The ADJR Act primarily affects two groups: Commonwealth administrators and persons aggrieved by their actions.

On the administrative side, every "Commonwealth authority" (defined in s 3(1) as any authority or body established by Commonwealth Act, whether incorporated or not) and every "officer of the Commonwealth" (bearing the constitutional meaning from s 75(v)) must make decisions in accordance with the grounds set out in ss 5, 6 and 7. Ministers, departmental secretaries, statutory office-holders, and delegates (deemed to act as the principal under s 3(8)) are all captured when exercising power under an "enactment". Because the definition of enactment includes instruments made under Acts (s 3(1)(c)) and, via Schedule 3 and s 19B, certain applied State and Territory energy, competition, agricultural and petroleum laws, administrators operating under those uniform schemes are equally subject to ADJR scrutiny when the law is applied as a law of the relevant jurisdiction.

The second group comprises "persons aggrieved". Section 3(4) adopts an interest-based test: a person whose interests are adversely affected, or would be if a report or recommendation were acted upon. This is broader than strict legal standing and captures applicants, objectors, competitors, and community groups whose economic, reputational or environmental interests are engaged. The Act expressly extends to preparatory conduct (s 3(5)) and failures to decide (s 7), meaning applicants need not wait for a final adverse instrument.

Courts themselves are affected through the detailed procedural regime in s 11, the power to order additional reasons (s 13(7)), the discretion to transfer proceedings (s 18A), and the Attorney-General's right of intervention (s 18). Legal practitioners must master the interaction between ADJR applications, requests for statements under s 13, time limits keyed to the furnishing of reasons, and the overlapping but distinct grounds in ss 5–7. Finally, because s 9 limits State court jurisdiction and ss 9A–9B impose temporary stays during criminal and certain civil proceedings, prosecutors, defendants and civil litigants in national-security matters must navigate the interface between the ADJR Act and the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004.

The ADJR Act creates a suite of rights and correlative duties.

Rights of applicants include:

• The right to apply for review on any of the s 5, s 6 or s 7 grounds (ss 5(1), 6(1), 7(1)–(2)).
• The right to obtain a statement of reasons (s 13(1)), subject only to the exceptions in ss 13(5), 13A and 14.
• The right to seek a stay of the impugned decision or related proceedings (ss 15, 15A).
• The right to join as a party if interested (s 12).
• The right to amend grounds with leave (s 11(6)–(7)).

Duties imposed on decision-makers are both substantive and procedural. Substantively, administrators must avoid the vitiating defects listed in ss 5–7. Procedurally, they must furnish statements of reasons within 28 days of a valid request (s 13(2)), or give notice if they believe the requester lacks entitlement (s 13(3)). Where protected personal or business information is involved (s 13A) or an Attorney-General certificate has issued (s 14), the decision-maker must still notify the requester why the statement is incomplete or withheld. Decision-makers must also comply with court orders referring matters back with directions (s 16(1)(b)) or directing positive or negative acts (s 16(1)(d), (2)(b), (3)(c)).

The Attorney-General holds a statutory power to certify that disclosure would be contrary to the public interest on security, Cabinet or other judicially recognised grounds (s 14(1)). Once certified, that information is excluded from statements of reasons, although the court retains discovery and evidence powers (s 14(4)).

Courts are under duties to consider time-limit extensions (s 11(1)(c)), to assess the reasonableness of delay where no statutory period exists (s 7(1)), and to exercise remedial discretion under s 16 "as the court thinks fit" while doing justice between the parties.

The ADJR Act is not a penal statute; it contains no offence provisions or direct monetary penalties. Enforcement occurs through the civil remedies in s 16 and the ancillary powers in ss 15 and 15A. Non-compliance with a court order made under s 16 (for example, a direction to refrain from implementing a quashed decision or to make a decision within a specified time) would expose the respondent to contempt proceedings in the ordinary way.

Costs consequences are expressly contemplated. When the Attorney-General intervenes (s 18), the court may order the Commonwealth to pay costs. In ordinary litigation, the successful applicant will usually recover costs on a standard basis, although the broad discretion in s 16(1)(d) and the power to refuse relief under s 10(2) give courts latitude to deny costs where an application is premature or an alternative remedy was adequate.

