Criminal Law - Appeal and new trial - Appeal against sentence - Grounds for interference - Sentence manifestly excessive or inadequate - Assaults on pregnant woman and five attempts to interfere with a witness - Family violence - Sentence of 22 months' imprisonment with non-parole period of 11 months manifestly inadequate.

Judgment Number: [2018] TASCCA 6

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v LUKE PETER KARKLINS

1. Sentence of 1 year 10 months' imprisonment with non-parole period of half that sentence set aside.

1. Respondent sentenced to 2 years 10 months' imprisonment with effect from 17 March 2017.

1. Respondent not to be eligible for parole until he has served 20 months of that sentence.

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v LUKE PETER KARKLINS

1. I agree with the orders proposed by Geason J. I agree in substance with his comments as to the relevant sentencing considerations.
2. When imposing global sentences of imprisonment in respect of a number of crimes or offences, I have generally not provided arithmetical calculations relating to the components attributable to particular offences or discounts relating to totality or other factors. However I acknowledge that there is no reason why a sentencer should not take such an approach. Although I have rarely indicated the discount that I consider appropriate in relation to a plea of guilty in any particular case, I acknowledge that there are times when providing specific information as to the size of such a discount is appropriate. Because offenders in some types of cases, particularly serious and complicated drug trafficking cases, are often slow to indicate a willingness to plead guilty, it may be that the time has come for the Tasmanian Parliament to consider introducing legislation relating to the range of sentencing discounts that ought ordinarily to be given when offenders plead guilty at particular stages of the criminal justice process.

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v LUKE PETER KARKLINS

1. This is an appeal against sentence. The respondent pleaded guilty to a single count of assault, contrary to s 184 of the Criminal Code, three counts of assault on a pregnant woman, contrary to s 184A of the Code, five counts of attempting to interfere with a witness, contrary to ss 100 and 299 of the Code, and one count of destroying property, contrary to s 37(1) of the Police Offences Act 1935.
2. By way of global sentence, he was sentenced by Pearce J to one year and ten months' imprisonment, backdated to 17 March 2017 when he was taken into custody. The non-parole period was half that sentence.
3. The State contends that the sentence imposed upon the respondent was manifestly inadequate.

1. The respondent and the complainant had been living together for about five months prior to the commission of these offences. They shared their home with the complainant's seven-year-old son, from a previous relationship.
2. At the time of the offending the complainant was about four weeks' pregnant with the respondent's child.
3. At around 3pm on 17 March 2017, the complainant and the respondent picked up the complainant's son from school. On the journey home the respondent called the son a "sook" and a "little bitch". The complainant asked him to stop, but he would not. He continued until she struck him to the face. He did not retaliate, but continued belittling the complainant's son.
4. When they arrived home, he announced that he was going to leave the complainant. She asked him to stay. An argument began between them. She said that she did not want to be left to raise another child by herself.
5. She called her mother and asked her to come and get her son. Her mother arrived at approximately 3.30pm. She found the complainant's son in the driveway shaking and crying. She could hear the complainant and the respondent arguing. She attempted to speak to the respondent but he told her not to interfere. The argument continued with the complainant pleading for the respondent to stay. He refused.
6. The complainant's mother left at around 5pm. She was concerned for her daughter's safety but needed to collect her husband. She took the complainant's son with her. The respondent assured her that he would not hit the complainant as it would be "a soft thing to do, hitting a woman".
7. In time, the complainant tired of trying to persuade the respondent to stay. She told him to leave. She picked up some of his clothes and threw them to the front door. She called him "a dog".
8. The respondent walked over to her and head-butted her to the right side of her face. He abused her calling her "a junkie, a slut, a mole and a cunt". He said that he hoped she lost the baby and that if she did not he would come back and kill her.
9. Whilst the respondent was out the front of the house the complainant closed and locked the front door. This angered him. He still had some belongings inside the house. He punched the glass in the front door causing it to smash, cutting his hands as he did so. He reached through the broken glass, unlocked the door and went back inside. He threatened to kill the complainant. He squeezed her throat for about 20 seconds until she could not breathe. He said to her, "this will be your last breath". Again, he threatened to kill her and their baby and "put them in a river". The complainant thought she was going to die. She struggled unsuccessfully to prise his hand from around her throat. She was eventually able to kick the respondent to the groin, causing him to let go and get off her.
10. The complainant got herself up off the floor and went and sat in the hallway. The respondent continued packing his belongings, before he moved towards her again. He grabbed her by the throat a second time, restricting her ability to breathe. She freed herself by kicking him in the stomach area, and went into the main bedroom, where she sat on the bed. She was upset and crying. He began verbally abusing her. As he approached she stood up. He pushed her against a dresser and she fell to the floor. He grabbed her around the throat with one hand, and then pulled her up off the floor by her hair. This caused her intense pain. He held her in front of a mirror and said to her, "look at who you are". He then let go of her, and she fell to the ground and lost consciousness for a short time.
11. When the complainant regained consciousness, the respondent was still in the house packing. She got onto the bed to try to recover. He returned and grabbed her by the throat again, choking her until she could not breathe. He stated that it would be her last breath and that he was going to kill her and their baby. He said that if the baby survived he would kill it and bury their bodies "in the lake". The complainant lost consciousness for a second time.
12. When she regained consciousness the complainant saw the respondent leaving the house with a friend. Police and an ambulance were called and attended. As a result of the assault the complainant was taken to hospital suffering from bruising and swelling to her eye, red marks to both sides of her throat, and scratches and bruising to her back. Initial tests showed that her baby was uninjured. She made a video recorded statement to police regarding the events.
13. Later that evening the respondent was arrested and taken to the Devonport police station where he was detained. He was interviewed the following morning. He stated that the complainant had repeatedly struck him during the drive home from collecting her son from school. He said that because of this he had decided to leave the relationship. When he arrived home, he had begun packing his belongings.
14. He denied choking the complainant saying that she probably did it to herself. He said that if he had assaulted her "she would be more fucked up than that". He said that he did not know how the complainant received her injuries. He admitted pushing her against a cupboard because she was getting in his way. He was aware she was pregnant. He agreed that he told her that the baby was going to die, but claimed that he meant that the baby would die within three months by way of miscarriage as this had happened to the complainant twice before.
15. The respondent was described as aggressive and unco-operative in his dealings with police.
16. An interim family violence order was made which prohibited the respondent from contacting the complainant.
17. On 10 April 2017, whilst on remand for these offences, the respondent contacted a friend. He told him to speak to the complainant, and to tell her to go to the police station and "pull her statement". He was to tell her that if she did this the respondent would consider "getting back with her".
18. The visit to the complainant occurred as requested. It had the desired effect. Later that day she went to the police station where she made a statutory declaration expressing her desire to retract her statement to police. Among other things she said that she wanted the respondent to be involved with their child, that she was no longer scared of him and would like to be able to communicate with him. She said that she did not want him charged with assaulting her. She swore the statutory declaration was true and correct, and that she had not been coerced into making it.
19. On 12 April 2017, the respondent made enquiries of his friend to see if the complainant had done what he had asked. He was told that she had. The respondent asked him to tell the complainant that he loved her, or "some other bullshit to keep her happy". He told his friend that "keeping her sweet" was better for him.
20. On 25 April 2017, the respondent spoke to the complainant on the telephone. He told her that if he "went not guilty" then she should not turn up at court to give evidence.
21. On 27 April 2017, he told the complainant she was going to get a summons to attend court and that she would have to tell them that she did not remember anything. He also asked his friend to remind the complainant of this.
22. On 28 April 2017, the respondent spoke to the complainant by telephone. He told her that he was going to be in prison for a while. The complainant told him that she knew he was taking the matter to trial and said she was scared. The respondent said that it would come down to her evidence. He told her that she had to say she had blotted it out of her memory and she did not remember anything. The complainant replied that it had "actually happened" that way, and "she really doesn't remember".
23. On 30 April 2017, the respondent spoke to his friend again. He explained that he was pleading not guilty and was waiting for a trial date in the Supreme Court. He repeated his belief that if the complainant said she did not remember, he would be alright.
24. On 3 May 2017, the respondent spoke to the complainant on the telephone. During the call, he said that he hoped things went well in court. She told the respondent that she was to speak to the prosecutor that day. He reminded her that she was to tell the prosecutor that she would not give evidence against him, and to tell the prosecutor that she could not remember. The complainant said that "she was onto it". The respondent replied, "hopefully the charges will be dropped".
25. On 5 May 2017, the respondent spoke to the complainant again. He told her that he just been on the phone to his lawyer. He said that it was all going to come down to the complainant and "whether you cooperate or not". He told her that she was better off co-operating with him. The complainant said that she would do as he asked and that she was not going to change her mind.
26. In July 2017, police obtained recordings of each of the telephone calls. They spoke with the complainant in late July. She told them that she feared the consequences if she did not go along with the respondent.
27. Counsel for the respondent made submissions in mitigation. Summarised in the appeal papers in terms not disputed, they were as follows:

