Whether the finding of unconscionability against Twentieth Green under s 51AC of the TPA should have been made? - Notice of Cross-Appeal, Grounds 5 - 6
27 Grounds five and six of the Notice of Cross-Appeal state:
5. The learned primary judge erred at [290]-[302] of the First Reasons in finding that it was unconscionable for the first to seventh respondents to rely on the Payment Authorities and in holding at [298] and [301] of those Reasons that in requiring Grovan to enter into the Payment Authorities as a condition for the provision of funds so as to enable CRP to complete the works, Twentieth Green thereby engaged in conduct that was unconscionable in contravention of s 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) or contrary to general law principles of unconscionability.
6. The learned primary judge ought to have held that it was not unconscionable for the first to seventh respondents to rely on the Payment Authorities in circumstances where:
(a) Mr Price was a director of each of Grovan, CRP and Twentieth Green (First Reasons at [4] and [296]);
(b) CRP had no assets from which to meet obligations it had incurred to sub-contractors (First Reasons at [171(b)];
(c) CRP was experiencing severe financial difficulty (First Reasons at [173]);
(d) it was most unlikely that CRP could have obtained the funds required to complete the Project other than by way of an advance from Twentieth Green;
(e) CRP was in no position to repay monies advanced from Twentieth Green (First Reasons at [171] and [173]);
(f) Grovan and CRP were both entities controlled by Mr Price (First Reasons at [176]);
(g) Mr Price knew that the money advanced pursuant to the Payment Authorities would be repaid from Grovan's share of distributions from the Project (First Reasons at [175]); and
(h) Grovan committing to repay any monies advanced to CRP by Twentieth Green was the only way in which CRP could obtain the funds necessary to complete the Project.
28 On 3 September 2008 Mr Power and Mr Reynolds met with Mr Price. Immediately after the meeting Mr Power typed up and Mr Price signed the First Payment Authority which stated:
In consideration of several advances made to C.R. Price and Associates from Resort Systems Pty. Ltd. to the total of $150,000.00
The first such advance of $30,000.00 effected 03/09/08
Colin and Faye Price on behalf of Grovan Pty. Ltd. hereby undertake to repay the total sum together with interest at 10% p.a. calculated daily.
Such repayments will be made by a minimum $50,000.00 being part proceeds from Twentieth Green Pty. Ltd. $50,000.00 being part proceeds from Rose Anna Pty. Ltd. and the balance being part proceeds from Gruboc Pty. Ltd.
We hereby authorize and direct the above amounts to be repaid to Resort Systems Pty. Ltd. from settlements at the earliest possible opportunity as circumstances permit.
Dated 3rd day of September 2008
Signed Grovan Pty. Ltd. by Colin Price (signed)
In the presence of
Signed Grovan Pty. Ltd. by Faye Price ……………………….
In the presence of
Signed On behalf of Resort Systems Pty. Ltd. ……………………….
In the presence of
29 Resort Systems was a company associated with Mr Power, Mr Reynolds and Mr Rice. Mr Price signed the First Payment Authority, but neither Mrs Price nor Resort Systems did so.
30 The First Payment Authority incorrectly stated that Resort Systems had already advanced $150,000 to CRP. As the primary judge noted (at [165]), that sum was advanced to CRP later, in five separate payments between 3 September and 17 September 2008.
31 On 24 December 2008 Mr Power again met with Mr Price. Immediately after the meeting Mr Power typed up and Mr Price signed the Second Payment Authority, which stated:
I Colin Price of Canberra Grove Brighton, in consideration of various advances made by Resort Systems Pty. Ltd. and other associated Companies hereby undertake to repay principal and interest out of distributions from Twentieth Green Pty Ltd and Gruboc Pty Ltd. as and when they fall due,
Interest will be calculated at a daily rate of 18% from 24/12/08
Dated this 24 day of December 2008
Signed on behalf of Grovan Pty. Ltd
By Colin Price (signed)
In the presence of (signed)
Name and Address of Witness Brett Maher
1 Seaview Court Dandenong North
32 Mr Price signed the Second Payment Authority. It did not include a place for Mrs Price's signature. No funds were advanced or paid to CRP pursuant to this Authority.
