The resolution of the appeal
58 The appeal should be upheld. In our view, the primary judge's focus on the question whether or not an order that the penalties be paid to Mr Sayed would deliver him a "windfall", which would not be appropriate in the circumstances, led to error in this case.
59 The nature of the power to direct payment of a penalty under s 546(3) is to be discerned from a consideration, not just of the text of the provision, but also of its context in Pt 4 of the FW Act which deals with civil remedies; its legislative history and the construction of like predecessor provisions; as well as by reference to the Explanatory Memorandum. While her Honour considered some matters of context, she overlooked others and, in particular, some important features of the legislative history and of Pt 4 of the FW Act.
60 The so-called "common informer" legislation that is now found in s 546(3) of the FW Act, in one form or another, has been a part of the industrial relations framework of the Commonwealth since the passage of the pioneering Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) (1904 Act).
61 Sections 44 and 45 of the 1904 Act as enacted (renumbered ss 59 and 60 in a 1947 amendment to the 1904 Act and then subsequently renumbered ss 119 and 120 in a 1956 amendment to the 1904 Act) provided as follows:
44.(1) Where any organization or person bound by an order or award has committed any breach or non-observance of any term of the order or award any penalties which the Court has power to impose may be imposed by any Court of summary jurisdiction constituted by a Police Stipendiary or Special Magistrate.
(2) Any such penalty may be sued for and recovered by -
(a) the Registrar; or
(b) any organization which is affected, or whose members or any of them are affected, by the breach or non-observance; or
(c) any member of any organization who is affected by the breach or non-observance.
45. Where the Court, or any Court of summary jurisdiction, imposes any penalty for any breach or non-observance of any term of an order or award, it may order that the penalty, or any part thereof, be paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund, or to such organization or person as is specified in the order.
62 Following the repeal of the 1904 Act with the introduction of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) (1988 Act), ss 178 and 356 of the 1988 Act provided:
Imposition and recovery of penalties
178.(1) Subject to section 182, where an organisation or person bound by an award or an order of the Commission breaches a term of the award or order, a penalty may be imposed by the Court or, except in the case of a breach of a bans clause, by a court of competent jurisdiction.
...
(5) A penalty for a breach of a term of an award or order may be sued for and recovered by:
(a) an inspector;
(b) a party to the award or order;
(c) a member of an organisation who is affected by the breach;
(d) an organisation that is affected, or any of whose members are affected, by the breach; or
(e) an officer of an organisation that is affected, or any of whose members are affected, by the breach where the officer is authorised, under the rules of the organisation, to sue on behalf of the organisation.
...
Application of penalties
356. A court that imposes a penalty under section 178 or 311 may order that the penalty, or a part of the penalty, be paid:
(a) into the Consolidated Revenue Fund; or
(b) to a particular organisation or person.
63 Relevantly, s 178(5)(c) was amended in a 1990 amendment to the 1988 Act to read as follows:
(c) an employer who is a member of an organisation and who is affected by the breach;
(ca) a person:
(i) whose employment is, or at the time of the breach was, subject to the award; and
(ii) who is affected by the breach;
64 And s 178(5)(e) was amended in a 1993 amendment to the 1988 Act to read:
(e) an officer or employee of an organisation that is affected, or any of whose members are affected, by the breach where the officer or employee is authorised, under the rules of the organisation, to sue on behalf of the organisation.
65 Then, under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (WR Act) as introduced by the Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (Cth), ss 178 and 356 were amended as follows:
Imposition and recovery of penalties
178.(1) Subject to section 182, where an organisation or person bound by an award, an order of the Commission or a certified agreement breaches a term of the award, order or agreement, a penalty may be imposed by the Court or, except in the case of a breach of a bans clause, by a court of competent jurisdiction.
...
(5) A penalty for a breach of a term of an award or order may be sued for and recovered by:
(a) an inspector;
(b) a party to the award or order;
(c) an employer who is a member of an organisation and who is affected by the breach;
(ca) a person:
(i) whose employment is, or at the time of the breach was, subject to the award; and
(ii) who is affected by the breach;
(d) an organisation that is affected, or any of whose members are affected, by the breach; or
(e) an officer or employee of an organisation that is affected, or any of whose members are affected, by the breach where the officer or employee is authorised, under the rules of the organisation, to sue on behalf of the organisation.
