Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Lahoud [2025] NSWCATOD 79

Application for disciplinary findings and orders

1. The Council of the New South Wales Bar Association (the Bar Council) found that a barrister, Ms Rita Lahoud, had engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional misconduct. The Bar Council has applied to the Tribunal under the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2015 (NSW) (Uniform Law) for disciplinary findings and orders against Ms Lahoud. (At various parts of these reasons Ms Lahoud is referred to as "the Respondent" and the Bar Council is referred to as "the Applicant".)
2. The ground for the application for a finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct is based on "the B complaint". On 24 December 2019, Ms Lahoud went to the home of Ms B and her partner, Mr B. At that time the couple had had full time care and custody of a ten year old child (Child A) since November 2012. Child A's biological mother, identified in these reasons as Ms A, is Ms B's half-sister. We have used these pseudonyms to protect the identify of Child A.
3. In March 2018, nearly two years before this visit, Ms A had engaged Ms Lahoud directly as her barrister to "pursue an application for permanent restoration of care and responsibility of [her] daughter". During the visit to the home of Ms and Mr B, Ms Lahoud delivered presents for Child A from her mother and encouraged Ms B to negotiate about increased access between Child A and her mother.
4. The ground for the application for a finding of professional misconduct is based on the "Bar Council complaint". On five separate occasions between February 2021 and April 2022, Ms Lahoud falsely represented to the Bar Council that she did not attend Ms and Mr B's home on 24 December 2019 or at any other time.
5. The parties provided a Statement of Agreed Facts. The only disputed fact in that statement is whether, during the discussion with Ms and Mr B at their home, Ms Lahoud said she could "slap them with a section", which Ms B understood to be a reference to a legal or court action.
6. Ms Lahoud admits that the "B complaint" amounts to unsatisfactory professional conduct. She also admits that the "Bar Council complaint" amounts to professional misconduct. Despite those admissions, we must decide for ourselves whether the conduct comes within the statutory definitions of those terms.
7. Ms Lahoud does not currently hold a practising certificate. On 21 December 2023, she agreed that it should be suspended and it has now expired. The Bar Council has applied to the Tribunal for an order that Ms Lahoud not apply for a practising certificate for 3 years from the date of this decision. Ms Lahoud submitted that a period of 3 years is punitive rather than protective and that a significantly shorter period is appropriate.
8. We have decided that Ms Lahoud should be prohibited from applying for a practising certificate for a period of 18 months from the date of this decision. The effect of that order is that she will have been without a practising certificate for approximately three years before she is able to re-apply.

1. A preliminary issue arose as to the scope of the "B complaint" alleging unsatisfactory professional conduct. The evidence from Ms B and her partner included allegations that Ms Lahoud had behaved in a harassing, threatening or intimidatory manner. Ms Lahoud submitted that allegations of that nature were not included in the "B complaint" and it was procedurally unfair for her to have to respond to them.
2. The factual and legal issues the Tribunal must determine, and our findings, are:

(1) Does the scope of the B complaint (Ground 1) extend to allegations that Ms Lahoud's conduct at Ms and Mr B's home was harassing, threatening or intimidatory? No.

(2) Does the ruling about the scope of Ground 1 mean that evidence about harassing, threatening or intimidatory conduct should not be admitted? Yes, or only admitted for a limited purpose.

(3) Did Ms Lahoud tell Ms B and her partner that she could "slap [them] with a section"? Yes.

(4) Does the conduct in Ground 1 amount to unsatisfactory professional conduct? Yes.

(5) Does the conduct in Ground 2 amount to professional misconduct? Yes.

(6) What are the appropriate protective orders? That Ms Lahoud is not to apply for an Australian practising certificate for a period of 18 months from the date of this decision.

Does the scope of the B complaint extend to allegations that Ms Lahoud's conduct at Ms and Mr B's home was harassing, threatening or intimidatory?

1. The grounds of complaint investigated by the Bar Council included an allegation by Ms B that ". . . Ms Lahoud delivered presents for the child in her care and at the same time threatened her with court proceedings and made her feel harassed and intimidated". The Further Amended Grounds and Particulars for Application for Disciplinary Findings and Orders (the Application) included an allegation about Ms Lahoud delivering presents for Child A and telling Ms B that Ms A would like to have regular contact with her daughter.
2. Apart from the allegation that Ms Lahoud said she could "slap [them] with a section", there were no other allegations (or particulars) alleging harassing, threatening or intimidatory conduct. Ms Lahoud contended that in those circumstances, evidence alleging harassing, threatening or intimidatory conduct should not be admitted. The Tribunal agreed with that submission for the following reasons.
3. In Della Bruna v Health Care Complaints Commission [2025] NSWCA 105 Bell CJ and Kirk JA held that the Tribunal had denied the appellant procedural fairness. The Tribunal had found that the appellant's objectivity was inhibited by financial pressure to dispose of a stockpile of medication. However, that allegation was not part of the Amended Complaint, nor was it identified specifically in a letter providing further particulars. Bell CJ and Kirk JA concluded at [42], that:

"A foundational requirement of procedural fairness is that a person liable to be adversely affected by a decision be fairly apprised of the case against them and given a reasonable opportunity to meet it: see eg Johnson v Miller [1937] HCA 77; (1937) 59 CLR 467 at 489; [1937] HCA 77; Kanda v Government of Malaya [1962] UKPC 2; [1962] AC 322 at 337; Commissioner for ACT Revenue v Alphaone [1994] FCA 1074; (1994) 49 FCR 576 at 591. The person should not be left to guess, nor required to box at vague shadows. It would not have been difficult for the Commission to articulate the point. If it intended to rely on the type of serious finding made by the Majority then it could and should have been articulated in clear terms in the Amended Complaint or, failing that, at least in its answer to the relevant question in the request for further particulars. Neither was done."