"1 The respondent was 29 years of age. He was from New South Wales where he had an unstable and traumatic upbringing with his alcoholic mother. He suffered violence from some of his mother's partners.

1. He moved to Victoria at age 11 to live with his older sister and brother. His brother was a serious drug user who perpetrated physical violence upon him during his three-year stay.
2. He does not know his biological father.
3. From the age of approximately 14 years, he led an unstable and itinerant life.
4. He has limited education, leaving formal schooling shortly after commencing year 8, and only limited qualifications, gained while in prison in Victoria.
5. He has not had permanent employment but has worked casually in manual type positions.
6. He has prior convictions relating to the infliction of significant violence, however none in the context of a domestic relationship.
7. The respondent has two children from a previous marriage. He has not had contact with them for approximately two years.
8. The respondent was intoxicated when he committed the assaults and destroyed property. He acknowledged he was an alcoholic.
9. He 'repeatedly and continuously made efforts to remove himself from the situation' during the period the assaults were committed. [Emphasis added.]
10. He had not responded physically to an assault committed on him by the complainant earlier that day and 'when the parties had returned home he has taken the view that he should leave the residence for at least some period of time'. [Emphasis added.]
11. It was significant that he desisted between the various assaults and resumed trying to collect his belongings and leave the residence.
12. He caused damage to the front door because he was being denied entry to the property to collect his belongings.
13. He pleaded guilty at a relatively early stage, and by his plea the complainant was saved from the need to give evidence in proceedings."

1. In sentencing the respondent the learned sentencing judge said:

"Luke Karklins pleads guilty to one count of assault, three counts of assault on a pregnant woman and five counts of attempting to interfere with a witness. I also agreed to deal with his plea of guilty to the summary charge of destroying property. All of the offences occurred in the course of one incident on 17 March 2017.

The defendant and the complainant had been in a relationship for about five months. They lived together in Ulverstone with her seven year old son. The complainant was four months [sic] pregnant with his child.

After the complainant became angry about how the defendant spoke to her son she punched him to the face. He did not retaliate but told her he was leaving and started to pack his belongings. She told him she did not want him to leave. He refused and a prolonged argument followed.

After more than an hour the complainant tired of trying to persuade the defendant to stay and she threw some of his clothes out the front door and called him a dog. He responded by head-butting her. That is the first assault. He abused and threatened her but persisted in his attempts to leave. However the complainant locked him outside when his dog and some of his belongings were still inside. He re-entered by breaking the glass in the door with his hand, thereby destroying property.

He threatened to kill the complainant and grabbed her by the throat with his hand, choking her. He squeezed for about 20 seconds until she couldn't breathe. She unsuccessfully tried to prise his hand away but escaped by kicking him in the groin. The defendant continued to make threats to kill her but resumed packing his belongings. However he again approached her and grabbed her by the throat a second time, again restricting her ability to breathe.

Those two instances of grabbing her by the throat are collectively the second assault. Again she escaped by kicking him. She walked to the bedroom, upset and crying. He followed her and pushed her over. While she was on the ground he choked her for a third time. He then pulled her up by the hair and held her in front of a mirror while making disparaging comments. She fell to the ground, losing consciousness for a short time. Those events are the third assault.

After packing more belongings the defendant again returned to the bedroom and grabbed her by the throat while she was on the bed, choking her for the fourth time. He threatened to kill her and the baby. That is the fourth assault. She lost consciousness again and woke to see the defendant leaving the house with a friend. The police and an ambulance were called. The police found the defendant at another house in Ulverstone that evening. He was arrested. He was interviewed but was aggressive and uncooperative and did not admit what he had done. He has been in custody ever since.

