1. On 5 February 2016, 70 initiating Applications against the Chief Executive Officer (Housing) (the 'Respondent') were filed in the Tribunal by the legal representative of the applicants, Mr Kelly. It was agreed between the parties that, given the commonality of factual and legal issues, only four of the 70 matters would proceed to the Tribunal for hearing. The other matters remain outstanding pending the resolution of the matters remitted to the Tribunal for decision.

1. Following the Tribunal's decision in Various Applicants, two of the four applicants, Ms Young and Mr Conway (the 'Applicants'), brought an appeal to the NTSC pursuant to section 141(1) of the Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 ('NTCAT Act'). That provision permits a party to "appeal to the Supreme Court against a decision of the Tribunal on a question of law".
2. In the NTSC, the Applicants relied on five grounds of appeal, namely;
   • 5.1. the Tribunal failed to evaluate and apply the principles from Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio [1983] HCA 14; (1983) 151 CLR 447;
   • 5.2. whether the tenancy agreement prescribed under the RTA was void for uncertainty having regard to Schedule 2, clause 2(2) of the Residential Tenancies Regulations;
   • 5.3. whether the Tribunal erred in law in finding that the Applicants' homes did not constitute "improvised dwellings" within the meaning of the Remote Rent Framework;
   • 5.4. whether the Tribunal properly applied the term 'habitable' in section 48(1)(a) of the RTA;
   • 5.5. whether, in respect of Ms Young, the Tribunal erred in finding that the absence of a back door in Ms Young's premises was not a security device within the meaning of section 49(1) of the RTA.
3. The NTSC upheld the grounds noted at [5.1], [5.4] and [5.5], but not those noted at [5.2], [5.3] and [5.4]. The matters noted in grounds [5.1] ('Amadio') and [5.4] (section 48(1)(a) of the RTA) were remitted back to the Tribunal for reconsideration. Relying on the principles enunciated in the High Court decisions in Moore v Scenic Tours [2020] HCA 17; (2020) 268 CLR 326 and Baltic Shipping v Dillon (1993) 176 CLR 344,[1] the NTSC assessed compensation owing to Ms Young under section 122 of the RTA for the Respondent's breach of section 49(1) to be the sum of $10,200.

1. The Respondent appealed to the NTCA the decision in Young and Conway v Chief Executive Officer, Housing (2020) 355 FLR 290; [2020] NTSC 59. The NTCA found that the NTSC erred in remitting the matter noted in [5.1] to the Tribunal because the Tribunal had no jurisdiction or power to make a determination on the matter remitted.[2]
2. In addition, while the NTCA agreed with the NTSC that the Tribunal fell into error in its approach to the construction of the word "habitable" in section 48(1)(a) of the RTA, and that the issue of habitability should be remitted back to the Tribunal, it held that the test enunciated by the NTSC "should not be adopted in its entirety in that reconsideration".[3] In particular, the NTCA, contrary to the finding of the NTSC, held that "a finding that premises are not fit for habitation should not be lightly made".[4] Also, the NTCA found that the NTSC's suggested criteria of "humaneness" and "suitability" were insufficiently precise to "engage the exercise of judicial power" when determining the issue of habitability as set out in section 48(1)(a).[5]
3. The NTCA set out the test of habitability applicable to section 48(1)(a) as follows:

The relevant test of liability, apart from matters of health and safety, is "comfort", subject to Lord Atkin's qualification that a reasonable view of that criterion must be taken. Questions of fitness for habitation are to be judged against a standard of reasonableness having regard to the age, character and locality of the residential premises and to the effect of the defect on the state of the premises as a whole.[6]

1. Finally, the NTCA held that the NTSC fell into error in awarding damages to Ms Young arising from the Respondent's breach of section 49(1) of the RTA. While the NTCA found that the Tribunal had erred in law in finding that the Respondent's failure to provide a back door to Ms Young's premises did not constitute a breach of section 49(1), it concluded that the NTSC erred in finding that an award of compensation under section 122 was governed by the second limb of the principle in Baltic Shipping. The NTCA stated:

For the reasons we have already described, the award of compensation made by the Supreme Court was for distress and disappointment caused by the failure to provide secure premises under the second limb of the principle in Baltic Shipping, rather than as a consequence of physical inconvenience caused by the breach. That conclusion derives not only from a reading of the relevant part of the Supreme Court's reasons as a whole, but also from the fact that there was no finding by the Tribunal of physical inconvenience by reason of the breach, and no evidence on which to make such a finding. For reasons we have also described, the Supreme Court fell into error in finding that the tenancy agreement was governed by the second limb of the principle in Baltic Shipping concerning damages for distress and disappointment for breach of contract.[7]