1. The Bar Council submitted that Ms Lahoud's conduct in going to Ms and Mr B's home unannounced, had the potential to and indeed did threaten or intimidate them. However, if the Bar Council sought a finding to that effect, they should have articulated it in clear terms in the Application. "Particulars" supporting such a finding should have been included.
2. Ms Lahoud has been "on notice" that Ms B felt threatened and intimidated since she received the complaint on 12 January 2021. But that does not overcome the procedural unfairness of not including a "particular" to that effect in Ground 1. Ms Lahoud is only required to address the Grounds and particulars in the Application. She is not required to respond to earlier versions of those allegations, nor is she deemed to be on notice that an allegation forms part of the Ground just because that allegation is included in a statement from a witness.
3. The absence of an express particular about harassing, threatening or intimidatory conduct in the application cannot be overcome by reference to the Tribunal's duty to act "with as little formality as the circumstances of the case permit": Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act), s 38(4). The Tribunal is always subject to the rules of procedural fairness: NCAT Act, s 38(2).
4. Ground 1 does not extend to an allegation that the conduct in issue was harassing, threatening or intimidatory.

Does the ruling about the scope of Ground 1 mean that evidence about harassing, threatening or intimidatory conduct should not be admitted?

1. We struck out various parts of Ms B's, Mr B's and Ms Lahoud's affidavits and admitted other parts for a limited purpose. The Tribunal's rulings on the objections to evidence are in Appendix 1.

Did Ms Lahoud tell Ms and Mr B that she could "slap [them] with a section"?

1. Of the pleaded grounds and particulars, the only fact in dispute is Particular 14(viii)(c), that Ms Lahoud said to Ms B and Mr B that:

"She (the Respondent) could 'slap them (Mr and Ms B) with a section'."

1. The Statement of Agreed Facts as to what was said during the discussion at Ms and Mr B's home includes the following at [25](c) and (d) and [26]:

"The Respondent told Ms B that [Ms A] would like to have regular contact with [Child A] and that she (the Respondent) was attending the [B] home to help [Ms A].

The Respondent said that [Ms A] missed and loved [Child A].

The Respondent asked [Ms B] for her mobile phone number, which [Ms B] provided to the Respondent. [Ms B] provided her mobile phone number to the Respondent, as she felt that otherwise she would appear uncooperative."

1. In her initial complaint to the Office of the Legal Commissioner, Ms B wrote that, "[Ms Lahoud] did threaten me with certain sections through the court . . .". Ms B's affidavit evidence was that Ms Lahoud said she could "slap [them] with a section" on the veranda of her home. She understood those words to be a reference to "a law or court action". She added that Ms Lahoud "did not say a number of a section". Ms B confirmed that evidence in cross-examination adding that she asked Ms Lahoud "what section?" but "she did not follow through". Ms B's evidence was also that Ms Lahoud said, "[Ms A] would like to have regular contact with [Child A] and that she (Ms Lahoud) wanted to discuss this with me."
2. Ms B agreed that Ms Lahoud did not raise her voice, but spoke with "more of a louder voice maybe". She did not swear or make any physical contact.
3. Mr B's evidence was that Ms Lahoud spoke about Ms A being able to require them to arrange contact with Child A, and said words like she (Ms Lahoud) would "slap [us] with a section". When it was put to him in cross examination that Ms Lahoud did not say those words, Mr B disagreed. His evidence was that "she did say that". Mr B also gave evidence that Ms Lahoud said Ms A wanted to have more contact with Child A and that Ms Lahoud wanted Ms and Mr B to sit down with Ms A and have a meeting. Mr B formed the impression that if they did not reach agreement at that meeting, there was a possibility that Ms Lahoud might commence court proceedings.
4. Ms Lahoud denied making any reference to a section of legislation or saying anything to the effect that she would "slap" them with "a section". Her evidence was that she introduced herself and told Ms B that Ms A had asked her to drop off gifts for Child A. Ms Lahoud then said to Ms B something like "you two [Ms B and Ms A] are sisters" and "you both love and care for Child A". She went on to say, "as sisters, the two of you can have informal settlement discussions about a contact plan - just the two of you".
5. Ms Lahoud then said that "the conversation moved to the fact that there was an unsuccessful attempt at mediation" in May 2018, two months after Ms A had directly briefed Ms Lahoud. On 1 May 2018, Ms A (and Ms Lahoud) were advised by NSW Legal Aid that it was unable to conduct a "care and protection" mediation in relation to Child A as the matter had been assessed as unsuitable for mediation. Ms B's and Ms Lahoud's understanding of why that mediation failed affects the likelihood that Ms Lahoud said that she would "slap [them] with a section".
6. Ms B's understanding of why mediation was "unsuitable" was that the mediator breached confidence by telling Ms A that an estranged adult son of hers had arranged to meet Child A, who is his half-sister. After she was told of the proposed visit, Ms B understood that Ms A found her adult son on FaceBook, sent him text messages and harassed his girlfriend. Because the adult son thought Ms A (his mother) would be there when he visited Child A, he cancelled the visit. Based on this understanding of what had happened, Ms B made a complaint about the mediator disclosing confidential information and the mediation did not go ahead.
7. Ms Lahoud also understood that the mediation had failed because Ms B had complained that the mediator had breached confidence but she did not know that Ms B's understanding was that Ms A had tried to contact her estranged son and harassed his girlfriend. If Ms B's version of events were true, Ms Lahoud accepted that she would have been less critical of Ms B.
8. Ms Lahoud was questioned about her understanding of which "section" was relevant when commencing care proceedings. She nominated the "Children and Young Persons Care and Protection Act" and said that she had represented a client in an application for restoration under that legislation in 2015 or 2016. However, that was the only application of that kind she had made, and she did not know the relevant section of the Act.
9. The circumstances supporting a finding that Ms Lahoud said she could "slap" a "section" on Ms and Mr B (being a reference to a legal or court action) is firstly that Ms B mentioned in her initial complaint that Ms Lahoud threatened her "with certain sections through the court". Both Ms B and Mr B gave consistent and unwavering evidence to that effect. There was no suggestion of any collusion between them.
10. Secondly, because the word "section" is not a word a non-lawyer would use as part of a normal conversation, it is a word that Ms B and Mr B are likely to remember. Ms B said she specifically recalls asking Ms Lahoud "what section" and not receiving an answer.
11. Thirdly, Ms Lahoud admits that "the conversation moved to the fact that there was an unsuccessful attempt at mediation" and she raised the issue of a "round table" or mediation with a view to increasing contact with Child A. She suggested having "informal discussions settlement discussions about a contact plan". It is feasible that Ms Lahoud mentioned that she could "slap [them] with a section" in that context because Ms Lahoud understood that Ms B had "derailed the mediation" in 2018.
12. Finally, although less persuasively, Ms Lahoud had brought termination proceedings before and thus was aware of the availability of legal redress including the name of the relevant legislation, although not the number of the specific section.
13. When each of the circumstances outlined above is considered, we are satisfied that on the balance of probabilities, Ms Lahoud did say words or words to the effect that she could "slap [them] with a section" despite her emphatic and consistent denial. That is not to say that Ms Lahoud was lying when she denied saying those words. She did not keep a record of the conversation and it may be that she genuinely believes she did not do so.

