Before the Tribunal
10 The appellant did not fare any better before the Tribunal than before the delegate. For reasons that are factually complicated, adverse credit findings caused the Tribunal to disregard even some apparently inconsequential aspects of his account of events. A number of those adverse findings were not apparently necessary for the Tribunal's decision, even in an extended sense of being contextually important. In a more contentious set of circumstances this blanket approach might give rise to serious concerns about whether a protection visa applicant's claims had been fully addressed and the Tribunal's statutory task properly performed.
11 Care needs to be taken by the Tribunal to ensure that blanket, reflex or exaggerated adverse credit findings do not take the place of a proper examination of a visa applicant's claims as required by s 414 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). When adverse credit findings of this kind are made, there is a risk that the Tribunal will lose sight of and not discharge its statutorily-mandated task, including by overlooking a material claim or part of a claim that an applicant has made. Credibility will not always be a complete answer to every integer of such a claim.
12 At the hearing of the appeal, we expressed some concern about the nature and extent of the adverse credit findings made by the Tribunal in this case. Counsel for the Minister addressed the Court about how the adverse credibility findings had been arrived at and used by the Tribunal, especially by reference to the transcript of the Tribunal hearing. This allayed our concerns in the sense that it was sufficiently clear that the adverse credibility findings made by the Tribunal did not ultimately compromise the essential features of the merits review process in relation to the appellant's claims.
13 With this in mind, we return to the Tribunal's findings and reasons. After giving a narrative of the appellant's claims, the Tribunal addressed at some length its concerns about the appellant's credibility. The Tribunal considered four topics: (1) when the appellant said he went into hiding prior to leaving for Australia; (2) the money the appellant said was paid to K; (3) a letter that was given to a politician about the abduction of his cousin and K's reaction to that letter; and (4) a claim of sudden interest being taken in the appellant by K. The Tribunal did not accept the appellant's account on each of those topics, largely due to changes in the appellant's accounts of what had happened to him.
14 As we have already indicated, in addressing its credibility concerns, the Tribunal's concerns accumulated to the point where virtually nothing the appellant said of importance to his claims, and a number of things of little apparent importance, were believed. However it is apparent from the hearing transcript that the Tribunal was trying, by open-ended and non-leading questions, to obtain a consistent and coherent account from the appellant. As we have already stated, we might have reached a different conclusion about the Tribunal's approach to its task based on the reasons for decision alone and without the benefit of the hearing transcript.
15 We turn briefly to the four topics in order to explain how it was that the global adverse credit findings were arrived at, which as we have already observed went further than was necessary to address the appellant's claims for protection.
16 As to the first topic, the appellant's account as to when he went into hiding prior to leaving for Australia shifted several times between different dates in April and May 2012. His account concluded with an assertion that, as a result of having earlier been abducted and held by K, on 19 April 2012 he obtained a visa for India for the purposes of fleeing Sri Lanka, then returned to work for several weeks, then went into hiding before finally departing for Australia. The Tribunal regarded the appellant's final claimed sequence of events as not being credible, especially as the date upon which the appellant said he went into hiding changed three or four times.
17 On the second topic of payments to K, the appellant's visa application statutory declaration dated 25 November 2012 included an account of a demand for payment being made by K, but no payment being made. That statutory declaration indicates that a deliberate decision had been made not to pay K. At the Tribunal hearing, the appellant said substantial amounts of money had been paid to K. The Tribunal regarded this as a significant discrepancy.
18 On the third topic of writing a letter to a politician about the abduction of his cousin, and K's reaction to that letter, the appellant's account in his 17 February 2015 pre-hearing statement to the Tribunal was that K, in response to the letter, had sought to intimidate the appellant's aunt in his presence in 2011. The appellant's statement said that K had told his aunt in his presence that K had killed the appellant's cousin and not to waste time looking for her. At the Tribunal hearing, the appellant said he first had trouble with anybody beyond general army round-ups in April 2012, and that he first started to have trouble with K in February 2012. He did not say anything about the letter being referred to by K until that was raised by the Tribunal. The Tribunal considered the initial account given at the hearing to be different from the account given in the pre-hearing statement of 17 February 2015. The Tribunal's reasons record the appellant being given ample opportunity to mention this earlier 2011 encounter with K when he was initially questioned as to his difficulties with K, which is borne out by the hearing transcript. The Tribunal regarded the appellant's failure to mention the 2011 encounter when first describing difficulties with K at the hearing and instead for him to claim at that point that his difficulties with K began in February 2012 as not being credible.
19 The fourth topic of K's sudden interest in the appellant was approached by the Tribunal with scepticism. The Tribunal considered it was inherently unlikely that K, as a man with connections with the authorities, and who had carried out serious offences over a number of years, would suddenly take an interest in the appellant in circumstances where there had been a considerable earlier period in which K's interest could have occurred, during which nothing happened. The Tribunal regarded the late emergence of a claim of sudden interest by K as a fabrication designed to coincide with the appellant's departure from Sri Lanka less than two months later.
20 These four topics and the adverse conclusions made about each of them were considered cumulatively on the question of overall credibility. Except as to peripheral matters, the Tribunal decided the appellant was not a witness of truth and should not be believed in relation to a raft of his claims, both central and residual. As noted above, the Tribunal warned the appellant at the beginning of the hearing that it had to make its own assessment as to whether he was telling the truth.
21 The Tribunal did not believe the appellant's claim of having been abducted and imprisoned by K or any of the other claims concerning K, including threats of extortion.
22 Claims by the appellant that people had acted on K's behalf or on behalf of the CID were found to be false. Residual claims of having a record or file with the police, being questioned by the authorities about his movements, having problems with security forces while at school, and being harassed, rounded up or held by the army were all disbelieved.
23 The appellant asserted in his pre-hearing statement to the Tribunal that K did not like him because he was on various societies and committees. In that context, he referred to joining the fishing association in 2007, being secretary from around 2008 until he went to Colombo in 2011, when he became co-secretary (later referred to as vice secretary).
24 In pre-hearing written submissions made on the appellant's behalf to the Tribunal dated 19 February 2015 it was said he had a prominent position in the community, including membership of various committees which were relevant to his profile and to K's animosity towards him. It was submitted this needed to be explored further by the Tribunal. That further exploration took place when, during the Tribunal hearing, the appellant was asked about his involvement in the Hindu welfare society, and he said that the society had two duties, namely, to "help the injured" and to "organise the people"; and that he undertook these activities for the society, including organising the people for an annual festival in July each year. He was asked about the fishing association and said that it collected money and distributed it to fishermen, and that he attended monthly meetings, the last that he attended being in April 2012.
25 The Tribunal accepted that the appellant was the secretary and vice secretary of the fishing committee, and was a member of the Hindu welfare society. However, because he was found not to be a witness of truth, the Tribunal considered that there was no credible evidence of what he had done as secretary or vice secretary of the fishing association, or what he had done more generally for those organisations, and over what period.
26 As a result of the Tribunal accepting that the appellant had indeed occupied the position of secretary, it declined to wait to receive a further document to demonstrate that this position was in fact held by him.
27 The Tribunal found no credible evidence that the appellant or any member of his family suffered harm in Sri Lanka or that anyone there wished to harm him, nor any credible evidence of wealth, or perception of wealth, so as to ground that aspect of his claim.
28 After considering country information at some length, the Tribunal found that the appellant did not hold a well-founded fear of persecution for any Refugees Convention reason. Similarly, no basis for complementary protection was made out because the Tribunal found no substantial ground for believing that the appellant had any real risk of suffering significant harm as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of returning to Sri Lanka.