PARTIES: ACTING DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

Criminal Law - Appeal and new trial - Appeal against sentence - Grounds for interference - Sentence manifestly excessive or inadequate - Three counts of assault - Community service order of 210 hours and probation order.

Appellant: Acting Director of Public Prosecutions

Judgment Number: [2015] TASCCA 11

1. In addition to the community service order made on 12 November 2014, the respondent is sentenced to 10 months' imprisonment, wholly suspended on conditions that (a) he is not to commit any offence punishable by imprisonment for a period of two years from today; (b) he is to complete the performance of the 210 hours of community service ordered on 12 November 2014; and (c) he is to comply with the conditions of the probation order made today.

1. The probation order made on 12 November 2014 is quashed.

1. Probation order, requiring that the respondent submit to the supervision of a probation officer for a period of 18 months from today, with special conditions that (a) he must comply with the directions of his probation officer regarding psychological or psychiatric assessment, treatment and therapy; and (b) he must comply with directions of his probation officer regarding alcohol and drug abuse, including any direction that he attend a residential drug rehabilitation program.

1. This is an appeal against sentence, brought by the Acting Director of Public Prosecutions. It concerns a sentence imposed upon the respondent for three counts of assault, of a community service order of 210 hours and a probation order for 12 months, delivered by Estcourt J on 12 November 2014. The ground of appeal is that the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
2. The respondent pleaded guilty to charges which particularised that he unlawfully assaulted Sean Patrick Mahoney by the following acts:

Count: 1 punching him to the head, knocking him to the ground and punching him to the head again.

Count: 2 punching and kicking him to the head numerous times.

Count: 3 picking him up and pushing him to the ground, punching him to the head and kicking him to the body.

1. The three assaults arose out of an incident which occurred during a New Year's Eve celebration in the early morning of 1 January 2014. The sentencing judge was provided with details of the facts in the following terms.
2. The respondent, Jess Aaron Morgan, aged 22, and the complainant, Sean Patrick Mahoney, aged 25, had been friends for approximately 10 years. The respondent was aware that the complainant had been in a car accident two years before and had received serious injuries. The complainant's serious injuries were to his head and abdomen.
3. On 31 December 2013, the respondent and the complainant met for drinks at the complainant's house in Lauderdale. They went to celebrate New Year's Eve with friends at a restaurant in the vicinity.
4. At approximately 10pm, people at the function took ecstasy. The respondent took a tablet of ecstasy and the complainant took half a tablet. They both continued to drink alcohol.
5. After midnight, the group walked to the home of the restaurant owner in Bay View Road. It was near the beach so they lit a fire on the beach and socialised there. They continued to drink alcohol. At approximately 5am, the respondent started to "carry on" about either himself or the complainant driving the complainant's car, which was parked at the complainant's house. The complainant explained that it would not be a good idea, given that they had been drinking. It was at this stage that the respondent's assaults upon the complainant suddenly commenced.
6. The respondent punched the complainant to the head once or twice, knocked him to the ground and punched him to the head again. This is the conduct captured by count one of the indictment. The complainant did not fight back. Two of the group of friends separated the respondent from the complainant, and the respondent was also aggressive towards them. At this time, the respondent ran off.
7. The group left behind, including the complainant, walked up a track from the beach to Bay View Road. The respondent appeared behind them. The two friends who had previously separated the men told the complainant to walk ahead, and asked the respondent to leave the complainant alone. What followed was the subject of count 2 of the indictment. The respondent pushed past the friends, caught up with the complainant and punched him to the head until he fell to the ground with his hands over his head. The respondent punched and kicked him while he was on the ground. The complainant was hit to the head a total of 10 to 15 times. The complainant, again, did not fight back. The two friends present wanted to stop the respondent but realised they could not. The respondent left the area as police and an ambulance were called.
8. Following this incident, the complainant was unconscious and appeared to be having a seizure. Two neighbours came out to assist the complainant.
9. After approximately 10 minutes, the respondent returned. He pulled the complainant, still unconscious, off the ground and then pushed him back down, kicked him to the bottom and punched him to the head. This is count 3 of the indictment. The respondent told the neighbours not to call the police, saying that he knew their names, where they lived, and that he would come back with knives.
10. The complainant was taken by ambulance to the Royal Hobart Hospital in a critical condition. The complainant had grazing and bruising to his head and was in a seizure state. He was in that state for 45 minutes and was put into an induced coma and placed on a ventilator to protect his airway. He discharged himself against the advice of his doctors on 3 January 2014. He now takes medication involving 14 tablets a day to prevent seizures; he has poor memory and trouble sleeping. A victim impact statement was not provided to the court.
11. It was accepted by the Crown for the purpose of the plea of guilty that the cause of the seizure was likely to be multifactorial. Neurologist Helen Castley's opinion was that the seizure could have been a result of one or more of the following: a pre-existing head injury, low calcium level, tiredness, the consumption of alcohol and drugs, or the assault.
12. The respondent sent a text message to his girlfriend at 5.57am saying, "Gonna kill you all of the cops do t get me". Around the same time, he put a post on Facebook, saying, "Well the cops are chasin me, I bashed Sean Mahoney because he's a dog. Fair call. Anyone who thinks I did wrong, fuck you all. Cunts deserve what they get haha ... You called the cops on me Oliver Oxley. Big mistake cunt. You best hope the cops get me first mate." Police located the respondent on the beach after some help from his girlfriend, who was negotiating with him on his mobile phone. He was arrested and held in custody until he could be interviewed.
13. In his police interview, the respondent told police that he could not remember much; it was his fault and he was being a dickhead; he started it, he wanted to get his car from the complainant's house; he remembered hitting the complainant; he did not notice if the complainant was conscious or unconscious; he did not recall kicking the complainant but agreed that he probably did. He admitted that the complainant did not do anything to him. He also said that, "I lost it, and I couldn't control myself at that stage". He further stated that he knows he gets like that, and things set him off. He told police he had done an anger management course before and that he was being dominant and using scare tactics. He also said he was trying to co-operate (with police), as he knew he had done the wrong thing.

