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[2026] NSWCA 56
appellant. Appeal allowed. The orders dated 17 July 2025 and 17 October 2025, including the declaratory orders and findings and convictions on Charges 1, 2 and 3, were set aside. Each party was to bear their...
The Court of Appeal held that the restraint in the consent order lasted while the parties’ evidence was being heard, not until the judge later delivered judgment. The correspondence before the order was made showed that its main purpose was to protect witnesses from being influenced during the proceedings. The Court also said that, even if the restraint lasted longer, its wording left real doubt about its duration, and an ambiguous order cannot support a contempt finding. The contempt findings were set aside, and the fine money paid was to be reimbursed.
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2,561 words · generated 08/10/2026
Laurae Harvey began defamation proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales against Gary Henderson and Sara Tilling on 8 December 2020. She sought damages and orders restraining further publication of material conveying the same or substantially similar imputations as the publications complained of [5]. Those publications allegedly conveyed that Harvey was a fraud and had misappropriated charitable donations for personal benefit [8].
6 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
In September 2021, the parties’ solicitors negotiated proposed interlocutory orders. Order 6, made by consent on 17 September 2021, stated: “The Defendants be restrained, pending the hearing of this matter from publishing any matter conveying the same or substantially similar imputations to the publications complained of” [6]-[7].
The substantive hearing took evidence from 15 to 30 April 2024. There was then an adjournment before closing addresses on 12 June 2024, after which judgment was reserved. Judgment in the defamation proceedings was delivered on 12 June 2025 [9]. While judgment was reserved, Henderson made online posts and sent a Facebook message about Harvey and Wild2Free. The posts concerned, among other things, an alleged lease arrangement between Harvey and the charity, and included allegations about the use of donations [13]-[19].
Harvey pursued contempt charges based on three groups of publications. The primary judge found that Henderson had published the material, that it conveyed imputations the same or substantially similar to those in the substantive proceedings, and that he had voluntarily and deliberately breached order 6 [20]-[21], [33]. The contempt findings and a $10,000 fine followed [33]-[35].
Henderson appealed. The central question was whether “pending the hearing of this matter” meant until the physical hearing had concluded, or whether the restraint continued until judgment was delivered [22]. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. It held that the restraint ended when the parties’ evidentiary cases were closed. Alternatively, the order was ambiguous as to its duration and could not found contempt [69]-[73]. The Court set aside the specified contempt-related orders and ordered reimbursement of amounts paid towards the fine, with accrued interest [74]-[75].
Griffiths AJA identified the governing approach as objective construction. Where a consent order’s meaning is not immediately plain, its meaning is ascertained according to ordinary rules of construction, considering text, context and purpose [40]. The text remains central, but its meaning is assessed in the circumstances known to the parties, including correspondence between their legal representatives [40(d)].
The correspondence mattered because it explained why Harvey had sought order 6. Her solicitor said that the defendants had sent their defence and fraud allegations to people and organisations, including people who would be witnesses or prospective witnesses. The solicitor expressed concern that the conduct might influence witnesses and therefore affect the administration of justice [42]. Griffiths AJA considered that explanation important context for understanding the order’s object: protecting the integrity of the proceedings by preventing attempts to influence actual or potential witnesses [43].
That context gave the words “pending the hearing of this matter” a more specific focus than a general pause on all potentially defamatory publication until the dispute was finally resolved. The relevant period was the period in which improper interference with witnesses could affect the evidentiary process. Griffiths AJA concluded that it ended when the parties had closed their evidentiary cases, including any case in reply [48]. The evidence-taking hearing ran from 15 to 30 April 2024, and the parties’ evidentiary cases were closed at its completion [9], [48], [69].
The primary judge had treated the purpose as a “ceasefire” intended to prevent further damage while the issues were unresolved [28]-[29]. Griffiths AJA considered that the correspondence changed the contextual picture: the central purpose was not simply preventing further reputational harm while judgment was pending, but preventing potential influence on witnesses [47]. The primary judge’s failure to refer to the correspondence was therefore a material error in applying the construction principles [38], [47].
Griffiths AJA also rejected the contention that the order should be read as extending to the hypothetical possibility that a party might seek leave to reopen its case after judgment was reserved. The respondent did not identify evidence that the parties had contemplated such a possibility when the order was made [50].
There was also an independent alternative basis for allowing the appeal. The Court stated that if the order did not mean what Griffiths AJA concluded it meant, a person required to comply with it could be in real doubt about its duration [70]-[72]. The contempt jurisdiction carries a particular need for clarity: the Court referred to the principle that a person should not be punished for failing to obey an order that is not clear in a relevant respect [40(c)]. The respondent’s counsel accepted that an ambiguous order could not found the contempt charges [73].
McHugh JA agreed and added concerns about the drafting of the prohibited conduct. Order 6 referred to imputations conveyed by “the publications complained of”, without identifying the imputations themselves or referring directly to the imputations alleged in the statement of claim. Which imputations the publications conveyed was itself in dispute in the substantive proceedings. McHugh JA observed that this could mean Henderson would not know what conduct was prohibited until judgment [2]. He also observed that the order’s language was wider than necessary to protect against witness interference [3].
The judgment did not purport to introduce a new general test for construing consent orders. It applied principles drawn from Australian authorities, including Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan, Kirkpatrick v Kotis, Pang v Bydand Holdings Pty Ltd, Cherry v Steele-Park and Bathurst Real Estate Pty Ltd v Fairbrother [39]-[40].
The principles as stated in the judgment are these. First, where a consent order’s meaning is not immediately plain, it is construed under ordinary principles by examining text, context and purpose [40(a)]. Secondly, the construction is objective, and relevant context includes the circumstances known to the parties when the order was made, including solicitor correspondence [40(d)]. Thirdly, a distinction exists between a genuine ambiguity and a mere difficulty of construction. A person subject to an order is expected to try to understand and obey it, but if that person could be in real doubt about what it means in a respect relevant to the alleged contempt, the charge fails [40(b)-(c)].