Does the conduct in the B complaint amount to unsatisfactory professional conduct?

"The Respondent is guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct by breaching Rule 8(c) of the Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015, or is it otherwise guilty of unsatisfactory conduct by engaging in conduct likely to diminish public confidence in the legal profession, or otherwise bring the legal profession into disrepute by her conduct in connection with attending on the complainant, [Ms B], at the [B] home on 24 December 2019, in relation to care proceedings concerning a child who was in her [Ms B's] care.

Particulars (Agreed Facts)

(i) On 24 December 2019, at some time between 12.00 pm and 4.00 pm, the Respondent attended the [B] home unannounced, and without prior appointment.

(ii) Prior to 24 December 2019, both [Ms B] and [Mr B] had no contact with the Respondent.

(iii) The Respondent and [Mr B] then had a conversation with words to the effect of:

Respondent: I've got some presents for [Child A], would you mind if she got them?

[Mr B]: [Child A] isn't here at the moment. I will just give my wife a call.

[Mr B]: Sorry, but who are you to [Ms A]?

The Respondent: I am a barrister helping [Ms A].

[Mr B]: Do you have a card?

(iv) [Mr B] then telephoned [Ms B] and asked her to return home to speak with the Respondent.

(v) [Ms B] then arrived at the [B] home. The following events occurred in the presence of [Mr B]:

a. The Respondent introduced herself to [Ms B] as 'Rita';

b. The Respondent showed [Ms B] gifts that she was carrying.

c. The Respondent told [Ms B] that [Ms A] would like to have regular contact with [Child A] and that she (the Respondent) was attending the [B] home to help [Ms A].

h. The Respondent said that [Ms A] missed and loved [Child A].

She (the Respondent) could "slap them [Mr and Mrs B] with a section".

(vi) The Respondent asked [Ms B] for her mobile phone number, which [Ms B] provided to the Respondent. [Ms B] provided her mobile phone number to the Respondent, as she felt that otherwise she would appear uncooperative."

1. Unsatisfactory professional conduct is defined in s 296 of the Uniform Law:

296 Unsatisfactory professional conduct

For the purposes of this Law, unsatisfactory professional conduct includes conduct of a lawyer occurring in connection with the practice of law that falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent lawyer.

1. A contravention of the Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015 (NSW) (Barristers Rules) is capable of constituting unsatisfactory professional conduct (or professional misconduct): Uniform Law, s 298(b). The B complaint is that Ms Lahoud has breached Rule 8(c) of the Barristers Rules. Rule 8 provides that:

A barrister must not engage in conduct which is:

(a) dishonest or otherwise discreditable to a barrister,

(b) prejudicial to the administration of justice, or

(c) likely to diminish public confidence in the legal profession or the administration of justice or otherwise bring the legal profession into disrepute.