The five counts of attempting to interfere with a witness arise from a series of communications made by the defendant to the complainant while he has been in custody on remand. On 10, 25, 27 and 28 April 2017, and again on 3 May 2017, the defendant contacted the complainant attempting to prevent or dissuade her from giving a true account to the police of what had occurred, or from giving evidence in court proceedings. Three of those occasions comprised phone conversations between the defendant and the complainant. The other two occasions were via an intermediary. All were attempts to pervert or obstruct the course of justice by applying pressure to the complainant to hide the truth and advance a lie. The complainant told the police that she was scared of the consequences if she did not do as she was asked. She made a statutory declaration on 17 March 2017 to the effect that she did not want the defendant charged. The declaration was correctly ignored. Whether she would have refused to give evidence against the defendant has not been tested because of his plea.

The defendant is 29. He has a disadvantaged and traumatic background. He originally lived in NSW. He does not know his biological father. His alcoholic mother kicked him out of home when he was very young. For a time he lived with his sister and older brother in Victoria. However when his brother was violent towards him he left and from age 14 has led an itinerant life. He has very limited education. He has held some employment but only in casual manual labouring positions. His only skills were acquired while serving terms of imprisonment. He has a record for violent offending. In 2007, when he was 19, he was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment in NSW for maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm. Then in 2011 he was imprisoned in Victoria for 3½ years, with a non-parole period of two years, for recklessly causing serious injury. None of his prior convictions are for family violence.

The defendant is entitled to mitigation from his plea of guilty. It facilitates the course of justice, avoids the need for the complainant to give evidence and indicates an acceptance of responsibility.

The complainant was the first to apply force, but the defendant is a powerful man and was in a position of physical dominance over her. There was no excuse for the violence he inflicted and it is to be condemned. The assaults were not committed in the presence of the complainant's son, who had gone out with his grandmother. There are some aspects of his behaviour which reflect in his favour. More than once he attempted to defuse the situation by leaving the house, only to be prevented by her from doing so. As to the steps he later took to pressure the complainant to change her story, none of his approaches contained express threats of violence or intimidation. Most fortunately, it seems that the complainant suffered no serious or lasting physical injury, although the experience must have been traumatic and frightening for her. Family violence is rightly the subject of condemnation by the courts and the community. Offenders must be punished and the public protected. The defendant's knowledge of the complainant's pregnancy makes the crime more serious because of the risk posed to her unborn child. Attempting to interfere with a witness is also a serious crime. It requires proof or admission of intent to pervert or obstruct the due course of justice. Crimes of this nature are regarded as serious because they tend to subvert the justice system, the integrity of which is essential to the wellbeing of our society. Those who commit the crime are almost invariably sent to prison, not only to punish the offender, but to send a message to those who might be tempted to act as the defendant did that prison is the likely outcome. That is so even if, as in this case, the attempt to avoid prosecution was unsuccessful, although the fact that it was unsuccessful is relevant. These factors have a particular force when a victim of family violence is discouraged from reporting it or asked to give false evidence.

There are some balancing considerations. It seems from the defendant's record that he has never had the benefit of much assistance or supervision while in the community. My assessment is that there is still a prospect of his rehabilitation. Therefore, despite his record, I will permit eligibility for parole. To ensure further protection of the complainant I will make a family violence order.

Luke Karklins, you are convicted on each count. In accordance with the Family Violence Act 2004, s 13A, I direct that each offence be recorded on your criminal record as a family violence offence. You must pay the victim of crime compensation levy of $470 within 28 days of your release. I make a family violence order for a period of three years from today in terms of the interim family violence order made by a magistrate on 25 August 2017. I impose one sentence. You are sentenced to imprisonment for one year and ten months from 17 March 2017. I order that you not be eligible for parole until you have served half of that sentence."

1. The appellant's right of appeal derives from s 401(2)(c) of the Code.
2. In Green v The Queen [2011] HCA 49, 244 CLR 462 at 477, the High Court observed that the purpose of the Crown appeal is "to lay down principles for the governance and guidance that Courts have in the duty of sentencing convicted persons. That is a limiting purpose. It does not extend to the general correction of errors made by sentencing judges." [My emphasis.]
3. The reference to "principles" is to be understood as encompassing the avoidance of manifest inadequacy or inconsistency in sentencing standards: Everett v The Queen [1994] HCA 49; (1994) 181 CLR 295 at 300.
4. In R v Darwich [2018] NSWCCA 46, White JA considered the proposition that the purpose of Crown appeals was a "limiting purpose":

"[10] ... the statement in Green v The Queen that the purpose of Crown appeals under s 5D is to lay down principles for the governance and guidance of courts and that this is a limiting purpose, is to be understood in the sense that the discretion to re-sentence if error of principle is shown, or the residual discretion not to re-sentence notwithstanding that error in principle is shown, is to be exercised having regard to the Court of Criminal Appeal's function of interfering with sentences only where a sentence is manifestly inadequate, or error of principle is shown, or there is a gross departure from a sentencing norm".

1. The principles applicable in appeals alleging manifest inadequacy (or excess) are settled. An appellate court sits to correct material error: Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54, 202 CLR 321, per Kirby J at [57]-[60]. The Crown contended that the aggregate sentence is manifestly inadequate in the sense of being "unreasonable and plainly unjust": Dinsdale v The Queen and Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25, 228 CLR 357 at [25]. A conclusion that a sentence is manifestly inadequate does not depend upon the identification of specific error: Dinsdale v The Queen at [6]. But where specific error is not alleged, the appellate court must be persuaded of error of the second type referred to in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505, that is, that the sentence imposed is "unreasonable or plainly unjust".
2. In Director of Public Prosecutions (Acting) v Pearce [2015] TASCCA 1, Pearce J, with whom Blow CJ and Porter J agreed, said at [8]:

"It must be established that the sentencing order is so manifestly wrong that it could only be the result of some undefinable error in the exercise of the judicial discretion: Bresnehan v The Queen [1992] TASSC 55; (1992) 1 Tas R 234 at 242. A court of criminal appeal may not substitute its own opinion for that of the sentencing judge merely because the appellate court would have exercised its discretion in a manner different from the manner in which the sentencing judge exercised his or her discretion: see Lowndes v The Queen [1999] HCA 29; (1999) 195 CLR 665 at [15], and the other cases referred to by this Court in Director of Public Prosecutions v CSS [2013] TASCCA 10. Sentencing judges should be 'accorded a wide measure of latitude': Postiglione v The Queen [1997] HCA 26; (1997) 189 CLR 295 per Kirby J at 336. Excess or inadequacy is either apparent or it is not: Dinsdale v The Queen (above) at [6]. In considering that question regard is to be given to all the matters that are relevant to determining the sentence: Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; (2010) 242 CLR 520 at 539."