1. The matters advanced in mitigation can be summarised as follows:
   • The respondent was aged 22 years at the time of offending.
   • He had no relevant prior convictions.
   • His behaviour was uncharacteristic. However, as drawn out in sentencing submissions, in light of his responses in the police interview, it could not be said that he had no tendency to violence or had not reacted with violence in the past.
   • He was co-operative in his police interview and had made admissions to the extent he could, given the limits of his memory.
   • He was genuinely remorseful and he expressed remorse in his police interview.
   • The respondent had entered an early plea of guilty once the charge was downgraded from a more serious charge.
   • The incident had adversely impacted upon him emotionally. He had lost about 30kg. His gardening and maintenance business had since ended.
   • His relationship with his girlfriend had ended and he had lost his friendship with the complainant who was his best mate.
   • He had the support of his parents.
   • He had a substance abuse problem which he had the resolve to address.
   • His counsel announced to the court an unconditional apology to the complainant and a letter of apology was handed to the court. The respondent had recently written it. Crown counsel informed the court that the complainant had not decided whether he would receive the letter.
   • The respondent had commenced taking anti-depressants and they were having a stabilising effect upon him.
2. The sentencing judge was provided with a report from a psychologist, Dr Walter Slaghuis, which was relied upon in the plea in mitigation. Also handed up was a character reference from Diana Freeman. Ms Freeman's association with the respondent was two years prior to the sentencing hearing, when the respondent had done some gardening at her home for a period of over two years, and she had found him to be "courteous, thoughtful and caring".
3. Dr Slaghuis' report was dated 3 November 2014. The respondent had been referred to him by the respondent's general practitioner in January 2014, post-offending, for management of anxiety and depression. Since then, he had attended a number of appointments with Dr Slaghuis.
4. The report included information as to the following:
   • At the first appointment (immediately post-offending), he was assessed as having severely depressed mood with suicidal thoughts and multiple signs of anxiety and stress, and long-standing low self-esteem and self-worth.
   • His depression was within the severe range of intensity and his level of anxiety and stress was in the moderate to severe range.
   • The respondent continues to experience chronic low self-esteem and self-worth and continues to experience symptoms consistent with elements of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. These symptoms result from an assault upon him by a family member when he was 16 years of age, resulting in a period of hospitalisation.
   • He began using substances (alcohol, cannabis and other substances) regularly and excessively at 16 years of age after the assault. His substance use profile is consistent with the criteria of Substance Dependence.
   • His current symptom profile appears to be consistent with the criteria of Adjustment Disorder with Chronic and Severe Mixed Anxiety and Depression.
   • Dr Slaghuis' assessment indicates that the respondent uses substances in order to moderate the symptoms, and his use of substances has had an increasingly negative impact on his mental and emotional condition, and his interpersonal and social functioning.
   • At the most recent appointment on 29 October 2014 (shortly before the sentencing hearing), Dr Slaghuis noted a deterioration in the respondent's mental and emotional condition, and he noted a significant and continuing loss of weight.

