This Act has been repealed and is no longer in force. It is retained for historical reference.
Jurisdiction
Commonwealth
Act Number
40 of 1946
Collection
act
Plain English Summary
7/10 complexity
What the Act does (mechanical changes first)
Creates a statutory authority called the Joint Coal Board ("the Board") as a body corporate with power to own property, sue and be sued and carry on business necessary for its functions (ss 5–6).
Sets the Board’s membership and governance: three members (one is Chair), one member representing employers and one representing employees; members may be full‑time or part‑time and serve terms up to three years (ss 7–8). The Board can delegate powers, hold meetings (including by phone), and transact business by circulated papers (ss 16, 19–21).
Gives the Board specified operational powers focused on coal‑industry health, welfare and related matters: provide occupational health and rehabilitation services, collect and publish health and accident statistics, refer safety matters to inspectors or Ministers, run training courses under approved international programs, carry out research and inspections, and promote the welfare of workers and communities (ss 23, 25–27).
Empowers the Board to make orders about health and safety, but only with the written approval of both the Commonwealth Minister and the State Minister; such orders must be published in the Gazette and the State Gazette and take effect on publication (ss 28, 28A). The Board is subject to joint direction and control by the Commonwealth and State Ministers and must carry out written directions where both Ministers agree (s 28B).
Gives the Board a workers’ compensation role: it may establish workers’ compensation insurance schemes and may require employers in the State coal industry to obtain workers’ compensation insurance with or through the Board (s 26).
Sourced from the Federal Register of Legislation (legislation.gov.au), CC BY 4.0.
Sets finance, audit and reporting rules: the Board may charge fees, receive appropriations, open bank accounts, invest funds in conservative instruments or approved banks, borrow (subject to a $2,000,000 outstanding‑debt limit without Ministerial approval), keep commercial accounts, and must submit audited annual financial statements and an annual operating plan (ss 28H–28R, 28S, 28N, 28Q).
Confers inspection and enforcement powers: the Board may appoint inspectors who may enter and search premises (with conditions such as producing authority, no entry to residences without consent), require answers and documents, retain copies for reasonable periods, and inspect books (ss 49–52). Non‑compliance and obstruction attract monetary penalties (s 53).
Provides administrative safeguards and review: a requirement issued under the Board’s health power (s 24) may be reviewed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, subject to a stay where an appeal is already before the State Supreme Court (s 24(2)–(3)).
Official purpose claimed by the Act
The Preamble states the two governments agreed to establish joint authorities to take action on industrial relations, mineworkers’ health and welfare and related coal‑industry matters. The Act embeds that joint arrangement by giving the Board powers and by requiring joint ministerial agreement for key decisions (Preamble; ss 5, 28B).
Testing the claimed purpose against mechanics, incentives and trade‑offs (source‑grounded)
Who pays (sources of funding and who bears costs):
The Board may charge fees for services (s 28J) and receive premiums and other money for workers’ compensation schemes; those funds must be applied to scheme payments, administration, occupational health and rehabilitation and related welfare uses (s 28L). Employers in the coal industry may be required to effect workers’ compensation insurance with or through the Board (s 26), which shifts premium flows toward the Board and away from other insurers.
The Commonwealth may appropriate money to the Board (s 28K). Borrowing is permitted, but total outstanding debt must not exceed $2,000,000 without both Ministers’ written approval (s 28R). These rules create a mixed funding model (fees/premiums, appropriation, limited borrowing).
Who decides (control and discretion):
The Board has delegated administrative discretion to exercise its statutory powers (s 23–27), to make orders with Ministerial approval (s 28), and to employ staff and engage consultants (ss 28C–28D). However, the Board is explicitly subject to joint control and direction by the Commonwealth Minister and the State Minister; written directions agreed by both Ministers are binding (s 28B). Ministers must also approve Board orders (s 28).
The Governor‑General may make regulations on the recommendation of the Commonwealth Minister with the State Minister’s agreement (s 56). Many operational levers therefore require Ministerial concurrence; this concentrates ultimate policy control at Minister level (s 28B, s 28).
Effects on private enterprise, competition and contract freedom:
The statutory power to require employers to effect workers’ compensation insurance with or through the Board (s 26) limits employers’ choice of insurer in the coal industry and channels that business to the Board. That alters the commercial opportunity set for private insurers and affects employer contracting for insurance.
Tax exemptions for the Board (property, income and operations not liable to income tax, payroll tax or land tax under Commonwealth law and not liable to certain State taxes) change the relative cost profile between the Board and private entities (s 28U).
Compliance burden and administrative cost for regulated parties:
Employers and other persons may be required to comply with Board orders (s 28) and health requirements (s 24); inspectors can require production of books and answers on premises entries (ss 50–51). Failure to comply carries specified monetary penalties, up to $10,000 for bodies corporate for some offences, and up to $6,000 for assaulting or obstructing an inspector (s 53). Those obligations impose record‑keeping, disclosure and operational compliance costs.
Accountability, oversight and audit:
The Board must submit an annual operating plan (s 28E) and annual report and audited financial statements to both Ministers; the Auditor‑General inspects and audits accounts and must report to Ministers (ss 28N, 28T). These provisions create formal transparency and financial oversight channels.
Trade‑offs and implementation risks:
Joint control by two Ministers (Commonwealth and State) makes key actions contingent on intergovernmental agreement (preamble; s 28B). That protects coordinated decision‑making but creates a potential implementation bottleneck where Ministers disagree.
The Board’s ability to make orders is constrained by the requirement for Ministerial approval (s 28) and by judicial and administrative review rights (s 24(2)); those checks limit unilateral regulatory action but add procedural steps and legal risk.
The requirement that certain Orders be published in both Gazettes (s 28A) means affected parties are put on formal notice, but the Act also allows orders to commence on the day of publication, which can create short lead times for compliance (s 28A(2)).
Who benefits and who bears concentrated costs:
The Board’s functions (health services, statistics, rehabilitation and welfare) are directed to coal‑industry workers and communities (s 23(g)). Funding via compulsory insurance or mandatory use of Board schemes (s 26) would concentrate premium flows to the Board and shift costs onto employers and, indirectly, workers.
Practical implementation features to note (sections cited)
Ministerial control: joint ministerial approval or agreement is required for orders, directions, regulations and removal of certain offices (ss 28, 28A, 28B, 56, 9(4)).
Enforcement mechanics: inspectors’ powers to enter, search and copy records, retain documents temporarily and require answers are set out along with limits and compensation rules (ss 49–52). Penalties for non‑cooperation are in s 53.
Financial constraints and protections: borrowing cap without Ministerial approval is $2,000,000 (s 28R); investments must be conservative or in approved banks (s 28S); Auditor‑General oversight is mandatory (s 28T); tax exemptions are specified (s 28U).
Conclusion (neutral, mechanical):
Mechanically, the Act establishes a jointly controlled statutory Board with explicit powers over occupational health, rehabilitation, statistics, research, orders relating to health, and workers’ compensation arrangements for the coal industry in New South Wales. The Board operates with a mixed funding model (fees, premiums, appropriations, limited borrowing), is subject to Auditor‑General review and to joint ministerial direction and approval for major instruments. Those mechanics shift certain insurance flows to the Board, require compliance by employers and create ministerial gates for policy changes; they also place inspection and record‑production obligations on industry participants with specified penalties for breaches (see ss 5–28, 49–53, 28L, 26, 28B).