The decision’s contribution is its application of those principles to the particular phrase “pending the hearing of this matter”. The Court treated the purpose disclosed in the correspondence as a limiting context: because the restraint was sought to protect witnesses, the operative period ended when the evidentiary cases closed [43], [48]-[49], [69]. The Court distinguished statutory cases about the meaning of “hear” or “hear and determine” because those cases concerned jurisdictional powers or statutory duties, not the construction of a consent restraint in its particular factual setting [58]-[68].
The judgment therefore should not be read as establishing that “pending the hearing” always ends when evidence closes. Its reasoning depends on the wording, purpose and known surrounding circumstances of this order. Nor does the judgment establish a general rule that correspondence overrides the language of a consent order. The Court described construction as objective and gave primacy to text read in context and purpose [40(d)]. Here, the correspondence was important because it illuminated what the parties were addressing when they agreed to order 6.
The practical point for legal drafting is also confined to the Court’s stated concerns. McHugh JA criticised the order’s failure to specify the relevant imputations and its breadth beyond what was necessary for the witness-protection purpose [2]-[3]. Those observations underline the importance of precision where a breach may be prosecuted as contempt, but the decision does not set out a prescribed drafting form.
At [40], Griffiths AJA states: “If the true meaning of a consent order or undertaking is not immediately plain, that meaning is to be ascertained according to ordinary rules of construction.” In plain English, a consent order is not interpreted by isolating one word. The Court reads the wording objectively alongside the relevant context and purpose.
At [42], the judgment reproduces the plaintiff’s solicitor’s explanation that order 6 was sought because defendants had sent allegations to people who were witnesses or possible witnesses, and that the conduct “may influence witnesses”. This correspondence is not itself the Court’s legal rule. Its significance is evidentiary and contextual: it showed what concern the proposed restraint addressed.
At [43], Griffiths AJA says the object was “to protect the integrity of the legal proceedings and the judicial process.” In plain English, the order’s purpose was understood as preventing conduct that might affect witnesses and the fairness of the hearing.
At [48], the Court says the relevant period ran until the parties had closed their cases, including any reply case, when the plaintiff’s witnesses would have been excused. This explains why the Court read “pending the hearing” as tied to the evidence-taking process rather than the later delivery of judgment.
At [69], Griffiths AJA concludes that the phrase referred to the physical hearing from 15 to 30 April 2024, ending with closure of the evidentiary cases, and that the order did not operate thereafter. That was the principal basis for finding that the contempt findings could not stand.
At [72], Griffiths AJA states that a person required to comply with order 6 could be in “real doubt” about what it meant if the Court’s primary construction were not correct. In plain English, even if the Court had not settled the order’s meaning in Henderson’s favour, the uncertainty itself was enough to prevent contempt.
McHugh JA’s comments at [2]-[3] address a separate drafting problem. His point was that the order did not identify the particular imputations prohibited, even though the meaning of the publications was contested. He also considered the restraint broader than needed for the witness-protection purpose. Those comments reinforce the importance of clarity but do not replace Griffiths AJA’s central construction reasoning.
The decision is most directly relevant where a contempt allegation depends on the meaning of a consent order, undertaking or injunction whose duration or prohibited conduct is disputed. The judgment makes the construction exercise sensitive to the particular text, purpose and circumstances known when the order was made [40].
It is especially relevant where there is contemporaneous correspondence explaining why an order was proposed or accepted. Here, the solicitors’ emails identified concerns about communications with actual and potential witnesses. The Court treated that correspondence as an important aid in identifying the order’s purpose [42]-[43]. A lawyer assessing another matter would need to check whether similar communications exist, what they say, and whether they were known to the parties when the order was made.
The decision may also be relevant where the wording uses a temporal expression such as “pending the hearing”, “until the hearing” or similar language, and the proceedings involve distinct stages: evidence, closing submissions, reservation of judgment and delivery of reasons. The Court’s conclusion was not based on the phrase in isolation. It depended on the order’s witness-protection context and the fact that the evidentiary cases had closed [48]-[49], [69].
A further trigger is a contempt charge where the order leaves more than one reasonably arguable meaning on an element relevant to the alleged breach. Under the principles the Court applied, the question is not whether any grammatical or semantic difficulty exists. It is whether a person trying to comply could be in real doubt in a respect relevant to the charge [40(b)-(c)], [70]-[72].
The decision also signals a drafting issue where an injunction prohibits publications by reference to imputations “complained of”, but does not identify the imputations. McHugh JA considered that this formulation might leave a person uncertain about the prohibited conduct until the underlying dispute was decided [2]. That observation may be pertinent to orders whose scope depends on contested findings in the very proceedings in which the restraint operates.
The decision does not determine the outcome of other cases with different wording, a different stated purpose, or different surrounding circumstances. It also does not decide whether every publication made after evidence closes falls outside every order expressed to operate “pending the hearing”. Its reasoning is tied to this order and the context established in the record.
The supplied judgment is dated 21 April 2026 and contains no account of later judicial treatment of Henderson v Harvey. It therefore does not establish whether subsequent courts have followed, distinguished, applied or questioned its reasoning. No later authorities should be inferred from the case list or from the judgment’s discussion of earlier decisions.
The judgment itself explains its relationship with prior authorities. It considers Morgan, Kirkpatrick, Pang, Fairbrother and Cherry as sources for construction and ambiguity principles [39]-[40]. It distinguishes Salt v Cooper, Green v Lord Penzance, R v The Archbishop of Canterbury and Re Austral Bronze because those matters concerned statutory jurisdiction, statutory duties or the meaning of powers to hear and determine, rather than construction of this consent order [58]-[68]. It cites Owners of Ship Shin Kobe Maru and Kain in explaining the different approach applicable to statutory provisions conferring jurisdiction or powers [64].
Accordingly, the available text supports analysis of how the Court used precedent, but not any claim about treatment after this decision. For a current research assessment, later case history would need to be checked independently against reliable legal sources.
The judgment does not decide how the phrase “pending the hearing” should be construed in contexts where the order’s purpose is broader than witness protection, such as where the stated purpose is to prevent continuing harm pending resolution of the dispute. The primary judge adopted a “ceasefire” understanding [28], but the Court of Appeal rejected that as the best reading of this order after considering the correspondence [47]. The case does not decide whether a different record could support that broader meaning.
