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[1984] FCA 176
respondent. The application for an extension of the time for bringing of the application to the Tribunal is refused. The application is dismissed.
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Mr Saleam asked the Registrar for a copy of a marriage certificate to help with an old conviction inquiry. The request was refused and an internal review upheld that refusal. He was two weeks late in appealing to the Tribunal. Although he said he thought he had 60 days instead of 28, the Tribunal ruled this was not a good enough excuse because he had used the Tribunal many times before and had been told about the rules. His underlying case was essentially the same as one he had already lost in 2003, so it had little prospect of success. The Tribunal therefore refused extra time and dismissed the case.
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1,938 words · generated 24/04/2026
James Saleam made a request in December 2010 under s 47 of the Births Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (BDMR Act) for a copy of the marriage certificate of a woman he described as a potential witness in Supreme Court proceedings aimed at casting doubt on his criminal convictions. The Registrar refused that request by letter dated 20 December 2010. Saleam lodged an application for internal review on 3 May 2011. On 13 May 2011 the Assistant Registrar wrote confirming the refusal and listing the factors taken into account: the relationship between Saleam and the person, the age of the entry, its contents, and other relevant factors. That letter did not contain the statements required by s 53(6) of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (ADT Act) concerning reasons and appeal rights.
Because the internal review notice was non-compliant, s 53(9)(b) of the ADT Act deemed the review finalised 21 days after lodgment, i.e. on 24 May 2011. Section 55(2)(a) therefore fixed the default application period to the Tribunal as expiring on 21 June 2011. Saleam filed his Tribunal application on 7 July 2011, some 16 days late. He simultaneously applied for an extension of time under s 57 of the ADT Act. Both parties consented to the extension issue being decided on the papers. The Registrar opposed the grant of leave, contending that Saleam had not offered a reasonable explanation, that the underlying application lacked merit because it substantially repeated the claim dismissed by Magistrate Hennessy in Saleam v Registrar of Births, Deaths & Marriages [2003] NSWADT 79, and that the public interest favoured finality.
Judicial Member Montgomery applied the Stapleton factors, found the explanation inadequate given Saleam's litigation history, held the substantive case to be without fresh merit, and concluded that the discretion under s 57 should not be exercised in Saleam's favour. The extension was refused and the application dismissed.
The Tribunal's reasoning is grounded in a structured application of the factors enumerated in Director General, Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources v Stapleton [2003] NSWADT 212 and adopted in Hawke v Chief Executive Officer, Workcover NSW [2008] NSWADT 4. At [17]-[19] the judgment expressly endorses those factors: explanation for the delay, prejudice, timeliness and delay in the antecedent administrative process, apparent merits of the case, and public interest.
On explanation, Saleam asserted he had believed the time limit was 60 days from the internal-review outcome. At [37] the Tribunal held this belief should not have been held by a person with Saleam's "previous dealing with the Tribunal". Reference is made to the fact that Deputy President Patten had earlier refused an extension application brought seven and a half years out of time in relation to the 2003 decision. The judgment aligns with the approach in Ministry of Transport v Kharbanda (GD) [2006] NSWADTAP 61 at [27], distinguishing the position of a sophisticated repeat litigant from that of a one-time unrepresented participant. Ignorance or oversight of the 28-day period was therefore given little weight.
The merits analysis occupies a substantial portion of the reasons ([26]-[30]). The Tribunal accepted the Registrar's submission that the present request was "substantially the same" as the 2003 application. In both matters Saleam sought the married name of a woman said to be a potential witness whose evidence might support an application under the (then) Crimes Act 1900 ss 474D and 474E for an inquiry into his convictions. The 2003 decision had already examined the relationship between admissible evidence and the "doubt or question" threshold and had found the request did not justify release. At [28] the judgment reproduces Deputy President Patten's reasoning on the leave-to-appeal application, which concluded that Magistrate Hennessy's analysis at [43]-[44] of the 2003 reasons contained no error of law. Because no new evidentiary material or changed circumstances were identified, the current application was characterised as an attempt to re-litigate a settled issue. That characterisation strongly told against extension.
Prejudice to the Registrar was conceded to be minimal, yet the Tribunal cited Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 176 at [21] and Re Ljubo Maric v Comcare [1993] FCA 31 at [13] for the proposition that absence of prejudice is not itself a sufficient positive factor. The length of delay, though only two to three weeks in absolute terms, was viewed through the lens of the eight-year gap since the 2003 decision, rendering the present filing an attempt to circumvent earlier refusals of leave.
