Law Society of New South Wales v Maharaj

Factual background

1. The relevant factual background was not in dispute and may be stated in summary form. As will be seen, the chronology is significant, as are the circumstances confronted by the respondent after she realised that she had made a grave mistake.
2. After completing her qualifying tertiary educational requirements in law in Queensland in 1990, the respondent served articles of clerkship in the taxation division of a well-known leading firm of solicitors in Queensland. She was admitted to practice as a solicitor in Queensland in 2001 and then moved to Sydney where she worked as a tax consultant with another well-known firm until 2006. From 2006 and until 2015 she worked as a Senior Associate in the tax group of a well-known firm of solicitors. The respondent worked part-time after the birth of each of her two children and was so employed in April 2015. On 21 April 2015 the respondent signed a contract to purchase a residential property and approached her bank the same day for a housing loan. On 24 April 2015 she was required by the bank to produce a payslip.
3. In order to produce a payslip from her home computer, the respondent located an earlier payslip which she had generated from the software of the firm but which did not contain her then current salary details. She used this payslip to create a new document on 24 April 2015. In order to do this the respondent had to manually insert her ordinary rate of pay, taxation deductions, and the year-to-date summary showing both gross and net pay. She was also required to insert details of the name of the employer's superannuation fund. She also appears to have deleted reference to her banking details from that contained in the "original" payslip and to have inserted the logo of the firm which does not appear on the payslip accessed by employees of the firm.
4. The falsified payslip was then submitted by the respondent to the bank. She said that after doing so "I continued to ruminate on what I had done because I realised almost immediately that it was wrong and that I should not have submitted the Payslip with my full-time wage details, rather than with the details of the actual wage I was receiving at the time."
5. By 27 April 2015 the respondent said that she had decided to withdraw the application for finance and rescind the contract for the purchase of the property. On 29 April 2015 she said that she "worked up the courage to confess what I had done to my husband." She then rescinded the contract within the cooling off period which was part of its terms, and said that she attempted to call the bank representative on about 30 April 2015 to withdraw the finance application and left a message to that effect on his phone. He telephoned her on 1 May 2015 and she told him that she wanted to withdraw the loan application.
6. On 5 May 2015 she was summoned to a meeting with her supervising partner and the human resources manager of her employer law firm. She was told that the bank had made contact with the firm to confirm the details on the payslip and it had been ascertained that the payslip which she had created contained incorrect salary details. The respondent confessed what she had done. On 7 May 2015 her services with the law firm were terminated. That firm reported the "dishonesty" of the respondent to the Law Society, which was the trigger for certain investigations and the institution of these proceedings.

Professional misconduct

1. The applicant's submissions supported a finding of professional misconduct and the consequential orders which had been agreed between the parties. The respondent conceded that her conduct constituted professional misconduct. Such a conclusion represents the agreed position of all parties, and in particular, the respondent. For reasons which we shall shortly develop, we are comfortably satisfied that we should make such a finding. However, in the circumstances there is no need for us to state these reasons in any detail.
2. Professional misconduct is defined in the Act by reference to the definition of unsatisfactory professional misconduct. The relevant definitions are in the following terms; 496 Unsatisfactory professional conduct For the purposes of this Act: "unsatisfactory professional conduct" includes conduct of an Australian legal practitioner occurring in connection with the practice of law that falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent Australian legal practitioner. Professional misconduct 497 Professional misconduct For the purposes of this Act: "professional misconduct" includes: (a) unsatisfactory professional conduct of an Australian legal practitioner, where the conduct involves a substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence, and (b) conduct of an Australian legal practitioner whether occurring in connection with the practice of law or occurring otherwise than in connection with the practice of law that would, if established, justify a finding that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice. (2) For finding that an Australian legal practitioner is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice as mentioned in subsection (1), regard may be had to the matters that would be considered under section 25 or 42 if the practitioner were an applicant for admission to the legal profession under this Act or for the grant or renewal of a local practising certificate and any other relevant matters.
3. For completeness, we note that each of these definitions is inclusive, and, in general terms, permit reference to the common law concepts of professional misconduct.
