Chapple v Workpac Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 1487

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

1. This application concerns a relatively narrow procedural question. The applicant, Ms Chapple, seeks leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (FCFCOA) given on 11 December 2024: Chapple v Workpac Pty Ltd [2024] FedCFamC2G 1364 (primary judgment or PJ). That decision rejected Ms Chapple's application to restrain the solicitor on the record for the second respondent (Pilbara Iron) from further participation in proceedings in the FCFCOA brought by Ms Chapple.
2. The primary judgment solely concerned whether the solicitor in question (Ms Roach of Hall & Wilcox) should be restrained from acting further in the proceedings in the FCFCOA. As the primary judgment was an interlocutory decision, Ms Chapple needs leave to appeal.
3. Notwithstanding the narrow subject matter, Ms Chapple's application for leave to appeal raises 22 separate grounds. There are criticisms of the reasoning in the primary judgment and criticisms of the procedure adopted by the primary judge. Ms Chapple was self-represented in the interlocutory application below, and again in this Court.
4. The application for leave to appeal the primary judgment (Leave Application) was initially listed for hearing before me on 23 June 2025. On 13 June 2025, Ms Chapple sent a letter to Chambers and requested that the application be determined on the papers without the requirement for an oral hearing, including on the grounds that Ms Chapple considered that she was at a disadvantage at an oral hearing and was suffering from adverse impacts on her mental health. I acceded to that request on the basis that the second respondent consented to this course. Ms Chapple was permitted to file and rely on additional material (outside of the original timetable), and the parties have exchanged written submissions on the application for leave.
5. As the interlocutory application for which leave is sought only concerns the second respondent, on 8 April 2025 I made orders that the first respondent be excused from participation in and attendance at any hearing with respect to this proceeding.
6. By way of outline, in the FCFCOA, Ms Chapple's interlocutory application to restrain Ms Roach concerned, inter alia, an allegation that Ms Roach knowingly made misrepresentations to Ms Chapple and to the Court in relation to her knowledge of an alleged incident of sexual assault that occurred at one of the residential sites (known as "villages") used by Pilbara Iron, being a company in the Rio Tinto group of companies.
7. The substantive proceedings in the FCFCOA concerned Ms Chapple's allegations that adverse action had been taken against her by the respondents in contravention of the general protections provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). Ms Chapple alleges, amongst other things, that she had her employment unlawfully brought to a premature end because she had complained about Rio Tinto's inadequate response to an allegation of sexual assault by a contractor working on a Rio Tinto project.
8. As the Leave Application seeks to impugn factual findings the primary judge made, and in order to understand what led to the situation that Ms Chapple complains about, it is helpful to set out some of the factual background.
9. Ms Chapple gives the following evidence. She was employed by the first respondent, Workpac Pty Ltd (Workpac), between August 2021 and August 2022. Workpac is (inter alia) a labour hire company. During the course of that employment, she was deployed to Pilbara Iron in two positions. It appears that "Pilbara Iron" and "Rio Tinto" are used interchangeably in the correspondence and other materials, but nothing of significance turns on this point. Although Ms Chapple was employed by Workpac, from her perspective she was engaged by Pilbara Iron/Rio Tinto and was employed through Workpac.
10. Ms Chapple says that her employment included responsibility for implementing a transformation at Rio Tinto, making Rio Tinto's villages "safe, inclusive and respectful." Ms Chapple says that during the course of her employment, in April 2022, there was a sexual assault (or a "rape") reported at a Rio Tinto village. I will refer to this village as Village A, rather than its proper name, to prevent any unintended identification of the victim or other collateral impact on confidentiality. Ms Chapple says that she became aware of this in April 2022, but asserts that the incident was not reported to employees in a proper way. Ms Chapple complains about the way that Rio Tinto dealt with the incident, and also complains about Rio Tinto's treatment of her, including for seeking to raise what Ms Chapple says was a failure to follow a proper process. This is merely some of a number of complaints that Ms Chapple has about her employment and her termination of employment. Ms Chapple says that her experiences with Rio Tinto caused her to develop Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
11. Ms Chapple gives evidence that on 10 July 2023, she attended a meeting with two employees from DT Infrastructure who informed her that there had "recently" been an allegation of a "rape" at another village in the Pilbara region. The precise identity of that location has been kept confidential in publicly available documents (including the judgment below) to protect the identity of the complainant. I shall do the same, and therefore will refer to the location of the incident reported to Ms Chapple on 10 July 2023 as Village B (which was referred to as "the Village" in the primary judgment).
12. Ms Chapple has stated that the employees of DT Infrastructure identified the name of the site and described the incident as a "rape".
13. Ms Chapple says that this news had an impact on her. In an email to the employees of DT Infrastructure on 26 July 2023, Ms Chapple said that the news put her "back a few steps" (DT Infrastructure Email).
14. I emphasise that I have no objective evidence about what happened at either Village A or Village B, and I make no findings about that. That is not the subject matter of the present application. However, it is relevant to understand Ms Chapple's state of mind and why she thought that it was significant that there had been, as she understood it from her conversation with DT Infrastructure, another rape at a Rio Tinto village, being a second one in just over 12 months.
15. On 12 July 2023, the applicant sent an email to several senior executives of Rio Tinto, including the Chief Executive Officer, with the subject line "Another rape..." (Rio Tinto Email). In that email, Ms Chapple said (amongst other things):

This week, I heard, there has been another Rio Tinto rape, this time at [Village B]. The victim, I understand, was a contractor, the assailant, once again, a Rio Tinto employee....

I'm writing, because my heart goes out to that lady, for without doubt, past the event itself, she will continue to suffer in silence. She will be raped of her voice to talk or warn others (if she chooses) about what happened because the incident will be missing from the PSH dashboard, it will not go to leadership, or be reported to DMIR's or WorkSafe, and hundreds, perhaps thousands of employees and contractors, will not be made aware of the hazards that still exist in Rio Tinto's workplaces. Likewise, "Everyday Respect" and "making our workplaces safe, inclusive and respectful" will continue to be Rio Tinto's catchphrase on social media; triggering and haunting those that know otherwise (myself included).

1. In the Rio Tinto Email, Ms Chapple also complained about the treatment she had received from Rio Tinto.
2. It appears, although the relevant correspondence is not in evidence (and only a summary of it is), that on or about 14 July 2023, Ms Chapple's then solicitors, MKI Legal, reported to her that Rio Tinto had made enquiries about the Village B incident but had not been able to ascertain details about that incident, and asked Ms Chapple to provide further information through the "MyVoice" platform, where people can make confidential and anonymous reports.
3. On 25 July 2023, Ms Chapple sent a letter to Mr Walthall of MinterEllison and Ms Roach of Hall & Wilcox. MinterEllison and Hall & Wilcox are the solicitors of the first and second respondents, respectively. The letter was a detailed letter about the FCFCOA legal proceedings then on foot. The first topic was Ms Chapple advising Mr Walthall and Ms Roach that she was no longer legally represented, having previously been represented by MKI Legal. In that letter, Ms Chapple referred to the Rio Tinto Email and stated (emphasis added):

I wish to advise Minter Ellison of correspondence sent to Pilbara Iron (Rio Tinto executives - Jakob Stausholm, Simon Trott and Kellie Parker) in relation to a third-party disclosure of another rape incident, this time at [Village B]...

I stayed at [Village B] during my time at WorkPac, as do, and have, other WorkPac and Rio Tinto employees...

MKI Legal advised me (following their receipt of phone call from Hall & Willcox), of Rio Tinto's decision not to reply to my email. They did confirm to Hall & Willcox their understanding that no such event has occurred...

1. On 1 August 2023, one of the employees from DT Infrastructure emailed the applicant (DT Infrastructure Response) stating (emphasis in original):

There was a supplier brief sent out regarding the incident, and although it isn't what should be shared, we both thought you might like to know that a notification was provided to suppliers about the [Village B] incident.

1. The DT Infrastructure Response attached an email chain which included a notification titled "CMOne Supplier Brief" dated 22 June 2023. That email was from Matt Holcz and Richard Cohen, relatively senior executives at Rio Tinto, and was titled "Supplier Brief | Report of sexual assault at a Rio Tinto site." It relevantly provided (amongst other things):

A sexual assault has recently been reported at a Rio Tinto site. We want to inform you as you may see media coverage of this incident.

Our priority is on providing care and support to the impacted person.

Authorities are aware of this incident. We will not be providing further detail on this incident, unless we have the consent of the impacted person - consistent with our commitment to prioritising their welfare.

