THE APPROPRIATE PENALTIES to impose
169 The central issue in fixing the appropriate penalties in this case, therefore, is to determine what penalties will suffice to encourage compliance with the relevant provisions of the Fair Work Act by Crookes (specific deterrence) and others who may engage in similar conduct in the future (general deterrence). The penalties must be such that they will not be regarded by Crookes and others as being "an acceptable cost of doing business". There must also be a reasonable relationship between the penalties imposed and the "theoretical" maximum penalties, bearing in mind that the maximum penalties are intended to be imposed in respect of contraventions warranting the strongest deterrence. The maximum penalty for the contravention by Crookes of s 501 of the Fair Work Act at the Opera Quays site on 26 May 2020 is $63,000. The maximum penalty in respect of each of the other contraventions is $66,000.
170 The exercise of fixing appropriate pecuniary penalties for the contraventions in question should not be approached as if it were a scientific or mathematical exercise. It essentially involves weighing and balancing all the relevant facts and circumstances.
171 The following features or circumstances of the contravening conduct of Crookes are relevant to determining the appropriate penalty to secure deterrence, general and specific, in this case.
172 First, it is relevant to have regard to the nature and character of the provisions of the Fair Work Act that were contravened.
173 Sections 501 and 502 of the Fair Work Act are part of a statutory scheme which aims to balance the interests of occupiers of premises, employers, unions and employees in respect of the rights of entry to premises: Maritime Union of Australia v Fair Work Commission (2015) 230 FCR 15; [2015] FCAFC 56. One of the obvious objectives of that scheme is to secure the health and safety of workers and workplaces. As Tracey J observed in Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Decmil Engineering Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 1237 at [43], "the protection of workers' safety on building sites is a highly important function and breaches of provisions such as s 501 have the potential fundamentally to undermine workers' safety".
174 Contraventions of ss 501 and 502 of the Fair Work Act by an employer are, by their very nature, objectively serious, particularly where entry to the premises was sought to investigate suspected contraventions relating to the safety of workers and the workplace in question. As a general proposition, higher penalties are likely to be appropriate to secure effective deterrence, particularly general deterrence, in circumstances where the mischief to which the civil penalty provision in question is directed is serious. In the case of ss 501 and 502 of the Fair Work Act, it "must be made clear to employers that they are not entitled to deny access to their premises to union officials who are exercising lawful rights of entry under the [Fair Work] Act": Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Safety Glass Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 989 at [23].
175 Second, the contraventions of ss 501 and 502 in question in this case came about largely as a result of the decisions and actions of relatively senior managers at Crookes, Mr Waller and Mr Stavrinos. Both Mr Waller and Mr Stavrinos were employed by Crookes as Construction Managers, which was a position relatively high in the management hierarchy.
176 The evidence ultimately revealed that it was Mr Waller who was the relevant decision-maker responsible for the contraventions at the Opera Quays site in May and July 2020. It was readily apparent that Messrs Diversi, Yamin and Cooper were really just acting in accordance with Mr Waller's instructions or directions when they refused to permit Messrs Strand, Kirby and Carroll to enter the Opera Quays site.
177 As for the contraventions at the Loftus Lane site, it was Mr Stavrinos who hindered or obstructed Mr Strand and Mr Carroll. Mr Crino was simply acting on the instructions of Mr Stavrinos when he called the police. The evidence also ultimately revealed that Mr Stavrinos was the effective decision-maker in respect of the decision to refuse to allow Mr Strand and Mr Carroll to enter the Loftus Lane site on 12 November 2020. Mr Crino was effectively acting on the instructions of Mr Stavrinos.
178 The involvement of senior management in the contraventions would tend to suggest that a higher penalty is required to achieve effective deterrence.
179 Third, the conduct of both Mr Waller and Mr Stavrinos that gave rise to the contraventions was relevantly deliberate, though perhaps not entirely contumelious or contumacious. This again would tend to suggest that a higher penalty is required to secure effective deterrence.
180 As for Mr Waller, as one might expect given his position, Mr Waller knew that Messrs Strand, Kirby and Carroll were permit holders when he instructed Messrs Diversi, Yamin and Cooper to refuse them entry. He also knew, in general terms, that, as permit holders, Messrs Strand, Kirby and Carroll had the right to enter the Opera Quays site for the purpose of inquiring into contraventions which they reasonably suspected had or were occurring on the site. He also knew that Crookes did not have the right to refuse Messrs Strand, Kirby and Carroll entry to the site in those circumstances.