1. In coming to this conclusion, the NTCA noted that "[d]amages for discomfort and loss of enjoyment are not generally recoverable for breach of contract because they are considered to be too remote".[8] It also noted that residential tenancy agreements do not fall within the same category as the type of contract at issue in cases such as Baltic Shipping - namely, for example, contracts promising peaceful and comfortable accommodation to holidaymakers.[9]

That is because the central object of the residential tenancy agreement is to grant a right of occupation of premises for the purpose of use as a residence in return for rent. Although the exclusive possession of premises in pursuance of a tenancy agreement no doubt affords a degree of security and comfort, among other benefits, the central object of such contract is not to relieve a party from anxiety or annoyance, or to provide pleasure and relaxation.[10]

1. The Applicants appealed the decision of the NTCA to the High Court of Australia.[11] The question to be determined by the appeal was articulated by Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Gleeson JJ (the 'majority') at [1] of Young v Chief Executive (Housing) [2023] HCA 31; (2023) 278 CLR 208.

The dispositive question in this appeal is whether the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of the Northern Territory ... is empowered by s 122(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1999 (NT) ... to order that a landlord compensate a tenant for distress or disappointment suffered by the tenant as a normal healthy reaction to a failure on the part of the landlord to comply with a statutorily imposed term of a residential tenancy agreement that the landlord take reasonable steps to provide and maintain security devices necessary to ensure that residential premises are reasonably secure.

1. The majority held that the NTCA was correct to conclude that the assessment of damages under section 122 of the RTA would, inter alia, be governed by the common law principles of remoteness.[12] The majority found, however, that:

Where the reasoning of the Court of Appeal and the argument of the CEO went too far was in postulating a further element of the design of the Act to be that the measure of compensation capable of being ordered by the Tribunal under s 122 of the Act for breach of a term of a tenancy agreement is confined by reference to the measure of damages that could be ordered by a court for breach of that term of that tenancy agreement in a common law action for breach of contract. Statutory compensation under s 122 is rather to be seen as an alternative, and likely more accessible, remedy to common law damages for breach of a tenancy agreement.[13]

1. The majority articulated the approach to an award of compensation given the facts of these proceedings.[14]

The evident purpose of the obligation specified by s 49(1) of the Act to be a term of a tenancy agreement, with which the CEO as landlord failed to comply, is ensuring that premises occupied by a tenant for the purpose of residency are reasonably secure. For a tenant to be secure in the occupation of premises is for the tenant to reside there free from threat of harm or unwanted access. The feeling of insecurity which Ms Young experienced because of the landlord's failure to provide the residential premises with a back door was the obverse of the security which it was the purpose of the obligation to secure. The connection between the landlord's breach and the distress and disappointment suffered by Ms Young readily satisfied the causal connection required by the word "because" in s 122(1).

Whether or not the distress and disappointment found to have been suffered by Ms Young due to the failure of the CEO to provide the requisite security would have been compensable in an action for damages at common law, Ms Young's distress and disappointment was compensable on application to the Tribunal under s 122(1)(a) of the Act, subject to the Tribunal's consideration of the factors prescribed by s 122(3).

1. The remaining members of the High Court, Gordon and Edelman JJ, also allowed the appeal, but based on reasoning different from that expressed by the majority. They held that the,

default position in s 122 of the Residential Tenancies Act is to adopt general contract law rules in respect of a claim for compensation for loss or damage suffered because of a failure to comply with the tenancy agreement.[15]

1. Gordon and Edelman JJ held that compensation could be recovered under section 122(1)(a) of the RTA for a breach section of 49(1) for "disappointment and distress where that disappointment and distress is not consequential upon physical injury or physical inconvenience."[16] In applying the second limb of Baltic Shipping, Gordon and Edelman JJ held that:

damages for disappointment and distress are not available at common law unless an object of the contract, or the specific term that is breached, was concerned with the promisee's state of mind. The relevant contract term breached in this case, with its focus upon the safety and security of the premises, had an object which included providing the tenant with security and peace of mind.[17]

