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[2026] ACTCA 13
procedural. The application dated 30 April 2026 was dismissed with costs reserved; orders 1–4 made on 29 April 2026 were vacated; the leave application was listed for 12 June 2026 at 9:15 am with written...
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
Mr Manny asked the court to hear his application for permission to appeal sooner because he said his health was deteriorating and he might die or become incapacitated. Mossop J accepted that he had several serious health and personal difficulties, but found that the evidence did not show a sufficiently limited life expectancy to justify giving his case greater priority. The court also noted that an early decision granting permission to appeal would not resolve the dispute: a further appeal would still be needed, and the underlying claims could continue only after that. The request for expedition was dismissed. The permission-to-appeal application was scheduled for 12 June 2026, with written-submission limits and permission for Mr Manny to attend remotely.
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2,263 words · generated 07/10/2026
Manny v ACT [2026] ACTCA 13 concerned an application to expedite a pending application for leave to appeal. It did not decide whether leave to appeal should be granted, nor did it determine the underlying claims.
Jeff Manny was self-represented. He sought leave to appeal from a decision of Muller AJ in Manny v ACT (No 2) [2026] ACTSC 23. That decision struck out an originating claim and amended statements of claim and dismissed proceedings concerning dental treatment, a parking infringement, an assault and housing ([1]). Mossop J summarised the reasons given below: the pleadings had not addressed deficiencies previously identified, despite an opportunity to amend, and the claims were dismissed after consideration of whether another opportunity to replead was appropriate ([10]).
The leave application had been listed for 19 June 2026. The Chief Justice could not hear it because of her earlier involvement in proceedings relevant to the underlying claims. Mossop J noted that, absent a further expedition order, the leave application could instead be listed before another judge on 12 June 2026 ([2]-[3]).
On 30 April 2026, Mr Manny applied for an urgent hearing, asking that the court hear the matter within a week or two before he became totally incapacitated or died ([4]). He relied on asserted health conditions, financial hardship, possible homelessness from 1 June 2026 and the absence of legal assistance ([5]-[6]). His supporting material included affidavits filed in the appeal and underlying proceedings ([7]-[9]).
Mossop J described evidence of multiple conditions, including musculoskeletal problems, medication, high blood pressure, dental problems, pain and a history of broken ribs. The judge also noted that Mr Manny appeared frail and older than his years ([12]). A family member who was also his landlord had given notice requiring vacant possession by 1 June 2026 ([13]). However, the evidence did not include expert opinion that his life expectancy was limited, and most of the conditions appeared to have existed for some time ([14]).
The court dismissed the expedition application. It vacated orders 1-4 made on 29 April 2026, listed the leave application for 12 June 2026, set five-page limits and filing dates for written submissions, allowed Mr Manny to appear by audio or audiovisual link, and limited oral submissions to 25 minutes in chief and 10 minutes in reply ([19]). Costs were reserved.
The court’s central concern was whether the evidence justified giving Mr Manny’s case priority over other cases. Mossop J recognised that expedition may be appropriate where a party has a demonstrated limited life expectancy. The example given was terminal cancer. The stated reasons included enabling a significant claim to be finalised before the person dies and respecting the person’s interest in knowing the outcome of the proceedings ([15]).
The court did not treat a list of serious symptoms or circumstances as automatically establishing the necessary basis for expedition. It assessed the evidence provided. The material showed general deterioration across several areas, but the judge found it lacked the certainty needed to warrant the order sought ([17]). In particular, there was no expert evidence indicating a relevantly limited life expectancy ([14]). The distinction in the reasoning is between evidence of ongoing illness and evidence supporting a sufficiently urgent prognosis for expedition.
Mossop J separately considered the risk of homelessness. The court accepted that Mr Manny was at risk of losing his accommodation from 1 June 2026, but found that circumstance was not, on its own, significant enough to justify expedition ([17]). The judgment therefore recognises the housing issue as part of the circumstances, but does not treat it as determinative of the scheduling question.
A further consideration was that Mr Manny declined to have the leave application heard on the papers because he wished to make oral submissions ([16]). The judgment records that procedural choice as part of the context. It does not state that requesting an oral hearing was improper or that it independently defeated expedition.