181 It is true that Mr Waller claimed in his evidence that he mistakenly believed, based on the training that he had apparently received, that it was up to him to decide whether or not the CFMMEU officials reasonably suspected that contraventions had or were occurring on the site. It is equally true that Mr Waller claimed in his evidence that he believed that the CFMMEU officials did not reasonably suspect that contraventions had or were occurring on the site and that they were instead motivated by industrial concerns. As discussed in detail earlier, however, Mr Waller's evidence concerning those beliefs was far from convincing or persuasive. He had, for the most part, no reasonable basis for forming those beliefs and his actions somewhat belied the genuineness of those beliefs. He made no attempt to seek the advice or counsel from others about his right to refuse entry to the permit holders, made no genuine attempt to seek the advice or counsel of Crookes' own work health and safety officers or managers about the safety issues raised by the CFMMEU officials, and made no genuine attempt to engage, or cause others to engage, with the CFMMEU officers about the nature and authenticity of their suspicions.
182 It may be accepted that the July 2020 contraventions, at least, occurred in the context of heightened industrial tensions arising from the position of the Eastside workers and their replacement by workers from Prestige. The overwhelming and overriding inference, however, is that Mr Waller determined to instruct Mr Yamin and Mr Cooper to refuse entry to the CFMMEU permit holders as a result of those industrial tensions without genuinely turning his mind to whether the permit holders' suspicions concerning safety contraventions were genuine or to whether he had the right to refuse the permit holders access to the site. The overwhelming inference is that Mr Waller's actions were, at best, a knee-jerk and ill-considered response to his perceptions of industrial disharmony. He was, at best, reckless as to whether he had the right to do what he did.
183 As for Mr Stavrinos, he well knew, on 11 November 2020, that Mr Strand and Mr Carroll, as permit holders, had the right to enter and remain on the Loftus Lane site. While he claimed in his evidence that he believed that he had the right to revoke the CFMMEU officials' right to be on the site because they were not following his instructions, for the reasons given earlier his evidence in that regard was far from credible. His evidence as to the source of his belief that he had a right to revoke was, at best, vague and his evidence about Mr Strand and Mr Carroll not following his instructions was self-serving, unimpressive and far from compelling.
184 As for the contravention on 12 November 2020, Mr Stavrinos's evidence concerning the source of his supposed belief that he could refuse entry to permit holders once SafeWork inspectors were involved was equally self-serving, unimpressive and unpersuasive. The overwhelming and overriding inference was again that Mr Stavrinos determined to instruct Mr Crino to refuse to allow the CFMMEU permit holders access to the site without genuinely turning his mind to whether he had the right to do so. As was the case with Mr Waller, Mr Stavrinos's actions were ill-considered and he was, at the very best, reckless as to whether he had the right to do what he did.
185 The actions of Mr Stavrinos must also be considered in light of the fact that, by November 2020, the CFMMEU had already commenced proceedings against Crookes in respect of the May and July 2020 contraventions at the Opera Quays site. While Crookes initially defended those proceedings, it is somewhat surprising that the existence of the proceedings did not focus Mr Stavrinos's mind on the rights of permit holders to access premises and the potential repercussions of refusing access to, or otherwise hindering, permit holders.
186 While the real decision-makers in respect of the contraventions were Mr Waller, in the case of the May and July 2020 contraventions, and Mr Stavrinos, in the case of the November 2020 contraventions, mention should also be made of the conduct of Mr Yamin and Mr Cooper, in respect of the May and July 2020 contraventions, and Mr Crino, in the case of the November 2020 contraventions. The evidence of each of those Crookes managers was also less than impressive or persuasive.
187 As discussed in detail earlier, Mr Yamin and Mr Cooper sought to justify or explain their conduct as being the product of their erroneous beliefs that the actions of the CFMMEU permit holders were industrially motivated and that they were able to refuse access to the permit holders on that basis. It readily became apparent from the evidence, however, that they had no reasonable basis for entertaining those beliefs and did not reasonably or genuinely turn their minds to whether the permit holders reasonably suspected that contraventions had occurred or were occurring on the site, or to whether they had the right to refuse to allow the permit holders to access the site in the circumstances. It is clear that they were simply acting on the instructions of Mr Waller.