1. Unfairly using a person's professional position to gain an advantage (or intimidate members of the community) may amount to unsatisfactory professional conduct. In Quinlivan v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2012] WASCA 263 at [53] the Court (Pullin JA, Newnes JA and Murphy JA) outlined the nature of such conduct:

"53 As a general proposition, it may be said that a practitioner may be guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct (or perhaps professional misconduct depending on all the circumstances) if a practitioner unfairly uses his or her professional position in order to gain a personal advantage over, or to intimidate, members of the community. Whether improper conduct of that kind has occurred will depend upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The observations of de Jersey CJ in Legal Services Commission v Sing [2007] LPT 004; [2007] 2 Qd R 158 at [29] - [30] are pertinent:

Pressure is daily brought to bear to encourage people to discharge their legal obligations. There is nothing legally or morally wrong with that, assuming reasonable restraint. As previously observed, [the solicitor], while applying pressure, acted in a measured way. The issue is whether the [solicitor] nevertheless unfairly used his professional position to reinforce that application of pressure, so as to overreach or intimidate ...

There is a continuum applicable to practitioners, with legitimate pressure at the one end, and improper intimidation at the other. It may, in any particular case, be difficult to delineate the precise point at which any application of pressure becomes improper. That is why practitioners must be extremely careful before resorting to any even arguably threatening conduct. They are well advised to err on the side of caution, as in all aspects of their professional approach. With the increasingly intense demands of clients, and the high level of competition which these days characterises the practice of the law, practitioners will inevitably be asked to stretch the limits of their consciences: they must be steadfast not to yield to that temptation."

Finding that the B complaint amounts to unsatisfactory professional conduct

1. The circumstances of visiting the home of Ms B and Mr B unannounced on Christmas Eve are outlined above. Ms A had retained Ms Lahoud to pursue an application for permanent restoration of care and responsibility for Child A. No application had been lodged. There was a history of a failed mediation and there had been no regular contact between mother and child for some time. The purpose of the visit was ostensibly to deliver presents for Child A, but the conversation turned to the contact arrangements between Child A and her biological mother culminating in Ms Lahoud saying that she could "slap [them] (Mr and Ms B) with a section". Ms B understood those words to be a reference to "a law or court action". That was a reasonable conclusion.
2. Ms Lahoud's conduct was not overtly threatening. She did not come into the house or shout at them. But she did use her position as Ms A's barrister to try to persuade Ms B to negotiate about access with Child A. She mentioned that she could "slap [them] with a section". She did not do so to gain any personal advantage, but Ms Lahoud appreciates that her visit "created a real risk of distressing the B family and Child A". Using her status as a barrister to apply pressure on Ms B to negotiate about access and to do so on their doorstep on Christmas Eve was unprofessional and inappropriate.
3. Ms Lahoud has engaged in conduct which is likely to diminish public confidence in the legal profession. That conduct falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent lawyer. Ms Lahoud is guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct.

Does the conduct in the Bar Council complaint amount to professional misconduct?

"The Respondent is guilty of professional misconduct by breaching Rule 8(a) of the Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015, or is otherwise guilty of professional misconduct, by engaging in conduct which is dishonest or otherwise discreditable to a barrister by her false representations to the Bar Council during its investigation into the Complaint that she did not attend the [B] home on 24 December 2019, or at all.

Particulars

On 16 February 2021, 20 March 2021, 9 April 2021 and 14 April 2022, the Respondent represented to the Bar Council that she did not attend the [B] home on 24 December 2019, or at any other time.

On 26 August 2022, through her solicitors, the Respondent represented to the Bar Council that she did not attend the [B] home on 24 December 2019, or at any other time.

The Respondent did, in fact, attend the [B] home on 24 December 2019 as particularised . . . (in the B complaint)." (Words in brackets added.)

1. The agreed facts about the Bar Council complaint are set out at [28] to [35] of the Statement of Agreed Facts:

"28. On 16 February 2021, after being provided with a copy of the [B] Complaint and being asked by the Bar Council to provide a response to it, the Respondent said that, among other things:

"The complaint is not only untrue, but more importantly, the complainant has pursued this mechanism with a malicious intent - to end the contact proceedings . . ."

29. On 20 March 2021, the Respondent provided the Bar Council with her substantive response to the [B] Complaint and said, among other things, that:

a. the allegation that the Respondent attended the [B] home on 24 December 2019 without prior appointment, delivered presents to [Child A], threatened [Ms B] with court proceedings and made [Ms B] feel harassed and intimidated was "Untrue and completely denied";

b. the allegation that the Respondent identified herself to [Ms B] in three different capacities (being [Ms A]'s friend, solicitor and barrister), was "Untrue and again, denied in full";

c. the allegation that the Respondent was delivering presents to [Child A] was "Untrue, denied";

d. the allegation that the Respondent disclosed matters relating to [Ms A]'s health not relevant to the care proceedings was "untrue, denied".

30. The Respondent also responded to various questions from the Bar Council in her response on 20 March 2021 affirming the above denials. For example, the Bar Council asked the Respondent if she threatened [Ms B] with court proceedings, and in response, the Respondent said, "Please refer to answers [in relation to the allegation that she attended the B home on 24 December 2019 without prior appointment]. No such conversations or attendance took place. I cannot recall who was the first to provide [Ms B's] email and number, it might have been [Ms A] or [Ms B] herself first, as they both did at various intervals".

31. On 9 April 2021, in response to further question from the Bar Council, the Respondent, among other things, again denied that she attended the [B] home on 24 December 2019 or had ever attended the [B] home.

