ABC19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 449

ABC19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 449 | Case summary | Zoe

[36]

The factual background to this matter is summarised in both the primary judgment and the Tribunal's decision. It is necessary only to recite those facts which are relevant to this appeal.
The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He arrived in Australia on 16 February 2015 on a Tourist visa (Subclass FA 600).
On or around 31 March 2015, the appellant applied for a protection visa. The appellant claimed that he would be at risk of serious or significant harm if he were returned to Bangladesh due to his conversion to Christianity, which he claims commenced in Bangladesh and continued after his arrival in Australia. The application was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 20 October 2015.
On 5 November 2015, the appellant applied to the Tribunal for merits review of the delegate's decision. The Tribunal hearing was held over the course of two days, after which the Tribunal invited the appellant (under the now repealed s 424A of the Migration Act) to comment on matters raised at the hearing.
The Tribunal found, inter alia, that the appellant was not a truthful or credible witness. It did not accept that the appellant had any involvement with Christianity at any time in Bangladesh, nor that he fled to Australia to avoid harm in Bangladesh after being attacked and assaulted as a consequence of his interest in Christianity. While the Tribunal accepted that the appellant was baptised and attended church in Australia, it found that he had done so only to gain residency in Australia.
The Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of s 5J of the Migration Act, nor that he faced a real risk of significant harm if returned to Bangladesh.
On 17 December 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision. The Tribunal found that the appellant did not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), nor the alternative criterion in s 36(2)(aa), of the Migration Act.
On 7 January 2019, the appellant applied to the FCFCOA seeking review of the Tribunal's decision under s 476 of the Migration Act. By an amended originating application filed on 6 May 2021, the appellant advanced three grounds of appeal, being that the Tribunal: (i) was affected by apprehended bias; (ii) failed to afford the appellant a fair hearing; and (iii) failed to carry out its statutory task of reviewing the primary decision under s 414 of the Migration Act.
The primary judge found there to be no merit in any of those grounds, which are now replicated on appeal.

[40]

The test for apprehended bias is whether a fair-minded lay observer properly informed as to the nature of the proceeding, the matters in issue and the relevant conduct, might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal might not have brought an impartial mind to the determination of the matter on its merits: Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28 at [27]- [28]; Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [6] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Chen v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 41; (2022) 288 FCR 218 at [35].
The test is one of objective possibility: Ex parte H at [28]. Where apprehended bias is established, the error will be jurisdictional irrespective of any effect that the error might or might not have had on the decision that was made in fact (i.e., there is no materiality threshold): LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321 at [6].
When applied in a non-curial context, the rule must account for the different nature of the body or tribunal whose decision is in issue and the different character of its proceedings. Regard must be had to the applicable statutory provisions, the nature of the inquiries to be made and the particular subject matter with which the decision is concerned: Ex parte H at [5].
The test for apprehended bias entails three steps: (1) identification of the factor which it is said might lead a judge to resolve the question other than on its legal and factual merits; (2) articulation of the logical connection between that factor and the apprehended deviation from deciding that question on its merits; and (3) assessment of the reasonableness of that apprehension from the perspective of a fair-minded lay observer: QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 15; (2023) 279 CLR 148 at [38] (Kiefel CJ and Gageler J).
The appellant identified the species of apprehended bias as one of prejudgment, in the sense of reaching a fixed conclusion before completion of the evidence: SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [27].
It is well-accepted that vigorous testing of evidence and frank exposure of its weaknesses is permissible in inquisitorial proceedings, even with unrepresented parties, but there will be error if a fair-minded lay observer or properly informed lay person might infer that there is nothing a witness could say or do to change a tribunal's preconceived view: Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1790 at [36], citing Ex parte H at [31]-[32].
In the present case, the appellant does not rely on the vigorous testing of evidence, but rather the foreclosing of evidence by the failure of the Tribunal to pursue a specific line of enquiry to which its attention was brought.
It was not in contest that more must be shown than a mere predisposition of the Tribunal to a particular view; it is necessary to show a decision-maker's mind is not open to persuasion: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at 531‑532 (Gleeson CJ and Gummow J).