188 Much the same can be said in respect of Mr Crino. The overwhelming inference is that he did not genuinely turn his mind to whether he had the right to refuse to allow the permit holders to access the site. He simply acted on the instructions of Mr Stavrinos.
189 In all the circumstances, the attempts by Messrs Waller, Cooper, Yamin, Stavrinos and Crino to explain or justify their actions were unimpressive, and did not reflect particularly well on Crookes and its attitude or response to the contraventions in question. The evidence of each of those men was, on the whole, unimpressive and lacked credibility.
190 Fourth, it may be accepted that the five contraventions were relatively isolated occurrences. The evidence suggested that Crookes had permitted CFMMEU permit holders to access building sites they occupied, including the Opera Quays site and the Loftus Lane site, on a number of occasions both before and after May and July 2020 and November 2020. That said, as has already been noted, the November 2020 contraventions occurred at a time when the contraventions concerning the May and July 2020 were already before the Court.
191 As for Crookes' subjective circumstances, the considerations relevant to specific and general deterrence include the following.
192 First, there was no evidence to suggest that Crookes was a frequent or habitual contravener of industrial laws, in particular those relating to allowing permit holders to access building sites it occupied. As already noted, the contraventions were relatively isolated. There could be no suggestion that Crookes was a wilful recidivist. Indeed, there was no evidence that Crookes had previously contravened any provision of the Fair Work Act, let alone ss 501 and 502 of the Fair Work Act. The absence of any previous contraventions reflects well on Crookes and tempers the need for a higher penalty to secure specific deterrence.
193 Second, there was little, if any, indication of genuine contrition or remorse on the part of Crookes. There was certainly no evidence which could be fairly characterised as an apology or statement of genuine regret or repentance by senior officers or managers of Crookes. Indeed, as has already been noted, much of the evidence adduced on behalf of Crookes could fairly be characterised as unpersuasive attempts to explain or justify the actions of the employees or managers in question. Each of the employees or managers did, however, ultimately concede in their evidence that they now recognise that their actions were wrong.
194 Crookes also initially defended the proceedings and it is somewhat difficult to avoid the inference from the evidence that the belated change in plea was somewhat reluctant and begrudging. The November 2020 contraventions occurred at a time when the May and July 2020 contraventions were already before the Court, albeit the proceeding was being defended at that point.
195 The absence of any apparent genuine contrition or remorse on the part of Crookes did not reflect well on Crookes and tended to suggest that higher penalties were likely to be required to secure effective specific deterrence.
196 Third, the evidence also tended to suggest that Crookes has not taken any significant and genuine positive steps to ensure that the contraventions are not repeated. There was an attempt, largely unsuccessful, to shift some of the blame for the contraventions onto the training that had been given to Crookes' managers. As has already been discussed, the evidence adduced in that regard was on the whole unimpressive and lacked credibility.
197 Even if that evidence was credible, however, it would not greatly assist Crookes. That is because it would tend to suggest that Crookes' training of its employees in the past has been deficient and yet the evidence indicated that Crookes had done little, if anything, to remedy or rectify that situation. Crookes had not instigated any formal training or retraining of its managers following the contraventions. While some of the managers referred in their evidence to certain discussions that had occurred following the contraventions, that evidence was far from compelling or impressive. The same could be said of the evidence to the effect that the COVID-19 pandemic had somehow stymied any formal training or retraining following the contraventions. It is also relevant to note that none of the officers involved in the contraventions had been sanctioned or disciplined in any meaningful way.
198 The fact that Crookes appears to have taken no genuine or positive steps in response to the contraventions so as to ensure they are not repeated again does not reflect well on Crookes and suggests that higher penalties are required to secure effective specific deterrence.
199 Fourth, there was a paucity of evidence in relation to Crookes' size, financial position and resources. Nevertheless, such evidence as there was in respect of Crookes tended to suggest that it was a large and well-resourced building and construction company. The building projects at both the Opera Quays site and the Loftus Lane site were very substantial. Mr Waller's evidence was that Crookes would typically have somewhere between 45 and 53 projects afoot at any given time. Many of those projects were valued at tens, if not hundreds, of millions of dollars. Crookes did not adduce any evidence to counter the obvious inference that it was a very large and well-resourced company. There was certainly no evidence to suggest that Crookes would have any difficulty in paying any pecuniary penalty that may be imposed.