32. On 14 April 2022, the Respondent responded to further questions from the Bar Council and relevantly said, among other things that she did not have any contemporaneous records showing that she was not at the [B] home at any point. The Respondent said that she did not "know what [was] meant by the question as [she has] nothing to 'show' for an account that did not happen, nor would there be evidence to show the non-existence of a fact."

33. On 26 August 2022, through her solicitors, the Respondent made further representations to the Bar Council including:

a. "that she did not attend the premises [being the B home] on that day [24 December 2019]";

b. that the Respondent was "elsewhere on this day", and provided a detailed chronological account of her whereabouts on 24 December 2019 to demonstrate that the Respondent could not have attended "as a matter of simple timing". The Respondent provided a statement from a member of the Respondent's family and a receipt of a bank statement showing a bank deposit made by the Respondent to support the Respondent's account of her whereabouts for the balance of 24 December 2019;

c. that the Respondent's recollection and timing of events on 24 December 2019 was "contrary to the statutory declaration of [Ms B] of 14 January 2022 wherein [Ms B] declares the respondent did in fact attend the premises" and further, that [Ms B's] "statutory declaration [was] false and the respondent never attended the premises".

34. Contrary to the assertions advanced by the Respondent as outlined above, the Respondent did, in fact, attend the [B] home on 24 December 2019 as outlined in the facts relating to the [B] Complaint above.

35. The Respondent admits that she was dishonest in her responses to the Bar Council on 16 February 2021, 20 March 2021, 9 April 2021 and 14 April 2022 as outlined in the facts relating to the Bar Council Complaint above, and in her response through her solicitors on 26 August 2022."

1. Section 297 of the Uniform Law sets out the inclusive definition of professional misconduct:

(1) For the purposes of this Law, professional misconduct includes -

(a) unsatisfactory professional conduct of a lawyer, where the conduct involves a substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence; and

(b) conduct of a lawyer whether occurring in connection with the practice of law or occurring otherwise than in connection with the practice of law that would, if established, justify a finding that the lawyer is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice.

(2) For the purpose of deciding whether a lawyer is or is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice as referred to in subsection (1)(b), regard may be had to the matters that would be considered if the lawyer were an applicant for admission to the Australian legal profession or for the grant or renewal of an Australian practising certificate and any other relevant matters.

1. The Court of Appeal (Bathurst CJ; Leeming JA; Simpson AJA) held in Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v EFA (a pseudonym) [2021] NSWCA 339 (EFA) at [169], that ". . . a finding of unfitness involves more than an objective analysis of the impugned conduct". It may also involve "other relevant (often extenuating) circumstances" and the "personal qualities" of the lawyer. The Court went on to explain that "[U]nfitness is ultimately a finding about character, although conduct plays an important role in the evaluation of character."
2. Section 297(2) of the Uniform Law provides that the Tribunal may have regard, when determining whether conduct constitutes professional misconduct, to the matters that would be considered if the lawyer were an applicant for admission to the Australian profession or for the grant or renewal of an Australian practising certificate. Rule 13(1)(a) of the Legal Profession Uniform General Rules 2015 (NSW) provides that the Tribunal may consider whether the Respondent is currently of good fame and character. Those terms were described by the Court of Appeal (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P, Sackville AJA) in Prothonotary v Gregory [2017] NSWCA 101 at [25](8):

"Fame refers to a person's reputation in the relevant community, character refers to the person's actual nature: McBride v Walton (NSWCA 15.7.1994 per Kirby P); Clearihan v Registrar of Motor Vehicle Dealers (1994) 117 FLR 455, 459."

1. In Prothonotary v Comeskey [2018] NSWCA 18 at [40]- [41] Macfarlan JA, Simpson JA agreeing, referred to the following legal principles relating to the objective circumstances of the conduct:

"40 A legal practitioner owes a duty to be candid in dealings with the Court and his or her professional association (A Solicitor at [30]; Prothonotary v Van Es [2014] NSWCA 169 at [38]). . . .

41 As stated in Prothonotary v Montenegro [2015] NSWCA 409 at [66], '[q]ualities of honesty and integrity and a preparedness to comply with the law are essential requirements for being a fit and proper person'."

1. Honesty goes to the heart of the professional responsibilities of a legal practitioner: Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Yousif [2025] NSWCA 77 at [44]. As Spigelman CJ explained in New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins (2001) 52 NSWLR 279; [2001] NSWCA 284 (Mason P and Handley JA agreeing), a case involving a barrister who failed to lodge tax returns over many years:

"[19] Honesty and integrity are important in many spheres of conduct. However, in some spheres significant public interests are involved in the conduct of particular persons and the state regulates and restricts those who are entitled to engage in those activities and acquire the privileges associated with a particular status. The legal profession has long required the highest standards of integrity."

1. A contravention of the Barristers Rules is capable of constituting professional misconduct (or unsatisfactory professional conduct): Uniform Law, s 298(b). The Bar Council alleges that Ms Lahoud has breached Rule 8(a) of the Barristers Rules - "A barrister must not engage in conduct which is dishonest or otherwise discreditable to a barrister".