Public interest considerations were balanced at [33]-[35]. The Registrar acknowledged Saleam's right to make a fresh administrative request but submitted that treating that right as decisive would render the 28-day limit meaningless. The Tribunal agreed. It further noted the public interest in conserving resources that would be expended on re-agitating a claim previously found wanting. These considerations, taken together, led the Tribunal to refuse the extension at [39] and dismiss the substantive application.
Prior to this decision the law on extensions under s 57 of the ADT Act was already informed by Commonwealth authorities imported through Stapleton. Re Mulheron and Australian Telecommunications Corporation (1991) 14 AAR 42 had supplied the original checklist later adapted in Stapleton. Hawke had confirmed that the same factors applied across different ADT jurisdictions. What this judgment adds is an explicit application of those factors to a repeat litigant in the context of the BDMR Act, emphasising that litigation history is relevant to the reasonableness of an explanation. The decision also reinforces that the statutory language in s 53(9) operates strictly: a non-compliant internal-review notice automatically triggers the 21-day deeming provision, removing any argument that time runs only from actual receipt of proper notice.
After the decision the legal position remained unchanged in its essentials. The judgment does not purport to alter the statutory text or the Stapleton checklist; rather it illustrates their application to a sophisticated litigant seeking to revisit an earlier adverse merits determination. Subsequent ADT decisions have continued to cite Stapleton and Hawke without needing to reconcile any doctrinal shift introduced here. The strict approach to repeat applications without fresh material has become an expected aspect of the "merits" limb of the Stapleton analysis in the General Division.
Paragraph [11]: "Accordingly, pursuant to section 53(9)(b) of the ADT Act, the internal review is taken to have been finalised 21 days after the applicant lodged the application for review. The application for review was lodged on 3 May 2011 and therefore, the internal review is taken to have been finalised on 24 May 2011."
Plain-English: Because the review letter missed the required legal warnings, the law automatically treats the review as finished 21 days after you asked for it. That pushed the deadline forward regardless of when Saleam actually read the letter.
Paragraph [21]: "The respondent submits that the applicant has not provided a reasonable explanation for the late filing of his application. Mr McDonnell submitted that the applicant has experience in the Tribunal and a history of filing late applications or appeals."
Plain-English: The Registrar argued that Saleam, who has been before the Tribunal many times and has previously run late applications, cannot credibly claim he simply did not know the time limit.
Paragraph [37]: "I note that the applicant's explanation for the delay in lodging his application was his mistaken understanding that he had a period of 60 days from 13 May 2011 to lodge it. It is my view that the applicant should have been aware of the time period because of his previous dealing with the Tribunal."
Plain-English: The Tribunal did not accept the 60-day mistake story. A person who has litigated here before, and who was expressly told about time limits in an earlier appeal, is expected to get the deadline right.
Paragraph [38]: "I also note the applicant's assertion that if leave is not granted, he will start again and not make the same mistake and that this would merely cause time to be lost and further expense on all sides to be incurred. I agree with the respondent that this should not be considered to be a persuasive public interest consideration in determining whether to allow an application filed out of time."
Plain-English: Saleam said that if he lost he would simply file a fresh request and everyone would waste more time and money. The Tribunal ruled that this argument does not justify ignoring the statutory deadline; otherwise the time limit would have no practical effect.
This decision is triggered when an applicant with a documented history of ADT or appeal litigation seeks an extension under s 57 after missing the 28-day default period and offers only an assertion of ignorance or miscalculation of the time limit. It is especially relevant where the substantive application replicates an earlier claim that has already been determined on its merits without fresh evidence or a material change in circumstances. The precedent applies with particular force in BDMR Act reviews concerning sensitive register entries where the Registrar has balanced the factors listed in s 47(2) and the applicant seeks to re-canvass those balances. It is also engaged when the internal-review notice is defective, thereby fixing the deemed finalisation date under s 53(9)(b) and starting the clock irrespective of the applicant's actual knowledge of appeal rights. Finally, the decision is engaged where the respondent can demonstrate that the delay, even if measured in weeks, forms part of a pattern of successive applications spanning years.