1. The CMOne Supplier Brief did not name the location or identify the incident as a "rape".
2. On 14 August 2023 at 2:40 pm, Ms Roach sent a letter to Ms Chapple in which the title was the name of Village B and which responded to Ms Chapple's letter of 25 July 2023. The letter stated (inter alia):

Your letter references an incident at [Village B] which allegedly occurred between a contractor and a Rio Tinto employee. We thank you for raising this concern. Rio Tinto takes such allegations very seriously and is committed to providing a safe workplace.

You also made reference to this same incident in your email dated 12 July 2023. Upon receiving the email on 12 July 2023, Rio Tinto engaged us to contact MKI Legal to acknowledge receipt of your correspondence, to ensure that you were receiving the care and support needed and to share with you the various avenues to provide further information about the incident you have raised.

Rio Tinto is not aware of any incident of this nature at [Village B]. As such, the purpose of this letter is to seek any additional information that you can share in relation to the incident. Noting your concerns raised, you are encouraged to do so in a manner you are comfortable with, which could include through Rio Tinto's confidential reporting programme, myVoice. You may also provide any information directly to us which we will then provide to Rio Tinto. If there is any information that the third party referred to in your letter can share in relation to the alleged incident, they are also encouraged to do so in a manner they are comfortable to report.

1. On that same day, at 9:07 pm, Ms Chapple sent a letter to Mr Walthall and Ms Roach. It appears that at the time of sending this email, Ms Chapple was not aware of the letter Ms Roach had sent to her earlier that day. Ms Chapple's letter enclosed several documents including a document described as "Timeline Rape Disclosure", an "RFI Tracker" and a "Contract Review Tracker". Ms Chapple's letter is lengthy and raises numerous matters, including in relation to the proceedings and about the termination of her work. The letter repeatedly alleges that the processes of Rio Tinto (and Workpac) were to enable "plausible deniability", and also alleges that Rio Tinto was "gaslighting" Ms Chapple.
2. The "Timeline Rape Disclosure" document included a header which read "Rape Incident ([Village B])". The document referred to the Rio Tinto Email, included an excerpt of the DT Infrastructure Email (including the reference to the Village B sexual assault), and included an excerpt from the CMOne Supplier Brief but not a copy of the original notification.
3. At 10:25 pm, having discovered Ms Roach's letter sent at 2:40 pm earlier that day, the applicant sent a further letter. In that letter she referred to the letter she had sent at 9:07 pm and responded to Ms Roach's letter. The letter included the following:

In response, I have updated my previous document issue with the inclusion of 1 additional page with the CMOne Brief referred to by quote in page 3. This brief was supplied to me (on 1st August) in reference to this being an incident (rape) at [Village B], and after I had been also advised separately and verbally on 10th July.

1. Consistently with this description by Ms Chapple of the incident as a "rape", rather than a sexual assault, and it taking place at Village B, the letter enclosed a copy of the CMOne Supplier Brief but with a heading added at the top of the page in bold and capital letters stating:

1. Relevantly for present purposes, it is obvious from the correspondence (as Ms Chapple now confirms) that it was Ms Chapple who added this heading. This is hardly surprising: Ms Chapple was endeavouring to provide further information about the incident as she understood it, and to provide further information about what she had summarised in previous material.
2. It is also apparent from this correspondence that Ms Chapple understood the incident to have been a "rape". That was not how it was described in the body of the CMOne Supplier Brief, or in the subject matter of the original email enclosing the brief, which had been sent to Ms Chapple. That subject was:

Supplier Brief | Report of sexual assault at a Rio Tinto site.

1. As noted earlier, the CMOne Supplier Brief, likewise, did not identify Village B as the site of the incident.
2. On 21 August 2023 at 1:52 pm, Ms Roach emailed the applicant and stated:

I confirm that we have received your letter dated 14 August 2023, containing information about the alleged [Village B] incident.

Rio Tinto want to thank you for providing the additional information. We confirm that Rio Tinto are aware of the incident referred to in the correspondence you have attached from Matt Holcz and Richard Cohen. However, based on the information you previously provided, Rio Tinto was not aware you were referring to this specific incident. Rio Tinto have taken steps to address this issue and are ensuring the impacted person receives the necessary care and support.

1. This response evidently caused some aggravation for Ms Chapple. On 21 August 2023 at 11:24 pm, Ms Chapple responded to Ms Roach's email and stated:

Thank you for your confirmation that a sexual assault incident has occurred as per my report. Re: Incident, and comments, please can you provide a response to the following questions:

1. When, as per previous correspondence, Rio Tinto "made inquiries" about my report, (and confirmed no details or awareness) did they fail to interpret "this specific incident" referred to"?

2. What specificity in particular was missing?

3. Any incident is an incident is it not?

4. These events one would assume and hope; don't occur frequently, so is Rio Tinto confirming there was more than one Rio Tinto sexual assault in the last 2 months? The wording suggests otherwise?

5. Is Rio Tinto now "back-pedalling" confirming that they were aware of the incident, rather than just the play on words I've received? (for which gaslighting is a specific descriptor/behaviour in workplace bullying)

4. Could Rio Tinto (H&W) please be more "specific" about what they are relating/referring to below?

1. On 5 September 2023, Ms Roach responded to the applicant's email of 21 August 2023, and stated:

We confirm that Rio Tinto is only aware of the one incident in the period you refer to, being the incident referred to in the correspondence from Matt Holcz and Richard Cohen which is attached to your letter dated 14 August 2023. Rio Tinto is unable to provide any further details in relation to this incident out of respect for the impacted person and due to confidentiality obligations.

1. That response from Ms Roach was perhaps unfortunately dismissive, in that it appears to have precipitated the present application to the FCFCOA and the application for leave to this Court. It might have been preferable if Ms Roach had provided an explanation for why Pilbara Iron had not initially realised that the incident being raised by Ms Chapple was an incident already known to Pilbara Iron, which was at the heart of Ms Chapple's 21 August 2023 email. There are a number of possible explanations for this, but none was provided to Ms Chapple.
2. Nor did Pilbara Iron provide any explanation in evidence before the primary judge. This was unhelpful, including because it made it somewhat difficult for the primary judge (and this Court) to understand what has happened in the present case.
3. These circumstances have given rise to concerns on behalf of Ms Chapple. Ms Chapple has a number of complaints.
4. First, it appears (although it is not crystal clear) that Ms Chapple asserts that it should be inferred that Ms Roach and Pilbara Iron knew about the incident, and that Ms Roach's correspondence asserting otherwise was false or misleading and was an attempt to deflect Ms Chapple. Ms Chapple says that Rio Tinto, through Ms Roach, has engaged in a process of "gaslighting" her.
5. Secondly, Ms Chapple has a broader complaint that Ms Roach is acting as a "mere mouthpiece" and is not exercising independent judgment. This appears to involve a complaint that Ms Roach should have exercised independent judgment to avoid "denying the rape" (or more accurately, to avoid asserting that Rio Tinto was not aware of the incident in question). It also involves an assertion that Ms Roach should have asked more questions of Rio Tinto or sought to get to the bottom of whether there had been an incident, rather than simply stating that Rio Tinto was unaware of it.
6. The nature of the broader complaint can be gleaned from the following examples from the transcript of the hearing before the primary judge:

(T4:31) MS CHAPPLE: ...I guess, putting more context to the matter, my understanding is that there should be a forensic approach to counsel's [i.e. Ms Roach's] investigation of matters, and based on her demonstrated or expectation for competence and due diligence, and it also should be viewed that where there is a conflict with the duty owed to a court, the lawyer must disregard any of the client's instructions, and that's under the paramount duty and that refers to the Conduct Rules 2015 is relevant,...

(T5:21) MS CHAPPLE: ...I have concerns that given the number of circumstances, number of correspondence that I received in relation to this current matter on 12 July that I'm concerned as to, well, if it was, in my perception, misleading in terms of whether an event have occurred, which I believed it had, and then subsequently proved it had, for my general protections, how I don't necessarily have faith or trust that matters by the second respondent or counsel - - -

(T5:43) MS CHAPPLE: ...It's I'm just concerned about the veracity of any future information that may be supplied to me...

(T9:3) MS CHAPPLE: Well, in my understanding, I would have the expectation that Ms Roach would go back to Rio Tinto and ask them, "Has there been a sexual assault at this particular site?" because it is a public matter of interest, it is a reportable offence through WorkSafe. So I would have expected that she would double-check that and, also, if that was the case - - -

(T15:20) MS CHAPPLE: ...I know that common sense can sometimes be rare, but I would have expected, given Ms Roach's experience and level of competence, that she would have inquired with her client about this, and given my PTSD and the fact that the email I had sent titled Another Rape obviously showed a level of emotion and, quite frankly, it had triggered me, because it had happened again, and - - -

(T15:44) MS CHAPPLE: ...It should also notice that, you know, from what I understand of the Uniform Law and the nature of independence, there is a need irrespective to forensically perform their role.