Dr Slaghuis made recommendations for professional intervention for the respondent's substance abuse problem and also, psychological intervention for ongoing mental and emotional problems relating to self-esteem. He was prescribed an anti-depressant used to treat Major Depressive Disorder.

1. The report was the subject of submissions by Crown counsel. Ms Mannering submitted the report should be given little weight because the psychologist had not been treating the respondent prior to his offending, and aspects of the report, such as the traumatic event that gave rise to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, lacked detail. It was submitted that the report may explain his personal circumstances and the reasons for his drinking. She noted that it provides that he still has a drinking problem. Defence counsel conceded that the weight to be attributed to the report was a matter for the sentencing judge. The sentencing judge indicated that he accepted Ms Mannering's submissions.
2. The learned sentencing judge did not refer in his sentencing comments to the report or explain in what regard he took the opinions into account. Presumably, his Honour took the report into account but gave aspects of it muted weight.
3. It can be seen that the report fleshes out details regarding matters advanced in mitigation, such as the adverse emotional impact of the respondent's crimes, his history of substance abuse, and the stabilising of his mental health. It usefully provides an explanation for the genesis of his abuse of alcohol and drugs. In particular, the circumstances which led to his dependence on substances were his traumatic experience at 16 years of age and his resulting mental health difficulties. The details in the report lend significance to the respondent's resolve to address his substance abuse, and reveal the importance of treatment to address his current psychological condition.

1. The learned sentencing judge outlined the facts and then continued:

"The defendant has no relevant prior convictions. Indeed his prior record consists of only two minor traffic infringements. He is still a relatively young man at 23 years old. I take into account all that has been submitted on his behalf by Mr Slicer.

These are serious assaults. The second assault in particular which rendered the complainant unconscious and the third involving an attack upon an unconscious man. They would ordinarily warrant an immediate sentence of imprisonment in my view. However, given the still relatively young age of the defendant and his complete lack of any relevant prior convictions it would not, in my view, be in the interests of the community to punish him by sending him to prison. Community correction is the appropriate penalty and the imposition of community service orders is, to my mind, a more meaningful and effective deterrent in this case than a suspended sentence.

I convict the defendant of three counts of assault. I order that he undertakes 210 hours of community service. Once again, I note that the maximum period of community service that can be imposed by law is 240 hours. That period may need to be increased if community correction is going to play a greater role in sentencing in the future and is to be imposed for serious assaults such as these.

In addition, taking into account the submissions made by Ms Mannering, I make a probation order for a period of 12 months with the statutory conditions included only."

1. The reference to the submissions made by Ms Mannering was evidently to the submissions referred to above at [20], and her submission that, given that the attack was unprovoked, and given that the complainant was unconscious following the second assault, it was a matter at the higher end for assaults, and a deterrent sentence was warranted.