(5A) A penalty for a breach of a term of a certified agreement may be sued for and recovered by:
(a) an inspector; or
(b) an employee whose employment is subject to the agreement; or
(c) a person or organisation that is bound by the agreement; or
(d) an organisation:
(i) that has at least one member whose employment is subject to the agreement; and
(ii) that is entitled to represent the industrial interests of the member in relation to work carried on by the member that is subject to the agreement; or
(e) an officer or employee of an organisation mentioned in paragraph (c) or (d), where the officer or employee is authorised, under the rules of the organisation, to sue on behalf of the organisation.
...
Application of penalty
356. A court that imposes a monetary penalty under this Act (other than a penalty for an offence) may order that the penalty, or a part of the penalty, be paid:
(a) into the Consolidated Revenue Fund; or
(b) to a particular organisation or person.
66 Following amendments in 2005 to the WR Act, s 178 was renumbered as s 719, and s 718 set out, in a table to subs 718(1), those persons who could apply for a penalty or other remedy under Div 2 of Pt 14, in relation to a breach of an applicable provision. Section 356 was renumbered s 841. Section 841 provided as follows:
841 Application of penalty
A court that imposes a pecuniary penalty under this Act (other than a penalty for an offence) may order that the penalty, or a part of the penalty, be paid:
(a) to the Commonwealth; or
(b) to a particular organisation or person.
67 In the current FW Act s 546(3) provides:
Payment of penalty
(3) The court may order that the pecuniary penalty, or a part of the penalty, be paid to:
(a) the Commonwealth; or
(b) a particular organisation; or
(c) a particular person.
68 Section 539(2), which appears in Pt 4.1, Div 2, Subdiv A dealing with applications for orders, authorises the persons referred to in the table to that subsection to apply to the courts referred to in the table for orders in relation to a contravention or proposed contravention of a relevant provision, including the maximum penalty referred to in the table. By subs (1) a provision referred to in column 1 of the table is a "civil remedy provision".
69 Section 351(1), upon which Mr Sayed relied and succeeded in this proceeding, is one of the general protection provisions referred to in item 11 of the table.
70 The table further identifies the persons or entities who may apply for the imposition of a penalty for contravention of s 351(1), namely:
(a) a person affected by the contravention;
(b) an industrial association;
(c) an inspector[.]
71 Mr Sayed brought the proceeding against the union as "a person affected by the contravention". While it may be said that s 351(1) has something in common with the "common informer" provisions to which the primary judge alluded, it is different from such provisions in that the Parliament has directly authorised "a person affected by the contravention" - not just any person - to bring an enforcement proceeding.
72 One may begin to understand, therefore, why it is that s 546(3), in Pt 4.1, Div 2, Subdiv B, empowers the Court to order that a pecuniary penalty, or a part of the penalty, be paid to the Commonwealth, a particular organisation, or a particular person. If a proceeding for contravention of s 351(1) is brought by the inspector, the inspector being a public official of the Commonwealth, it may be expected that ordinarily the pecuniary penalty would be paid to the Commonwealth. If a union were to bring the proceeding successfully, for the benefit of its members, it may be expected that the penalty would be paid to the union. If the union brought the proceeding for the benefit of a particular member, there might be payment of the penalty to that member, on the basis he or she is a particular person to whom it should be paid; or part payment to that member and the balance to the union. If a person individually affected by a contravention brought the proceeding, then the penalty may be paid to him or her as a particular person. There is a certain symmetry between the person or entity authorised to prosecute an enforcement proceeding and the person or entity to whom the penalty, if imposed, might be paid. This symmetry is recognised by the Explanatory Memorandum and authority.
73 For example, the Explanatory Memorandum, by para 2157 (set out above) expressly notes that:
Ordinarily, any pecuniary penalty awarded by the court is paid to the applicant or, in the case of proceedings brought by a Commonwealth official such as an inspector, to the Commonwealth (on the basis that the applicant represents the Commonwealth).