1. On these bases, Ms Chapple asserts that Ms Roach has engaged in inappropriate conduct which justified an order restraining her from acting in the proceedings, and that the primary judge's failure to make such an order involved error.
2. Ms Chapple's complaint has also shifted to now include the conduct of Ms Gretton, who is also a solicitor from Hall & Wilcox acting for the second respondent. Ms Gretton affirmed an affidavit on 5 August 2024 in the FCFCOA proceedings. However, the order sought by Ms Chapple before the primary judge did not include any restraint directed at Ms Gretton, and so Ms Gretton's conduct is not properly the subject of this application for leave to appeal and I must put it to one side.
3. As will be seen below, the numerous grounds raised by Ms Chapple concern particular aspects of the way in which the proceedings before the primary judge were conducted. However, it is important to bear in mind that the decision of the primary judge concerned an interlocutory application to restrain Ms Roach from acting as a solicitor for Pilbara Iron. All of the procedural questions fall to be determined against that background. In considering whether leave to appeal should be granted, it is relevant to consider the prospects of successfully appealing the ultimate conclusion on that issue.

1. As Ms Chapple's grounds include numerous attacks on the conduct of the hearing before the primary judge, it is necessary to outline various aspects of the conduct of that hearing.
2. On 6 May 2024, the applicant filed an interlocutory application in the FCFCOA proceeding which sought, amongst other things, proposed Order 10:

The Second Respondent's Counsel, Ms Rosemary Roach, (Partner, Hall & Willcox) is stood aside as counsel and participation in these proceedings.

1. The primary judge determined that he would hear the prayer for relief in Order 10 of the interlocutory application separately from, and in advance of, the balance of the application. The application (the Stand Aside Application) was heard by the primary judge on 9 August 2024, with judgment delivered on 11 December 2024.
2. At the hearing on 9 August 2024, Ms Chapple appeared in person and was unrepresented, and Mr Beetham of counsel appeared for the second respondent.
3. At the start of the hearing, the primary judge noted that the applicant had filed affidavits in the Stand Aside Application but no submissions. However, his Honour did not consider this to be material in circumstances where the legal tests were "reasonably clear", and his Honour considered that the applicant could address the Court on the factual basis for her application:

HIS HONOUR: ...orders were made in relation to this hearing previously, and that you have filed affidavits in relation to the matter but no outline of submissions...I'm not too sure that that matters too much for today's purposes in the end. I mean, the legal tests are reasonably clear, and it will be a matter of you telling us what the factual basis is for your application and how the law applies to that, and the law is, subject to one caveat, sufficiently set out I think in Mr Beetham's outline of submissions on behalf of the second respondent...

1. The primary judge then asked the parties what evidence they sought to rely on in the Stand Aside Application and whether there was any intention to cross-examine on that evidence:

HIS HONOUR: ...For the purposes of today's application, can the court take it that you intend to rely upon your affidavits sworn or affirmed - I'm not sure which now - on 26 April and 16 July?

MS CHAPPLE: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: And can the court take it, Mr Beetham, there's no intention to cross-examine on those?

MR BEETHAM: No.

HIS HONOUR: All right. And while you're on your feet, Mr Beetham, can the court take it that you intend to rely upon the affidavit of Ms Gretton sworn or affirmed on 5 August 2024?

MR BEETHAM: Yes, your Honour. That's correct.

HIS HONOUR: All right. And, Ms Chapple, I'm assuming that you're not intending to cross-examine Ms Gretton on that affidavit?

MS CHAPPLE: No, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: All right. Well. those affidavits then, as the court has indicated, will be taken as read and in evidence...

1. The primary judge outlined what would happen next in the hearing and what the applicant was expected to do:

HIS HONOUR: ...Just in terms of process, Ms Chapple, it's a matter of you making submissions in relation to both the law, but as I've said that's reasonably well set out in Mr Beetham's submissions, and telling the court what facts it is that you rely upon to establish your case with respect to the application to remove or have Ms Roach stood aside....

1. Ms Chapple proceeded to make oral submissions. It is not necessary to reproduce or summarise those submissions in these reasons, save to observe that when the primary judge considered that Ms Chapple was not making submissions directly relevant to the legal and factual issues of the application, the primary judge intervened.
2. During the primary judge's first intervention, the primary judge described the legal test that was outlined in the second respondent's submissions which his Honour appears to have accepted, and asked Ms Chapple to:

...focus upon whether or not in the circumstances of this case Ms Roach ought to be removed ... based on the facts which you rely upon in this case which are relevant to your general protections application in relation to which the court ultimately has to consider whether or not the employer acted or contravened the general protections provisions of the Fair Work Act...

1. The primary judge also indicated that he would be assisted by Ms Chapple addressing "what duty Ms Roach owed to the court in relation to these proceedings."
2. The primary judge interrupted Ms Chapple on several more occasions during her oral submissions to clarify the factual issues relied on by Ms Chapple and to guide Ms Chapple towards the correct legal test. For example, when Ms Chapple referred to her lack of "faith or trust" in the second respondent and her concern about "the veracity of any future information that may be supplied", the primary judge directed the applicant back to the legal test, namely "whether ...a reasonably informed member of the public might or would think that the court ought not have faith or trust in Ms Roach."
3. During the course of the applicant's oral submissions, there was some confusion in locating the DT Infrastructure Response and its attachment (which included the original CMOne Supplier Brief) in the applicant's evidence. It transpired that the DT Infrastructure Response and its attachment were not put in evidence before the primary judge, although they have ultimately been put into evidence before me as an annexure to the affidavit of Ms Chapple affirmed 2 January 2025 (as relevant to whether any ground can be made out in connection with their absence below). It appears that Ms Chapple had a hard copy of the DT Infrastructure Response and attachment at the hearing, and has given evidence that she provided copies to the second respondent's counsel and solicitors prior to the hearing. However, the primary judge did not receive this new material and asked:

HIS HONOUR: Well, how is that relevant if Ms Roach never saw that? How is it relevant to the stand aside application? ... How is it relevant to anything the court ultimately has to decide?

MS CHAPPLE: Well, in my understanding, I would have the expectation that Ms Roach would go back to Rio Tinto and ask them, "Has there been a sexual assault at this particular site?" because it is a public matter of interest, it is a reportable offence through WorkSafe. So I would have expected that she would double-check that...

1. The primary judge appeared to reject that submission, noting that it was not relevant to the Stand Aside Application.
2. When Ms Chapple had finished her oral submissions, the primary judge informed Ms Chapple that she would have the opportunity to reply to any submissions Mr Beetham made.
3. The second respondent's counsel, Mr Beetham, made oral submissions which are not necessary to recount here. In any event, they are consistent with the submissions made in the Leave Application.
4. The primary judge then invited Ms Chapple to reply to Mr Beetham's submissions. At the close of her reply, Ms Chapple stated:

MS CHAPPLE: I think that's all. Thank you, your Honour.

1. In the primary judgment, it was observed that the Stand Aside Application (PJ [13]):

appears to be primarily based on alleged misrepresentations made by [Ms Roach] to Ms Chapple. Ms Chapple alleges that these misrepresentations are in breach of Ms Roach's overriding duty to the Court, and that as a result Ms Roach does not possess the necessary independence required of an officer of the Court to provide truthful information and to not act as a mere mouthpiece for Pilbara Iron.

1. The "misrepresentation" related to "allegations that Ms Roach knowingly made false representations about Ms Roach and Pilbara Iron's knowledge of an alleged incident of sexual assault" (PJ [5]). The primary judge identified that one of Ms Chapple's submissions was that the alleged misrepresentations led "Ms Chapple to be concerned about the veracity of any future information that might be supplied to her by Ms Roach in relation to these proceedings" (PJ [11(f)]).
2. The primary judge acknowledged that Ms Chapple had not filed written submissions but that she had made oral submissions at the hearing of the Stand Aside Application (PJ [11]).
3. The primary judge extracted several paragraphs of two affidavits Ms Chapple had affirmed, and one affidavit affirmed by Ms Gretton, a solicitor for the second respondent (PJ [5] - [8]).
4. Relevantly, the primary judge extracted the following submission Ms Chapple made in an affidavit affirmed on 16 July 2024 (PJ [6]):
   1. This affidavit relates to concerns regarding the professional conduct and legal duties and obligations of the Second Respondent's counsel (Rosemary Roach, Hall & Willcox) in denying that a rape had occurred during the course of my General Protection case proceedings.
   2. It also relates to the conduct of their client the Respondent, Pilbara Iron Services ("Rio Tinto") specifically company executive officers and also those involved in liaising with counsel.
   3. The denial of a rape, subsequent confirmation it had occurred, and at the location as the applicant had confirmed (albeit not formally retracted) resulted in significant impacts (mentally and financially) to the Applicant.
   4. Both the Respondent and counsel had been aware the Applicant had been suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, medically diagnosed and caused by the Applicants treatment during her deployment at Rio Tinto by her employer WorkPac and the circumstances of her departure from this employment (detailed in these General Protections proceedings).
   5. As I result of these denials and conduct, I have concerns to the veracity and accuracy of any future information supplied by Counsel and Rio Tinto to the Applicant, the Court and in future counsel prepared affidavits for witnesses and any communications issued.
5. As to the court's power to restrain a solicitor from acting in a proceeding, the primary judge correctly observed that the court has "inherent jurisdiction to control the conduct of solicitors and counsel as officers of the Court" (PJ [16]).
6. Adopting the test endorsed by the authorities, the primary judge considered that the primary issue to be determined in the Stand Aside Application was (PJ [13]):

whether a fair minded and reasonably informed member of the public might conclude that the alleged misrepresentations by Ms Roach to Ms Chapple, if established, are serious enough that the administration of justice requires that Ms Roach be restrained from continuing to act in these proceedings.