33 Mr Price gave evidence that he had no recollection of signing the First or Second Payment Authorities but in cross-examination he accepted that he had done so. He testified that had it been explained to him or had he known that by signing the Authorities Grovan's share of the profits from the Project would be applied to pay CRP's liabilities, he would not have signed them without first seeking advice from an accountant or a solicitor and obtaining his wife's agreement.
34 The primary judge accepted Mr Price's evidence that in early September 2008, before he signed the First Payment Authority, he informed Mr Power and Mr Reynolds that the Project had cost significantly more than the syndicate had allowed, he was unable to obtain more credit from the BankWest facility which financed the Project, he had used up all of his available lines of credit in trying to complete the Project based on the respondents' earlier assurances that the finances would all be sorted out at the end, and that the syndicate was not reimbursing CRP all the amounts that it had incurred. In effect he conveyed that CRP was unable to complete the Project. Mr Power did not dispute that he was aware of those matters.
35 The primary judge also accepted Mr Price's evidence that in early September 2008, before he signed the First Payment Authority:
(a) he was under "significant financial duress", as the Trust had not paid all of CRP's project costs;
(b) various contractors and trades-people who had provided goods and services in relation to the Project had not been paid, CRP and Grovan had no more money to pay them and some had threatened to commence legal proceedings;
(c) he was receiving calls (both during business hours and after hours) from contractors and trades-people demanding payment; these included calls making threats against him;
(d) he was facing up to the likelihood of having to sell the properties that he and his wife owned to repay bank loans;
(e) his relationship with his wife was very strained due to their financial situation; and
(f) he was feeling quite depressed about the situation.
Importantly, the primary judge also accepted Mr Price's evidence that he informed the other syndicate members of those matters. Mr Power did not dispute that he was aware of those matters.
36 Mr Power accepted that at the time he requested Mr Price to sign the First Payment Authority he wanted CRP to finish the building works on the Project, and that Mr Price was behaving strangely and was "very stressed". Mr Reynolds also accepted that Mr Price was under some pressure during 2008 and he said that Mr Price's contractors complained that "this guy is crazy, you know. There's something wrong". Mr Reynolds said: "so I really thought [Mr Price] was - he was under mental stress, quite frankly."
37 The primary judge found (at [179]) that at the time Mr Price signed the First and Second Payment Authorities he was under significant financial and emotional pressure and that this was evident to both Mr Power and Mr Reynolds. His Honour found that, had Mr Price not been under such pressure, it was likely that he would have sought independent advice and consulted Mrs Price in relation to the Payment Authorities and he may not have signed them. His Honour found that Mrs Price was not aware of the Payment Authorities and did not agree to Grovan entering into them.
38 The primary judge expressed his conclusions in relation to the question of unconscionability (at [299]-[300]). His Honour said:
In paragraph [179] above, I concluded that, at the times Mr Price signed the First and Second Payment Authorities, he was under significant financial and emotional pressure and that this was evident to Mr Stephen Power and Mr Reynolds. In particular, I found that Mr Price conveyed to Mr Stephen Power and Mr Reynolds the substance of the matters set out in paragraph [173] above before the First Payment Authority was signed. In circumstances where (to the knowledge of Mr Stephen Power and Mr Reynolds) Mr Price was experiencing extreme financial difficulties, he was being threatened by tradesmen and suppliers, his relationship with his wife was not good, he was extremely stressed, and he had developed a drinking problem, he was evidently not in a position to look after Grovan's interests. Putting to one side the construction issues raised by the applicants in relation to the First Payment Authority, the deal that is reflected in the document in effect required Grovan to give up its right to share in a large part of the proceeds of the Project to pay for cost overruns. No other unit holder was required to make a comparable sacrifice. Notwithstanding the possibility that Resort Systems may not have been prepared to provide the money had Grovan not agreed to these terms, it is far from clear that the deal was in the interests of Grovan (a mere 10% unit holder). In any event, it was not in a position (because of the financial and emotional stress that Mr Price was under) properly to consider its best interests. As noted above, Mr Reynolds said in cross-examination: "So I really thought he was - he was under mental stress, quite frankly". I think that Twentieth Green took advantage of Mr Price's predicament to extract these terms. In the language of the cases, Twentieth Green's conduct was not done in good conscience.