4. We should state at the outset that the respondent readily conceded the obvious, namely that her conduct in submitting a payslip to the bank which she had knowingly and deliberately created and which overstated her income constituted an act of dishonesty incompatible with the qualities expected of a legal practitioner.
5. It is uncontroversial that such conduct by a legal practitioner will constitute professional misconduct as defined in the Act whether committed in the course of practice, or outside such practice. In New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins [2001] NSWCA 284 Spigelman CJ (Mason P and Handley JA agreeing) said 19 Honesty and integrity are important in many spheres of conduct. However, in some spheres significant public interests are involved in the conduct of particular persons and the state regulates and restricts those who are entitled to engage in those activities and acquire the privileges associated with a particular status. The legal profession has long required the highest standards of integrity. 20 There are four interrelated interests involved. Clients must feel secure in confiding their secrets and entrusting their most personal affairs to lawyers. Fellow practitioners must be able to depend implicitly on the word and the behaviour of their colleagues. The judiciary must have confidence in those who appear before the courts. The public must have confidence in the legal profession by reason of the central role the profession plays in the administration of justice. Many aspects of the administration of justice depend on the trust by the judiciary and/or the public in the performance of professional obligations by professional people. … 56 There is authority in favour of extending the terminology "professional misconduct" to acts not occurring directly in the course of professional practice. That is not to say that any form of personal conduct may be regarded as professional misconduct. The authorities appear to me to suggest two kinds of relationships that justify applying the terminology in this broader way. First, acts may be sufficiently closely connected with actual practice, albeit not occurring in the course of such practice. Secondly, conduct outside the course of practice may manifest the presence or absence of qualities which are incompatible with, or essential for, the conduct of practice. In this second case, the terminology of "professional misconduct" overlaps with and, usually it is not necessary to distinguish it from, the terminology of "good fame and character" or "fit and proper person".
6. Having regard to the principles set out in Cummins (and in many other authorities), we are comfortably satisfied on the balance of probabilities, in accordance with the well-known Briginshaw principles that the respondent is guilty of professional misconduct as defined in section 497 of the Act, by reason of the matters summarised above, and we so find.

Protective orders

1. The area of controversy, as it concerned us, was whether it was appropriate in all the circumstances for us to impose a reprimand as the primary protective order to reflect the misconduct so found as sought by the parties, or whether cancellation or suspension of registration would be more appropriate. In so stating we proceed on the basis that we are not bound by the agreed consent position put forward by the parties. The submissions of the parties and in particular the respondent focused on this area. It is uncontroversial that the power to make orders pursuant to section 564 of the Act is discretionary. One of the considerations is the matter of public interest as referred to particularly in subsection (10). We have taken this matter into consideration in arriving at our decision concerning the appropriate determination of these proceedings.
2. It is well-established that the orders which we are entitled to make consequent upon a finding of professional misconduct are protective in nature, and are not intended to be imposed by way of punishment, although, in most cases, there will be a punitive effect.
3. The range of orders which are available to the Tribunal are set out in section 562 of the Act which is in the following terms; 562 Determinations of Tribunal (1) Orders generally If, after it has completed a hearing under this Part in relation to a complaint against an Australian legal practitioner, the Tribunal is satisfied that the practitioner has engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, the Tribunal may make such orders as it thinks fit, including any one or more of the orders specified in this section. (2) Orders requiring official implementation in this jurisdiction The Tribunal may make the following orders under this subsection: (a) an order that the name of the practitioner be removed from the local roll, (b) an order that the practitioner's local practising certificate be suspended for a specified period or cancelled, (c) an order that a local practising certificate not be issued to the practitioner before the end of a specified period, (d) an order that: (i) specified conditions be imposed on the practitioner's practising certificate issued or to be issued under this Act, and (ii) the conditions be imposed for a specified period, and (iii) specifies the time (if any) after which the practitioner may apply to the Tribunal for the conditions to be amended or removed, (e) an order reprimanding the practitioner, (f) an order that the name of the practitioner be removed from the roll of public notaries maintained