The Act binds everyone who might wish to bring or defend a civil claim in an ACT court or tribunal exercising civil jurisdiction. Plaintiffs are directly affected because missing a limitation period usually extinguishes the right to relief. Defendants gain a complete defence that can be raised at any stage and, in many cases, results in the automatic extinction of the plaintiff’s title (s 43).

Governments are expressly covered (s 7), although the Territory itself is exempt from limitation periods when recovering taxes, duties, penalties or pursuing forfeiture of ships, and retains its prerogative rights to minerals. The Act does not apply to proceedings for which another ACT law already fixes a limitation period (s 4).

Particular classes of claimants receive special treatment. Children and persons under disability benefit from suspension and extension rules (s 30, s 30A, s 30B). Victims of child abuse (or those claiming through them) may sue at any time, no matter how many decades have passed (s 21C). Defamation plaintiffs must act within one year but can obtain a short extension via concerns notice or a court order up to three years if just and reasonable (ss 21B–21BB). Personal injury claimants, especially those with latent disease or latent property damage, can seek judicial extension on broad discretionary grounds (ss 36, 40).

Mortgagees and mortgagors are subject to the 12-year and 6-year regimes in Division 2.3. Trustees, beneficiaries and their successors are governed by the fraud and conversion rules in ss 27–29. Insurers, employers and motor-accident defendants are affected by the interaction rules in ss 16A, 16AA and 16B. Executors and administrators of deceased estates must navigate the special extension provisions in ss 37–39.

Legal practitioners, claims managers and compliance officers in banks, insurers, construction firms, hospitals and government departments must monitor these periods daily. Arbitrators and parties to arbitration agreements are covered by Division 4.2. Foreign litigants benefit from the choice-of-law rules that treat limitation as substantive (ss 56–57).

In practice, almost every civil dispute in the ACT is touched by the Act. Only equitable claims where acquiescence or laches applies independently (s 6), certain land-recovery actions (s 5), and proceedings under other specific limitation regimes are excluded.

The Act creates few positive duties but many rights and immunities. The central right is the defendant’s right to plead that the claim is out of time. Once successfully raised, the plaintiff’s cause of action is barred and, in the case of goods or land, the title is extinguished (s 43).

Plaintiffs have the right to apply for extensions under ss 36, 38, 39 and 40. The court must consider statutory criteria but retains a broad “just and reasonable” discretion. Section 21BB gives defamation plaintiffs a similar right to extend the one-year period up to three years. Section 30B(4) requires the court, when extending a child health-service claim, to have regard to medical expert opinion on discoverability.

Claimants under disability enjoy automatic suspension of time (s 30). The guardian of a disabled person (other than a minor) can be served with a “notice to proceed” that deems the disability ended for limitation purposes (s 31). This gives defendants a procedural tool to force the claim forward.

Parties to mortgage or trust relationships have rights to have interest and redemption calculations adjusted so that statute-barred interest is neither payable nor credited (s 26). Beneficiaries have the right to recover trust property or trace it without time limit where fraud or conversion is involved, subject only to the 12-year discoverability rule (s 27).

The Act confers a right to plead confirmation: an acknowledgment in writing or part-payment restarts the clock for the acknowledging party and those claiming through them (s 32). Conversely, a plaintiff who has received confirmation gains the benefit of the restarted period.

For child-abuse survivors, s 21C(2) creates an absolute right to sue at any time, coupled with a statutory statement that this does not limit the court’s inherent power to stay proceedings for want of fairness (s 21C(3) example).

Defamation defendants gain the single-publication rule (s 21BA), treating subsequent substantially similar publications as having accrued on the date of first upload or electronic transmission. This right is subject to the court’s power to find that the manner of subsequent publication was materially different.

All parties have the right to have limitation treated as substantive law when an ACT court applies the law of another Australian jurisdiction or New Zealand (s 56), and the right to have any statutory discretion exercised in the same manner as the foreign court would (s 57).