74 Paragraph 2158 then goes on to point out that s 546(3) gives the court the flexibility to award the penalty to someone other than the applicant, "where the plaintiff or applicant requests". The example given is where an inspector brings penalty proceedings against the director of a company that has gone into liquidation and asks the court to pay any penalty to an employee, rather than the Commonwealth, in circumstances where the employee is out of pocket. That example, it might be noted, in passing, comprehends that a particular person may, in a sense, be compensated for being "out of pocket".
75 Paragraph 2160 further observes that, by s 546(5), the court can make a pecuniary penalty order in addition to one or more orders made under s 545 (being an order that the court considers appropriate, including but not limited to injunctions, compensation and reinstatement under s 545(2)). Paragraph 2160 states that the effect of this is that a court is not restricted to the making of only one order in respect of any contravention of a particular civil remedy provision. This lends support to the view that a compensation order is not intended to be a surrogate for a penalty order.
76 In that regard, s 546(5) provides:
To avoid doubt, a court may make a pecuniary penalty order in addition to one or more orders under section 545.
77 This subsection, of course, does not say anything about to whom a penalty should be paid.
78 The concept of the "usual order" - to which para 2157 of the Explanatory Memorandum alludes - is a long standing principle governing the exercise of the discretion to make an order directing the payment of a penalty under s 546(3).
79 In Plancor, referred to above, an industrial magistrate, following the non-appearance of the appellant, Plancor Pty Ltd, gave summary judgment for the union which had brought the proceeding on behalf of its member, Ms Baker, and awarded three penalties for three separate breaches of the relevant award, totalling some $19,000. The magistrate then ordered, pursuant to s 841 of the then operative WR Act, set out at [66] above, that the total amount of the penalty be paid, in part ($2,000) to Ms Baker, in part ($4,000) to the union, and the balance ($13,000) to the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
80 At that time, s 718(1) of the WR Act, by item 4(c) of the table to that subsection, authorised an organisation of employees to bring an enforcement proceeding. Item 4(c) of the table to s 718(1) also allowed an employer or employee bound by the relevant collective agreement and an inspector to bring a proceeding.
81 In their joint judgment, Branson and Lander JJ, at [63], observed that the decision to order that the penalties imposed be paid to Ms Baker, the union and the Consolidated Revenue Fund was "not uncontroversial" and that the magistrate ought to have provided reasons for making the order.
82 At [64], their Honours then discussed the exercise of the power conveyed by s 841 of the WR Act. Their Honours first noted the observations of Gray J (the third member of the Full Court in Plancor) in Gibbs at 223-224, where his Honour had said that the "usual order" in such a proceeding, when not brought by an inspector, is for payment to the person or organisation applying for the penalty (citing authority, as discussed further below). Their Honours noted that Gray J then stated:
In the present case, the applicant has brought the proceeding on behalf of the Union, to enforce the Award for the benefit of the Union and its members. Had the applicant brought the proceeding in his personal capacity, and at his own expense, it would have been appropriate to order that the penalties be paid to him. It is unlikely that the applicant has become responsible personally for the costs of the proceeding and more likely that those costs will be met by the Union. In the circumstances, it is appropriate that the Union should be the recipient of the penalties.
(Emphasis added.)
83 We interpolate that the costs provisions in the WR Act were not materially different from the costs provisions in the FW Act.
84 Branson and Lander JJ noted, at [65], that that approach had been adopted in a number of other cases, although they also observed, at [66], that in CPSU v Telstra, Finkelstein J, at [22]-[28], queried the appropriateness of the "usual order" in every case.
85 In those paragraphs, set out by their Honours, Finkelstein J referred to "common informer" legislation which, by the time of Henry VIII, gave informers the right of action to recover a penalty in their own name. His Honour did not doubt that employer and employee organisations play a legitimate and important role in seeing that there is compliance with the provisions of industrial legislation, and noted that an individual employee will rarely have the ability to fund a proceeding for a contravention. His Honour said that if unions do not bring the proceedings, contraventions will go unpunished.
86 Finkelstein J added:
Perhaps the 'usual' order is to be explained on the basis that often an industrial organisation brings proceedings for a contravention of the … Act to protect the legitimate interests of its individual members. In such a case, it is appropriate for the organisation to receive the penalty, to defray its actual costs and to provide some compensation for the time lost by its staff.