1. However, the primary judge also identified an extant (and unresolved) debate in the authorities as to whether the relevant test is that the fair minded, reasonably informed member of the public "would" (cf. "might") conclude that the proper administration of justice requires a lawyer to be restrained.
2. The primary judge ultimately determined that in relation to the Stand Aside Application, whether the correct standard was "would" or "might" was "neither here [nor] there...because the misrepresentations alleged by Ms Chapple to have been made by Ms Roach were simply not made, and there is no factual basis on which to apply the test" (PJ [21]).
3. The primary judge proceeded to summarise his factual findings as to what occurred (PJ [22]):

22 What happened here is that:

(a) Rio Tinto issued the CMOne Supplier Brief referring to a sexual assault upon a contractor's employee at an unspecified site;

(b) an unknown person (unknown for the purpose of these proceedings at least) sent Ms Chapple the Altered CMOne Supplier Brief, with the altered text referring to a "rape" at [Village B];

(c) Ms Chapple then wrote to Ms Roach (and to senior Rio Tinto executives) alleging, on the basis of the Altered CMOne Supplier Brief, that there had been "Another rape" at [Village B];

(d) Ms Roach, quite correctly said that Pilbara Iron (and one can infer Rio Tinto) was unaware of another case of sexual assault at [Village B] (that is another case in addition to that referred to in the (unaltered) CMOne Supplier Brief; and

(e) when it became apparent to Ms Roach that the "Another rape" referred to by Ms Chapple was, in fact, the same incident referred to in the unaltered CMOne Supplier Brief, Ms Roach, quite properly, wrote to Ms Chapple that Rio Tinto was unaware of what was in fact a single incident of sexual assault at the Village.

1. As is apparent from the background section above, this factual summary is not quite accurate, in the following respects:

(a) Ms Chapple was not sent an "altered" CMOne Supplier Brief. Ms Chapple added a heading to the CMOne Supplier Brief when she forwarded it on to the solicitors for the respondents.

(b) Ms Chapple did not assert there had been "another rape" on the basis of the "altered" CMOne Supplier Brief. She did not receive a copy of CMOne Supplier Brief until 1 August 2023, which is after she sent the Rio Tinto Email and the letter to the first and second respondents' solicitors on 25 July 2023. Ms Chapple's understanding was derived from the two employees at DT Infrastructure, and she added to the heading to the CMOne Supplier Brief to reflect this.

(c) In relation to (d), whilst it may have been correct that Rio Tinto was unaware of another incident in addition to that described in the CMOne Supplier Brief, it has not been demonstrated that Ms Roach was aware of the CMOne Supplier Brief or understood the phrase "another rape" to mean something additional to the incident referred to in the CMOne Supplier Brief. There is no clear evidence that Ms Roach knew anything at all about an incident at Village B. She may or she may not - there was no clear evidence one way or the other.

(d) In relation to (e), it is more likely that Ms Roach did not reach any realisation herself, but rather was simply relaying instructions from her client. An annexure to Ms Chapple's affidavit affirmed on 18 June 2025 indicates that the second respondent's solicitors were only provided with the original "unaltered" CMOne Supplier Brief by their client on 5 August 2024, four days before the hearing before the primary judge.

1. However, these matters do not themselves justify a grant of leave. The relevant question remains whether there is any prospect of demonstrating conduct that justifies an order restraining Ms Roach. The corrected factual position does not, of itself, support a conclusion that Ms Roach has engaged in any conduct that could give rise to any possible basis for being restrained from acting in the proceedings.
2. In dismissing the Stand Aside Application, the primary judge concluded (PJ [23] - [24]):
   1. There was, in the circumstances, no false or misleading statement by Ms Roach; and even if, contrary to this conclusion, there was a false or misleading statement, it could not on the present facts be said to have been made "knowingly" for the purposes of r 22.1 of the LP Solicitor's Conduct Rules.
   2. It follows that no fair-minded reasonably informed member of the public might, or would, have concluded that the proper administration of justice requires that Ms Roach be stood aside in these proceedings.

1. Ms Chapple's Leave Application contained 22 separate grounds. Many of those grounds overlap, but can be broadly distilled into the following main contentions:

(a) Procedural Fairness (grounds 5, 8, 9 and 21): the primary judge denied Ms Chapple procedural fairness by not allowing Ms Chapple to adequately present her case at the primary hearing on 9 August 2024 and failing to have regard to Ms Chapple's lack of legal representation.

(b) Apprehended Bias (grounds 3 and 18): the primary judgment is affected by apprehended bias in finding that Ms Chapple had "altered" the "CMOne Supplier Brief".

(c) Incorrect factual findings (grounds 4, 6, 10, 11, 16, 17, 20 and 22): the primary judge made various factual findings that were not supported by the evidence or were the result of a failure to give sufficient weight to Ms Chapple's evidence.

(d) Errors of law (grounds 7, 12, 13 and 15): the primary judge applied various errors of law, that were accepted from the second respondent's submissions, that formed the basis for the reasons for judgment.

1. I note that many of Ms Chapple's contentions of apprehended bias were, in substance, contentions that the primary judge made incorrect factual findings or incorrectly applied the relevant test in making certain factual findings. However, I acknowledge that implicit in Ms Chapple's application is that the alleged apprehended bias led to incorrect factual findings and errors of law.
2. There are other grounds that do not fit neatly within the above categories (grounds 1, 2, 14, 19) which I will deal with separately.

1. Ms Chapple has filed two affidavits in relation to the Leave Application. The respondents did not seek to adduce any evidence in the Leave Application.
2. An affidavit of Ms Chapple affirmed on 2 January 2025 has been filed which includes four annexures. This affidavit was included in the parties' agreed court book and no objection appears to be made by the respondents to this affidavit. I therefore take this affidavit and its annexures to be read on this application.
3. Ms Chapple has also filed an affidavit of 18 June 2025, which contains 11 annexures. I made an order on 26 June 2025 granting leave to the second respondent to file and serve any further written submissions, including in response to this affidavit. The second respondent made no formal objections to this affidavit, but filed brief written submissions on 1 July 2025 addressing why this evidence was not relevant to Ms Chapple's Leave Application. This affidavit will be read. I have also taken the second respondent's written submissions of 1 July 2025 into account when considering this evidence.

1. This Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from judgments of the FCFCOA pursuant to s 24(1)(d) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act). However, a grant of leave to appeal is required before an appeal can proceed as the primary judgment was of an interlocutory nature: s 24(1A) of the FCA Act.
2. The principles for granting leave to appeal are well settled and will generally involve considerations of:

(a) whether the decision from which leave to appeal is sought is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration; and

(b) whether Ms Chapple would suffer substantial injustice if leave is refused, supposing the decision to be wrong.

(Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-9 (Sheppard, Burchett and Heerey JJ (Décor)); Re CSR Ltd (2010) 183 FCR 358; [2010] FCAFC 34 at [5] (Keane CJ and Jacobson J); Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd v Lavazza Australia Pty Ltd [2025] FCAFC 12 at [156] (Nicholas, Jackson and Rofe JJ)).

1. While the Court's discretion to grant leave to appeal should not be constrained by rigid rules (see Décor at 399), as recently observed by the Full Court in AIX20 v Director-General of Security [2025] FCAFC 38 at [13], the above considerations are cumulative and leave to appeal will usually not be granted unless each limb of the test is made out: Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 81 ATR 36; [2010] FCAFC 139 at [5] (Ryan, Stone and Jagot JJ).

