Manny v ACT [2026] ACTSC 23 | Case summary | Zoe

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Manny v ACT [2026] ACTSC 23 | Case summary | Zoe

Mr Manny has proved adamantine in his pursuit of the Territory, the Commonwealth and other agencies for relief in respect of the matters that are the subject of the four proceedings under consideration before me.
He has commenced no less than 15 separate proceedings in this Court in respect of broadly the same subject matter.
The proceedings that are the subject of the present applications are listed below with a shorthand identifier for ease of reference: (a) SC 500 of 2022 (the Dental Treatment Claim). (b) SC 64 of 2023 (the Parking Infringement Claim). (c) SC 82 of 2023 (the Assault Claim). (d) SC 96 of 2023 (the Housing Claim).
The pleadings in each of the four proceedings were previously struck out by McWilliam J on 15 April 2025 in Manny v ACT [2025] ACTSC 151 with leave granted to re-plead on conditions. The pleading conditions imposed by her Honour at [56] in each proceeding were as follows: … (3) Leave is granted to the plaintiff to file an amended originating and an amended statement of claim limited to pleading, but only in the latter, any or all of the following causes of action: (i) Any statutory cause of action, on the condition that the statute in question is named, the provision giving rise to the statutory action specified and the conduct said to constitute any breach of the named statute separately set out. (ii) Any action in negligence. …
Her Honour explained the reason for this approach at [51]-[54]: 51. Here, the extent of the non-compliance with the above Rules is so great in each pleading that the entire pleading must be struck out. 52. Otherwise, insofar as the pleading refers to any claim made in respect of the Racial Discrimination Act, none of the matters that form the subject of the litigation against the Territory have been the subject of any complaint to the Australian Human Rights Commission. Th[is] poses fatal jurisdictional hurdles for the plaintiff, which are set out in Manny 2025 [Manny v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 146] at [69]- [70]. Those difficulties apply equally to the claims against the Territory here. 53. Further, where the pleadings include repeated claims made against third parties, these must be put to one side as they have no bearing on the proceeding against the Territory. Any further claim dealing with the litigation in [P and W v Manny [2010] ACTSC 50] has been held to be an abuse of process: see Manny 2025 at [44]-[51]. That includes allegations of criminal conduct and fraud made against the Police. 54. However, the Territory fairly accepted that in each of the proceedings there was an arguable cause of action that may involve a statutory cause of action or a claim in negligence, even if it was not reasonably disclosed in the current version of the pleading relevant to the respective proceeding. I agree with that view taken of the pleadings and will make orders that have conditions crafted to ensuring that the plaintiff avoids simply repeating allegations that have been held to be unarguable or otherwise an abuse of process.
An amended originating claim and amended statement of claim was subsequently filed by the plaintiff in each of the four proceedings.

The plaintiff refers to a meeting he had with the ACT Chief Minister in 2004, in the course of which the plaintiff warned that the Ginninderra Lake walking and riding tracks were highly dangerous to users.
He refers to a series of assaults upon him on 27 August 2004, 10 December 2022, 13 February 2023, 16 November 2023 and 6 December 2023. The assaults in December 2022 and February 2023 are alleged to have occurred on the Ginninderra Lake Walking track. In relation to four of the five assaults, he alleges that a report was made to police but they failed to attend. For the other assault he alleges that police were slow to respond, enabling his attacker to escape. Although an incident number was created, the plaintiff says no further action was taken by police.
In relation to the 13 February 2023 incident, the plaintiff says that he was riding his bike on the track at a very slow speed in the vicinity of Hungry Jacks. A person suddenly and deliberately jumped in front of him, causing him to swerve and fall from his bike onto the ground. He asserts various physical injuries as a result of the accident, including multiple rib fractures, consequent lung damage and a torn ligament in his right shoulder that requires surgical intervention.
The plaintiff contends that the inadequate responses from ACT Policing in respect of the identified incidents were each acts of apprehended bias and otherwise breaches of the duty of care owed to him. He does not particularise the nature of the breach. He asserts that his ongoing ill health, consequent particularly upon the February 2023 accident, has resulted in his suffering pure economic loss valued at $9 million and pain and suffering valued at $4 million.
The plaintiff then refers to SC 492 of 2022 and SC 263 of 2023, being other proceedings commenced by him against the Commonwealth, which were previously dismissed by the Court in Manny v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2). The purpose for which reference is made to those proceedings in this pleading is unclear.

