Katara v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1197

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

1. This decision is about whether Kodarbhai Katara should be granted an extension of time to seek a review of a decision of a Registrar of this Court.
2. In short, the background to the matter is as follows:

(a) The Delegate refused Mr Katara a Permanent Employer Nomination visa because, at the time of the decision, Mr Katara did not have a nominating employer; a fact fatal to the application for his visa, and one that could never be cured.

(b) The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the relevant Minister.

(c) The Registrar dismissed Mr Katara's application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal. The Registrar was satisfied the application to this Court had no reasonably prospects of success.

1. This review is a hearing de novo.[1] That is to say, this decision is not concerned with correcting any error on behalf of the Registrar but is "a fresh hearing which may result in a different order having the effect of undoing or revoking the decision of the registrar."[2]
2. However, the Court must first determine whether to grant Mr Katara an extension of time to file the review of the Registrar's decision. That is because the present application was filed 8 days late.
3. For the reasons that follow, the application for an extension of time is dismissed. Consequently, there is no application before the Court to review the decision of the Registrar. That means the decision of the Registrar (to dismiss the Applicant's application for judicial review of a decision of the Tribunal) prevails.

1. On 13 November 2018, Kodarbhai Katara (Primary Applicant), together with his wife, Mrs Dipali Akash Katara (Second Applicant), and son, Yuvin Akash Katara (Third Applicant) (Applicants), lodged an application for a Permanent Employer Nomination Scheme (Subclass 186) visa under the Temporary Residence Transition stream (Nomination Visa).[3] The Primary Applicant was nominated for the position of Cook by "Devru Investment Pty Ltd" (Devru Investments).[4] The applications of the Second and Third Applicant were dependant on the Primary Applicant.
2. On 16 July 2019, the Department of Home Affairs issued a letter to the Primary Applicant, advising that the nomination of Devru Investments had been refused.[5] The Primary Applicant was invited to respond within 28 days, failing which the nomination visa would be refused. No response was received.[6]
3. On 23 August 2019, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (as the Minister was then called) (Delegate) refused the nomination visa on the basis that the underlying nomination had been refused, and thus, the criteria in cl 186.233(1) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations) were not satisfied.[7]
4. Because the applications of the Second and Third Applicant were dependant on the Primary Applicant, their applications were also refused.[8]
5. On 30 August 2019, the Applicants applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) for review of the Delegate's decision.[9]
6. On 5 May 2021, the Tribunal issued an invitation to comment under s 359A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act), advising that the nomination was not approved, and that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to review the refusal of the nomination.[10] The Applicants were informed that this may result in the Tribunal affirming the refusal of the visa application (s 359A Letter).[11]
7. Other than an Appointment of Representative form (appointing Ms Tanvi Dutt of GNT Migration), received on 12 May 2021[12] no other response was provided to the Tribunal's invitation. No extension was sought.
8. On 20 May 2021, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate's decision. The Tribunal found that the Visa Application could not succeed without an approved nomination.[13]

1. On 16 June 2021, the Applicant filed an application with this Court under s 476 of the Act (Originating Application), seeking judicial review of the Tribunal's decision.
2. The Originating Application sought, amongst other orders, to quash the decision of the Tribunal and be remitted back to the Tribunal for reconsideration according to law.
3. The Originating Application contained 10 grounds of review (addressed below).
4. On 24 November 2021, the First Respondent (Minister) filed a response which sought, among other orders, that the matter be summarily dismissed (Summary Dismissal Application) pursuant to r 13.13 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (Rules).

1. On 6 May 2025, a Registrar of this Court made orders programming the Summary Dismissal Application for hearing. The orders directed the parties to file submissions. Only the Minister complied with the orders.
2. On 19 June 2025, the Registrar acceded to the Minister's application to summarily dismiss the Originating Application.

1. On 4 July 2025, the Applicant lodged the Review Application. The orders sought by the Applicant include that the Registrar's Decision be set aside, the Originating Application be reinstated and the Tribunal Decision be quashed.
2. Also on 4 July 2025 the Applicant filed an affidavit (Review Affidavit). The Review Affidavit contained 25 numbered paragraphs including background information and proposed grounds of review. The Review Affidavit is reproduced without alteration in the Appendix to this decision.
3. The matter was allocated to the Court as presently constituted on 9 July 2025. On the same day, the matter was listed for hearing on 15 July 2025.
4. On 10 July 2025, this Court informed the parties that the Review Application was made 8 days outside of the time prescribed by the Rules to seek such a review. The parties were provided with an opportunity to file written submissions addressing each of the factors relevant in the exercise of the Court's discretion to extend the time for the filing of the Review Application. Neither party availed themselves of the opportunity.