…
However, there is no reason to make 'the usual order' if that will result in a windfall to an organisation. Proceedings for pecuniary penalties are not to be used for profit …
An appropriate order (if there be enough funds) would allow the unions a sufficient sum to meet their costs and expenses, including the expense of staff time. The balance (if any) should be paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
87 Branson and Lander JJ then referred, at [67], to some remarks of Wilcox J in Finance Sector Union of Australia v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2002] FCA 1035. There, at [16], Wilcox J said that he was not sure that he agreed with what Finkelstein J had said in CPSU v Telstra. Wilcox J considered the rationale of the "usual order" practice is that it tends to encourage a "common informer" to police the relevant legislation. His Honour added that he considered the rationale was likely to be defeated if the common informer is not allowed to make a profit.
88 Branson and Lander JJ, at [68], referred to conflicting authorities expressing agreement with the observation of Wilcox J, or approval of the observation of Finkelstein J. It may be said, in passing, as indeed the judgment of the primary judge reveals that this division of opinion has endured.
89 Their Honours then made observations, at [69] of the joint judgment, as to what a "windfall" might mean, in the context in which it had been used by Finkelstein J:
In our view, neither the total penalty actually imposed in this case, nor the amount of the penalty likely to be imposed on reconsideration of that penalty, is sufficient to give rise to concerns about a 'windfall'. We understand a 'windfall' in this context to involve an unexpected and relatively large financial benefit. Within an organisation such as the respondent, the true cost of bringing a legal proceeding is likely to prove substantial if the time of all staff involved is appropriately accounted for and other costs, possibly including overheads, identified. Before a penalty could constitute a 'windfall' in the relevant sense it would need to exceed the total amount of that cost by a significant margin.
90 But their Honours refrained from expressing a concluded view on whether, in a case in which it would otherwise be appropriate for the "usual order" to be made, such an order should not be made if it would be likely to result in a windfall to an applicant (in the sense they had described it). In other words, their Honours refrained from deciding the issue that apparently now arises for consideration in this appeal.
91 In Plancor, Gray J observed, at [38], that in Vehicle Builders' Employees' Federation of Australia v General Motors Holdens Pty Ltd (1977) 32 FLR 100 at 113, the Full Court had recognised that:
each of the persons entitled to institute proceedings under s. 119 of the [1904] Act (see s. 119 (2)) can be said to be an appropriate person selected by the legislature to police the legislation. In other words, each has a special interest to institute proceedings, and in our opinion s. 119 (2) has a limiting effect: cf. Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914, s. 13.
We interpolate that s 13 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) then authorised any person to institute a proceeding for a criminal offence against the law of the Commonwealth.
92 Returning to Plancor, Gray J further observed, at [39], that in Seymour Northrop J had described a proceeding brought under s 119 as "based on the concept of an action brought by a common informer", and added that normally in proceedings for a penalty brought by a common informer "any penalty imposed is ordered to be paid to the person who brought the proceedings".
93 Gray J then referred, at [41], to what he had said in Gibbs, to the effect that the Vehicle Builders' Employees' Federation case and Seymour were the foundation for his view that, when a proceeding is not brought by an inspector, the "usual order" is for payment to the person or organisation applying for the penalty. His Honour added, at [41], that where the applicant has not brought the proceeding in his personal capacity, but on behalf of an organisation, it was more appropriate to exercise the power to order payment of the penalty to that organisation. His Honour noted (as did Branson and Lander JJ in their joint judgment in the same case) that, in expressing this exception, he had said:
In the present case, the applicant has brought the proceeding on behalf of the Union, to enforce the Award for the benefit of the Union and its members. Had the applicant brought the proceeding in his personal capacity, and at his own expense, it would have been appropriate to order that the penalties be paid to him.
94 Gray J went on to observe, at [42], that unfortunately the references to the applicant's "own expense" and to "the cost of the proceeding" seemed to have been subsequently relied on as a foundation for the notion that an order that the penalty be paid to the initiating party is made in order to compensate that party for the cost of bringing the proceeding. His Honour said that was "not the view that [he] intended to express", nor was it the correct view, and stated:
Nothing in the reasoning in the Vehicle Builders' Employees' Federation … case or Seymour … suggests that the legislative intention behind the power to order payment of a penalty to an organisation or person was compensatory.
