The operation of s 21 of the ACL
654 The main appellate authorities that have considered the operation of s 21 of the ACL and cognate provisions in the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) include: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Lux Distributors Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 90 (Allsop CJ, Jacobson and Gordon JJ) (Lux); Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2015] FCAFC 50; 236 FCR 199 at [259]-[306] (Allsop CJ, Besanko J at [371] and Middleton J at [398] agreeing) (Paciocco FCAFC); Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28; 258 CLR 525 (Paciocco HCA); Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Kojic [2016] FCAFC 186; 249 FCR 421 (Kojic) at [53]-[59] (Allsop CJ, Besanko J at [69] and Edelman J at [85] agreeing); Colin R Price & Associates Pty Ltd v Four Oaks Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 75; 251 FCR 404 (Colin R Price) at [51]-[58] (Rares, Murphy and Davies JJ); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Medibank Private Ltd [2018] FCAFC 235; 267 FCR 544 (Medibank) at [232]-[255] (Beach J, with whom Perram J at [2] and Murphy J at [103] agreed); and Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Kobelt [2019] HCA 18; 368 ALR 1 (Kobelt). There is also a helpful summary of the relevant principles by Beach J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v AGM Markets Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 3) [2020] FCA 208; 380 ALR 27 at [362]-[379].
655 In Kobelt, there are differences of expression and emphasis in the reasons of the majority Justices, Kiefel CJ and Bell J, Gageler J, and Keane J, in describing some aspects of the organising principles. However, as a question of authority, I do not understand the reasons of the majority Justices in Paciocco HCA or Kobelt as combining to detract from the analysis and the principles that were essayed by Allsop CJ in Paciocco FCAFC. It is not possible in any summary of principles to do justice to the depth of that analysis. Subject to that observation, for the purposes of the present proceeding, I take the applicable principles to be as follows.
656 When a question arises as to whether impugned conduct is unconscionable for the purposes of s 21(1), what is required is an evaluative conclusion as to whether the conduct is to be characterised as unconscionable. In undertaking that evaluative task, the text of s 21(1) directs attention to all the circumstances, which informs the judicial technique that is required in assessing the impugned conduct against the statutory norm: see, Kobelt at [86]-[87] (Gageler J) and at [120] (Keane J), Paciocco FCAFC at [271] and [281], and Medibank at [233]-[236]. An allegation that a party has engaged in unconscionable conduct requires that there be "a scrutiny of the exact relations established between the parties": Jenyns v Public Curator (Qld) (1953) 90 CLR 113 (Jenyns) at 118 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Kitto JJ), cited in Kobelt at [115] (Keane J). As such, an evaluation of whether conduct is unconscionable involves taking a more comprehensive view of the facts than a court of law might in determining whether the elements of a common law cause of action are made out, because the evaluation by the court of an allegation of unconscionable conduct invites attention to "every connected circumstance that ought to influence its determination upon the real justice of the case": The Juliana (1822) 2 Dods 504 at 522 (Lord Stowell); Paciocco FCAFC at [271]-[275] (Allsop CJ); Jenyns at 119; Kobelt at [120] (Gagler J). The judicial technique that is described in these authorities has some similarities to the consideration of circumstantial evidence, which may involve evaluating the overall effect of the detail, which may be "best appreciated by standing back and viewing it from a distance, making an informed, considered and qualitative appreciation of the whole. The overall effect of the detail is not necessarily the same as the sum total of the individual details": Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd v Longmuir [1997] 1 VR 125 at 141 (Tadgell JA), citing Hall (Inspector of Taxes) v Lorimer [1992] 1 WLR 939 at 944 (Mummery J).
657 While the enquiry involves an evaluative judgment, it is an enquiry to which there is one correct answer: Kobelt at [47] (Kiefel CJ and Bell J). As such, the evaluation does not involve some mix of judicial discretion, personal intuitive assertion, or the formless void of individual moral opinion, but as Allsop CJ stated in Paciocco FCAFC at [296], it is "an evaluation which must be reasoned and enunciated by reference to the values and norms recognised by the text, structure and context of the legislation, and made against an assessment of all connected circumstances." See also: Kojic at [56] and [58] (Allsop CJ), and cf, Muschinski v Dodds [1985] HCA 78; 160 CLR 583 at 616 (Deane J).