under the Public Notaries Act 1997 . (3) Orders requiring official implementation in another jurisdiction The Tribunal may make the following orders under this subsection: (a) an order recommending that the name of the practitioner be removed from an interstate roll, (b) an order recommending that the practitioner's interstate practising certificate be suspended for a specified period or cancelled, (c) an order recommending that an interstate practising certificate not be granted to the practitioner before the end of a specified period, (d) an order recommending that: (i) specified conditions be imposed on the practitioner's interstate practising certificate, and (ii) the conditions be imposed for a specified period, and (iii) the conditions specify the time (if any) after which the practitioner may apply to the Tribunal for the conditions to be amended or removed. (4) Orders requiring compliance by practitioner The Tribunal may make the following orders under this subsection: (a) an order that the practitioner pay a fine of a specified amount, (b) an order that the practitioner undertake and complete a specified course of further legal education, (c) an order that the practitioner undertake a specified period of practice under supervision, (d) an order that the practitioner do or refrain from doing something in connection with the practice of law, (e) an order that the practitioner cease to accept instructions as a public notary in relation to notarial services, (f) an order that the practitioner's practice, or the financial affairs of the practitioner or of the practitioner's practice, be conducted for a specified period in a specified way or subject to specified conditions, (g) an order that the practitioner's practice be subject to periodic inspection for a specified period, (h) an order that the practitioner undergo counselling or medical treatment or act in accordance with medical advice given to the practitioner, (i) an order that the practitioner use the services of an accountant or other financial specialist in connection with the practitioner's practice, (j) an order that the practitioner not apply for a local practising certificate before the end of a specified period. Note : This subsection is not an exhaustive statement of orders that must be complied with by the practitioner. (5) Ancillary or other orders The Tribunal may make ancillary or other orders, including an order for payment by the practitioner of expenses associated with orders under subsection (4), as assessed or reviewed in or in accordance with the order or as agreed. (6) Alternative finding The Tribunal may find that a person has engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct even though the complaint or disciplinary application alleged professional misconduct or may find that a person has engaged in professional misconduct even though the complaint or disciplinary application alleged unsatisfactory professional conduct. (7) Maximum fine The amount ordered by the Tribunal under this section to be paid by way of fines by any one Australian legal practitioner in connection with the Tribunal's findings about a complaint must not exceed in total: (a) $10,000 in the case of unsatisfactory professional conduct not amounting to professional misconduct, or (b) $75,000 in the case of professional misconduct. If the Tribunal finds that the practitioner has engaged in both professional misconduct and unsatisfactory professional conduct not amounting to professional misconduct, the amount must not exceed $75,000 in total. (8) Reprimands If the Tribunal makes an order reprimanding the practitioner, the Tribunal is to publish the order and a statement of its reasons for making the order. (9) It is sufficient compliance with the requirement to publish an order under subsection (8) if the Tribunal provides to the Commissioner sufficient information to enable the Commissioner to exercise the Commissioner's powers or functions in respect of the Register of Disciplinary Action required to be kept under Part 4.10 (Publicising disciplinary action).
4. It is well-established, without the necessity for resort to authority, that there are four principal aspects to be considered in determining what protective orders are appropriate in any particular case. These are; 1. the gravity of the misconduct 2. the deterrent effect of any protective order on the further conduct of the practitioner 3. the deterrent effect of any protective order on the conduct of other practitioners 4. the enhancement of confidence in the public in the integrity of the profession
5. We commence by observing that an act of dishonesty of the kind in which the respondent engaged is prima facie incompatible with a determination that she is a fit and proper person to engage in the practice of law. Unfitness to practice is a powerful consideration for the cancellation or suspension of the right to practice constituted by the existence of a practising certificate. Similar considerations dictate that both the respondent and other practitioners must be aware that the conduct of this kind exposes them to a real risk that there will be an adverse impact on their right to practice law. Furthermore, the public must have confidence that persons who practice law will observe the highest standards of integrity and honesty not only in their practice but also in their everyday life. In these circumstances the respondent, as she accepted, bears some responsibility for convincing us that neither cancellation nor suspension is appropriate.