95 His Honour then noted, at [43], that the maximum penalty that could be imposed for many years would have been highly unlikely to compensate a party bringing a proceeding for the costs incurred in doing so. His Honour observed that, for many years, the industrial legislation had provided that there be no order for costs in a proceeding arising under that legislation, save in circumstances specifically defined. His Honour added, at [43]:
To utilise the power to award payment of a penalty to the party initiating the proceeding as a way of compensating for that party's costs would be to undermine this policy. It cannot be the case that, in choosing to increase the maximum penalty that can be imposed, Parliament intended to substitute a new rationale for the power to order payment of a penalty to a particular organisation or person.
96 His Honour concluded, at [44], that:
The correct view is that the initiating party is normally the proper recipient of the penalty as part of a system of recognising particular interests in certain classes of persons … in upholding the integrity of awards and agreements the subject of penal proceedings. Where a public official vindicates the law by suing for and obtaining a penalty, it is appropriate that the penalty be paid to the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Otherwise, the general rule remains appropriate, that the penalty is to be paid to the party initiating the proceeding, with the Gibbs … exception that the penalty may be ordered to be paid to the organisation on whose behalf the initiating party has acted.
97 Gray J added, at [45], that the notion that the penalty was designed to compensate for the costs of the proceeding has in turn led to the notion that the Court should avoid ordering a payment which would produce a "windfall" to the initiating party, referring to what was said by Finkelstein J in the CPSU v Telstra case. He also referred to what French J (as his Honour then was) said in Municipal Officers Association of Australia v City of Bayswater (1987) 22 IR 45 at 51, in referring to s 120 of the 1904 Act (as amended in 1956):
I have not been persuaded that there is any reason that this penalty ought to be paid to the applicants. The applicants' interests in respect of these particular redundancies have not been seriously affected. There is no suggestion that the employees concerned have been in any way under compensated for the redundancies to which they have been subjected.
98 Gray J considered that French J was in error in seeing the purpose of the order as compensatory. Gray J added that the passage he had previously cited from Seymour contained a refutation of that proposition and provided no support for the proposition that proceedings for pecuniary penalties are not to be used for profit. His Honour added that, "[t]he question of profit simply did not arise".
99 Gray J concluded:
The notion that the order to pay a penalty to the initiating party could produce a windfall is a false notion. If the true purpose of such an order is taken into account, and the order is not regarded as compensatory in any way, any notion of a windfall disappears.
100 We respectfully agree.
101 Given the legislative history of ss 539(2) and 546(3) of the FW Act, since the enactment of ss 44 and 45 in the pioneering 1904 Act, and the manner in which the "usual order" was articulated in such early cases as the Vehicle Builders' Employees' Federation case and Seymour, which is reflected in the Explanatory Memorandum, we consider that the power conveyed by s 546(3) is ordinarily to be exercised by awarding any penalty to the successful applicant. We accept that there may be cases (of which this is not one) where the penalty, or a part of the penalty, should be paid to another person in the circumstances described by Gray J in Plancor at [44] (as set out at [96] above).
102 The examples given in the Explanatory Memorandum and by Gray J in Gibbs as to when a payment (or a part payment) might be made to a particular person support the view that, depending on the factual circumstances of a particular case, a particular person for whose benefit, in effect, the contravention proceeding was brought may be the beneficiary of a s 546(3) order in the types of cases there referred to.
103 However, the circumstance that a beneficiary of such an order is no longer "out of pocket" (to use the language of the Explanatory Memorandum) does not, in our view, support the articulation of a principle that a successful applicant is only entitled to such an order if they can demonstrate they have incurred costs, not being legal costs within s 570 of the FW Act; or where they can show that if the penalty is paid to them they would not receive a "windfall" - however that term should properly be understood.
104 In our view, the legislative history of s 546(3), older authority and the terms of the Explanatory Memorandum show that no immediate or obvious connection was intended to be drawn between the exercise of the s 546(3) power and the exercise of the power under s 545 of the FW Act to order compensation.