The judgment itself treats earlier authorities in a conventional way. It follows Stapleton and Hawke without reservation ([17]-[19]), cites Kharbanda for the proposition that experienced litigants are held to a higher standard ([23]-[24]), and relies on the 2003 Saleam decision and the subsequent leave-to-appeal refusal to demonstrate lack of merit ([27]-[29]). It cites but does not purport to distinguish Hunter Valley Developments; instead it extracts the orthodox statement that absence of prejudice is not enough. No part of the reasoning overrules or criticises any prior decision. The Tribunal's own earlier decision in Saleam v Registrar of Births, Deaths & Marriages [2003] NSWADT 79 is treated as authoritative on the substantive merits and is not reopened. The 2011 reasons therefore sit comfortably within the existing line of ADT authority on extension applications and add a factual illustration rather than a doctrinal innovation.
The judgment leaves open whether a genuinely new factual development—such as fresh corroborative material supporting the "doubt or question" threshold under the Crimes Act inquiry provisions—would alter the merits assessment sufficiently to justify an extension despite a repeat applicant's history. It does not explore the outer limits of what constitutes a "reasonable explanation" for a self-represented litigant who can point to specific misleading conduct by the Registry rather than a general misreading of the legislation. The interaction between the right to make successive administrative requests under the BDMR Act and the statutory time bar for Tribunal review is acknowledged but not exhaustively analysed; the judgment simply notes that treating the fresh-application right as decisive would render the time limit otiose, yet does not address whether repeated fresh requests could themselves be met with an abuse-of-process argument. Finally, the weight to be given to the public-interest consideration in the administration of justice when an applicant asserts that register information could materially assist a petition for a judicial inquiry remains fact-sensitive and is not closed off by this decision. These areas continue to require case-by-case evaluation informed by, but not conclusively answered by, the 2011 reasons.
REasons for decision 1GENERAL DIVISION (S MONTGOMERY, (JUDICIAL MEMBER)): The applicant has applied to the Tribunal for review of a decision of the Registrar, Registry of Births, Deaths & Marriages Review ("the Registrar") in relation to a request for a copy of a marriage certificate of a named individual ("Ms A"). 2It is common ground that the application to the Tribunal was not brought within the time allowed by the applicable legislation. A preliminary issue has arisen in regard to whether the time for bringing of the application to the Tribunal should be extended to permit the application.
Background 3The request to the Registrar was made in December 2010 pursuant to section 47 of the Births Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 ("the BDMR Act"). 4This request was declined by way of letter dated 20 December 2010. The applicant applied for a review of that decision in May 2011. By way of a letter dated 13 May 2011 the Assistant Registrar, Client Services Division advised the applicant: "I refer to your fax of 3 May 2011 requesting a review of the decision to deny your application for access to the marriage certificate of [Ms A]. After reviewing your request and the decision made on 20 December 2011, I advise that your application to be issued with a marriage certificate of [Ms A] is denied. The following factors were considered in making this decision: the relationship (if any) between yourself and the person to whom the information relates, and the age of the entry, and the contents of the entry, and other relevant factors" 5The applicant filed his application for review by the Tribunal on 7 July 2011.
Applicable Legislation 6Section 56 of the BDMR Act provides: "A person who is dissatisfied with a decision of the Registrar made in the exercise or purported exercise of functions under this Act may apply to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal for a review of the decision." 7Section 56 of the BDMR Act does not specify a time in which an application to the Tribunal is to be brought. 8Section 55 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 ("the ADT Act") provides: 55 When can an application for a review be made? (1) A person may apply to the Tribunal for a review of a reviewable decision only if: ... (d) the application is made within the period or by the time prescribed by or under the enactment under which the application is made or, if no such period or time is prescribed, by the end of the default application period for the decision. ... (2) The default application period for a reviewable decision is: (a) in the case where the applicant has duly applied for an internal review of the reviewable decision-the period of 28 days after the day on which the internal review is taken to have been finalised under section 53 (9), or (b) in any other case-the period of 28 days after: (i) if the applicant has requested reasons under section 49 for the reviewable decision-the day on which the applicant was provided with a statement of reasons under section 49 or notified under section 50 of a refusal to provide reasons, or (ii) if the applicant has not requested reasons under section 49-the day on which the applicant was notified of the making of the reviewable decision. ... 9Section 53 (9) of the ADT Act provides: (9) When an internal review is finalised An internal review is taken to be finalised if: (a) the applicant is notified of the outcome of the review under subsection (6), or (b) the applicant is not notified of the outcome of the review within 21 days after the application for the review is lodged (or such other period as the administrator and person agree on). 10It is conceded that the notice provided to the applicant by letter dated 13 May 2011, which is referred to above, did not comply with section 53 (6) of the ADT Act. Section 53 (6) provides: "(6) Notice of result of review and appeal rights Within 21 days after the application for the internal review is lodged (or such other period as the administrator and person agree on), the administrator must notify the applicant in writing of: (a) the outcome of the internal review, and (b) the reasons for the decision in the internal review, and (c) the right of the person to have the decision reviewed by the Tribunal." 11Accordingly, pursuant to section 53(9)(b) of the ADT Act, the internal review is taken to have been finalised 21 days after the applicant lodged the application for review. The application for review was lodged on 3 May 2011 and therefore, the internal review is taken to have been finalised on 24 May 2011. 12Pursuant to section 55(2)(a) of the ADT Act, the default application period for bringing the application to the Tribunal will have expired on 21 June 2011. 13The applicant filed his application for review on 7 July 2011.