6. We have had specific regard to the position taken by the Law Society of NSW and the Legal Services Commissioner both of whom are charged with a degree of responsibility in ensuring that legal practitioners uphold appropriate standards in the practice of their profession. Indeed, the Law Society plays an important part in the formulation, establishment and promotion of codes of conduct for solicitors throughout New South Wales. Furthermore, we would expect that the Law Society in formulating its approach to appropriate protective orders in these proceedings was endeavouring to reflect the representative views of solicitors in New South Wales who are its members. Both of them supported protective orders short of cancellation or suspension of the respondent's practising certificate.
7. Senior counsel for the respondent emphasised that there were a number of features of these proceedings which took them out of those which would justify either cancellation or suspension of the respondent's practising certificate.
8. In so submitting there was reliance on a number of other decisions of this Tribunal, where it was said that the culpability of the practitioner was greater than that of the respondent in these proceedings, and yet protective orders of lesser impact were made than those contemplated by the parties in these proceedings. We do not propose to discuss these decisions because each matter depends upon its own individual facts. Furthermore, although each party who comes before this Tribunal should expect the same result no matter who constitutes the Tribunal, the reality is that such expectation may not always be fulfilled, particularly in areas involving the exercise of a value judgement about the conduct of a particular person, and it is possible that we may have come to a different conclusion concerning the outcome of some of those decisions. The Courts have been wary of accepting statistical evidence concerning the disposition of certain criminal matters. In the same way, comparison of outcomes in other disciplinary proceedings must also attract the same caution.
9. The respondent emphasised, and the applicant and the Legal Services Commissioner accepted, that there were a number of distinguishing features of these proceedings which took them out of the "ordinary" cases of dishonest conduct. Even though the respondent deliberately and intentionally falsified the payslip, and must have then realised that she was engaged in a dishonest act, she quickly took action to ensure that there were no adverse consequences to any third party, and there was no question of her having gained any financial advantage. Furthermore, the manner in which she said that she disclosed her conduct to her husband indicated that she felt shame for what she had done. Her ready confession of her misconduct when confronted by her employer and the manner in which she did so is indicative of expressions of contrition and remorse for her conduct. (In referring to the respondent's interaction with her employer, we do not infer that she would have disclosed her wrongdoing if she had not been confronted with the false payslip, and indeed, we infer in all the circumstances that the respondent had hoped that by withdrawing her loan application her indiscretion would have never come to the attention of anyone). We note also that the respondent willingly and promptly co-operated in replying to enquiries initiated by the applicant.
10. The respondent had given evidence that at the time that she had sought to purchase the home and had applied for the bank finance she was under personal stress because she was endeavouring to balance the need to care for two small children against the need to earn income. It appears that she was the main breadwinner and that her husband, although also a solicitor, was working less hours and earning less income. Furthermore, she was under pressure from the partner for whom she worked to increase her hours of work to full-time equivalent. It was said that the respondent's "single instance of dishonesty was committed at a time (she) was facing substantial pressure trying to balance professional and personal life."
11. The respondent has undoubtedly suffered personally as a result of her misconduct. Her employment as a solicitor was terminated, and she has been subjected to the personal shame and humiliation of having to acknowledge her misconduct to her husband, her employer, the Law Society, the Legal Services Commissioner, and to this Tribunal in the course of these proceedings. Her prospects of further engagement as a solicitor must be affected by the finding of professional misconduct which we have made.
12. Furthermore, the respondent has adduced in support of her case a number of character references. The partner for whom she worked at the law firm at the time that the respondent produced the false payslip said that she had worked under his supervision continuously in the taxation group of the firm since 2006. He described her as being a well-respected member of the taxation team and of the firm generally. The partner was aware of the acknowledged misconduct of the respondent which he described as appearing to him to be "out of character and one-off." A partner in a large law firm in Brisbane who was also aware of the nature and extent of the respondent's misconduct and who had known the respondent for over 20 years described the respondent as being "an honest, diligent, hard-working, caring and above all ethical person. She takes the time to help others and always puts their interests above her own." She described the respondent's conduct as "extraordinarily out of character." She attested to conversations with the respondent at around the time of the misconduct "about how distressed she was about her working situation and the difficulties of juggling the role and responsibilities of a working mother." A reference was also provided by the Minister of an Anglican Church who has known the respondent for 16 years. He said that he had met with the respondent and discussed the issues involved in these proceedings. He confirmed her expressions of contrition and remorse and also described what occurred as being out of character and a "one-off lapse in judgement." He thought that it was unlikely that she would ever engage in conduct of this kind again and that she had learned her lesson.
