Consideration
33In our view, this is a clear case. The only findings available on the uncontested evidence are that there was (a) a deliberate attempt to cheat in the Bar Association's Ethics examination, (b) a deliberate attempt to deceive a senior officer of the Bar Association following Mr van Es' exclusion from that exam, (c) a lack of candour in explaining what had occurred to the Executive Director of the Bar Association and (d) a failure, which is ongoing, extending to Mr van Es' evidence in this Court, to appreciate the obligations of candour owed by Mr van Es. The evidence amply supports the declarations as particularised. In accordance with Smith v New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256, we confine our findings of professional misconduct to those which were particularised and are described in [2] and [3] above. Our findings concerning the evidence that Mr van Es gave to this Court are relevant only to respond to Mr van Es' contention that his particularised conduct is not, or at least is no longer, a fair reflection of his character.
34Mr van Es has been shown to have acted dishonestly on two separate occasions. On the first, he attempted to gain an improper advantage in order to satisfy the requirements for the issuing of a practising certificate as a barrister. On the second, he attempted to mislead the Bar Association. On both occasions, he said things that were not true to his knowledge.
35Mr van Es' dealings with the Bar Association took place three days after the examination had been held. In the meantime, he had the opportunity to reflect on his actions in and outside the examination room. Nonetheless, he persisted in his course of dishonest conduct.
36We have taken into account Mr van Es' expressions of remorse in his letter of 2 March 2012 which was the subject of his affidavit. Mr van Es described his conduct as "misleading". His conduct was in fact deceitful, and repeatedly so. Even in his apology, Mr van Es confined his shame and remorse to what had occurred on the day of the examination, rather than extending to what occurred at the meeting on 27 February 2012. That letter was sent after Mr van Es had been given the opportunity to view the incriminating CCTV footage, the existence of which had been drawn to his attention in the meeting with Mr Selth and Mr D'Aeth on 27 February 2012. Nevertheless, we are satisfied from Mr van Es' testimony in this Court that he now appreciates that it was very wrong of him to have done what he did.
37However, it is necessary to say something more about Mr van Es' obligation of candour, which we are not satisfied, even today, he fully appreciates or understands.
38Mr van Es owed an obligation of candour in his dealings with the Bar Association: see A Solicitor v Council of the NSW Law Society [2004] HCA 1; 216 CLR 253 at [30]. He is also obliged to be candid with the Court.
39The importance of the obligation of candour may be seen in Re Davis (1947) 75 CLR 409, where Latham CJ's and Dixon J's judgments contain some measure of sympathy for the circumstances in which Mr Davis committed a crime years before, but none at all for his failure to disclose it in the course of his application. The obligation emphasised in Re Davis has not diminished subsequently: see HealthCare Complaints Commission v Wingate [2007] NSWCA 326; 70 NSWLR 323 at [43] and Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Power [2008] NSWCA 135; 71 NSWLR 451 at [16]. That obligation was breached, repeatedly, by Mr van Es, on the morning of the Ethics examination and again in his dealings with senior officers of the Association. He did not tell the whole truth; in fact he actively and repeatedly sought to conceal the truth by telling lies.
40Moreover, Mr van Es' conduct at the meeting calls into serious question his statement in the letter, reproduced above, that he had been seeking to be "frank, open and honest" at the meeting. Indeed, until the CCTV footage was disclosed, his conduct was the opposite of "frank, open and honest". Ultimately, he admitted that he had been dishonest.
41We have carefully considered Mr van Es' evidence in this Court. His counsel described his statements as to his intention as "idiosyncratic". Understandable as that advocacy was, it seriously understates the concerns we share arising from Mr van Es' testimony.
42It is to be recalled that by the time he gave evidence Mr van Es was squarely on notice of the case against him, of the concerns of this Court, of the inevitability of cross-examination, and of the nature of the obligations of officers of the Court. He had leading senior counsel appearing for him (who had only relatively recently been retained). He was better placed than most people to receive advice as to his professional obligations.
43Mr van Es gave evidence to the effect that he now understood the gravity of his conduct. However, having heard that evidence, we are not satisfied that Mr van Es fully understands what being candid means or requires.
44The plainest example was his explanation of the sentence in his letter, "You said you felt misled at that point, though it was certainly not my intention to do so." Mr van Es' consistent account in his evidence in this Court was that notwithstanding that he had given a false explanation to Mr Selth and Mr D'Aeth, and had been told that his conduct had been captured on CCTV, and that Mr Selth had said he felt misled, the fact that (so he said) he had arrived at the conference with an intention to be frank, open and honest - being an intention which was not reflected in what he said, and which was immediately replaced by an intention to deceive - justified the correctness of the letter.
45There are, as we see it, precisely two possibilities. The first is that Mr van Es fully intended to deny any wrongdoing until he was told that the CCTV had recorded his placing material under his shirt. If that were so, his letter of 2 March 2012 would have been deceitful, and his evidence to this Court false.
46The second is that Mr van Es had the intention of being frank, open and honest with Messrs Selth and D'Aeth when he arrived at the meeting, but almost immediately changed that intention because of what he perceived to be Mr Selth's overpowering tone. He then was concededly dishonest, his dishonesty "getting the better of me over my initial intention" (to use his language) until confronted with fact that there was CCTV footage, at which time he determined to be truthful. That accords with his evidence to this Court. Although that evidence might appears to be self-serving, and improbable, there is the countervailing consideration that its very improbability means that it reflects Mr van Es' sincere belief as to what occurred more than two years ago.
47It was not put to Mr van Es that his evidence to this Court was false, and it would be wrong to proceed on that basis: cf Smith v New South Wales Bar Association. We accordingly proceed on the basis stated in his evidence. That evidence fails to persuade us that he appreciates the obligations of candour owed by an Australian lawyer to a court.
48Even on the account most favourable to Mr van Es, it is impossible to conclude that the statement that it was "certainly not my intention" to mislead Mr Selth was "absolutely correct", as he asserted to this Court it to be. On that account, although he did not enter the meeting intending to mislead, he did intend to mislead Mr Selth after the meeting commenced (when he felt "belittled" and "with my tail between my legs" and when his dishonesty "[got] the better of me over my initial intention"). The long explanation given by him which we have reproduced above suggests that Mr van Es continues to think that by taking an improbably technical and literal approach to the words he uses, he can comply with his obligations of candour.
49Because it went squarely to the conduct which gave rise to the proceeding, this example was the focus of most attention. But it was not an isolated instance. For example, Mr van Es explained that a sentence in his letter, which was plainly intended to be exculpatory, "I have also sought counselling", was to be read in a special way, contrary to its ordinary meaning:
"Q. Who did you seek counselling from?
A. I saw sought from my friends, I sought counselling from legal friends as well, also that of my mother included. But specifically a counsellor as counsel is referring to, no I have not, not a counsellor but I have sought counselling from those that I can relate to, both directly and objectively."
50To similar effect, Mr van Es made the submission in writing that "The Opponent is reflecting on his behaviour with professional assistance". It is very difficult to see how that submission, which was only qualified when brought to Mr van Es' attention after his cross-examination, could ever have fairly described his position.
51As at today's date, the Court concludes that Mr van Es is not a person of good fame and character and that he is not a fit and proper person to remain on the Roll. We therefore make the orders to which the parties consented, the final order (as to costs) reflecting a further agreement in light of the additional hearing.