austlii:cth/FedCFamC2G/2025/938
General information, not legal advice.
FedCFamC2G
2025-06-19
Original judgment source is linked above.
Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v CFMEU [2018] HCA 3
Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Pattinson (2022) 399 ALR 599; [2022] HCA 13
Australian Ophthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith
British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground Electric Rlys Co of London Ltd [1912] UKLawRpAC 43; [1912] AC 673
Burazin v Blacktown City Guardian Pty Ltd [1996] IRCA 371; (1996) 142 ALR 144
Chaplin v Hicks [1911] UKLawRpKQB 104; [1911] 2 KB 786
Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing & Allied Services Union of Australia v ACI Operations Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 122
Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU) v Telstra Corp Limited [2001] FCA 1364; (2001) 108 IR 228
Fair Work Ombudsman v NSH North Pty Ltd t/as New Shanghai Charlestown [2017] FCA 1301; (2017) 275 IR 148
Fair Work Ombudsman v Offshore Marine Services Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 498
Footscray Football Club Ltd v Kneale [2024] VSCA 314
Guthrie v Mondiale VGL Pty Ltd [2024] FedCFamC2G 384
Guthrie v Visa Global Logistics Pty Ltd [2021] FCCA 479
GW Sinclair & Co Pty Ltd v Cocks [2001] VSCA 47
Hill v St Anthony's Tennis Club (No 2) [2023] FedCFamC2G 269
James Cook University v Ridd [2020] FCAFC 123
Jeater v Mondiale VGL Pty Ltd [2022] FedCFamC2G 758
Johnson v Perez [1988] HCA 64; (1988) 166 CLR 351
Kelly v Fitzpatrick [2007] FCA 1080
Kumova v Davison (No 2) [2023] FCA 1
Malec v Hutton (1990) 169 CLR 638
Mann Judd v Paper Sales Australia (WA) Pty Ltd [1998] WASCA 268
Maritime Union of Australia v Fair Work Ombudsman & Anor [2015] FCAFC 120
Mining and Energy Union v BM Alliance Coal Operations Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] FCA 1594
O'Brien v Dunsdon (1965) 39 ALJR 78
Parsons v Serco Citizen Services Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 754
Rizk v PVH Brands Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2G 613
Sayed v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2016] FCAFC 4
Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL [1994] HCA 4; (1994) 179 CLR 332
Transport Workers' Union of Australia v Qantas Airways Limited [2024] FCA 1216
United Workers' Union v Bervar Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] FedCFamC2G 251
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
[179] The Court finds that:
(a) Mondiale has not discharged the reverse onus under s 361 of the FW Act with respect to the dismissal of Mr Guthrie from his employment. It follows that there must be a conclusion that adverse action under s 342(1), Item 1(a) of the FW Act was taken against Mr Guthrie by Mondiale by dismissing him from his employment in contravention of s 340(1) of the FW Act by reason of his having exercised the workplace rights asserted at [104] above. There will be a declaration accordingly;
(b) Mr Guthrie has failed to prove:
(i) the alleged underpayments under the RTD Award by Mondiale, and that claim must be dismissed; and
(ii) that required information was not included on payslips by Mondiale in contravention of reg 3.46(3) of the FW Regulations, and that claim must be dismissed,
The Court:
- Declares that the termination of the Applicant's employment by the Respondent contravened section 340(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth).
- Orders that:
the application be dismissed insofar as it relates to alleged contravention of:
the Road Transport and Distribution Award; and
regulation 3.46(3) of the Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth);
the proceedings be adjourned to 11:00am on 28 June 2024 for further directions as to a penalty hearing in relation to the Respondent's contravention of s 340(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth); and
costs, if any, be reserved.
Asserted workplace rights established
[104] For the reasons set out above Mr Guthrie has established that:
(a) his various requests to Mondiale to provide him with more flexible working arrangements by providing him with a night shift so that he could better attend to child-care responsibilities was a complaint in relation to a workplace right which he had or proposed to exercise;
(b) his assertion as to the alleged underpayment of casual and afternoon shift loadings was an assertion of a workplace right which he had or proposed to exercise; and
(c) the initiation and participation in the conference in the FWC was the initiation and participation in a process or proceeding under a workplace law and the assertion of a workplace right which he had.
(a) had a history of safety issues breaches; and
(b) displayed unprofessional work behaviours in the workplace which contravened Mondiale's Code of Conduct.