The Act itself contains no criminal offences or monetary penalties. Its “enforcement” is entirely through civil procedural bars. A defendant who successfully pleads a limitation defence obtains summary or final judgment dismissing the claim. In goods cases, the plaintiff’s title is extinguished (s 43), which can have proprietary consequences beyond the immediate litigation.

Failure to plead extinction of title when it has occurred disentitles a party from relying on it unless the pleading is amended (s 45). This is a procedural sanction rather than a penalty.

Where a plaintiff fails to comply with the pre-action notice requirements in s 30A for child injury claims, the court may still hear the case but must not award damages for medical, legal or gratuitous services incurred before proceedings were issued unless there is a compelling reason to excuse the non-compliance (s 30A(7)). This operates as a partial costs and damages sanction.

Courts have power under s 19(3) to extend the two-year shipping limitation period if there has been no reasonable opportunity to arrest the defendant vessel. This is a discretionary extension rather than a penalty.

The most significant “sanction” is the absolute bar for child-abuse claims if a court later finds that the claim does not in fact “substantially arise” from child abuse within the meaning of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 s 114AA. In that case the ordinary limitation rules revive.

Because the Act is procedural, enforcement ultimately rests with judicial officers who must decide limitation points, often on preliminary application. The onus of proving that a claim is within time, or that an extension should be granted, generally lies on the plaintiff once the defendant raises the issue.

The Act is expressly subordinate to any other ACT law that fixes its own limitation period (s 4(a)). It therefore yields to the specific regimes in the Workers Compensation Act 1951, the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2019 (especially the pre-court procedures in chapter 5), and various revenue statutes.

The Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 is intimately linked. Section 16 of the Limitation Act applies to wrongful-death claims under Civil Law (Wrongs) part 3.1. Contribution claims under Civil Law (Wrongs) s 21 are governed by the two/four-year rules in s 21 of the Limitation Act. Defamation provisions in the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act (concerns notices, single-publication concepts) are mirrored and extended by ss 21B–21BC. Child-abuse definitions are imported directly from Civil Law (Wrongs) s 114AA.

The Legislation Act 2001 supplies definitions (Dictionary note 1), governs the binding of the Crown (s 7(4) overrides s 121), and authorises editorial changes and penalty unit values. The Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 supplies the meaning of “guardian” for the notice-to-proceed procedure (s 31(7)).

The Land Titles Act 1925 interacts with the mortgage provisions; a registered mortgage is largely outside the Act except for money-recovery actions (s 22). The Administration and Probate Act 1929 s 64 notice of intended distribution triggers the estate-protection rules in s 37.

Choice-of-law rules in Division 4.4 operate alongside the common-law rules of private international law and the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth). Because limitation is characterised as substantive (s 56), an ACT court hearing a claim governed by New South Wales substantive law must apply the NSW Limitation Act 1969 as part of that substantive law.

The Human Rights Act 2004 is indirectly engaged through the retrospectivity of s 21C and the court’s power to stay oppressive proceedings. The Act also sits beside equitable doctrines of laches and acquiescence, which remain unaffected (s 6).

The most significant recent change is the Statute Law Amendment Act 2025 (A2025-29), which made formal amendments to ss 30A, 58 and 59 and updated penalty-unit cross-references. These are largely editorial.

The Civil Law (Wrongs) Amendment Act 2021 introduced the single-publication rule (s 21BA), the three-year discretionary extension for defamation (s 21BB), and the clarification that electronic-publication dates affect only limitation (s 21BC). These changes were driven by the rise of internet and social-media defamation, the difficulty of identifying every republication, and a desire to bring the ACT into line with uniform defamation reforms across Australia. The 56-day concerns-notice extension mechanism (s 21B(2)–(3)) encourages early negotiation.

The Justice and Community Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2022 refined s 21C to clarify that “subjected” to child abuse includes having witnessed it, and removed any residual doubt about the scope of the removal of limitation periods. This continued the national response to the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, which recommended that limitation periods be abolished for such claims because of the well-documented delays in disclosure and the power imbalances involved.

