The Funder's commission
64 The Distribution Scheme contemplates a deduction of $7,800,000 (or 30% of the settlement sum) on account of the "Funder's Success Fee" identified in cl 1.21 of the Funding Agreement. It ought to be noted that, under the return structure contained in the Funding Agreement, the Funder would be entitled to a commission of approximately $15.2 million. Quite appropriately, the Funder has not sought to recover that full entitlement.
65 The Funder's commission is proposed to be paid by way of a common fund order, which would have the result that the group members contribute equally to the costs of progressing the representative proceeding from any entitlement they are due to receive. Although the question of the Court's power to make a common fund order may have historically been one of great contention, any doubt was recently resolved by the Full Court in Elliott-Carde v McDonald's Australia Ltd (2023) 301 FCR 1. In particular, each member of the Full Court confirmed (at 7 [10], 30 [170], 65 [408] and 82 [504]) that s 33V confers a discretionary power to make a common fund order on settlement as part of the Court's power to make any orders which are just under s 33V(2).
66 The question of whether the Court should make a common fund order, and in what amount, is guided by the factors which were (non-exhaustively) set out in Money Max Int Pty Ltd v QBE Insurance Group Ltd (2016) 245 FCR 191, 209 - 210 [80]:
(a) the funding commission rate agreed by sophisticated class members and the number of such class members who agreed. That can be said to show acceptance of a particular rate by astute class members;
(b) the information provided to class members as to the funding commission. That may be important to understand the extent to which class members were informed when agreeing to the funding commission rate;
(c) a comparison of the funding commission with funding commissions in other Pt IVA proceedings and/or what is available or common in the market. It will be relevant to know the broad parameters of the funding commission rates available in the market;
(d) the litigation risks of providing funding in the proceeding. This is a critical factor and the assessment must avoid the risk of hindsight bias and recognise that the funder took on those risks at the commencement of the proceeding;
(e) the quantum of adverse costs exposure that the funder assumed. This is another important factor and the assessment must recognise that the funder assumed that risk at the commencement of the proceeding;
(f) the legal costs expended and to be expended, and the security for costs provided, by the funder;
(g) the amount of any settlement or judgment. This could be of particular significance when a very large or very small settlement or judgment is obtained. The aggregate commission received will be a product of the commission rate and the amount of settlement or judgment. It will be important to ensure that the aggregate commission received is proportionate to the amount sought and recovered in the proceeding and the risks assumed by the funder;
(h) any substantial objections made by class members in relation to any litigation funding charges. This may reveal concerns not otherwise apparent to the Court; and
(i) class members' likely recovery "in hand" under any pre-existing funding arrangements.
67 It is appropriate to make a common fund order in the present case. The Funder assumed a not insignificant amount of risk in committing to fund this proceeding. It has been involved in the proceeding for over four years and, in total, has expended approximately $4.3 million. The Funder advanced funding to all group members and it is appropriate to allow it to receive a return on its investment by reference to the settlement produced for all those group members. It is also relevant that group members were clearly notified that a common fund order would be sought on the application for settlement approval. No substantial objection to this was received.
68 The real concern in this matter is whether the amount of commission proposed is fair and reasonable. In assessing this, the Court must keep steadily in mind the market and the perception of risk at the time the action was funded. Funding rates should provide an appropriate reward for the risk undertaken by a litigation funder, and the approval of funding commission rates should not become a "race to the bottom": see Court v Spotless Group Holdings Limited [2020] FCA 1730 [82].
69 Mr Whyte gave detailed evidence of the circumstances surrounding the entry into the Funding Agreement and the commencement of this proceeding. Mr Morris, the Funder's representative, also gave evidence on this point. What their evidence reveals is that the circumstances of entry into the Funding Agreement in this case were somewhat unique, in the sense that the negotiations took place over a long period of time during which there was an uncertain market. Those circumstances can be summarised as follows.
70 Piper Alderman commenced investigations into the claims which are now the subject of the proceeding on or about 27 June 2018. Those investigations continued until the proceeding was commenced on 17 June 2020. As Mr Whyte deposed, obtaining funding for the class action was a necessary precondition for its commencement. The applicants were not in a financial position to fund the action, nor were they willing to meet any adverse cost orders or pay security for costs. They only agreed to act as representative applicants in the proceeding in the event that litigation funding was secured.
71 Mr Whyte explained that, in 2018, he had it in mind that the case would be commenced on an open class basis, with the most likely funding structure involving the funder seeking a common fund order. However, as events transpired, by the time the proceeding was ready to be commenced, there was legal doubt as to the availability of this structure. That was ultimately reflected in the terms that funders were prepared to offer at the time.
72 Piper Alderman approached four funders in relation to the action. On 11 October 2019, an "initial term sheet" was provided by the now Funder, Woodsford Litigation Funding 4 LLP. At the time that offer was presented, two funders had already declined to finance the proceeding, and the third had not provided any proposed terms. In the circumstances, Mr Whyte agreed to the offer. Relevantly, it provided that the Funder's commission would be the greater of 2.5 times the cash outlay or 25% of the proceeds.
