Covneu. 4 fis v discharged and order nisi to qu

WELSBACH LIGHT COMPANY OF AUS- TRALASIA LTD. : y : . REspot PLAINTIFFS,

Freee VICTORIA, 1907.

• • • Patent - Infringement - Validity of patent - Prior publication - Prior uaer- MELBOURNE, person other than inventor - Prior sale of product of invention - Product Feb. 27, 28 ; discloses process of manufactwre - Statute of Monopolies (21 Jac. I. c. 3), Ta iE 48,

A patent was obtained in Victoria for " an improved hood for ine:

iniean gas burners," the specification for which described the mode of man Barton, of the hood, and the claim therein was for a hood " prepared as d

Higgins, JJ. The Court having found on the evidence that hoods manufactured

to the specification had been publicly sold in Victoria prior to the patent, and that the hood was of such composition and construction that any person con- versant with the subject, and applying the common knowledge at the time of the sale, could have reproduced it :

Held, that the patent was invalid on the ground that, where a patent is obtained for a process of manufacture, and there has been a prior public sale, of the product of that manufacture, if the product is such that any person conversant with the subject and applying the common knowledge at the time of the sale, could have brought about the same result, the patent is invali- dated.

Quere, per Higgins J., whether prior user of a subsequently patented article by others than the patentee, even without proof of actual or potential knowledge by the public of the process by which the article is to be repro- duced, would not invalidate the patent.

Decision of Full Court, Welsbach Light Co. of Australasia Ltd. v. Lascelles, (1906) V.L.R., 677 ; 28 A.L.T., 155, reversed.

The Welsbach Light Company of Australasia Ltd. brought an action against Robert Lascelles for infringement of their patent No. 11,247, Victoria, dated 31st March 1894. The specification of the patent was substantially as follows : -

"Av Improved Hoop For INCANDESCENT GAs BURNERS. This invention relates to incandescent gas burners of the kind described in the specification No. 4472 of 1886.

"Burners as herein described consist of a network hood of metallic oxide heated to incandescence by the flame of a Bunsen burner over which the hood is suspended. It has been found that the incandescent oxide of the metal thorium, when in a pure state, gives comparatively little light, but that when it has added to it a very small proportion, generally not exceeding one or two per cent. of the oxides of certain others of the rare metals, namely, uranium, cerium or prazeodymium, it has a very high illuminating power. In order to produce a hood of this kind according to this invention, nitrate of thorium in the purest possible condition is dissolved in water to which is added oneato two per cent. of solution of nitrate of one of the other metals above mentioned, preferably uranium. A network hood of vegetable textile material is soaked in the solution, dried, and then subjected to heat over a Bunsen burner, whereby the vegetable fibres are burned away

• and the metallic nitrates are converted into oxides, forming a net

work skeleton hood of the mixed oxides which, when it is to incandescence over a Bunsen burner, gives out a very brilli light.

" Having now particularly described and ascertained the natuy of the said invention, and in what manner the same is to be per formed, I declare that what I claim is - a hood for an incandes gas burner consisting of pure oxide of thorium with a small pro portion of oxide of one of the rare metals herein mentioned prepared as described." '

The plaintiffs claimed an injunction and damages or an account, and the usual auxiliary relief.

Among the defences were, that the alleged invention was new, and that the invention was publicly used in Victoria b James McEwan & Co., and members of the public to whom tha firm supplied mantles, from 1891 to 1894 inclusive. a

The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgments hereunder, -

The action was tried before Hodges J., who gave judgment forth defendant: Welsbach Light Co. of Australasia Ltd. v. Lascelles (1)

The plaintiffs then appealed to the Full Court, which allow the appeal, and granted the relief claimed: Welsbach Light Co. 0 Australasia Ltd. v. Lascelles (2).

The defendant having died subsequently to the proceedings in the Supreme Court, the action was continued by his executor.

Mitchell K.C. and Starke, for the appellant. The evidence es

patent was granted were identical in composition with those made under the patent. Even if the evidence did not prove that

demonstration, all the evidence that the appellant could possibly give was given. Everything else was in the respondents' kni ledge and the burden of proof was shifted to them. 'They wet bound then to prove that some other discovery had been made by them in the meanwhile. Stephens' Digest of Evidence, 5th ed pp. 109, 111. If the mantles sold before and after the patent ¥ er

(1) (1906) V.L.R., 169; 27 A.L.T., (2) (1906) V.L.R., 677; 28 A.! 131. 155.

one, invalidates the subsequent patent: Wood v. Zimmer (1); Pennock and Sellers v. Dialogue (2). That is so, even where the patent is for a process of manufacture and the sale is of the pro- 'duct: Wood v. Zimmer (1); and even if examination or analysis of the product would not disclose the process : Germ Milling Co. v. Robinson (3). The reason for this is given by Story J. in Pennock and Sellers v. Dialogue (4) as follows : - " If an inventor should be permitted to hold back from the knowledge of the public the secrets of his invention ; if he should for a long period of years retain the monopoly, and make, and sell his invention publicly, and thus gather the whole profits of it, relying upon his superior skill and knowledge of the structure ; and then, and then only, when the danger of competition should force him to secure the exclusive right, he should be allowed to take out a patent, and thus exclude the public from any farther use than what should be derived under it during his fourteen years : it would materially retard the progress of science and the useful arts, and give a premium to those, who should be least prompt to communicate their discoveries." And in Morgan y. Seaward (5), Parke B. says: - "If the inventor could sell his invention, keeping his secret to himself, and, when it was likely to be discovered by another, take out a patent, he might have, practically, a monopoly

~ for a much longer period than fourteen years." It is now too late to consider whether that reasoning is right. See also Butes v. Coe (6); Losh v. Hague (7); Hindmarch on Patent Privileges,

• p. 464; Merrilees v. Rhodes (8). {Hicers J - In Mullins v. Hart (9) a mere offering for sale was sufficient to destroy a subsequent patent. Grirrit C.J. referred to Hdmunds on Patents, 2nd ed., p. 60.] It is immaterial whether the sale is by the subsequent patentee or by others. In dealing with the question of prior user, "it is the use in a public way of the combination which is in question and not a conveying to the public mind minute details about the

: (1) Holt, N.P., 58. (6) 8 Otto, 31, at p. 46. : (2) 2 Peters, 1. (7) 1 Web. Pat. Cas., 200; 8 L.J., (3) 3R.P.C., 11, 399, Ex., 251.

(4) 2 Peters, 1, at p. 18. (8) 16 A.L.T., 219, at p. 221. (5) 2M. & W,, 544, at p. 559. (9) 3 Car. & K., 297.

identical, then the sale before the patent, even if there was only H. ©. oF A.

H.C. of A. composition of the ingredients": Gill v. Coutts Sons & Cutler ( aa 'The specification does not sufficiently describe the invention. see real merit of the invention was the discovery of the mixture Wersnacn thorium and cerium, and the addition of the words " preferably Licur Co. oF uranium" would have the effect of putting a person desirous o| a aia making one of these mantles on the wrong line of investigation It is a false suggestion and renders the specification bad : Grom ton v. Ibbotson (2). al [Counsel also referred to Welsbach Incandescent Gas Light v. New Incandescent (Sunlight Patent) Gas Light Co. (3).