1. If error is demonstrated, an appellant must persuade the court that its residual discretion not to interfere should not be exercised: Director of Public Prosecutions v Harington [2017] TASCCA 4, at [96] per Pearce J; R v Hernando [2002] NSWCCA 489, 136 A Crim R 451 at [12]; CMB v Attorney-General (NSW) [2015] HCA 9, 243 A Crim R 282, per French CJ and Gageler J at [34] and Kiefel J (as she then was), Bell and Keane JJ at [66].

1. In Tasmania, between August 2005 and November 2017 there have been 27 sentences for the crime of assault on a pregnant woman, either as a single count or as part of a global sentence.
2. The Sentencing Advisory Council statistics indicate that sentences of imprisonment for multiple counts of assault on a pregnant woman in the period 2001-2014 fell in the range of eight to 36 months, with an average of 12. Single counts of the crime fell within the range of six and nine months imprisonment, with an average of 7.7 months. Single counts of assault for the same period ranged from 0.13 months to 24 months, with an average of 6.9 months.
3. Of the 27 reported cases of assault on a pregnant woman to which the Court was referred, seven involved acts of smothering or choking having an effect on the complainant's ability to breathe. One involved a loss of consciousness. In all but one case a head sentence of imprisonment was imposed. I note that there was no indication in that single case that the complainant's ability to breathe was affected. In the three cases where a non-parole period was set, it was no less than 75% of the head sentence.

1. There are no Sentencing Advisory Council statistics available for the crime of attempting to interfere with a witness. However, this crime is regarded seriously for its capacity to undermine the operation of the criminal justice system, and create a risk that offenders go unpunished. Sentences for this crime have regularly emphasised these factors as justifying actual custodial sentences: Porter J: Daniel Luke Bennett, 10 September 2015 - 2 months' imprisonment; Blow J (as he then was): Christopher Steven Stanley, 6 December 2011 - 3 months' imprisonment and Nathan John Garth, 30 March 2011 - 2 years' imprisonment; Underwood CJ: Ian Anthony Martin, 21 February 2008 - 18 months' imprisonment (eligible for parole after 10 months).
2. It is recognised that any statistical analysis of sentences imposed for offences covering a wide range of conduct and criminality is attended by risk, particularly where the sample size is small, and the reasons for particular penalties not articulated: Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64, 207 CLR 584 [59] and [66]. See also Kaye v Tasmania [2016] TASCCA 15 at [12]. Even where a "sentencing range" can be demonstrated, it does not mean that the range itself or its upper or lower limits are correct: Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45, 292 CLR 520 at [54]. In DPP v Dalgliesh [2017] HCA 41 349 ALR 37, the High Court said at [49]:

"In Elias v The Queen [2013] HCA 31; (2013) 248 CLR 483 at [27], French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ said: '[t]he administration of the criminal law involves individualised justice'. The imposition of a just sentence on an offender in a particular case is an exercise of judicial discretion concerned to do justice in that case. It is also the case that, as Gleeson CJ said in Wong v The Queen (2001) HCA 64 at [6]: '[t]he administration of criminal justice works as a system ... It should be systematically fair, and that involves, amongst other things, reasonable consistency'."

1. The consistency that is required is consistency in the application of the relevant legal principles: Hili (above) at [53].

1. In R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67 at 68, Gleeson CJ said:

"A moment's consideration will show that the interplay of the considerations relevant to sentencing may be complex and on occasion even intricate. It is therefore erroneous in principle to approach the law of sentencing as though automatic consequences follow from the presence or absence of particular factual circumstances. In every case, what is called for is the making of a discretionary decision in the light of the circumstances of the individual case, and in the light of the purposes to be served by the sentencing exercise."

1. In Wong v The Queen (above) it was said by Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ:

"[T]he task of the sentencer is to take account of all of the relevant factors and to arrive at a single result which takes due account of them all. That is what is meant by saying that the task is to arrive at an 'instinctive synthesis'. This expression is used, not as might be supposed, to cloak the task of the sentencer in some mystery, but to make plain that the sentencer is called on to reach a single sentence which, in the case of an offence like the one now under discussion, balances many different and conflicting features."

1. Matters said to be aggravating or mitigatory are considerations of which "due account is taken" in the "making of a discretionary decision in the light of the circumstances of the individual case".
2. There were a number of aggravating features of this case. At the time the respondent committed the acts of choking the complainant to the point of unconsciousness, he had already head-butted her to the face and choked her twice. She was vulnerable, crying, injured and unable to defend herself from further attack. She was also frightened for her life and that of her unborn child. During the choking episodes, the complainant did not know when or if the respondent would stop. She thought she was going to die. On two occasions, she lost consciousness. The respondent further denigrated the complainant, holding her up in front of a mirror by her hair and telling her to "look at who you are".
3. The complainant was four weeks' pregnant with his child. That the respondent continued to engage in strangling his victim in those circumstances compounds the seriousness of his conduct. As does the fact that that he left the premises, notwithstanding his victim's unconscious state, choosing not to render assistance or procure it. That was callous and cruel. It exposes the respondent's complete indifference to his victim's condition and her welfare.
4. Because of the assaults the complainant received physical injuries, including bruising to her back, bruising and swelling to her eye, and bruising and red marks to both sides of her throat. Her baby was not injured, although at the time the complainant did not know this, and underwent testing at the hospital, further compounding the anxiety and trauma.
5. On multiple occasions throughout the assaults, the respondent mentioned the unborn child, stating he hoped the complainant lost the baby and if she did not, he would "come back and kill her", threatening to kill both the complainant and the baby and put them in a river, and "if the baby survived, he would kill it and bury their bodies in the lake".
6. The crimes were committed in the context of a domestic relationship. This is also an aggravating factor: Price v Tasmania [2016] TASCCA 22 at [39] per Estcourt J.
7. The respondent had an opportunity to reflect upon his conduct between each attack, and to desist. He did not. This too, is an aggravating factor: Hiron v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 336.
8. The respondent's attempts to frustrate his prosecution should also be seen as particularly serious matters. They were a cynical exercise in emotional blackmail. That these offences occurred while the respondent was subject to an interim family violence order is an aggravating factor. Domestic violence typically occurs behind closed doors, making detection inherently difficult. Relationship dynamics frequently militate against a prosecution. Conduct directed at interfering with the prosecutorial process undermines the system intended to afford protection to victims of violence, making an inherently difficult process more so. When it is effective the opportunity for court intervention is foregone. Such intervention might be lifesaving. This offending should be viewed as striking at the heart of legislative attempts to provide protection to the vulnerable. It should be accepted in cases of family violence that attempts to interfere with the due administration of justice by the means of emotional manipulation of a vulnerable victim is a serious matter the consequences of which will always be severe.
9. It was acknowledged in R v Kilic [2016] HCA 48, 91 ALJR 131 at [21] that sentencing practices for offences involving domestic violence may "depart from past sentencing practices for this category of offence because of changes in societal attitudes to domestic relations".
10. In Devine, 5 July 1993, Underwood J (as he then was) said, while sentencing an offender for assaulting his estranged wife in the presence of small children:

"Domestic violence is a profound problem and it is the duty of the Courts to denounce offences such as these and attempt to deter its recurrence by you and other men. The relationship between husband and wife, albeit estranged, is an aggravating factor for violence of this kind constitutes a breach of trust. It is also an abuse of power and control on one who, in the circumstances, was in a position of vulnerability".

1. In Parker v The Queen A57/1994, [1994] TASSC 94 at [39], Underwood J said:

"... sentencing for crimes of domestic violence should proceed in accordance with the following principles expressed by the Alberta Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Brown (1992) 73 CCC (3d) 242 at 249:

'When a man assaults his wife or other female partner, his violence toward her can be accurately characterised as a breach of the position of trust which he occupies. It is an aggravating factor. Men who assault their wives are abusing the power and control which they so often have over the women with whom they live. The vulnerability of many such women is increased by the financial and emotional situation in which they find themselves, which makes it difficult for them to escape'."

1. Wood J also referred to the breach of trust aspect in Mayne v Tasmania [2017] TASSC 38 at [40].

1. At the hearing of this appeal the respondent conceded that the pleas of guilty in respect of the various counts of assault were not entered or indicated at the earliest possible opportunity. It was accepted that an application for preliminary proceedings had been filed. However that application was adjourned pending consideration of certain matters by the Crown. Nonetheless, it was said that the pleas were indicated at a relatively early stage in proceedings.
2. The quantum of any discount will depend on all the circumstances, including the timing of the plea, a matter bearing directly upon the extent to which the cost and inconvenience to the State will have been reduced: DPP v Harington (above) at [36] per Pearce J.
3. A plea of guilty, even if delivered at a late stage of proceedings, attracts a discount: Director of Public Prosecutions v Harris [2013] TASCCA 5 at [40]- [41] per Estcourt J

"[40] Counsel for the respondent also pointed to the fact that although the case against the respondent was overwhelming, he did arrange for the matter to be brought forward so that it could be quickly dealt with and the respondent pleaded guilty at an early stage. The learned sentencing judge accepted those actions of the respondent demonstrated his express remorse and that he was entitled to credit for those things. That approach was not challenged on this appeal and was plainly a matter going to the length of the appropriate sentence to be imposed.

[41] I digress to observe that, even were it otherwise and the early plea of guilty was born of nothing other than acceptance of the inevitable, it would nonetheless have had the effect of saving the State the expense and inconvenience of a trial and of saving the victims of the crime, particularly the employee who required additional counselling as a result of the crime, from any concern about having to give evidence."

1. This is further explained in Director of Public Prosecutions v Farmer [2005] TASSC 15, 13 Tas R 418 at [50] by Blow J:

"By pleading guilty when he did, the respondent avoided the need for the seven complainants, all of whom had given evidence and been cross-examined on the voir dire, to give evidence again before a jury. He also saved the Crown and its other witnesses the cost and inconvenience of completing a long trial. It is in the interests of the administration of justice that a substantial sentencing discount be provided to any offender who pleads guilty, even at such a late stage. Otherwise offenders will have little incentive to plead guilty. Evans J has suggested that a sentencing discount of about 20 per cent would be appropriate in such circumstances. For my part, I would be a little less generous, but I acknowledge that a substantial discount is appropriate by reason of this factor in this case".

1. As to specification of the amount of the discount in X_iao v The Queen_ [2018] NSWCCA 4 a court of five judges said at [279]-[280]:

"[279] There remains the question of whether it is necessary or appropriate to specify the discount given for a plea. In R v Place, where the legislation in question was in similar terms to s 16A(2)(g), the plurality stated (at [81]-[83]) that courts should be encouraged to identify the specific reduction given. That is consistent with what was said by Kirby J in Cameron (at [71) that it is desirable and certainly permissible to identify the measure of discount afforded for a plea of guilty. Further, McHugh J pointed out in Markarian (at [74]) that specification of such a discount is not inconsistent with the instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing.

[280] Section 16A(2)(g) neither requires nor prohibits the specification of a discount. However, once it is accepted that s 16A allows a sentencing judge to give a discount to the sentence which would otherwise be imposed, it seems to us desirable that, in the interests of transparency, such discounts be specified. However, there is no obligation on the sentencing judge to do so, and a failure to do so would not of itself amount to error."

1. This decision is referred to by Estcourt J in Director of Public Prosecutions v Broad [2018] TASCCA 5 at [25], in part, for the proposition that it is in the interests of transparency such discount be specified.
2. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Farmer at [39] Evans J quantified a discount for the plea of guilty at 20%. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Harington, Wood J said at [36]:

"I accept that the respondent's plea of guilty is a significant mitigatory factor. In determining an appropriate discount, the timing of the plea is important, an early plea attracts a greater discount than a late plea. Here, the respondent's pleas of guilty were entered at a very late stage but saved the victims from giving evidence. His pleas of guilty may, in the circumstances of this case, result in a discount of up to 20%."

1. Estcourt J agreed with her Honour's approach in that case in Butt v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 3 at [27].
2. I am conscious of what was said by the Court in Pavlic v The Queen [1995] TASSC 96; (1995) 5 Tas R 186. But I repeat what I said in Director of Public Prosecutions v Broad [2018] TASCCA 5 at [38]. Unless the discount which is applied is quantified, the force of the oft repeated proposition that a benefit accrues from entering an early plea is diminished. As such, in my view, the amount of any discount afforded a defendant should be disclosed.

