The Queen v Hughes

The Queen v Hughes - [2000] HCA 22 - HCA 2000 case summary — Zoe

[61]

Where, by reason of the operation of Div 2, a function or power is conferred on an officer or authority of the Commonwealth, that function or power may not be performed or exercised by an officer or authority of Western Australia. Section 33 so specifies. This provision appears to have been designed to implement cl 27.1 of the Alice Springs Agreement. This stated that the DPP was to "have responsibility" for the prosecution of offences under the new national scheme legislation. Undoubtedly this responsibility includes the exercise of what in argument was referred to as the "prosecutorial discretion"[11]. But it also is apparent that the responsibility which is withdrawn by the State legislation from State authorities is to be conferred on officers or authorities of the Commonwealth as a matter of obligation to which they are subjected, not as a power or function the exercise of which by them is merely permitted.
Section 29 uses the expression "[t]he Commonwealth laws". "Commonwealth law" is defined in s 3(1) as meaning "any of the written or unwritten laws of the Commonwealth, including laws about the exercise of prerogative powers, rights and privileges …". The definition excludes from its operation certain statutes, in particular the Law. This is identified in the definition as "the Corporations Law of the [Australian] Capital Territory". (The exclusion avoids a risk of repetition and circularity: the Law is already "picked up" by s 7 of the WA Corporations Act, the text of which is set out earlier in these reasons.) What is significant for present purposes is that the term "Commonwealth law" is apt to include the DPP Act. Section 29(1) then operates, for present purposes, by stating that the DPP Act applies as a law of Western Australia in relation to an offence against provisions of the Corporations Law of Western Australia "as if" those provisions were not laws of Western Australia but were laws of the Commonwealth[12].
Then, "[f]or the purposes of a law of Western Australia", s 29(2) provides that an offence against the Corporations Law of Western Australia "is taken to be" an offence against the laws of the Commonwealth (again, as if the Corporations Law of Western Australia were a law of the Commonwealth) and not "an offence against the laws of Western Australia"[13]. It is significant that s 29(2) is expressed to apply "[f]or the purposes of a law of Western Australia". This indicates that the State legislature is not purporting to dictate to the Commonwealth Parliament what are Commonwealth laws. Rather, it is requiring certain of the laws of Western Australia to be treated as if they were Commonwealth laws for the purposes of Western Australian law.
The phrases "as if" (in s 29(1)) and "is taken to be" (in s 29(2)) no doubt appeared to those drawing those provisions to be, in Windeyer J's words[14], "a convenient device for reducing the verbiage of an enactment". The terms used in s 79 of the Judiciary Act to "pick up" certain State laws as surrogate federal laws also may have given some inspiration[15]. Perhaps paradoxically, it is to be expected that this very lack of verbiage will give rise to various textual awkwardnesses. Some of these were debated in the course of submissions in the present case. They are distractions from the issues presently before the Full Court.
It should, however, be noted that some foresight as to the difficulties that may arise is apparent from the text of s 32. This is directed to the situation where, for example, in a provision of the DPP Act, there is a reference to another provision of that statute or to another Commonwealth law. In such a case, the reference is to be taken, for the purposes of s 29, "to be a reference to that provision as applying because of that section" (s 32).
Section 29 is not invalid as an exercise of State legislative power because it represents an "abdication" rather than the exercise of such an authority. There is no such principle applicable here. The authorities rejecting submissions to this effect are collected in Byrnes v The Queen[16]. Section 29 does not deny or displace the binding effect upon the courts, judges and people of Western Australia given, by covering cl 5 of the Constitution, to the Constitution and laws made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth. Nor is s 29 defective for want of sufficient specification of the command which, in an Austinian sense, it directs to the community[17]. Difficulties of interpretation by reason of such a "pick up" provision may arise from case to case but that prospect does not entail invalidity. The submissions by the accused respecting the alleged invalidity of s 29 and cognate provisions of the WA Corporations Act should be rejected.
For present purposes, namely the decision whether the indictment of the accused should be quashed, the DPP Act is rendered applicable as a law of Western Australia in relation to the offences against the Corporations Law of Western Australia which are the subject of the indictment. Section 31(1) is thus enlivened. It states:

[64]

It is here that s 46 of the Corporations Act comes into play. The effect of that provision is that, as a matter of Commonwealth law, the Attorney-General "has such functions and powers as are expressed to be conferred on him or her by or under [the WA Corporations Act]". With respect to the DPP, it is the provisions of s 47 of the Corporations Act and of reg 3(1)(d) of the Regulations which operate, as a matter of Commonwealth law, to specify that that officer has the functions and powers expressed to be conferred on him or her by the WA Corporations Act[18].
It may be accepted that, subject to what may be the operation of negative implications arising from the Constitution, for example Ch III, in the exercise of the incidental power the Parliament may permit officers of the Commonwealth holding appointments by or under statute to perform functions and accept appointments in addition to their Commonwealth appointments. Provisions such as s 46 and s 47 illustrate two further propositions. The first is that a State by its laws cannot unilaterally invest functions under that law in officers of the Commonwealth; the second is that a State law which purported to grant a wider power or authority than that the acceptance of which was prescribed by Commonwealth law would, to that extent, be inconsistent with the Commonwealth law and invalid under s 109 of the Constitution[19].
However, those propositions do not exhaust the operation of s 47 in the present matter; nor do they explain the operation of s 46. In particular, they do not provide a basis for the imposition by federal law upon Commonwealth officers of duties to perform functions or exercise powers created and conferred by State law. Such a federal law must be supported by a head of power. As indicated earlier in these reasons, the effect of the national scheme was to substitute the Commonwealth prosecution apparatus for that of the relevant State. State functionaries were directed by State law, in this case by s 33 of the WA Corporations Act, not to perform or exercise functions or powers conferred by the State legislation upon an officer or authority of the Commonwealth.
It is submitted, principally by the DPP and the Attorney-General who intervened in his support, that reg 3(1)(d) of the Regulations and the federal laws which support it involve no more than an approval or consent to the exercise of State functions and powers by the DPP. It is said that the State provisions simply purport to confer powers upon the DPP, whose exercise may be the subject of general directions by the Attorney-General under s 8 of the DPP Act. However, what is involved in the federal legislation is more than consent or permission by the Commonwealth to the exercise by its officers of additional functions and powers derived entirely from State law. These additional functions and powers are imposed by federal law as a matter of duty or obligation, lest there be an abdication of State authority with no certainty of its effective replacement.
We have stated above our acceptance of a proposition as to permissive provisions respecting the exercise of additional functions by Commonwealth officers. Whether the further step taken here of imposing duties by Commonwealth law was necessary not merely to implement the agreement between the respective Executive Governments, but as a constitutional imperative, we need not stay to consider. The immediate point is that, the step having been taken, the federal law taking it required support by an available head of power.
To adapt what was said by Deane J in R v Duncan; Ex parte Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd[20], what is involved here is more than an indication by the Commonwealth Parliament of "a negative intention not to cover the field"; rather, there is a "positive provision" which vests "ancillary powers which the Commonwealth Parliament could alone confer". Moreover, as the Attorney-General for the State of Victoria points out, it is the operation of Commonwealth law which enables the DPP to expend Commonwealth resources in exercise of powers and functions "conferred" by State law.
These points may be emphasised by reference to s 46 of the Corporations Act. This operates in the present case to direct the Attorney-General with respect to the exercise of the powers in relation to the DPP conferred on the AttorneyGeneral by ss 7 and 8 of the DPP Act. The Executive Government of the Commonwealth, which is provided for in Ch II of the Constitution (ss 61-70) and of which the Attorney-General is part, involves the execution and maintenance of laws of the Commonwealth, not those of the States.