13. The respondent has of her own volition enrolled in an ethics and professional responsibility course conducted by the College of Law, and the successful completion of that course is a matter which is dealt with in the conditions contemplated by the Consent Orders.
14. For completion, we note that the respondent has agreed to pay the costs of the applicant which we are advised will be something less than $10,000. Furthermore, she will be required to pay for the cost of her own representation which we were informed will exceed $30,000. The respondent will suffer a significant financial loss as a result of her misconduct and the necessity to participate in these proceedings.
15. In the NSW Court of Appeal, McHugh JA (as his Honour then was) in Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Ritchard (NSWCA, 31 July 1987, unreported) said:
16. "In Ex Parte Lenehan [1948] HCA 45; (1948) 77 CLR 403 Latham CJ, Dixon and Williams JJ pointed out (at 422) that when a person, who has been struck off the Roll, `applies for reinstatement he is in a more disadvantageous position than an original applicant because he must displace the decision as to probable, permanent unfitness which was the basis of his removal'. Nothing in the evidence in the present case provides any ground for supposing that the presumption of permanent unfitness for practice is not applicable to the Opponent. The jurisdiction of the Court to remove a practitioner from the Rolls is entirely protective: New South Wales Bar Association v Evatt [1968] HCA 20; (1968) 117 CLR 177 at 183-184. An order for the involuntary removal of the name of a practitioner from the Roll of solicitors is made only because the probability is that the solicitor is permanently unfit to practise. Unless the court is persuaded that the probability exists, the proper order to make will usually be one of suspension or fine instead of removal."
17. These comments, and comments to similar effect have been considered as indicating that an order for cancellation or suspension of a practising certificate can only appropriately be made if a court or tribunal finds that the practitioner is probably permanently unfit to practise. See, for example, Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Breeze [2015] NSWCATOD 152 at 25. In general terms, such a finding would require an examination of the circumstances of the practitioner to ascertain whether he or she might ever become fit to practise in the future, and unless any such conclusion to the contrary is made, cancellation or suspension would be inappropriate. That is, the prima facie adherence to such a principle would result in very few instances of cancellation or suspension. Furthermore, such a conclusion detracts from a consideration of matters such as the deterrent effect to other practitioners and the enhancement of the confidence of the public in the integrity of the profession. It is not necessary in the circumstances of these proceedings that we pursue this matter further. We observe that consistently with these authorities the matter might be approached on the basis that a finding of professional misconduct involving dishonesty would prima facie indicate probable permanent unfitness to practice. Seen in this way, the burden of negativing this position would fall on the respondent. Such evidence as is necessary to displace the prima facie position is peculiarly in the possession of the practitioner, and it would be unfair to burden an applicant with the necessity of leading evidence about matters of this kind. These proceeding were conducted on this basis.
18. We are of the opinion that the respondent appreciated the gravity of her misconduct shortly after engaging in it, and we note that she was subjected to the shame and ignominy of having to confront others with what she had done. This experience has had a salutary effect on her. It is our assessment based on the evidence in the proceedings and in particular the evidence given personally by the respondent that she is unlikely ever to transgress in the future. Furthermore, on the evidence, this one isolated act was out of character of a person who had seemingly conducted herself in the past in an exemplary fashion.
19. In all the circumstances, we are persuaded that even though the respondent exhibited conduct which would demonstrate that at the time that it occurred that she was not a fit and proper person to be permitted to practise as a solicitor, she no longer represents an inappropriate risk, and that it is not appropriate to either cancel or suspend her practising certificate.
20. In these circumstances, a reprimand as proposed by the parties is an appropriate protective order.
21. The consent orders originally proposed by the parties included the payment of a fine. In the course of the proceedings we canvassed with the parties the necessity for including the imposition of a fine within the consequential orders, particularly having regard to the financial burden on the respondent created by the costs orders which we anticipated making. The parties agreed that it would not be appropriate in the circumstances for a fine be imposed.
