hashimoto's thyroiditis; (c) Natalie has aggressive multiple sclerosis that requires close monitoring of both the disease and potential side effects of her immunotherapies, and regular engagement with pain management services; (d) most patients with the sort of multiple sclerosis Natalie has (high lesion burden especially with brainstem and spinal cord lesions) will eventually enter a secondary progressive phase of the disease where disability progresses in the absence of further relapse. The time at which this occurs is impossible to predict in an individual, but multiple population studies indicate a median of approximately 20 years since first symptoms. Natalie is already 10 years post first symptoms; (e) many costs associated with multiple sclerosis are not covered by Medicare, most importantly physiotherapy; (f) stem cell therapy is available overseas at a cost of $100,000-$300,000, but is not available in Australia outside of clinical trials.
An earlier report by Dr Spies dated 16 June 2022 stated that Natalie is at a high risk of significant disability, and a higher risk of ending up in a wheelchair, being disabled and needing care, but her life expectancy is normal.
Dr Spies did not depart from that evidence in cross-examination. She confirmed that 'there is no doubt about the diagnosis or the aggressive nature of it' (T807.9); so far as prognosis is concerned she accepted it varies from individual to individual but said there are well-established predictive factors (T807.20-25); and agreed Natalie's condition is currently stable but with residual deficits (T808.4) and continued 'MS doesn't go away, it sort of stays there and you get accrual of things with new lesions' (T808.11).
After the conclusion of the hearing, Natalie was given leave to reopen her case to tender (without objection by the defendant) a report of Dr Daniel Guilfoyle (in consultation with Dr Spies) following a further MRI scan which indicates that her multiple sclerosis is no longer stable and recommends 'instituting further highly effective multiple sclerosis disease modifying therapy to try to regain control of her aggressive relapsing condition (particularly in light of her extensive burden of old disease)'. The report (Ex HH) sets out a revised treatment plan going forward with Natalie's agreement.
Associate Professor Koh's report dated 18 September 2023 describes Natalie's onset of symptoms of gastrointestinal motility disorder as 'atypical and the management of this has been challenging'. Although her view is that 'it is difficult to be prescriptive about what Natalie will require' she will need long term support and may require surgery. Her condition is presently stable, but fluctuating (T830.4-50).
Natalie has experienced the following symptoms caused by her multiple sclerosis: foot drop, trigeminal neuralgia and greater auricular neuralgia, optic neuritis in the left eye, severe vertigo and balance issues, bladder, issues causing incontinence, difficulties swallowing food, sensation of pins and needles throughout the left side of her body and fatigue. She has also suffered through pericarditis and post-inflammatory syndrome, having been diagnosed after receiving her COVID-19 vaccines in 2021, a variety of respiratory conditions (including sleep apnoea), carpal tunnel syndrome requiring surgery and gastrointestinal disorders.
Natalie's age of 34 is significant because one aspect of her medical issues is that multiple sclerosis causes significant disability without significantly compromising life expectancy.

Le v Angius; Angius v Angius

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