[70]

The DPP Act in a sense is supported by as many heads of power as from time to time have been exercised by the Parliament to create offences against Commonwealth laws. State law may create offences in fields where it would have been competent for the Parliament of the Commonwealth to enter directly by its own offence-creating legislation. The power conferred by s 51(xx) with respect to foreign corporations and trading or financial corporations is an obvious example. In such a situation, a federal law which specifies that certain Commonwealth officers have powers and functions expressed to be conferred by the State law with respect to the prosecution of State offences is a law with respect to that head of federal legislative power. This will be true of perhaps the very great majority of offences created by the State legislation which adopts the Law.
There is a question as to whether the "prescribed interest" provision of s 1064(1) could be characterised as a law with respect to corporations within the operation of s 51(xx). Section 1064(1) conferred upon any "public corporation" a privilege in relation to its financial activities by forbidding engagement in such activities to all others[25]. The term "public corporation" was so defined in s 9 of the Law as to include corporations not established as one or more of the corporations in the class identified in s 51(xx) of the Constitution. However, the Attorney-General submits that a corporation which deals with prescribed interests may be characterised as a "financial corporation" for the purposes of s 51(xx) by reason of its engagement in transactions whose subject is finance. In this respect, the Attorney-General relies upon what was said in the joint judgment of Mason, Murphy and Deane JJ in State Superannuation Board v Trade Practices Commission[26]. The privilege conferred by s 1064(1) permitted financial corporations to do in relation to their financial activities what other entities were not permitted to do and, the Attorney-General submits, such a law if enacted by the Parliament of the Commonwealth would be supported by s 51(xx). The Attorney-General contends (and the Attorney-General for the State of Western Australia disputes) that passages in the various judgments in Re Dingjan; Ex parte Wagner[27] support that conclusion.
It is unnecessary further to consider the matter. Nor is it necessary to consider whether, in so far as the prescribed interests in question here involved the use of the Australian banking system, s 1064(1) could be characterised as a law with respect to "[b]anking, other than State banking" and so supported by s 51(xiii) of the Constitution. This is because the offences with which the accused is charged relate to the making of investments in the United States and thus to trade and commerce with other countries (s 51(i)). They also relate to matters territorially outside Australia, but touching and concerning Australia, and so would attract s 51(xxix)[28].
The subsidiary definitions respecting "prescribed interest" which are set out earlier in these reasons were so drawn as to operate "whether in Australia or elsewhere" or "whether in this jurisdiction [Western Australia] or elsewhere". Upon the present hypothesis, a law of the Commonwealth could not take these definitions as criteria of operation for a prosecution unless they were read down to exclude purely domestic dealings of the proscribed varieties. However, s 15A of the Interpretation Act may be applied to read down a provision expressed in general terms, including a power to prosecute so as to apply only where the particular prosecution is supported by a head of power[29]. Consistently with the statement of general principle in the joint judgment in the Industrial Relations Act Case[30], this would be achieved by construing the phrase in s 47(1) of the Corporations Act "functions and powers that are expressed to be conferred on them by or under corresponding laws" as limited to those functions and powers in respect of matters within the legislative powers of the Parliament of the Commonwealth[31].
Accordingly, the federal legislation identified above (s 47(1) of the Corporations Act and reg 3(1)(d) of the Regulations) operates to provide such authority as is necessary under federal law to support the prosecution by the DPP of the offences against the law of Western Australia which are specified in the indictment.
Reference was made in argument to what was decided in Duncan[32]. The Attorney-General submits that the legislation whose validity was at issue in Duncan may have impliedly imposed duties upon the tribunal and not merely conferred powers. The Attorney-General for the State of Victoria goes further and says that the tribunal plainly had a duty to exercise the powers or jurisdiction conferred on it. That may well be so, but would not undermine the decision in Duncan. This is because the several judgments of Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane JJ in that case support the proposition that the powers in s 51(xxxv) and s 51(xxxix) support legislation to establish a tribunal to exercise federal and State powers where this may better achieve the object of preventing and settling interstate disputes in the coal industry[33]. What has been said above respecting the powers and functions of the DPP which derive from State law is consistent with that approach.
Duncan is one of a number of decisions[34] which recognise that co‑operation on the part of the Commonwealth and States may well achieve objects that could be achieved by neither acting alone. Nothing in these reasons denies that general proposition. The present case emphasises that for the Commonwealth to impose on an officer or instrumentality of the Commonwealth powers coupled with duties adversely to affect the rights of individuals, where no such power is directly conferred on that officer or instrumentality by the Constitution itself, requires a law of the Commonwealth supported by an appropriate head of power.

[88]