200 The size and resources available to a corporate contravener are relevant considerations to the fixing of an appropriate pecuniary penalty. As a general proposition, the larger the contravener and the more resources available to it, the larger the penalty may need to be to ensure effective specific deterrence: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (No 3) (2005) 215 ALR 301; [2005] FCA 265 at [39]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Apple Pty Limited [2012] FCA 646 at [38].
201 Fifth, Crookes should be given some credit for eventually conceding that, by the actions of its employees, it contravened the Fair Work Act and some credit for facilitating the hearing of the proceedings concerning penalty by agreeing to the basic facts relating to the contraventions. It should perhaps be noted, however, that ultimately the penalty hearing proceeded over a number of days given the approach taken by the parties to certain factual issues. It is, therefore, somewhat doubtful that it could be said that the proceedings were significantly shortened.
202 Overall, the considerations to which reference has just been made relating to the nature and circumstances of the contraventions, together with those that involve the subjective features of the contravener, suggest that relatively significant and substantial pecuniary penalties are required to secure the objectives of specific and general deterrence. On balance, the following pecuniary penalties are considered to be appropriate in the circumstances.
203 A pecuniary penalty of $25,000 should be imposed in respect of the contravention which occurred on 26 May 2020. This was perhaps the least serious contravention. It resulted in the permit holders' access to the Opera Quays site being delayed for no more than 60 minutes. It was nonetheless a relatively serious contravention of an important provision in the statutory scheme involving access to worksites for purposes including, relevantly, investigating suspected contraventions involving the safety of the workplace.
204 A pecuniary penalty of $40,000 should be imposed in respect of the contravention which occurred on 27 July 2020. This contravention was more serious than the 26 May 2020 because it resulted in the permit holders being excluded from accessing the Opera Quays site altogether. While the contravention occurred in the context of some industrial disharmony, for the reasons given in detail earlier, that circumstance does not adequately explain or significantly mitigate the contravention.
205 A pecuniary penalty of $45,000 should be imposed in respect of the contravention which occurred on 28 July 2020. This was in some respects a more serious contravention than the contravention of the previous day as the relevant Crookes managers had time to consider, reflect on and take advice in respect of the exclusion of the permit holders on the previous day. The circumstances of the contravention revealed a degree of intransigence and recalcitrance on the part of Crookes. It again resulted in the permit holders being completely excluded from accessing the site.
206 A pecuniary penalty of $30,000 should be imposed in respect of the contravention which occurred on 11 November 2020. Like the May 2020 contravention on the Opera Quays site, this contravention is somewhat less serious because it ultimately only resulted in the permit holders being delayed for a period of two and a half hours while the police were called and SafeWork inspectors arrived at the site. It was, however, still a fairly serious contravention in all the circumstances. The fact that it occurred at a time when the May and July 2020 contraventions at the Opera Quays site were before the Court suggests a degree of intransigence and recalcitrance on the part of Crookes.
207 A pecuniary penalty of $50,000 should be imposed in respect of the contravention which occurred on 12 November 2020. Like the July 2020 contraventions at the Opera Quays site, this was a serious contravention that resulted in the permit holders being excluded from the site altogether. Mr Stavrinos's explanations for his determination to refuse access to the site were unpersuasive, all the more so in light of the fact that the May and July 2020 contraventions were already before the Court at the time.
208 The pecuniary penalties imposed in respect of the five contraventions add up to $190,000. To the extent that the principle of totality applies as a tool of analysis in the civil penalty context, a total penalty of $190,000 could not be said to be oppressive or disproportionate in the sense that it could be seen to be greater than is necessary to achieve the object of deterrence. For all the reasons that have essentially already been given, the object of deterrence, both specific and general, warrants the imposition of a total penalty of $190,000 in all the circumstances. The overall penalty and each of the individual penalties bear a reasonable relationship to the theoretical maximum penalties.
209 Subsection 546(3) of the Fair Work Act provides that the Court may order that the pecuniary penalty, or a part of the pecuniary penalty, be paid to the Commonwealth, or a particular organisation, or a particular person. The usual order in cases such as this, where the applicant is not a regulator or the Commonwealth, is that the penalty be paid to the successful applicant: Sayed v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2016) 239 FCR 336; [2016] FCAFC 4 at [101]. The CFMMEU submitted that there was no reason to depart from that usual order. Crookes did not suggest otherwise. It follows that the pecuniary penalties should be paid to the CFMMEU.