73 In the period between Mr Whyte's agreement to the initial term sheet on 11 October 2019 and the execution of the Funding Agreement on 19 August 2020, a number of events occurred which placed the litigation funding market into what might be described as a state of turbulence. In particular:
(a) On 4 December 2019, the High Court's decision in BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster (2019) 269 CLR 574 was handed down, which created uncertainty as to whether common fund orders were available, and whether a "book" of registered group members was required to be built prior to the commencement of a representative proceeding;
(b) In March and April 2020, two decisions of the New South Wales Court of Appeal determined that interlocutory class closure orders extinguishing the rights of group members before settlement or trial were not permitted: see Wigmans v AMP Ltd (2020) 102 NSWLR 199; Hazelhurst v Toyota Motor Corporation Australia Ltd t/as Toyota Australia (2020) 101 NSWLR 890; and
(c) On 22 May 2020, the Federal Government announced that litigation funders would be subject to greater regulatory oversight, would be required to hold an Australian Financial Services Licence, and would be required to comply with certain legislative requirements relating to managed investment schemes.
74 Further, from January 2020, Australia was faced with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and associated shutdowns. This impacted not only the funding market, but the financial viability of the class action - the visitation numbers at the corporate respondents' Australian businesses were significantly impacted which, in turn, impacted their revenue and potential ability to meet a judgment in the event the applicants succeeded in any claims against them. As Mr Morris deposed, ALG reported a decline in revenue of $85 million in the financial year ended 30 June 2020, and a decline of $125.4 million from the equivalent prior period in the accounts reported for the half-year ended 31 December 2020.
75 Following discussions with the Funder, on or about 17 January 2020, it was proposed that the calculation of the Funder's commission would be increased from the greater of 25% of proceeds or 2.5 times the cash outlay to the greater of 35% of proceeds or 3.5 times the cash outlay.
76 Mr Whyte formed the view that it was in the best interests of group members to maintain the opportunity to obtain funding from the Funder, even though it required an increase to the initial pricing agreed to. Based on his experience, he considered that the revised terms still proposed commercial and standard rates at the time that they were offered.
77 In the light of these circumstances, there are a number of reasons why the amount of the Funder's commission is justifiable.
78 As Mr Whyte deposed, the proceeding could not have been conducted without litigation funding, and when the Funding Agreement was entered into, two other litigation funders had already refused to offer funding. The commission now sought is proportionate to the risks and financial exposure that the Funder assumed, which included:
(a) its commitment to fund $6 million for the costs of the proceeding, with the potential to fund cost overruns;
(b) the provision of an indemnity for adverse costs which was unlimited in amount (although this was partially offset by the ATE insurance obtained, which is discussed below);
(c) the uncertainty in 2019 as to whether a common fund order could be made;
(d) the respondents' uncertain financial position, particularly in light of COVID-19;
(e) the legally novel nature of the proceeding, it being an action based on the non-disclosure of a risk;
(f) the uncertainty of the quantum of the claim; and
(g) the lengthy period of time it would have taken to progress the proceeding to completion.
79 Another factor which weighs heavily in support of approving the commission sought are the risks which existed in relation to establishing the quantum of the loss claimed. Mr Whyte also deposed (confidentially) to his perception at the inception of the proceeding of the comparative risk of this class action compared to other securities class actions. It suffices to say that the proceeding did involve significant risk.
80 Further, as is set out above, the litigation funding market was undoubtedly in a state of uncertainty at the time the funding was obtained. The factual matrix within which the proceeding was funded, such as the outbreak of COVID-19 and the uncertainty (at the time) regarding the respondents' insurance position tends to support the view that a higher funding commission is appropriate.
81 Whilst the percentage sought for the Funder's commission might look high at first blush, it is but a reflection of the market at the time and the circumstances surrounding this particular case. It is appropriate to give substantial weight to the evidence given by Mr Whyte and Mr Morris as to the considerations which were influential when the Funding Agreement was entered into and the Funder's commission agreed.
82 Notably, the commission now sought ($7,800,000 or 30% of the settlement sum) is significantly less than that which is payable under the Funding Agreement - being $15.2 million - and therefore that which the group members were informed, by the opt-out notice, would be deducted from any amounts payable upon settlement. Indeed, the amount sought represents a multiple of 1.8 of the cash expended by the Funder.
83 When one looks at the commission by reference to the cash expended by the Funder, the commission proposed is low in comparison to that approved in many other class actions: see, for example, Lynden Iddles v Fonterra Aust Pty Ltd [2023] VSC 566 (Iddles v Fonterra); Williamson v Sydney Olympic Park Authority [2022] NSWSC 1618 (Williamson v SOPA); Hall v Arnold Bloch Leibler (a firm) (No 2) [2022] FCA 163; Clarke v Sandhurst Trustees Limited (No 2) [2018] FCA 511. No doubt many cases could also be pointed to which have much lower multiples than the present. Nevertheless, these comparisons provide comfort that the commission sought is within a reasonable range of potential outcomes.
84 In the circumstances, the Funder's commission should be allowed and a common fund order made at a rate of 30%.