The decision also does not settle how an order should apply if a party actually seeks leave to reopen its case after evidence closes. The respondent raised that possibility, but Griffiths AJA found it hypothetical on the evidence and not shown to have been contemplated when the order was made [50]. A case in which reopening was genuinely sought or anticipated could present a different construction question.
A further question concerns how much specificity is required when an injunction describes prohibited publications by reference to imputations in underlying proceedings. McHugh JA criticised order 6 because the imputations were not specified and remained disputed [2]. The judgment does not formulate a universal drafting test or decide the validity of differently framed orders.
Finally, the judgment does not assess whether each individual publication would have breached a differently worded or continuing order. The primary judge’s findings that the publications carried the relevant imputations and were deliberate were not challenged on appeal [20]-[21], but the appeal succeeded because of the construction and ambiguity issues. The appellate outcome should therefore be understood as resolving the operation and clarity of this consent order, rather than as resolving the truth or falsity of the allegations in the posts.
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Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Henderson v Harvey [2026] NSWCA 56
Hearing dates: 1 April 2026
Date of orders: 21 April 2026
Decision date: 21 April 2026
Before: McHugh JA at [1]
Griffiths AJA at [4]
Harrison AJA at [76]
Decision: 1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside the orders dated 17 July 2025 and 17 October 2025, including the declaratory orders dated 17 July 2025 and the orders dated 17 July 2025 and 17 October 2025 finding the appellant guilty of contempt and convicting him of Charges 1, 2 and 3 as set out in the notice of motion dated 17 October 2024.
3. In lieu thereof, there be no order as to costs of either the proceedings below or on appeal, with the intention that the parties each bear their own costs.
4. Order that the appellant be reimbursed the money he has paid to the Registry in respect of the $10,000 fine, together with any accrued interest.
Catchwords: CONTEMPT — Civil contempt — Breach of orders — Clarity of terms — Proper construction of consent order – Meaning of the words “pending the hearing of this matter” — Ambiguity — Whether consent order was ambiguous
Legislation Cited: Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 (NSW), ss 10, 11 12
Public Worship Regulation Act 1874, 37 & 38 Vict c 85, ss 8, 9
Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, 36 & 37 Vict c 66, s 24
Cases Cited: Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan (1965) 112 CLR 483; [1965] HCA 21
Bathurst Real Estate Pty Ltd v Fairbrother [2022] NSWSC 351
Cherry v Steele-Park (2017) 96 NSWLR 548; [2017] NSWCA 295
Green v Lord Penzance (1881) 6 App Cas 657
Harvey v Henderson (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 764
Harvey v Henderson (No 3) [2025] NSWSC 1186
Harvey v Henderson (No 4) [2025] NSWSC 1203
Harvey v Henderson [2025] NSWSC 601
Kain v R&B Investments Pty Ltd (2025) 99 ALJR 1138; [2025] HCA 28
Kirkpatrick v Kotis (2004) 62 NSWLR 567; [2004] NSWSC 1265
Owners of Ship Shin Kobe Maru v Empire Shipping Co Inc (1994) 181 CLR 404; [1994] HCA 54
Pang v Bydand Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 69 Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; [1998] HCA 28
R v The Archbishop of Canterbury (1859) 1 E & E 545; 120 ER 1014
Re Austral Bronze Pty Ltd (No 2) (2020) 149 ACSR 221; [2020] NSWSC 1633
Salt v Cooper (1880) 16 Ch D 544
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362; [2017] HCA 34
Woolworths Ltd v Strong (No 2) (2011) 80 NSWLR 445; [2011] NSWCA 72
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Gary Henderson (Appellant)
Laurae Harvey (Respondent)
Representation: Counsel:
Self-represented (Appellant)
R Rasmussen with A Cheema (Respondent)
Solicitors:
Kalantzis Lawyers (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2025/00306627
Publication restriction: Nil
[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]
The appellant, Mr Gary Henderson, appeals from orders and the judgment of Rothman J in Harvey v Henderson (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 764 (the contempt proceedings). The primary judge found Mr Henderson guilty of contempt of Court in relation to a series of online messages and posts that he published in alleged breach of consent orders made by Sackar J on 17 September 2021.
On 8 December 2020, by statement of claim, Ms Laurae Harvey commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court against Mr Henderson and Ms Sara Tilling, seeking damages for alleged defamatory comments as well as orders enjoining the defendants from further publishing material that conveyed the same or substantially similar imputations to the publications which were the subject of the defamation proceedings (the substantive proceedings). Following an exchange of correspondence between the parties’ legal representatives, consent orders were made by Sackar J on 17 September 2021. Order 6 of those consent orders provided that “The Defendants be restrained, pending the hearing of this matter from publishing any matter conveying the same or substantially similar imputations to the publications complained of”.
Prior to judgment being delivered in the substantive proceedings but after judgment was reserved in that matter, Mr Henderson published a series of posts online through social media. It is these posts which became the subject of Charges 1, 2 and 3 in the contempt proceedings before Rothman J.
The main issue on appeal, as in the proceedings below, is the meaning of the words in order 6, that the “Defendants be restrained, pending the hearing of this matter” and whether this meant that Mr Henderson was restrained until some point in time referable to the actual physical hearing itself or whether the restraint extended beyond that period to the determination of the proceeding.
The Court (Griffiths AJA, McHugh JA and Harrison AJA agreeing) held, allowing the appeal:
Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan (1965) 112 CLR 483; [1965] HCA 21; Kirkpatrick v Kotis (2004) 62 NSWLR 567; [2004] NSWSC 1265; Pang v Bydand Holding Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 69; Cherry v Steele-Park (2017) 96 NSWLR 548; [2017] NSWCA 295; and Bathurst Real Estate Pty Ltd v Fairbrother [2022] NSWSC 351 considered.
Pang v Bydand Holding Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 69; and Kirkpatrick v Kotis (2004) 62 NSWLR 567; [2004] NSWSC 1265 considered.
“(6) The Defendants be restrained, pending the hearing of this matter from publishing any matter conveying the same or substantially similar imputations to the publications complained of”.