[117] The utter paucity of Mondiale's evidence as to the investigation and explanation of the alleged safety issues, and the lack of any, or implausibility of the, explanation as to how the alleged safety issues came to be part of the reason for the dismissal decision, have led the Court to conclude that not only did the alleged safety issues not occur, but also that they could not, in any event, have been substantive or operative reasons for the dismissal decision.
[149]...the Court's view is that it can be inferred that there were reasons for Mr Guthrie's dismissal other than those contained in the dismissal letter, and that those other reasons included, at least, Mr Guthrie's complaints or inquiries in relation to the alleged underpayment of casual and afternoon shift loadings. It follows that, in this respect, adverse action was taken against Mr Guthrie by Mondiale in relation to a workplace right in contravention of s 340(1) of the FW Act.
[159] There is no evidence before the Court that Mr Punter's and Ms Coleman's other joint decision-makers excluded the workplace rights summarised at [104] above in determining to dismiss Mr Guthrie. There was no opportunity for the state of mind or mental processes of the not called other joint decision-makers to be exposed to or considered by the Court. Further, the Court can also infer that those other joint decision-makers were not called because their evidence may not have assisted Mondiale's case that the reasons for the dismissal were limited to alleged safety issues and alleged unprofessional behaviour: Dunkel, CLR at 308 per Kitto J, 312 per Menzies J and 320-321 per Windeyer J.
[160] In relation to the other joint decision-makers the Court is thus left with no explanation or evidence capable of discharging the reverse onus imposed on Mondiale under s 361 of the FW Act, and is thus satisfied that adverse action was taken against Mr Guthrie by Mondiale by dismissing him from his employment because of the exercise of the workplace rights asserted, and summarised at [104] above.
(a) The quantum of compensation payable pursuant to s 545 of the FW Act to Mr Guthrie for loss suffered because of the contravention of his workplace rights and dismissal; and
(b) The quantum of any penalty payable by Mondiale for contravention of the FW Act.
(1) Loss of Earnings;
(2) Loss of Superannuation Benefits;
(3) Loss of Long Service Leave;
(4) Additional Travel Costs;
(5) Legal costs and expenses incurred in pursuing interlocutory relief;
(6) Loss of the value of a Tag Heuer watch;
(7) Loss of the opportunity to buy a family home; and
(8) Pain and suffering (also described as Hurt and Humiliation).
[28] The task of the primary judge, having found the relevant contraventions, was to assess the compensation, if any, that was causally related to those contraventions. That involved not an examination of what did happen, but an assessment of what would or might have occurred, but which could no longer occur (because of the contraventions). Subject to any statutory requirement to the contrary, questions of the future or hypothetical effects of a wrong in determining compensation or damages are not to be decided on the balance of probability that they would or would not have happened. Rather, the assessment is by way of the degree of probability of the effects - the probabilities and the possibilities: Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd [1990] HCA 20; 169 CLR 625 at 642-643; Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL [1994] HCA 4; 179 CLR 332 at 352-356. The above proposition must be qualified by the recognition that, where the fact of injury or loss is part of the cause of action or wrong, it must be proved on the balance of probability. Compensation is generally awarded for loss or damage actually caused or incurred, not potential or likely damage: Tabet v Gett [2010] HCA 12; 240 CLR 537; Sellars at 348; Wardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia [1992] HCA 55; 175 CLR 514 at 526; that is equally so here under ss 807(1)(b) and 545(2)(b).
[34] The assessment of the value of the loss of an opportunity may involve an evaluative judgment that calls for restraint in appellate review: McCartney v Orica Investments Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 337 at [126]-[127]; Horne v Cranney [2011] QCA 149 at [9]; Hammond Worthington v Da Silva [2006] WASCA 180 at [128]; Nigam v Harm (No 2) [2011] WASCA 221 at [259]; Falkingham v Hoffmans (a firm) [2014] WASCA 140 at [47]-[49]; Wainwright v Barrick Gold of Australia Ltd [2014] WASCA 15 at [88]-[90]. It may also involve factual analysis and findings of a non-evaluative character, and it will almost necessarily involve a degree of speculation. Thus, how (that is, by what methodology), and with what ultimate result, an evaluation is made may involve questions of choice, and judgments about which reasonable minds may differ.