The court also examined what an earlier hearing could achieve. The immediate application concerned permission to appeal, not the appeal itself. If leave were granted, the appeal would still need to be heard. If that appeal ultimately succeeded, the underlying proceedings could then continue. Mossop J considered that process likely to take years rather than months ([17]). That meant an earlier hearing of the leave application would not necessarily produce a final determination of the underlying claims within the period relevant to Mr Manny’s asserted health concerns.
The conclusion followed from these combined considerations. The evidence did not establish the kind of limited life expectancy that would warrant expedition, the housing risk did not independently justify it, and the procedural step sought would not itself finally resolve the underlying dispute. The judge therefore found no appropriate basis to expedite the leave application ([17]-[18]).
The judgment does not identify or interpret a statute, regulation or separately cited appellate authority governing expedition. Its account of the applicable approach is contained in Mossop J’s statement at [15] and its application at [17]-[18]. It should therefore be read as a procedural decision grounded in the circumstances and evidence before the court, rather than as a comprehensive statement of a statutory test.
Before this decision, the relevant proposition expressed in the judgment was that courts would usually take steps to expedite a significant claim where a party was shown to have a limited life expectancy. The court connected that approach both to the possibility of finalising the claim before death and to the person’s interest in knowing the outcome ([15]). It also expressly acknowledged the institutional consequence: expedition gives that case priority over cases where the same personal factors are absent ([15]).
The decision did not replace or qualify that observation with a numerical threshold, a prescribed form of medical evidence, or a set of mandatory factors. It did not say that expert evidence is invariably necessary. Rather, in this case, the absence of expert evidence formed part of the explanation for why the material did not establish the relevantly limited life expectancy ([14], [17]). The judgment’s reasoning is fact-sensitive.
After the decision, the immediate procedural position was clear: the expedition application had been dismissed, while the application for leave to appeal remained to be heard on 12 June 2026 ([19]). The judgment did not grant or refuse leave, decide the merits of an appeal, or reinstate the underlying claims. Nor does the supplied judgment establish a broader change in the law. Its practical contribution is its explanation of how the court assessed the evidence and the likely effect of expedition in this application.
The underlying decision in Manny (No 2) is discussed only to explain the nature and procedural history of the leave application ([1], [10]). Mossop J’s decision does not rehear or endorse the merits of Muller AJ’s conclusions. The immediate question was scheduling, not whether the pleadings had been properly struck out.
At [15], Mossop J said that where a party is shown to have a limited life expectancy, “the court would usually take steps to expedite the hearing and determination of a claim”. In plain English, a well-supported prospect that a claimant may not live long enough to see a case resolved can be a substantial reason to give the case earlier attention. The passage also identifies a human reason for expedition: the person may have an interest in learning the result while alive.
At [15], the judge also noted that expedition “will have the effect of giving priority” to that case over others. In plain English, an expedited listing is not merely a change of date without wider consequences. It affects the order in which the court’s limited hearing time is allocated. The judgment places that consequence alongside the personal reasons that may justify expedition.
At [17], the judge said the evidence was “not sufficient to establish that Mr Manny has such a limited life expectancy as would warrant expedition”. This is the central application of the approach. It does not deny that Mr Manny had health problems; the reasons record several of them at [12]. It explains that the evidence, taken as a whole, did not establish the degree of urgency the court considered necessary for the requested priority.
At [17], the court said homelessness from 1 June 2026 was not “such a significant factor as would warrant, of itself, a grant of expedition”. In plain English, the court accepted that the housing concern mattered, but did not find that it independently justified advancing the hearing.
Also at [17], Mossop J explained that granting leave would not itself end the case. A separate appeal would still be needed, and a successful appeal would allow the underlying proceedings to continue. The judge considered that process likely to take years rather than months. In practical terms, an earlier permission hearing would be only an earlier procedural step, not necessarily an earlier final outcome.
The decision is most directly relevant to applications seeking expedition because of a party’s health or asserted risk of death or incapacity. It indicates that the court may consider whether the evidence establishes a sufficiently limited life expectancy, rather than relying only on the existence of multiple health conditions. In this case, the court noted a range of conditions but found no expert evidence of a relevantly limited prognosis ([12], [14], [17]).
It is also relevant where the requested early hearing concerns an intermediate procedural question, such as leave to appeal, rather than the final hearing of the dispute. The court considered whether advancing that first step would bring about a final result in a meaningful period. Here, a grant of leave would still have been followed by an appeal, and potentially further proceedings ([17]).