First, although no ground of appeal went to this issue, something should be said about the words used to identify the prohibited conduct: “publishing any matter conveying the same or substantially similar imputations to the publications complained of”. That language is unsatisfactory. Order 6 did not identify any particular imputations, or even operate by reference to the imputations alleged in the statement of claim. Instead, the injunction referred to the imputations conveyed by the publications complained of, whatever they might be. But which imputations the publications in fact conveyed was an issue in the substantive defamation proceedings. The appellant thus would not know what conduct the injunction prohibited until after the event, when judgment was given in the substantive proceedings. Plainly, the parties should have paid greater attention to the form of order 6.
Secondly, as Griffiths AJA demonstrates, the object of order 6 was to protect the integrity of the judicial process by preventing the appellant from influencing potential witnesses. The terms of order 6 were however wider than necessary to protect against potential interference with witnesses. While the breadth of the language used offers some support for the respondent’s construction of the order, in light of the contextual material to which Griffiths AJA points the appellant’s construction is to be preferred. The more general point is again that the parties should have paid greater attention to the form of order.
GRIFFITHS AJA: The appellant, Mr Gary Henderson, appeals from orders and the judgment of Rothman J in Harvey v Henderson (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 764 (p****rimary j****udgment or PJ). The primary judge found Mr Henderson guilty of contempt of Court in relation to a series of online messages and posts that he published in alleged breach of consent orders made by Sackar J on 17 September 2021.
On 8 December 2020, by statement of claim, Ms Laurae Harvey commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court against Mr Henderson and Ms Sara Tilling, seeking damages for alleged defamatory comments as well as orders enjoining the defendants from further publishing material that conveyed the same or substantially similar imputations to the publications which were the subject of the defamation proceedings (the substantive proceedings).
On 15 September 2021, lawyers acting for Ms Harvey wrote to the defendants’ lawyers seeking consent to certain proposed interlocutory orders, including an order restraining the defendants, pending the hearing of the matter, from publishing any matter conveying the same or substantially similar imputations to the publications complained of. The parties’ solicitors exchanged emails concerning this proposed order. It will be necessary to say something more later about these exchanges because they provide important context for the proper construction of the relevant order. Ultimately, however, the defendants’ solicitor sent an email to the plaintiff’s solicitor on 16 September 2021 at 2.09pm, notifying him that her clients consented to the proposed restraining order.
The following day, on 17 September 2021, Sackar J issued consent orders in the terms agreed upon by the parties’ solicitors (emphasis added):
(1) The Plaintiff to file and serve amended statement of claim by 1st October 2021;
(2) The Defendants to file and serve defence to amended statement of claim by 15th October 2021;
(3) The Plaintiff to request further and better particulars by 29th October 2021;
(4) The Defendants to respond to further and better particulars by 12th November 2021;
(5) The Plaintiff to file and serve Reply on or before 26th November 2021;
(6) The Defendants be restrained, pending the hearing of this matter from publishing any matter conveying the same or substantially similar imputations to the publications complained of;
(7) The directions hearing of the 17th September 2021 be vacated; and
(8) Leave to re-list on two days prior notice.
The substantive proceedings related to a series of online publications, comprised mostly of social media posts and emails by the defendants, which Ms Harvey alleged raised imputations that she was a fraud and misappropriated charitable funds donated to Wild2Free, a charity with which she was involved, for her own personal financial benefit and self-aggrandizement.
The hearing of the substantive proceedings commenced on 15 April 2024 and continued with the taking of evidence until 30 April 2024. There was then an adjournment of about six weeks. The oral hearing concluded on 12 June 2024 with the making of closing addresses, at which time judgment was reserved. Twelve months later, on 12 June 2025, Rothman J published his reasons for judgment in the substantive proceedings (see Harvey v Henderson [2025] NSWSC 601). Judgment was given for the plaintiff, and the defendants were ordered to pay damages, interest and costs. They were also restrained from publishing on the internet or elsewhere material that repeated the imputations found to be defamatory.
During the period when judgment was reserved, by notice of motion dated 17 October 2024, Ms Harvey prosecuted Mr Henderson alleging that he was in contempt of Court for breach of the consent orders made by Sackar J on 17 September 2021. Initially, Ms Harvey laid five charges against Mr Henderson. Ultimately, however, she did not press Charges 4 and 5 (which related to alleged breaches by Mr Henderson of the Harman undertaking). Consequently, only Charges 1, 2 and 3 were pressed and are relevant to this appeal.
Prior to judgment being delivered in the substantive proceedings but after judgment was reserved in that matter, Mr Henderson published a series of posts online through social media. It is these posts which became the subject of Charges 1, 2 and 3 in the contempt proceedings before Rothman J. Each of the three charges pertained to three separate alleged breaches by Mr Henderson of order 6 of the consent orders dated 17 September 2021 (the terms of which are set out at [7] above).
The publications the subject of Charges 1, 2 and 3 are summarised below.
Just a heads up if anyone contemplates donating to the charity below run by Laurae Harvey from her home at Runnyford. Documents filed with ACNC showed Wild2Free received donations of $80,000 in 22/23, yet most of that ended up in her own bank account through a ‘land lease’ deal where she rents part of her bush block to the charity for around $50K per year. It’s an absolute disgrace.
Charge 3 concerns three posts made by Mr Henderson on a Facebook page called “Beware of Wild2Free”. Ms Harvey became aware of this page on 8 October 2024.
The first post was made on 2 October 2024 and states:
Intro: Kangaroo Sanctuary – We raise money under the guise of donations being used directly to help kangaroos but instead pay most of them to our President for her personal living expenses.
The second post was again an anonymous post made on 5 October 2024 that was cast in similar terms to the anonymous post extracted above at [14].
The third post was made on 10 October 2024 and reads as follows:
And as predicted by this page the sheer scale of the corruption and dishonest conduct by the board members of the Wild2Free charity is now being revealed. The Wild2Free charity itself after doing nothing for the last few years in regard to animal care, is cutting back to do even less of nothing. Meanwhile the charity is saddled with a massive lease obligation involving the payment of hundreds of thousands of dollars to non [sic, read ‘none’] other than the president Rae Harvey for the next seven years under the corrupt ‘land lease’ deal. We’ll be watching closely to see how the board members responsible for that outrageous lease extract the charity and on what terms. Of course some have such as Margaret Park, Peter Sharp, Simon Orbell and Yana de Valle have done their devious deeds and cut and run but some stay and will hopefully be held accountable. Our eyes are on you Anita Davies-Morgan, Lynne Gillam and Leigh Blakie. It was obvious right from the start you failed to act in the best interests of the charity, merely bowing to the wishes of president Harvey to send donations meant for the care of animals into her own bank account.