Further appeal to the NTCA on the issue of compensation

1. In August 2024, the NTCA heard a further appeal from the decision of the NTSC brought by the administrator of Ms Young's estate (the 'Administrator').[18] The appeal concerned the Administrator's submissions that the NTSC erred in its approach to the calculation of compensation under section 122(1) of the RTA for the CEO Housing's failure to provide a back door to Ms Young's property for an extended period of time or, alternatively, that the amount of compensation ordered for this breach of the RTA was manifestly inadequate.
2. The Administrator submitted that the NTSC erred in finding that:

The principles and observations drawn from both Baltic Shipping and Moore v Scenic Tours Pty Ltd must be heavily calibrated appropriately to the circumstances of Ms Young's reduced enjoyment of the premises and subsequent distress and disappointment due to the failure to provide a premises which was secure. Although I am prepared to accept the application of those principles, heavily calibrated to include frustration and distress, compensation here cannot be based on a proportion of the damages in Moore v Scenic Tours Pty Ltd as was suggested by the appellants.[19]

1. In the NTCA,[20] the Administrator argued that the decisions of the High Court support the proposition that the common law principles from Baltic Shipping apply to the award of compensation under section 122 of the RTA. In the words of the NTCA, the Administrator submitted that such common law principles,

should be taken to have application because the members of the High Court were unanimous as to the result; the three-member joint reasons did not expressly disavow the reasoning in the two-member joint reasons; and two justices may constitute a Full Court of the High Court.[21]

1. In unequivocal terms, the NTCA rejected this submission.

That argument must be rejected. The relevant claim was exclusively for statutory compensation under section 122 of the Residential Tenancies Act. It was not, and is not, an action for damages at common law for breach of contract, nor would the Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain such a claim. For the reasons already described, the ratio of the High Court's decision is that the availability of compensation under s 122 of the Residential Tenancies Act is a matter of statutory interpretation having regard to the nature and purpose of the obligation with which there has been a failure to comply, and does not import the common law principles of remoteness addressed in Baltic Shipping.[22]

1. The NTCA went on to hold that the NTSC erred in determining damages based on the common law principles of recoverability expressed in Baltic Shipping.[23] The NTSC's order of compensation in the sum of $10,200 for a breach of the Respondent's obligation under section 49 of the RTA was set aside, and the matter remitted to the Tribunal for determination in accordance with the principles enunciated in the High Court majority decision, as interpreted by the NTCA.
2. At the hearing before the Tribunal, the Applicants submitted that the NTCA did not properly interpret the decision of the High Court and reiterated the submissions noted at [19] above. In particular, the Applicants maintained that a proper reading of the High Court's decision in Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2023] HCA 31; (2023) 278 CLR 208 supported the proposition that the common law principles of recoverability expressed in Baltic Shipping apply to the Tribunal's assessment of compensation under section 122 of the RTA.
3. In support of this proposition, the Applicant's cited the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court ('FCAFC') in BVT20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs and Another [2020] FCAFC 222; (2020) 283 FCR 97. In that case, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ('AAT') perceived that there was an inconsistency between a decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which remitted the matter to the AAT, and an earlier decision of the Federal Court. The AAT applied the law as articulated in the Federal Court decision. The FCAFC in BVT20 concluded that the AAT was correct to apply the decision of the Federal Court over that of the Federal Circuit Court, given that the former was higher in the judicial hierarchy.[24]
4. The current proceedings differ from the facts in BVT20. In Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2025] NTCA 5, the NTCA interpreted the ratio of the earlier High Court decision in Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2023] HCA 31; (2023) 278 CLR 208. The NTCA decision is precisely on point with these proceedings. Further, no appeal was taken from the NTCA decision.
5. When faced with such a situation, the Tribunal is bound to follow the decision of the NTCA. In the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision in Attorney-General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 86, McHugh JA (as his Honour then was) stated at page 188:

... his Honour was in error in thinking that he was entitled to refuse to follow a decision of this Court on the ground that it was inconsistent with earlier High Court statements. Judges of the Divisions of the Supreme Court are bound by the ratio decidendi of a Court of Appeal decision until it is overruled by the High Court. In Jacob v Utah Construction and Engineering Pty Ltd [1966] HCA 67; (1966) 116 CLR 200, Barwick CJ, speaking of the relationship between the High Court and the State Supreme Courts at a time when the High Court was bound by Privy Council decisions, said (at 207):

"...It is not, in my opinion, for a Supreme Court of a State to decide that a decision of this Court precisely in point ought now to be decided differently because it appears to the Supreme Court to be inconsistent with reasoning of the Judicial Committee in a subsequent case. If the decision of this Court is to be overruled, it must be by the Judicial Committee, or by this Court itself. It cannot be treated by a Supreme Court as if it were overruled. The matter is, of course, different where this Court's decision is not precisely in point and comparison has to be made merely between two lines of reasoning."