The Motor Accident Injuries Act 2019 inserted s 16AA and amended related sections to create a five-year limit for common-law damages claims arising from motor accidents under the new no-fault scheme. This was part of a comprehensive reform to reduce premiums and provide certainty to insurers and the CTP scheme.

The Justice and Community Safety Legislation Amendment Act 2016 (No 2) inserted the original s 21C, removing limitation periods for child-abuse claims. That reform was a direct implementation of the Royal Commission’s recommendations and responded to decades of lobbying by survivor groups who argued that ordinary limitation rules re-traumatised victims and shielded institutions.

Earlier changes in 2003–2006 introduced the discoverability test for personal injury (s 16B), the child-injury pre-action notice regime (s 30A–30B), and the latent-damage extension power (s 40). These were responses to cases where plaintiffs discovered serious injuries or property damage years after the original negligence.

Each amendment reflects a policy tension: the desire for finality versus the recognition that rigid time bars can produce manifest injustice in particular classes of case.

Because the Act is procedural, most litigation concerns whether a claim has been brought in time, whether discoverability has occurred, and whether extension should be granted. The ACT Supreme Court and Court of Appeal have considered the interaction between s 21C and the court’s inherent power to stay proceedings for unfairness. The example in s 21C(3) makes clear that a permanent stay remains available where the passage of decades has made a fair trial impossible; this has been the subject of contested applications in institutional-abuse cases.

Section 36 extensions for personal injury have generated voluminous case law on the weight to be given to prejudice, the plaintiff’s conduct, and the reasons for delay. Courts have emphasised that the discretion is unfettered but must be exercised judicially, having regard to all statutory factors. Similar controversies surround the latent-damage extension under s 40, particularly the 15-year long-stop from the act or omission.

The single-publication rule in s 21BA has been tested on the question of what constitutes “substantially the same” matter and when the “manner” of publication is “materially different”. The non-exhaustive list in s 21BA(4) (prominence and extent of publication) has required courts to balance the policy of preventing indefinite liability against the reality of algorithmic amplification on social media.

Choice-of-law provisions (ss 56–57) have arisen in cross-border personal-injury and defamation disputes. Courts must characterise the applicable limitation law as substantive and, where discretion is involved, attempt to replicate the approach that would be taken by the courts of the other jurisdiction. This has produced procedural complexity and occasional satellite litigation about foreign limitation rules.

Controversy also surrounds the notice-to-proceed mechanism (s 31). Critics argue it can unfairly remove the protection of disability for vulnerable adults who have guardians, while defendants see it as an essential safeguard against indefinite postponement.

The interaction between s 30B (child health-service claims) and the extension power in s 36 has been litigated; the statute expressly prevents s 36 from extending the six-year period in s 30B(2), creating a hard long-stop for some child medical-negligence claims.

Overall, the case law demonstrates that while the Act aims for certainty, its numerous discretionary gateways and discoverability tests continue to generate satellite litigation that can be almost as expensive as the substantive claim.

Most practitioners are aware of the basic three- and six-year periods, but several subtleties catch even experienced lawyers. First, the discoverability test in s 16B(2)(a) for disease or disorder runs from when the plaintiff first knows (or ought reasonably to know) both that they have the injury and that it is related to someone else’s act or omission. Many plaintiffs assume the clock starts at diagnosis; it may start later, but defendants will argue it started when symptoms first appeared and the plaintiff sought medical advice.

Second, s 21C’s removal of limitation for child-abuse claims is not unlimited. The claim must “substantially arise” from the abuse. A plaintiff who pleads a broader institutional negligence claim that includes non-abuse matters may find the entire proceeding struck out or stayed if the court finds the dominant cause is not the abuse. The example in s 21C(3) reminding practitioners of the court’s power to stay for prejudice is often overlooked until the eve of trial.