The primary judge was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Henderson had published the material which was the subject of the three charges.
His Honour was also satisfied that each of the publications identified in those charges gave rise to imputations which were the same or substantially similar to the imputations in the publications complained of in the substantive proceedings. These findings are not challenged on appeal.
The main issue in the proceedings below (and on appeal) is the meaning of the words in order 6, that the “Defendants be restrained, pending the hearing of this matter”. Does this mean that Mr Henderson was restrained until some point in time referable to the actual physical hearing itself or did the restraint extend beyond that period to the determination of the proceeding?
The resolution of this issue involves the proper construction of the order. At [55]-[56], the primary judge summarised the principles guiding the construction of a consent order as follows:
the orders of a court are construed objectively…
The order must be understood in the context in which it is issued and in a manner which derives, objectively, the purpose of the parties to it or the judicial officer issuing it and in a manner which achieves that purpose.
At [45], his Honour described Mr Henderson’s argument on construction as being that the restraining order applied only until 15 April 2024, when the hearing of the substantive proceedings commenced. As will be developed below, this was not an accurate summary of Mr Henderson’s argument.
The primary judge viewed the principles of statutory construction set out by the High Court in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; [1998] HCA 28 and SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362; [2017] HCA 34 as being relevant to the construction of the order.
In considering the context in which the restraining order was made, his Honour said at [60] that:
… the parties were in dispute about imputations published by the defendants and sought permanent and interlocutory injunctions restraining the defendants from republishing such imputations. Issues existed between the parties as to whether the imputations were defamatory. It was agreed that, pending the hearing of the matter, there should be no further publications.
As will be explained below, although correctly acknowledging the importance of context in construing the order, it is notable that the primary judge made no reference to the relevant correspondence exchanged between the parties’ legal representatives immediately preceding the making of order 6, which provides important context.
At [61], the primary judge described the “objective intention” of the parties in the following terms:
Plainly, the orders were intended to bring about that which in current circumstances might be termed a “ceasefire”. The intention is plainly that no further damage be created pending the resolution of the issues between the parties.
To place on the terms of the order the dictionary definitions of “pending” and “hearing” to arrive at the meaning which allows the order to run only until the hearing and not beyond it would make a mockery of the purpose and intention of the order. Is it seriously suggested (and it was not the subject of submissions) that the restraint would apply only until 10am on the first day of hearing and that at 10.05am the defendants would be free to publish all of the imputations which were the subject of proceedings? Such a construction would be perverse.
Again, with respect, the primary judge misstated Mr Henderson’s argument on construction, a matter to which I will return below.
Having rejected what the primary judge understood to be Mr Henderson’s argument on construction, his Honour concluded at [63] that the restraining order operated until the conclusion of the hearing, which his Honour identified as the time “when the Court issues the judgment resolving the justiciable controversy between the parties”.
At [65]-[68], the primary judge turned his attention to the significance of the term “pending” in the context of the phrase “pending the hearing of this matter”. His Honour held that this meant until the “determination or finalisation” of the substantive proceedings, being the point in time when the judgment is delivered. His Honour viewed this construction as being supported by cases such as Salt v Cooper (1880) 16 Ch D 544; Green v Lord Penzance (1881) 6 App Cas 657 and R v The Archbishop of Canterbury (1859) 1 E & E 545; 120 ER 1014.
For these reasons, the primary judge found that the publications the subject of Charges 1, 2 and 3 were in breach of order 6 and that the breaches were both voluntary and deliberate. Mr Henderson was thus held guilty of contempt on all three charges.
On 10 October 2025, the primary judge made orders requiring the defendants in the substantive proceedings, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff’s costs on an indemnity basis, as well as interest (see Harvey v Henderson (No 3) [2025] NSWSC 1186).
After a separate hearing on penalty on 17 October 2025 relating to the findings of contempt (see Harvey v Henderson (No 4) [2025] NSWSC 1203), the following orders were made:
(1) The Court finds the defendant, Gary Henderson, guilty of contempt of Court as outlined in the previous judgment of the Court.
(2) The Court records each of those convictions.
(3) The Court fines the defendant, Gary Henderson, a total of $10,000 payable forthwith.
(4) The defendant shall pay the plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to the contempt and sentencing proceedings on an indemnity basis.
Mr Henderson raises the following seven grounds of appeal:
The primary judge erred in finding that order 6 continued to apply until the judgment was delivered in the substantive proceedings.
The primary judge erred in finding that there was an onus on the defendant to seek clarification from the Court as to his interpretation of order 6.
The primary judge erred in failing to find that order 6 should be given its natural and ordinary meaning.
The primary judge erred in making a finding as to the intention of the parties and the intention of the Court.
The primary judge erred in finding that the publications relating to Charge 3 were “threatening”, that they referred to the original lease, and that the applicant and his partner were members of the committee which approved the lease.
The primary judge erred by taking the word “pending” out of the context in which it was used in order 6 and instead applying it to the status of the substantive proceedings as a whole.
In the alternative to the above grounds of appeal, the primary judge erred in failing to find that order 6 was ambiguous.
I consider the relevant legal principles which guide the task of construction to be found in a series of Australian cases, including Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan (1965) 112 CLR 483; [1965] HCA 21; Kirkpatrick v Kotis (2004) 62 NSWLR 567; [2004] NSWSC 1265; Pang v Bydand Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 69 and Bathurst Real Estate Pty Ltd v Fairbrother [2022] NSWSC 351 per Kunc J.