The basis for restraining a solicitor from acting

1. The primary judge correctly identified the relevant principles applicable to the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction to restrain legal representatives from acting in a matter in the primary judgment at PJ [14] - [19].
2. The basis for the power to restrain a solicitor from acting was explained in more detail in the recent decision of Maclean v Brylewski, in the matter of Maclean [2025] FCAFC 133 (Maclean) at [13] - [24] (Jackson and Moore JJ).
3. As the primary judge recognised, in the category of case relevant to the present circumstances, the relevant test is whether a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would (or might) conclude that the proper administration of justice requires that a legal practitioner should be prevented from acting, in the interests of the protection of the integrity of the judicial process and the due administration of justice, including the appearance of justice: PJ [16].
4. The primary judge also correctly observed at PJ [17] - [19] that there is controversy as to whether the relevant test is "would" conclude or "might" conclude: Kallinicos v Hunt (2005) 64 NSWLR 561; [2005] NSWSC 1181 at [76] (Brereton J); Mumbin v Northern Territory of Australia (No 1) [2020] FCA 475 at [39] (Griffiths J); Porter v Dyer (2022) 402 ALR 659; [2022] FCAFC 116 (Porter) at [113] - [114] (Lee J, Besanko and Abraham JJ agreeing); Maclean at [24]. In Porter at [114], it was observed that the preponderance of authority favoured "would".
5. As the primary judge observed at PJ [20], there is no need to resolve that controversy in the present case, because the outcome is the same on either test.
6. As noted above at [36] - [37], there were two aspects to Ms Chapple's general complaint against Ms Roach. The first was that Ms Roach had made a false or misleading statement or statements. The second is that Ms Roach had acted as a mere mouthpiece.
7. As to the first, there is no evidence to suggest that the statements by Ms Roach that "Rio Tinto is not aware of any incident of this nature at [Village B]" and "based on the information you previously provided, Rio Tinto was not aware you were referring to this specific incident" were deliberately false statements: i.e. known by Ms Roach to be untrue. There is no basis for concluding that Ms Roach was seeking to mislead Ms Chapple or was setting out to "gaslight" her (to use a term adopted by Ms Chapple). Ms Chapple had the onus to prove any such allegation, and there is no evidence before the primary judge (or before me) to support these allegations. There is, for example, no evidence that Ms Roach knew anything at all about the subject matter of the CMOne Supplier Brief, let alone evidence that Ms Roach knew that the incident raised by Ms Chapple was the same as the incident referred to in that brief, or evidence that Ms Roach knew that Rio Tinto was already aware of the incident.
8. Therefore, and subject to the qualification referred to below, any ground that is based on a contention that Ms Roach has deliberately misled Ms Chapple has no realistic prospects and does not support any grant of leave to appeal.
9. The issues just discussed are different in nature from a suggestion that Rio Tinto should have realised that Ms Chapple was describing the same incident as the incident which was the subject of the CMOne Supplier Brief. In a different context, it might have been relevant to consider whether Rio Tinto gave adequate consideration to the matter identified by Ms Chapple, and whether it should have understood better what Ms Chapple was raising. However, that is no proper basis for the present application, which is directed at Ms Roach and seeks to restrain her from acting.
10. In relation to the second ground of complaint against Ms Roach, the criticism seems to involve something of a misunderstanding as to the role of a solicitor. Ms Roach's role is not to investigate or interrogate her client. She is not charged with undertaking a forensic examination. She is not responsible for the accuracy or otherwise of the instructions given to her by her client if she does not know or have reason to suspect that the instructions are incorrect. The mere fact that instructions are inaccurate (if that was in fact the case), or involve a misunderstanding, is not itself a basis for restraining a solicitor from acting.
11. The difficulties are compounded for Ms Chapple's application in the present case because there may be numerous possible reasons why it was not appreciated, even by Pilbara Iron, that the incident being raised by Ms Chapple was the same as the incident the subject of the CMOne Supplier Brief. There is therefore no basis for impugning the conduct of Ms Roach in merely passing on an observation that "Rio Tinto is not aware of an incident of this nature at [Village B]" or making the statement that "based on the information you previously provided, Rio Tinto was not aware you were referring to this specific incident." Not only has Ms Chapple not demonstrated that those statements were known to be false by Ms Roach (or ought to have been known to be false), but Ms Chapple has not demonstrated that those statements did not reflect the true state of mind of Pilbara Iron.
12. Instead, Ms Chapple emphasises her belief that Ms Roach should have "double-checked" the information before relaying it - that Ms Roach should have conducted an investigation to test the veracity of it - and that Ms Chapple cannot now trust information relayed to her by Ms Roach. But it is not the proper or required role of Ms Roach to double-check instructions from her client. Nor is Ms Roach required to earn the trust of the person on the other side of litigation.
13. Ms Chapple's submissions before the primary judge, and again in this Court, therefore do not identify any proper basis for suggesting that Ms Roach's conduct involved any impropriety or otherwise departed from the recognised standard of proper conduct. That is significant in assessing the numerous grounds relied upon by Ms Chapple. With one qualification, those grounds ultimately do not go anywhere because they do not have the potential to impugn the conduct of Ms Roach in a relevant sense.
14. The qualification is that grounds that go to the effectiveness or fairness of the procedure before the primary judge - e.g. the ground that Ms Chapple should have been informed about the possibility of cross-examining Ms Gretton - could influence what might have been the content of the evidence before the primary judge.
15. I will deal with the grounds with these considerations in mind.

1. Ms Chapple is self-represented and does not have the benefit of legal representation. The first and second respondents are both represented by solicitors from large firms.
2. Given that many of the grounds Ms Chapple relies on in her Leave Application relate to asserted disadvantages she experienced as a self-represented or unrepresented litigant, it is appropriate to outline the Court's duty to self-represented litigants.
3. The guiding principles regarding the Court's duty were outlined in Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375 (Hamod) at [309] - [316] by Beazley, Giles and Whealy JJA:
   1. Courts have an overriding duty to ensure that a trial is fair: Dietrich v R [1992] HCA 57; 177 CLR 292. This entails ensuring that the trial is conducted fairly and in accordance with law: MacPherson v The Queen [1981] HCA 46; 147 CLR 512 per Gibbs CJ and Wilson J at [16] 525. The duty reposes in the individual judicial officer hearing a case. In the context of an unrepresented litigant, the duty requires that a person does not suffer a disadvantage from exercising the recognised right of a litigant to be self-represented: R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91 at 94-95. In MacPherson Mason J, at [31] 534, noted that:

"A trial in which a judge allows an accused to remain in ignorance of a fundamental procedure which, if invoked, may prove to be advantageous to him, can hardly be labelled as 'fair'."

1. However, the court's duty is not solely to the unrepresented litigant. The obligation is to ensure a fair trial for all parties. For this reason, the duty is usually stated in terms that require that the impartial function of the judge is preserved, whilst also requiring the judge to intervene where necessary to ensure the trial is fair and just: Tomasevic v Travaglini [2007] VSC 337; 17 VR 100 at [95]; Barghouthi v Transfield Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 666; 122 FCR 19, 23; NAGA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 944, [11]; Nagy v Ryan [2003] SASC 37, [52]-[53].

2. Insofar as the duty relates specifically to an unrepresented party, it has been said that a trial judge has an obligation to take appropriate steps to ensure that the unrepresented litigant has sufficient information about the practice and procedure of the court, so far as is reasonably practicable for the purpose of ensuring a fair trial. The application of that principle will vary depending upon the circumstances of the case: Jae Kyung Lee v Bob Chae-Sang Cha per Basten JA at [48]. See also Abram v Bank of New Zealand (1996) ATPR 41-507, 43,341, 43,347; Microsoft Corporation v Ezy Loans Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1135; (2004) 63 IPR 54; Pezos v Police [2005] SASC 500; (2005) 94 SASR 154.

3. Although the duty of a trial judge to assist an unrepresented litigant is cast in active terms, it does not extend to advising the accused as to how his or her rights should be exercised: R v Gidley (1984) 3 NSWLR 168. Rather, the judge has to put the unrepresented litigant in the position of being able to make an effective choice, a duty which applies notwithstanding the adversarial character of a criminal trial: McPherson per Mason J at 534. The duty is the same in a civil proceeding, with such modifications as are called for to take account of civil procedures. However, it is not the function of the court to give judicial advice to, or conduct the case on behalf of, the unrepresented litigant: Bhagwanani v Martin (1999) 204 LSJS 449; [1999] SASC 406; Clark v State of New South Wales (No 2) [2006] NSWSC 914.