658 The statutory norm established by s 21 of the ACL is fixed by the text of the section, when construed against its context and purpose. The language of the norm is broadly expressed, and is to be understood and applied in the particular circumstances that arise: Lux at [41]. The matters set out in s 22(1) are matters to which the court must have regard, if relevant: Kojic at [72] (Besanko J); Medibank at [252], both citing Paciocco HCA at [189] (Gageler J). The matters provide guidance for the purpose of determining whether a person has engaged in unconscionable conduct in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods or services. The themes running through the matters specified in the paragraphs of s 22(1) were identified by Allsop CJ in Paciocco FCAFC at [285] to be: fairness and equality - see paras (a), (b), (d) to (k); a lack of understanding or ignorance of a party - para (c); the risk and worth of the bargain - paras (e) and (i); and good faith and fair dealing - para (l). While disparity in bargaining power between the parties, which is referred to in s 22(1)(a), may be one factor which may contribute to the evaluation, its mere existence does not establish that the party with superior bargaining power acts unconscionably by exercising it: Paciocco HCA at [293] (Keane J).
659 Although the structure and language of ss 21 and 22 of the ACL bear close similarities to ss 12CB and 12CC of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act, which were considered in Paciocco FCAFC, Paciocco HCA, and Kobelt, one must bear in mind that s 21 sits within the ACL, and is specifically concerned with conduct in connection with the supply of goods and services which, in respect of transactions with consumers, is also regulated by other provisions of the ACL to which I have referred. While statements of principle relating to cognate provisions in other legislation provide highly valuable and persuasive insight and guidance in relation to the operation of s 21 of the ACL, one must be mindful that what is in issue is s 21 of the ACL, and its text, context, and purpose, and the harmonious goals to which the ACL is directed: see, Brennan v Comcare [1994] FA 360; 50 FCR 555 at 572 (Gummow J), McNamara v Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal [2005] HCA 55; 221 CLR 646 at [40] (McHugh, Gummow and Heydon JJ).
660 The legislative choice of the word unconscionable in s 21 of the ACL to identify the conduct that is proscribed is significant to determining the scope of the proscription: Kobelt at [118]-[119] (Keane J). So too is the provision in s 224 of the ACL for the imposition of a penalty for contravention of s 21: Paciocco FCAFC at [300]; Medibank at [254]. In Kojic at [53], Allsop CJ referred to the seriousness of a finding of unconscionable conduct, which in that case was sought against a bank.
661 Focussing on s 21(1), unconscionable means something not done in good conscience: Lux at [41]. Similarly, the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (6th edition, 2007) defines unconscionable in its first meaning as "[s]howing no regard for conscience; not in accordance with what is right or reasonable". For the purposes of s 21(1) of the ACL, the conscience by reference to which the standard is to be evaluated is not the conscience of a person, or of an individual judge. Rather, it is a metaphor that embodies a construct of the values and norms of society that are to be derived from the text and structure of the legislation that go to inform standards of conscientious behaviour: see, Medibank at [239]. One issue that has attracted the attention of appellate courts is whether statutory unconscionable conduct must involve some level of moral obloquy. In Kobelt, Keane J at [119] stated that "the legislative choice of 'unconscionability' as the key statutory concept, rather than less morally freighted terms such as 'unjust', 'unfair' or 'unreasonable', confirms that the moral obloquy involved in the exploitation or victimisation that is characteristic of unconscionable conduct is also required for a finding of [statutory unconscionability]". The other Justices forming the majority did not express themselves in these terms. Kiefel CJ and Bell J in their joint judgment at [60] referred with apparent approval to the approach of the Full Court, under which moral obloquy had a role to play, but was not a substitute for the statutory words. Under this approach it was relevant that the respondent, Mr Kobelt, had been held to have acted with a degree of good faith, and not dishonesty, to which the Full Court had correctly had regard. Gageler J at [91]-[92] retreated from his Honour's use of the language of "high level of moral obloquy" in Paciocco HCA at [188], but explained that what he meant to convey by the use of that description was that what was required was "conduct that is so far outside societal norms of acceptable commercial behaviour as to warrant condemnation as conduct that is offensive to conscience." And at [88] and [90], Gageler J referred to the gravity of conduct that is associated with the term unconscionable, citing the reasons of Bryson J in Burt v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1994) ATPR (Digest) 46-123 at 53,598, who stated, "[u]nconscionability is not a slight matter, and behaviour is only unconscionable where there is some real and substantial ground based on conscience for preventing a person from relying on what are, in terms of the general law, that person's legal rights".