The following principles may be extracted from those authorities:
(a) If the true meaning of a consent order or undertaking is not immediately plain, that meaning is to be ascertained according to ordinary rules of construction (Morgan at 503 per Windeyer J), which requires consideration of text, context and purpose. If, however, after applying those rules of construction, the meaning is ambiguous, a person cannot be committed for contempt of Court for breach of that order (or undertaking) (Pang at [52] and [57] per Beazley JA, McColl JA agreeing; see also Lindgren AJA at [152]). (b) “The requisite ambiguity that will prevent a finding of contempt will exist if the Court is satisfied that, in a respect which is relevant to the particular charge of contempt, there are clearly or reasonably arguable alternative contentions for the constructional choices required to be made to ascertain the meaning of the undertaking. While they may largely overlap, ‘clearly’ and ‘reasonably’ are not coextensive in this context. However, not every difficulty of construction raised by an alleged contemnor will meet this threshold” (Fairbrother at [57(7)]). (c) There is a distinction between an order (or an undertaking) the terms of which are ambiguous and the situation where there are difficulties of construction (Pang at [53]). The following observations by Campbell J in Kirkpatrick at [55], although directed to a Court order rather than a consent order, are apposite:
In my view, the court approaches the question of whether the order is ambiguous with the caution appropriate to a type of litigation which could result in the defendant being punished — if an order is really not clear, it is unjust for someone to be punished for not obeying it. As well, though, the court approaches the question of whether the order is ambiguous on the basis that the recipient is expected to try to understand it and obey it. If a person taking that approach to the order could be in real doubt about what it meant, in a respect which is relevant to the particular charge of contempt which is brought, the charge will fail. This means that there will sometimes be orders which a grammatical analysis would show to contain a syntactic ambiguity, but which are none the less enforceable if it is the type of ambiguity that has no real risk of misleading. There will sometimes be orders which contain a term which has multiple meanings, but where that semantic ambiguity has no real risk of misleading. If there were to be an order addressed to a promoter of musical groups not in any way to be involved in the advertising or promotion of a band under some particular name, the order would be enforceable notwithstanding that a “band” can sometimes be a rubber band, or a headband.
(d) The terms of an order (or undertaking) are to be given a sensible meaning, consistent with the actual terms, but considerations of context and purpose are also relevant (Pang at [57] and [59], Fairbrother at [57]). The task of construction requires an objective determination of meaning giving primacy to the text, but read in light of the context, purpose and the surrounding circumstances known to the parties (Fairbrother at [57] and see also Cherry v Steele-Park (2017) 96 NSWLR 548; [2017] NSWCA 295 at [72]-[79] per Leeming JA, Gleeson and White JJA agreeing), including correspondence between the parties’ legal representatives (Pang at [59]-[62]).
6. Defendants be restrained pending the hearing of this matter from publishing any matter conveying the same or substantially similar imputations to the publications complained of…
We note the requirement for Order 6 is because the defendants have been sending their defence in these defamation proceedings to a number of persons and organisations claiming that it substantiates their claims of fraud against our client.
At present we have identified the following parties have received the emails:
1. Yana De Valle (a person who will be a witness in both these proceedings and the property matter);
2. Wildlife Rescue South Coast; and
3. Sarah Hart;
We are not sure as to which other prospective witnesses they have sent these fraud claims too [sic].
Their conduct may influence witnesses in this matter and therefore may also be contemptuous.
Also, in a letter to the Secretary of Wild2Free Inc in respect to Henderson’s Disciplinary matter, Mr Henderson states “Australia’s biggest wildlife fraud Rae Harvey” and “I will not stop until the full extent of Harvey’s fraudulent conduct is exposed to the donating public and prosecuted to the full extent”. We understand as a matter of course this letter was sent by Wild2Free Inc to its members which include a number of prospective witnesses in both proceedings.
This explanation regarding proposed order 6 provides important context. It highlights the fact that insofar as the plaintiff was concerned, order 6 was required in order to promote the due administration of justice by restraining the defendants from seeking to influence persons who were identified as being witnesses or potential witnesses in the proceeding. The clear object of the proposed restraining order, which must have been equally apparent to the defendants having regard to the explanation provided by the plaintiff’s solicitor, was to protect the integrity of the legal proceedings and the judicial process.
By an email sent on the morning of the following day (16 September 2021), the defendants’ solicitor informed the plaintiff’s solicitor that her clients consented to all orders except for proposed order 6, in relation to which she was seeking instructions but did not presently consent to.
Later, on 16 September 2021 (after receiving a further email from the plaintiff’s solicitor indicating that if proposed order 6 was not consented to, the directions hearing proposed for the following day would have to proceed), the defendants’ solicitor stated that she was instructed that her clients consented to proposed order 6.
As noted above, the six consent orders were made by the Court on 17 September 2021 and the directions hearing was vacated.
It is regrettable that there is no reference to this correspondence in the primary judgment. It casts a different light on the purpose of order 6 which was not so much to call a “ceasefire” and avoid further damage being created pending the resolution of the issues in dispute, as found by the primary judge, but rather to restrain the defendants from seeking to influence actual or potential witnesses who would or might give evidence for the plaintiff at the substantive hearing.
Viewed in this context, the reference to the defendants being restrained “pending the hearing of this matter” focuses attention on the period when there was a need to prevent improper interference with the administration of justice by the defendants seeking to influence actual or potential witnesses for the plaintiff. That period would operate up until the parties had closed their respective cases (including any case in reply by the plaintiff). At this point in the proceedings, all the plaintiff’s witnesses would have been excused.
These important surrounding circumstances, which were known to all the parties, sit uncomfortably with the primary judge’s construction of the phrase “pending the hearing of this matter”, which has the order operate beyond the actual conduct of the hearing involving the taking of evidence and until final judgment is delivered.
I do not accept the respondent’s contention that, in construing the phrase “pending the hearing of this matter”, allowance needs to be made for the possibility that one or other of the parties may have sought leave to re-open their case after judgment was reserved. The respondent was unable to point to anything which indicated that this possibility was anything more than entirely hypothetical in the present case. Nor is there any suggestion in the evidence relating to the circumstances surrounding the making of the relevant order on 17 September 2021 to indicate that the parties mutually contemplated that there might be a need for leave to be sought to re-open and adduce further evidence after judgment was reserved.
For the following reasons, I do not accept the respondent’s submission that the argument on construction presented by Mr Henderson on the appeal was not sufficiently advanced by him at trial.