That principle is directly applicable to the relationship of the Court of Appeal and the Divisions of the Supreme Court. It is the duty of the judges of the courts of justice to accept loyally the decision of the higher tiers: Broome v Cassell & Co Ltd [1972] UKHL 3; [1972] AC 1027 at 1054. [25]

1. If the Applicants sought to challenge the decision of the NTCA in Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2025] NTCA 5, it should have done so by way of appeal to the High Court. In the circumstances of these proceedings, the doctrine of precedent requires that the Tribunal follows the reasoning of the NTCA.

1. The hearing of the matters remitted to the Tribunal was heard in Alice Springs on 10 to 11 September 2025. The Applicant sought to tender into evidence an Unattended Declaration of Daniel Kelly dated 28 July 2025. The Respondent did not object to the admission of Mr Kelly's evidence at the hearing, although issue was later taken by the Respondent with the admission of Mr Kelly's evidence in the Respondent's closing submissions.[26]
2. The Respondent sought to admit into evidence an Unattested Declaration of Amanda Thorneycroft dated 25 August 2025, and an Unattested Declaration of Tamara Biro dated 28 August 2025. The Applicant objected to the admission of Ms Thorneycroft and Ms Biro's evidence.
3. Consequently, four preliminary matters warrant discussion in these reasons, namely whether:
   • 29.1. the Unattested Declaration of Daniel Kelly dated 28 July 2025 should be allowed into evidence;
   • 29.2. the Unattested Declaration of Amanda Jane Thorneycroft dated 25 August 2025 should be allowed into evidence;
   • 29.3. the Unattested Declaration of Tamara Biro dated 28 August 2025 should be allowed into evidence; and
   • 29.4. a number of documents not produced by the Resondent in the Various Applicants proceeding should be allowed into evidence.

1. In its closing submissions, the Respondent took issue with the fact that the Tribunal permitted the receipt into evidence of the Unattested Declaration of Daniel Kelly dated 28 July 2025. Mr Kelly is the solicitor for the Applicants.
2. In particular, the Respondent now objects to an annexure to the Unattested Declaration, namely annexure 1 which is a statutory declaration made by Ms Young dated 2 March 2023. The Respondent maintains that it had no opportunity to cross-examine Ms Young on the statutory declaration and Ms Young's evidence could, and should, have been adduced at the Various Applicants hearing.[27]
3. In the remittal hearing the Tribunal was advised by counsel for the Applicant that the Respondent had no objection to the admission into evidence of Mr Kelly's Unattested Declaration of 28 July 2025. At no time did counsel for the Respondent refute this representation. An objection to the admission of Mr Kelly's Unattested Declaration should have been made at the hearing, not in written supplemental closing submissions.
4. No issue can be taken with the relevance of the evidence contained in Mr Kelly's Unattested Declaration to the matters in issue in these proceedings. In the absence of an objection to the admission of the evidence, and in light of the relevance of the evidence to the matters in issue in these proceedings, the Tribunal allowed the evidence to be admitted. While the Tribunal accepts the Respondent's submission that such evidence, and in particular the evidence contained in the statutory declaration of Ms Young, could and should have been led at the hearing of Various Applicants, in the circumstances that is a matter that goes to weight to be given to the evidence rather than to its admissibility.

Admission of the Thornycroft and Biro Unattested Declarations

1. Ms Thornycroft is the Director, Housing Property Services at the Department of Housing, Local Government and Community Development (the 'Department') within the Northern Territory Government, a position she has held since 21 July 2025. Ms Biro is the Acting Financial Officer of the Department, a position she has held since 30 September 2024.
2. Ms Thornycroft conducted an analysis of documents pertaining to the lots occupied by both Ms Young and Mr Conway. A number of the documents analysed by Ms Thornycroft were not produced to the Applicants or to the Tribunal in the Various Applicants proceeding, notwithstanding numerous Tribunal orders directing the exchange of evidence in the lead-up to the hearing and the assurance of then counsel for the Respondent that a thorough search had been conducted and that all the relevant documents had been produced. Based on Ms Thornycroft's analysis of the documentation held by the Respondent, she proffered an opinion on when a number of the defects relied on by Ms Young and Mr Conway in the Various Applicants proceeding arose.
3. At the hearing, the admission of Ms Thornycroft's Unattested Declaration was refused. Ms Biro's Unattested Declaration was admitted on a provisional basis. The Tribunal indicated that full reasons for the decisions would be provided in these reasons.
4. In support of the admission of Ms Thornycroft's Unattested Declaration, the Respondent cited the decision of Macaulay J in Barfly's Nominees Pty Ltd v Klinger Partners (A Firm) [2020] VSC 277. That case involved a remitter from the Victorian Court of Appeal to the Victorian Supreme Court for the assessment of damages caused by the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's negligent advice. A preliminary question arose as to whether the defendant could adduce further evidence on the remitter.
5. After reviewing relevant case law, Macaulay J held that a decision to admit further evidence is discretionary, which discretion is to be exercised judicially.[28] His Honour went on to state:

Guided by the approach illustrated in these authorities, and without attempting to be exhaustive, relevant factors to take into account in the particular circumstances of this case include:[29]

• the overarching purpose of s 7 of the CPA [Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) "to facilitate just, efficient, timely and cost-effective resolution of the real issues in dispute"[30]];
• the directions given by the Court of Appeal pursuant to its powers under r 64.37(7) of the Rules;
• the nature of the matter that has been remitted and the manner in which the task of determining the remitted matter is to be undertaken;
• the public interest in the finality of litigation;
• fairness to all parties, including a fair opportunity to be heard and to present evidence to the Court on the issues which need to be decided, tempered by the values of timeliness, efficiency and cost effectiveness in resolving the issues in dispute;
• the extent to which the new evidence may expand the dimension of the dispute; and
• the opportunities which the applicant party had to adduce the evidence in the past and the reasons for not having done so.

1. The Applicants opposed the admission of the Unattested Declarations of both Ms Thornycroft and Ms Biro. They cited the decision of Blow CJ in RV Pty Ltd v Connector Park Pty Ltd (No 4) (2022) 35 Tas R 183 at [19] in which the learned Chief Justice referred to the applicable principles relating to the nature of a remitter discussed by Jackson J in Harvard Nominees Pty Ltd v Tiller (No 4) [2022] FCA 105; (2022) 403 ALR 498.

His Honour reviewed the authorities. At [47] [of H_arvard Nominees_] he referred to "the character of the remitter hearing as a continuation of the previous trial" and said:

... the primary court, on remitter, cannot go outside the scope of what is remitted, or reconsider any of its previous findings that have not been disturbed by the appellate court, unless it determines in accordance with ordinary principles that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to give leave to reopen.

1. The Applicants submitted that the test for allowing new evidence in a remitter proceeding when an objection has been taken is set out in the FCAFC decision in McCarthy v McIntyre [2000] FCA 1250 at [30]:

Where an application is made to reopen on the basis that new or additional evidence is available, it would be relevant to enquire why the evidence was not called at the hearing. If there was a deliberate decision not to call it, ordinarily that will tell decisively against the application. Even if that hurdle is passed, different considerations will apply depending upon whether the case is simply one in which the hearing is complete or one in which reasons for judgment have been delivered. In the former situation, the primary consideration should be that of embarrassment or prejudice to the other side. However, in the latter situation, the appeal rules relating to fresh evidence provide a useful guide as to the manner in which the discretion to reopen should be exercised - Smith v NSW Bar Association [1992] HCA 36; (1992) 176 CLR 256 at 266-7.

1. In Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v MB [2021] FCAFC 194, the FCAFC stated at [22]:

Assuming that the interlocutory application is directed to the Court's power to admit fresh evidence on appeal ... the following requirements arise:

(a) whether the further evidence is such that, had it been adduced below, the result would very probably have been different; and

(b) the party seeking to adduce the evidence must demonstrate that it was unaware of the evidence and could not have been, with reasonable diligence, made aware of the evidence ... .