662 For my purposes, the question whether unconscionable conduct must involve moral obloquy has been resolved by the Full Courts in Paciocco FCAFC, Kojic, Colin R Price, and Medibank. The text of s 21(1) of the ACL should not be substituted by judicial formulations that are directed to developing the organising principles and the conceptual boundaries of unconscionable conduct. References to conduct involving a high degree of moral obloquy as a description of unconscionable conduct are a gloss on the statutory text: Medibank at [240]. However, as Keane J in Kobelt at [118] and Allsop CJ in Paciocco at [261] suggest, the reference to moral obloquy may serve to differentiate conduct that is truly unconscionable from conduct that is of a lesser order such as being unjust, or unfair. Gageler J expressed much the same idea in Kobelt at [92], although as I have noted, preferring to eschew the term moral obloquy. And in Ipstar Australia Pty Ltd v APS Satellite Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 15; 329 FLR 149 (Ipstar), Leeming JA at [277]-[278] made a similar point in terms endorsed by Beach J in Medibank at [242]. In this sense, moral obloquy may have a role to play, but as the authorities emphasise, the statutory text refers to conduct that is unconscionable. In Paciocco FCAFC at [262], Allsop CJ explained -
The task involved is not the choice of synonyms; rather, it is to identify and apply the values and norms that Parliament must be taken to have considered relevant to the assessment of unconscionability: being the values and norms from the text and structure of the Act, and from the context of the provision.
663 In Medibank, Beach J at [240] adopted the analysis of Allsop CJ in Paciocco FCAFC and at [241] stated that "[a]t most, the statutory concept of unconscionable may accommodate a flavour of moral obloquy, but it is to divert the relevant normative enquiry to specifically seek to identify its existence or to clothe the relevant conduct with such a conclusory label".
664 A related issue is the extent to which an alleged contravener's state of mind is relevant to whether conduct is to be characterised as unconscionable. In this case, senior counsel for the ACCC clarified in final address that the ACCC did not submit that Jayco Corp consciously shut the Consumers out from their alleged rights under the ACL. Rather, the ACCC's case was that the shutting out, or obstruction, of the Consumers' rights under the ACL was the effect of what Jayco Corp did, and that the community would require of a corporation of its nature that it be aware of, informed by, and observant of the Consumers' rights embedded in the ACL.
665 While an alleged contravener's subjective state of mind may be relevant, the enquiry to determine whether a person engaged in statutory unconscionable conduct is necessarily broader. A broader, objective focus is dictated by the statute itself, which requires an assessment of whether the alleged contravener's conduct was, in all the circumstances, unconscionable. As stated by Keane J in Kobelt at [120], in considering the corresponding statutory norm in s 12CB of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act, the "ultimate issue under the statute is whether the conduct in question is rightly to be characterised as unconscionable". The other majority Justices in Kobelt commented on the relevance of an alleged contravener's subjective state of mind to that ultimate objective assessment. Kiefel CJ and Bell J stated at [59] that it may be accepted that conduct may be unconscionable in circumstances that do not involve dishonesty, although that was not to say that an absence of dishonesty, or other moral taint, was not a material consideration in determining the ultimate objective assessment. Further and as I have stated above, their Honours at [60] referred with approval to the approach of the Full Court below, which had considered that it was relevant that the respondent, Mr Kobelt, had been held to have acted with a degree of good faith, and not dishonesty. Separately, Gageler J at [91], in retreating from his Honour's earlier use of the language of "high level of moral obloquy" in Paciocco HCA at [188], stated that this terminology had "the potential to be misleading to the extent that it might be taken to suggest a requirement for conscious wrongdoing", which was not contained in the statutory proscription.