It is to be recalled that Mr Henderson represented himself both below and on the appeal. At the trial, he relied on his affidavit filed 13 May 2025. Paragraph 10 of that affidavit is directed to order 6. In its entirety the paragraph states (without alteration and with emphasis added):
Around the 18th of October 2024 I received an email from Mr Kalantzis, solicitor for the plaintiff stating that he wanted to relist the defamation matter for consideration by his Honour. At this time I remember taking time to read the court order from the 17th of September 2021 and to confirm that Order 6. was in place only until the hearing of the defamation matter. I was obviously aware the matter had been heard during April and June 2024.
In the final sentence to [10], Mr Henderson deposed that he was “obviously aware the matter had been heard during April and June 2024”. It will be recalled that the hearing was conducted from 15 to 30 April 2024 for the taking of evidence and there was a gap of approximately six weeks before closing submissions were made on 12 June 2024, at which time judgment was reserved.
It is notable that, in the primary judgment at [39], the primary judge refers to the penultimate sentence of this part of Mr Henderson’s affidavit but omits any reference to the final sentence in which Mr Henderson stated his awareness that the matter had been heard during April and June 2024. This omission may have led his Honour to believe Mr Henderson’s position was that the phrase “pending the hearing of this matter” simply meant up until the time the hearing commenced, a proposition which his Honour addressed and rejected in strong terms at [62] and [63] of his reasons for judgment (see at [29] and [31] above).
But that does not accurately describe Mr Henderson’s position. If there was any uncertainty as to his position despite what is stated at [10] of his affidavit, Mr Henderson made clear in his further written submissions below dated 9 June 2025 that he considered that the reference to “the hearing of this matter” covered the period of the hearing between 15 and 30 April 2024 and also extended to the making of final submissions (final oral submissions actually occurred on 12 June 2024 and not 21 June 2024 as appears in the passages below and the same error occurs in the respondent’s chronology in the appeal). Thus, at [6] and [7] of those submissions, Mr Henderson contended (without alteration):
It is submitted Order 6. From the 17th of September 2021 is clear, concise and unambiguous. The defendant was restrained from publishing any matter containing the same or substantially similar imputations to the publications complained of until the matter had been heard, or in other words a hearing had taken place. It is not in dispute that the matter was heard in the Supreme Court of NSW between the 15th and 30th of April 2024, with final submissions on the 21st June 2024 [sic].
With consent orders having the characteristics of a contract, the wording and terms should be given their natural and ordinary meaning, in this case the important words are ‘hearing of this matter’. A court ‘hearing’ is a distinct and easily identifiable stage of the entire court proceedings…
MCHUGH JA: … I'm just wanting to raise with you that the concern about protecting the integrity of the administration of justice, and to ensure that witnesses were not putting in what is intended to be neutral way interfered with in some way. That is, that they were left alone until the hearing. Would that not support your construction on the basis that if the purpose of the injunction was to stop with the witnesses from being spoken to or contacted, that purpose would be achieved by the end of the hearing, and would not require the injunction to continue until judgment. I'm asking you whether you wish to embrace that.
APPELLANT: To be honest, I hadn't considered.
MCHUGH JA: It doesn't matter whether you did or you didn't, because we're talking about the objective meaning now as you stand here. The objective meaning of the order in light of the circumstances in which the order was made. The question is in light of the purpose that's identified in this email, construing the order objectively, is that something that you wish to embrace?
APPELLANT: Yes, your Honour. That does support my contention.
The respondent contended that the primary judge’s construction was supported by the English authorities referred to at [32] above, as well as by Rees J’s decision in Re Austral Bronze Pty Ltd (No 2) (2020) 149 ACSR 221; [2020] NSWSC 1633. For the following reasons, that contention should not be accepted.
Salt involved the question whether an action is a “cause or matter pending” within the meaning of s 24(7) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, 36 & 37 Vict c 66, which provided:
The High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal respectively, in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in them by this Act in every cause or matter pending before them respectively, shall have power to grant, and shall grant, either absolutely or on such reasonable terms and conditions as to them shall seem just, all such remedies whatsoever as any of the parties thereto may appear to be entitled to in respect of any and every legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by them respectively in such cause or matter; so that, as far as possible, all matters so in controversy between the said parties respectively may be completely and finally determined, and all multiplicity of legal proceedings concerning any of such matters avoided.
Jessel MR described the provision as being in “very large terms”. It was held that in an action by a creditor against a debtor in which the plaintiff had obtained final judgment, the Court had power under s 24(7), in order to satisfy the judgment, to grant equitable execution against the defendant by appointing a receiver and that it was unnecessary to bring another action for that purpose.
Self-evidently, the circumstances in Salt are far removed from those here and relevant considerations of context and purpose are entirely different.
Turning to Lord Penzance, the House of Lords was required to construe s 9 of the Public Worship Regulation Act 1874, 37 & 38 Vict c 85, which provided for a Judge to be appointed to hear and determine a representation made against a clerk or rector of a parish for offences against s 8 of that Act. Section 9 provided that the Archbishop shall “require the Judge to hear the matter of the representation at any place within the diocese or province, or in London or Westminster”. It was argued that the determination of the matter ought not to have occurred at Westminster but rather within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court of York where the representation was made.
The determination of the matter occurred at Westminster as directed by the Archbishop. The Lord Chancellor, Lord Selborne, held that s 9 should be construed broadly so that “to hear” comprised the whole determination of the matter, with all its necessary antecedents and proper consequences. Although Lord Selborne noted that the Judge had to do various things before the actual hearing was conducted, including making orders as to evidence and the attendance of witnesses, and those things may not technically be part of the hearing, they were nevertheless included in the authority of the Court to hear and determine the matter.
Once again, the circumstances in Lord Penzance are far removed from those here. Those circumstances related to the conferral of jurisdiction on a Court and the authority of the Court to decide an issue. The danger of relying on what was said in Lord Penzance in the very different circumstances here, involving the proper construction of a consent order, is highlighted by the well-established principle that, in construing provisions conferring jurisdiction or granting powers on a court, it is “quite inappropriate” to make implications or impose limitations which are not found in the express words of the provision (see, for example, Owners of Ship Shin Kobe Maru v Empire Shipping Co Inc (1994) 181 CLR 404; [1994] HCA 54 at 421 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ; Kain v R&B Investments Pty Ltd (2025) 99 ALJR 1138; [2025] HCA 28 at [16] per Gageler CJ).