105 Moreover, s 546(5) makes it plain the Court may make a pecuniary penalty order in addition to a s 545 order. The fact that a compensation order has also been made should not control the exercise of the s 546(3) power with respect to the payment of the penalty.
106 There is no necessary tension, as the primary judge put it, between the application of the "usual order", where a person affected by the contravention succeeds in a court proceeding and a penalty is imposed, and the separate entitlement of that person to be compensated under s 545. Nor is there any necessary relationship between the s 570 limitation on the recovery of legal costs in proceedings under the FW Act, except in prescribed circumstances, and the application of the "usual order".
107 Rather, s 546(3) has a long and well-understood operation. The FW Act enables, amongst others, a person affected by a contravention to initiate an enforcement proceeding and to receive the penalty, where one is imposed.
108 We note that this understanding as to how the power to award the payment of a penalty should be exercised was preferred by Gilmour J in Woodside Burrup Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2011) 220 FCR 551; [2011] FCA 949.
109 That case dealt with s 49(5) of the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth) (BCII Act), which provided:
A pecuniary penalty is payable to the Commonwealth or some other person if the Court so directs.
110 Gilmour J noted, at [125], that applications under the BCII Act differed from those under the WR Act (in effect at that time) in that a successful applicant was entitled to an order for costs. Nonetheless, his Honour considered the authorities referred to above.
111 At [133]-[134], his Honour accepted what Gray J had said in Plancor at [45] that the power to award payment of a penalty to an applicant is not regarded as compensatory and that:
It is a distinct power of a kind historically construed as intended to encourage common informers.
112 His Honour said that save, perhaps, for the question of a windfall, there was no reason why such an order should not be made even where an applicant is awarded both costs and compensation. However, Gilmour J further added, as to the "windfall" question, that his view accorded with what Gray J had said in Plancor at [45], to the effect that properly understood, because such an order is not regarded as compensatory in any way, "any notion of a windfall disappears". In the event, however, Gilmour J found it unnecessary to resolve the "windfall" issue, finding, at [136], that no question of a windfall arose in that case.
113 The decision of Jessup J in Murrihy v Betezy.com.au Pty Ltd (No 2) (2013) 221 FCR 118; [2013] FCA 1146 also generally supports the approach we have identified above. Referring to Plancor, Jessup J made the following points in relation to the case before him, at [116],:
First, the case did not call for a consideration of the situation in which a registered organisation is the applicant.
Secondly, in the words of Branson and Lander JJ in Plancor, the applicant was "the individual affected by the conduct so penalised", so the circumstance that she may, in some instances, have been compensated for some of the loss which she had sustained would not necessarily stand in the way of her receiving all or some of the penalties to be imposed.
Thirdly, their Honours' treatment of the "windfall" point was consistent with it being appropriate to take into account the costs and expenses to which the applicant, as applicant, had obviously been exposed in the assertion of her contractual and statutory rights in the proceeding. That was not to suggest that the s 546(3) discretion should be exercised in a way that provides a substitute for costs which are unavailable under s 570 of the FW Act, but, where there have clearly been such costs and expenses, it may serve to counter any suggestion that the applicant would walk away from the case with a "windfall" or "profit".
And fourthly, provisions of the kind now found in s 546(3)(b) and (c) of the FW Act - in the case of (c), to the extent that it refers to an applicant - have a considerable history in federal industrial legislation, and have for many years been recognised as setting up a presumptive entitlement in the nature of that of a common informer.
114 At [118]-[119], Jessup J further noted that:
First, there were some areas of the case before his Honour in which the applicant would receive compensation (or damages). There were, however, areas in which she would not.
Secondly, the case before him was not a case in which non-economic loss had been either alleged or proven. But that was not to say that the applicant should not be regarded as a victim of the respondents' contraventions whose position was affected for the worse by their conduct.
Thirdly, his Honour had upheld the applicant's claims for costs in some areas. While a payment under s 546(3)(c) should not be regarded as a back-door method of securing costs, nonetheless the recovery of costs to some extent has the potential to bear upon any consideration of whether such a payment would deliver a "windfall" to the applicant.