The judgment also speaks to cases where other hardship, such as possible homelessness, is relied on alongside health concerns. The court considered that circumstance, but found it insufficient by itself to warrant expedition on the facts presented ([13], [17]). That conclusion is specific to this record; the judgment does not state that housing insecurity can never support expedition.
The reasons do not establish that every future applicant must provide expert medical evidence, that only terminal illness can justify expedition, or that a party’s wish to make oral submissions weighs against expedition as a rule. The court gave terminal cancer as an example of limited life expectancy, and it assessed Mr Manny’s evidence as a whole. It also recorded his preference for oral submissions without laying down a general rule about that preference ([15]-[17]).
For procedural analysis, the relevant questions raised by the judgment are therefore evidentiary and practical: what the material shows about prognosis; whether the health circumstances establish urgency; what other hardship is relied on; whether the requested hearing would produce a final determination or only another procedural stage; and what priority an expedited listing would give the case relative to others. Those are features of the reasoning, not a separate checklist formulated by the court.
The supplied judgment contains no decisions issued after Manny v ACT [2026] ACTCA 13 and therefore provides no material showing how later courts have treated it. It would not be possible to identify later applications, distinctions, approvals or criticisms from this source alone.
The only other judicial decision identified is Manny v ACT (No 2) [2026] ACTSC 23, the decision from which Mr Manny sought leave to appeal. Mossop J referred to that decision to summarise the underlying claims and the reasons for striking out the pleadings ([1], [10]). That is procedural background, not later treatment of the expedition decision.
The judgment also refers at [10] to earlier deficiencies identified by McWilliam J, but does so through the account of the reasons in Manny (No 2). The supplied text does not give a separate citation for those proceedings or establish any relationship between them and the expedition issue. No wider precedent history should be inferred from these references.
The judgment does not define what evidence will be sufficient to establish a limited life expectancy in other cases. It gives terminal cancer as an example and explains why the evidence in Mr Manny’s case did not suffice, but does not prescribe a medical report format, a particular prognosis period, or a fixed evidentiary threshold ([15], [17]).
It also does not decide whether expert evidence is always necessary. The absence of expert evidence was expressly noted ([14]), but the reasoning is framed as an assessment of the evidence overall. The judgment leaves open how other material, or a different combination of medical evidence and circumstances, might be assessed.
The relationship between urgent personal circumstances and procedural efficiency is addressed only at a general level. Mossop J recognised the interest in knowing the outcome before death, while also noting the priority given over other cases ([15]). The decision does not explain how a court should balance those considerations in circumstances unlike those before it.
Finally, the judgment did not decide the merits of the proposed appeal or the underlying claims. The leave application was listed for 12 June 2026, with written submissions due on the dates specified in the orders ([19]). The supplied material does not show what happened at that later hearing or whether the underlying proceedings ultimately continued.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY COURT OF APPEAL
Case Title: Manny v ACT Citation: [2026] ACTCA 13 Hearing Date: 8 May 2026 Decision Date: 8 May 2026 Before: Mossop J Decision: (1) The application dated 30 April 2026 is dismissed with costs reserved. (2) Orders 1-4 made on 29 April 2026 are vacated. (3) The application for leave to appeal is listed for hearing on 12 June 2026 at 9:15am. (4) The applicant is to file and serve written submissions limited to not more than 5 pages by 22 May 2026. (5) The respondent is to file and serve written submissions limited to not more than 5 pages by 5 June 2026. (6) The Registrar is directed to not accept for filing any written submissions that exceed the specified page limit. (7) The applicant has leave to appear by audio or audiovisual link at the hearing on 12 June 2026. (8) Oral submissions are limited to 25 minutes in chief and 10 in reply. Catchwords: JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – APPEAL – Application to expedite hearing of application for leave to appeal – whether applicant had such a limited life expectancy as would warrant expedition – where applicant declined to have application for leave to appeal heard on the papers – where expedition of hearing of leave to appeal would not substantially impact timing of underlying proceedings if applicant successful – held evidence did not disclose sufficient basis for expedition – application dismissed Cases Cited: Manny v ACT (No 2) [2026] ACTSC 23 Parties: Jeff Manny (Applicant) Australian Capital Territory (Respondent) Representation: Counsel Self-represented (Applicant) C Davis (Respondent) Solicitors Self-represented (Applicant) ACT Government Solicitor (Respondent) File Number: ACTCA 14 of 2026 Decision Under Appeal: Court: ACT Supreme Court Before: Muller AJ Date of Decision: 11 February 2026 Case Title: Manny v ACT (No 2) Citation: [2026] ACTSC 23 Court File Numbers: SC 500 of 2022 SC 64 of 2023 SC 82 of 2023 SC 96 of 2023 MOSSOP J: Introduction
Jeff Manny has applied for leave to appeal against a decision of Muller AJ striking out an originating claim and amended statement of claim, and dismissing proceedings in a number of claims brought by Mr Manny: Manny v ACT (No 2) [2026] ACTSC 23. These were identified in Manny (No 2) as: (a) SC 500 of 2022 (the Dental Treatment Claim); (b) SC 64 of 2023 (the Parking Infringement Claim); (c) SC 82 of 2023 (the Assault Claim); and (d) SC 96 of 2023 (the Housing Claim).