1. On 15 July 2025, the Review Application was heard by this Court by video on MS Teams. The:

(a) Primary Applicant on behalf of himself and the other Applicants; and

(b) Minister was represented by Mr Matthew Daly, solicitor at Mills Oakley.

(a) explained to the Primary Applicant that:

(i) the Court cannot set aside the decision of the Tribunal unless there is a jurisdictional error in the decision. The main categories of jurisdictional error were explained.

(ii) before the Court could consider the issue of jurisdictional error, it was necessary to determine whether to grant the Applicants an extension of time to file the review application.

(b) confirmed with the Primary Applicant that they had read the email sent to the parties on 10 July 2025 which explained the principles relevant to granting an extension of time for filing a Review Application. The Court repeated those principles and invited the Primary Applicant to address the Court about each of the considerations relevant to an extension of time.

1. Noting that the Primary Applicant was unrepresented, the Court gave the Primary Applicant an opportunity to elaborate on his grounds of review and to outline any other concerns he might have with the Tribunal's decision. This is now the standard procedure in this Court following the decision in Bala v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCA 600 at [7].
2. Before the Court, the Primary Applicant explained he did not draft the Review Affidavit and was assisted by "some other people". The Court as presently constituted notes that the Review Affidavit can only be considered as amended grounds of review if the Primary Applicant is granted an extension of time to file the Review Application. In any case, and in fairness to the Primary Applicant so as to provide him with the best opportunity to put forward his case, the Primary Applicant was provided an opportunity to say something about the Review Affidavit as well. He chose not to.
3. Mr Daly made submissions on behalf of the Minister. The submissions are referred to below.

1. s 256(1) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (FCFCOA Act) permits a party to a proceeding in which a delegate has exercised any of the powers of the Court to apply to the Court for review of that exercise of power. Such an application must be made within the time prescribed by the Rules or within any further time allowed in accordance with the Rules.
2. Rule 21.02 of the Rules states:

(1) For the purposes of subsection 256(1) of the Act, an application for review of the exercise of a power by a Registrar must be made within 7 days.

(2) The time prescribed by subrule (1) may be extended in a proceeding:

(a) by the Court or a Registrar on any terms that the Court or Registrar thinks fit; or

(b) with the consent of the parties to the proceeding.

1. The Registrar dismissed the Applicant's Reinstatement Application on 19 June 2025. Pursuant to r 21.02 of the Rules, the Applicants had until 26 June 2025 to lodge their Review Application. As they did not do so until 4 July 2025, the Applicants are 8 days out of time.
2. Rule 21.02(2)(b) allows the Court to extend the time prescribed with the consent of the parties to the proceeding. The Minister does not consent.
3. It remains to be seen whether the Court will extend the time prescribed on any terms the Court thinks fit.
4. The broad discretion to extend time in r 21.02(2) of the Rules should be exercised in the context of the well-established factors guiding decisions whether to extend time in cases such as Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment [1984] FCA 176; (1984) 3 FCR 344 and Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 276 CLR 579 at [12]. These factors are:

(a) the extent of the delay,

(b) the explanation for the delay,

(c) prejudice to the respondent due to the delay, and

(d) the merits of the proposed application.

1. When determining if a proposed application has "merit" or an "arguable prospect of success", the Court will do so at a "reasonably impressionistic level".[14] Importantly, an Applicant need therefore only identify an "arguable case" (which may not yet be fully developed) that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error. In this regard, the Court will itself remain astute and alert to the possibility of a reasonably arguable error which may warrant an extension being granted.[15]
2. The discretionary power to extend time is broad and there will be circumstances where it is appropriate for the Court to engage in more than an impressionistic assessment of the merits. In Tu'uta Katoa at [18], the High Court provided the following examples of such circumstances (references omitted):

For example, if the delay is lengthy and unexplained, the applicant may be required to show that the case is strong or even "exceptional". In such a case, a proper exercise of the power conferred by s 477A(2) will not require the judge to confine their consideration of the merits to an assessment of what is "reasonably arguable" or some similar standard. In other cases, the proposed ground of review may be hopeless, but it may be necessary to examine the proposed application in some detail to reach that conclusion.