4. The touchstone at all times remains that of fairness. In Rajski v Scitec Corporation Pty Ltd (Court of Appeal, 16 June 1986, unreported) Samuels JA, at 14, stated:

"But the court should be astute to see that it does not extend its auxiliary role so as to confer upon a litigant in person a positive advantage over the represented opponent ... At all events, the absence of legal representation on one side ought not to induce a court to deprive the other side of one jot of its lawful entitlement ... An unrepresented party is as much subject to the rules as any other litigant."

1. Thus, a trial judge is entitled to reprimand an unrepresented litigant if the judge believes that the litigant is trifling with the court: see Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263 at 283 per Meagher JA; Michael v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 100 at [64] per Steytler P (McLure JA and Miller AJA agreeing); Jae Kyung Lee v Bob Chae-Sang Cha at [84] per Basten JA.

2. There may be a fine tension in striking the balance between providing assistance to an unrepresented litigant and ensuring a fair trial for all parties. However, it is the task of the judge to strike that balance. In Minogue v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1999] FCA 85; (1999) 84 FCR 438 at 446 the Full Federal Court dealt with the tension between the duty of the trial judge to ensure a fair trial and the requirement of impartiality:

"A trial judge often faces something of a dilemma. While he or she may be bound to provide some advice and assistance to an unrepresented litigant, the authorities make it clear that the Judge should not intervene to such an extent that he or she cannot maintain a position of neutrality in the litigation: Burwood Municipal Council v Harvey [1995] NSWSC 149; (1995) 86 LGERA 389 at 397 (NSW CA), per Kirby P. However, the boundaries of legitimate intervention are flexible and will be influenced by the need for intervention to ensure a fair and just trial: Panagopoulos v Southern Healthcare Network (unreported, Supreme Court, Vic, Smith J, 15 September 1997) at 6."

1. The position can be stated no more clearly than reiterating that the judge must remain at all times the impartial adjudicator of the matter, measured against the touchstone of fairness.

1. These paragraphs have been cited with approval in many authorities including by the Full Court in SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2013) 216 FCR 445; [2013] FCAFC 146 at [37] (Robertson J, Allsop CJ and Mortimer JJ agreeing).
2. The Full Court in Flightdeck Geelong Pty Ltd v All Options Pty Ltd (2020) 280 FCR 479; [2020] FCAFC 138 at [54] (Markovic, Derrington and Anastassiou JJ) noted that the scope of the Court's assistance to a self-represented litigant must be limited "to that which is necessary to diminish the disadvantage which he or she will ordinarily suffer, and the Court should be wary to avoid placing a litigant-in-person in a person of advantage or privilege over a represented opponent."
3. The Full Court (at [55]) then outlined some examples of the types of assistance that could be appropriate for the Court to provide to a self-represented litigant:

(a) Ensuring the litigant has sufficient information about the practice and procedure of the Court to make effective choices in the conduct of the matter: Hamod at [311]. For example, failing to explain the difference between formal sworn testimony and statements made from the bar table, and the significance of failing to file an affidavit, to enable a litigant-in-person to choose whether or not to give oral evidence, may amount to a denial of procedural fairness: SZRUR at [39]. Additionally, failing to explain the risks in not leading evidence where adverse inferences might be drawn may also constitute a denial of procedural fairness_: Downes v Maxwell Richard Rhys & Co Pty Ltd (in liq)_ [2014] VSCA 193; (2014) 46 VR 283.

(b) Ensuring the litigant is informed of procedures which, if invoked, may prove to be advantageous: MacPherson at 534. For example, failing to inform a litigant-in-person of their ability to apply for an adjournment may amount to a denial of procedural fairness: AMF15 at [47].

(c) Ensuring the litigant has not, because of a lack of legal skill, failed to claim rights or put forward arguments: Rajski.

1. The scope and precise application of the Court's duty in a given proceeding will necessarily vary according to the particular circumstances of the case before the Court and the circumstances of the unrepresented litigant. It is therefore inevitable, as the High Court observed in Neil v Nott (1994) 121 ALR 148; [1994] HCA 23 at 150, that "[a] frequent consequence of self-representation is that the court must assume the burden of endeavouring to ascertain the rights of parties which are obfuscated by their own advocacy."
2. In Abram v Bank of New Zealand (1996) ATPR 41-507; [1996] FCA 635 at 42,347 (Hill, Tamberlin and Sundberg JJ), the Full Court held that "[w]hat a judge must do to assist a litigant in person depends on the litigant, the nature of the case, and the litigant's intelligence and understanding of the case." See also Microsoft Corporations v Ezy Loans Pty Ltd (2004) 63 IPR 54; [2004] FCA 1135 at [10] (Stone J).
3. In Lamont v Malishus Limited (No 2) [2022] FCA 237 at [81], Burley J stated that the trial judge's duty to ensure a fair trial by giving self-represented litigants due assistance "does not arise in a vacuum" and that the nature of the hearing is relevant:

One relevant contextual matter is the nature of the hearing. Thus, the seriousness of the consequences to a person who is self-represented is a factor to be taken into account. For instance, where the nature of the hearing under consideration concerns whether a sequestration order is to be made in bankruptcy proceedings, where the outcome of the proceedings affects not only the private rights and obligations of the debtor and creditor, but also concerns the status of an individual who may become susceptible to criminal conduct for what would otherwise be innocent conduct, is a relevant factor to the assistance which must be given to the self-represented litigant: Boensch v Somerville Legal [2021] FCAFC 79 at [88] (Katzmann, Markovic and Abraham JJ). A fortiori, where the proceedings are criminal trials, as in Dietrich, and MacPherson. In each of these cases it may be said that the duty weighs more heavily than in a commercial action where the liberty or status of an individual is not at stake. The content of the duty to ensure that a trial is fair remains an imperative in other kinds of proceedings although the content of the duty will vary according to the circumstances: Mendonca v Legal Services Commissioner [2020] NSWCA 84 at [21] (McCallum JA, with whom Basten and Leeming JJA agreed).

1. Ms Chapple submits that at the hearing on 9 August 2024, the primary judge erred in denying Ms Chapple procedural fairness on the basis that his Honour:

(a) did not provide Ms Chapple with the opportunity to cross-examine Ms Gretton, a solicitor for the second respondent, which "would have provided significant opportunity for Ms Chapple to confirm multiple details and information relating to the credibility and sources of the information;"

(b) did not provide Ms Chapple with an opportunity to confirm or ask questions as to why she had not filed any submissions, which would have revealed that until three days before the hearing, she did not know what an "outline of submissions" was;

(c) requested that Ms Chapple, "without consideration or sufficient time or opportunity to request adjournment, ... provide detailed facts, legal relevance cases and an argument relating to application of law and fact"; and

(d) failed to appreciate, in the conduct of the hearing, Ms Chapple's status as a self-represented litigant with limited legal experience, as opposed to the respondents who had access to legal representation and "financial capacity".