In relation to the specific matters set out in s 51AC(3) and (4), I note the following:
(a) in relation to the relative strengths of the bargaining positions of the parties, by reason of the financial and emotional stress that Mr Price was under, and Grovan's inability to access funds, Grovan was in a weaker bargaining position and Twentieth Green was in a stronger bargaining position;
(b) in relation to whether Grovan was required to comply with conditions that were not reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of Twentieth Green, Grovan was in effect being required to share the whole of the burden of the cost overruns while the other unit holders were not;
(c) in relation to whether Grovan was able to understand the First Payment Authority, while I think it likely that Mr Price understood the basics of the deal, I do not think he was in a position properly to consider Grovan's best interests;
(d) in relation to whether any undue influence or pressure was exerted on, or any unfair tactics were used against, Grovan, I consider that, given the significant financial implications of the document for Grovan, having Mr Price sign the document shortly after the discussion, without the opportunity to take it away and consider his position, discuss it with Mrs Price or obtain advice, involved undue pressure and an unfair tactic;
(e) in relation to whether parties acted in good faith, I do not consider that either party acted in bad faith.
While the last matter does not support a finding of unconscionability, the other matters do. Taking into account these matters and the other matters referred to above, I consider that the conduct of Twentieth Green was, in all the circumstances, unconscionable.
39 His Honour said that essentially the same circumstances applied in relation to the Second Payment Authority (at [301]) and reached the same conclusion as to unconscionable conduct. However, because no monies were advanced to Grovan pursuant to the Second Payment Authority it is strictly unnecessary to deal with that agreement.
40 The respondents contend that the circumstances in which the Payment Authorities were made ought not to have led the primary judge to conclude that it was unconscionable for Twentieth Green to have relied upon them. They say that Mr Price had enjoyed a long-standing relationship with Mr Reynolds, who had invited Mr Price to become an equity participant in the Project, and that after Mr Price agreed to invest (using Grovan as his investment vehicle) he then negotiated for CRP to be appointed as builder.
41 The thrust of the respondents' argument is that Resort Systems agreed to advance the necessary funds to CRP only when it became clear that the building works undertaken by CRP had fallen well behind schedule, the building costs far exceeded the sum specified in the Simple Works Contract, that CRP was experiencing significant financial difficulties and that it had insufficient assets to meet the obligations it had incurred to sub-contractors it had engaged on the Project. At that point CRP's ability to fund completion of the Project depended upon the advance of funds from one or other of the syndicate members.
42 The respondents submit that the Payment Authorities came about in circumstances where CRP, as builder, needed money that it could not otherwise obtain or repay at that stage. They argue that CRP's sole director, Mr Price, therefore agreed that Grovan (of which Mr Price and his wife were directors) would repay the money from the proceeds of the Project and the other projects they were jointly engaged in. They contend that Mr Price plainly understood this because he gave evidence that he was content for the monies to be advanced to allow the Project to be completed as that allowed Grovan to share in the proceeds of the Project (at [175]). The respondents say that the suggestion that the other unit holders ought to have made a similar commitment is nonsensical. On their submissions, there was no proper basis upon which the other unit holders were required to support CRP as builder or Grovan as unit holder.
43 It is common ground that at the time the Payment Authorities were entered into it was critical that CRP finish the project quickly so that the apartment sales contracts could be settled. The respondents argue that it was not just critical to Twentieth Green but also to the individual investors, including Grovan. The respondents submit that, contrary to the findings of the primary judge at [299], the Payment Authorities were in Grovan's interest because the timely completion of the Project was in the interests of all the investors. They submit that Grovan obtained a tangible benefit through the Payment Authorities and that their interests in the Project as builder were aligned with the interests of the other investors.
44 They argue that they did not take advantage of Mr Price, as the primary judge found, because he knew that CRP could not finish the Project without further funds and that he would eventually receive a return from the Project and other projects. They argue that, against that backdrop, Mr Price sought that the funds be paid to CRP and agreed that Grovan provide security for the repayment. They argue that the deal had obvious benefits for Mr Price and there was nothing that smacked of heavy-handed behaviour or overbearing conduct by the respondents in relation to a person who had little or no bargaining power.
45 The respondents submit that the primary judge did not take proper account of the fact that Resort Systems, which was not a unit holder, was prevailed upon to provide CRP the funds it required to complete the building contract. They argue that all persons involved in the Payment Authorities recognised that CRP had no prospect of repaying the advance and Mr Price therefore agreed that Grovan would do so.