Rule 425 of the Rules provides: 425 Pleadings—striking out (1) The court may, at any stage of a proceeding, order that a pleading or part of a pleading be struck out if the pleading— (a) discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence appropriate to the nature of the pleading; or (b) may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the proceeding; or (c) is frivolous, scandalous, unnecessary or vexatious; or (d) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. Note 1 The registrar may also reject a document that is filed if it does not comply with these rules (see r 6140 (Rejecting documents—noncompliance with rules etc) or if it is an abuse of the court’s process or is frivolous or vexatious (see r 6142 (Rejecting documents—abuse of process etc)). Note 2 Pt 6.2 (Applications in proceedings) applies to an application for an order under this rule. Note 3 Rule 6901 (Orders may be made on conditions) provides that the court may make an order under these rules on any conditions it considers appropriate. (2) The court may receive evidence on the hearing of an application for an order under this rule. (3) If the court makes an order under this rule, it may also make any other order it considers appropriate, including, for example— (a) if the court makes an order under subrule (1) (a)—an order staying or dismissing the proceeding or entering judgment; and (b) an order about the future conduct of the proceeding.
The defendant notes that the losses identified by the plaintiff as underpinning the very substantial damages claims that he makes in each of the proceedings are losses that are asserted to have been incurred in the period between 2009 and 2011 (that is so, other than in relation to the Assault Claim). All of the events that are described as forming the basis for each of these claims are events occurring well after that time and can have no bearing on any loss or damage suffered by the plaintiff at the earlier time.
In addition, the economic losses that are claimed in the nature of losses associated with the plaintiff’s previous business are matters that have already been the subject of proceedings determined adversely to the plaintiff, and therefore matters which he is not permitted to re-litigate.
The defendant submits: There is an inherent, and incurable, illogicality in the plaintiff claiming damages in respect of losses prior to the events which he relies on as supposedly founding liability of the defendant. In addition, as determined by McWilliam J in Manny v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2), the plaintiff is precluded from seeking damages against the defendant in the Proceedings in circumstances where he has already unsuccessfully sought those damages in the litigation involving David Lardner Lawyers. (Citations omitted.)
Finally, the defendant highlights the limitation on re-pleading of the plaintiff’s claim in the form of the conditions imposed by McWilliam J on the re-pleading process as set out above. The conditions imposed by her Honour limited the plaintiff to pleading causes of action in negligence or for breach of statutory duty. The defendant notes that included in the affidavit material relied upon by the plaintiff are further forms of pleading described as “2nd amended pleadings”. The defendant submits that those documents should be disregarded as they were not filed within the timetable set by McWilliam J. In the alternative, the defendant submits that those pleadings only further obscure the nature of the cause of action brought by the plaintiff.
For present purposes, I will address the defendant’s applications in the context of the amended pleadings as filed.

I adopt the summary of the relevant principles set out by McWilliam J in Manny v ACT at [38]-[48].
Put simply, the plaintiff has failed in his amended form of pleading in each of the proceedings, to address the inadequacies identified by her Honour in the previous forms of pleading. The particular failings in each of the present pleadings are: (a) The plaintiff does not state briefly and specifically the nature of the claim that he makes. (b) He refers to and relies upon causes of action that he has already unsuccessfully litigated. (c) There is conflation of allegations against the defendant with allegations against third parties who are not parties to these actions. (d) There is a failure to comply with the formal requirements in rr 405-407 of the Rules. (e) In relation to the allegations of negligence and breach of statutory duty, it is not possible to discern from the pleadings the facts and circumstances of each negligent act or omission or breach of statutory duty alleged against the defendant within the meaning of r 432 of the Rules. (f) Although the pleadings make reference to a multitude of statutory provisions, there has been no attempt by the plaintiff to identify the facts and circumstances forming the basis for an allegation of breach of each of those statutory provisions. By way of example, I have set out below paragraph 20 of the Housing Claim: Pursuant to the Paragraph 1 to 19 and Articles (2 to 8) of the first plaintiff on 8 August 2025 – SC 96 of 2023; Statement of claim-SC 96 of 2023 herein; s 5A Court procedures Act 2004 (ACT); Crimes Act 1900 (CTH); Ss 274, 399, 114D, 64B, 27A(3)(a), 40, 40C(3)(4), 40A Australian Federal Policy Act 1979 (CTH); Part 5A Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT); r 6033 Civil Law (Wrong) Act 2002 (ACT); Australian Administrative Laws, S18 Consumer Law 2010 (Clt), Equity Law (Clt); S18c Racial, Discrimination Act 1975 (Clt); Part 5A ACT Human Rights Act 2004 and S19A Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Clt); Rule 1146 of Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) that the defendant was apprehended bias; breached their statutory duties and duty of care to the plaintiff to give a Government housing to the first plaintiff with 3 depended children on 5 August 2013 caused 4 years delay to file Court proceedings in the Court for the fraud CWA that they were homeless, carless and had no money caused by the fraud of CWA, before, on 27, 28 August 2004 and after caused the Orders of Justice Gray in 11 June 2010 in the matter of SC 601 of 2005 that the Orders of Justice Gray-SC601 of 2025 was put on Google and Canberra times caused apprehended bias of authorities and public caused substantial pure economic loss of $250 million up to now to the plaintiffs; physical and mental disability which caused by pain from his torn shoulder, dental infection, bad eyesight, hearing impairment and among others and pain and suffering to the first plaintiff and his family that caused the first plaintiff to lose all his Court proceedings. (g) In the course of oral submissions before me, an issue arose as to whether the plaintiff had provided the medical evidence that McWilliam J requested he file in support of his medical negligence claim. In accordance with the direction that I made in response to those submissions, the plaintiff subsequently produced a report from Dr Michael Newman of Weetangera Family Dental Care dated 20 March 2023. Dr Newman's report addresses the nature of the dental issues identified by him following an examination of the plaintiff on 8 December 2020. The doctor does not provide an opinion that is supportive of the proposition that the treatment the plaintiff received from the Canberra Hospital for his dental issues was provided in a manner that was inconsistent with reasonable care. Nor does the report support or otherwise address the proposition that the plaintiff has suffered a worsened outcome as a consequence of the treatment he received from the hospital.
In response to a further direction I made, some additional material in the form of correspondence and email communications relating to the status of the plaintiff’s housing application were provided. The effect of that material is: (a) The plaintiff, together with his former partner, lodged an application for public housing on 5 August 2013. (b) On 22 February 2016, Housing ACT made a decision to remove the plaintiff and his former partner from their list because he travelled overseas. (c) On 14 March 2016, the plaintiff’s former partner emailed Housing ACT expressing disagreement with the decision to remove them from the list. (d) On 11 June 2020, the plaintiff sent an email to the Suburban Land Agency that he “managed to register” (but it is unclear what is meant by this). (e) On 1 May 2021, the plaintiff requested a copy of the application form to apply for social housing assistance, but it is unclear if he completed such an application. (f) In July 2025, the plaintiff applied with Housing ACT for housing but was asked to provide further information in the form of a medical support letter.
Even with the assistance of the additional material, I am unable to discern from the amended form of pleading a substantive claim in respect of the Territory’s failure to provide Mr Manny with government housing.
As was the case with the previous forms of pleading, the non-compliance with the rules of pleading is of such a degree that the entire pleading should be struck out.