The application for leave to appeal is listed for hearing on 19 June 2026 at 9:15am before the Chief Justice. Because it is unable to be heard by the Chief Justice due to her previous involvement with proceedings relevant to the underlying claims, it will need to be heard by another judge.
Unless further expedited as a result of the current application (which I will address in a moment), the application for leave to appeal will be listed instead on 12 June 2026 before another judge and the timetable for written submissions adjusted accordingly. The timetable that is in place requires written submissions from Mr Manny to be filed three weeks prior to the hearing and written submissions from the respondent to be filed one week prior to the hearing. If adjusted to take into account the earlier hearing date, Mr Manny’s submissions would be due on 22 May 2026 (two weeks from today), and the respondent’s submissions due on 5 June 2026. The hearing would be 35 days from today.
By application in proceeding dated 30 April 2026, Mr Manny seeks an order that the court “hear the proceedings of AC 14 of 2026, urgently and if possible within a week or two before the appellant is totally incapacitated or dies”.
Grounds and evidence
The grounds of the application include the following: 1. The appellant is very sick and semi-paralysed on right side of his body since the criminal attack on him on 13 February 2023, and getting worse by time. 2. The appellant is suffering from very high blood pressure of 179/89 for the past 2 years that he already had two heart attacks; 3. The appellant is suffering from very severe dental infections and pain in the past 8 years; 4. The appellant is homeless and doesn’t have anywhere to live from 1 June 2026; 5. The appellant has severe mental stress, depression, painful kidney, sick liver and problems with his digesting system caused by very strong antibiotics, painkillers and blood pressure pills since 2018 and 2023 6. The appellant has no money to remedy his severe health problems and his homelessness and he is in debt of $11,514.71 to his credit cards …
The grounds also refer to his inability to travel to his country of birth to get care or medical assistance, and that he has no money to get legal assistance. The grounds assert that it is in the interests of justice and public confidence that the court hear the application for leave to appeal as soon as possible before the applicant “falls to his death; have another heart attack and die or totally incapacitated to be able to move out of his bed that the appellant is pursuing justice for 23 years”.
The evidence in support of the application is identified as two affidavits filed in the present appeal proceedings, as well as five affidavits filed in one or other of the underlying proceedings in the Supreme Court.
Those are the affidavits of Jeff Manny dated: (a) 28 April 2026 and 30 March 2026, filed in proceedings ACTCA 14 of 2026; (b) 4 August 2025, filed in proceedings SC 500 of 2022; (c) 3 October 2025, filed in proceedings SC 500 of 2022; (d) 8 October 2025, filed in proceedings SC 64 of 2023; (e) 7 October 2025, lodged for filing in proceedings SC 96 of 2022; and (f) 3 October 2025, filed in proceedings SC 82 of 2023.
The grounds as I have articulated them are affirmed in the affidavit of Jeff Manny dated 28 April 2026.