Duffy K.C. and Coldham (with them Mann), for the respon ents. There is no evidence that, before the grant of the paten McEwan & Co. sold mantles made in accordance with the respon: dents' patent. No inference as against the respondents can b drawn from the fact that they took no steps to prove what is s to have been in their knowledge. The burden of proof would not be shifted, but the Court would be satisfied with much less eyi- dence if it thought the respondents were trying to hide awa anything. But the respondents were not in a position to prov anything more. The putting in of the letters patent is sufficien evidence of novelty: Amory v. Brown (4). Whatever may b the weight attached to the contention that a sale without dis closure of the nature of the invention invalidates a subseq patent, that contention is not raised on the pleadings. 'The objec- tion of prior user is raised, but that must be such a user as puts: the public in possession of the invention, A prior sale is only a form of prior publication: Hdmawnds on Patents, 2nd ed., p. 57 and a prior publication, whether it is in a book or by a sale, must be such that not only the means of knowledge of the inyentio was open to the public, but that the public had acquired knowledge: Frost on Patents, 3rd ed., vol. 1., pp. 125, 137; Ha cock v. Somervell (5); Terrell on Patents, 4th ed., p. 82. must be something from which the inference can be drawn that the public had acquired that knowledge, and it does not follow. that, because the chemical constituents of an article are know

(1) 13 R.P.C., 125, at p, 139. (3) 17 R.P.C., 237. (2) 1 Web. Pat. Cas, 83; 6 LJ. (4) LR., 8 Kq., 663. (0.8.), K.B., 214. (5) 39 Newton's Lond. Journ., 158.

4CLR.] OF AUSTRALIA 995 its method of manufacture is disclosed. Romer J.,in In re Miller's H.C. oF A. Patent (1), said that he thought it was still open for consideration ea

whether a person who discovers a secret process and uses that Ceirew ze

process to manufacture an article which he sells publicly andy... 0, commercially, and then seeks to obtain a patent for that very Licnt Co. or same process, is entitled to hold his patent. The patent here is for a a process of manufacture, and a use of the product of that process

is not a use of the process. See also Patterson v. Gas Light and

Coke Co. (2); Croysdale v. Fisher (3); Australian Gold Recovery

0. v. Day Dawn P.C. Gold Mining Co. (4); Plimpton vy. Mal-

colmson (5); Harwood vy. Great Northern Railway Co. (6);

Wallace and Williamson on Patents, p. 71; Humpherson v. Syer

(7). There must be something in the prior publication or user

which would show that the result was brought about in the way

described in the specification : Sunlight Incandescent Gas Lamp

Co. v. Incandescent Gus Light Co. (8); Edmunds on Patents, 2nd

ed., p. 61. The reason given for the proposition that a prior sale

of a patented article invalidates the patent, viz., that the period

of the monopoly would be extended, is not a good one: Betts v.

Menzies (9). The use by the inventor before the patent is at his

own risk. If anyone discovers the invention which the inventor afterwards patents, the patent is invalid. The case of Gill v.

Coutts & Sons and Cutler (10) does not touch the present case,

because there an article made according to the patent, which was

for a process, was made and sold by another person prior to the

grant of the patent. See also Haskell Golf Bull Co. v. Hutchison

(11). The statement in Wood vy. Zimmer (12), that a prior sale invalidates a subsequent patent, is obiter. The article was openly manufactured by the patentee before the patent issued, and there

was no doubt of the publication. So also in Pennock and Sellers

y. Dialogue (13), the question was whether the patentee had

intended to abandon his invention, and there was evidence of manufacture and sale of the article by another person for years

(1) 15 B.P.C., 205, at p. 212. (8) 14 R.P.C., 757, at p. 774.

(2) 3 App. Cas., 239, at p. 244. (9) 1 EL 990, at pp. 1007, (3) LR.P.C., 17, at p. 21. 1008.

(4) (190 R., Qa, 123, at p. 149. (10) 13 R.P.C., 125.

H.C. of A. before the patent issued. he fact that there might have Ban analysis made of these mantles sold by McEwan & Co. prior

Cui to the patent, is not sufficient. There must be evidence that the

P 7Ris) Wi Further, i ysis would show the con- Werseach ®nalysis was made. Further, if analysis wo m-

Licut Co. oF stituents of the mantles, it would not disclose how they were eatin made. The Court will be slower to draw the inference that an- analysis had been made than to draw the inference from the presence of a book in a library that there has been publication, The objection based on the words "preferably uranium" is not

Counsel also referred to Dollond's Patent (1); Walton v. Bate- man (2); Robinson on Patents, pp. 310, 425, 480, 493; Terrell on Patents, pp. 87, 349; Frost on Patents, 3rd ed., vol. 1, p. 18; Shaw v. Cooper (3); Carpenter v. Smith (4); Morgan y. Sea- - ward (5); Losh v. Hague (6); Househill Coal and Iron Co. v. Neilson (7); Mullins v. Hart (8); Germ Milling Co. v. Robinson (9); Hoe & Co. v. Foster & Sons (10); Edmunds on Patents, 2nd ed., p. 53; In re Gaulard and Gibbs' Patent (11); Plimpton vy. | Spiller (12); Harris v. Rothwell (13). 2

Mitchell K.C. in reply. By the law of England if the product of an invention, which is afterwards patented, or the invention itself is publicly sold by the person who afterwards obtains the patent, that sale is deemed to be a dedication to the public of the - invention. The only qualification suggested in the cases is that of Romer J. in Inve Miller's Patent ( 14). But the facts established do not bring this case within that exception. Here the patent is for the article which was previously sold, and not for the process, and an analysis would disclose the invention. The case of Hoe & Co. v. Foster & Sons (10) is put on the ground that by the prior sale of the patented article a gift of the invention is made to the public. The means of knowledge having been available to the

(1) 1 Web. Pat. Cas., 43. (7) 1 Web. Pat. Cas., 675, at p. 719(n). (2) 1 Web. Pat. Cas., 613, at p. 617. (8) 3 Car. & K., 297.

(5) 2 M. & W., 544, 1 Web. Pat. Cas., 167, at p. 194.

public before the patent, the onus is on the respondents to show 'I- ©. or A. that it was not made use of. [He also referred to In ve Newall ~~

& Elliot (1); Frost on Patents, 3rd ed., vol. 1, p. 23; Plimpton pe y. Malcolmson (2); Terrell on Patenis, p. 709.] .

Grirritu C.J. This was an action for an infringement of a hls patent, No. 11,247 of Victoria, for a hood for incandescent gas burners. The claim in the specification is for "an incandescent gas burner consisting of pure oxide of thorium with a small proportion of one of the rare metals herein mentioned prepared as described." The proportion mentioned in the body of the speci- fication was " a very small proportion, generally not exceeding one or two per cent. of the oxides of certain other of the rare metals, namely, uranium, cerium, or prazeodymium." The mode of preparation was described as dissolving nitrate of thorium in the purest possible condition, and adding 1 to 2 per cent. of solution of nitrate of one of the other metals, preferably uranium. Various defences were set up, of which it is only necessary to mention two - that the invention was not new, and that it was publicly used by others than the inventor in Victoria before the grant of the letters patent. Hodges J., before whom the action was tried, found as a fact upon the evidence that the prior user by others was proved, and decided that the patent was for that reason invalid. The Full Court arrived at a different conclusion upon the evidence, and being of opinion that the other objections were all invalid, allowed the appeal and gave judgment for the plaintitts. The matter has been very fully and ably argued, and many points of great and general interest have been discussed, with which, however, in the view which I take of the facts, it is not necessary to deal at length.