1. I commence my consideration of the sentencing order by reflecting on some particular matters relied on as aggravating or mitigating factors and other matters raised in submissions.
2. The matters of opinion expressed by Dr Slaghuis require some attention, although it is not a case where the offender's psychological condition or psychiatric condition contributed to the commission of the offences of assault in a direct or material way. It was conceded by Crown counsel during submissions on appeal that it was appropriate to proceed on the basis that personal considerations, including the respondent's mental state after the assault when he was 16 years old, had rendered him vulnerable to developing alcohol dependence. His consumption of alcohol and drugs was, undoubtedly, a substantial factor in the commission of these crimes. In view of his mental state, he was vulnerable to developing substance dependence and the sentencing judge may have regard to the circumstances which led to that dependence. This is an aspect of the particular circumstances of the offender which should be considered in an appropriate case: R v McKee [2003] VSCA 16; (2003) 138 A Crim R 88, Buchanan JA (Eames JA concurring) at [13] and Vincent JA, referred to by Porter J in Director of Public Prosecutions v Poole [2015] TASCCA 10. See also R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346 per Simpson J at [336] and [344] and Wood CJ at CL at [273]. Taking this into account does not suggest that intoxication itself can mitigate the seriousness of an offence or reduce the offender's culpability: Hasan v The Queen (2010) 222 A Crim R 306. It must also be said that the respondent was responsible for his choice to consume alcohol to excess and take drugs, and there is no suggestion that he did so without appreciating that a consequence was that he may lose control and act violently and aggressively. In reality, the circumstances that led to his addiction are a point of comparison with other cases lacking such an explanation, which impinges on responsibility for developing the addiction or dependence; to a degree there is mitigatory value in this explanation. However, as stated by Porter J in Director of Public Prosecutions v Poole (above) at [33], while drug addiction and its consequences are factors to be taken into account, "the effect and weight will vary considerably across individual cases, depending on, among other things, the seriousness of the offence".
3. The psychological state of the respondent had some further relevance. His mental condition post-offending, as described by Dr Slaghuis, may mean that a prison sentence would weigh more heavily on him than it would on a person in normal health: R v Tsiaris [1996] VicRp 26; [1996] 1 VR 398 per joint judgment of Charles and Callaway JJA and Vincent AJA at 400; Startup v Tasmania [2010] TASCCA 5. Further, it would have a bearing on the sentence that is imposed, particularly with respect to any conditions of a non-custodial order, such as a probation order, or conditions of a suspended sentence that may be warranted in order to promote his rehabilitation: R v Tsiaris at 400. Of further significance is whether or not the circumstances that led to his intoxication are unlikely to be repeated. Here, the respondent's willingness to address his substance dependence bears on this issue and is of mitigatory value.
4. It was submitted for the respondent that the attack was a spontaneous act of violence and there was no element of premeditation. In relation to features of the assaults submitted by the Crown as aggravating, that they were unprovoked and in a public place, it was submitted as a countervailing consideration that both the respondent and the complainant had been socialising together, both having consumed alcohol and drugs. This led to a discussion regarding the complainant's participation in consuming alcohol and drugs with the respondent, and to what extent, if any, it was a mitigating factor or the absence of an aggravating factor.
5. In my view, the complainant's conduct in socialising with the respondent and their shared participation in drinking alcohol together and taking drugs is simply part of the factual matrix of the offending, and is not to be regarded as either a matter in mitigation, or absence of an aggravating factor. The behaviour of the complainant in this case, in drinking alcohol and taking drugs with the respondent in a social, celebratory setting, is quite unrelated to the respondent's conduct in turning on the complainant, his own friend, in an unprovoked and violent outburst. There could not be seen to be any kind of complicity in the violence, or an assumption of the risk of violence by the complainant. There have been cases where complicity of the victim in the risk-taking behaviour giving rise to the crime has been treated as an absence of an aggravating factor (the aggravating factor commonly called "innocence" of the victim). This issue has arisen most prominently in relation to culpable driving, where victims have willingly become passengers with drivers known to be grossly intoxicated and have done nothing to dissuade them from driving: R v Tran [2002] VSCA 52; (2002) 4 VR 457; R v Errington [1999] NSWCCA 18. However, that sort of complicity is entirely different from the current set of facts in which the risk taking behaviour of the complainant was far removed from the criminal conduct later inflicted upon him. In short, there was not any kind of complicity of the victim or "lack of innocence" bearing on the sentencing discretion.