46 The respondents also argue that the primary judge failed to weigh in the balance the significant implications for CRP of not signing the Payment Authorities. They say that in its parlous financial condition, CRP would have been unlikely to obtain any other funding to repay the contractors that were threatening it and to finish the Project. This would have diminished Mr Price's and CRP's reputations and compromised his or its ability to make money as a builder in the future. They also argue that, absent such an arrangement, CRP was likely to become insolvent and be wound up. This would have reduced the funds available to Grovan, which was Mr and Mrs Price's investment vehicle, because the Project, which had the potential to provide a return to it, was at risk.
47 The respondents submit that there is a degree of unreality in the claims of unconscionable conduct made against them. They argue that the claims ignore the reality that the Project was in fact completed, the apartments sold and distributions made to the unit holders. They seek to characterise the parties' entry into the Payment Authorities as orthodox financial transactions.
48 The respondents argue that the fact that Mr Price was under a good deal of financial stress did not, in and of itself, make Grovan's agreement to repay funds advanced to CRP unconscionable. They submit that his Honour erred by ignoring the commercial reality that people in difficult financial circumstances are frequently required to enter into refinancing transactions, which will often be disadvantageous.
49 We do not accept the respondents' contentions. The assessment as to whether Twentieth Green's conduct was unconscionable involves questions of degree upon which reasonable minds may differ, but we consider the respondents failed to establish that the primary judge erred in the finding reached.
50 We note that unconscionable conduct under the TPA (and its successor the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) in Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) extends beyond that in equity. A business transaction might not be unconscionable in equity but it might still be unconscionable under s 51AC. It therefore suffices to address the respondents' submissions by reference to unconscionable conduct under the TPA.
51 An assessment of whether conduct is unconscionable pursuant to a statute must have regard to the principles governing that concept in its statutory context including any particular factors prescribed for consideration. We accept, as the respondents contend, that an element of hardship or unfairness in the terms of the transaction in question or in the manner of its performance is insufficient foundation, in itself, to interfere in a contract on grounds of unconscionability: see Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 315; [2003] HCA 57 at [26] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Callinan and Heydon JJ).
52 We do not, however, accept the respondents' contention that it is necessary to show "a high level of moral obloquy" before a finding of unconscionable conduct in breach of s 51AC of the TPA may be made: see Attorney-General (NSW) v World Best Holdings Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 557; [2005] NSWCA 261 (World Best) at [121] (Spigelman CJ). In Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (2015) 236 FCR 199; [2015] FCAFC 50 (Paciocco) at [259]-[306] Allsop CJ (with the agreement of Besanko J at [371] and Middleton J at [398]) explained that consideration of what constitutes unconscionable conduct is undertaken by reference to an evaluative statutory standard. Allsop CJ recognised that in World Best Spigelman CJ used the phrase "a high level of moral obloquy" so as to differentiate the moral or normative standard in unconscionability from mere unfairness or unjustness. Allsop CJ then went on to identify the danger in approaching the question of statutory unconscionability through a requirement to meet a standard set by reference to shorthand expressions such as "moral obloquy" or "a high level of moral obloquy", rather than by reference to the word chosen by Parliament ("unconscionable").
53 Allsop CJ referred to the values and norms recognised in the relevant statute (at [263]-(269]), to the place of norms and values in equity and commercial law (at [270]-[284]), and to the guidance in the statute itself as to the values that bore upon the question of whether particular conduct was unconscionable (at [285]-[295]). His Honour said (at [296]) that the required evaluative judgment involves a careful examination of all attendant circumstances against the statutory norm, as described in Jenyns v Public Curator (Qld) (1953) 90 CLR 113; [1953] HCA 2 at 119 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan and Kitto JJ), which cited Lord Stowell's generalisation in The Juliana (1822) 2 Dods 504 at 522; 165 ER 1560 at 1567.