The real "sanction" is the setting aside of the decision (s 16(1)(a)) with effect from a date chosen by the court, which may be retrospective. This can invalidate downstream actions, require repayment of wrongly collected monies, or necessitate fresh decision-making. In regulatory contexts, such as decisions under applied national electricity or gas laws listed in Schedule 3, the commercial consequences can be substantial.

The ADJR Act is expressly additional to other review rights (s 10(1)) and operates "notwithstanding anything contained in any law in force at the commencement of this Act" (s 4). It therefore sits alongside constitutional review under s 75(v) of the Constitution, prerogative writs in State Supreme Courts (subject to the s 9 ouster), merits review by the Administrative Review Tribunal, and complaints to the Commonwealth Ombudsman (expressly preserved by s 10(1)(b)).

Particular interaction occurs with the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 and the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 through the transfer provisions (ss 18A, 3(10)–(11)) and the adoption of court rules for procedure (s 11). The Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 and Corporations Act 2001 s 1337B(3) qualify the s 9 limitation on State jurisdiction.

Schedule 3 and ss 19A–19B integrate the ADJR Act with uniform national schemes. For example, the National Electricity Law, National Gas Law, Competition Code and Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals Code, when applied by State or Territory legislation, become "enactments" for ADJR purposes. Regulations under s 19 can exclude classes of decisions, while s 19A permits declaration of additional Northern Territory laws (other than those within Ministerial executive authority under the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978).

Sections 9A and 9B create temporary jurisdictional bars during pending criminal prosecutions or civil proceedings involving national-security notices or certificates under the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004. These provisions prevent collateral attacks via ADJR while the primary proceeding is on foot, reflecting a legislative policy of centralising related issues.

The Act also intersects with freedom-of-information and privacy legislation: a s 13 statement can sometimes overlap with FOI requests, although s 13A protects third-party personal and business information supplied in confidence or protected by statutory secrecy.

The consolidated text reflects a series of amendments that respond to institutional and policy developments. The most visible are the repeated references to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) and its Rules, inserted to accommodate the 2018–2021 court restructuring. Subsections 3(10) and (11) contain "to avoid doubt" provisions that deem transferred proceedings to have always been within the statutory language; these clarify that the 28-day time limit and other procedural rules apply regardless of transfer pathway.

Sections 9A and 9B were added to manage the interface with national-security litigation. Section 9A(4) defines "related criminal justice process decision" expansively to include investigation, committal, warrant and appeal decisions, and expressly notes that a decision to prosecute is excluded from review by paragraph (xa) of Schedule 1. Section 9B performs the same function for civil proceedings involving Attorney-General or ministerial certificates under the National Security Information Act. These changes reflect a legislative judgment that ADJR applications by defendants or parties should not fragment or delay primary criminal or civil processes.

Schedule 3 has been expanded by regulation-making power (s 19B) to capture successive cooperative schemes: the National Gas Law, National Energy Retail Law, Competition Code, and various Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Acts. The amendments ensure that decisions under these applied laws are reviewable in the Federal Court rather than scattered across State jurisdictions, promoting uniformity.

The insertion of s 13(11)(a) cross-referencing the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 shows ongoing integration with the federal merits-review architecture. Collectively, these changes demonstrate a legislative pattern of expanding the Act's reach to national schemes while contracting it in sensitive criminal and security contexts.

Although the source text does not cite specific judgments, several structural features have generated litigation. The distinction between "administrative" and "legislative" or "judicial" character (embedded in the definition of "decision to which this Act applies") has produced boundary disputes. Decisions listed in Schedule 1, including decisions to prosecute (para (xa)), remain immune, prompting arguments about the proper characterisation of ancillary investigative steps.

The breadth of "person aggrieved" in s 3(4) has been tested at the margins, particularly where environmental or competitive interests are asserted. The "no evidence" ground (s 5(1)(h) read with s 5(3)) has required courts to distinguish between jurisdictional facts and ordinary factual findings.

Sections 9, 9A and 9B have attracted controversy for their ouster and stay effects. The temporary bar during criminal proceedings (s 9A(1)) and the prosecutor's power to seek a permanent stay (s 9A(3)) raise questions about access to justice and the separation of powers. Similarly, the Attorney-General's certification power under s 14 has been challenged on the basis that it may shield large swathes of deliberative material, although the preservation of court-ordered discovery (s 14(4)) provides a safety valve.