Power of the Tribunal to consider a late application 14Section 57 of the ADT Act provides: "57 Late applications to Tribunal (1) Despite section 55 (1) (d), the Tribunal may, on application by an interested person seeking to make a late application to the Tribunal, extend the time for the making by that person of an application if the Tribunal is of the opinion that the person has provided a reasonable explanation for the delay in making the application. (1A) An application by an interested person under subsection (1) must be in writing unless the Tribunal dispenses with the requirement. (2) The time for making an application for a review of a reviewable decision may be extended under subsection (1) although that time has expired. (3) In this section, late application means an application not made within the period or time referred to in section 55 (1) (d)." 15It is my understanding that the parties have agreed that this issue is to be determined on the basis of written submissions without the need for hearing.
The applicant's submissions 16The applicant has provided a written request to the Tribunal, seeking an order to extend the time for the making of the application. He submitted: "1. This action has been filed out of time and I must now show why leave to initiate the proceedings should be granted. 2. When I filed in this matter, I was of the view that I was allowed some 60 days from May 13 2011 - the time when an internal review of the primary decision was made (or just after I received the notice). I did not know that the time allowed was only 28 days. I cannot explain why I thought it was 60 days. It may be that I had read something previously to this effect from a source and if such that I had formed an erroneous view. 3. My action in the Tribunal is only a few weeks out of time and it does not constitute any real abuse of process if leave is granted. 4. If leave is not granted, I say I will start again and not make the same mistake. That causes time to be lost and further expense on all sides to be incurred. 5. I apologise that I have made this mistake but I cannot see why the respondent would seek to advance the argument that leave should not be granted. There is certainly a public interest in all procedural rules being followed, but there is also a public interest in saving State agencies from unnecessary burdens (financial and otherwise), particularly if the error is unintentional and arose in a way that was not unreasonable. 6. The interests of justice would suggest that leave be granted and the case pursued with expedition."
The respondent's submissions 17Mr McDonnell provided written submissions on behalf of the respondent. He submitted that the factors to be considered in determining whether the Tribunal should extend the time for the making of an application include the reasonableness of the applicant's explanation for failing to file the application in time, the prejudice to the applicant or the respondent should the Tribunal refuse the late application, the timeliness and delay in the antecedent administrative process, the length of delay in bringing the late application, the apparent merits of the case, and the public interest in accepting the late application. He referred to discussions of those issues in the decisions in Hawke v Chief Executive Officer, Workcover NSW [2008] NSWADT 4 at [23] and Director General, Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources v Stapleton [2003] NSWADT 212. 18In Hawke v Chief Executive Officer, Workcover NSW I considered earlier decisions that had dealt with the issue and stated: 23 In Stapleton the Tribunal's President referred to Commonwealth cases which have considered a similar provision to that in section 57: see for example Re Mulheron and Australian Telecommunications Corporation (1991) 14 AAR 42. The President identified the following factors as relevant to the exercise of the discretion to grant leave for an application to proceed out of time: Explanation for Failing to File in Time Prejudice Timeliness and Delay in the Antecedent Administrative Process Apparent Merits of the Case Public Interest 19I formed the view that the Stapleton factors were relevant to the application in Hawke. In my view, those factors are also applicable in the circumstances of this matter. 20Mr McDonnell has submitted that the time for bringing the application to the Tribunal should not be extended.