In these proceedings, Mr Craig Hughes ("the accused") challenges the power of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the Commonwealth ("the Commonwealth DPP") to prosecute him on behalf of the Queen ("the prosecution") in the District Court of Western Australia. He moved to quash the indictment which the Commonwealth DPP had presented against him and another person for three offences under the Corporations Law[36]. The accused contends that, in so far as the Corporations Law is purportedly enacted as a law of Western Australia[37] and in so far as provision is made by Western Australian law authorising the Commonwealth DPP to prosecute him for offences against the Corporations Law, such provisions are invalid as beyond the power of the Western Australian Parliament and contrary to the Constitution. Additionally, the accused contends that, in so far as federal law purports to extend its operation into the criminal law of Western Australia and to authorise the Commonwealth DPP to prosecute him under Western Australian laws, it too is invalid as contrary to the Constitution.
The accused's arguments thus present a challenge to the scheme adopted for the regulation of corporations in Australia, of which the Corporations Law is the centrepiece. Unless the offences provided in the Corporations Law are valid and may be the subject of prosecution in Western Australia by the Commonwealth DPP, the legislative and administrative scheme for the regulation of corporations in Australia would collapse. Without enforceability, the Corporations Law would be no more than a pious aspiration. The importance of the accused's challenge to the validity of the indictment could therefore not be overstated.
To answer the questions reserved for the opinion of the Full Court[38], propounded by the accused in support of his contentions, it is necessary to resume the unpleasant task[39] of examining an almost incomprehensible network of federal, State and Territory laws. This and a like task have lately engaged the Court in other challenges bearing some similarities to the present[40]. The Court, in matters such as this, is not involved in the ascertainment of the substantive merits of the prosecution but only its legal merits. If a gap in the legislation is found - either because of the omission to provide a critical power[41] or because of the enactment of crucial provisions beyond constitutional power[42] - this Court must say so, leaving it to legislators and officials to sort out the consequences.
The national importance of the legislation under scrutiny, the way in which it attempts to achieve its objectives by cooperation amongst the constituent governments of the Commonwealth and the presumption that such cooperation is an elemental feature of the federal system of government which the Constitution establishes, make it appropriate to approach this matter in a way that gives the Constitution and the legislation in question, to the full extent that their language and structure allow, an operation that is rational, harmonious and efficient[43]. This Court should be the upholder, and not the destroyer, of lawful cooperation between the organs of government in all of the constituent parts into which the Commonwealth of Australia is divided[44]. No other approach is appropriate to the

[91]

The relevant facts, the history of the proceedings and the provisions of the legislation in question are all contained in the joint reasons in terms which I accept.
It is helpful, in my view, in construing the provisions of the federal and State legislation which the accused challenges to view that legislation in the context of the purposes for which it was enacted. For most of the first century of federation the regulation of corporations in Australia was substantially left to State and Territory law. Because of the paucity of relevant federal courts, jurisdiction over corporations was substantially confined to that of State and Territory courts, save for a relatively small number of cases which found their way to this Court or to the Privy Council. The growth of the national and global economies and of a significant number of corporations operating in several or all of the jurisdictions of Australia (and overseas) eventually produced the first cooperative scheme for corporate regulation. This involved generally identical Companies Codes and an interjurisdictional mechanism designed to develop and maintain uniform administration and legislative amendments[47].
The inadequacies and inefficiencies of this cooperative arrangement soon became apparent. Meanwhile, a number of decisions of this Court[48], disapproving of and discarding earlier authority[49], attracted fresh attention to the potential of the corporations power under the Constitution[50] to afford a substantial foundation for federal regulation of corporations of the kind described in the Constitution[51].
It was the pursuit of this new idea, together with the need for a more efficient system of national regulation of corporations in Australia, that led to the enactment of the Corporations Act. That Act was not proclaimed to commence pending a determination by this Court of questions relating to the validity of a number of its provisions. Those provisions were "based upon the assumption that the Commonwealth has power to legislate for the incorporation of a company if the subscribers to the memorandum of association intend that trading or financial activities are to be a substantial part of its activities"[52]. Furthermore the Corporations Act, as originally enacted, assumed "that the Commonwealth can prohibit the incorporation of a company under the law of a State or Territory if the body upon incorporation will be a trading or financial corporation"[53].
In the Incorporation Case[54] this Court, by majority[55], held that the corporations power did not entitle the Federal Parliament to legislate for the incorporation of trading and financial corporations. A key assumption of the Corporations Act, as enacted, was thus invalidated. This narrow decision of the Court will, in my opinion, one day need to be revisited[56]. A factual consequence has been the grotesque complications that exist in the regulation of corporations under Australian law illustrated in Byrnes[57], Bond[58] and now this case.
The precise reasons for adopting the scheme that now comes under scrutiny, in response to the Incorporation Case, are not disclosed. The rejection of a formal amendment of the Constitution to allow ample legislative powers to the Federal Parliament can doubtless be explained by the discouraging history of referendum proposals under s 128 of the Constitution[59]. The disinclination to refer powers to[60], or to request and concur in the exercise of State powers by[61], the Federal Parliament is said to arise out of a concern that such powers, once surrendered, might not be capable of retrieval by the States. But only political considerations, disputes over revenue and possibly a feeling of discouragement following the Incorporation Case can explain the nearly incomprehensible scheme of legislation eventually adopted.
Courts, including this Court, regularly speak in terms of the "intention" of the legislature when interpreting particular legislation. This polite but unacceptable fiction has never been shown in starker relief than in the present case. So complex is the interlocking legislation, with fiction piled upon fiction, that it must be doubted whether any of those presenting and enacting it were truly aware of precisely what they were doing. It may be hoped that this and other recent decisions, together with the great national importance of the subject matter of the legislation, will encourage its early reconsideration and the adoption of a simpler constitutional foundation to reduce the perils that are otherwise bound to recur, possibly with serious results.

[101]

Approach to the task of interpretation: The fact that it might have been possible to achieve an efficient system of national regulation of corporations in Australia by other means is irrelevant to the issues presented by these proceedings. From first to last they concern the meaning and validity of the legislation in fact enacted. Likewise, a natural sense of irritation with the apparently unnecessary complexity of that legislation, or a distaste for the "novel legislative device" which it adopts are not proper foundations for the elucidation of the meaning of that legislation and its measurement against the requirements of the Constitution. Certain general propositions can be stated. I do not take them to be disputed.
In considering the validity or otherwise of the legislation giving effect to cooperation between the units of the federation (federal, State and Territory) said to be invalid, it is necessary, at the threshold, to elucidate the meaning and operation of the provisions in question[71]. This is an elementary point. However it is important in the present case. If particular provisions claimed to be unconstitutional have no operation in the circumstances of the matter before the Court, it is irrelevant, and therefore unnecessary, to determine their validity. Constitutionality is not normally decided on a hypothesis inapplicable to the resolution of a particular dispute[72]. If, upon a true construction of the legislation, it operates in a way that does no offence to the language and structure of the Constitution[73], it is irrelevant that, had it been construed in a different way, it might have done so. This Court will not answer constitutional questions on the basis of assumptions that have no practical or legal consequence for the case in hand.
Cooperation is a constitutional objective: Particular provisions of the Constitution must be construed in the context of the fundamental purposes of that document. Relevantly, these include affording a charter for the entire government of the Australian Commonwealth in a nation of continental size, with a relatively small and scattered population for which the necessarily limited resources of government ought, to the extent that the Constitution permits, to operate harmoniously and efficiently to achieve the constitutional objectives of "peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth"[74].
Cooperation between the legislatures and the Executive Governments (and in my view the judiciary) of the constituent parts of the Commonwealth, far from being an idea alien to the Constitution, is a "positive objective"[75] of the polity which the Constitution establishes[76]. The presumption remains that "federalism and cooperation are not inconsistent"[77]. It is true that the Constitution imposes an allocation of powers and functions between the constituent parts of the Commonwealth (on the one hand) and also between the respective branches of government (on the other). But the nature of the Australian federation is such that a high measure of cooperation is contemplated at all levels. Moreover, cooperation is often achieved.
Some of the provisions of the Constitution expressly envisage cooperative schemes between the Commonwealth and the States[78]. Past decisions of this Court accept the power of the legislatures of the States and self-governing Territories to cooperate with the Federal Parliament in the enactment of complementary legislation. Not only does this extend at an intergovernmental level to agreement between the polities themselves on matters such as the effective sharing of functions and of revenues[79]. It also extends to empowering officers and authorities of the Commonwealth, States and Territories to enforce each others' laws and to collect federal, State and Territory revenues[80].
So far as the officers of the Executive Governments of the Commonwealth, States and Territories are concerned, it is "beyond question"[81] that the legislative powers of the constituent elements of the Australian federation extend to entry into intergovernmental agreements on matters of joint interest. Where legislation is required to implement such agreements, such legislation will be upheld by this Court "so long … as the end to be achieved and the means by which it is to be achieved are consistent with and do not contravene the Constitution"[82].
Any federal Constitution imports a measure of cooperation between the constituent parts. That is the very nature and essence of federation[83]. Cooperation to enhance the movement of people, goods and services within the federation[84] and to diminish impediments to optimal trade in property rights within the federation are legitimate federal objectives[85]. That this is a feature of the Australian federation is made clear by the many provisions which the Constitution contains creating a national common market[86] and establishing uniform tariffs, customs, excise and bounties[87]. For the better achievement of such objectives, it is clear that a high level of cooperation between the constituent parts of the Commonwealth is envisaged. This fact helps to explain why negative implications forbidding such arrangements have not generally been drawn by this Court[88]. On the contrary, this Court has adopted a general approach which supports such cooperation[89].
The fact that such commingling of legislative and administrative powers has been accepted as constitutionally permissible has meant that, in the Australian federation, unlike some others, the constituent parts of the federation can, by cooperation, achieve objects and perform functions which, separately, would have been impossible[90]. The advantages secured are not only the obvious and practical ones. They also extend to "subtle" benefits such as existed under the original cross-vesting legislation[91]. Thus the kind of intergovernmental regulation of the coal industry in Australia that was upheld by decisions of this Court[92] would not have been possible by separate legislation of the Commonwealth and the States concerned. This Court emphasised that what was created by the joint operation of the federal and State legislation in relation to Re Cram was not a separate federal and State tribunal meeting for convenience in the one place and made up of common personnel. It was a single joint tribunal exercising at the one time both federal and State powers[93]. This fact permitted the officers and authorities concerned to derive their respective existence from federal and State Acts and to perform functions and exercise powers which, individually or severally, they could not have done.
The decisions of this Court upholding the foregoing principles[94] as possible within the federation for which the Constitution provides contained no dissenting opinions. They expressed the unanimous approach of this Court about the ambit and effect of permissible legislative and administrative cooperation in Australia. The accused did not contest these authorities. In these proceedings, this Court must apply the principles which they establish.
Division of legislative responsibility: It was also common ground (and correctly so) that neither the Federal Parliament nor a State Parliament or Territory legislature enjoys the power, by its own legislation, to change the substantive character of a law that it enacts so as to make it the law of another Parliament or legislature. The Constitution provides for both the Federal[95] and State Parliaments[96]. It empowers the creation of the legislatures of the Territories[97]. The character of each legislature is fixed by its constitutional origins, purposes and powers. One could not, by its own declaration or assertion, turn itself into another. Nor by any legislative formula could one enact laws amounting to laws of another. The constitutional division of legislative responsibility between the constituent legislatures of Australia confines each to its own legislative concerns. These propositions were the linchpin for the accused's arguments. However, they were not contested by the prosecution nor by those governments intervening to support it.
Authority for conferral of functions and powers: An officer or authority of the Commonwealth (such as the Commonwealth DPP) would ordinarily be immune from the imposition, by a law of a State or Territory, of functions and powers distinct from, or additional to, those imposed by federal law[98]. Effective immunity from such imposition arises from several sources. These include the provisions of the Constitution itself[99]; the implication derived from the Constitution that the laws of the States and self-governing Territories may not impermissibly restrict or modify the capability of the Commonwealth to perform its functions as such[100]; and the principle of statutory construction that the functions of a donee of legislative power will ordinarily be taken as confined to those relevant to the polity within which the officer or authority concerned operates[101].
Nevertheless, subject to the Constitution, the Federal Parliament has the power to make it clear that it does not purport to "cover the field" or to exclude the conferral of State or Territory administrative powers on a federal officer or authority; that it consents to the imposition by a State or Territory of additional functions on a federal officer or authority created by or under its laws; and that the addition of such functions are to be treated as compatible with its own legislation.
To permit the performance of functions and the exercise of powers by an officer or authority of the Commonwealth additional to those expressly conferred by the Federal Parliament (and to authorise the consequent appropriation of moneys to the Commonwealth for that purpose), specific legislation of the Federal Parliament is required. However, if such legislation is validly enacted, no reason of constitutional principle prevents an officer or authority of the Commonwealth from exercising such additional functions conferred by or under State or Territory law. The question in each case is whether a State or selfgoverning Territory, by its law, has validly conferred the performance of functions and the exercise of powers on the officer or authority of the Commonwealth concerned. If it has, the counterpart question then arises as to whether the Commonwealth has validly consented to such conferral of State or Territory functions and powers and has authorised them to be performed and exercised to an end and by a means which do not contravene the Constitution[102]. These are the ultimate questions that must be answered in the present proceedings.
Cooperation may be subject to constitutional prohibitions: No legislative provision to implement a cooperative scheme may contravene a prohibition expressed in, or implied from, the terms or structure of the Constitution. Where it is argued that legislation contravenes an express constitutional prohibition, such as that contained in s 92 of the Constitution, the courts will examine the substantive operation of the impugned law to test its validity by reference to the prohibition[103].
An attempt to circumvent limits imposed by the Constitution on federal, State and Territory laws will also be ineffective[104]. It was on this footing that this Court held that one element of the second cooperative scheme (that providing for the cross-vesting of State jurisdiction in federal courts) was invalid. Over-ruling Gould v Brown[105], the Court concluded that the terms and structure of Ch III of the Constitution forbade the legislature of any polity in the federation, other than the Federal Parliament, from conferring jurisdiction on a federal court. The outer boundaries of cooperative legislation were thus set. No amount of legislative cooperation or intergovernmental agreement could supply the power to overcome a constitutional prohibition if one applies[106].
The result of the holding in Re Wakim was to invalidate an important element of the Heads of Agreement. It rendered invalid, and thus inoperative, those provisions of the Corporations Act and of the State Corporations Acts that purported to vest State judicial power in federal courts. That this was an important component of the second cooperative scheme cannot be doubted. Instead of relying on the general provisions of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Crossvesting) Act 1987 (Cth) and the mirror legislation in each State and the Northern Territory, special provisions for corporations had been included in the respective Corporations Acts[107].
For the accused, the present proceedings were to be seen to be as much the progeny of Re Wakim as of the decisions in Byrnes and Bond. No implied constitutional prohibition derived from Ch III was invoked because of the way in which the proceedings had come before this Court[108]. Such a prohibition may later arise in respect of attempts to invoke the jurisdiction of federal courts in relation to the conduct of the Commonwealth DPP in the discharge of purely State functions and powers[109]. Instead, the implied prohibitions invoked by the accused in these proceedings were: (1) that no legislature within the federation could usurp or purport to exercise the powers of another legislature; (2) that no such legislature could abdicate its legislative functions to another save as the Constitution expressly permits[110]; and (3) that no such legislature could enact a "law" which was so unacceptably vague and uncertain as to be denied the character of valid law as the Constitution envisages it.

[103]

Many of the questions reserved for the opinion of the Full Court do not arise, either because of the undisputed factual circumstances of the proceedings involving the accused, or because of the true construction of the Corporations Act or the WA Corporations Act.
Thus, it is unnecessary to answer the first of the questions reserved which refers to s 45 of the Corporations Act as amended[111]. This is because, in its terms, s 45 applies only in the Australian Capital Territory[112]. It has no application to the present case which must be determined by reference to the law applicable in Western Australia. The first question is therefore unnecessary to answer. The second question, which is dependent on it, must likewise be so answered.
Similarly, it is unnecessary to answer the third question which concerns s 43(2) of the Corporations Act. That sub-section does not arise because its operation is limited, in its terms, to laws of the Commonwealth "as applying because of" sub-section (1) or (2) of s 42 of the Corporations Act. These subsections, in turn, provide for federal laws to apply as laws of the Australian Capital Territory or external Territories respectively. The provision of s 43(2) therefore has no application to a case such as the present which concerns the exercise of powers by the Commonwealth DPP only within Western Australia.
The fourth question presents an exercise in construction of the inter-related legislation. The accused asserts that the Commonwealth DPP lacks the power to prosecute him on the basis that the Corporations Act and the WA Corporations Act purport to convert offences against the Corporations Law of Western Australia into federal offences and this is beyond the power of the Parliament of Western Australia. The accused's argument proceeds that the offences are not independently supported by any head of federal legislative power and that, consequently, the purported conferral of power upon the Commonwealth DPP to prosecute him for the offences alleged is ineffective. It is thus unlawful. It requires the quashing of the indictment.
There is a fundamental flaw in the first step of this argument. It arises out of a misinterpretation of the meaning and effect of the inter-related provisions of the Corporations Act and the WA Corporations Act. It is a misinterpretation that is easily made having regard to the extremely opaque terms in which the "novel legislative device" is expressed. But it illustrates the importance, in constitutional elucidation, of first construing the law which is impugned.
The WA Corporations Act, s 29, read in the context of the cooperative legislative scheme, does not purport, in fact or law, to enact a law of the Commonwealth. Instead, out of the legislative powers of the Parliament of Western Australia, it applies certain "Commonwealth laws" in Western Australia. It does so, as twice indicated, by the use of statutory fictions. The first fiction is evident in the statement that such "Commonwealth laws" apply "as laws of Western Australia". The second is that such laws apply "as if those provisions were laws of the Commonwealth and were not laws of Western Australia"[113].
Whilst it would certainly be impermissible for the Parliament of Western Australia to purport to exercise the legislative powers of the Federal Parliament, it is not impermissible, in the present context, for that State Parliament to apply designated federal laws "as laws of Western Australia". The distinction is important. If the Parliament of Western Australia purported to enact a law with a legal operation as a "Commonwealth law", that would indeed exceed the limitations (substantially geographic) upon its legislative powers. But this would not be the case where, sourced to its legislative powers in Western Australia, the Parliament of that State adopts and applies, as a law of the State, a pre-existing law of the Commonwealth (or of some other State or Territory) which it thereby makes its own. The reading of the closing words of s 29(1) of the WA Corporations Act must be confined to giving effect to the foregoing purpose. It is for the purpose of the laws of Western Australia, and to the extent that the Parliament of Western Australia can so enact, that the adopted federal laws are to be treated "as if those provisions were laws of the Commonwealth and were not laws of Western Australia". This fiction does not change the constitutional character of those laws. That character is settled both by the body giving legal effect to the laws and by the language in which they are expressed. The character of the law remains that of a law of the State of Western Australia whose Parliament has enacted it.
So far as s 29(2) of the WA Corporations Act is concerned, the foregoing construction is reinforced by the opening words of the sub-section ("For the purposes of a law of Western Australia ..."). This sub-section is an interpretive provision designed to carry into effect the administrative and organisational arrangements agreed to in the Heads of Agreement for the prosecution of offences against the WA Corporations Act. Such prosecution is not to be performed by the agency which would ordinarily have the responsibility of performing the prosecution of State criminal law (ie State prosecutors) but by the agency to which that task is assigned under the Heads of Agreement and by the integrated legislation, namely the Commonwealth DPP.
I accept that the obscure and ungainly language of s 29 could reasonably give rise to the objection which the accused argued. But the objection must fail because of the proper interpretation of the applicable provisions. I acknowledge that the terms of s 29 of the applicable local Corporations Act (and its equivalents in other States and the Northern Territory) will give rise to many further problems in working out which laws of the State and of the Commonwealth are picked up and applied, and which are not, in a trial of an offence against the Corporations Law. Thus it was submitted during argument that relevant provisions of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)[114] relating to the sentencing of federal offenders would apply in such a case. However, there was uncertainty as to whether the provisions of s 80 of the Constitution[115] and the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) would apply.
These are very practical complications which will doubtless return to trouble the courts unless a greater measure of clarity can be introduced into the operation of the "novel legislative device". But in so far as the accused attacked s 29 of the WA Corporations Act as a purported attempt of the Western Australian Parliament to go beyond its legislative competence and, in doing so, to create what were in law offences against federal law, such submissions fail because they are based on a fundamental misunderstanding about the character of the law. Imperfect as its language may be, it is no more than a legislative provision of the Parliament of Western Australia within that Parliament's own area of legislative competence. This construction is further reinforced by the terms of s 33 of the WA Corporations Act[116]. Construed in the foregoing way, s 29 of the WA Corporations Act is a valid law of the Parliament of Western Australia. It operates according to its terms. The fourth question should be answered accordingly.
The fifth question, in so far as it assumes that the offences are in fact "against the laws of the Commonwealth", is likewise based on a false assumption. It is therefore unnecessary to answer it. Similarly, it is unnecessary to answer the sixth question, although it follows from what I have said that the offences provided by s 1064 of the Corporations Law of Western Australia are, and remain, for their legal character, offences against the laws of Western Australia even if, for particular purposes, the fiction in s 29 is brought into play.
These conclusions leave to be answered the critical questions reserved to the Full Court concerning: (1) the purported conferral by s 31 (read with s 29) of the WA Corporations Act upon the Commonwealth DPP of functions and powers to prosecute offences against the State law; and (2) the concomitant provision of the Corporations Act, s 47, and reg 3(1)(d) of the Corporations (Commonwealth Authorities and Officers) Regulations (Cth) ("the Regulations") authorising the Commonwealth DPP to accept and perform those functions and exercise those powers. I turn to those questions.

[107]

No unacceptable vagueness: In the United States of America, the constitutional guarantee of due process of law[121] has been developed to afford protection from arbitrary government and an assurance of the legitimacy of official conduct. These concepts have been expanded to impose minimum requirements of certainty in relation to the making and expression of laws affecting the liberty and property of individuals[122]. If laws are found to be unacceptably vague or over-broad and uncertain in their commands they are deprived of legal efficacy[123]. There are similar developments of legal reasoning in the Supreme Court of Canada[124], in the European Court of Justice[125] and in the European Court of Human Rights[126].
The accused certainly had grounds for criticising the meaning and operation of s 29 of the WA Corporations Act. Precisely which federal laws that section picks up and applies "as laws of Western Australia" is, as I have indicated, most unclear. Similar problems in some ways have long existed in the application of provisions of the Judiciary Act[127]. The latter have not hitherto been treated as invalid.
The Constitution has no express equivalent to the "due process" requirements of the United States Constitution or the similar obligations on the basis of which the courts in Canada and Europe have developed doctrines of invalidating vagueness. On the other hand, the requirement of due process lies deep in our law, being derived ultimately from the Magna Charta which spoke of the King's duty to conform to the "law of the land". Suggestions have been made in this Court that, at least in some circumstances, a constitutional implication of "due process" may be derived from the terms, structure and purposes of the Constitution, and particularly the provisions in Ch III[128]. I am sympathetic to such suggestions.
This is not the occasion to explore such suggestions further. Assuming such a principle exists in Australian law, in these proceedings, the particular difficulties that may arise in the implementation of s 29 of the WA Corporations Act do not, in my view, present such an impermissibly vague burden on the persons subject to the section as to invoke a constitutional prohibition invalidating it. The ascertainment of the specific "Commonwealth laws" rendered applicable as laws of Western Australia by force of s 29 of the WA Corporations Act will be an obligation of the courts on a case by case basis. At least that will be so unless the "novel legislative device", of which s 29 is part, is replaced by clearer legislative commands. One might reasonably hope for such a development. It may not be constitutionally invalid for the cooperative legislative scheme to proceed in the way that s 29 of the WA Corporations Act does. The section nonetheless imposes a most unreasonable burden on accused persons, prosecutors, trial judges and appellate courts. In the field of corporations law, and particularly where criminal process and sanctions are invoked, such a burden diminishes the efficacy of corporate regulation. It opens the way to technical objections and litigation which add significantly to the costs of administering the regulatory scheme without any equivalent return in terms of proper corporate standards or the achievement of efficient corporate regulation.
The foregoing point was made most clearly during the hearing when the Commonwealth candidly admitted that it was unable to say with certainty whether particular federal laws were, or were not, picked up by force of s 29 "in relation to an offence against the applicable provisions of Western Australia"[129]. One thing is clear. The power to prosecute and thus to find and present an indictment is conferred on the Commonwealth DPP expressly by the WA Corporations Act. Other functions and powers are not so clear. Whether or not they are "picked up" by s 29 are questions that lie in wait for a subsequent stage of these or similar proceedings.
A valid Western Australian law: Subject to the Constitution, it is competent for the Parliament of Western Australia to make laws for the "peace, order and good Government" of that State[130]. In relation to criminal offences, the Parliament of Western Australia has authority to determine the constituent elements of, and the practice and procedure applicable to, crimes that are committed within or in connection with its territorial limits[131]. Provided the legislation has a sufficient territorial connection with Western Australia, it will be valid on that ground[132]. The grant of legislative power includes the power to provide that laws of another jurisdiction, including laws of the Commonwealth, apply in respect of offences against the law of Western Australia as if they were laws of Western Australia. All that this device does is to avoid the necessity of setting out seriatim in the text of the Western Australian law the provisions of the law of the Commonwealth[133]. In relation to conduct constituting an offence against the Corporations Law of Western Australia in or from Western Australia, ss 29(1) and 31(1) are clearly laws which perform that function.
There are two relevant impediments to the effective conferral by State legislation of non-judicial functions and powers on an officer or authority of the Commonwealth. The first originates in the implied constitutional immunity which would forbid the States (or self-governing Territories) from imposing functions and powers on such an officer or authority (except by reason of a law applicable to persons generally[134]) in a way that would prevent the latter from discharging the functions and duties of federal office. In an appropriate case this immunity might be waived. Secondly, it is not competent to a State (or self-governing Territory) to impose functions and powers on an officer or authority of the Commonwealth which are inconsistent with the functions and powers imposed by federal legislation[135]. Any imposition of functions and powers would divert the federal officer or authority from the discharge of federal responsibilities, and ordinarily involve expenditure of funds and diversion of personnel, thus rendering the State or Territory law inconsistent with federal law unless expressly authorised by the latter. Hence the need, examined in Gould[136] and Re Wakim[137], for a coincidence of valid State conferral of State functions and powers and valid federal authorisation of such conferral on the federal recipient concerned.
Once it is accepted that s 29 of the WA Corporations Act is not an abdication of State legislative power but the exercise of it and is not fundamentally flawed as impermissibly vague and uncertain, the effectiveness of the provisions in the WA Corporations Act to impose prosecutorial functions and powers on the Commonwealth DPP is secured by two principal steps. The first is the importation into the law of Western Australia of "Commonwealth laws … in relation to an offence against the applicable provisions of Western Australia"[138]. Relevantly, the "applicable provision" is the Corporations Law and Regulations of that jurisdiction[139]. In this way, the relevant "Commonwealth law", being the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) ("the DPP Act"), is, in relation to an offence against the Corporations Law of Western Australia, applied by force of the law of Western Australia as a law of that State. It is to be so applied "as if" its provisions were "laws of the Commonwealth and were not laws of Western Australia". But this is only so by force of Western Australian legislation which cannot, of itself, confer upon its own laws all of the characteristics which a federal law, operating by its own force and in its own terms, would (if valid) attract by virtue of the Constitution.
Relevantly to these proceedings, the purpose of s 29(1) of the WA Corporations Act is to ensure that the Commonwealth DPP will perform in Western Australia the functions of "investigation and prosecution of offences" against the Corporations Law of Western Australia[140]. The DPP Act, as imported, is to be adapted so that, where otherwise its terms would suggest that the Commonwealth DPP is limited to the prosecution of federal offences, when operating in Western Australia, pursuant to the authority conferred by ss 29 and 31 of the WA Corporations Act, the offences against the applicable provisions of Western Australia are taken, for this limited purpose, to be offences against the laws of the Commonwealth.
This interpretation is confirmed by several exclusionary provisions which follow in the WA Corporations Act. First, s 29(2)(b) of the WA Corporations Act provides that where the "Commonwealth law" (here the DPP Act) is picked up and applied as a law of Western Australia, an offence against the applicable provisions of Western Australia is taken not to be an offence against the laws of Western Australia. This is so provided lest, for that reason, it would render inapplicable, in its terms, the DPP Act as applied in Western Australia.
The second step is found in the provision of s 31(1) of the WA Corporations Act which is crucial. This sub-section makes it clear that the conferral of functions and powers on an officer or authority of the Commonwealth by a "Commonwealth law applying because of section 29" also confers the same functions and powers in relation to an offence against the corresponding applicable provision of Western Australia. By s 33 of the WA Corporations Act the performance or exercise of such functions and powers by an officer or authority of the State is excluded.
I see no defect in the conferral of State functions and powers in this way upon the Commonwealth DPP. True, the legislative scheme is cumbersome, indirect and needlessly obscure. But, subject to what follows, it is constitutionally valid and effective. By Western Australian law, it authorises the Commonwealth DPP to investigate and prosecute offences against the Corporations Law of Western Australia. These include the offences of which the accused is charged.