Finding that Bar Council complaint amounts to professional misconduct

1. Since commencing practice as a barrister in 2010, the Bar Council has not received any other complaints about Ms Lahoud.
2. The circumstances surrounding Ms Lahoud's dishonesty make it more serious than a single denial to, or concealment of information from, a professional association. Those circumstances are the number of times she lied, the lengthy period during which she maintained the lie, the fact that she constructed an elaborate positive case that she could not have attended the home of Ms B and Mr B and the fact that she attributed a malicious intent to Ms B in lodging the complaint.
3. In five discrete representations to the Bar Council between January 2021 and August 2022 Ms Lahoud, either personally or through her legal representatives, categorically denied attending the B home on 24 December 2019. In cross examination Ms Lahoud conceded that her false denials amount to discrete instances of dishonesty over an eighteen month period rather than a single continuing contravention. In final submissions Ms Lahoud characterised the instances of dishonesty as "a single series of events". The Bar Council submitted that it was not reasonably open to characterise the conduct in that way.
4. Each denial was in response to the same allegation: that Ms Lahoud attended the home of Ms B and Mr B on 24 December 2019. On each occasion Ms Lahoud decided to repeat the same lie, despite the fact that she had many months to reflect on her responses. The denials constitute separate acts of dishonesty arising from the same circumstances.
5. Ms Lahoud was first notified of the complaint on 12 January 2021. On 8 June 2023 the Bar Council notified her that proceedings would be initiated against her for unsatisfactory professional conduct. Ms Lahoud told her solicitors that her denials were untrue before the Bar Council amended the application to add the complaint of professional misconduct. But it was not until 10 November 2023 that she filed a reply admitting that she had been dishonest. The lengthy period during which Ms Lahoud denied that she had visited the home of Ms B and Mr B adds to the gravity of her conduct.
6. In a letter from Ms Lahoud's solicitors to the Bar Council dated 26 August 2022 Ms Lahoud gave a detailed account of her whereabouts on 24 December 2019 and claimed that those activities would have left no time for the "almost three and a half hour exercise to have actually occurred". Ms Lahoud attempted to support this account with other evidence including a statement from her mother, evidence of a bank transaction and e-toll records. Her attempts to construct a positive case that she could not have been at the home of Ms B and Mr B add to the gravity of her conduct.
7. Ms Lahoud attributed a malicious intent to Ms B for making a complaint. In an email of 16 February 2021 to the Bar Association she wrote:

"The complaint is not only untrue, but more importantly, the complainant has pursued this mechanism with malicious intent - to end the contact proceedings. In other words, to end contact between a mother and child."

1. When questioned about telling the Bar Council that Ms B's motivation in making the complaint was malicious, Ms Lahoud conceded that the word "malicious" was too harsh. Nevertheless, she maintained her view that Ms B intended to "derail or thwart the proceedings". Attributing a malicious intent to Ms B for making the complaint adds to the seriousness of Ms Lahoud's misconduct.
2. There was no evidence as to Ms Lahoud's personal qualities, or character, except that since 2010, when she began practising, this is the first complaint about her that the Bar Council has received. There are no other relevant circumstances, extenuating or otherwise, that would justify a finding that Ms Lahoud is not guilty of professional misconduct.
3. Ms Lahoud has engaged in conduct which is dishonest. The conduct set out in the Bar Council complaint and in the Statement of Agreed Facts at [27] - [35] is a breach of Rule 8(a) of the Barristers Rules. For the reasons given above as to the nature, gravity and persistence of her dishonesty, we find that Ms Lahoud is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice.

1. The Tribunal has various powers under s 302(1) of the Uniform Law, including the power under s 302(1)(j) to order that a lawyer not apply for a practising certificate before the end of a specified period.

302 Determination by designated tribunal - disciplinary matters

(1) If, after it has completed a hearing under this Part into the conduct of a respondent lawyer, the designated tribunal finds that the lawyer is guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, the designated tribunal may make any orders that it thinks fit, including any of the orders that a local regulatory authority can make under section 299 in relation to a lawyer and any one or more of the following -

. . .

(i) an order directing that an Australian practising certificate or Australian registration certificate not be granted to the lawyer before the end of a specified period;

. . .

1. The Bar Council sought an order that Ms Lahoud not apply for a practising certificate for three years from the date of this decision. Ms Lahoud submitted that a period of three years is punitive rather than protective and that a significantly shorter period is appropriate.
2. Section 302 of the Uniform Law extends the Tribunal's powers to the making of orders under s 299 including an order under s 299(1)(e) requiring that the lawyer undertake counselling. While the Bar Council did not ask for a counselling order, Ms Lahoud did not oppose the making of such an order.
3. Neither party submitted that we should make an order under any other provision of s 302 or s 299 and we are of the view that no other kind of order is appropriate.

1. The disciplinary jurisdiction of the Tribunal is protective, although because the Tribunal may make orders including a reprimand and a fine, it may be perceived as punitive: EFA at [177]-[178]. The Tribunal must consider what orders appropriately protect against repeated behaviour by the lawyer while also deterring other practitioners contemplating similar conduct: Law Society of NSW v Foreman (No 2) [1994] NSWCA 69; (1994) 34 NSWLR 408 (Foreman) at 441 per Mahoney J.
2. Disciplinary orders relate to the circumstances at the time the orders are made and are to be responsive to the identified risk: Prothonotary v Del-Castillo [2001] NSWCA 75 at [71]; Foreman at 419G (per Kirby P, in dissent) and 441C per Mahoney JA.
3. An assessment of the practitioner's fitness to practise at the time of hearing includes a finding as to whether the practitioner is likely to transgress in the future: Law Society of NSW v Maharaj [2017] NSWCATOD 79 at [37]- [38]. The assessment also includes consideration of the practitioner's reflection on what has occurred; any insight and contrition offered by the practitioner and an overall assessment of the practitioner's character: Clyne v NSW Bar Association [1960] HCA 40; (1960) 104 CLR 186 at 201-202; [1960] HCA 40.