666 In the earlier decision in Medibank, the Full Court considered the question of the relevance of an alleged contravener's subjective state of mind. In that case, Beach J at [247], with whom Perram J and Murphy J agreed, stated -
… statutory unconscionability does not require only focusing on Medibank's or its officers' or employees' state of mind, whether actual intention or knowledge or what it ought to have known. It is a broader concept requiring an 'objective value judgment on behaviour' (cf Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55; [2008] 4 All ER 713 at [92] per Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe). But the subjective state of mind of the alleged contravener whether actual or constructive is relevant to the broader sense. Although I am concerned with a normative notion of conscience, Medibank's state of mind is relevant.
667 In the speech of Lord Walker in Cobbe referred to by Beach J in that passage, his Lordship considered the role of unconscionability as a unifying element in establishing a proprietary estoppel under English law, and stated at [92] that the term unconscionable was "being used (as in my opinion it should always be used) as an objective value judgment on behaviour (regardless of the state of mind of the individual in question)."
668 However, as the Full Court held in Medibank, for the purposes of statutory unconscionable conduct, an objective evaluation may include consideration of the state of mind of the alleged contravener, where it is relevant to determining whether the impugned conduct is to be characterised as unconscionable. Section 22(2)(l) of the ACL directs attention to the extent to which the supplier and the customer acted in good faith. The leading feature of Lux that rendered the contraveners' conduct unconscionable was the deceptive ruse that was employed to obtain entry to the consumers' homes for the purposes of attempting to sell vacuum cleaners, and that intentional deception was part of the circumstances that fell to be evaluated. And as I have mentioned above, in Kobelt, Kiefel CJ and Bell J held that the Full Court had been correct to take account of the findings that Mr Kobelt had acted with a degree of good faith, and not dishonesty, as among the circumstances to which it was necessary to have regard. Moreover, morally neutral features of an alleged contravener's state of mind, such as knowledge, may be relevant to determining whether conduct with that knowledge is objectively to be characterised as unconscionable.
669 Where the alleged contravener is a corporation, questions of attribution of conduct, and attribution of knowledge or some other state of mind, will usually arise. Section 139B of the Competition and Consumer Act provides for statutory rules of attribution, which supplement but do not replace general principles of attribution: Kojic at [64] (Allsop CJ) and [109] (Edelman J). Under general principles, in the absence of statutory support it is generally not permissible for the purposes of attribution of a state of mind to aggregate the knowledge or other states of mind of different agents of a corporation: see, Kojic at [89]-[149] (Edelman J, Allsop CJ at [31] and [62] generally agreeing). However, there may be exceptions to such a generalised statement, which turn on the particular statutory context in which the question for determination arises: Kojic at [66] (Allsop CJ), and see also [81]-[83] (Besanko J). In relation to the conduct that is proscribed by s 21 of the ACL, in Kojic Edelman J at [112] addressed the question of aggregation of knowledge for the purposes of the cognate provisions of s 51AB and s 51AC of the Trade Practices Act, as formerly in force, stating -
… It is not easy to see how a corporation, which can only act through natural persons, can engage in unconscionable conduct when none of those persons acts unconscionably. Similar reasoning has led courts to reject submissions that a corporation has acted fraudulently where no individual has done so (in instances of deceit) and that a corporation has acted contumeliously where no individual has done so (in cases of exemplary damages).
670 The state of knowledge or other state of mind to be attributed to a corporation will usually be material to the question whether conduct that is impugned is to be characterised as unconscionable, and Lux, Kojic, and Medibank were instances where the state of mind to be attributed to a corporation was decisive to the result. But the focus of s 21 remains whether the conduct of the person (the corporation) was in all the circumstances unconscionable.