54 His Honour explained the approach to the evaluative judgment in the following terms (at [296]-[299] and [304]-(306]):
[296] The working through of what a modern Australian commercial, business or trade conscience contains and requires, in both consumer and business contexts, will take its inspiration and formative direction from the nation's legal heritage in Equity and the common law, and from modern social and commercial legal values identified by Australian Parliaments and courts. The evaluation of conduct will be made by the judicial technique referred to in Jenyns. It does not involve personal intuitive assertion. It is an evaluation which must be reasoned and enunciated by reference to the values and norms recognised by the text, structure and context of the legislation, and made against an assessment of all connected circumstances. The evaluation includes a recognition of the deep and abiding requirement of honesty in behaviour; a rejection of trickery or sharp practice; fairness when dealing with consumers; the central importance of the faithful performance of bargains and promises freely made; the protection of those whose vulnerability as to the protection of their own interests places them in a position that calls for a just legal system to respond for their protection, especially from those who would victimise, predate or take advantage; a recognition that inequality of bargaining power can (but not always) be used in a way that is contrary to fair dealing or conscience; the importance of a reasonable degree of certainty in commercial transactions; the reversibility of enrichments unjustly received; the importance of behaviour in a business and consumer context that exhibits good faith and fair dealing; and the conduct of an equitable and certain judicial system that is not a harbour for idiosyncratic or personal moral judgment and exercise of power and discretion based thereon.
[297] The variety of considerations that may affect the assessment of unconscionability only reflects the variety and richness of commercial life. It should be emphasised, however, that faithfulness or fidelity to a bargain freely and fairly made should be seen as a central aspect of legal policy and commercial law. It binds commerce; it engenders trust; it is a core element of decency in commerce; and it gives life and content to the other considerations that attend the qualifications to it that focus on whether the bargain was free or fair in its making or enforcement.
[298] The normative standard of a business conscience referred to in the statute is permeated with accepted and acceptable community values: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Lux Distributors Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 90 at [23]; Perpetual Trustee Company Limited v Khoshaba [2006] NSWCA 41 at [64] and Australian Securities and Investment Commission v National Exchange Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 226; 148 FCR 132 at 139-140, esp [30].
[299] These considerations may involve behaviour that is best evaluated relationally in a transaction; they may involve conduct that can be evaluated against normative or ethical standards, apart from any particular transaction: see, for instance, National Exchange.
…
[304] In any given case, the conclusion as to what is, or is not, against conscience may be contestable. That is inevitable given that the standard is based on a broad expression of values and norms. Thus, any agonised search for definition, for distilled epitomes or for shorthands of broad social norms and general principles will lead to disappointment, to a sense of futility, and to the likelihood of error. The evaluation is not a process of deductive reasoning predicated upon the presence or absence of fixed elements or fixed rules. It is an evaluation of business behaviour (conduct in trade or commerce) as to whether it warrants the characterisation of unconscionable, in the light of the values and norms recognised by the statute.
[305] The task is not limited to finding "moral obloquy"; such may only divert the normative inquiry from that required by the statute, to another, not tied to the words of the statute. The clearest example of the lack of need for dishonesty, at least in Equity in unconscionable conduct (in the unwritten law), is the lack of criticism of the bank manager in Amadio by Deane J: 151 CLR at 478. See also Johnson v Smith [2010] NSWCA 306 at [5] and Aboody v Ryan [2012] NSWCA 395 at [65]. Such is not to deny that, in many cases of unconscionable conduct in Equity, a degree of moral criticism may attend the evaluation that the relevant conduct was unconscionable.
[306] As Deane J said in Muschinski v Dodds 160 CLR at 616, property rights (and the same can be said of jural relations in trade or commerce) should be governed by law, and not some mix of judicial discretion or the subjective views as to who should win based on the formless void of individual moral opinion. Nothing in Subdiv C and ss 12CB and 12CC or the other statutes with which this case is concerned should be seen as requiring this. The notions of conscience, justice and fairness are based on enunciated and organised norms and values, including the organised principles of law and Equity, taken from the legal context of the statutes in question and the words of the statutes themselves. Employing judicial technique involving a close examination of the complete attendant facts and rational justification, the Court must assess and characterise the conduct of an impugned party in trade or commerce against the standard of business conscience, reflecting the values and norms recognised by Parliament to which I have referred.
(Emphasis added.)
55 In the High Court appeal (Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (2016) 333 ALR 569; [2016] HCA 28) Keane J considered the question of statutory unconscionability at [292]-[294]. There is nothing in his Honour's reasons (with which French CJ at [2] and Kiefel J at [70] agreed) to indicate any disagreement with the evaluative approach to statutory unconscionability recommended by Allsop CJ. We note that in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Kojic [2016] FCAFC 186 at [54]-[59] Allsop CJ reiterated his approach in Paciocco (with the agreement of Besanko J at [69] and Edelman J at [85]).