6. It was submitted for the appellant, that the failure of the learned sentencing judge to impose a term of imprisonment, actual or suspended, rendered the sentence manifestly inadequate. In submissions for the appellant there was reliance on sentencing data that demonstrated that, in Tasmania, sentences of imprisonment are generally considered appropriate for assaults of a serious character (Professor Kate Warner, Sentencing in Tasmania, 2nd ed (2002), The Federal Press, at 294). There was a focus in submissions on the period 2011-2013, and 11 instances involving defendants who acted alone and had no relevant prior convictions. With one exception, a sentence of imprisonment was imposed in each instance. For the reasons previously expressed by this Court, data and statistics are of limited assistance without regard to the circumstances of the cases that gave rise to the individual sentences. Obviously, generalised sentencing outcomes cannot dictate the sentencing discretion to be exercised in a particular case, which must take account of the particular conduct and the individual circumstances of the offender. It is the statement of principles which affects how the sentencing discretion should be exercised that gives rise to binding precedent, not the past sentence itself: Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; (2010) 242 CLR 520. In relation to the recent individual cases referred to, 11 cases is a very small sample, particularly with respect to the crime of assault, which captures such a diverse range of conduct. Allowing for the fact that the sentence here is low compared to those referred to, this does not mean that it is too low or that error can be shown: R v Dowie [1989] Tas R 167 per Wright J at 186.
7. It was submitted for the respondent that the sentence in this case was delivered to aid in rehabilitation and to take into account that he is a young man, and his lack of antecedents. It is evident that that was so and that these are weighty considerations: Lahey v Sanderson [1959] TASStRp 10; [1959] Tas SR 17. The sentencing judge noted that sending the respondent to prison was not in the interests of the community. As stated by Crawford J (as then was) and Slicer J in Attorney-General (Tas) v Blackler [2001] TASSC 27; (2001) 121 A Crim R 465 at [15]: "If leaving out of prison a young person who has not previously appeared in court for offences results in the offender not reoffending, then the public will have been well served by the sentence which was selected." His Honour also sought to impose a sentence that would be effective as a personal deterrent. He gave consideration to a suspended sentence, but imposed a community service order, regarding that as a more meaningful and effective deterrent in this particular case. It is noted that his Honour imposed close to the statutory maximum of 240 hours of community service. It is acknowledged that if a choice had to be made between a community service order and a suspended sentence, it may be that, for an individual offender, a community service order may be a more effective and meaningful deterrent. It is an outcome that has an immediate impact. In the case of young offenders, it can be particularly useful because of the restorative quality of the sentence, providing an opportunity to make some amends by way of community work for the harm caused by offending. The approach taken by his Honour gave due consideration to personal deterrence and rehabilitation. However, there were other sentencing goals that needed to be reflected in the sentence.
8. The respondent committed three distinct acts of assault. While it may be said that the attack began in a spontaneous fashion, and was not premeditated, the second and third assaults were not spontaneous; there was time for the respondent to give thought to his actions and, if he could not calm down, to leave the situation. The attack was upon his best friend without provocation. The only explanation for the attack was that the complainant had expressed resistance to the respondent's irresponsible suggestion about obtaining his vehicle.
9. The crimes amounted to a violent attack of considerable gravity. His conduct involved multiple punches and some kicks to the head, inflicted while the complainant was overwhelmed and prone on the ground. Repeatedly kicking and punching someone to the head carries the potential for severe injury; fists and feet are effective weapons and just one punch or kick to the head may result in grave or possibly even fatal injury. As there was no evidence that the respondent caused the seizure suffered by the complainant, it must be assumed for sentencing purposes that he did not cause that seizure or its sequelae. However, the sentence needs to adequately reflect the real potential for grave harm. The respondent inflicted multiple blows, each one carrying such potential. It is the kind and level of violence often seen by the courts in crimes associated with serious injury.
10. The respondent's conduct demonstrated a determination to cause harm to the complainant. His level of culpability needed to be adequately reflected in the sentence. An aggravating factor with respect to all three counts is that the complainant was physically vulnerable because of his serious injuries, and that the respondent knew that.
11. The respondent persisted with his assault notwithstanding the defenceless state of the complainant. The respondent was undeterred by the efforts of others to protect him, ignoring friends who asked him to leave the complainant alone. A significant number of blows to the head were inflicted, and the complainant was rendered unconscious.
12. In relation to the third assault, the respondent pulled the complainant from the ground in an unconscious state and again punched him to the head. The unconscious state of the complainant is an aggravating factor with respect to the third count. In Hards v The Queen [2013] VSCA 119 at [13] Maxwell ACJ, with whom Buchanan JA agreed, said: "There is, in my opinion, something particularly shocking about an attack which persists after the victim has been rendered unconscious. That in itself pushes a case like this into a higher level of gravity, because of the evident determination to cause really serious harm, and the cowardice of attacking someone who is unable to defend himself".