Mr. Mitchell, for the appellant, submitted the broad proposi- tion that, if the product of an invention is publicly sold by the inventor, that fact is conclusive proof that the invention has been given to the public, and that there is no exception to this rule,

unless, possibly, in the case where the product is of such a nature that the mode of production cannot be discovered from it. There are, no doubt, reported cases in which the language of the learned Judges is wide enough to cover this proposition to its fullest extent. But with one possible exception: Wood v. Zimmer (1), - which is not fully reported, so wide a proposition was not neces- sary for the decision of any of the cases. The invalidity of a patent which follows from what is sometimes called, indiscrimi- - nately, public user may depend upon either of two reasons: (1) If the public user, whatever that term means, has been by the - inventor himself, the invention is no longer new. In that case - the objection is want of novelty. (2). If the public user, what- ever that term means, has been by others, the grant is forbidden by the Statute of Monopolies, which is incorporated in the definition of the term "invention" in the Victorian Patents Act - 1890. The ground of the objection founded upon user by the inventor alone is, therefore, that the invention has been published to the world. And so the case is treated by the Courts in Hancock y. Somervell (2) (quoted in all the text books); Morgan v. Seaward (3); Harwood vy. Great Northern Railway Co. (4); Humpherson v. Syer (5), and other cases. But it is manifest that, whether an invention has been published or disclosed to the world or not is a question of fact. I will afterwards consider the question whether the use by the public of an article from which no information can be obtained as to the nature of the process by which it is produced is a user by "others than the inventor" within the meaning of the Statute of Monopolies, and the further question whether the disclosure of means of know- ledge is conclusive or sufficient evidence of disclosure of the invention. If the sale or use of the article produced gives in fact no information to anyone as to the nature of the invention it is hard to discover any principle on which it can be said that there - has been a disclosure.

In my opinion a distinction must be taken between different classes of cases. It is settled that a patent may be granted for

(1) Holt N.P., 58. (4) 2B. & S., 194, at p. 226, per (2) 39 Newton's Lond. Journ., 158. Pollock C.B. (3) 2 M. & W., 544; 1 Web. Pat. (5) 4 R.P.C., 407.

an invention of a new thing or contrivance, i.c., for a new product, or for a new process for producing a thing previously known, if the other necessary conditions exist. If (Case I.) the invention is for producing a thing already known, ¢.y., the metal aluminium,

or common salt, by a new process, the sale of the product will Licut Co. or

give no information as to the nature of the invention. If (Case IL) the invention is of a new contrivance, such as the lock which was in question in Carpenter v. Smith (1), the sale or public use of it by the inventor would of itself disclose the nature of the invention. But there are intermediate cases. The product may (Case IIL.) be of such a nature that any person conversant with the subject, and applying the common knowledge of the time, could bring about the same result. Of this class of case the "Magnolia Metal " in question in Zn re Miller's Patent (2), is an instance. Or (Case IV.) the product may be of such a nature that, although the elements of which it is composed and their proportions can be ascertained, the mode of production cannot be discovered from it. In Morgan v. Seaward (3), it was pointed out that the word "use" in the Statute of Monopolics may be read as referring either to the thing produced by the invention, or to the process by which it is produced, and this doubt has not, so far as I know, ever been authoritatively resolved. As at present advised, I am not prepared to accept the rule suggested by Mr. Mitchell as applying to the first class of cases which I have suggested, namely, when the product of the invention is a substance or article already well known. It is clearly applicable to the second class. Whether it applies to the fourth class is, in the state of the authorities, a question of some difficulty. When the invention is in use by other persons than the inventor, in the sense that they use the same process to produce the same result, other considerations arise. Such a case is within the direct pro- hibition of the Statute of Monopolies, whether the product does or does not disclose the process. The appellant contends that the present case is one of the third class, and that the product of the invention is of such a nature that it discloses the process by which it is produced, and, that, being of such a nature, it was

both published to the world by the inventor and used by persons before the date of the patent. The case made by the appellant depended upon cireumstanti Raieaadit evidence, of which I will briefly state the nature, referring onl; Lieu Co. or to facts established by uncontradicted testimony. It was estal Austas'**!4Jished that the method of illumination by incandescent h was well known before the year 1893. The mode of constructio of the hoods, namely, by impregnating woven vegetable fibr with solutions of salts of certain rare metals, and then burnin, off the vegetable foundation, was also well known. Mi experiments had been made to discover a metallic basis wl would produce a satisfactory result. Up to the year 1893 none of the hoods produced had been a commercial success. In or about the beginning of that year it was discovered that th combination of metallic oxides which is the subject matter of patent now in question, namely, pure oxide of thorium with ; small percentage of 1 to 2 per cent. of cerium, uranium, or pra odymium, produced very much better results. This was descril by one witness

and was groping about in the dark to find." A patent for invention was taken out in England in 1893, but the exact d of the patent does not appear.

The plaintiff company was formed in England under the of the " Australasian Incandescent Gas Light Company " on 1 March 1893. The memorandum and articles of association we not put in evidence, but it may be inferred from the name of company that it was formed for the purposes of promoting business of incandescent gas lighting in Australasia. In J 1893 gas-burners, consisting of incandescent hoods or man' with the usual appliances, were advertised for sale in Melbow by the firm of James McEwan & Co. Ltd. under the name "The Welsbach Gas Burner," and "The New Welsbach Ga: Burner," and some of them were sold, and may be taken to have come into use by the purchasers. From September 1893 till the | date of the patent, 31st March 1894, and for many years after wards, the same firm sold gas-burners by the same name

agents for the plaintiffs. It was deposed by the salesman who had charge of that branch of their business during all that period that in May 1893 some hundreds of new burners came into his hands, which were put to use in the warehouse. A large room on the first floor, about 80 feet by 40 in dimensions, was fully lighted with twelve or fourteen of them, and they continued to be so used for many years. They were similar in appearance to those now made by the plaintiffs under their patent, and were sold in similar boxes. The witness said that, so far as he could see, there was no change in the shape of the mantles, or in the brilliancy of the light that they gave, or in the quantity of light which they diffused, before and after March 1894. It appeared from other evidence of expert witnesses that the light which had been given by all the mantles in use before the plaintiffs' invention was far inferior to 'that given by those made under it. The learned Judge of first instance was of opinion that this witness was thoroughly trustworthy. It is contended for the respondents that, even assuming the accuracy of his evidence, it is not suffi- cient to establish identity in kind between the mantles sold before and those sold after the grant of the patent. As I have already said, the evidence is circumstantial. In my opinion it is highly improbable that, in the case of a large room entirely lighted by twelve or fourteen hoods, a sudden inerease in brilliancy (to the extent of from 50 to 80 per cent.) would not have been noticed by an intelligent observer whose duty it was to push

• the sale of the article in question. It is also highly improbable that the plaintiff company would have begun their operations in Australasia by sending out obsolete or obsolescent hoods, and _ when the new discovery was made would not have called public attention to it. Public attention was in fact called in June 1893 to the "New Welsbach Gas Burners," but it was not proved that this was done under the plaintiffs' authority. If, however, still newer and much better hoods were sold after the date of the _ patent, it would have been to the plaintiff' interest that the fact
• should be' made known to the public. The plaintiffs' agents, _ however, whose special duty it would have been to make it _ public, were not asked to do so. The natural inference of fact is

• that the new mantles were in use before, as well as after, the date j vou. 1V. :

H.C. or A. of the grant. If this inference is not in accordance with # ees truth, nothing would have been easier than for the plaintiffs t Curtes prove the actual facts. If the mantles sent by them to th Werepacr Melbourne agents before April 1894 were of a different kind, an Licur Co. or made according to some other specification, that fact is in 'AUSTRALASIA i i Lr. own exclusive knowledge. hey were directly interrogated o the point, and the gentleman who made the answering affi after saying that inquiries from the plaintiffs' servants in Au tralia did not enable him to give the desired information, ceeded to object that the defendant was not entitled to an answe to the question "as it would be disclosing the name of plaintiffs' witness or witnesses." It is suggested that the al

of any evidence is to be accounted for by the fact that the

and that they did not anticipate such evidence as that offered the defendant. The point was however distinctly raised, and n case of surprise is, or could be, made. Upon the evidence I ea doubt that the conclusion of the learned Judge was correct.