[122]

In response to the complaint that the Tribunal did not direct the witnesses' attention to the relevant issue in question, the primary judge held that there was no general obligation on the Tribunal to investigate an applicant's claims: PJ [74], citing Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 111 ALD 15 at [25]. The primary judge did not accept that a fair‑minded lay observer properly informed as to the nature of the proceeding would reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal may not bring an impartial mind in determining the application for review: PJ [75].
The primary judge held that even though the Tribunal questioned the relevance of additional evidence being called on matters it clearly accepted, the Tribunal "went ahead and heard that evidence", which was supportive of the proposition that the Tribunal was prepared to give the appellant every opportunity to make his case: PJ [76]. The primary judge held further that the majority of that evidence was either not helpful at all to the issue in question, or merely confirmed what the Tribunal had already indicated it was prepared to accept.
At this stage, I observe that, in my view, this misses the point. The appellant's complaint is that the Tribunal's conduct of the hearing affected the evidence, which I take to be a reference to the evidence that was actually given and the evidence that might potentially have been given. I accept that the evidence actually given by the witnesses confirmed what the Tribunal already accepted; viz., that the witnesses believed that the appellant was a genuine Christian.
The primary judge concluded that the appellant's complaints seek to portray the Tribunal member "in the worst possible light", are unjustified and not supported by the totality of the evidence: PJ [77]. The primary judge relied on the Tribunal member's statement at the end of the hearing that she had not yet reached a conclusion as to whether the appellant was a genuine convert to Catholicism. The primary judge considered this to be a definite indicator that the Tribunal's mind was open to persuasion, and that it had not reached a conclusion prior to the end of the hearing: PJ [78].
The first respondent submits that the primary judge applied the correct test for apprehended bias and was correct to conclude that apprehended bias was not demonstrated. The first respondent says that the transcript must be viewed in its entirety (see e.g., Singh at [37]), and that, in context, the passages impugned by the appellant indicate nothing more than occasional displays of impatience and possibly irritation by the Tribunal member. The first respondent contends that the Tribunal was entitled not to spend more time hearing some of the witnesses' evidence as to the appellant being a Christian, which the Tribunal was prepared to accept. This puts the matter simply and, as I have observed, does not address the appellant's claim.
In any event, the Minister submits that the Tribunal ultimately heard from the witnesses; the representative did not intervene or request that further or additional questions be asked; and several of the witnesses did not "offer much". The Minister does not accept that the Tribunal's examination of witnesses was terse or perfunctory. In the end, I have not found such characterisations of the Tribunal's conduct to be helpful.
The appellant submits that the primary judge erred by:

[127]

The appellant has identified the factor which he says might lead the Tribunal to resolve the question other than on its legal and factual merits. It is prejudgment as to the appellant's credibility as inferred from the Tribunal's conduct and demeanour, demonstrated in the passages recited in the table at paragraph [28] above, and by the audio recording of the hearing.
The appellant has articulated a logical connection between that factor and the apprehended deviation from deciding the question (of the appellant's credibility in relation to his claimed conversion to Christianity) on its merits. That connection is inherent in the species of bias claimed. The question then arises as to whether an apprehension of bias arising from the Tribunal's conduct of the hearing is reasonable from the perspective of a fair-minded lay observer.
Considering the passages in their immediate and broader context, I conclude that it is not. This is because the Tribunal's exchanges with the witnesses and the appellant's representative suggest that the Tribunal's conduct was informed by a view (the correctness of which will be addressed further in relation to Ground 2 of the appeal) that additional evidence as to the belief of the witnesses was of little utility, and therefore could not assist the Tribunal member in forming her own view as to the credibility of the appellant's claim. I do not consider that an apprehension that the Tribunal member had already formed her own view reasonably arises from those exchanges.
The Tribunal member repeats her view that the anticipated evidence is only going to affirm that which she accepts: viz., that the witnesses believe that the appellant is a "genuine Christian". The Tribunal member repeats that it is her function to make her own assessment, and states that she has not yet reached a conclusion on that issue. That statement is preceded by several attempts to elicit what the Tribunal considers to be relevant evidence. Those attempts include making phone calls to witnesses who were not present at the hearing; repeated questioning of the appellant's representative as to the relevance of the proposed evidence; and affording the appellant's representative an opportunity, expressly in relation to one witness, to suggest further questioning (although I accept that the response to that opportunity should be viewed in light of earlier exchanges with the Tribunal). It also included extending the hearing to two days, once it became apparent that the first day would not be sufficient to canvass the evidence.
I do not accept the appellant's submission that those attempts should be dismissed on the basis that the Tribunal foreshadowed the possibility of "dilemma[s]" were it to decline to call the appellant's Australian witnesses by telephone. Nor do I accept that the calls with witnesses were quick and, at times, perfunctory. The Tribunal's conduct in that regard reflects the scepticism that the Tribunal expressed as to the utility of the proposed evidence. In the same way that a predisposition is not sufficient to show that a decision-maker's mind is not open to persuasion, the Tribunal's scepticism is not antithetical to an open mind.
A closed mind as to the credibility of the appellant is not to be mistaken for taking a particular view as to the utility of certain evidence in assessing the "credibility issue".
I accept that the Tribunal, at times, pre-empted the evidence of the witnesses and interrupted the submissions of the appellant's representative, thereby potentially limiting both. The fact that those interruptions may appear to the reasonable bystander to be terse or impatient does not alter the analysis: VFAB at [81]. A reasonable bystander would view that conduct in light of the Tribunal's professed understanding of the utility of the proposed evidence of the witnesses' belief that the appellant was a genuine Christian. As explained further in relation to Ground 2, that understanding was misconceived.
The conclusion of the primary judge that the appellant had not demonstrated apprehended bias is informed by a number of findings that pertain also to Ground 2. I find that there is no error in the primary judge's conclusion on Ground 1, although, as explained below in relation to the second ground of appeal, I do not embrace the entirety of those findings.