1. At the hearing, the Primary Applicant (who spoke on behalf of the Applicants) was invited to address each of the factors relevant to granting an extension of time for the Review Application.
2. The Minister made oral submissions and relied on its written submissions filed on 27 May 2025, submitting that an extension would be futile as the decision of the Tribunal was not affected by a jurisdictional error. The Court incorporates (without repetition) paragraphs 25 to 37 of the Minister's outline of submissions filed 27 May 2025.

1. Before this Court, the Primary Applicant accepted that the delay in lodging the Review Application was 8 days.
2. The delay is modest. However, the efficient administration of justice necessitates the observance of time limits. For this reason, this factor weighs against granting the Applicants an extension of time.

1. At the hearing, the Primary Applicant explained that the Court's email and attached Orders dated 19 June 2025 did not specify that the Primary Applicant had seven days in which to seek a review. The Primary Applicant was unaware of the 7 day timeframe and was under the impression he had 21 days.
2. The Court notes that the Court's email of 19 June 2025 did not explicitly mention that the Applicant had only seven days to seek review of the Registrar's decision. Although ignorance of the law is not a reasonable excuse, this omission may have contributed to the Primary Applicant's confusion. That omission may merit attention by those responsible for Court practice rules to ensure unrepresented litigants receive clear guidance about applicable deadlines.
3. The Court acknowledges that the Applicants are unrepresented. However, the Primary Applicant's explanation remains unsatisfactory. Given the Primary Applicant's desire to engage with the judicial review process, the onus remained on him to ensure that he filed his application within the set timeframe. If he was unsure about the process, he could have sought professional advice. However, there is no evidence that the Primary Applicant made inquiries with the Court or any legal service to confirm the applicable time limits or to obtain competent legal advice. This factor weighs against the time being extended.

1. The Minister accepts that there is no substantial prejudice that could not be remedied by a costs order. However, the absence of prejudice is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to grant the Applicants an extension of time.[16]
2. This factor is a neutral consideration in deciding whether to grant the Applicants an extension of time.

1. The final and most significant factor in determining whether to grant the Applicant an extension of time to file the Review Application is the merits of the review itself.
2. At the hearing, the Court took the Primary Applicant to the grounds of review contained within the originating application.

*** The decision maker failed to apply the rules of procedural fairness.**

1. At the hearing, the Primary Applicant was asked what he meant by this ground. The Primary Applicant explained he did not receive "any proper guidance". However, he was unable to further explain how the Tribunal did not afford him procedural fairness.
2. Without further particular the ground must be rejected. The Tribunal clearly afforded the Primary Applicant procedural farness. The Tribunal:

(a) wrote to the Applicants (s359A letter);

(b) provided an opportunity to respond; and

(c) clearly explained the consequences of not responding to the letter (i.e. which was a decision would we made without a hearing).

1. The Applicants failed to respond to this letter, this is not the fault of the Tribunal.
2. Ground 1 does not establish a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on behalf of the Tribunal.

*** The application for approval of the nominated position made by Devru Investments Pty Ltd (the nominator) was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration. The nominator sought a review of that decision.**

1. Ground 2 is background explaining what happened. Ground 2 does not establish a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on behalf of the Tribunal.

*** There was unfairness and failure to take into consideration that the Applicant satisfied the Employer Nomination (subclass 186) visa on the basis of the Temporary Residence Transition stream criteria and completed more than 2 years employment, prior to applying for the 186 application.**

1. At the hearing, the Primary Applicant was asked what he meant by this ground. The Primary Applicant explained that it was unfair that his visa nomination was rejected.
2. The Court as presently constituted confirmed with the Primary Applicant that, at the time the Delegate made their decision on 24 August 2019, he did not have a nominator. The Primary Applicant was then asked to explain how the Tribunal was wrong in affirming the Delegate's decision, in circumstances where he did not have a nominator. The Applicant was unable to explain any fault on the Tribunal in relation to this ground.
3. Ground 3 does not establish a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on behalf of the Tribunal.

*** That at the time of application for the 186 application, the applicant had complied with all requirements.**

1. At the hearing, the Court reaffirmed that at the time of the Tribunal decision, the Primary Applicant did not have a nominator.
2. Like Ground 3, Ground 4 does not establish a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on behalf of the Tribunal.

*** The department refused the applicant visa because the Department claimed that the applicant did not meet cl 186.223. The department has made an error as at the time the applicant satisfied all his Employer Nomination (subclass 186) visa on the basis of the Temporary Residence Transition stream requirements prior to the nomination being cancelled.**

1. The Court explained to the Primary Applicant, that it cannot review the decision of the Delegate (referred to by the Primary Applicant as "the department").[17] The Court only can review the Tribunal's decision. In any case, the relevant time for compliance with all requirements was when the Delegate made their decision, not at the time of application.
2. Given Ground 5 is directed at the Delegate, Ground 5 does not establish a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on behalf of the Tribunal.

