The value of the class action claims
18 In her affidavit of 10 July 2020, Ms Blacker attempted to quantify the value of the claim made in the class action and arrived at a figure of between $294m and $310m. This calculation was based on the quoted price of a stapled security at the opening of the market on 25 October 2016, being the day of the incident, at $2.55 and its closing price of $2.00 on the following day. The underlying hypothesis was that the difference of $0.55 roughly represented the degree to which the price of the stapled securities had been inflated by reason of ALL and ALML's failure to fulfil their disclosure obligations. Ms Blacker then considered the volume of the trades of the stapled securities over the period between 30 June 2014 and 25 October 2016. Every security purchased in that period was attributed a notional loss of $0.55 on the assumption that it was still held on 25 October 2016, with the consequence that the holders suffered a loss on each security of that amount. Those assumptions produced an estimated range of total losses of between $588m and $620m (exclusive of interest and costs). From there a "preliminary discount" of 50% was applied so as to exclude circumstances where the securities may have been purchased and then sold within the identified period, such as in the case of trades by day traders. That reduced the estimated claim to $294m to $310m.
19 It cannot be doubted that the quantification by Ms Blacker was at a rudimentary level, although there is no necessary criticism in that given the embryonic stage of the class action proceedings. If the matter continues, experts will be engaged on both sides to quantify the alleged loss and their "event reports", as they are called, may adopt an econometric analysis of the market variations which might have occurred had the identified data been released. The concept of market-based or indirect causation theory is frequently applied in cases such as this and damages are usually claimed on the "inflation-based measure", being the difference between the price paid for a security and the market price which would have prevailed had the alleged disclosure contraventions not occurred. This is thoroughly discussed in detail in the reasons of Beach J in TPT Patrol Pty Ltd (as trustee for Amies Superannuation Fund) v Myer Holdings Ltd (2019) 140 ASCR 38 and, for present purposes, there is no need to consider its intricacies any further.
20 Mr Owens SC, who appeared with Ms Lindeman for the respondents, submitted that the actual fall in the value of the stapled securities on 25 and 26 October 2016, does not represent any useful proxy for the position that would have pertained had the respondents not failed to comply with their disclosure obligations as alleged by the applicants. In many securities class actions the claim is founded upon the late or delayed fulfilment of the market disclosure obligations. In those circumstances, the impact of the late disclosure might fairly be taken as a good indicator of what the position would have been had the required disclosure occurred at an earlier time. Here, however, it was the occurrence of the tragic incident which precipitated the decline in the value of the securities. That was the crystallisation of the risk which it is said the applicants ought to have disclosed. In this respect there is substance in Mr Owen SC's submission that the occurrence of the event is qualitatively different to the risk that it might occur and it is not unfair to assume that the disclosure of the risk, as opposed to its crystallisation, is likely to have had a less detrimental impact on the price of the securities.
21 That being so, it might be said that Ms Blacker's approach tends to overstate the extent of the loss to some degree. On the other hand, the quantum of any loss might also depend upon the nature of the causation case advanced. Here, reliance on market based causation becomes problematic for the class action applicants given the manner in which they have framed their case, and that is particularly so in relation to the misleading or deceptive conduct claim. If the general assertion is that the class members paid too much for their stapled securities such that, had the relevant information been known, they would have purchased them at a lower price - that is in the nature of a "different transaction case" - the fall in the value of the securities consequent upon the October 2016 incident may not be reflective of the loss "caused by" the alleged contraventions. Alternatively, if the claim being advanced is in the nature of a "no transaction" case, the position may be different. No conclusion can be reached in relation to these somewhat difficult issues in the present matter and, no doubt, questions of reliance and causation will consume much time at the trial of the class action. For present purposes, however, it is apparent that the evidence of Ms Blacker on this issue is expressed at a high level of abstraction and provides only slender support for any conclusion as to the quantum of the claim.
22 Mr Owens SC also submitted that it cannot be assumed that all persons who are potentially members of the class will remain in the action. It may well be that many will opt out for one reason or another. That may include institutional shareholders who remain as shareholders of the company. For such entities there is often a real concern that any benefit derived from a shareholder class action is likely to be less than the diminution in the value of their existing shareholding. Of course, whether that is true or not depends on the existence, type and quantum of insurance coverage held by the company in respect of the claims made against it. In any event, the point to be made is that the size of the class and the concomitant size of the potential damages is dependent upon a number of factors, including the rate at which members might opt out. This was not explicitly taken into account in Ms Blacker's quantification of the potential loss and it is possible that the amount of the postulated claim is overstated for that reason.
23 A further issue raised by Mr Owens SC was that, although Ms Blacker averted to the existence of day traders who bought and sold securities over short periods, she did not refer to or take account of investors other than short term traders who sold their securities prior to the event in question. He submitted that only those who held the securities as at 25 October 2016 could be members of the class. There is substance in this submission and it is not clear that Ms Blacker's preliminary discounting took into account these larger shareholders who may have divested their securities before the relevant date.
24 A related issue is that the methodology of assessing the number of security trades in the relevant period may be open to question. It is apparent that the approach was to identify the number of securities purchased in the period between 30 June 2014 and 25 October 2016, being the period which corresponds with that used to identify the class members. Although the notional loss of between $588m to $620m was discounted as discussed, this approach was somewhat arbitrary and did not appear to take into account the extent to which the securities were traded. If they were heavily traded, the quantum of the notional loss would be inflated and vice versa. For instance, the identified notional loss of $620m equates to a $0.55 loss in respect of 1,127m issued securities. That may overstate the number of stapled securities on issue at the time, although there is no evidence of what that number was. The FY 2020 financial statements indicated that the number of ALGL issued shares to date, including Distribution Reinvestment shares, was 479,706,016. If it were assumed that a similar number of stapled securities had been on issue as at 25 October 2016 and a loss of $0.55 was incurred in respect of each, the maximum loss would be $263,838,308. Even on that approach a discounting would need to occur in relation to securities which were acquired prior to 30 June 2014 and or prior to the date on which the relevant nondisclosure occurred. Although this exercise is based on the information available as at June 2020, its point is only to identify the fragility of Ms Blacker's methodology and, perhaps, to underscore the absence of any confirmatory analysis in the assessment. Again, that is not a pejorative observation, but is intended to disclose the difficulty at this early stage of the class action of reliably identifying the losses which might be recovered.
25 It was suggested that an issue for the applicants was that the cost of acquiring an expert's "event report" as to the size of the class action claim, even a preliminary one, is likely to be substantial. Necessarily it would mean the outlaying of significant expenditure at an early stage of the litigation when it is unclear whether the action will proceed. On the other hand, on their case, the amount claimed is in the hundreds of millions of dollars and, in that context, the cost of a preliminary expert's report would be relatively slight.
26 For present purposes, the evidence of Ms Blacker does not suffice to enable the Court to identify with any great precision the likely quantum of the claim in the class action. Whilst her observations are sufficient to establish that the total amount of the claim may be considerable, it is not possible to say whether it will be $100 million, $200 million or $300 million, or something lower or higher of those numbers. The difficulty for the applicants posed by the paucity of evidence as to the value of the claim is that part of their asserted rationale for seeking to inspect the respondents' insurance policies is to assure themselves of the commercial viability of the class action. However, as it seems that the Ardent Group has substantial nett assets from which any judgment might possibly be satisfied, the applicants' inability to demonstrate that their claim in the class action might exceed the value of those nett assets renders their asserted rationale somewhat inutile.