56 The primary judge's task was to evaluate the facts by reference to a normative standard of conscience, a standard permeated with accepted and acceptable community values as to proper business practices, the content of which values were illuminated by the requirements of the TPA: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Lux Distributors Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 90 at [23] (Allsop CJ, Jacobson and Gordon JJ).
57 Section 51AC of the TPA is titled "Unconscionable conduct in business transactions" and at the relevant time it operated to prohibit conduct in trade or commerce that was, in all the circumstances, unconscionable. It reinforced a recognised societal expectation that, even in the competitive world of business, people acting in trade or commerce must be dealt with honestly, fairly and without deception or unfair pressure.
58 The primary judge was required to consider each of the non-exhaustive list of matters set out in s 51AC(3) and (4), if relevant, because the word "may" in subs (3) and (4) is conditional not permissive. It would have been wrong to focus on one or two of the listed matters at the expense of others: Paciocco 333 ALR 569 at [189] (Gageler J) and at [293]-[294] (Keane J). In our view his Honour paid close attention to those matters (at [300]) and expressly took into account:
(a) the relative strengths of the parties' bargaining positions (subs (3)(a) or (4)(a));
(b) whether Grovan was required by Twentieth Green to comply with conditions that were not reasonably necessary (subs (3)(b) or (4)(b));
(c) whether Grovan was able to understand the First Payment Authority, or more particularly the effect of the arrangement on its best interests (subs (3)(c) or (4)(c));
(d) whether any unusual influence or pressure was exerted on Grovan or any unfair tactics were used against it by Twentieth Green (subs (3)(d) or (4)(d)); and
(e) the extent to which the parties acted in good faith (subs (3)(k) or (4)(k)).
59 The only relevant matters that the primary judge did not expressly consider was the extent to which Twentieth Green unreasonably failed to disclose to Grovan:
(a) how Twentieth Green's intended conduct might affect Grovan's business interests; and
(b) any risk to Grovan arising from its intended conduct
as required by s 51AC(3)(i) and (4)(i).
60 However, had the primary judge expressly done so, in our view, that would have provided further support for the finding of unconscionable conduct. We say this because the evidence supports an inference that Mr Power and Mr Reynolds did not disclose to Mr Price the extent of the deleterious effect that the Payment Authorities would have on Grovan's recovery from the Project. The evidence indicates that Mr Price did not understand how much Grovan would receive after taking into account the Payment Authorities, and the primary judge found (at [181]), that Mr Power sought to mislead Mr Price in that regard on 19 September 2008.
61 The evidence is that on 19 September 2008 (about two weeks after the 3 September 2008 meeting, and only two days after the final instalment of $150,000 was advanced to CRP) Mr Price asked Mr Power for a letter which he could provide to his bank as an assurance that Grovan would shortly receive its share of proceeds from the Project (and other projects). On that day Mr Power provided Mr Price with a letter which said that Grovan's share of the proceeds of the Project, due in October 2008, was $170,000.
62 The primary judge found that, if the First Payment Authority was binding, the amount due to Grovan was far less than $170,000. In cross-examination Mr Power accepted that, on his view at the time, Grovan would receive nothing out of the Project and indeed would incur a small debt to the Trust. He accepted that the letter he provided was "entirely misleading".
63 In our view the evidence supports the finding of unconscionable conduct pursuant to s 51AC of the TPA and we can discern no error in the finding in that regard. The evidence is that in April 2008 Mr Price told Mr Reynolds, Mr Power and Mr Rice that the costs of completing stage one of the Project had been significantly higher than had been allowed for, that the costs of stage two of the Project were likely to be significantly higher than had been allowed for, and that CRP had run into financial trouble as a result. In that context Mr Reynolds (in the presence of Mr Power and Mr Rice) told Mr Price that he should "just get the Project completed so they can settle and get the money in" and "we will sort it out at the end". As the primary judge accepted, that statement gave "some form of comfort" to Mr Price. It is likely to have reassured Mr Price that CRP's interests would be reasonably accommodated in some way. Mr and Mrs Price proceeded to draw on their own funds to complete the Project including by using their own property as security. His Honour found (at [329]) that had Mr Reynolds not made that statement Mr and Mrs Price and CRP would not have funded completion of the Project.