Fourthly, the "common informer" policy considerations which are ingrained into s 546(3)(c) and its statutory predecessors were said to "speak loudly" in the circumstances of the case before his Honour. For the applicant - an individual employee in a responsible position in a non-industrialised workplace - to have advanced, and persisted with, claims which the Court had held to be legitimate, and to have done so in the face of the deferrals and procrastinations of the respondents, could only have constituted a substantial, continuing, burden for her. In a forensic and evidentiary environment which would have tested the most seasoned of litigators, the applicant maintained her focus and, ultimately, achieved the success which was always her due. His Honour considered it to be "four-square" within the policy of s 546(3)(c) that an employee in the position of the applicant should be encouraged to proceed as she had done, thereby making it the more likely that the applicable provisions of the FW Act will be more than mere words on the statute book.
115 We agree generally with the observations made by Jessup J.
116 In this appeal, as Jessup J said of the case before him, the policy considerations of s 546(3) "speak loudly" in the circumstances to justify the payment of the penalty imposed to the individual affected by the contravention who, under the authority of the FW Act, commenced and maintained this enforcement proceeding. If Mr Sayed had not pursued the action, it is unlikely that it would have been pursued. He took on the proceeding at obvious cost to himself.
117 It is as clear today, as it was in 1904, that unions will not always, or invariably, be the prosecutor in an enforcement proceeding under industrial legislation. Yet the principle adopted by the primary judge would have the effect of stultifying civil penalty proceedings by persons affected by a contravention who are not backed by industrial power of one sort or another.
118 There is, in any event, something problematic about not applying the "usual order" because of an apprehended "windfall" to the successful applicant. In the joint judgment of Branson and Lander JJ in Plancor, at [69], their Honours considered that neither the total penalty actually imposed in that case, nor the amount of the penalty likely to be imposed on reconsideration, was sufficient to give rise to concerns about a "windfall". Having just referred to what Finkelstein J said in CPSU v Telstra, suggesting a "windfall" factor may be relevant to the exercise of the power in that case, their Honours made the observations about the concept of "windfall" set out above at [89].
119 In our view, it is not at all clear on the evidence in this case that, if the primary judge had chosen to direct payment of the penalties to him Mr Sayed would have received a windfall in the sense described by Branson and Lander JJ. We say this because, although Mr Sayed did not lead evidence himself about the extent of costs he had incurred in maintaining his prosecution of the CFMEU, it was obvious, on the face of the proceeding, that he had significant personal involvement in the maintenance of the proceeding where he was represented over a three day hearing by senior and junior counsel, instructed by solicitors he had retained, who also prepared the submissions as to penalty. Accepting that legal expenses should not be taken into account in considering "the true cost" of bringing such a prosecution because of the stipulation in s 570 that a party's legal costs are not recoverable except in circumstances not applicable here, there can be no doubt that Mr Sayed, in bringing and maintaining the prosecution of the union, and in dealing with the solicitors he instructed and the counsel they briefed, must have incurred considerable time, trouble and lost opportunity, not to mention the real risk to his career that Mr Sayed assumed in running the proceeding.
120 To the extent that the primary judge appears to have drawn a distinction, at [88]-[89], between a case prosecuted by a union or other representative organisation and one prosecuted by the person directly affected by the contravention(s), we fail to see how that distinction, of itself, should lead to any immediate assumption or conclusion that the individual, by contrast to an organisation, has not, or has not necessarily, incurred significant time, trouble and lost opportunity costs in maintaining the prosecution, so that in the absence of some disentitling feature, the usual order for payment of the penalty to the prosecutor is appropriate.
121 Furthermore, it is not apparent to us why the receipt of a penalty should not operate as an incentive to an affected person to bring a prosecution like this under the FW Act. After all, as Wilcox J noted in Finance Sector Union, it ensures the enforcement of the legislative scheme. Moreover, as Jessup J put it in Murrihy, this incentive to bring and maintain such a proceeding makes it more likely that the applicable provisions of the FW Act "will be more than mere words on the statute book". As Gray J said in Plancor, the question of "profit" does not arise on a proper construction of the power.
122 For these reasons we would allow the appeal and vary order 4 made on 13 April 2015 so that:
The penalties payable by reason of paragraphs 1 to 3 inclusive of these orders be payable to the applicant forthwith.