1. In relation to Ms Thornycroft's Unattested Declaration, the Respondent could, and should, have been aware of the documents now relied upon by Ms Thornycroft but not produced in the Various Applicants proceeding. While there is insufficient evidence to ascertain whether the failure to disclose such documents was deliberate or simply a result of incompetence, the fact remains that the Respondent was under an obligation to produce the evidence, had ample time to search for and find the documents, yet failed to do so without an adequate explanation as to the reasons for such failure.
2. In addition, there is little question that the death of Ms Young and Mr Conway significantly hinders the Applicants' ability to respond to Ms Thornycroft's evidence. Through no fault of their own, if the evidence was admitted the Applicants would be in a position of responding to an analysis of documents which could, and should, have been produced by the Respondent in the Various Applicants proceeding. Had the Respondent complied with its discovery obligations, Ms Young and Mr Conway could have responded to the evidence.
3. Finally, while it is a statutory objective of the Tribunal to "act with as little formality and technicality as possible"[31] in the conduct of proceedings, the Tribunal, inter alia, must act fairly[32] and comply with the rules of natural justice.[33] To allow into evidence Ms Thornycroft's analysis of documents, many of which were not produced in the Various Applicants proceeding, would in the circumstances be unfair to the Applicants.
4. Different considerations apply to the Unattested Declaration of Ms Biro. Ms Biro reviewed the rental records relating to Ms Young's lot (Lot 165) and Mr Conway's lot (Lot 195). In particular, Ms Biro reviewed the Tenancy Management System ('TMS') files relating to both lots. Such TMS files were produced by the Respondent in Various Applicants.
5. Prior to Ms Biro giving oral evidence, counsel for the Respondent informed the Tribunal that the following paragraphs of Ms Biro's Unattested Declaration were not being read: [6], [8], [18]-[22] and [28]-[36]. Consequently, the following exhibits to Ms Biro's Unattested Declaration, found at pages 588-604 and 630-640 of the Court Book prepared by the Respondent and filed on 28 August 2025, also were not being relied upon.
6. In her Unattested Declaration, Ms Biro notes that, on or about 28 June 2022, a decision was made by the Northern Territory Treasurer to write off or waive pursuant to section 35 of the Financial Management Act 1995, $70,992,192.37 of rental debt owed by tenants in remote communities as at 11 December 2021.[34] Consequently, any debts owing by Ms Young or Mr Conway have now been written off or waived.
7. Ms Biro also notes that, in relation to Mr Conway's lot, the TMS indicates that in the period between 13 November 2011 and 11 February 2018, the total rent charged for that lot was $60,168.00.[35] In examination-in-chief, an error in the calculation was acknowledged and Ms Biro revised that figure to $59,274.30. Further, based on the TMS files, the rent paid by Mr Conway during this period was $17,740.[36]
8. In relation to Ms Young's lot, Ms Biro's analysis of the TMS data indicates that the rent charged between 5 February 2012 and 26 November 2017 was $55,936.00.[37] In oral evidence, Ms Brio revised this figure to $55,778.30. For the same period, Ms Biro's analysis of the TMS data indicates that Ms Young paid rent in the sum of $9,596.00.[38]
9. Counsel for the Respondent submitted that Ms Biro's evidence is relevant to the Tribunal's consideration of any compensation it owes to the Applicants pursuant to section 122 of the RTA. In particular, section 122(3)(d) provides that:

In determining whether to order the payment of compensation to a party, the Tribunal must take into account each of the following: ...

(d) whether a reduction or refund of rent or other allowance has been made to or by the applicant in respect of the tenancy agreement; ...

1. At the hearing, the Tribunal allowed into evidence on a provisional basis the Unattested Declaration of Ms Biro dated 28 August 2025. The documentation upon which Ms Biro's analysis was based was before the Tribunal in Various Applicants. Further, the basis on which Ms Young and Mr Conway's rent was calculated was canvassed extensively in the Various Applicants proceeding (as shall become evident below). Consequently, the unfairness to the Applicants discussed above regarding Ms Thornycroft's evidence does not apply to that given by Ms Biro.
2. In Various Applicants, evidence on behalf of the Respondent regarding the calculation of rent paid and owing by, inter alia, Ms Young and Mr Conway was given by Ms Tania Jacobson. At the time of giving evidence, Ms Jacobson was the Director, Client Relations, Public Housing Safety and Compliance within the Department of Housing.
3. In cross-examination, Ms Jacobson was questioned about pages relating to one of the applicants in the Various Applicants proceeding, Ms Cavanagh, which was taken from the TMS. Her evidence relating to the pages was as follows:[39]
   1. When an Information Act request was made about Ms Cavanagh this was provided to us.

MA And your evidence is that this document is what meaningless?

1. I'm saying to you that this is a record of the total rent payable throughout that period of time for that particular account but the Department did not rely on this particular document.
2. So this is a record of the total amount payable? That is your evidence?

1. That is a record of what the system says. We were using the system which we weren't.

1. This is an urban tenancy management tool. It wasn't used for remote tenancies. Remote tenancies ledgers were managed in a manual way.