There was also a very different context in . The issue there related to the right of a curate whose licence has been revoked by the Bishop under a statutory provision, to appeal to the Archbishop who was statutorily bound “to hear the said appeal, and decide the merits thereof”. The Reverend Baring lodged an appeal against the revocation of his licence after the Bishop made adverse findings that he had inappropriately questioned female parishioners “on the subject of violations of the seventh commandment”. The Bishop described the curate’s conduct as revealing a “dangerous tendency”.
…The Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to “hear and determine” proceedings for damages. In the absence of a delimiting context, the words “hear and determine” mean that the Court is to hear and determine the matter following its ordinary procedure; “to hear” a matter includes all its necessary antecedents and proper consequences: Green v Penzance (Lord) (1881) 6 AC 657; Bond v Murdoch (1921) 17 Tas LR 84 at 89. “Determining” proceedings connotes the end of the process, that which the Court eventually decides: R v Young (Trevor) [2003] EWCA Crim 3481; [2004] 1 WLR 1587 at 1601. In the life cycle of legal proceedings, “hear and determine” appears to focus on the resolution and conclusion of proceedings brought in the Tribunal rather than, perhaps, procedural matters in respect of an initiating process.
Her Honour’s reference to the possibility of “a delimiting context” is important. For the reasons given above, the circumstances surrounding the making of order 6 in the present proceeding provide a significant “delimiting context”.
For all these reasons, I consider that the primary judge erred in his construction of order 6. When regard is had to the text, context, and purpose of the order, the phrase “pending the hearing of this matter” on its proper construction refers to the duration of the physical hearing before the Court from 15 to 30 April 2024, at the completion of which the parties’ evidentiary cases were closed. Order 6 did not operate thereafter and include, for example, the publication of his Honour’s reasons for judgment.
Even if that not be the true meaning of order 6, I consider that the appeal should be allowed on the alternative basis that order 6 is ambiguous.
The ambiguity relates to the fact that, having regard to the alternative constructions outlined above, there is a real doubt about what order 6 truly means. As stated in Pang at [56]:
…various phrases have been used when seeking to determine whether the terms of an undertaking are ambiguous. These include: whether its terms were really not clear; whether the terms were such that a person reasonably trying to obey them would know what they meant; whether the person required to comply with the undertaking could be in real doubt as to what the undertaking meant: see Kirkpatrick v Kotis at [55]; whether the terms of the undertaking could mislead the person bound upon a plain reading of its words: see Spokes at 48-49.
I have no hesitation in finding that if the true meaning of order 6 is not that described above, a person required to comply with order 6 could be in real doubt as to what the consent order meant (see also Kirkpatrick at [55]).
As the following exchange reveals, the respondent’s counsel properly acknowledged that, if order 6 was ambiguous, Mr Henderson should not have been found guilty of contempt and the relevant orders should be set aside:
MCHUGH JA: If we move to the alternative one about ambiguity, you don't dispute that if the order is properly characterised as ambiguous in the relevant respect, that at that point [it can’t found] a charge of contempt. Is that right?
RASMUSSEN: I agree with that. That's right. If your Honours find that it was ambiguous in that relevant respect, it couldn't have founded a contempt, and Mr Henderson would be entitled to an acquittal and the orders being set aside. I don't cavil with it.
For all these reasons, I consider that the appeal should be allowed. I understood the parties to agree that this would require the setting aside of the orders dated 17 July 2025 and 17 October 2025, including the declaratory orders dated 17 July 2025 and the orders dated 17 July 2025 and 17 October 2025 finding the appellant guilty of contempt and convicting him of Charges 1, 2 and 3 as set out in the notice of motion dated 17 October 2024. It was also common ground that there should be no order as to costs of either the trial or the appeal. I also understood the respondent not to oppose an order which would have the money paid to date by Mr Henderson in respect of the $10,000 fine being reimbursed together with any accrued interest (see Woolworths Ltd v Strong (No 2) (2011) 80 NSWLR 445; [2011] NSWCA 72 at [32]-[33] per Campbell JA, Handley AJA and Harrison J agreeing).
I propose the following orders:
Appeal allowed.
Set aside the orders dated 17 July 2025, 17 October 2025, including the declaratory orders dated 17 July 2025 and the orders dated 17 July 2025 and 17 October 2025 finding the appellant guilty of contempt and convicting him of Charges 1, 2 and 3 as set out in the notice of motion dated 17 October 2024.
In lieu thereof, there be no order as to costs of either the proceedings below or on appeal, with the intention that the parties each bear their own costs.
Order that the appellant be reimbursed the money he has paid to the Registry in respect of the $10,000 fine, together with any accrued interest.
HARRISON A****JA: I agree with Griffiths AJA.
**********
Henderson
Harvey [2026] NSWCA 56
(1965) 112 CLR 483
(2017) 96 NSWLR 548
(2025) 99 ALJR 1138
(2004) 62 NSWLR 567
(1994) 181 CLR 404
(1998) 194 CLR 355
(2017) 262 CLR 362
(2011) 80 NSWLR 445
Appeal allowed. The orders dated 17 July 2025 and 17 October 2025, including the declaratory orders and findings and convictions on Charges 1, 2 and 3, were set aside. Each party was to bear their own costs, and Henderson was to be reimbursed money paid towards the $10,000 fine, with accrued interest: [75].
The curate exercised his right of appeal to the Archbishop and specifically asked for a time and place to be appointed at which he could be heard and adduce evidence in support of his case. No such hearing was afforded to the curate. The Archbishop was content merely to confirm the revocation decision based on the papers. Unsurprisingly in these circumstances, the Court found that the curate had been denied a hearing because the Archbishop had failed to conduct a judicial inquiry as contemplated by the statute.
Finally, there is Rees J’s judgment in Austral Bronze. Once again, in contrast with the circumstances here, the issue was one of the jurisdiction of a body (in this case, the Dust Diseases Tribunal). Section 10 of the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 (NSW) conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Tribunal “to hear and determine” proceedings referred to in ss 11 and 12. Her Honour stated at [103]: