Case law library
© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe gives general legal information, not legal advice. For the authoritative text, check the official register of the law's own jurisdiction, such as the Federal Register of Legislation for Commonwealth laws.
Australian case law library
Search court decisions by neutral citation, case name, jurisdiction, court, judges, catchwords, and judgment summary.
Case law entry points
Start with judgments that other decisions keep coming back to, then follow the citations through the case graph.
NCAT Appeal Panel | 2014-04-09
Tenants were terminated for non-payment of rent following an uncontested hearing where the landlord's agent gave evidence and the Member recorded findings in hearing notes. The tenants sought leave to internally appeal under s 80(2)(b) but did not raise any question of law; therefore leave required. Clause 12 Schedule 4 requires showing the appellant 'may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice' because the decision was unfair, against the weight of evidence, or there is significant new evidence. The tenants relied on phone logs and asserted contact and willingness to pay. The Appeal Panel found the record disclosed arrears and necessary findings, the phone logs were not fresh or persuasive, and there was no denial of procedural fairness. Leave was refused, the appeal dismissed, and the stay of the original orders lifted.
1,627 case citations
Before: Kelly AJ
Before: Bell CJ at [1]; Mitchelmore JA at [75]; Adamson JA at [76].
Paula-Marie said her parents had promised her the family home and business if she worked in the business without pay. The trial judge found that the evidence did not establish a clear promise that the assets would be transferred during the parents’ lifetimes or when Paul retired. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was entitled to reach that conclusion, including by assessing witness evidence and comparing the alleged promises with the parties’ conduct. It also rejected an attempt to rely on a different inheritance-based claim that had not been pleaded. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Before: Ward P at [1] Free JA at [2] Griffiths AJA at [3]
The Court of Appeal dismissed Michael Di Giannantonio and Mamro’s appeal from orders enforcing a 2018 deed and approving Michael’s release of potential family provision rights. It refused to let them add new grounds alleging that Michael lacked capacity at trial: the proposed evidence could have been obtained earlier, was not sufficiently persuasive, and the trial record did not establish incapacity. The Court also held that the s 95 approval did not require a detailed valuation of every asset, that the escrow finding was within the pleaded dispute about whether the deed was binding, and that the parties’ conduct independently supported mutual assent. The appellants were ordered to pay Maria’s appeal costs on an indemnity basis.
Before: Kelly AJ
Before: Bell CJ at [1]; Kirk JA at [2]; Stern JA at [3]
The Court of Appeal upheld the damages judgment arising from a dog attack. It accepted that the trial judge could prefer the respondent’s psychiatrist, rely on contemporaneous treatment records, and find that the attack caused PTSD and some loss of earning capacity. The trial judge used the wrong label for the source of the causation test, but reached the correct result using the applicable statutory test. The appeal failed, as did the appellant’s attempt to rely on public material about the respondent’s later business activity.
Before: Stern JA at [1]; Dhanji J at [2]; R A Hulme AJ at [45].
Before: Stern JA at [1] Dhanji J at [60] R A Hulme AJ at [61]
Before: Stern JA at [1]; Dhanji J at [2]; R A Hulme AJ at [3];
Before: Wright J at [1] Fagan J at [189] Rigg J at [221]
Before: Taylor J
Before: N Adams CJ at CL at [1]; Hamill J at [11]; Yehia J at [12].
Before: Muller J
Before: Baker J
Before: Ball JA; Free JA
The NSW Court of Appeal refused both sides permission to appeal. It considered that Mr Mohareb had not shown a sufficiently clear error in the primary judge’s conclusions about limitation periods, earlier proceedings, or the alleged bias. The DPP also failed to show a clear error in allowing Mr Mohareb one more opportunity to plead certain claims. The Court did not decide whether the DPP owed a victim a duty of care when prosecuting an alleged offender. Both applications were dismissed with costs.
Before: Leeming JA at [1] Adamson JA at [2] Ball JA at [3]
The Court of Appeal held that an expert report is not automatically inadmissible in judicial review just because some of it evaluates the development itself. Here, the report also explained what further owl-related inquiries could reasonably have been made, especially about light spill affecting a known breeding pair of Powerful Owls. That made the report relevant to the legal challenge. The appeal court therefore set aside the refusal and granted leave to rely on the affidavit. It did not decide whether the Council breached its statutory duty or whether the development approval was legally unreasonable.
Before: Taylor J
Before: Muller J
Before: Ward P at [1]; McHugh JA at [191]; Free JA at [192]
The Court of Appeal held that the Council's internal footpath policy did not automatically set the legal standard for reasonable care. Although the Council had previously identified the lip, the Court considered it a relatively minor, unobscured hazard of the kind pedestrians should expect on public footpaths, and found no breach in failing to repair it before Ms MacLean fell. The primary judge had erred to the extent that he treated Ms MacLean's lack of care as negating the Council's duty, but that error did not change the result because the no-breach finding stood. The Court also upheld the contributory negligence finding and found no substantive error in the contingent assessment of damages. Leave and an extension of time were granted, but the appeal was dismissed with costs.
Before: Ainslie-Wallace AJ
Before: Baker J
Before: Brereton J
Before: Hill J
Before: Hill J
Before: Vaughan JA
Before: Muller J
Before: Younan J
Before: Feutrill J
Before: McHugh JA
The Court of Appeal held that the restraint in the consent order lasted while the parties’ evidence was being heard, not until the judge later delivered judgment. The correspondence before the order was made showed that its main purpose was to protect witnesses from being influenced during the proceedings. The Court also said that, even if the restraint lasted longer, its wording left real doubt about its duration, and an ambiguous order cannot support a contempt finding. The contempt findings were set aside, and the fine money paid was to be reimbursed.
Before: Sirtes J