Third, the single-publication rule in s 21BA applies even to republications by associates (employees, contractors, associated entities). A media outlet that republishes an article years later on a new platform may still be protected if the content is substantially the same, but the “materially different manner” exception (prominence, reach) is fact-sensitive and rarely litigated to finality.

Fourth, s 8A provides that accrual rules in the Act apply only for the purposes of the Limitation Act itself. This prevents parties from using the Act’s accrual dates in contract, tort or estoppel arguments in substantive disputes. Many settlement agreements inadvertently incorporate limitation language that is rendered meaningless by s 8A.

Fifth, the revenue-recovery provision (s 21A) contains a trap: the six-month limit applies even to payments made under compulsion, but does not apply if the tax would have been recoverable as an overpayment had the underlying provision been valid. Taxpayers who pay under protest must still act within six months or lose the right to challenge the impost.

Sixth, mortgage interest calculations under s 26 can produce unexpected results. A mortgagor seeking redemption can refuse to pay interest that would have been statute-barred had the mortgagee sued on the date of redemption. Many redemption statements still include such interest because practitioners forget to apply the adjustment.

Seventh, the notice-to-proceed mechanism (s 31) can be used by defendants against incapacitated adults who have guardians. Service on the guardian deems the disability ended, even if the person remains incapable. This is little known outside specialist personal-injury firms.

Eighth, s 45 requires that extinction of title be expressly pleaded. A defendant who simply pleads “the claim is statute-barred” may be unable to rely on the proprietary consequences of s 43 unless the defence is amended.

Finally, many lawyers assume that once any limitation period has expired, all is lost. Section 41 provides that if an extension is later granted under Division 3.2, the prior expiry is ignored. This “revival” power is wider than many realise and can catch defendants who have already destroyed documents in the reasonable belief that the claim was dead.

Compliance begins with a robust diary system keyed to the earliest possible accrual date for every potential claim. For personal-injury files, that means recording both the date of the accident and the date of discoverability (knowledge of injury and its negligent cause). For defamation, the upload or transmission date of the first electronic publication must be captured.

Organisations should maintain limitation calendars that flag impending expiries at 6, 12 and 18 months. For child-abuse matters there is no diary entry; these claims can arrive decades later and must be defended on prejudice and fairness grounds rather than limitation.

When a potential claim is identified, the first step is to characterise the cause of action correctly. A claim pleaded in both contract and tort may have different limitation outcomes. Contribution claims require tracking both the two-year period from judgment or settlement and the four-year period from the principal claim’s limitation date (s 21).

For defendants wishing to force a disabled plaintiff to proceed, the notice-to-proceed under s 31 must be drafted with the particularity required by s 31(2) and served in one of the authorised modes. Minor deviations are forgiven only if they do not affect substance or mislead.

Plaintiffs seeking extension should file the application before issuing proceedings where possible, although s 36(4) permits applications even after proceedings have begun. Affidavits must address every statutory factor in ss 36(3), 38(2), 39(3), 40(2) and 21BB(3). Failure to lead evidence on prejudice or delay almost always results in refusal.

Organisations facing child-abuse claims should immediately consider whether a permanent-stay application under the court’s inherent jurisdiction is viable. Evidence of destroyed records, unavailable witnesses and faded memories must be assembled promptly.

In mortgage and trust work, files should be reviewed every six years to confirm whether acknowledgments or part-payments have restarted the clock. Redemption statements must be checked against s 26 to exclude barred interest.

Legal practitioners must advise clients in writing of limitation dates and the consequences of missing them. Failure to do so can itself give rise to a professional-negligence claim with its own three-year discoverability period under s 16B.

Finally, compliance requires regular training. The 2021 defamation amendments, the 2022 child-abuse clarifications and the 2025 statute-law updates mean that precedents drafted even five years ago may no longer be safe. A limitation audit of standard pleadings, correspondence templates and settlement deeds is a prudent compliance step for any firm or in-house legal team operating in the ACT.