[133]

The appellant's reliance on DBD16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 362 is apposite in explaining the utility of the proposed evidence. In that case, the Tribunal struggled to accept that the applicant was a genuine Christian convert when it took into account its concerns about the applicant's credibility arising from inconsistencies in the applicant's account of events upon which his claims were based. The Tribunal did not accept that support from a Reverend attesting to his belief that the applicant was a genuine Christian convert demonstrated that the applicant was a genuine convert in fact: DBD16 at [55]-[56]. The Tribunal's position was that any oral evidence taken from the Reverend could not have influenced the adverse view it had formed of the applicant's credibility founded on the information provided in respect of his other claims: DBD16 at [57]-[58]. On that basis, the Tribunal refused the applicant's request to take evidence from the Reverend in exercise of its power under s 427(1)(a) of the Migration Act. On review, Feutrill J held that this amounted to jurisdictional error: DBD16 at [71].
For present purposes, what is significant in that decision is the distinction drawn between a "bald statement of belief", which would not assist the Tribunal for the reasons it gave, and the facts, matters and circumstances supporting that belief, which may be of considerable relevance and importance to determining if that belief has a proper foundation, and therefore should be accepted: DBD16 at [59].
The Minister distinguishes this case from DBD16. The Minister argues that, in the present case, the Tribunal held two hearings, and the appellant was under no misapprehension as to the central issue. The Tribunal summarised the evidence of the relevant witnesses and accepted that evidence. Even so, I find that the question remains whether the appellant was afforded a meaningful opportunity to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review.

[134]