[109]

Federal law authorises State conferral: By s 47 of the Corporations Act, the Federal Parliament has enacted that Regulations may provide that prescribed officers and authorities of the Commonwealth "have prescribed functions and powers that are expressed to be conferred on them by or under corresponding laws"[141]. The WA Corporations Act is a "corresponding law" for this purpose[142]. By reg 3(1)(d) of the Regulations, made pursuant to s 47 of the Corporations Act, it is expressly provided that the Commonwealth DPP has functions and powers "expressed to be conferred on [it] by or under a corresponding law".
The foregoing provisions meet a number of potential objections to the conferral of State functions and powers on the Commonwealth DPP. They constitute a waiver of any constitutional immunity which such an officer or authority of the Commonwealth would enjoy from the unilateral imposition of State functions and powers which are special and particular, rather than applicable to persons generally. They remove any suggestion that the imposition of such State functions and powers is inconsistent with the functions and powers imposed on the Commonwealth DPP by federal law (which would otherwise expel a purported attempt to impose additional and different State functions and powers)[143]. They also explicitly provide the consent of the Federal Parliament which is regarded as necessary for the implementation of such a scheme of interjurisdictional cooperation, given that the operation of the State law would inevitably impose a burden on the consolidated revenue of the Commonwealth.
In this case there is no express or implied prohibition in the Constitution against the conferral of such functions and powers by State law on the Commonwealth officer or authority concerned, as was held in Re Wakim to exist in respect of the purported federal consent to the conferral of State jurisdiction upon federal courts[144]. On the contrary, it is established beyond argument that State functions and powers may be conferred upon officers and authorities of the Executive Government of the Commonwealth[145]. There are many such arrangements to which the Federal Parliament has consented[146].
The federal authorisation is valid in this case: Where a provision is enacted affording the consent of the Federal Parliament to the conferral of State functions and powers upon an officer or authority of the Commonwealth it must be possible, as with every federal law, to demonstrate constitutional validity of the provision. At least this is necessary where such law is challenged. Here, the accused does challenge the validity of the federal law authorising the Commonwealth DPP to prosecute him for offences provided in Western Australian law. Accordingly, it is not sufficient for the prosecution, or the Commonwealth and States as interveners, simply to point to the cooperative legislative scheme and suggest that this alone and the merits of such national cooperation, without more, sustain the constitutional validity of the facility afforded to the Commonwealth DPP by s 47 of the Corporations Act and reg 3(1)(d) of the Regulations. The Commonwealth DPP for the prosecution must be able to demonstrate that the federal law which, in effect, consents to the conferral on him of State functions and powers is "clothed in the raiments of constitutional validity"[147].
On its face, the Corporations Act, as it was amended following the decision in the Incorporation Case, rests for its constitutional validity on the legislative power conferred on the Federal Parliament to make laws for the Territories of the Commonwealth[148] together with the express incidental power[149]. The Corporations Act as it was first enacted relied upon a range of heads of federal constitutional powers (notably the corporations power in s 51(xx) of the Constitution). However, such express reliance was withdrawn when the "novel legislative device" was adopted of providing a federal "template"[150] for the Australian Capital Territory, which could be picked up and applied as local law in every State of Australia and in the Northern Territory.
Whilst the holding in the Incorporation Case[151] stands, it would be impossible to justify a federal law (such as s 47 of the Corporations Act and reg 3(1)(d) of the Regulations) as valid in relation to the State of Western Australia based on no more than the operation of the Corporations Act in the Australian Capital Territory and matters incidental thereto[152]. The absence of express reference in the Corporations Act to other relevant heads of federal legislative power is not fatal to its constitutional validity beyond the Capital Territory. What is in issue is the existence of constitutional authority for the impugned law as it operates in the particular case. It is not whether, as a matter of drafting of that law, the relevant federal head of power is that expressly nominated[153]. The prosecution and the Commonwealth pointed to various additional sources of power which, they suggested, supported the law authorising the Commonwealth DPP in this case to perform the functions and exercise the powers conferred on it by the law of Western Australia.
Amongst the sources of power mentioned were (1) the express incidental power, in aid of the execution of the Executive power of the Commonwealth[154]; (2) the powers supporting the establishment of the office of the Commonwealth DPP and the express incidental power enlarging those functions in the context of a national cooperative scheme[155]; (3) the implied legislative power to make provision for the acceptance of a State function and the power to give effect to such a scheme; (4) the corporations power[156]; (5) the powers in relation to trade and commerce with other countries and amongst the States and external affairs[157]; and (6) the implied nationhood power, being that which facilitates national cooperation and coordination of governmental activities in response to the "complexity ... of a modern national society"[158].
It is possible that some of these sources of federal legislative power would validate different aspects of the federal law in question as applicable to a particular case. Such law might (to the extent that its terms exceeded any available heads of constitutional power) then be capable of being read down, as necessary, to limit its operations to the contexts for which constitutional power existed[159].
The validity of the federal law in question in this matter[160] should be explored no further than is strictly necessary to establish validity in this case. The path of wisdom in such a large enterprise is to do only what is essential to answer the questions reserved. Because the context of the accused's case is one which undoubtedly involves activity that constitutes trade and commerce with other countries[161] and affairs external to Australia[162], the federal laws authorising the conferral on the Commonwealth DPP of functions and powers under the WA Corporations Act are valid in so far as they affect the accused. They sustain the performance by the Commonwealth DPP of the function of prosecuting the accused. It is undesirable to go further than this and to consider other hypothetical cases with different facts.
The accused submitted that s 47 of the Corporations Act and reg 3(1)(d) of the Regulations, read with s 1064 of the Corporations Law of Western Australia, could not be supported by reference to the trade and commerce power or the external affairs power since such provisions were not directed, in terms, to such activities. He urged that, in considering the constitutional validity of the federal law, authorising the conferral of power on the Commonwealth DPP to prosecute an offence against the WA Corporations Act, it was necessary to look at the statute itself so as to characterise the law in question rather than to evaluate its operation in the facts of a particular case. This is true up to a point.
However, it has long been recognised by this Court, in performing the task of characterisation of an impugned law (to discover whether or not it is within the ambit of a propounded head of constitutional power), that the "actual operation of the law in question in creating, changing, regulating or abolishing rights, duties, powers or privileges" is initially to be considered[163]. Once this is done the Court will examine whether the operation of the impugned law "falls in substance within the relevant authorized subject matter, or whether it touches it only incidentally, or whether it is really an endeavour, by purporting to use one power, to make a law upon a subject which is beyond power"[164]. Thus, ascertaining the actual operation of the law in the facts of the particular case is not an exceptional approach. It is normally the first step before the scope of the Federal Parliament's constitutional authority is addressed. This is done by reference to the law's substance rather than its form. The Court then passes to the "text of the law"[165]. Thus the Court "looks to the practical operation (or substance) as well as the legal operation (or form) of an impugned law"[166].
In the present matter, the "actual operation of the law in question" undoubtedly affects rights, duties, powers and privileges in relation to activities falling within established heads of federal constitutional power, namely s 51(i) and (xxix). Although the text of the law is silent about these propounded paragraphs of the Constitution, the law is as valid as it would have been if they had been expressly mentioned in the text and called in aid of the claim to constitutional validity. The absence of an explicit reference to the constitutional source is certainly unusual[167]. It invites challenges such as the present. However, upon analysis, it is not fatal in this particular instance.
Obviously, to the extent that federal law purports to authorise an officer or authority of the Commonwealth to perform functions conferred by State law which seriously affect the liberty and property rights of individuals, it may be expected that, when challenged, those who propound the constitutional validity of such authorisation will be able to demonstrate that validity exists[168]. The more drastic the consequences for those affected, the more vigilant will be the scrutiny of the impugned law, measured against the constitutional warrant. The proposition that serious and burdensome consequences of criminal proceedings may be sustained by reference to nothing more than the creation of the office of the Commonwealth DPP and incidents thereto in the context of the joint cooperative scheme (or this with the execution of the Executive power of the Commonwealth or the implied nationhood power) is highly doubtful. For such outcomes a firm foundation of constitutional authority would appear to be necessary. Under our Constitution, criminal liability and punishment, when provided in a federal law, must be supported by demonstrable constitutional authority. Convenience and desirability are not enough if the constitutional foundation is missing.
In the peculiar circumstances of this case that foundation exists. It might also exist in some other circumstances where the practical operation of the law (substance), as well as the legal operation (form), are held to fall within an established head of federal legislative power. Obviously, the search for a constitutional source is not helped by the absence of any relevant expression by the Federal Parliament of the propounded constitutional bases of its enactment. It remains to be seen whether, in other factual circumstances, such defects will prove fatal to other prosecutions. Clearly, it is a fragile foundation for a highly important national law. The present accused fails in his challenge. But the next case may not present circumstances sufficient to attract the essential constitutional support. Early attention to the "novel legislative device" would appear to be prudent.