1. Although Ms Lahoud said that her decision to go to the home of Ms B and Mr B was "well-intentioned" she appreciated that it was "unprofessional, misguided and wrong". She accepted the visit "created a real risk of distressing the [B] family and [Child A]". She added that it was a "terrible mistake" to involve her mother in giving evidence supporting her lies. Ms Lahoud apologised to the Bar Council for her conduct from January 2021 to August 2022. We find that Ms Lahoud is genuinely remorseful.
2. Ms Lahoud said that while she accepts that she has made serious mistakes she also believes that she has insight into what went wrong and the ability to ensure that she does not repeat her mistakes. She listed three circumstances which she said go some way to explaining why she lied to the Bar Council. Firstly, she said she was not objective and responded emotionally when she received the complaint. Secondly, she did not have her own chambers and felt isolated. Thirdly, once she had lied, she felt trapped and embarrassed.
3. Reflecting on her behaviour, Ms Lahoud believed that Ms B had "been determined to thwart any relationship between (her client) and Child A ever since Child A was first placed with her." Ms Lahoud has maintained her belief that Ms B's motives in making the complaint were to "derail or thwart the proceedings". Ms Lahoud was outraged by Ms B's allegations that she had threatened, harassed and intimidated her. She continued to react emotionally as she wrongly viewed the Bar Council's actions through the prism of the care proceedings and Ms B's role in those proceedings. She describes the circumstances as "an emotional maelstrom involving Ms and Mr [B], [Ms A] and [Child A] with its genesis being a series of highly unusual events".
4. Ms Lahoud said that she now recognises that her view of Ms B's role in the care proceedings is "beside the point". As a way of explaining her emotional response to the care proceedings, Ms Lahoud gave evidence that she has a "deep desire" to have children of her own.
5. Ms Lahoud stated that she mistakenly thought that the Bar Council had believed everything Ms B said and was not supporting her. At the time she took offence to the "tone" of the Bar Council's correspondence. She found it to be "accusatory". She also said that she felt betrayed by the Bar Association. After all the hard work Ms Lahoud had put in, including pro bono work, she expected the Bar Council to know that she would never threaten, harass or intimidate anyone.
6. In particular, Ms Lahoud objected to the way the Bar Council originally framed the B complaint. In the 12 January 2021 letter to Ms Lahoud, the Bar Council alleged that she had breached Rule 8(c) of the Barristers Rules by:

"Attending on the complainant, Ms B, at her home without prior appointment on 24 December 2019, in relation to current care proceedings concerning a child who is in her care. In so attending Ms B's home, Ms Lahoud delivered presents for the child in her care and at the same time threatened her with court proceedings and made her feel harassed and intimidated . . ." (Italics added.)

1. By using the words "and at the same time" Ms Lahoud felt that the Bar Council had rolled into one the fact that she had delivered presents to Child A, with a serious allegation of harassment and intimidation. She would have liked to have been asked separately whether she attended the home of Ms B and Mr B. Ms Lahoud continued to suggest that if the complaint had been framed differently, she would not have lied. She said she now recognises that the Bar Council's correspondence was courteous and inquisitorial, not accusatory.
2. Ms Lahoud's response to feeling betrayed is to view the Bar Association purely as a regulator, or "authority" not as a "trade union" or professional body. She does not believe the Bar Association should have both roles. She now feels deprived of support from a "trade union like" body that can provide social activities and professional support.
3. Throughout the complaint process, Ms Lahoud felt isolated. She was not working from chambers. She had at least one professional colleague who she could have turned to for support but said she did not do so at the time because she was embarrassed. She has now spoken to that person who advised her to speak to colleagues straight away in future. If faced with a similar situation again Ms Lahoud said she would speak to colleagues and seek advice.
4. Ms Lahoud said she continued to deny that she had attended the home of Ms B and Mr B, even to her own solicitors as late as August 2022, because she "felt trapped in her own lie" and was embarrassed to admit the mistakes she had made. She knew she was doing the wrong thing but did not have the courage to "come clean".
5. Ms Lahoud is remorseful and has reflected on why she lied to the Bar Council. The Bar Council submitted that the tenor of Ms Lahoud's evidence was one of personal grievance against Ms B and the Bar Association. The Bar Council submitted that Ms Lahoud needs to achieve a deeper and more nuanced understanding of why she behaved in the way she did. She has not taken any positive steps to rehabilitate herself apart from her own reflections. That could have been achieved, according to the Bar Council, by attending a counsellor or psychologist and, perhaps, by undertaking a course of study about professional boundaries and ethics.
6. Ms Lahoud's response is that her behaviour should not be pathologised. The fact that she has not sought counselling or psychological treatment does not mean that she has no insight or that she is more likely to repeat the conduct. She had not considered speaking to a counsellor or psychologist, but is now open to doing so. Ms Lahoud would not oppose an order that she undertake counselling.
7. Ms Lahoud agreed that she could not be dispassionate about this case and should not have agreed to represent Ms A. As a way of ensuring that she will not repeat this kind of conduct, Ms Lahoud said she does not intend to take on any matters involving care proceedings. That is because she does not consider that she has the "requisite skills to do so, especially in relation to managing the emotional burden of those proceedings". In her view, Ms A should have contact with Child A because every child has a human right to have contact with their mother. She does not want to practise in a jurisdiction that cannot assist mothers as well as it should.
8. The Bar Council submitted that the prospect of a barrister being faced with emotionally charged personal circumstances is not confined to care proceedings.