671 Returning to the present proceeding, in light of the principles referred to at [664] to [670] above, the premise of the ACCC's unconscionable conduct case against Jayco Corp may be accepted at a general level. That is, Jayco Corp could have, objectively, engaged in conduct that was, in all the circumstances, unconscionable because of its effect of obstructing the Consumers' rights under the ACL, despite Jayco Corp not having consciously, or subjectively, intended to do so. Nonetheless, the subjective state of mind to be attributed to Jayco Corp, including its motive for engaging in conduct alleged to have unconscionably obstructed those rights, and whether it acted in good faith, remain relevant to that ultimate objective assessment.
672 Section 21(4)(a) of the ACL makes explicit that the statutory conception of unconscionable conduct is not confined to that developed by the unwritten law: Kobelt at [83], [89] (Gageler J); Paciocco FCAFC at [283]. However, the values and norms developed by the unwritten law, both common law and equity, have a significant part to play in informing the statutory notion of conscience: Paciocco FCAFC at [270]-[284]. The statutory notion of conscience is also informed by the values that are embedded in other statutory provisions that regulate the relevant trading or commercial activity: Lux at [5], [23], [71]; Paciocco FCAFC at [302]. And the statutory notion of conscience is permeated with acceptable and accepted community values that are explicitly or implicitly recognised by the statute.
673 In the context of the supply in trade or commerce of goods and services to consumers, dealing in good conscience involves dealing with fairness and in good faith, and not engaging in trickery or sharp practice: Kobelt at [14] (Kiefel CJ and Bell J), citing Paciocco FCAFC at [296]. In order that conduct be characterised as unconscionable it is not necessary that there be circumstances that involve dishonesty, but that is not to say that the absence of dishonesty or moral taint would not be material: Kobelt at [59] (Kiefel CJ and Bell J). To act in good conscience in the course of trade or commerce in connection with the supply of goods, a person is not required to act in a disinterested or altruistic way, or required to act in the interests of others: Kobelt at [75] (Kiefel CJ and Bell J), and at [117] (Keane J). That would be a standard of conduct that equity would require of a fiduciary. And in determining what amounts to unconscionable conduct it is necessary to respect the legal policy that supports certainty in commerce, and a bargain freely and fairly made: Kobelt at [50] (Kiefel CJ and Bell J); Paciocco FCAFC at [297] (Allsop CJ).
674 In Kojic, Allsop CJ at [58] stated that as the standard of unconscionability is applied, courts will develop principles and legally relevant considerations that will give comfortable form to fact situations. The Chief Justice drew a parallel to the development in the case law applying the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW), which had given structure and content to the legal standards of indeterminate reference contained in that legislation. One should be mindful of course that observations made by judges in the course of deciding issues of fact ought not to be treated as laying down rules of law: Teubner v Humble [1963] HCA 11; 108 CLR 491 at 503 (Windeyer J). However, one of the characteristics of our legal system is that legal principles, including the organising principles for the application of statutory provisions, are developed through decided cases, and that "it is the insight of the common law that wisdom can be drawn from previous examination of similar problems": Scott v Copenhagen Reinsurance Co (UK) Ltd [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 190 at [33] (Rix LJ). The common law in particular develops principles incrementally: Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee [1999] HCA 59; 200 CLR 1 at [73] (McHugh J); Perre v Apand Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 36; 198 CLR 180 at [93]-[94] (McHugh J). There have, at times, been difficulties in expressing unifying principles of common law that allow the ready solution of novel problems: Sullivan v Moody [2001] HCA 59; 207 CLR 562 at [53] (the Court). Equity, however, functions differently, because equity "involves the application of doctrines themselves sufficiently comprehensive to meet novel cases": Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW v Dederer [2007] HCA 42; 234 CLR 330 at [57] (Gummow J). The identification of the organising principles for the application of a statutory provision of indeterminate reference does not involve the common law technique of development by increments. Rather, like an equitable doctrine, the standard is established, albeit by the statute, which is then given form by the articulation of principles as the statutory standard is applied to fact situations using the judicial technique described in Jenyns at 118-119.