The reasons of Muller AJ indicate that no reasonable cause of action is disclosed because, notwithstanding an opportunity to remedy deficiencies in an earlier version of his pleadings, “the plaintiff has failed in his amended form of pleading in each of the proceedings, to address the inadequacies identified by [McWilliam J] in the previous forms of pleading”: Manny (No 2) at [38]. His Honour also considered whether Mr Manny should be afforded a further opportunity to replead his claim, particularly having regard to the fact that he is a self-represented litigant and “has identified a number of health limitations that have negatively impacted his more recent participation in the court process”: at [42]. His Honour determined that notwithstanding the “very clear terms” in which McWilliam J had identified particular shortcomings in the previous form of pleadings, Mr Manny had “failed to take the opportunity that was presented to him to plead his claims in a manner that complies with the Rules”, despite being afforded a fair opportunity to do so. His Honour accepted a submission that the Mr Manny’s claims were almost entirely for losses that he suffered at a time substantially predating the events relied upon for each of the claims. His Honour determined that it was appropriate to dismiss the claims: see Manny (No 2) at [43]-[47].
Decision
In a case where a party is shown to have a limited life expectancy (for example, suffering from terminal cancer), the court would usually take steps to expedite the hearing and determination of a claim by that person in order that, if possible, a significant claim can be finalised prior to the person’s death. Even where the death of the person would not affect the person’s cause of action, such a course is appropriate out of respect for the interest that the person has in knowing the outcome of those proceedings before they die. Expedition will have the effect of giving priority to their case over other cases where those personal factors are not present.
In the present case, Mr Manny has declined to have his application for leave dealt with on the papers, indicating that he wishes to make oral submissions.
The evidence is not sufficient to establish that Mr Manny has such a limited life expectancy as would warrant expedition beyond the date which will be given to his application. The evidence is of a general deterioration on a number of fronts, but lacks the kind of certainty which would warrant the making of an order. Similarly, although I accept that Mr Manny is at a risk of homelessness from 1 June 2026, that is not such a significant factor as would warrant, of itself, a grant of expedition. Further, the nature of the determination of the application for leave to appeal is not such as to strongly support an application for expedition in that it may have the effect of finally determining, adverse to Mr Manny, his proceedings but would not finally determine those proceedings in his favour. If leave was granted, then the appeal would still be required to be heard and if that appeal was ultimately successful, the underlying proceedings would then be able to continue. That is a process which is likely to take years, rather than months.
Because of the nature of the evidence put forward in support of the application and the nature of the proceedings which are presently on foot, I do not consider that it is an appropriate case in which to make an order for expedition. Unless any party has anything to say to the contrary, I will reserve the question of costs. However, I will relist the matter on a date when a judge is available and adjust the timetable accordingly.
Orders
I certify that the preceding nineteen [19] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Justice Mossop. Associate: Date:
Manny
ACT
The application dated 30 April 2026 was dismissed with costs reserved; orders 1–4 made on 29 April 2026 were vacated; the leave application was listed for 12 June 2026 at 9:15 am with written submissions due 22 May and 5 June 2026, each limited to five pages; the Registrar was directed not to accept submissions exceeding that limit; the applicant was granted leave to appear by audio or audiovisual link; and oral submissions were limited to 25 minutes in chief and 10 minutes in reply.
As articulated earlier, the principal basis upon which it is said that the application should be expedited is the poor health of the applicant and the prospect that he may die before the application for leave to appeal is heard and determined.
The evidence put forward indicates the following: (a) Mr Manny is almost 67 years old. (b) He suffers from a variety of health conditions. (i) He has “a [musculoskeletal] condition” (which I infer is a back and right shoulder condition), for which he is awaiting surgery and for which he requires a carer. (ii) He has a requirement to take a variety of drugs, the significance of most of which is not explained in the evidence, although one of those was Endone, a serious painkiller, which he was prescribed in September 2025 and which he indicated today that he continues to take. (iii) He is recorded as having a blood pressure of 179/89, and is taking blood pressure medication. (iv) He has a very complicated, and what appears on its face to be a very unpleasant and serious, history of dental conditions and treatment. (v) He has suffered from right shoulder and back pain since at least 2025, having suffered broken ribs in 2023. (vi) He had COVID-19 in July 2025. (vii) He had what a doctor described as “?? Left kidney pain” in April 2025. (viii) In September 2025, his general practitioner described him as having “a right shoulder condition” and “right shoulder pain, pain right side of back”. (ix) He appears before the court as someone who is frail and old to an extent beyond his years.
He has received notice from a family member, who is also his landlord, indicating that vacant possession of the property which he is renting is required by 1 June 2026.
There is no expert evidence indicating that he has a relevantly limited life expectancy. So far as the evidence discloses, he has been suffering from most of these conditions for a considerable period of time.