The learned Judges in the Full Court, who were of a differet opinion, thought that the only reliable means of ascertaining composition of one of the mantles would have been to have ii analysed by a competent chemist. his would hardly be a p ticable mode of proof in a case of a fragile perishable articlea the lapse of many years. But there is no reason why cireu stantial evidence should not be used in such a case as well as it others. And if the only party in possession of direct evider withholds it he cannot complain that effect is given to circumstantial evidence.

Upon these facts it appears that the plaintiffs' invention had been disclosed to the public before the date of the patent so fi r as such disclosure is to be inferred from the nature of the prod a of the invention, and also that there was before that time such

to whom it was sold), as is to be inferred from the nature of product. What information then was given by the produet itsel as to the nature of the invention? It is not disputed that relative proportions of thorium and the other metallic base, what- ever it was, could be discovered by analysis. The method o

applying the metallic base to the vegetable fibre in the form of a solution of nitrates was disclosed by the specification for patent 4472, granted in 1886, and it appeared from the evidence of the expert witnesses, who spoke of the solution as "the lighting fluid," to be a matter of common knowledge. It is clear, then, that the product of the invention was of such a nature that any- one conversant with the subject and applying the common know- ledge of the time could, with the aid of the information given by the product itself, have brought about the same result. It was, however, contended by Mr. Coldham that this is not sufficient, and that the validity of the patent is not affected unless the Court is able to draw the further inference of fact that some person actually made the necessary analysis and so discovered the nature of the invention. In the case of Zn re Miller's Patent (1), the contrary proposition was treated as too clear for argument. In my opinion the rule laid down in Ln re Gaulard & Gibbs' Patent (2), as to prior publication by writings, is equally applie- able to publication by putting the thing itself in public use when the thing is of such a nature as to disclose its composition and the mode of making it, and the Court is bound to draw the inference that the information actually available to the public is in their possession. I am, therefore, of opinion that the invention had been published to the world in Victoria before the date of the patent. The product of this particular invention is, I think, to be regarded as a new thing. And, since the manner of pro- ducing it was disclosed by the thing itself, the invention was, in my opinion, also used by others than the inventor within the meaning of the Statute. The appeal must therefore be allowed.

Barton J. In this case only three issues were contested before us, that is to say : - that the alleged invention is not new; that it had been published in Victoria prior to the application for the patent ; and that it was publicly used in Victoria prior to the application for the patent.

The company was incorporated on the 14th March 1893, and

CULLEN v. WELSBACH Licnt Co. oF AUSTRALASIA Lap.

H.C. or A. the specification of the patent taken out on the 31st Mareh 18! 1907. No. 11,247, is as follows - - CuLtes «"« An Improvep Hoop ror INcANDESCENT GAS BURNE ss This invention relates to incandescent gas-burners of the

Wersrac ee oe 5 Licut Co. or described in the specification No. 4472 of 1886.

porane "Burners as therein described consist of a network hood o metallic oxide heated to incandescence by the flame of a Buns burner over which the hood is suspended. It has been fi that the incandescent oxide of the metal thorium, when in a pu state gives comparatively little light but that when it has a to it a very small proportion generally not exceeding one or per cent. of the oxides of certain others of the rare metals nai uranium cerium or prazeodymium it has a very high illuminati power. In order to produce a hood of this kind according to invention nitrate of thorium in the purest possible conditi dissolved in water to which is added one to two per cent. of tion of nitrate of one of the other metals above menti preferably uranium. A network hood of vegetable textile

material is soaked in the solution dried and then subjected to heat over a Bunsen burner whereby the vegetable fibres a1 burned away and the metallic nitrates are converted oxides forming a network skeleton hood of the mixed oxi which when it is heated to ineandescence over a Bunsen bi gives out a very brilliant light. Having now particularly cribed and ascertained the nature of the said invention and what manner the same is to be performed I declare that wl claim is - a hood for an incandescent gas-burner consisting pure oxide of thorium with a small proportion of oxide of one of the rare metals herein mentioned prepared as described." ;

With regard to the plaintiffs' mantle it was not denied

argument that its constituents and true proportions could ascertained by analysis; but it was said that was not e because the main portion of the process, that is to say the played by the aqueous solution of the nitrates, was stilla n to be discovered. Substantially, at any rate, it did not to be discovered, because, by a patent, No. 4472, issued on th 5th February 1886 to the assignor of the plaintiff company, I find that, in a part of the process, the patentee claimed the

of a fine fabric, preferably of cotton previously cleansed by H. ©. oF A.

washing with hydrochloric acid, which fabric is saturated with 'an aqueous solution of nitrate or acetate of the oxides of the rare metals, and so forth. As to the facts which came out in evidence before Hodges J., there were sales by James McEwan & Co., first apparently on their own account, and secondly as agents for the respondents ; (a) on their own account for some time in 1893, not later than June, and (b) as agents for the respondents from September 1893 till long after the issue of the patent. I shall not follow His Honor through the details of the evidence as to the identity in kind of the mantles sold by James McEwan & Co., whether independently or as agents before the patent was issued, and those sold by the company afterwards as agents under the patent. Evidence was given by a witness who was ina responsible position in McEwan & Co.'s establishment, who had to look after this branch of their business, and who, more than anyone else, probably, would be likely to notice any sensible difference in appearance in the shape, make or luminousness, or in the colour of the light which the mantles gave. It would be most strange that there should be any marked difference in any of those par- ticulars which would not be observed by him. At any rate he gives evidence that, during the period antenior to the agency of McEwan & Co. and from that onwards and during the latter period after the issue of the patent, he could observe no difference, in any of those particulars, in the appearance of the mantles. That seems to me to be primd facie evidence. Unanswered it is strong evidence. Of course I do not forget that, when novelty is in issue, the presumption is that the invention is novel once the patent is produced. The case of Amory v. Brown (1) cited by Mr. Coldham, seems to establish that proposition, and Lindley LJ. in Harris v. Rothwell (2), cites it with approval as settling the question. When the question is one of novelty the plaintiff establishes a primd facie case by proving his patent, so that the burden is then thrown on the defendant of proving prior use cr prior publication, but when he has given express, even though not overwhelming, evidence to rebut the tacit presumption, does it not become fatally strong when no attempt is made to deny

H.C. or A. or in any way meet it? It is not disputed by the responden Bo: that all the mantles sold from September 1893 were Welsba Couey mantles. Were those sold before that time different? Eviden Werepacn having been given that they were the same in appearance, that Lieut Co. or in shape, make, luminousness, colour, &ce. - in fact that McEw: ae * & Co's employé could not find any difference - it would have interesting to know whether the mantles previously on sale y withdrawn in September when the agency was conferred, a replaced by fresh ones; or whether the previous stock allowed to run down to nothing and new stock put in its place September; and similarly as to the period between Septem 1893 and the issue of the patent. The defendant haying elicited prima facie evidence that the mantles sold during the periods were precisely alike - indeed identical in effect and so presumably in composition - the fact that no attempt is made t shake the evidence in its main features or to countervail it mu have been most impressive to the learned Judge who tried case, as it would have been to any of us. The expert evidene has been sufficiently dealt with by His Honor the Chief Jus and I need only state that I have come to the same matter o fact conclusion as he has on that question. Now the Statute*of Monopolies (21 Jac. I. e. 3), after prohibit ing monopolies, enacts in sec. 6 that: "Any declaration befor mentioned " (against monopolies) " shall not extend to any letter patents and grants of privilege for the term of fourteen years 0 under, hereafter to be made, of the sole working or making of a manner of new manufactures within this realm, to the true am first inventor and inventors of such manufactures, which oth at the time of making such letters patents and grants shall use." The Victorian Patents Act 1890, defines "inyention" "any manner of new manufacture which might be in En and Wales the subject of letters patent and grant of pri within section six of the Statute of Monopolies," &. So that thi definition clause of the Victorian Patents Act 1890 brings inté use, for the purpose of defining "invention," the very ph ology of the Statute of Monopolies. Now the question here is really in a broad way one of novelty. There were some ¢ pre sions of Mr. Justice Story in the case of Pennock & Sellers ¥

