Mr Manny asked the court to hear his application for permission to appeal sooner because he said his health was deteriorating and he might die or become incapacitated. Mossop J accepted that he had several serious health and personal difficulties, but found that the evidence did not show a sufficiently limited life expectancy to justify giving his case greater priority. The court also noted that an early decision granting permission to appeal would not resolve the dispute: a further appeal would still be needed, and the underlying claims could continue only after that. The request for expedition was dismissed. The permission-to-appeal application was scheduled for 12 June 2026, with written-submission limits and permission for Mr Manny to attend remotely.

The High Court held that the State’s statutory authority to arrange the port privatisations did not give it a legal right to make NSW Ports accept terms or ignore Commonwealth competition law. A government’s general ability to contract is not enough to extend derivative Crown immunity to a private company dealing with it. The Court also held that Mayfield’s limited participation in an earlier ACCC appeal did not prevent its own case, and that a release in favour of the State did not release NSW Ports. The appeal succeeded, but the underlying competition claims were remitted for further determination, not finally decided. This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes, and a qualified Australian lawyer should check this before it is acted on, relied on or used.

The High Court dismissed TCXM’s appeal. A 2025 statutory validation provision treated the Australia-Nauru arrangement as valid for all purposes despite the alleged lack of procedural fairness. The Court also held that TCXM had not shown his removal to Nauru was outside the statutory duty to remove as soon as reasonably practicable. The judges differed in their reasoning about whether some post-arrival consequences could ever be relevant, but each rejected TCXM’s argument on the facts and statutory framework. Finally, the Court held that the increased risk to his health did not establish that his removal was punishment prohibited by Ch III.

The employer accepted that BNV’s psychological condition worsened during her employment and that work stressors played some part. The dispute was whether work was the main contributing factor to that worsening. The Court of Appeal concluded that the presidential member understood that question correctly, considered the possible role of BNV’s prior condition and stressors, and found no other contributing factor established by the evidence. The employer’s disagreement with that factual assessment did not establish legal error. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Court cancelled the earlier order requiring Ms Williment to provide $100,000 security for Ms Waters’ costs of the appeal. The key change was that Ms Waters had since brought her own cross-appeal, which would require overlapping preparation and reduce the work attributable only to Ms Williment’s appeal. The Court also considered the reasons given for security and found that they did not amount to special circumstances. It did not conduct a full assessment of the appeal’s merits and said the grounds were reasonably arguable on the incomplete record before it. The evidence indicated that security in a significant amount was likely to prevent the appeal from continuing.

The Court refused to extend the time for Ms Marium to seek review of an earlier decision. The earlier decision had upheld a Registrar's order requiring her to file a summons for leave to appeal by a specified deadline, failing which her proceedings would be dismissed. The summons arrived after that deadline. The Court said the order took effect automatically when the deadline was missed, and found no demonstrated error in the primary judge's refusal to vary it. Ms Marium was ordered to pay costs. This is a summary of the judgment, not a determination of any other proceeding or claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed B & B Legal to update its response and rely on a deed, but it did not allow Mr Smits to proceed with his proposed appeal. The summons was late, the delay was not adequately explained, and the proposed grounds did not show the kind of significant error needed for leave. The Court also stressed that the primary judge had only needed to decide whether a genuine dispute existed, not finally decide who owed the deposit. Mr Smits was ordered to pay B & B Legal’s costs.

The Court accepted that BRG had acted oppressively and breached its agreement with FPL when it hindered the transfer of clients. But proving wrongdoing did not itself establish how much compensable loss it caused. FPL's expert calculation relied on a version of events the trial judge rejected, and the evidence did not show which clients stayed with BRG because of the wrongful conduct rather than their own choices or other circumstances. The Court would not guess at a number. Without a rational basis to quantify the loss, neither compensation nor a share buy-out was justified, so the appeal was dismissed.

The Folleys bought a business and later argued that the Hockeys' failure to remove a bank charge meant they should not have to pay the vendor finance. The Court of Appeal held that, under the agreement, proceeding to completion meant the Folleys could not later insist on the unsatisfied conditions precedent. It also rejected their attempts to introduce most additional evidence and several new arguments. The Court found no procedural unfairness in the credibility findings and no basis for partial rescission. The appeal was dismissed, although one exhibit was admitted and the notice of appeal was amended.