[110]

The foregoing conclusions leave many questions raised during argument unanswered. For example, it is not necessary to decide whether the Commonwealth DPP, when solely exercising State functions and powers, is an officer of the Commonwealth for the purposes of the Constitution[169]. The basis upon which the present matter comes before this Court obviates any necessity to decide that point. It should therefore be left to a proceeding where that decision is essential.
It is also unnecessary to speculate on whether any heads of power other than those in s 51(i) and (xxix) of the Constitution would sustain the federal law authorising the performance by the Commonwealth DPP of functions conferred by State law, had the element of commerce with another country, external to Australia, not been present in the particular facts of this case to which the law applied.
Nor, in my view, should this Court deal with a point raised by the accused during argument concerning the alleged defects of the indictment presented in his case by reason of the form in which the name of the prosecutor was expressed[170]. This Court, as now constituted, is not concerned with the application to quash the indictment for defects of form. Its sole concern is to answer questions of large moment and general application that have been reserved to it. None of those questions raises an objection as to the form of the indictment. It is unthinkable that this Court would usurp the functions of the courts of Western Australia by deciding such a point.
Finally, in my view, it is not necessary in these proceedings to decide whether the Corporations Act not merely authorises the Commonwealth DPP to perform functions and exercise powers under State law but, by force of federal law, imposes a duty or obligation to do so. The verb in the federal laws in question (s 47 of the Corporations Act and reg 3(1)(d) of the Regulations) is expressed to provide that the prescribed authority (the Commonwealth DPP) shall "have prescribed functions and powers" (emphasis added). In its terms this expression appears to be a recognition of the fact that the binding obligation imposed by such functions and powers derives from State (or Territory) law and not from the federal law in question. Upon this basis the federal law is merely facultative and permissory[171]. At least that would appear to be all that the Federal Parliament has enacted.
Commonly, by virtue of their character, the imposition of public functions on a statutory officer or authority such as the Commonwealth DPP will oblige the performance of those functions to the full extent of the office-holder's capacity[172]. In the present case, the discharge of the functions under Western Australian law is not in doubt. The Commonwealth DPP has in fact brought the prosecution against the accused. It is therefore hypothetical, and beyond the issues presented by the matter, to speculate upon what might happen if the Commonwealth DPP were to decline or omit to perform the functions conferred upon him by State (and Territory) law with the consent of federal law. The sanctions in such a case would seem, at least primarily, to be political and intergovernmental. I would therefore leave this question to be decided in a case where it was necessary to do so. It is not necessary here.

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