The discretionary power to refuse relief under s 10(2)(b)(ii) where "adequate provision" exists elsewhere has led to debates about the relative merits of ADJR versus constitutional writs or statutory appeals. Because the Act does not require an error to appear on the record (s 5(1)(f)), it has been used to ventilate errors of law discovered only through s 13 statements, creating a practical incentive to request reasons even in borderline cases.

Most practitioners underestimate the strictness of the time limits in s 11(3). The 28-day period runs from the furnishing of a document setting out the terms of the decision, but only if that document includes findings, evidence references and reasons. If it does not, time may run from a later s 13 statement or, in default, from the date the decision document itself was furnished. Missing the deadline by even one day can be fatal unless the court grants an extension under s 11(1)(c), which is not automatic.

The "decision" definition in s 3(2) and (3) catches many preliminary steps that administrators assume are immune. A refusal to issue a certificate, the imposition of a condition, or even the holding of an inquiry can constitute reviewable conduct under s 6. Conversely, many believe that a mere policy or guideline is reviewable; it is not, unless it amounts to a decision or conduct under an enactment.

Schedule 1 exclusions are broader than they appear. Paragraph (xa) excludes decisions to prosecute, but s 9A extends the exclusion to a wide range of related investigative and evidentiary decisions once a prosecution is on foot. Requesting reasons under s 13 can inadvertently start the clock or trigger a notice under s 13(5) that the request is out of time, crystallising the limitation period.

Section 13A and s 14 allow decision-makers to withhold information without furnishing a full statement, yet the court retains power to order discovery. Applicants who fail to pursue discovery promptly may find that the withheld material is never tested. The "unreasonable delay" ground in s 7(1) requires the absence of any prescribed period; if a statute sets even an aspirational timeframe, the application must proceed under s 7(2) on the narrower ground that the duty survives expiry.

Finally, the expanded definition of enactment via Schedule 3 means that a decision taken under what appears to be State legislation (for example, the National Gas Law as applied in South Australia or Western Australia) is in fact an ADJR decision. Failing to recognise this can lead to proceedings being issued in the wrong court or against the wrong respondent.

Compliance for administrators begins with process. Every decision-maker should maintain a contemporaneous file that records material questions of fact, the evidence relied upon, and the reasoning process. This file will form the basis of a s 13 statement and will be the primary evidence if an application is filed. Where a statute requires particular procedures or considerations, a checklist linked to the relevant statutory power reduces the risk of breach of s 5(1)(b) or irrelevant/relevant consideration grounds.

When a request for reasons arrives, the 28-day clock starts immediately. If the requester appears not to be a "person aggrieved", issue a s 13(3) notice promptly and consider an application under s 13(4A) for a declaration. Where confidential third-party information is involved, prepare a redacted statement and a covering notice under s 13A(3). Attorney-General certificates under s 14 should be sought only where genuine public-interest concerns exist; overuse invites judicial scepticism and potential costs orders.

Decision records should expressly address mandatory relevant considerations and avoid reference to extraneous matters. Where policy is relevant, the decision-maker must demonstrate that the merits of the individual case were considered (s 5(2)(f)). If delay is inevitable, document the reasons for it; this evidence will be critical if a s 7 application is lodged.

For applicants and their advisers, the first step is to obtain the best available statement of reasons. If the furnished statement is inadequate, apply under s 13(7) for further and better particulars before commencing proceedings. Identify the precise "decision" or "conduct" and map each ground to the language of ss 5, 6 or 7; courts expect pleadings to track the statutory language. Time limits must be diarised from the earliest possible trigger date. Where the matter is urgent, a simultaneous application for a stay under s 15 or 15A should be filed.

Organisations operating under applied laws listed in Schedule 3 should maintain dual compliance systems: the substantive rules of the applied law plus the procedural disciplines of the ADJR Act. Training for decision-makers should emphasise that a decision "under" an applied State law is, for ADJR purposes, a decision under an enactment.

Finally, agencies should develop protocols for Attorney-General intervention (s 18) and for responding to transfer applications under s 18A. Early identification of parallel proceedings that might engage ss 9A or 9B can avoid wasted costs and the risk of a permanent stay. By treating the ADJR Act as an integral part of administrative decision-making rather than an after-the-fact litigation risk, Commonwealth and applied-law administrators can substantially reduce exposure to successful review.