64 Further, as the primary judge found, Mr Price subsequently to April 2008 (and before he signed the First Payment Authority) informed the respondents (as set out at [33]-[34] above) that CRP and he were experiencing severe financial difficulties, he was being threatened by tradesmen and suppliers, his cheques were bouncing, he was extremely stressed, he had developed a drinking problem and his relationship with his wife was troubled. Mr Reynolds said that the sub-contractors on the Project were complaining that Mr Price was "crazy" and that there was "something wrong" with him. Mr Power accepted that Mr Price was behaving strangely and was "very stressed" at that time. The evidence indicates, as the primary judge found, that at the time Mr Price signed the First Payment Authority Mr Power and Mr Reynolds knew that he was under significant financial and emotional pressure.
65 As the primary judge found (at [300]), Mr Price was in a much weaker bargaining position than Twentieth Green, Twentieth Green imposed conditions on Grovan that were not reasonably necessary for the protection of Twentieth Green's legitimate interests and Mr Price was not in a position to properly consider Grovan's best interests. Twentieth Green had not given Mr Price an opportunity to go away and consider his position on the First Payment Authority, discuss it with Mrs Price or obtain advice and this involved undue pressure and an unfair tactic.
66 As the primary judge found, Mr Power knew that there had been a significant deterioration in Mr Price's relationship with his wife and yet, notwithstanding that he drafted the First Payment Authority to provide for execution by Mrs Price, he did not seek her signature. While there is no evidence that Mr Power knew of Mrs Price's opposition to the Payment Authorities, it is relevant that Mrs Price's unchallenged evidence is that she would not have signed them had she been asked to do so, and would have urged Mr Price not to do so.
67 We would add that Mr Power's letter in which he sought to mislead Mr Price by stating that Grovan would receive a $170,000 share of the proceeds of the Project, when he understood that Mr Price would receive nothing, reflects poorly on Mr Power's business conscience and ethics (and through him on Twentieth Green). Mr Power's state of mind, as the person who acted for Twentieth Green in procuring Mr Price to sign the First Payment Authority, was the relevant state of mind on which to assess whether Twentieth Green acted unconscionably. There is no evidence that Mr Reynolds' understanding of the effect of the First Payment Authority on Grovan's share of the proceeds of the Project was any different to that of Mr Power.
68 As the primary judge found (at [299]), having regard to these matters Mr Price was evidently not in a position to look after Grovan's interests, and Twentieth Green took advantage of Mr Price's position to extract the First Payment Authority.
69 We agree with the primary judge that the First Payment Authority was not in Grovan's interests when Mr Power understood, at the time, that Grovan would receive nothing from the Project. The evidence indicates that neither Mr Power nor Mr Reynolds told Mr Price that. Even if, as the respondents contend, Mr Price thought at the time that the First Payment Authority was in Grovan's interests, in our view that is likely to reflect the fact that:
(a) Mr Price was incapable of protecting Grovan's interests because of the financial and emotional stress he was under (which Mr Reynolds and Mr Power knew); and
(b) Mr Reynolds and Mr Power failed to disclose to Mr Price that the First Payment Authority would reduce Grovan's share of the proceeds of the Project to nothing.
70 We agree with his Honour that it was not in Grovan's interest to make itself, as a 10% unit holder, solely responsible for the repayment of what was effectively a loan to CRP. The effect of the arrangement was that Grovan was required to give up its right to share in the proceeds of the Project so as to pay for building cost overruns which affected all unit holders, not just Grovan. Grovan stood to receive 10% of the profits, yet the arrangement required it to bear 100% of the liability to repay the loan to CRP. None of the other unit holders were requested to make any commitment. Twentieth Green proposed that arrangement when Mr and Mrs Price had already put all of their personal assets into the Project in reliance on Mr Reynolds' assurance at the April 2008 meeting.
71 Having regard to the values and norms recognised by s 51AC, and taking into account all the connected circumstances, we can see no proper basis to conclude that his Honour was wrong in finding that in all the circumstances Twentieth Green engaged in unconscionable conduct in contravention of the TPA.
72 Accordingly, we dismiss grounds five and six of the cross-appeal.