Explanation for Failing to File in Time 21The respondent submits that the applicant has not provided a reasonable explanation for the late filing of his application. Mr McDonnell submitted that the applicant has experience in the Tribunal and a history of filing late applications or appeals. 22In support of that submission Mr McDonnell outlined a history of applications by the applicant to the Tribunal. He submits that the applicant's history in the Tribunal suggests that he is very familiar with the procedures of the Tribunal. Furthermore, he asserts that that in two relatively recent proceedings the applicant filed late applications or appeals and the out of time issue was raised in those matters. He argues that this suggests that the applicant knew that he only had 28 days to file an application. 23Mr McDonnell further submitted that the Tribunal has previously considered that an oversight or ignorance of the limitation period generally will not constitute a "reasonable explanation". In Ministry of Transport v Kharbanda (GD) [2006] NSWADTAP 61, leave to allow a notice of appeal filed 28 days out of time was refused. At paragraph [27] the Tribunal's President stated: "27 A more generous approach to the acceptance of an explanation for late filing may be appropriate in the case of 'one-time' participants in the processes of the Tribunal, especially if they are unrepresented or have special disabilities. Even in the case of a sophisticated litigant (such as a government department) it may be unduly harsh to visit upon it an omission on the part of its legal adviser". 24His Honour distinguished the case of Stapleton. At paragraph [25] he stated: "25 In the Stapleton case, I did grant leave despite the oversight of the agency's legal officers. That case involved the first filing in a new statutory jurisdiction. The oversight was one committed by officers unfamiliar with the new jurisdiction. Ultimately in that case, the factor that tipped the balance in favour of the grant of leave was the public interest in allowing the disciplinary action to proceed in circumstances where there had been admissions by the respondent which gave rise to a serious question as to whether professional misconduct had occurred." 25The respondent submits that the applicant in this matter is experienced in the practice and procedure and of the Tribunal and, therefore, does not have a reasonable explanation for filing out of time. The failure of the applicant to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing his application should be given considerable weight in determining whether to allow the applicant to file the application out of time.
Merits 26The respondent submits that the applicant's case is without merit. Mr McDonnell submitted that the applicant seeks to re-litigate an issue which has previously been determined adversely against him by the Tribunal. He further submitted that the applicant has not identified any relevant new considerations that may persuade the Tribunal to make a different decision. 27The respondent submits that this application is substantially the same as that before the Tribunal's Deputy President Magistrate Hennessy in Saleam v Registrar of Births, Deaths & Marriages [2003] NSWADT 79 ("the 2003 case"). It contends that in both the present case and the 2003 case, the Registrar refused the applicant's application to search the register for an entry concerning the marriage of a woman. The applicant claimed that the woman was a friend of the Crown's key witness. He considered that the woman could provide evidence that would go to credit. The applicant could not contact the friend as she had remarried and the applicant did not know her married name. The respondent submits that the applicant incorrectly claims that his present application is a new application because, inter alia, he previously did not seek information regarding the woman's husband's full name. However, the respondent contends that the applicant also sought the husband's name in his previous application. Therefore, the application is substantively the same. 28The applicant sought leave to appeal the decision in the 2003 case. The appeal was brought almost seven and a half years out of time. Deputy President Patten considered whether a bona fide and arguable question of law could be identified which would warrant granting leave. He observed: "The applicant sought review of that decision and it was that review which came before Magistrate Hennessy and was the subject of her decision on 26 May 2003. Her Honour refused the application giving lengthy reasons. As I have indicated it is from that decision that the applicant seeks leave in November 2010 to appeal. He asserted in the Notice of Appeal that the magistrate erred in law identifying the question of law in these terms: "An incorrect application of the law pertaining to the Criminal Appeal and Review Act to deciding access to a document." That statement of itself does not identify any question of law which I am able to decide. However, when pressed about the matter today Mr Saleam asserted as I understand it that Magistrate Hennessy misquoted the law in paragraphs 43 and 44 of her reasons for decision. Those paragraphs read as follows: 43.Mr Saleam's reason for requesting the information is a genuine one. He believes that Ms S's evidence may assist him to prove that he is innocent of offences for which he has been convicted. He has provided some evidence to support that belief. The respondent submitted that this reason is not adequate because all the Supreme Court need to be satisfied of under s 474D is that it appears that there is a doubt or question as to the convicted person's guilt, as to any mitigating circumstances in the case or as to any part of the evidence in the case. The respondent says that a doubt or question would not have to be based on legally admissible evidence but could arise as a result of Mr Saleam's hearsay statements of his conversations with Ms S in 1988. 