MA So you are going to have to explain to me. Why does this exist?

1. No. It may have been created in the system now but it will be as apparent as of the date it was created.

1. So what is this document then? I know it is from the TMS as you have explained that. What is the point of it?
2. It is not used. So the point of it is nothing. It is not up to date. It is not accurate. It is not used.

1. In cross-examination, Ms Biro indicated that she could not comment on whether the TMS was used to calculate the rent owing by Ms Young and Mr Conway from 2011 to 2019. She also could not comment on whether, as at 19 November 2018, there were no rental arrears owing by Ms Young; a fact that was conceded by counsel for the Respondent in Various Applicants.
2. In Various Applicants, then counsel for the Respondent, Mr Littlejohn, made the following representations to the Tribunal regarding the issue of rental arrears owed by Ms Young.

To clarify the amount of the counter-claim we reconciled the accounts until the 12th November [2018] and that's what we are going to essentially rely on as the amounts of rent owed. In Ms Young's case she's up to date on that account so that part of the claim against Ms Young is [indistinct]. We're not going to be able to seek any relief against Ms Young for rent arrears. That, at this stage, is not before the Tribunal. I think there might be some objection or argument about that but I did want to highlight that just so you are aware Member that the amount of the counter-claim for Ms Young is not in the actual amount that the respondent seeks based on our current figures.[40]

1. The Respondent now contends that Mr Littlejohn erred in making this admission.[41] It submits that the "admission does not cast any doubt on the reliability of TMS, only on the diligent presentation of the respondent's case in 2019".[42]
2. There is clearly an inconsistency between the evidence of Ms Biro, who relied on the TMS to calculate the discrepancy between the rent owing and the rent paid by Ms Young and Mr Conway, and the evidence of Ms Jacobson. Ms Jacobson's evidence was that, at the relevant time, the TMS was not used to calculate the rent owing and paid by remote housing tenants. Rather, her evidence was that "[r]emote tenancies ledgers were managed in a manual way".[43]
3. The Respondent submitted that Ms Jacobson's role was client facing and that she was not called to give accounting or actuarial evidence.[44] This submission is rejected.
4. Ms Jacobson was the only witness called by the Respondent in Various Applicants. She was put forward by the Respondent to substantiate the Respondent's case, including its counterclaim against Ms Young and Mr Conway, and to refute aspects of the Applicants' case. The only witness called by the Respondent to address accounting or actuarial issues was Ms Jacobson.
5. Ms Jacobson's evidence is consistent with the evidence produced by the Respondent at the hearing in Various Applicants to substantiate its counterclaim. In Various Applicants, the Tribunal noted at [273] that the "Respondent also tendered four manually produced documents it maintained showed the amounts of unpaid rent owing by the Applicants". Had the TMS been in use, as relied on by Ms Biro, it would be anticipated that the Respondent would have relied on the TMS to calculate the amount it alleged was owing by, inter alia, Ms Young and Mr Conway rather than the manually produced documents tendered in the proceeding.
6. While Ms Biro's Unattested Declaration has been accepted into evidence, the Tribunal does not accept her conclusions as to the amount of any reduction or refund of rent or other allowances made to Ms Young or Mr Conway in respect of their tenancy agreements. Her evidence is based on an analysis of TMS data which, on Ms Jacobson's evidence, was not used to calculate the rent owing and paid by remote housing tenants at the time Various Applicants came on for hearing. The evidence of Ms Jacobson, who had personal knowledge of the way Ms Young and Mr Conway's rent was calculated, is to be preferred to that of Ms Biro.

