B Applicable Principles
12 As is well known, any settlement of a representative proceeding under Part IVA of the Act requires approval of the Court. In that regard, s 33V provides:
33V Settlement and discontinuance - representative proceeding
(1) A representative proceeding may not be settled or discontinued without the approval of the Court.
(2) If the Court gives such an approval, it may make such orders as are just with respect to the distribution of any money paid under a settlement or paid into the Court.
13 The fundamental question arising on an application made pursuant to s 33V of the Act is whether the settlement is "a fair and reasonable compromise of the claims made on behalf of the group members". This formulation derives from the judgment of Finkelstein J in Lopez v Star World Enterprises Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 104; (1999) ATPR 41-678 at 42,670, and what has also been described as the "foundational analysis" of Goldberg J in Williams v FAI Home Security Pty Ltd (No 4) [2000] FCA 1925; (2000) 180 ALR 459 at 465-466 [19]: see Foley v Gay [2016] FCA 273 at [7] per Beach J.
14 There are many examples where courts have sought to give an exposition of the relevant principles, both in this Court and in the Supreme Court of Victoria in exercising its identical jurisdiction under s 33V of Part 4A of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic). From this long line of cases it is possible to draw out a number of key principles or themes. In this regard, the role of the Court in considering whether to approve a proposed settlement pursuant to s 33V of the Act has been described in various ways:
(a) In Williams, Goldberg J stated at 465 [19] that:
Ordinarily the task of a court upon an application such as this, is to determine whether the proposed settlement or compromise is fair and reasonable, having regard to the claims made on behalf of the group members who will be bound by the settlement. Ordinarily in such circumstances the court will take into account the amount offered to each group member, the prospects of success in the proceeding, the likelihood of the group members obtaining judgment for an amount significantly in excess of the settlement offer, the terms of any advice received from counsel and from any independent expert in relation to the issues which arise in the proceeding, the likely duration and cost of the proceeding if continued to judgment, and the attitude of the group members to the settlement.
(b) In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Richards [2013] FCAFC 89 at [8], the Full Court (Jacobson, Middleton and Gordon JJ) said:
The role of the Court is important and onerous… It is protective. It assumes a role akin to that of a guardian, not unlike the role a court assumes when approving infant compromises.
(Citations omitted)
(c) In Hodges v Waters (No 7) [2015] FCA 264; (2015) 232 FCR 97 at 112 [70], Perram J said:
Insofar as s 33V is concerned, the authorities are clear. Approval will be granted to a settlement where it is just to do so and that will be so where the settlement is fair and reasonable having regard to the claims made by the group members who are bound by it. In carrying out the assessment called for by s 33V the Court's function is protective, recognising, as it must, that the interests of the parties before it and those of the class members as a whole may not wholly coincide…As Richards itself demonstrates, some care must be taken to ensure that the settlement is not only fair as between the parties but also as between individual class members.
(Citation omitted)
(d) In Camilleri v The Trust Company (Nominees) Limited [2015] FCA 1468 at [40]-[51], Moshinsky J set out, with some detail, the principles relevant to an assessment of whether or not a proposed settlement distribution scheme is fair and reasonable among group members inter se:
[40] In this case, as in many representative proceedings, the manner in which the settlement sum is to be distributed requires assumptions to be adopted and judgment calls to be made. There are different classes of claimants within the body of group members here, and it is necessary to arrive at some model that fairly and reasonably divides the settlement sum between those classes, recognising the differences in their respective claims. There is no single approach which alone can qualify as reasonable for sharing the fixed pool of funds among the claimants. Inevitably, adjustments in a given approach will be favourable for certain group members at the expense of others.
[41] The question, therefore, can only be whether the model is within the bounds of fairness and reasonableness in its attempts to balance what are, unavoidably, conflicts between the interests of the different claimants.
[42] As mentioned above, the applicants' solicitors have constructed the SDS for managing the distribution of the settlement funds among the claimants. The SDS, including the Loss Assessment Formula, reflects various 'judgment calls'. There is no doubt that other permutations of the distribution scheme could have been adopted. The question on this application is whether the SDS, as presented now, is within the bounds of reasonableness in achieving a broadly fair, 'rule of thumb' distribution between the claimants.
[43] The cases indicate a number of factors relevant to the assessment whether a proposed distribution scheme is fair and reasonable having regard to the interests of the group as a whole. Some of these factors are as follows:
(a) whether the distribution scheme subjects all claims to the same principles and procedures for assessing compensation shares;
(b) whether the assessment methodology, to the extent that it reflects 'judgment calls' of the kind described above, is consistent with the case that was to be advanced at trial and supportable as a matter of legal principle;
(c) whether the assessment methodology is likely to deliver a broadly fair assessment (where the settlement is uncapped as to total payments) or relativities (where the task is allocating shares in a fixed sum);
(d) whether the costs of a more perfect assessment procedure would erode the notional benefit of a more exact distribution;
(e) to the extent that the scheme involves any special treatment of the applicants or some group members, for instance via 'reimbursement' payments - whether the special treatment is justifiable, and whether as a matter of fairness a group member ought to be entitled to complain.
[44] There are also procedural factors which relate to the fairness of a proposed distribution process, such as:
(a) whether appropriate individuals have been nominated to administer the scheme;
(b) whether the procedures for lodging and assessing claims are appropriate and to be conducted in a timely manner;
(c) whether the scheme incorporates appropriate 'checks and balances', such as procedures for ensuring consistency between assessments and meaningful opportunities for review (and objection) by group members.
[45] In my view, the proposed arrangements for distributing the fixed pool of settlement funds between the claimants are fair and reasonable. The rationale of the SDS, including the different treatment of "No Transaction Notes" and "Rollover Notes", is discussed in detail in the confidential affidavit of the solicitor and the confidential opinion of counsel. I am satisfied on the basis of those opinions that the difference in treatment is appropriate and justified. Further, I note the following matters which support the fairness and reasonableness of the proposed arrangements.
[46] First, the SDS does not distinguish between the applicants on the one hand and group members on the other in terms of the procedures to be followed. They are all subject to the same assessment methodology.
[47] Second, the loss assessment formulae under the SDS have been constructed to 'proxy' the kinds of damages-assessment principles which the applicants' representatives expect would in substance be adopted at trial. For example, the formulae take into account differing amounts in fact recovered to date by group members in respect of the notes the subject of the proceeding.
[48] Third, apart from differences reflecting differences in quantum that likely could have been claimed by claimants respectively, the SDS otherwise does not discriminate between the applicants and the other claimants, or between different subcategories of claimants.
[49] Fourth, under the SDS, claimants will be notified of the assessment made for them and will have an opportunity to seek a review, initially by the scheme administrator and then, if required, by independent counsel.
[50] Fifth, the proposed administrator and the solicitors supporting him are experienced with the administration of such schemes. Their specialised skills and background familiarity with the matter should assist in the smooth and efficient administration of the scheme.
[51] Sixth, the scheme is designed to be implemented on a transparent, fair and timely basis.
15 As I said in the Introduction, the principles are not attended by any doubt and the appropriate approach was common ground between both the parties and the Objectors. Critically, in the present circumstances, this involved an assessment not only of the settlement between the applicants and S&P inter se, but also the operation of the SDS in distributing the settlement amount among the three applicants and the participating group members.