44.Proceedings under s 474D and 474E of the Crimes Act are not judicial proceedings. It must appear that there is a doubt or question as to the convicted person's guilt. As to any mitigating circumstances in the case or as to any part of the evidence in the case there is no requirement for legally admissible evidence to be the basis for an application. The applicant has no onus of proof and all the Supreme Court must do is consider the application and take the action it considers appropriate. In my opinion those two paragraphs accurately set out the effect of the section of the Crimes Act then relevant to the inquiry as which the applicant sought and correctly state the law applicable to applications for such an inquiry. In my view they do not evidence an error of law which the Appeal Panel could be asked to correct. 29Mr McDonnell submitted that the Tribunal has previously considered and dismissed the same application and therefore the applicant's present application lacks merit. In particular, the Tribunal has already expressly rejected the claim that the applicant relies upon in the current application regarding the Tribunal's purported error in its interpretation of sections 474D and 474E of the Crimes Act . 30Mr McDonnell further submitted that it would seem unlikely that any of the information the applicant hopes to obtain would assist him in obtaining an inquiry into his convictions. He argues that the applicant's actual reason for wanting the information, which may also be characterised as the public interest in the administration of justice, is no more or less persuasive than it was before Magistrate Hennessy in the 2003 case. Therefore, he submits that the applicant's case lacks merit. The matter has previously been determined by the Tribunal and there are no new circumstances which suggest that the Tribunal should find in favour of the applicant.
Prejudice 31The respondent does not seek to argue that it will suffer prejudice if the application is allowed. However, the respondent notes that "mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension": In Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 176; (1984) 3 FCR 344 at paragraph [21] (per Wilcox J); Re Ljubo Maric v Comcare [1993] FCA 31; (1993) 40 FCR 244 at [13]. Mr McDonnell further submitted that, given the history of the matter, including a previous application to the Tribunal for review of an application in the same terms as the present application, the applicant is unlikely to suffer prejudice in not having the opportunity to have the application considered by the Tribunal.
The length of the delay in bringing the application 32Mr McDonnell submitted that, seen in the context of the history of the matter, as this application is made in substantially the same terms as the 2003 case this application has been brought eight years late. The Tribunal refused the applicant leave to file an appeal almost seven and half years out of time of the decision in the 2003 case. The respondent submits that this application constitutes an attempt to circumvent this decision.
Public interest 33The respondent concedes that the applicant has the right under the BDMR Act to make another application to the Registrar, however it submits that this should not be considered to be a persuasive public interest consideration in determining whether to allow an application filed out of time. If is submitted that if the Tribunal were to find such a consideration to be persuasive, the 28 day limitation period would be rendered otiose. Any applicant with a right to make a further application to the original administrative decision-maker would effectively be entitled to ignore the limitation period. 34Furthermore, the respondent submits that there is a public interest in not expending public funds which is lacking in merit and which seeks to re-litigate matters previously considered by the Tribunal. 35In any event, the respondent submits that in the context of the applicant's history before the Tribunal, a delay of approximately two to three weeks in bringing the application for review is still a significant delay. Accordingly, the Tribunal should decline to exercise its jurisdiction under section 57 of the ADT Act.
Discussion 36I agree with the respondent's submission in regard to the approach to be taken to determine this issue. In my view the Stapleton factors are relevant to the application. 37I note that the applicant's explanation for the delay in lodging his application was his mistaken understanding that he had a period of 60 days from 13 May 2011 to lodge it. It is my view that the applicant should have been aware of the time period because of his previous dealing with the Tribunal. In his application for leave to appeal the decision in the 2003 case Deputy President Patten alerted him to the relevant time frames and refused his application for an extension of time. 38I also note the applicant's assertion that if leave is not granted, he will start again and not make the same mistake and that this would merely cause time to be lost and further expense on all sides to be incurred. I agree with the respondent that this should not be considered to be a persuasive public interest consideration in determining whether to allow an application filed out of time. 39For the reasons argued by the respondent, it is my view that the applicant has not made out a case for extending the time for lodging the application and accordingly leave for him to do so is refused.
Orders
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 08 November 2011
Saleam
Registrar, Registry of Births, Deaths & Marriages
The application for an extension of the time for bringing of the application to the Tribunal is refused. The application is dismissed.