The Tribunal's reasons do not show that consideration was given to the potential for evidence of the factual foundation for the witnesses' belief (that the appellant had genuinely converted to Christianity) to inform the Tribunal's assessment of the appellant's credibility regarding his claimed conversion: see DBD16 at [61]. Although the Tribunal believed that the appellant had arrived in Australia intending to remain permanently and concocted the claim that he had converted or intended to convert to Christianity and began to attend church solely in order to support his application for protection (TD [195]), there was a distinct and separate possibility that the appellant became a genuine Christian some time after he began attending church in Australia. As much is acknowledged by the Tribunal: TD [196].
The absence of apparent consideration in the Tribunal's reasons of the relevance of the factual foundations of the witnesses' belief, is not surprising. There is nothing to suggest that it was a matter of practical difficulty: cf. DBD16 at [62]; CZBH at [59]. The Tribunal stated that, as it advised the appellant at the hearing, it accepted that since arriving in Australia the appellant had been baptised, attended church on a reasonably regular basis, and that the priest and parishioners at his local church believed him to be a genuine convert to Christianity: TD [195].
For the Tribunal, the relevance of this evidence ends here. This is evident from the passages in the transcript extracted in the table at paragraph [28] above. As the Tribunal member asks rhetorically: "I just told you I accept that they believe that he is a genuine Christian, so what more is there?"
The appellant attempted to explain the relevance of the evidence of the witnesses he proposed to call, as attesting to his regularly attending church for prayer. As the Tribunal member responded: "I accept all of that, so I don't really need their evidence."
The appellant's representative went further to explain the relevance of the evidence as being one of "why they believe" that the appellant is a genuine convert. The Tribunal understood the utility of the evidence to be by way of character reference, which characterisation was rejected by the representative.
The transcript records the representative's objections to the frequent interruptions of the Tribunal on the basis that the Tribunal was not allowing the representative to develop his submission. In the midst of that exchange regarding the relevance of the proposed evidence, the Tribunal asked: "... so, you're going to say [the witness] can assess the genuineness of his conversion, is that what you're going to say?" The representative responded affirmatively. At that point, the Tribunal member indicated that she would speak to three witnesses, including the parish priest, but not anyone else: "because I don't think there's going to be anything to be gained from that."
It is evident from this exchange that the Tribunal member considered that the witnesses' assessment of the genuineness of the appellant's conversion was of no assistance to her. This is reinforced in the treatment of the basis of that view, to the extent that it was elicited from the witnesses, in the Tribunal's reasons. In that regard, it should be noted that notwithstanding that the Tribunal dismissed the relevance of "why" the witnesses held their belief, the Tribunal member did ask one witness (Sebastian): "Why do you believe that?" Similarly, the Tribunal member asked a pre-emptive question of one witness (Dass) as to the reason the witness believed the appellant was a genuine Christian: "... because of that knowledge of him you - you believe he's a genuine Christian, is that correct?" The Tribunal proceeded with an open-ended question (also in relation to witness Sebastian): "Is there anything else you'd like to tell me?"
However, this is in a context where the Tribunal had been asked by the appellant's representative to ask the witnesses why they believe the appellant is a genuine Christian, and the Tribunal member had indicated that the basis of that belief was of no assistance in her assessment of the appellant's credibility. That view is reflected in the Tribunal's reasons, where the Tribunal recites the evidence of the witnesses (TD [127]-[133]), including the basis of their belief, but demonstrates no consideration of the relevance of that factual basis to its assessment of the genuineness of the appellant's conversion in Australia. Rather, it is discounted.
While some of that foundational evidence was elicited from the witnesses, the Tribunal member conducted the hearing on the basis that such evidence could not assist her because it was her belief (or assessment) that was relevant. That the witnesses cannot assess the genuineness of the appellant's conversion for the Tribunal, does not negate the utility of the factual basis of their belief to the Tribunal's assessment.
As the appellant's representative explained, a "critical question" in that assessment is why the witnesses believe as they do. It is critical because it is the only basis upon which the Tribunal can assess the genuineness of the appellant's activities in Australia, aside from the adverse credibility finding in relation to the appellant's activities in Bangladesh. In the absence of that foundational evidence, the adverse credibility finding assumes greater significance. The representative proposed that the Tribunal ask the witnesses questions about the basis of their belief. The Tribunal responded that "this is not a space".
That the appellant's representative may not have communicated with clarity the relevance of the witnesses' foundation for their belief does not detract from the inquisitorial role of the Tribunal; it does not lessen the burden or mitigate the legitimate scope of inquiry. Indeed, in this case, it may be seen (at least, in part) as an incident of the Tribunal's conduct of the hearing.

[136]