1. There were no testimonials from her peers or other evidence as to Ms Lahoud's personal qualities or character. From 2010, she built up her experience by participating in the pro bono, duty barrister scheme. This is the first complaint about her that the Bar Council has received. Apart from the serious incidents of dishonesty we have described, there is no evidence to suggest that she is not otherwise of good character.

1. Ms Lahoud has breached her duty to be candid to her professional regulator in an extremely egregious manner. Her dishonesty was in response to a single allegation, but was made more serious because of the number of times she lied, the lengthy period during which she maintained the lie, the fact that she constructed an elaborate positive case in her defence and the fact that she initially attributed a malicious intent to Ms B in lodging the complaint.
2. The fact that the conduct occurred in circumstances which were highly emotional for her client does not lessen the seriousness of Ms Lahoud's conduct.
3. Ms Lahoud is remorseful for that conduct and has reflected on her dishonesty. She submitted that the honest and detailed answers during cross-examination suggest that the Tribunal should be satisfied that the prospect of her being dishonest in the future is low. Although Ms Lahoud still harbours grievances against Ms B and the Bar Council, we think it unlikely that she would lie to the Bar Council again after what she has been through. It is also unlikely that she would be dishonest in other situations. Nevertheless, she may gain more insight into her behaviour by seeing a psychologist. While there was little evidence of her character, she recognises that she cannot manage the burden of care proceedings. Emotionally charged situations are not confined to care proceedings, but we accept Ms Lahoud's evidence that she does not have the same emotional response to criminal or family law proceedings involving a mother and a child.
4. Ms Lahoud voluntarily agreed to the suspension of her practising certificate over various periods since 21 December 2023. As at the date of the hearing in May 2025, she had not practised for nearly 18 months. Ms Lahoud submitted that the inability to work for a significant period of time, coupled with published reasons that record that fact, provide both a general and specific deterrence. Ms Lahoud submitted that a period of three years from the date of the decision is neither proportionate or appropriate and that it "strays from being protective to punitive".
5. Even taking into account that the likelihood of Ms Lahoud being dishonest in the future is low, in recognition of the need to deter her and others from engaging in or repeating dishonest conduct, Ms Lahoud should not be able to practise for a significant further period of time.
6. The Bar Association has a policy for barristers returning to the Bar after two years without a practising certificate. Ms Lahoud submitted that she should be permitted to apply for a practising certificate before 30 June 2026. Otherwise she "must undertake the NSW Bar Examination and complete the Bar Practice Course and the Reading Program". However, there is an "Exemption Policy" which allows the Bar Council to waive the requirements in the "Returning to the Bar Policy".
7. The requirements in the "Returning to the Bar Policy" should not influence our decision as to the appropriate time during which Ms Lahoud should be prohibited from reapplying for a practising certificate. But the fact that Ms Lahoud has not practised for 18 months is relevant when considering the deterrent effect of any protective order on Ms Lahoud and on other practitioners. Other practitioners will appreciate that, if they find themselves in a similar situation, they can expect to be unable to practice for a significant period of time.
8. We order that Ms Lahoud is not to apply for an Australian practising certificate for a period of 18 months from the date of this decision. When combined with the period of approximately 18 months when Ms Lahoud has been suspended from practice, it will be three years from the start of the suspension before she is eligible to re-apply.

1. The costs rule for these kinds of matters is that, where the Tribunal finds a lawyer guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, the Tribunal "must make an order" requiring the lawyer to pay costs "unless the designated tribunal is satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist": Uniform Law, s 303. There are no "exceptional circumstances" that would displace the normal rule.

(1) Under s 302(1)(j) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2015 (NSW) the Respondent is not to apply for an Australian practising certificate for a period of 18 months from the date of this decision.

(2) The Respondent is to pay the costs of the Applicant as agreed and, failing agreement, as assessed under the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW).

Schedule of objections and withdrawal of evidence

(1) Objection to [16 e. iii] last sentence. Admitted not as evidence of the truth of those matters, but as to Ms B's state of mind.

(2) Objection to the whole of [17]. Admitted not as evidence of the truth of those matters, but as to Ms B's state of mind.

(1) Objection [19] first and last sentence. Objection upheld.

(1) Objection to [23]. Objection to [23] from "Further, while I cannot . . ." to the end of that paragraph. Admitted, not as evidence of the truth of those allegations, but as to Ms Lahoud's state of mind.

(2) Objection to [27] last sentence. Admitted, not as evidence of the truth of those allegations, but as to Ms Lahoud's state of mind.

(3) Objection to [32] Admitted, not as evidence of the truth of those allegations, but as to Ms Lahoud's state of mind.

(4) Objection to [36]. Admitted, not as evidence of the truth of those allegations, but as to Ms Lahoud's state of mind.

(6) Objection to [71]. Admitted, not as evidence of the truth of those allegations, but as to Ms Lahoud's state of mind.

(7) Objection to [86] Admitted, not as evidence of the truth of those allegations, but as to Ms Lahoud's state of mind.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

30 June 2025 - Paragraph 38 amended to remove "Ms Lahoud" and substitute "Ms B"