1. Ms Chapple also complains that counsel and solicitors for the second respondent received copies of the DT Infrastructure Response and attachment just prior to the hearing but failed to mention this to the primary judge during the hearing.
2. I have reviewed the transcript of the hearing on 9 August 2024 and the evidence that was put before the primary judge. I do not consider that Ms Chapple was denied procedural fairness at the hearing of the Stand Aside Application, and there is nothing to suggest that the primary judge did not act in accordance with the guidance outlined in Hamod at [309] - [316].
3. First, while perhaps inelegantly phrased, the primary judge did, in effect, ask Ms Chapple if she intended to cross-examine Ms Gretton. In response, Ms Chapple said "No, your Honour." Cross examination in an interlocutory application such as the present is not the usual course, and is therefore not an automatic entitlement: Wu v Avin Operations Pty Ltd (No 3) [2006] FCA 1321 at [18] (Kenny J); Scanlon v American Cigarette Company (Overseas) Pty Ltd (No 1) [1987] VicRp 21; [1987] VR 261 at 272 (Nicholson J). It would require an application for leave to cross-examine Ms Gretton, which in turn would require an identification of a reason for the cross-examination and what might be obtained from it.
4. I do not consider that the primary judge, before asking Ms Chapple whether she wanted to cross-examine Ms Gretton, had any obligation to explain to Ms Chapple the circumstances in which she might be permitted to do so or the matters that she would need to address in that regard. If Ms Chapple had said that she wanted to cross-examine Ms Gretton, then an explanation of these matters might be required. But that is not what occurred. Further, I do not consider that the primary judge had any obligation to explain that there might be adverse consequences from not cross-examining Ms Gretton, in part, because those consequences did not exist. Ms Gretton's evidence was purely formal, in the sense that it simply established that the original form of the CMOne Supplier Brief did not have the heading "Rape Incident ([Village B])". Ms Chapple knew that and indeed, did not challenge that evidence.
5. As noted above, any application to cross-examine Ms Gretton would require an identification of a reason for the cross-examination and what might be obtained from it. Although Ms Chapple has sought leave to appeal from the decision of the primary judge on this ground, she has not identified the type of questioning that she would have pursued, or why Ms Gretton would be expected to be able to give useful evidence about matters that would support Ms Chapple's application to restrain Ms Roach from acting.
6. I therefore consider that there are insufficient prospects on this ground of appeal to justify the grant of leave.
7. Secondly, in relation to Ms Chapple's complaint that the nature of written submissions were not explained to her, much of the affidavit evidence Ms Chapple filed would properly be characterised as submissions rather than evidence. The primary judge clearly had regard to these submissions in his reasons, for example, at PJ [6] which is extracted above at [63]. Further, Ms Chapple made oral submissions at the hearing on 9 August 2024. Ms Chapple therefore had, in substance, the opportunity to make submissions and did so. I am not persuaded that this ground of appeal has any realistic prospects that warrant the grant of leave.
8. Thirdly, I consider that the primary judge's conduct throughout the hearing had proper regard to Ms Chapple's position as a self-represented litigant. The primary judge, at various times throughout the hearing, explained the process of the hearing to Ms Chapple and guided Ms Chapple towards the relevant legal test. It is clear from the transcript that the primary judge took some trouble to understand Ms Chapple's case.
9. Fourthly, nothing turns on the absence before the primary judge of the DT Infrastructure Response and its attachments. As already noted, it was Ms Chapple who added a heading to the document. Nothing in that correspondence supports a conclusion that Ms Roach engaged in any inappropriate conduct.
10. The primary judge's conduct did not depart from what was described in Hamod, having regard to what was required in the circumstances of the present case.
11. Even if a denial of procedural fairness had existed (which I have not found), I do not accept that any such departure could have made a difference to the outcome of the Stand Aside Application: Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141; [1986] HCA 54 at 145 (Mason, Wilson, Brennan, Deane, Dawson JJ); EBW21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 341 at [49] (Feutrill J).
12. There is nothing in the evidence or submissions to suggest that had the hearing on 9 August 2024 been adjourned, Ms Chapple had filed written submissions, and was allowed to cross-examine Ms Gretton, that the outcome of the Stand Aside Application would have been different. Ms Chapple has not articulated what submissions she would have made in writing, as opposed to orally, that would have affected the outcome of the Stand Aside Application. Ms Chapple has not identified how cross-examination would have been likely to advance her case. Nor has Ms Chapple articulated the specific disadvantage she suffered in her lack of preparedness at the hearing (or what advantage would have been gained by additional understanding).
13. I accept Pilbara Iron's submission that this ground has no reasonable prospects of success and does not justify a grant of leave.

1. Ms Chapple submits that the primary judgment is affected by apprehended bias based on:

(a) the primary judge's description of the copy of the CMOne Supplier Brief annexed to Ms Chapple's affidavit affirmed on 16 July 2024 as being "amended, by parties unknown to Pilbara Iron, to add "Rape Incident ([Village B])"", and the use of the defined term "Altered CMOne Supplier Brief" for that document, which confirmed that the primary judge believed that Ms Chapple "had knowingly altered a document with the intent to deceive"; and

(b) the primary judge's "excessive intervention" during the hearing and the "manner of the questions and statements made" which suggests "a level of pre-judgement without a perceived level of knowledge or review of the case material presented prior to the hearing."

1. As to (a), this complaint is misconceived, because it is clear from the primary judgment that the primary judge did not understand that Ms Chapple had altered the CMOne Supplier Brief. It follows that he cannot have thought that Ms Chapple had the intent to deceive anyone. More generally, there is no reason for thinking that the primary judge's reference to the "altered" CMOne Supplier Brief was anything more than an objective description of the document - namely, that the original CMOne Supplier Brief was amended to include a header which stated "Rape Incident ([Village B])". There is nothing to suggest that the use of the words "altered" or "amended" supports an inference that the primary judge believed Ms Chapple had knowingly altered the document with an intention to deceive.
2. As to the second ground, it cannot be said that the primary judge's "interruptions" of Ms Chapple during the course of her oral submissions is evidence of any apprehended bias against Ms Chapple. Rather, properly construed, the primary judge "interrupted" Ms Chapple to ensure that she was addressing the relevant questions in dispute and to foreshadow issues the Court would need her to address. For example, the primary judge noted:

...one of the difficulties the court is having at present is establishing what duty Ms Roach owed to the court in relation to these issues, and that's something you're going to have to address, what duty she owed in relation to these proceedings in relation of the allegations that you seem to be relying upon.

1. The primary judge intervened to direct Ms Chapple to the relevant test she had to apply to the facts of her case. For example, and as I have previously outlined above, when Ms Chapple submitted that she did not have "faith or trust" in any future information that would be supplied by the second respondent, the primary judge directed her to the correct legal test:

HIS HONOUR: It's not a question of whether you've got faith or trust - - -

MS CHAPPLE: I know.

HIS HONOUR: - - - it's whether or not - - -

MS CHAPPLE: I apologise.

HIS HONOUR: - - - a reasonably informed member of the public might or would think that the court ought not have faith or trust in Ms Roach. Based on the facts, whatever they might be...

1. It is apparent that having appreciated Ms Chapple's limited legal experience, the primary judge was guiding Ms Chapple to address the relevant legal issues and to understand the nature of Ms Chapple's case.
2. Ms Chapple submits that during the hearing, while she was interrupted approximately 16 times, counsel for the second respondent was only interrupted 6 times. I do not consider this type of analysis to be helpful, as it tends to suggest that judges "interrupt" individuals appearing for the purpose of obstructing them from presenting their arguments in court. It is commonplace for judges to interrupt the flow of submissions to raise matters with individuals, including experienced counsel, to better understand the case that is being presented and to ensure that they are directing their submissions to the relevant issues.
3. I do not consider that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the primary judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the Stand Aside Application: Ebner v Offıcial Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63 at [6] - [8]. There is no logical connection between the grounds for apprehended bias identified by the applicant and a feared deviation from deciding the Stand Aside Application other than on its legal and factual merits.
4. Insofar as the submission regarding the primary judge's alleged "excessive" interruptions is also relied on in support of the procedural fairness ground, I do not accept it. There is nothing in the primary judge's conduct during the hearing to suggest that he prevented the applicant from putting forth her case, or that there was any pre-judgement.

1. For the reasons explained at paragraphs [86] to [93] above, there is nothing in the balance of the grounds which impugns the conduct of Ms Roach in a way that could conceivably lead to an order restraining her from acting. The balance of the grounds do not, therefore, support the grant of leave. I will consider them individually for completeness, without in any way detracting from this point.

1. I note that most of the grounds discussed below were not addressed by the applicant in her written submissions. However, for completeness, I have considered them.

1. Ground 4 of the Leave Application contends that the primary judge erred in his conclusion that the "misrepresentations alleged by Ms Chapple to have been made to Ms Roach were simply not made." Ground 10 is similarly directed to the finding of the primary judge that Ms Roach did not make misleading or deceptive statements when stating that Rio Tinto "was not aware of any incident of this nature at [Village B]."
2. I have dealt with this earlier. There was no evidence before the Court that Ms Roach was engaged in falsehoods. The primary judge was correct to conclude that there was no basis to conclude that Ms Roach made any false or misleading statements or that any statements were "knowingly" misleading (PJ [23]). Any appeal on this ground enjoys no prospects and therefore is not appropriate for a grant of leave.
3. If the statements made by Ms Roach turned out to be incorrect (and therefore misleading in that general sense), but Ms Roach was not aware of this at the time, then no basis has been identified for impugning the conduct of Ms Roach in a manner that would give rise to any basis for restraining her from acting.

1. This ground is expressed in somewhat ambiguous terms. However, I understand that the complaint made under this ground is that the primary judge did not describe the CMOne Supplier Brief that was annexed to Ms Gretton's affidavit affirmed on 5 August 2024 as "amended" or "altered" when it included the phrase "Annexure A" at the top of the document, being something added by the solicitors for Pilbara Iron. In contrast, the primary judge described the CMOne Supplier Brief annexed to Ms Chapple's affidavit affirmed on 16 July 2024 as being "altered" and "amended". The ground seems to involve an allegation of inconsistent treatment of Ms Chapple and Pilbara Iron.
2. This ground involves a simple misconception, including a misunderstanding of legal proceedings. First, as set out earlier, there was no criticism by the primary judge of any alteration by Ms Chapple because the primary judge did not realise she had altered the CMOne Supplier Brief, and this did not feature in the primary judge's dismissal of her application. There is therefore no logical connection between the asserted ground and the primary judgment. Secondly, there could never be a criticism of adding "Annexure A" to a document that is an annexure to an affidavit (given that this is a standard procedural step), and so a failure to criticise that conduct could never be a proper ground of complaint.