1. The task for a court on a plea of guilty was restated in Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39, 244 CLR 120 at [26], where the High Court confirmed that the proper approach to sentencing is as described by McHugh J in Markarian v The Queen (above) at [51], as follows:

"[T]he judge identifies all the factors that are relevant to the sentence, discusses their significance and then makes a value judgment as to what is the appropriate sentence given all the factors of the case."

1. General deterrence is a relevant factor. In R v Harrison (1997) 93 A Crim R 314 at 320, Hunt CJ at CL said at 320:

"Except in well-defined circumstances such as youth or the mental incapacity of the offender ... public deterrence is generally regarded as the main purpose of punishment, and the subjective considerations relating to the particular prisoner (however persuasive) are necessarily subsidiary to the duty of the courts to see that the sentence which is imposed will operate as a powerful factor in preventing the commission of similar crimes by those who may otherwise be tempted by the prospect that only light punishment will be imposed".

1. There is no suggestion of any mental illness in this case, and accordingly no proper basis for giving general deterrence a more limited operation in fixing penalty: Groenewege v Tasmania [2013] TASCCA 7; Thompson v The Queen [2005] WASCA 223, 157 A Crim R 385.
2. Relationship dynamics create a unique sentencing context and the result of criminal violence in a domestic situation is frequently sequelae that are significantly different from most other types of offending. These factors: reconciliation between perpetrator and offender; withdrawal of complaints; breaches of family violence orders implemented to protect the victim, often before trial; victims blaming themselves for the episodes of violence, can, in turn, make prosecution and sentencing more complex.
3. As to this type offending, in R v Fairbrother; ex parte Attorney General [2005] QCA 105 at 23, McMurdo P said at [23]:

"[23] Domestic violence is an insidious, prevalent and serious problem in our society. Victims are often too ashamed to publicly complain, partly because of misguided feelings of guilt and responsibility for the perpetrator's actions. Members of the community are often reluctant to become involved in the personal relationships of others where domestic violence is concerned. Perpetrators of domestic violence often fail to have insight into the seriousness of their offending, claiming an entitlement to behave in that way or at least to be forgiven by the victim and to evade punishment by society. Domestic violence has a deleterious on-going impact not only on the immediate victim but on the victim's wider family and ultimately on the whole of society. It is not solely a domestic issue; it is a crime against the State warranting salutary punishment. The cost to the community in terms of lost income and productivity, medical and psychological treatment and on-going social problems is immense. Perpetrators of serious acts of domestic violence must know that society will not tolerate such behaviour. They can expect the courts to impose significant sentences of imprisonment involving actual custody to deter not only individual offenders but also others who might otherwise think they can commit such acts with near impunity."

1. Similarly, in R v Dunn [2004] NSWCCA 41, 144 A Crim R 180 at [47], Adams J noted:

"[47] Crimes involving domestic violence have two important characteristics which differentiate them from many other crimes of violence: firstly, the offender usually believes that, in a real sense, what they do is justified, even that they are the true victim; and, secondly, the continued estrangement requires continued threat. These elements also usually mean that the victim never feels truly safe. Unlike the casual robbery, where the victim is often simply in the wrong place at the wrong time, the victim of a domestic violence offence is personally targeted. To my mind these considerations emphasise not only the need for general and personal deterrence but also of denunciation ...".

1. Each of those cases serves to emphasise that general deterrence is a significant consideration in sentencing for cases of domestic abuse. As is the need for vindication of the victim.
2. As to forgiveness of the offender, in R v Begbie [2001] NSWCCA 206, 124 A Crim R 300 at [43], Mason P said:

"[43] If the readiness of the young victim's family to offer forgiveness to the respondent and to empathise with the pain and sorrow he obviously feels is relevant - and on that I express no view - extreme caution would be required before giving it any weight. It should not have been determinative in the present case. The victim's family's attitude will doubtless be some comfort to the respondent, but it cannot over-reach the need for strong denunciation and general deterrence in response to the objective circumstances of this case."

1. In Shaw v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 58, it was held no error was made in circumstances where caution was exercised by a sentencing judge before weight was given to aspects of a victim's statutory declaration where she addressed her own responsibility for the decline in the relationship and her desire to withdraw her statement to police. It is a lengthy passage but it includes several important statements of principle, so I will set it out in full. Fullerton J said at [27], McClelland CJ and Grove J agreeing:

"It would also appear that his Honour did not consider the improvement in the relationship between the applicant and Ms Pahl to the point where they were reconciled at the time of sentence as weighing heavily in the applicant's favour. His Honour was clearly cautious before giving any weight to those aspects of Ms Pahl's statutory declaration where she addressed her own responsibility for the deterioration in the relationship, her desire to withdraw her statement to police and her desire for her family to be reunited. This was an approach open to his Honour since it is the collected experience of sentencing courts that victims of domestic violence may be actively pressured to forgive their assailants or compelled for other reasons to show a preparedness to forgive them. In R v Glen (Court of Criminal Appeal, 19 December 1994, unreported), Simpson J said:

'In my opinion, exceptional caution should be exercised in the receipt, and the use, of evidence of that kind [general evidence of forgiveness and desire that the assailant/partner not be imprisoned] in cases that fall within the general description of domestic violence offences, of which this case is one. It is a fact known to the courts and to the community that victims of domestic violence frequently, and clearly contrary to their own interests and welfare, forgive their attackers. It is said, and has been said so often and for so long as to be almost notorious, that it was this pattern of post offence forgiveness, accompanied by apparent remorse or contrition on the part of the offender, that prevented the prosecution of such offenders. In turn, it appeared that the victim of domestic violence was in a class different to the rest of the community insofar as the protection of the law was concerned. Domestic violence was not seen as a crime which attracted the sanction of the law in the same way or to the same extent as other crimes, whether or not of violence. The perpetrator of domestic violence was relatively safe to commit crimes with impunity, at least provided he or she (and, in the cases that have to date come before the courts, it has almost invariably been he) could attain the victim's forgiveness.'

There are two main arguments of principle against the proposition that this Court should give any weight to the expressed wish of the victim in this case that the applicant not be incarcerated. The first concerns the importance, especially great in cases of domestic violence, given the history that I have alluded to, of general deterrence. This Court must send a signal to domestic violence offenders that, regardless of self interest denying forgiveness on the part of victims, those victims will nevertheless receive the full protection of the law, insofar as the courts are able to afford it to them. It must not be forgotten, that, if it is to be accorded weight by the courts, forgiveness by the victim also operates contrary to the interests of other victims. Until it is recognised that domestic violence will be treated with severe penalties regardless of a later softening of attitude by the victim, no progress is likely to be made in its abolition or reduction. Put simply, the importance of general deterrence in such cases overrides any minor relevance that evidence of forgiveness might have.

For too long the community in general and the agencies of law enforcement in particular, have turned their backs upon the helpless victims of domestic violence. Acceptance of the victim's word that he/she forgives the offender, casts too great a burden of responsibility upon one individual already in a vulnerable position. Neither the community, the law enforcement agencies, nor the courts can be permitted to abdicate their responsibility in this fashion. Protection of the particular victim in the particular case is a step towards protection of other victims in other cases ...'."

1. I derive from these cases an indication of the particular importance of general deterrence, denunciation and vindication of the victim, in sentencing for domestic violence. I would, with respect, adopt all that has been said in these cases as proper statements of principle which should inform the Court's response to this appeal, and generally in cases involving violence within relationships.

1. It was necessary for his Honour to consider the principle of totality in arriving at the single sentence for all charged conduct. This was to ensure the aggregate sentence was "just and appropriate": Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70; (1988) 166 CLR 59 at 63, and to reflect the need for a sentence that does not crush an offender's hope for rehabilitation, and to recognise the compounding effect that an aggregate sentence has on the severity of the total sentence: Director of Public Prosecutions v Harington (above) at [27] per Pearce J. However it was also necessary in applying the principle that the learned sentencing judge gave "recognition to the separate harm caused to a victim by the commission of separate crimes": R v Wilson [2005] NSWCCA 219 at [38] per Simpson J.
2. The respondent concedes that the effect of the totality principle in the present case did not require significant allowance for concurrency in sentencing across the two courses of conduct identified, but submits that allowance for concurrency was nonetheless appropriate when aggregating sentences for the various counts comprising the respective series.

1. There was a submission made in mitigation that, upon returning home from collecting the complainant's son, the respondent decided that he should leave the residence. I consider it misleading if it is intended to suggest by that submission that the respondent's action in announcing he was leaving, was a reasoned response to the episode in the car, undertaken to defuse matters between himself and the complainant. That interpretation of the respondent's conduct bespeaks a maturity of attitude and reason on his part, which is entirely inconsistent with the facts. I consider it more likely that the respondent intended by his actions and words to convey the impression that he was walking out on the complainant. If that happened, the complainant faced the prospect of raising their child alone. Her vulnerability in that respect was demonstrated by her pleading with him to stay. His actions seem more likely to be an example of another way in which he demonstrated his power and control over her. As such I would respectfully disagree with the learned sentencing judge's characterisation of the conduct in his comments on passing sentence, as reflecting in the respondent's favour.
2. Nor do I accept that the respondent was prevented from leaving by the complainant. The evidence is that at one point he walked outside and was locked out. Rather than remain there or walk away he chose to smash the door to go back inside. There was no impediment to his leaving, in my view.
3. Nor do I accept the somewhat similar submission that the respondent "repeatedly and continuously" made efforts to remove himself from the situation during the period the assaults were committed. The evidence was that he moved towards the complainant on each occasion he inflicted the assaults upon her. That does not evidence efforts "repeatedly and continuously" to remove himself. It was not necessary except to hurt her.
4. Nor can I accept that any mitigatory weight should be attached to the fact that the complainant struck the respondent during the journey home from collecting her son. In his sentencing comments, the learned sentencing judge said "the complainant was the first to apply force ..." (before referring to the respondent's physical dominance). If his Honour was suggesting that the complainant's action in the car contributed to the respondent's subsequent assaults, then I respectfully disagree. Those events were separated in time and place, and I consider that any effect the punch in the car may have had, was likely to have been well and truly exhausted by the time the assaults commenced. I would not have mentioned that incident as having any relevance in sentencing.
5. Finally, I note that in sentencing, the learned sentencing judge said of the respondent's attempts to dissuade the complainant from pursuing a prosecution that, "as to the steps he later took to pressure the complainant to change her story, none of his approaches contained express threats of violence or intimidation". I do not consider that that in any way mitigates the conduct. Such conduct would be aggravating, but the absence of an aggravating feature, does not serve to mitigate the seriousness of the conduct which was admitted. Nor does the observation recognise that intimidation through manipulation can occur by means other than actual threats and violence, a proposition particularly pertinent in the context of relationships.

1. With respect to the learned sentencing judge, I consider the sentence to be inadequate in addressing the seriousness of the offending, and in reflecting the need for general deterrence, denunciation of the conduct and vindication of the victim. This case was marked by a prolonged series of assaults culminating in the abandonment of a victim who had been told she was to die, along with her unborn child. The offending occurred out of sight of anyone who could offer her protection. Her situation must have felt utterly hopeless as she fell into unconsciousness.
2. In Director of Public Prosecutions (Acting) v Morgan [2015] TASCCA 11, a case involving a series of three assaults close in time, Wood J at [38]-[39] made observations in respect of youthful offender, who presented without relevant prior convictions (unlike the respondent):

"[38] The seriousness of the conduct highlights that it is not only the offender's rehabilitation which is in the community's interest. As I have said, the sentencing function must fulfil other objectives as well, such as general deterrence and reinforcing the values of the community by denouncing such conduct. In R v Tran (above) at [14], Callaway JA said: 'The rehabilitation of youthful offenders, where practicable, is one of the great objectives of the criminal law, but it is not its only objective. It is not difficult to cite cases where other objectives have had to prevail. It is true that, in the case of a youthful offender, rehabilitation is usually far more important than general deterrence, but the word I have italicised is there to remind us that there are cases where just punishment, general deterrence or other sentencing objectives are at least equally important.' In terms of just punishment, it is in the community's interest for sentences to adequately recognise the nature and significance of the wrong that has been done: Director of Public Prosecutions v DJK [2003] VSCA 109 per Vincent JA at [18].