[35] It is also relevant to recall that all evidence is weighed according to the proof which it is in the power of one side to have produced and in the power of the other side to have contradicted: Blatch v Archer [1774] EngR 2; (1774) 1 Cowp 63 at 65; [1774] EngR 2; 98 ER 969 at 970; Hampton Court Ltd v Crooks [1957] HCA 28; 97 CLR 367 at 371-372; Cullen v Welsbach Light Company of Australasia [1907] HCA 3; 4 CLR 990 at 1013-1014; see also JD Heydon Cross on Evidence (10th Australian Edition) at 312-313 [7160] and the cases at footnote 132.
[98]...Usually, of course, in other areas of the law, the term "mitigation" is used in the phrase "a plaintiff's duty to mitigate" (albeit mistakenly, as there is no so‐called duty, because claimants are completely free to act as they perceive to be in their best interests, but defendants are not liable for all loss suffered by claimants in consequence of so acting): Sotiros Shipping Inc and Aeco Maritime SA v Sameiet Solholt, The Solholt [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep 605 (at 608 per Donaldson MR); Borealis AB v Geogas Trading SA [2011] 1 Lloyd's Rep 482; [2010] EWHC 2789 (Comm) (at [42]-[50] per Gross LJ). Such a factor might be best described as not being in "mitigation" of damage, but as simply a factor, among others, informing the Court's assessment. The concept can be viewed through the prism of causation of loss as the use of such evidence is relevant to, and impacts upon, the actual, causally‐related harm suffered.
'Not automatically. As I say, we had worked around that. Ideally, an afternoon shift was preferable, obviously. My son was only two and a half at the time. He had just started day care, so afternoon shift would be ideal.'
[77] In assessing whether one should exercise the statutory discretion to make a compensation order under s 545 and the terms of the order, it is necessary to bear in mind the focus of an order for compensation is "in a loose sense, the restoration of those affected by a contravention to the positions they would have occupied but for its occurrence": Shizas v Commissioner of Police [2017] FCA 61 (at [209] per Katzmann J). To this end, an order under s 545 does not confer power to grant remedies at large based on general considerations of fairness (FWO v CFMMEU (at [149])), but rather is directed to what is reasonable in the circumstances to compensate for the loss caused by the contravention: MUA v FWO (at [20]); see also Patrick Stevedores Holdings Pty Limited v CFMMEU (No 3).
CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION - Loss of superannuation
CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION - Loss of Long Service Leave entitlements
CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION - Additional Travel Costs
CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION - Loss of opportunity to purchase family home
CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION - Humiliation and Embarrassment/Hurt and Humiliation
PRINCIPLES RELEVANT TO THE DETERMINATION OF PENALTY
[9]...Under the civil penalty regime provided by the Act, the purpose of a civil penalty is primarily, if not solely, the promotion of the public interest in compliance with the provisions of the Act by the deterrence of further contraventions of the Act. In that context, the penalties fixed by the primary judge were appropriate because they were no more than might be considered to be reasonably necessary to deter further contraventions of a like kind by Mr Pattinson, the CFMMEU or others. They represented a reasonable assessment of what was necessary to make the continuation of the CFMMEU's non-compliance with the law, amply demonstrated by the history of its contraventions, too expensive to maintain.
[10] The Full Court's critical error was that it was distracted by a concern, drawn from the criminal law, that a penalty must be proportionate to the seriousness of the conduct that constituted the contravention. The power conferred by s 546 of the Act is not subject to constraints drawn from the criminal law and there is no place for a "notion of proportionality", in the sense in which the Full Court used that term, in a civil penalty regime. Further, and relatedly, their Honours were misled by the view that the Act required that the maximum penalty be reserved for only the most serious examples of the offending comprehended by s 349(1), and that this principle could prevent the court from imposing the maximum penalty even though a penalty in that amount might reasonably be considered to be necessary to deter future contraventions of a like kind. Nothing in the text, context or purpose of s 546 requires that the maximum penalty be reserved for the most serious examples of misconduct within s 349(1). What is required is that there be "some reasonable relationship between the theoretical maximum and the final penalty imposed". That relationship is established where the maximum penalty does not exceed what is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose of s 546: the deterrence of future contraventions of a like kind by the contravenor and by others.
[15] Most importantly, it has long been recognised that, unlike criminal sentences, civil penalties are imposed primarily, if not solely, for the purpose of deterrence...