13. The seriousness of the conduct highlights that it is not only the offender's rehabilitation which is in the community's interest. As I have said, the sentencing function must fulfil other objectives as well, such as general deterrence and reinforcing the values of the community by denouncing such conduct. In R v Tran (above) at [14], Callaway JA said: "The rehabilitation of youthful offenders, where practicable, is one of the great objectives of the criminal law, but it is not its only objective. It is not difficult to cite cases where other objectives have had to prevail. It is true that, in the case of a youthful offender, rehabilitation is usually far more important than general deterrence, but the word I have italicised is there to remind us that there are cases where just punishment, general deterrence or other sentencing objectives are at least equally important." In terms of just punishment, it is in the community's interest for sentences to adequately recognise the nature and significance of the wrong that has been done: Director of Public Prosecutions v DJK [2003] VSCA 109 per Vincent JA at [18].
14. The severity of the attack and the potential for serious injury demanded that weight be given to general deterrence. The crimes required denunciation in the sense of "appropriate vindication and to assuage public outrage", Evans J in DPP v NOP [2011] TASCCA 15 at [4]. This sentencing objective is to vindicate the rights of victims and reinforce the values of the community: DPP v Neethling [2009] VSCA 116; (2009) 22 VR 466 per Maxwell P, Vincent JA and Hargrave AJA at [56] and [57]. A community service order and a probation order failed to achieve these objectives.
15. These competing objectives need to be weighed with the desirability of the respondent's rehabilitation. Achieving the correct balance is a difficult task. A sentencing order which often commends itself in cases involving young offenders is a suspended term of imprisonment. These sentences have a tangible impact on an individual offender. As noted by Blow CJ in Director of Public Prosecutions (Acting) v Hawkins [2015] TASCCA 8 at [13] "... a criminal record that includes a suspended sentence can disadvantage an offender in a number of ways, particularly in relation to obtaining employment. A suspended sentence involves a denunciation of an offender's conduct, and should provide an offender with a strong incentive not to re-offend. It is always highly likely that a suspended sentence will be fully activated if re-offending occurs." In terms of denunciation, I add that a suspended sentence of imprisonment publicly condemns and stigmatises the criminal conduct, marking it as sufficiently serious as to warrant imprisonment, and in some cases, lengthy imprisonment. Unfortunately, the impact of a suspended sentence on an individual offender is not well understood in the community and this diminishes the effectiveness of this sentencing option in terms of general deterrence: Director of Public Prosecutions v Broadby, Cockshut and Woolley [2010] TASCCA 13; (2010) 20 Tas R 399 at [9], and Hawkins at [13]. This may mean that in cases where general deterrence is an important consideration, a more punitive sentencing order is required.
16. There was, in this particular case, a clear need to adequately reflect the nature of the criminal conduct, and denunciation and general deterrence were prominent sentencing aims. In my view, the combined sentence of a community service order and a probation order was clearly inadequate to achieve these sentencing goals. In view of the respondent's relatively young age, and his lack of prior convictions, and that there were prospects for his rehabilitation given compliance with recommendations for treatment and regarding his substance dependence, it was open to the learned sentencing judge not to impose an immediate term of imprisonment. The sentences of a community service order and a suspended term of imprisonment are not mutually exclusive, and the Sentencing Act 1997 permits combined sentencing orders: s 8(3). If the learned sentencing judge considered that an actual term of imprisonment was not required then, at least, a suspended term of imprisonment with comprehensive conditions was necessary. The conditions I have in mind would require that the respondent not re-offend for a lengthy period and comply with directions of a probation officer designed to promote his rehabilitation, and complete the balance of 210 hours of community service.

1. In resentencing, this Court has the benefit of further submissions. Evidently, there are outstanding charges that are being dealt with in the magistrates court in the mental health diversion list. The respondent has not yet entered a plea to those charges but is co-operating with directions addressing his mental health. Recently, he has commenced an alcohol and drug course. It is too early to assess his progress in that regard.
2. I would allow the appeal, not disturb the community service order, impose a wholly suspended sentence of 10 months' imprisonment, quash the probation order, and impose a fresh probation order with conditions tailored to the respondent's present circumstances. I propose that the 10 month sentence be wholly suspended on conditions that (a) the respondent is not to commit any offence punishable by imprisonment for a period of two years from today; (b) that he complete the performance of the 210 hours of community service as ordered on 12 November 2014; and (c) that he comply with the conditions of the probation order made today. I would make a probation order requiring that he submit to the supervision of a probation officer for a period of 18 months from today, with special conditions that (a) he must comply with the directions of his probation officer regarding psychological or psychiatric assessment, treatment and therapy; and (b) that he must comply with directions of his probation officer regarding alcohol and drug abuse, including any direction that he attend a residential drug rehabilitation program.