The primary judge did not accept that a hearing which extended over two days and took six hours to complete was one where the appellant did not have an opportunity to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal heard from each of the witnesses sought to be called, even though it clearly indicated that it did not think they could necessarily assist in relation to the issues in the review: PJ [81]. The Minister on appeal embraced the primary judge's finding.
In my view, this mistakes the length of the hearing with its quality. I accept that the Tribunal heard from each witness sought to be called and which it could reach by telephone, and that a second day of hearing was provided to accommodate this evidence. I accept that this opportunity was afforded notwithstanding the Tribunal's express misgivings about the utility of the proposed evidence. I also accept that the Tribunal asked open questions of the witnesses, and that there is no proscription on posing leading questions.
However, in the context of the Tribunal expressing its misgivings to the witnesses ("I have nothing to ask you"), and dismissing the submission of the appellant's representative as to the utility of further evidence regarding the basis of the witnesses' knowledge ("this is not a space"), it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the examination of the witnesses reinforced in general terms what the Tribunal already accepted, which is that "because of [the witnesses'] knowledge of [the appellant]", the witnesses believed the appellant was a genuine Christian.
Insofar as the witnesses' knowledge comprised the appellant's baptism, attendance at church and praying with the rosary, it is recorded in the Tribunal's decision at paragraphs [129], [131] and [132] (in relation to witnesses Dias, Sebastian and Strezovaki). In relation to witness Dass, who had known the appellant since September 2016, the Tribunal simply notes that the witness believed the appellant to be an honest person. There is no reference to any particulars of the witness' knowledge of the appellant. (The reference to the absence of personal knowledge of witness Dass at one point in the transcript appears to be limited to a particular piece of information that is indecipherable from the transcript.) The possibility that the witnesses' knowledge of the appellant comprised something that may have been significant to the Tribunal's assessment of the appellant's credibility in relation to his conversion in Australia, cannot be excluded. That possibility assumes greater significance in circumstances where the Tribunal has rejected the claim that the appellant is a genuine convert on the basis of a general credibility finding (as evidenced in the reasoning at TD [195]-[196]): i.e., a finding that is based on the Tribunal's assessment of the appellant's claimed activities in Bangladesh.
The open question that the Tribunal posed to the appellant's representative as to whether there was "anything else" that the representative would like the Tribunal to ask witness Dass, must be viewed in light of previous exchanges with the Tribunal member in which she made it clear that certain evidence was of no utility to her assessment of the appellant's credibility. The Minister's submission that the appellant's legal representative had the opportunity to elicit more information from the witnesses (but did not), should be understood in this context.
The primary judge rejected the notion of a general duty to "enquire" into an applicant's claims: PJ [74]. The Minister made a similar submission that the Tribunal was not obliged to take further steps to "explore" the basis of the witnesses' beliefs. As much may be accepted. It does not address the present case. The appellant's representative indicated to the Tribunal the relevance of the proposed evidence. The Tribunal responded that "this is not a space" for the examination of the foundation of the witnesses' belief that the appellant was a genuine convert.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this approach directed the course of witness examination. This is evident in the Tribunal member's statement to certain witnesses that she had nothing to ask them, and in the frequent interruptions of the appellant's representative with which the representative took issue in his attempt to explain the relevance of the proposed evidence, which explanation the Tribunal member did not accept. The fact that this approach had the potential (as a realistic possibility) to inform the examination of witnesses is sufficient to acknowledge the loss of opportunity to present evidence or make submissions on a critical issue, viz., the credibility of the appellant's conversion to Christianity in Australia.
This does not mean, as the appellant submits, that the Tribunal's examination of the witnesses was an "empty gesture": Maltsin at [38], referring to NALQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 121 at [30]. The examination proceeded as it did due to the Tribunal's misapprehension as to the utility of the proposed evidence. As explained above in relation to Ground 1, there is a distinction between a mind that is not open to persuasion, and one that is not in the end persuaded. I acknowledge that the appellant's representative experienced some difficulty (by way of interruption) in presenting his argument to the Tribunal. Nevertheless, the point was made as to the relevance of the basis of the witnesses' belief, which was dismissed by the Tribunal.
I consider that the opportunity afforded to present evidence and make submissions was limited by the Tribunal's misapprehension as to the utility of the evidence given and proposed to be given. The Tribunal indicated that it was not prepared to take evidence as to the basis of the witnesses' belief as "this is not a space" for such an enquiry. That was a misapprehension as to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review. The fact that the Tribunal accepted the evidence of the relevant witnesses (as to fact of their belief) is, therefore, not to the point. The Tribunal did not accept that the basis of their belief was relevant to a central issue in the review. In circumstances where the appellant was the subject of an adverse credibility finding in relation to his activities in Bangladesh, and the evidence of the appellant's activities in Australia was the only basis upon which a sur place claim could be assessed, it is a short step to conclude that the Tribunal's misapprehension as to the utility of that evidence undermined the opportunity afforded by s 425 of the Migration Act.