The residual question is whether the plaintiff should be afforded a further opportunity to re-plead his claim. I am mindful that he is a self-represented litigant and he has identified a number of health limitations that have negatively impacted his more recent participation in the court process.
The fundamental difficulty is that the decision of McWilliam J in Manny v ACT set out in very clear terms the particular shortcomings in the previous form of pleadings and the actions that were required of the plaintiff to address those shortcomings. The plaintiff has failed to take the opportunity that was presented to him to plead his claims in a manner that complies with the Rules.
A court’s role in these circumstances is to ensure that the pleadings are within the rules and perform their intended function. It is not the Court’s function to draw or settle the pleadings: see McGuirk v University of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 1424 at [35] (Johnson J).
As to considerations relevant more broadly in relation to the Court’s dealing with a self-represented litigant: (a) The procedures of the Court must produce as fair a trial as is practicable in each case: see Dietrich v The Queen [1992] HCA 75; 177 CLR 292 at 325 (Brennan J). (b) The role of the Court is limited to addressing as far as possible any imbalance in the presentation of the case flowing from the lack of representation of a party: see Dietrich at 345 (Dawson J). (c) Its role extends to ensuring that the self-represented person is aware of their rights in relation to the conduct of a matter: see MacPherson v The Queen [1981] HCA 46; 147 CLR 512 at 524 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J) and at 534 (Mason J). (d) However, its role does not extend to the Court advising a self-represented party on how those rights are to be exercised nor to conduct the proceedings on their behalf: see Hamod v NSW [2011] NSWCA 375 at [312] (Beazley JA). (e) In providing assistance as required to the self-represented party, the Court must not intervene to the extent that its position of neutrality is compromised: see Minogue v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [1999] FCA 85; 84 FCR 438 at [29] (Sackville, North and Kenny JJ). (f) While the Court may be lenient as to the standard of compliance that it requires, it must nevertheless ensure that the rules are obeyed: see Rajski v Scitec Corporation Pty Ltd (NSW Court of Appeal, Samuels JA, 16 June 1986) at 14. (g) The duty of the Court to ensure fairness is not owed solely to the self-represented litigant but to all parties: see Hamod at [310].
I am satisfied that the plaintiff has been afforded a fair opportunity to re-plead his claims and he has failed to provide pleadings that are compliant with the Rules.
I accept the submission of the defendant, that in circumstances where the substance of the plaintiff’s claim is almost entirely an action for losses that he suffered at a time that substantially pre-dated the events relied upon for these claims, there is an incurable defect in each of the claims. In the Assault Claim, to the extent that some damage is asserted, there is a failure to identify the elements of the claim for negligence or statutory breach, and to relate those breaches to the damage suffered. It is therefore appropriate that the claims are dismissed. Orders
The orders of the Court are in each of the proceedings: (1) The amended originating claim and amended statement of claim are struck out. (2) The proceedings are dismissed. (3) The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the proceedings.