*** That by the time the nomination was refused the applicant had satisfied all the requirements for the 457 and 186 application and therefore should not have be disadvantage because of the nomination being refused. The applicant had satisfied the work requirements and provided all documents in support.**

1. At the hearing, the Applicant had nothing to say in relation to this ground. This ground appears to be a simple disagreement with the Tribunal decision, rather than identifying any error.
2. Ground 6 does not establish a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on behalf of the Tribunal.

*** Further, the nomination being refused was a direct consequence of the conduct of the nominator, which conduct is outside the control of the applicant.**

1. It is true that the Primary Applicant is not responsible for the nominator being refused, but that is beside the point. At the point in time when the Delegate made their decision and, more importantly, when the Tribunal made its decision, the Applicant did not have a nominator. Consequently, the Tribunal made the only decision which it could possibly make, given the Applicant did not have a nominator.
2. Ground 7 does not establish a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on behalf of the Tribunal.

*** It cannot be the intend of the regulations to deprive the applicant his rights where he has satisfied all conditions save for the conduct of the nominator which he has no control over.**

1. The regulation is clear in its intent and purpose. There is no evidence that the Delegate or, more importantly, the Tribunal misapplied the regulations. This ground like Ground 6, appears to be disagreement with the visa application process and argumentative in nature, rather than a contention that the Tribunal made an error.
2. Ground 8 does not establish a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on behalf of the Tribunal.

*** There was a failure to consider errors and correctness in the interpretation and construction of the facts.**

1. At the hearing, the Primary Applicant was asked what he meant by this ground. He could not further explain it. The ground remains otherwise without particulars.
2. Given, the lack of particulars, Ground 9 is a bare ground which fails to establish a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on behalf of the Tribunal.

*** There was an error in law in that all relevant considerations were not taken into account.**

1. At the hearing, the Applicant was unable to explain what was the "error in law". The Tribunal clearly considered the "relevant considerations" in paragraphs 13 to 17 of the Tribunal's decision.[18] After, considering these claims, the Tribunal found that the position was not the subject of a nomination approved by the Minister,[19] and hence affirming the Delegate's decision was the only decision that could be made.
2. Accordingly, Ground 10 does not establish a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on behalf of the Tribunal.

1. The Court has considered the "grounds" contained in the Review Affidavit, on an impressionistic level, none of them (individually or cumulatively) disclose jurisdictional error. The grounds either misinterpret the cases referred, invoke incorrect sections of the Act or Regulations, misconceive the role of the Tribunal and/or invite the Court to engage in impermissible merits review. None of the grounds can succeed. The "grounds" in the Review Affidavit fail to take the Applicants' application any further, even if they did have some merit, it does not change the fact that,

(a) the Primary Applicant was not the subject of an approved nomination; and consequently,

(b) even if there was error in the Tribunal's decision it would be futile to remit the matter to the Tribunal.

1. Mindful of the Court's obligations towards unrepresented litigants as outlined in MZAIB at [59]-[77], [100] and [112]-[113], the Court has scrutinised the Originating Application, the materials before the Tribunal and the Tribunal's decision to identify any jurisdictional error. The Court has also read the Primary Applicant's substantive grounds and Review Affidavit as broadly as possible and remain alive to the possibility of jurisdictional error on the Tribunal's part. Nevertheless, the Court is of the view that error has not been disclosed on the Tribunal's part, and the Court is not persuaded that a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error arises out of the substantive application nor the Review Affidavit. In any case the issue of futility renders the grounds for judicial review otiose.[20]

1. The matter can be simply disposed of on the basis of futility. That is, even if the Applicants were to establish an error on behalf of the Tribunal, it would be futile to remit the matter to the Tribunal. The result would have to be the same. This is because at the relevant time the Primary Applicant did not have an approved nominator and nothing can cure that. The refusal of the nomination was fatal to the Primary Applicant's application for a visa. The Delegate made the only decision they could in the face of that evidence. The Tribunal in a procedurally fair way put this to the Primary Applicant and provided him with an opportunity to respond. He chose not to do so. In those circumstances the decision of the Delegate had to be affirmed by the Tribunal. The proposed sponsor was deregistered on 7 October 2020 and remains so. Consequently, the Court would, in the exercise of its discretion, be obliged to refuse relief to the Applicant.[21]
2. Because the grounds of review have no merit because of the futility issue, an extension of time should not be granted for the lodgement of the application for review of the Registrar's Decision.