22. We also canvassed with the parties the desirability of the respondent having access to a mentor upon her resuming practice as a solicitor. Such a person would not necessarily be involved in providing advice concerning any particular legal matter upon which the respondent was engaged, but would more appropriately be available to assist the respondent in balancing her work/personal life challenges. The parties agreed to the notation by the Tribunal of an undertaking by the respondent to enter into a mentoring arrangement, the provisions of which are set out below.
23. Otherwise the orders which we propose to make reflect the now agreed position between the parties. We should add for completeness that the parties urged upon us that any orders made should reflect their consent position under sec 564 of the Act, rather than being made under sec 562. We shall accede to this request, in particular having regard to the status of the applicant and the Legal Services Commissioner and the responsibilities imposed upon them in ensuring compliance with the provisions of the Act.
24. Consequent upon the finding of professional misconduct which we have made, we make the following orders;

Orders 1. The respondent is reprimanded. 2. The respondent shall: 1. at her own expense, undertake within 6 months of the date of these orders a course in Legal Ethics that is approved by the Director, Professional Standards (the Director) and therein achieve a pass mark of not less than 50% (Pass Mark). 2. within seven (7) days of receipt of the result of the course in Legal Ethics, provide the Director the original result notification from the provider of the course in Legal Ethics 1. Should the respondent fail to achieve the Pass Mark referred to in 2 (a) above, she shall complete any further course in Legal Ethics as approved by the Director until such time as she achieves the Pass Mark. 2. Should the respondent fail to achieve the Pass Mark referred to in 2(a) above within the time period in 2(a) above, her practising certificate shall be suspended until such time as she achieves the said Pass Mark and no further practising certificate is to be issued to her until such time as she achieves the said Pass Mark. 3. The respondent shall pay the costs of the applicant as agreed or assessed.

Notation

1. The Tribunal notes that the respondent has undertaken that she will: 1. 14 days prior to re-entering practice as a legal practitioner, nominate to the Director, Professional Standards of the Law Society of NSW (Director) for his/her approval the name of a solicitor of at least five years' standing who is prepared to act as a mentor to the respondent (the Mentor); 2. 28 days prior to re-entering practice as a lawyer, enter into a mentoring relationship with the Mentor, and which relationship is to have the following features: 1. the respondent is to meet with the Mentor for not less than one hour per fortnight; 2. the respondent is to meet with the Mentor for not less than a continuous period of six months; and 3. the respondent is to discuss with the Mentor any issues arising out of her practice, either generally or specifically relevant to the conduct the subject of these proceedings (being the Tribunal proceedings numbered 1620121); 1. 14 days prior to entering into the mentoring relationship, provide the Mentor with a copy of the Tribunal's decision in these proceedings; 2. 14 days prior to entering into the mentoring relationship, provide the Director with written notification by the Mentor that he or she: 1. consents to undertake the mentoring responsibilities outlined in paragraph 2; and 2. has received a copy of the Tribunal's decision in these proceedings; and 3. will report to the Director forthwith should the Mentor form the view that the respondent is not adequately participating in the mentoring relationship and/or that the Mentor has formed the view that the respondent has exhibited a lack of understanding of her professional and ethical responsibilities as a legal practitioner. 1. if the Mentor is no longer in a position to undertake the mentoring responsibilities: 1. immediately on learning of the Mentor's inability to continue to undertake the mentoring responsibilities, notify the Director of the Mentor's inability to undertake the mentoring responsibilities; 2. within 14 days of giving notice to the Director under 5(a), nominate a new Mentor for approval by the Director, on the same terms as outlined in paragraph 1 and provide the new Mentor with a copy of the Tribunal's decision in these proceedings; 3. within 28 days of giving notice to the Director under 5(a), provide the Director with written confirmation from the new Mentor that he/she agrees to the terms as set out in 4 above. 1. within 14 days of completing at least six months of continuous mentoring in accordance with the terms outlined above, provide the Director with written confirmation from the Mentor and/or, if applicable, the new Mentor that the respondent has completed the mentoring relationship pursuant to the terms outlined in 2, above and his/her views as to the respondent's participation in the mentoring relationship and her understanding of her professional and ethical responsibilities as a legal practitioner.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 22 May 2017