Dialogwe (1), which are worth citing. He said "It has not been, and indeed cannot be denied, that an inventor may abandon his invention, and surrender or dedicate it to the public. This inchoate right, thus once gone, cannot afterwards be resumed at.

his pleasure; for, where gifts are once made to the public in this Lieut Co. or

way, they become absolute." In illustration of that he cited the ease of dedication of a highway. The following passage from a well known text book was cited with approval by high authority in the House of Lords in 1877 on a question of prior publication. "If the public once becomes possessed of an invention by any means whatever, no subsequent patent for it can be granted either to the true and first inventor himself, or any other person, for the public cannot be deprived of the right to use the invention, and a patentee of the invention could not give any consideration to the public for the grant, the public already possessing every- thing that he could give." That passage is from Hindmarch on Patents, 1st ed. (1846), p. 33, and Lord Blackburn says in Patter- son v. Gas Light and Coke Co. (2): - * This, is, in my opinion, a correct statement of the law." The passage is cited again with approval by Fry L.J., in Humpherson v. Syer (3), and as Lord Blackburn says in the case I have mentioned, the consideration for a patent is the communication to the public of a process that isnew. It may be deprived of novelty in many ways, but in three principal ways : - (1) by prior publication, i.e. by publication of a sufficient description which would enable people to construct or make the thing in question by a specification which would give similar light and information, and published before the patent ; or (2) by prior user, i.e, user before the patent, except for the purposes of mere experiment and under confidence, by the inventor himself; or, (3) by user by the public in the ordinary and open way, as, for instance, by buying it in the open market and using it for the purpose for which it is designed. So, as to the issue of "true and first inventor," that in most cases is a mere question of novelty and generally depends upon the words which are to be found in the Statute of Monopolies. In that connection I refer to the judgment of Lindley LJ., in which Cotton L.J. concurred, in

(1) 2 Peters, 1, at p. 15, (2) 3 App. Cas., 239, at p. 244. (3) 4 R.P.C., 407, at p. 414.

ae CULLEN v. WELsBach Lieur Co. or AUSTRALASIA Lrp.

Harris y. Rothwell (1), which I think will be found to be enoug! to show that the issue of "true and first inventor" should }

where there is one, or the Judge without a jury, thinks that ti invention claimed by the plaintiff has " been so published in thi country as to have become known toanyone here." There ca be any distinction in reason between these two cases ; on the on hand, the deposit in an accessible place in a public library of book or scientific journal containing a description of the pro : and on the other hand, a number of sales of the product, when that is of such a nature as to give the means of knowledge of the process to those who are conversant with the subject. And in the case of Croysdule v. Fisher (2) Pollock B. puts the matter very pointedly when he says : - * Whether a patent was antici- pated by a previous specification or by previous publication in a book, or by previous user, the principle is the same, because in each case it must be shown, in order to effect a anticipation, that some person before the date of the pat has communicated to the public that which the patentee no) claims." Here, of course, the question is whether that whi the plaintiffs now claim has been communicated to the public, either in writing or in any other way, because writing is n essential; whether it has been published to the world by the user of the plaintiffs, or by the user of anyone else, or by asimple divulgation. The question as to publication may be put in th following words used by Fry LJ. in Humpherson v. Syer (3 "Ts it the fair conclusion from the evidence that some Eng! people, under no obligation to secrecy arising from confidence good faith towards the patentee, knew of the invention at the date when the plaintiff took out his patent ?" If, under nos seal of secrecy, people did know of it, and knew of it in suel a way that their knowledge was effective, then the inventor

knowledge has been so gained; or, if he does take it out, patent is void. And in that case His Lordship held that th disclosure of the gist of the plaintiff's invention by a third pei

(1) 4 R.P.C,, 295, at p. 230. (2) 1 R.P.C,, 17, at p. 21. (3) 4 B.P.C., 407, at p. 414.

• the defendant - to a person who rested under no obligation of H. ©. or A.

contidence was enough to constitute publication. Hoe & Co. v. Foster & Sons (1) was a case in which there wasa user of printing machines by the patentees and the newspaper owners in con- junction, for a fortnight up to the date of the grant. The machines which were imported by the patentees for the news- paper owners under contract, made several trial runs, and some small defects were remedied. On all occasions the papers were sold as printed by the machines, which were running perfectly a week before the patent issued. The machines were seen by several persons, and though it was alleged that the user was under a pledge of confidence, that excuse was brushed aside, and it was held by the Court of Appeal that the user described was fatal to the patent. Vaughan Williams LJ. concluded his judgment thus (2): - * I am aware that the Statute of Monopolies speaks of user by others, and at the same time there is no doubt that a user by the patentee does prevent his subsequently taking out letters patent, and it seems to me that really, where- ever you have a patentee supplying the patented article in such a way and to such an extent that he cannot recall the patented article - that he cannot impose any obligation of secreey - im- mediately you have that state of things, it becomes impossible for the inventor subsequently to take out letters patent." Of course, in that case the thing patented was a machine, the im- provements in which, the subject of the patent, would be dis- closed to a competent person by inspection. But the passage shows clearly the learned Lord Justice's opinion that the avoid- ance of a patent by user on the part of the inventor himself stands on the ground of publication or gift to the public - in effect the ground of want of novelty; while the user by others is referable to the explicit exception in the Statute of Monopolies. Both the other members of the Court - Lindley M.R. and Chitty L.J. - based on this user their decision on the two issues - first, that the invention was not new, because the patentees themselves had used it before grant and so had published it, and, secondly, that it had been used by others before the date of the patent. As Moulton, then Q.C. now L.J., said in the course of the argu-

H.C. ov A. ment (1): - * The doctrine of prior publication rests on the 1907.

'new,' that of prior user rests partly on the same word and pa x on the words ' which others at that time of making such let cy Patents and grants shall not use." 'The respondents Lieut Co. or a good deal on the case of Zn re Miller's Patent (2), AUSTRALASIA

Lap. that case Romer J. had pronounced against the validity of patent on the ground that there had been prior user, inasmu as the product of the invention had been made and sold it England by the inventors before the date of their patent, coming to that conclusion he had found that, in the state of chemical knowledge of the time, the entire composition of product as to ingredients and proportions could have been di covered by analysis, so that the prior user amounted to pub cation, Then he said this (3): - "The findings I have made render it unnecessary for me to decide the point of law whieh would otherwise have arisen, which I think is one of consi able importance, and one upon which I should have des further consideration but for the findings of fact I have made, Even assuming that the 'Magnolia Metal' sold could be said to have been a metal made according to a secret process which could not have been detected in the metal by analysis, it would be still a question whether the true owner of this patent couid, under th circumstances, have said that that sale would not invalidate patent. It is a point which one day will have to be determi and a point upon which T need at: present express no final opinio because, although it has to be considered, I think it might by said to be still open in some respects for further consideration b the Court, whether a person who discovers a secret process ant uses the benefit of that secret process to manufacture an artic

very same process, is entitled to hold that patent under these circumstances. That is a question which I think will require on of these days to be carefully considered." Without pre-judgin that question, which, in the view I take of the case, does no arise here, I should infer from the frame and tone of His Lord:

(1) 16 R.P.C., 33, at p. 36. (2) 15 R.P.C., 205, (3) 15 R.P.C., 205, at p. 212,

_ ship's remarks that he inclined to the opinion that even under those circumstances the patent could not hold. In the present case we might have arrived at the consideration of the point indicated by Romer J., but for the fact that in the specification of 1886, No. 4472, the assignor of the respondent company had given to the world the knowledge that a part of the process by which a mantle of the rarer earths could be made was the satur- ating of some light fabric such as cotton with an aqueous solution of the nitrate or acetate of the oxides of such earths, That knowledge may be taken together with the clear evidence, not seriously disputed by the respondents' counsel, that the com- ponents of the mantle in the 1894 patent No. 11247 could be detected by analysis. With this sum of knowledge the proved sales of the mantles by or for the patentees before the issue of the patent now in question were incontestably a pub- lication. As the question suggested by Romer J. does not arise in this case because of the last mentioned facts, it is clear to my mind that in this case both publication, in the sense of their own prior user by the patentees, has been proved, and also a user on the part of the public by buying the product which amounts to such a user within the Statute of Monopolies as would of itself defeat the patent. In respect of that user, I may conclude with some words that were used by MLean J. in delivering the judgment of the United States Supreme Court including Marshall C.J. and Story J. in the case of Shaw v. Cooper (1): - * Whatever may be the intention of the inventor, if he suffers his invention to go into public use, through any means whatsoever, without an immediate assertion of his right, he is not entitled to a patent; nor will a patent, obtained under such circumstances, protect his right."

Loath as I am to be a party to the avoiding of a patent which has apparently been gained by a bond fide inventor, still the objections which have been taken by the appellant in this case are too well founded to be overruled, and the appellant has, in my view, abundantly sustained the onus cast upon him in regard to each of the three issues I have mentioned. I am, therefore, of

• opinion that this appeal must be allowed. (1) 7 Peters, 292, at p. 322.

H.C. or A. Q'Connor J. Although the argument in this case covered a yi 1907. = ' ,

Cures If the respondent company's patent was valid there has clear Werevacy been an infringement. 'The validity of the patent, however, wi ee impeached on several grounds, two of which only are mention

Lr. on this appeal, namely, that the invention was not new, and tha it was publicly used in Victoria prior to the application for patent. In support of both grounds the appellant relies upon th same state of facts, that before the application James McE) Co. were selling as the respondents' agents gas-mantles m factured by the respondents of the same materials in the proportion and by the same process as described in the com; patent, and that there had been, before the application for patent, a public use in Victoria of the mantles so sold both the persons who bought them from McEwan & Co., and b McEwan & Co. themselves, during the period when they we not the company's agents. A public use in Melbourne by th Metropolitan Gas Co. was also relied on, but, as I am not satis' of the identity of the mantles used by the gas company wit those made under the patent, I leave that issue of fact out consideration.

It was admitted by the appellant that the onus of the defences was upon him. Hodges J. found that the appellant had established them, and entered judgment for him. The Sup Court, on appeal, reversed that judgment on the facts, not qu tioning the propositions of law upon which Mr. Mitchell, coun for the appellant, relied. Although other matters were d with in the judgment, the main reason for the decision is con- tained in the following passage (1): -

"For the reasons before mentioned, we do not think there evidence before the Court from which it could reasonably be in- ferred that the mantles sold by McEwan & Co. from Sep' 1893 to the 31st March 1894 were constructed in accordance ¥ the specification of patent No. 11,427. We are inclined to e with Mr. Mitchell's proposition that if a man who has invent a means of making a new article has sold that article in the ordinary course of trade for profit before he obtains a patent fo

(1) (1906) V.L.R., 677, at p, 685; 28 A.L,T., 155, at p. 157.

it, a patent subsequently obtained by him for the manufacture of H. ©. or A.

• that article is invalid. But the substantial identity in manufac- ture of the article patented with that previously sold must be proved by the objector in a suit for the infringement of the patent, and mere conjectures formed from external resemblances will not in our opinion be sufficient to shift the burden of proof." The necessity for establishing the identity mentioned cannot be disputed, and if the Supreme Court were right in their decision on the facts, the defence must fail. On the other hand, if the judgment of Hodges J. on the facts is right, the further question _ arises whether, upon the law applicable to the facts as found by _ him, the respondents are entitled to succeed. In my opinion the decision of Hodges J. on the facts was right, and I concur in the reasoning by which my learned brother the Chief Justice has arrived at the same conclusion. I wish, however, to add some- ES thing as to the mode and sufficiency of proof in such cas The onus of establishing the identity of the mantles sold by _ McEwan & Co. before the application for the Victorian patent with those sold afterwards was on the appellant. But it was not necessary to establish that identity by the most complete and ex- haustive proof possible. No doubt, the most satisfactory evidence

the mantles in use before the patent. But the appellant was not tied down to that mode of proof. Proof by admission or by cir- cumstantial evidence was equally admissible, and might be equally cogent. If he established in evidence circumstances from which _ the only fair and reasonable inference, in the absence of explana- _ tion by the respondent company, was the identity of the mantles, that is all he was bound to do in discharge of the onus which the _ law imposed on him in the first instance. In such cases there is _ ashifting onus as is clearly explained by Sir James Stephen in his Digest of the Law of Evidence, 5th ed., at p. 111, in the following passage : - "The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it _ is provided by any law that the burden of proving the fact shall _ lie on any particular person ; but the burden may in the course of a case be shifted from one side to the other, and in considering

H.C. or A. the amount of evidence necessary to shift the burden of pn

1907. the Court has regard to the opportunities of knowledge Cun respect to the fact to be proved which may be possessed by tl

Wergpacn Patties respectively." Licut Co. or In applying this rule each case will depend upon its o aaa circumstances. Mere proof of similarity of appearance in forn colour, intensity, and power, of the light, would not of itself h . been sufficient. Regard must be had to the skill, knowledge, ar opportunities of forming a sound judgment, possessed by

-clusion, that Hodges J. was right in deciding that the onus o explaining the appellant's prumd facie case was thrown on thi plaintiff company, and that, in the absence of such evidence, t identity relied on by the defendant must be taken as establis

sides. I do not consider it necessary after the full exposition my learned colleagues to discuss these questions in detail. Isha confine myself to stating what I conceive to be the law applica to the facts as found by Hodges J. The defences of want novelty and prior user in this case must be kept separate. both arise under the sixth section of the Statute of Monopolie

that to which the argument was principally directed. invention may consist in the new or improved process manufacture of a known article, or it may consist in the facture of some new article or compound. Where the process of manufacture is used by the inventor openly and publicly in way of business within the realm, that is to say, in the count in which he afterwards makes his application, his patent will void whether the product does or does not in itself afford public a knowledge of the invention. But where the process of manufacture is not publicly used by the inventor in the country in which his application is made, but the product has been there publicly before his application, then the question wheth

the product does or does not afford a knowledge of the invention H. ©. oF 4. becomes of vital importance. ae

Frost in his work on Patents, 3rd ed., at page 137, deals with caus a position of the same kind arising in England. "A question," _~ he says, " closely connected with the above is, will the publication in this country of an article made abroad be a publication of the invention by the exercise of which the article was made? If the article made abroad shows on the face of it how it was made, its sale in this country is a publication of the invention; but there is authority for saying that such will not be the case if the article does not show on the face of it how it was made."

The same principle must apply to a product of an English in- vention made in England and imported into Victoria, for it must be taken in this case that the mantles vy England and sold in Victoria in the ordinary way of business before the patent in Victoria was applied for. The law is now too well established to be disputed that an inventor may by public sale of the product of his invention, if the nature of the invention can be ascertained by the public from an examination of the article sold, disentitle himself from afterwards patenting the invention. The cases from Wood vy. Zimmer (1) down to Hoe & Co. v. Foster & Sons (2) in laying down and acting upon

• that rule have assigned many reasons, some good and some very

unsubstantial, for its existence. Perhaps the most practical is that stated by Vaughan Williams LJ. in his judgment in the latter case as follows (3) : -

"T am aware that the Statute of Monopolies speaks of user by others, and at the same time there is no doubt that the user by the patentee does prevent his subsequently taking out letters patent, and it seems to me that really, wherever you have a patentee supplying the patented article in such a way and to such an extent that he cannot recall the patented article - that he cannot impose any obligation of secrecy - immediately you have that state of things, it becomes impossible for the inventor subsequently to take out letters patent." In other words, when he has sent the product carrying the secret of the invention on

(1) Holt N.P., 58, (2) 16 R.P.C.,, 33. (3) 16 R.P.C,, 33, at p. 40.

H.C. oF A. its face into the world for the purposes of profit he cannot]

Hue heard any longer to say that his invention is new. I cannot

Connex assent to the proposition in the broad terms contended for } Werrenacr Mt. Mitchell that, where there has been a sale by an inventor ir

Licur Co. or the ordinary way of business of the product of his invention, AUSTRALASIA .

Lr. loses his right afterwards to apply for a patent whether th product does or does not disclose in itself the secret of the in

vention. None of the cases when examined authorize s

product was relied on, the product in itself disclosed the invent The most important question in this case therefore is, did tly mantle contain within itself information accessible to the public of the nature of the invention? In dealing with that qu the common knowledge existing at the time as to the subject matter of the invention must be considered. As to what is common knowledge the exposition of Jessel M.R. in Plimpton Maleolmson (1) is worth quoting : -

"When," he says, "you say a thing is known to the publie part of common knowledge, of course you do not mean that every individual member of the public knows it. That would be absurd, What is meant is that if it is a manufacture connected with a particular trade, the people in the trade shall know sometl about it; if it is a thing connected with a chemical invention, people conversant with chemistry shall know something about i. And it need not go so far as that. You need not show that the bulk, or even a larger number, of those people know it. Ifa sufficient number know it, or if the communication is such that sufficient number may be presumed, or assumed, to know it, will do. Now how are they to know it? They are to know it by being told of it, or informed of it in some way. You may show that they know it, by showing that the trade had commonly used it. That is the best evidence you can have. You may s the thing was known because it was used and brought into prac- tice, which is a case 1 have not now to consider. But you may show they knew it in another way - that it was published, or made known to the public. I use the word ' published' in that sense. How made known to the public? It has been held that

if it is in a specification, certainly in a modern specification, which has been enrolled in the Patent Office, and not published besides, that will do. And it has also been held that, as a common rule, if the description has been printed in Hngland, and published in England, in a book which circulates in England, that will do.

_ But, after all, it is a question of fact. The Judge must decide, from the evidence brought before him, whether it has in fact been sufficiently published to come within the definition of being made known within the realm."

In this case the evidence clearly establishes that everything necessary for the making of the patented article, except the nature and proportions of the constituents forming what has been spoken of as the "lighting fluid," was common knowledge in the sense so explained by Jessel M.R. at the time when these mantles were being sold in Melbourne before the application for the patent. It was the proportion in which cerium was mixed with thorium in the solution to be applied to the hoods which constituted the invention. The Victorian patent No. 4472 described the method of preparing the hood and applying the metallic base. If the constituents and proportion of the "lighting fluid" in which the hoods were to be saturated could be dis- covered by analysis the invention could be ascertained. There was no difficulty in discovering by analysis the constituents of the solution or mixture to be applied to the mantle or the pro- portions in which those constituents were used. In fact, part of the evidence given by the respondent company to establish infringement was founded on the analysis of the appellant's mantles. There was clearly no more difficulty in the discovering of the invention from the product in this case than there was in

_ the ease of the " Magnolia Metal," the subject of inquiry in the ease In ve Miller's Patent (1). The observations of Romer J. _ in that ease are very applicable to the supposed difficulties of the analysis in this : - " But it was said, and, as I have stated, that is the point now before me, that at the time the metal was so sold chemists analysing it would not have been able to find out the

~ constituents - at any rate, so far as concerned the bismuth. That is the point I have to try. Now, I am satisfied that the respond-

ents have failed on that. The bismuth could have be detected, and I am satisfied that, if reasonable care and reasor able skill were used by analysts before the date of this paten when this 'Magnolia Metal' was sold, its constituents and t proper proportion of those constituents could have been a tained, so that, the metal being sold, its constituents and proportions could have been known, and it could have been mad There was no difficulty, I wish to point out, and no secret o invention in making the alloy, when you once knew the stituents and the proportions of those constituents.

that you have a public sale of a metal, as I am pointing out, nol of a metal made by any secret process at all, but a publie sale 0 a metal which if anyone wanted to find out what it was made of and how it was made, he could have done so without diffi by analysis."

Mr. Coldham strenuously urged that the particular method o applying in their proper proportions the metals forming "lighting solution" in the form of nitrates was not discoverab by analysis. But the answer to that contention is that sufficien information to give that knowledge was accessible to any e who examined the former patent No. 4472 already mentioned.

Under the circumstances, I am of opinion that Hodges J. came to a right conclusion in finding, as he must be taken t have found, that to any person skilled in the chemistry of inean- descent lighting, and having the knowledge then accessible Victoria to any such person, the nature of the respondents' p was ascertainable from an examination and analyis of the man itself. Such being the case the sale in the ordinary way of busi- ness of these mantles in Victoria before'the patent was app for made it impossible for the respondent company to claim the invention was new within the meaning of the Statute o Monopolies. On this ground the appellant is entitled to succeed. I therefore agree that the appeal must be allowed and the jud ment of Hodges J. restored.

Hiccins J. The issues raised in this cause have be numerous, and on nearly all there has been agreement before tl primary Judge and the Full Court ; but the difference of opini

on one point involves the success or the failure of the plaintiffs. H. C. or A. 1907.

The point is, has the defendant adduced sufficient evidence to satisfy the Court - in the absence of counter evidence - that the patented manufacture was used in Victoria by others than the plaintiffs at the time of the grant of the patent.

Hodges J., who conducted the trial, said yes: the Full Court said no. Having had the advantage of hearing counsel's criti- cisms of both the judgments, I have come to the conclusion, not only that there was no suflicient ground for rejecting the finding of Hodges J., but that that finding was right.

Tt seems that the patent in question is the third of a series of patents under the Welsbach system. In the Victorian patent 4472 of 1886, there is found the use of certain rare oxides. In the British patent 3592 of 1886, there is found the use of pure thorium oxide and certain other alternative materials. But mantles under these patents did not prove very successful ; and between 1890 and 1893 the patentee discovered that the oxide of thorium, pure, gave no light. In 1891 or 1892, mantles in Europe began to show a great increase in illuminating power ;

and the new process was represented in the Victorian patent in question. he plaintiffs obtained their patent for the new pro- cess in England at some time in 1893, and in Victoria on the 31st March 1894. Now, it seems that about May 1893, certain incandescent mantles came from England to McEwan & Co., of Melbourne. It is conceded that they came from the plaintiff company, which was incorporated on the 14th March 1893, and was at first called The Australasian Incandescent Gas Light Co. Ltd.; and they were in boxes similar to those in which the plaintiffs' mantles made according to their patent now come. These were placarded for sale in McEwan's windows. Some were burning in the windows and in the warehouse during part of every day for months, and hundreds were sold during 1893 and 1894, According to their answers to interrogatories, the plain- tiff company believes that McEwan & Co. were its agents in respect of these mantles from September 1893, selling them under the name of the " Welsbach gas-burner," and the " New Welsbach gas-burner." According to the evidence of Lacey, a salesman of McEwan & Co., the illuminating power was as great as that of

the Welsbach burner of to-day, which are made under th : patent. Now, the plaintiffs have only taken out two patents Victoria - No. 4472 of 1886, and this patent 11,247 of 1894. patent of 1886 was for a hood made of fabric impregnated w a compound of oxide of lanthanum and zirconium or of the with oxide of yttrium; and it is admitted that a hood m under this patent would not give any such illumination as th present Welsbach hoods. Hoods made in accordance with th : patent of 1894 would give, and do give, this illumination

It is said, however, that the plaintiffs may have sent out t McEwan & Co. in 1893 hoods made, not in accordance with the important discovery of 1891-2, but in accordance with th British patent 3592 of 1886. This is the pure thorium oxide patent. It is sufficient to say that the hoods made under this patent were a failure as to illuminating power; and there is no evidence that they ever reached Melbourne. On such evidence, it is, to my mind, plain, that in the absence of | evidence to contradict or to explain it, the only inference to be | drawn is that the hoods of the plaintiff company sold in 1893 and _ 1894, having the same illuminating power as the plaintiffs' present day hoods, were made in accordance with the same process as the present day hoods. If this inference is wrong, it was for the - plaintiffs to contradict it by evidence. The plaintiffs had amp! warning and ample opportunity, as shown by the dates of defendant's objections, and of the commission to London, and as shown by the Judge's notes of the trial. If the mantles sent from England by the plaintiffs in 1893 were not made in accordance with the present day mantles, that fact would be peculiarly within knowledge of the plaintiffs and their servants ; and they have adduced any evidence whatever on the subject. Probably course taken by the plaintiffs' advisers was taken in the exercise of a wise discretion ; and it has actually led to success in the Full" Court. But I agree with Hodges J. I also think that when the - primary Judge has come to a definite finding on a question cf fact, as to which there is evidence, it is not the function of an Appeal Court to determine what conclusion its members would have arrived at if they were Judges of first instance. It is their _ duty to dismiss the appeal unless the appellant satisfy them th

the primary Judge has been clearly wrong: Allen v. Quebec Warehouse Co. (1); Colonial Seewrities Trust Co. v. Massey (2). Ido not refer merely to cases which turn on the credibility or veracity of witnesses. The mode in which witnesses are cr examined, the kind of questions put, and their mode of answering, as well as the whole conduct of the trial, are matters which the primary Judge only can satisfactorily weigh. I refer to this point particularly, because it has been urged that Lacey's evi- dence was weakened by his cross-examination. It is quite possible that the answers, as printed, are to be explained by the form of the leading questions put by counsel in due exercise of his rights as cross-examiner.

But the plaintiffs' counsel have also, in the argument before us, boldly impugned the accuracy of the law both of the primary Judge and of the Full Court. They insist that it is not enough for the defendant to show prior user of the invented article by others - that there must be such prior user as puts the public in actual possession of the invention - such user as supplies the public, not only with the means of knowledge, but with actual knowledge how to reproduce the article. The authorities cited have been so fully discussed in the judgments of my colleagues that I need say little. Personally, I have not felt much doubt on the point from the first, although I have found difficulty in tracing the precise application of some of the phrases used in the numerous judgments. Sec. 6 of the Statutes of Monopolies (21 Jac. 1c. 8) is the fountain head of our patent law. It is incorporated by the Victorian law by the definition of "invention" in sec. 3 of the Putents Act 1890. The only letters patent of monopoly permitted by law are those for "the sole working or making of any manner of new manufactures within this realm, to the true and first inventor and inventors of such manufactures, which others at the time of making such letters patents and grants shall not use." I feel strongly that in cases turning on Statutes, however old, the more steadfastly we keep out eyes on the words of the Statutes the better. The Statute is the beacon light for our guidance; and we must not let ourselves be distracted by the multitude of cases, as by the lights of mere lamps along the

H.C.or A. shore. Of course, if the Statute has during a long course of 1907.

years received one consistent interpretation, we should accept th interpretation ; but otherwise we should not depart from Werenacn Batural, reasonable meaning of the words. The decisions in the Licut Co. or United States, in particular, have to be used with great aa and caution, inasmuch as the words of the United States Statutes from 1793 onwards, are very different from the words of Statute of Monopolies (see Butes vy. Coe (1). In the present ea McEwan & Co. publicly used these mantles before they becam agents as well as after. They sold the mantles in hundreds, to various customers; and, presumably, the customers used what they bought. There is nothing in the words of the Statute about know- ledge on the part of those shown - nothing about degree of dis- closure of the mode of manufacture. No doubt, expressions maj de be found, in many of the cases, used by Judges who have no 4 thought it necessary always to point out the distinction between user by the patentee himself,and user by others. Where it is alleged that a patentee has, before his patent, given the world the bene of the invention, thrown it out freely to the world, as it were, the degree of disclosure, the amount of knowledge communicat may become very material. Moreover, the defences of "not true and first inventor," "not new" (or "known before"), " prior publication," "anticipation," &e., rest on facts very similar "prior user," facts which sometimes merge almost insensibly in the facts on which " prior user" is based. But I cannot find the authorities cited any decision to the effect that, if an invention has been used before the patent by others than the patentee, e defence is bad unless it be also shown that the public w

reproduce the invention. The case of Gill v. Coutts & Sons & Cutler (2) goes a long way towards bringing the reas back to the words of the Statute. The present case, however, is comparatively simple. It is the case of an invention - not of new process, but of a hood having certain constituents - a hood - which is an improvement on a previous hood made with oth constituents; and, assuming that such a finding is necess Hodges J. has found that "the article in itself presented s

means of knowledge to the public as to enable anyone of ordinary competence to reproduce the article." I accept this finding as correct, and I regard it as sufficient to justify the judgment for the defendant, if knowledge or means of knowledge should be treated as an element in the defence of prior user.

Solicitor, for appellant, C. J. Macfarlane, Melbourne. Solicitors, for respondents, Hodgson «& Finlayson, Melbourne.

B. L. (HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA.] CHARLES DECIMUS FRANCIS . 3 . APPELLANT; PLAINTIFE, AND JOHN LYON. i : : ' : . RESPONDENT. DEFENDANT,

Contract of sale - Sale of sheep - Right of purchaser to refuse to accept sheep H.C. or A. " unfit to travel" - Refusal to accept others which were fit to travel - Provisional 1907.

: refusal - Measure of damages - Repudiation by vendor - Sale of Goods Act ae (Q.) 1896 (60 Vict. No. 6), secs. 14 (2), 39, 52. BRISBANE, April 26, 29,

By a contract for the sale of a specific flock of sheep of a specified number at 39 ; May, 4. 'a certain price per head of those delivered and accepted, it was provided that the sheep should be delivered at a place between 200 and 300 miles from beset where the sheep then were, and to which the sheep would have to travel on Misins J. foot, and that the purchaser should have the option of rejecting all sheep unfit to travel. By the law of Queensland travelling sheep are required to travel at the rate of six miles per day. 'The destination of the sheep was unknown to the vendor, but it was within the contemplation of the parties