1. Ground 11 of the Leave Application contends that the primary judge:

failed to consider the initial communication was sent to senior executives, not Ms Roach. No evidence of how this communication was sent to Ms Roach or the instructions or the email (presumably) that would have been issued in the referral. No reference is made to the responsibilities that apply to these senior executives or whistleblower protections.

1. This ground does not articulate any connection to the conduct of Ms Roach or explain how this could be a basis for restraining Ms Roach from acting. It seems to be a criticism directed at Pilbara Iron, but that is not relevant to the present application. This ground has no prospect of success and does not support a grant of leave.

1. It is extremely difficult to understand what Ms Chapple complains about in Ground 16. It appears to relate to a criticism directed at Ms Roach that she suggested that Ms Chapple report information concerning the reported incident to the "MyVoice" service of Rio Tinto, when the MyVoice service is said by Ms Chapple not to be confidential. Ms Chapple also says that Ms Roach held no authority within Rio Tinto for reporting or relaying health and safety issues.
2. This appears to have nothing to do with any conduct of Ms Roach that could be said to be improper such that it would justify an order restraining her from acting. Even if Ms Roach should not have recommended the MyVoice service for some reason, there is no basis for a contention that this would prevent her from acting. Again, this ground seems to result from some misunderstanding as to the proper role of solicitors. It likewise follows that there cannot be any legitimate complaint about the failure by the primary judge to consider this issue.
3. This ground has no prospects of success and does not justify any grant of leave.

1. Ground 17 contends that the primary judge erred by failing to consider that the parties and the Court did not have access to the original "CMOne Supplier Brief as placed on the Rio Tinto intranet site", that there were potential differences between the form of the CMOne Supplier Brief as sent to suppliers and the form present on the Rio Tinto intranet, and that it was not clear that Ms Gretton had access to the intranet (rather than being sent a copy) when she gave her evidence.
2. The significance of all of this is not explained. Nor is any link established between these matters and any conduct of Ms Roach that could lead to her being removed.
3. I do not consider this ground to be relevant to the Stand Aside Application, and its prospects are therefore insufficient to support a grant of leave.

1. In Ground 20, the applicant contends that the primary judge "erred in his [judgment] by concluding that Ms Chapple had significantly altered the CMOne Supplier Brief so that there was insufficient information to be able to qualify an incident occurred or could be mistaken for what Ms Chapple reported."
2. No such finding was made by the primary judge, and therefore this ground does not support any grant of leave.

1. Ground 22 relies on three alleged factual errors of the primary judge. The first is the finding that an unknown person sent Ms Chapple the "altered" CMOne Supplier Brief. As noted above, this is an error, but it is not material to any decision regarding whether Ms Roach should be restrained.
2. The second is the alleged failure to recognise that Annexure A to Ms Gretton's affidavit has also been altered (by the addition of the words "Annexure A"). This is not an error, and has no relevance to the application to restrain Ms Roach, for the reasons set out above.
3. The third is an error (clearly a typographical error) in the date identified for Ms Chapple being informed of the incident at Village B. Nothing turns on this.

1. The applicant appears to submit that in affirming an affidavit in the Stand Aside Application, Ms Gretton breached r 27 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors' Conduct Rules 2015 (WA) (Solicitors' Conduct Rules) which provides:

27. Solicitor as material witness in client's case

27.1 In a case in which it is known, or becomes apparent, that a solicitor will be required to give evidence material to the determination of contested issues before the court, the solicitor may not appear as advocate for the client in the hearing.

27.2 In a case in which it is known, or becomes apparent, that a solicitor will be required to give evidence material to the determination of contested issues before the court the solicitor, an associate of the solicitor or a law practice of which the solicitor is a member must not continue to act for the client if doing so would prejudice the administration of justice.

1. It is contended that the primary judge's failure to consider this was an error of law.
2. This contention has no foundation. Ms Gretton gave purely formal evidence as to the original form of the CMOne Supplier Brief (i.e. its form before the heading "Rape Incident ([Village B])" was added by Ms Chapple). Ms Gretton did not appear as an advocate before the primary judge, and in light of the formal evidence, the conduct of Ms Gretton in continuing to act for Pilbara Iron could not cause any prejudice to the administration of justice.
3. That is why it is entirely commonplace for solicitors to give evidence about formal matters, such as the provenance of documents, in court proceedings. There is no substance to this ground, and it does not support a grant of leave.

1. The applicant appears to contend in Ground 12 that the primary judge erred in describing the jurisdiction of the Court to restrain a litigant from being represented by its solicitor of choice as being "exceptional", and in requiring that something exceptional be demonstrated.
2. The primary judge's statement of principles was a correct statement of the law, and there is no apparent error in his application of the relevant principles. This ground does not support a grant of leave.

1. Ground 13 appears to contend that the primary judge erred in failing to resolve the extant legal question of whether the standard of "might" or "would" is to be applied to the test for apprehended bias.
2. The primary judge was not required to resolve this legal controversy, as he accepted that the Stand Aside Application could not succeed even on the lower "might" test (PJ [24]):

It follows that no fair-minded reasonably informed member of the public might, or would, have concluded that the proper administration of justice requires that Ms Roach be stood aside in these proceedings.

No arguable error has been demonstrated in this conclusion, and therefore this ground does not support a grant of leave.

1. This ground contends that the primary judge was not able to rely on Osferatu v Osferatu (2015) 301 FLR 295; [2015] FamCAFC 177, in circumstances where this decision preceded the amalgamation of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia and the Family Court of Australia in 2021.
2. There is no proper basis to suggest that decisions made by those courts prior to the amalgamation have no precedential value, and I reject this contention.

1. I do not consider this to be a proper ground but rather a summary of the general grounds on which leave to appeal is sought.

1. The applicant submits that the primary judge's reference to John Hostettler's biography of Sir Edward Carson in Sir Edward Carson: A Dream Too Far (Barry Rose Law Publishers, 1997) in the opening lines of the primary judgment fails to capture the "context" of the quote the primary judge cited, which I will not reproduce here.
2. The very existence of this ground perhaps illustrates the caution that should be exercised before using literary quotes. However, there is no substance to Ms Chapple's complaint. The primary judge was simply identifying that Sir Edward Carson was no "mere mouthpiece", which was the complaint made against Ms Roach in these proceedings. Contrary to Ms Chapple's suggestion in the application for leave to appeal, the primary judge captured the context for the quote, and no error in reasoning or approach has been identified.
3. Ms Chapple also refers to the High Court's statement of principle in Ex parte Bucknell (1936) 56 CLR 221; [1936] HCA 67 (Bucknell) at 225 - 226 (Latham CJ, Rich, Dixon, Evatt, McTiernan JJ):

If the interlocutory order ... has the practical effect of finally determining the rights of the parties, though it is interlocutory in form, a prima facie case exists for granting leave to appeal. For example, a judgment for either party on a demurer might, in effect, be decisive of the whole litigation. Although such a judgment would often be interlocutory, it might be final in determining the issue between the parties, and, in such a case, leave would be granted almost as of course.

1. While it appears the applicant seeks to harness this principle in her favour, the Stand Aside Application is not within the realm of the type of case the High Court was referring to in Bucknell. The Stand Aside Application does not finally determine the rights of any party in the substantive proceeding that is on foot in the FCFCOA. Rather, it is peripheral to the substantive proceeding.

1. The applicant contends that the primary judge failed to refer to her "detailed understanding and experience in her capacity working professionally in this area in her role as a researcher at the Mental Awareness, Respect and Safety Centre for Mining at ECU, and the credibility and standing that comes with this...."
2. It is unclear on what basis the primary judge was required to refer to this and the relevance of this information to the Stand Aside Application. No arguable ground for setting aside the decision has been established, and this ground does not support a grant of leave.

erred in his judgement by failing to adequately consider the question and relevance in the hearing was denial of the incident, confirmation, the reporting itself, the substance of the matter in relation to the conduct and misleading of the applicant and it's applicability with the Legal Professional Uniform Laws. It concerned the actions and timing of the communication, which in my opinion is what any fair minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude.

1. I consider that the primary judge did adequately consider the aspects referred to in this ground, as evidenced by his Honour's summation at PJ [13]. No arguable error has been demonstrated, and this ground does not support a grant of leave.

1. I am not satisfied that any of the 22 grounds in the Leave Application has identified any error that is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration of the Stand Aside Application.
2. I also consider that there would be no injustice, let alone substantial injustice, if leave were to be refused. No prejudice to Ms Chapple has been identified.
3. For the above reasons, leave to appeal should be refused, with costs.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and sixty-eight (168) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Moore.