[150]

On a review of paragraphs [195] to [196] of the Tribunal's decision, it is evident that the Tribunal's assessment of the possibility that the appellant became a genuine Christian some time after he began attending church in Australia is subsumed by the Tribunal's assessment of the credibility of the appellant's claim that he converted to Christianity in Bangladesh prior to arriving in Australia: TD [196]. It is the Tribunal's assessment of the "[appellant's] lack of credibility" in relation to those claims that is the basis for the Tribunal's finding that the appellant arranged to be baptised and continues to attend church, not because he is a genuine convert, but in order to obtain residency in Australia.
The witnesses' belief of the genuineness of the appellant's conversion did not hold sway as against the Tribunal's general assessment of the appellant's credibility. This is the contest that the Tribunal set up at the hearing: viz., the witnesses' assessment as against the Tribunal's assessment. There does not appear to be any acknowledgment that the former could inform the latter, by virtue of the factual foundation for the witnesses' belief providing a basis for the Tribunal's assessment of credibility.
The Tribunal did acknowledge the basis of the witnesses' belief that the appellant is a genuine convert: TD [129], [131] and [132]. However, there does not appear to be any consideration of the foundation of that belief, other than to acknowledge that the Tribunal accepted that the priest and the appellant's fellow parishioners believed him to be a genuine convert: TD [195]. Consistent with the Tribunal's exchange with the appellant's legal representative, there does not appear to be any acknowledgement of the utility of that (kind of) evidence beyond supporting the witnesses' subjective belief of the appellant's character. There is certainly no acknowledgement that the basis of that belief might inform the Tribunal's assessment of the appellant's credibility.
The s 414 question is whether this general finding has caused the Tribunal to lose sight of and not discharge its statutorily mandated task by overlooking a material claim or part of a claim that the appellant has made. I accept that it has. The basis of the witnesses' belief as to the genuineness of the appellant's conversion to Christianity in Australia is an important aspect of the Tribunal's assessment of the credibility of that claim.
The Tribunal found that the appellant's claim that he had converted to Christianity in Bangladesh was "concocted", and that he "arrived in Australia intending to remain permanently": TD [195]. The Minister says that this intention materialised subsequently, through the appellant's claim for a protection visa one month after his arrival. Whether the appellant's intention on arrival can be inferred from his later application for a protection visa is moot, given that this consideration does not feature in the Tribunal's reasons. Rather, as the appellant submitted and the Minister ultimately acknowledged, this finding about the appellant's intention on arrival to Australia is linked to the adverse credibility findings made earlier in the decision.
The Tribunal acknowledges that something could have changed whilst in Australia. However, the Tribunal dismissed that possibility on the basis of "the applicant's lack of credibility", which the Tribunal assessed in relation to the appellant's activities in Bangladesh. The Tribunal did not assess separately the credibility of the appellant's conversion in Australia, the possibility of which it had acknowledged. As the Court cautions in AZU15 (at [11]), care needs to be taken by the Tribunal to ensure that blanket, reflex or exaggerated adverse credit findings do not take the place of a proper examination of a visa applicant's claims as required by s 414.
The fact that the Tribunal found that the appellant provided false evidence in relation to his claim of conversion in Bangladesh does not lead inextricably to a finding that the appellant provided false evidence in relation to his activities in Australia. There is no independent consideration of the basis of the claim of conversion in Australia. This is poignant in circumstances where the Tribunal was invited to examine the evidence of witnesses regarding the foundation of their belief as to the genuineness of the appellant's conversion in Australia. Furthermore, the Tribunal could not have made a general finding that the appellant is untruthful on the basis of its assessment of the appellant's activities in Bangladesh, without overlooking the possibility (which it acknowledged) of conversion in Australia.
Finally, the Tribunal's finding that the appellant would not face problems on return to Bangladesh, is based on the finding that there is no evidence to suggest that the Bangladeshi authorities were aware of the appellant attending church in Australia, which the Tribunal found was disingenuous (TD [197]); "no plausible reason" why his family would believe otherwise (TD [198]); and "no credible evidence" that the appellant would be viewed as having abandoned his faith on return to Bangladesh: TD [201]. Consequently, there is no consideration that the appellant might face harm on return to Bangladesh because his church attendance signals a genuine practice or belief, and one that he might continue in Bangladesh. This underscores the materiality of the Tribunal's error.

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