[39] The severity of the attack and the potential for serious injury demanded that weight be given to general deterrence. The crimes required denunciation in the sense of 'appropriate vindication and to assuage public outrage', Evans J in DPP v NOP [2011] TASCCA 15 at [4]. This sentencing objective is to vindicate the rights of victims and reinforce the values of the community: DPP v Neethling [2009] VSCA 116; (2009) 22 VR 466 per Maxwell P, Vincent JA and Hargrave AJA at [56] and [57]. A community service order and a probation order failed to achieve these objectives."

1. In my view the same can be said in this case for a sentence of 22 months imprisonment. I consider that the need for general deterrence and denunciation, as well as the need for personal deterrence, warrants a sentence of imprisonment significantly greater than that imposed.
2. Having reached that conclusion, should this Court interfere? In DPP v Dalgliesh (above) Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ said at [63],

"Having reached a conclusion that current sentences were so manifestly disproportionate to the gravity of the offending and the moral culpability of the offender as to bespeak an error of principle, there was no good reason for the Court of Appeal not to correct the effect of the error of principle which it recognised."

1. There is "no good reason" not to correct the error in this case. I am satisfied that a more severe sentence "was warranted in law" and should have been imposed: the Code, s 402(4). It is in the public interest that that should occur.
2. Domestic violence is properly regarded as a most serious form of offending, frequently hidden from view, and thus difficult to detect. The court has a symbolic function. Censure for domestic violence should be communicated through the sentences which are imposed. Community attitudes to it are changing: R v Kilic (above). Strong denunciation is called for, and general deterrence is a primary consideration. For crimes which are difficult to detect, the consequences of discovery must be severe enough to counter the perception that their commission is a risk worth taking.
3. And even if it is the case that future sentencing courts do not need guidance as to this, I agree with what Blow J (as he then was) said in Her Majesty's Attorney-General v O [2004] TASSC 53 at [36]:

"The authorities to which I have referred make it clear that on some occasions a Crown appeal against sentence should succeed even though there is no need for the appellate court to give guidance to sentencing judges or correct the idiosyncratic views of individual judges."

1. The Court heard submissions for the purposes of resentencing. The assaults perpetrated on the complainant were serious. They resulted in her becoming unconscious on two occasions. She feared for her life, and her baby. She was threatened with death. The subsequent interference with the prosecution of this offending was perpetrated on multiple occasions, and sought to manipulate the complainant by playing upon her vulnerability. The respondent's methods were devious and require the strongest denunciation. The respondent had prior offences involving violence. That there were no previous convictions for family violence is a matter of little weight.
2. For the single count of assault contrary to s 184 of the Code, and three counts of assault on a pregnant woman contrary to s 184A of the Code, I would impose a sentence of 22 months' imprisonment. For the five counts of attempting to interfere with a witness, contrary to ss 100 and 299 of the Code, I would impose a sentence of 23 months' imprisonment. I would apply those sentences cumulatively. That results in a sentence of 3 years 9 months. I would ameliorate the effect of the combined sentence by reducing the sentence to one of 3 years' and 4 months imprisonment. For his pleas of guilty I would discount that sentence by a further 6 months. The result is a sentence of 2 years 10 months' imprisonment.
3. I turn to the question of parole. The respondent acknowledged the absence of factors relevant to the consideration of the minimum non-parole period, most notably, any claim to prior good character: see Groenewege v Tasmania (above) at [56]-[60], Porter J (with whom Wood and Tennent JJ agreed); Connelly v Tasmania [2015] TASCCA 15, at [8]-[25] (Wood J), [38]-[40], Estcourt J (with whom Tennent J agreed).
4. In Young v Wilson [2015] TASSC 16 at [48], Wood J said:

"I pause to reflect on general principles applicable to the court's discretion in fixing a non-parole period. The purpose of such orders is to give a sentencing judge the opportunity, when appropriate, to mitigate a penalty of imprisonment in favour of the rehabilitation of a prisoner through conditional freedom".

1. The non-parole period is to be the minimum time that justice requires an offender must serve having regard to all the circumstances of his offence: Power v The Queen [1974] HCA 26; (1974) 131 CLR 623 at 629 per Barwick CJ, Menzies, Stephen and Mason JJ. This test applies to the parole regime in Tasmania: Carr v The Queen [2002] TASSC 60, 11 Tas R 362 at 389; Richman v Tasmania [2011] TASCCA 18 at [47]; Director of Public Prosecutions v Harris (above) at [10] per Blow CJ.
2. In Devine v The Queen [2003] TASSC 52, Evans J at [30] gave the following guidance in relation to fixing a non-parole period:

"Subject to the need to preserve a sentence's capacity to achieve all its intended objectives, in my view, a court should, in its approach to fixing a parole eligibility date, if any, be optimistic about a prisoner's rehabilitation prospects. If that optimism proves to be misplaced, it is reasonable to expect that the prisoner will not be paroled as the Parole Board is only empowered to grant a prisoner parole after considering the matters detailed in the Corrections Act, s72(4), which include the rehabilitation of the prisoner, the likelihood of the prisoner re-offending, and the protection of the public."

1. In Barrett v Wilson [2015] TASSC 3 at [22], Pearce J expressed his approval of those remarks.
2. The respondent's offences exhibited considerable anger. The Court was told that he had not undertaken any courses during his incarceration directed towards addressing anger management skills. That should be regarded as a matter of concern. It exhibits a lack of insight into his offending. Such insight is a minimum requirement for rehabilitation. Whilst I am satisfied that a period of parole will serve the best interests of the respondent and the community, I am not persuaded that the non-parole period should be the minimum therefor. In all the circumstances, I consider that in order to preserve the sentence's capacity to achieve its intended purposes, the respondent should serve 20 months of his sentence before he is eligible for parole.
3. I would substitute a sentence of 2 years 10 months' imprisonment backdated to commence on 17 March 2017. I would order that the respondent serve 20 months of that sentence before he is eligible for parole.

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v LUKE PETER KARKLINS

1. I have read the reasons for judgment of Geason J, along with those of the Chief Justice. I agree that the sentence is manifestly inadequate. I generally agree with the reasons of Geason J as to why that is so. With respect, I wish confine myself to that issue. In the context of this case, I would prefer not to offer any comment on whether or not it is desirable for a sentencer to state the quantum of a discount given, or to specify the components of a global sentence. I would join in making the proposed orders.