(1) Identify the separate contraventions involved - each contravention of each separate obligation in the FW Act is a separate contravention;
(2) Consider whether any of the contraventions arising from the above, constitute a single course of conduct within the meaning of s 557(1) of the FW Act;
(3) Consider the extent to which two or more of the contraventions have common elements - the penalties imposed should be an appropriate response to the conduct of the respondent;
(4) Consider the appropriate penalty for each contravention and, if relevant, each group of contraventions; and
(5) Finally, assess whether the overall penalty is an appropriate and proportionate response to the conduct as a whole which led to the contraventions. This is the application of the 'totality principle'.[13]
Whether the Breach was Properly Distinct or arose out of one Course of Conduct
Whether Senior Management was Involved in the Breaches
Whether the Party Committing the Breach had Exhibited Contrition
Whether the Party Committing the Breach has Cooperated with Enforcement Authorities
[116] ...the policy considerations of s 546(3) "speak loudly" in the circumstances to justify the payment of the penalty imposed to the individual affected by the contravention who, under the authority of the FW Act, commenced and maintained this enforcement proceeding. If Mr Sayed had not pursued the action, it is unlikely that it would have been pursued. He took on the proceeding at obvious cost to himself.
(a) Loss of wages $184,134.94.
(b) Loss of superannuation entitlements $6,974.52.
(c) Loss of long service leave entitlements $9,221.37.
(d) Loss of benefit of a Tag Heuer watch $2,000.00.
(e) Hurt and humiliation $5,000.00.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and fifty (150) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Corbett.
[1] His Honour delivered an interlocutory decision in Guthrie v Visa Global Logistics Pty Ltd [2021] FCCA 479 (Guthrie (No 1)) on 23 March 2021 in which his Honour dismissed Mr Guthrie's application for an interim injunction seeking reinstatement of his employment with Mondiale VGL Pty Ltd.
[2] Mondiale claimed to be unable to reproduce payroll records for Mr Guthrie and could not produce records for the hearing before Judge Lucev in Guthrie (No 2) or for this hearing. Mondiale did however produce two records, Annexure ND-14 (CB 566) and Exhibit R5, which purported to summarise Mondiale's calculation of income earned by Mr Guthrie during the period February 2019 to December 2019 (see also footnote 5 below).
[3] Which is the number of weeks leave an employee is entitled to after ten years of continuous employment under s 8 of the Long Service Leave Act 1958 (WA).
[4] Respondent's closing submissions 21 March 2025 at [2].
[5] Paragraph [44] of A1 and CB 112, (transcript page 59, lines 15 and 40), evidence of Tania Coleman on behalf of Mondiale. In Guthrie (No 2) it was claimed by Mr Guthrie that he was not provided with payslips in accordance with reg 3.46(3) of the Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth). This claim was dismissed because no payslips were produced and Mr Guthrie failed to prove that required information was not included on payslips (Guthrie (No 2) at [178]).
[6] Applicant's closing submissions 7 March 2025 at [14].
[7] Respondent's closing submissions 21 March 2025 [2].
[8] Respondent's closing submissions 21 March 2025 [10].
[9] Respondent's closing submissions 21 March 2025 [32].
[10] See also Applicant's closing submissions 7 March 2025 at [14].
[11] Mondiale accepts that Mr Guthrie was first employed on 10 June 2014, see Respondent's outline of closing submissions at [7] and the unchallenged finding of Judge Lucev in Guthrie No 2 at [28]. The original contract of employment dated 4 June 2014 was annexed to the Originating Form 2 Claim at CB 19. The commencement date of employment was stated to be 10 June 2014.
[12] Applicant's closing submissions 7 March 2025 at [14] and A1 at [46].
[13] Kelly v Fitzpatrick [2007] FCA 1080, at [30] ('Kelly v Fitzpatrick').
[14] See Pattinson at [18]; Kelly v Fitzpatrick at [14].
[15] See also s 557(1) of the FW Act. A single contravention is taken to occur where the contraventions are committed by the same person and arose out of a course of conduct by the person.
[16] Respondent's written closing submissions 21 March 2025 at [55].
Guthrie
Mondiale VGL Pty Ltd
(2022) 399 ALR 599
(1996) 142 ALR 144
(2001) 108 IR 228
(2017) 275 IR 148
(1990) 169 CLR 638
(1965) 39 ALJR 78
(1994) 179 CLR 332
(1992) 172 CLR 327
(1988) 166 CLR 351