675 With these considerations in mind, it is possible to identify some findings on statutory unconscionability made in some leading cases decided at the appellate level as being illustrative of the type of conduct that has, or has not, been held to be unconscionable.
676 In Lux, the Full Court held that a retailer acted unconscionably in the sale of vacuum cleaners by direct salesmen to three elderly women in their own homes. The Full Court held that the retailer engaged in a deceptive ruse whereby the salesmen arranged to attend the women's homes under the guise of conducting a free maintenance check of their existing vacuum cleaner, when in reality the purpose of their visit was to convince the women of an apparent need to replace their vacuum cleaner, and to sell them a new vacuum cleaner.
677 In Paciocco HCA, a majority of the High Court held that a bank did not act unconscionably in entering into and implementing contractual terms that entitled the bank to charge late payment fees to customers who failed to make the minimum monthly payment on their credit card accounts.
678 In Kojic, the Full Court held that a bank did not act unconscionably in facilitating a property development venture in circumstances involving the bank taking security over the property to be developed, which security extended beyond the bank's contribution to its purchase price to also cover all present and future indebtedness to the bank of a corporate vehicle involved in the venture. Allsop CJ at [60] found that the facts bespoke an entire absence of predation, of trickery, of any lack of honesty, of sharp practice, of vulnerability, of known mistake, of weakness, of a lack of good faith, of disability, or of any of the considerations in the relevant provision of the Trade Practices Act.
679 In Ipstar, the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that a wholesale supplier of broadband equipment and satellite bandwidth services acted unconscionably in its dealings with its customer, an internet service provider. The wholesale supplier had imposed a price increase on that customer, and not its other customers, by reference to its own exposure to statutory warranty claims, while concurrently refusing to pay any of those claims despite considering some of them to be valid.
680 In Colin R Price, the Full Court dismissed an appeal from a finding of unconscionable conduct in contravention of the Trade Practices Act. The Full Court upheld the primary judge's finding that it was unconscionable for the trustee of a property development unit trust to procure and rely upon a payment authority from one unit holding entity. Parties that were involved in the property development venture had induced a man whom they knew to be suffering from extreme financial and emotion stress to execute, on behalf of a unit holding entity which he controlled, an agreement that had the effect of unfairly depriving that entity of its interest in the proceeds of the project to cover cost overruns which affected all unit holders (see, [63]-[71]).
681 In Virk Pty Ltd (in liq) v YUM! Restaurants Australia Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 190, the Full Court held that the respondent, which was the franchisor of Pizza Hut restaurants in Australia, did not engage in unconscionable conduct towards its franchisees in contravention of s 21 of the ACL. The Full Court held that the respondent's decision to exercise its contractual power to set maximum prices under the franchise agreement to implement a low cost pizza "value strategy" was made in good faith, reasonably and not unconscionably, whether it was the right or wrong business strategy (see, [286]-[298]).
682 In Medibank, the Full Court held that a private health insurer did not act unconscionability in terminating its agreements with various diagnostic service providers without notifying its members, with the consequence that some members faced additional out of pocket expenses. The Full Court found that the insurer was faithful to the bargain that it struck with its members, by meeting its detailed contractual and legislative obligations, and that it did not act inconsistently with industry practice in terms of communicating with its members. Beach J at [353], with whom Perram J and Murphy J agreed, found that while the insurer acted harshly and unfairly, that was not enough to establish statutory unconscionability.
683 In Kobelt, a majority of the High Court held that the respondent, who operated a "book-up" system of credit to customers in the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Lands, did not act unconscionably. The book-up system involved the respondent's customers, who were overwhelmingly indigenous Australians lacking in financial literacy and living in remote communities, authorising the respondent to withdraw funds from their bank accounts to reduce their debt, in return for the supply of goods between pay days. The majority Justices found that the book-up system was not objectively contrary to the interests of the customers (at [77], Kiefel CJ and Bell J) or had been a matter of choice by the customers (at [107], Gageler J), and that the respondent had not sought to exploit the customers for his financial advantage (at [125], Keane J).