1. Taking into account all of the considerations above, particularly the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the Review Application, and the lack of any reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal, the Court is not satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice that time be extended in this matter.
2. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time is dismissed. The Court will now hear the parties on costs.

I certify that the preceding seventy-five (75) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Johns.

I submit this Affidavit in Support of my process, which involves seeking a review of the Registrar's decision, as I believe that the decision made by Registrar's under delegated powers are subject to review by a judge rather than an appellate process.

The Registrar's decision to summarily dismiss my judicial review application (under Rule 13.13(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Comi of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 for lacking reasonable prospects of success) can be reviewed by a judge of the FCFCOA.

This review is a de novo hearing, meaning the judge reconsiders the matter afresh, including any new evidence or arguments you present.

The process is governed by Part 14.3 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (specifically Rule 14.05), as applied to Division 2 proceedings via the Federal Circuit and Family Comi of Australia (Division 2) (Family Law) Rules 2021.

1. Background to Proceedings

I am the First Applicant in this matter, alongside my wife, DIPALI AK.ASH KATARA, the second applicant, and my son, YUVIN AK.ASH KATARA. Third Applicant.

1. I applied for a Subclass 186 visa on 13 November 2018 under the Temporary Residence Transition stream, with Devru Investments Pty Ltd as my nominating employer for the position of Cook (ANZSCO 351411). On 23 August 2019, a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs refused my visa application because the nomination by Devru Investments Pty Ltd was refused on 16 July 2019.

2. On 11/06/2021, I filed an application in I sought review of this decision by the ART (Tribunal Case No. 1924318).

3. the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) for judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) dated 20 May 2021, affirming the Department of Immigration's refusal on 23 August 2019 to grant us Employer Nomination (Permanent) (Class EN) Subclass 186 visas. On 20 May 2021, the ART affirmed the refusal, citing that the nomination had not been approved, and thus I failed to meet cl. 186.223(2) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Ctb) ("Regulations").

The Registrar summarily dismissed my application under Rule 13.13(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth). I now seek to appeal that decision and amend my application to include new grounds supported by recent evidence and legal developments.

2. Jurisdictional Errors

A. Misapplication of Clause 186.223

1. Failure to Consider Jurisdictional Validity of Nomination Refusal:

The ART relied on the refusal of the nomination application by Devru Investments Pty Ltd without verifying whether the Department's refusal decision was itself legally valid. Under cl. 186.223(2), the Minister must have "approved the nomination." The ART failed to examine whether the delegate's refusal of the nomination complied with the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("Act") and Regulations, including procedural fairness requirements (PAM3 Policy: "Assessing Nomination Applications").

1. Ignoring Evidence of Nomination Compliance:

I provided evidence that Devru Investments met all criteria for nomination approval (e.g., financial capacity, genuine position). The ART did not engage with this evidence, violating its duty under s. 368 of the Act to review the decision "according to law" (see Carrascalao v Minister [2017] FCAFC l 07).

B. Unreasonable and Illogical Findings

1. Presumption of Nomination Validity:

The ART assumed the nomination refusal was valid without independent scrutiny, contrary to the requirement in Minister for Immigration v Li [2012] HCA 61; (2013) 249 CLR 332 that decisions must be "logical and rational."

1. Failure to Consider Interdependence of Visa and Nomination:

The ART did not assess whether the nomination refusal was procedurally fair or lawful, despite my submissions that the refusal was based on errors. (e.g., incomplete assessment of Devru 's financial records).

3. Procedural Unfairness

A. Breach of s. 359A of the Migration Act

1. Failure to Provide Adequate Opportunity to Respond:

On 5 May 202.l, the ART invited me to comment on adverse information (the nomination refusal) under s. 359A. However, it did not disclose the reasons for the nomination refusal or provide access to the Department's file, preventing me from addressing specific deficiencies (e.g., alleged financial non-compliance by Devru).

1. Insufficient Time and Guidance:

2. The 14-day response period (ending 19 May 2021) was inadequate for obtaining evidence from Devru or preparing a rebuttal. PAM3 states: "Applicants must be given a meaningful opportunity to respond" (PAM3: "Procedural Fairness").

3. Denial of Right to a Hearing (s. 360)

4. The ART deemed my response "non-compliant" because my representative (GNT Migration) only filed an Appointment of Representative form on 12 May 2021, without substantive comments. This deprived me of a hearing under s. 360, despite my readiness to provide oral evidence on the nomination's validity.

5. Materiality of Errors

6. Had the ART properly assessed the nomination refusal or allowed a hearing, it could have:

   1. Requested the Department's nomination refusal records;
   2. Remitted the nomination for reconsideration; or
   3. Found the visa refusal invalid due to flawed nomination assessment.

7. The High Court in Hossain v Minister [2018] HCA 34 confirms that errors are material if they could change the outcome.

8. Grounds of Jurisdictional Error and Procedural Unfairness

   1. Misapplication of Clause 186.223: The AAT failed to assess whether the nomination refusal was lawful, a jurisdictional fact it was obliged to consider under Minister for Immigration v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3. The Department's failure to notify me of the residency certificate requirement breached procedural fairness (SZBEL v Minister for Immigration [2006] HCA 63), rendering the nomination refusal invalid. The AAT's assumption that the refusal's existence satisfied cl.186.223(2) misinterprets the clause, which presupposes a lawful process (Singh v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCAFC 105).
   2. Unreasonable Delay: The AAT delayed scheduling a hearing for over two years (application filed 9 August 2017; hearing held 14 June 2019). During this period, my employer sold its business in late 2018, voiding the nomination. This delay prejudiced my ability to secure a new nomination, constituting procedural unfairness (CNYl7 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCAFC 79).
   3. Failure to Notify Critical Information: The AAT did not inform me that the residency certificate was the sole basis for the nomination refusal, denying me an opportunity to address it

These errors were material under Hossain v Minister for Immigration [2018) HCA 34. A lawful nomination process, timely hearing, or proper notification could have allowed me to rectify the nomination issue or secure a new one, altering the outcome. The AAT's refusal to consider my request for time to obtain a new nomination or refer the matter for Ministerial intervention under s.351 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) further prejudiced my case (Singh) v MJBP [2017} FCAFC 105; Plaintiff S10/2011 v J\1inister for Immigration [2012] HCA 31).

1. Personal Circumstances and Prejudice
   1. Since the AAT decision, I have relentlessly managed to secure a new Nomination. A visa refusal at this juncture risks my employment and our livelihood.
   2. I have contributed to Australia through over three years of skilled employment and volunteering with community organisations (references available).
   3. The uncertainty has caused me significant stress and anxiety, documented by my general practitioner (available on request), exacerbating my ability to pursue this matter promptly.
2. Misinterpretation of Clause 186.223
   1. Linkage Between Nomination and Visa Application: I emphasise the integral link between the nomination process and the Subclass 186 visa application. The refusal to grant a visa on the basis of a lack of an approved nomination, while concurrently failing to consider critical evidence that directly impacts the validity of the nomination, illustrates a fundamental misunderstanding or disregard by the AAT and the Minister of the interconnected nature of these processes.
   2. Procedural Unfairness: I detail instances where the AAT failed to follow procedural fairness, such as not allowing additional submissions or failing to postpone the decision when new evidence was imminent.
   3. Incorrect Application of Law: I submit that the AAT incorrectly interpreted or applied migration regulations related to training benchmarks and nomination requirements.
   4. Impact of Errors: I discuss how these errors materially affected the outcome, leading to an unjust refusal of the nomination and subsequent visa application.
   5. My case has merit Jurisdictional error by the AAT) and is not "manifestly hopeless" (Spencer v Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28), rebutting the Registrar's dismissal basis.
3. Reason for Amendment and Appeal
   1. seek to amend my application to include these grounds, reflecting new evidence (e.g., employer insolvency in 2018) and legal developments like MZAPC v Minister.for Immigration [2021} HCA 17 and Nathanson v Minister.for Home Affairs [2022} HCA 26, which clarify materiality thresholds.
   2. The Registrar's summary dismissal was erroneous. My claims are arguable, not "manifestly hopeless" (Spencer v Commonwealth [2010} HCA 28; A/222 v Minister for Immigration [2023J FedCFcimC2G 44), and warrant full judicial review.

[1] see also Bechara v Bates [2021] FCFAFC 34; [2021] FCAFC 34; (2021) 286 FCR 166 at [1]- [7]

[2] BIM21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 307, [11].

[14] MZABP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392.

[15] MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391 ("MZAIB").

[16] Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 176; (1984) 3 FCR 344 at [21].

[17] s 476 2(a)

[20] Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 438 at [68].

[21] SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 147 CLR 297; [2007] HCA 26.