Admission of relevant documents not previously disclosed

1. Included in the court book prepared by the Respondent, and referenced in the Unattested Declaration of Ms Thornycroft, were approximately 35 documents which were not produced in the Various Applicants proceeding. The Applicants consent to the admission of the previously undisclosed documents that assists their case, but objects to the remainder being entered into evidence.
2. The Respondent submits that, given the Tribunal's ruling that Ms Thornycroft's Unattested Declaration should not be admitted, none of the previously undisclosed documents should be admitted. In the alternative, it submits that any previously undisclosed documents should be admitted on an issue-by-issue basis.
3. Clearly, as has been noted above, the Respondent was under an obligation to disclose any document relevant to a fact in issue in the Various Applicants proceeding. It is now clear that the Respondent failed to carry out this obligation.
4. The Tribunal reluctantly concludes that none of the documents included in the Unattested Declaration of Ms Thornycroft should now be admitted into evidence. Findings of fact based on the case as presented to the Tribunal in Various Applicants have been made by the Tribunal and relied on by the parties in appeals to the NTSC, NTCA and the High Court. Further, the Tribunal accepts the Respondent's submission that, "[s]elective inclusions, including unassisted by Ms Thorneycroft's explanations, produces an incomplete and inaccurate record".[45] Such an incomplete and inaccurate record would also result if the Tribunal accepted the Applicants' submission that only such documents which assists their case should be admitted.
5. While the Tribunal, pursuant to section 53(4) of the NTCAT Act, has a discretion to accept, "any document into evidence despite any non-compliance with a time limit or other requirement under this Act or the relevant Act relating to the document or the service of the document", the Tribunal declines to exercise such discretion for the reasons noted above. The exercise of such discretion in not appropriate in the circumstances of these proceedings.

Matters remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration

1. A review of the various appeals from the decision of the Tribunal in Various Applicants indicates that the following matters have been remitted back to the Tribunal for reconsideration.
   • 67.1. With respect to both Ms Young (Lot 165) and Mr Conway (Lot 195), was the Respondent in breach of its obligation under section 48(1)(a) of the RTA?
     • 67.1.1. If the Tribunal determines that the Respondent breached its obligations under section 48(1)(a), for what time period did the breach occur?
     • 67.1.2. If the Respondent breached its obligations under section 48(1)(a), what compensation should be ordered pursuant to section 122 of the RTA?
   • 67.2. With respect to Lot 165, what compensation, if any, should be awarded to Ms Young pursuant to section 122 of the RTA for the Respondent's breach of section 49(1) in failing to provide a back door to Ms Young's premises?

1. In its Amended Initiating Application filed on 16 February 2018, the Applicants pled in the alternative that the matters it alleged constituted a breach by the Respondent of its duty to repair premises (section 57(1)(b) of the RTA) also constituted a breach of section 48(1)(a) relating to habitability. Such matters are set out at [31] of Various Applicants in relation to Ms Young and at [38] in relation to Mr Conway. For ease of reference both are reproduced here (footnotes excluded).

Two rings on stove not working. Griller and oven not working.

Shower head leaking and drain cover needs replacing

Light and fan removed and residual circuit breaker turned off to all lights during installation of air conditioner/removal of ceiling fan. Wires left exposed from ceiling. Tenant left without functioning lights.

Leaking air conditioner in bedroom; does not cool premises

Oven and griller do not work. Griller does not seal.

1. In Chief Executive Office of Housing v Young and Anor (2022) 43 NTLR 196, as has been noted above, the NTCA concluded that the Tribunal fell into error in its approach to the construction of the word "habitable" in section 48(1)(a). Consequently, the Applicants' section 48(1)(a) claims must be reconsidered and the construction of the section enunciated by the NTCA in the above-noted and subsequent cases applied.
2. In relation to Ms Young's property, the NTCA in Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2025] NTCA 5 set out at [42] the matters remitted to the Tribunal for consideration under this section, namely: "(a) the showerhead and drain; (b) the toilet flush mechanism; (c) the leak under the kitchen sink; (d) the back door; (e) the perimeter fence; (f) the lights and fans; and (g) the exposed wires".

1. In Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Pepperill & ors [2024] NTCA 10, the NTCA stated at [34]:

As a general and broad statement, adapted from this Court's decision in [Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Young and Anor (2022) 43 NTLR 196] (at [42]-[43]), it should be accepted that, for premises or ancillary property to be other than 'habitable' within the meaning of the RTA, they must not be reasonably suited for occupation for residential use in that condition, whether by reason of safety, health or reasonable comfort'.

1. Relevant to this determination, as stated by the NTCA in Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Young and Anor (2022) 43 NTLR 196, is the fact that:

Questions of fitness for habitation are to be judged against a standard of reasonableness having regard to the age, character and locality of the residential premises and to the effect of the defect on the state of the premises as a whole.[46]

1. Finally, the NTCA in Pepperill went on to note at [96]:

Whether or not the landlord has breached the implied term in s 48(1)(a) turns on whether the uninhabitable condition of the premises (assuming that be established) was a consequence of the landlord's failure to take reasonable steps to ensure that the premises or ancillary property were habitable. That consideration involves questions as to the nature and degree of the risk to or impacts upon the health, safety and/or reasonable comfort of the tenants, the measures available to the landlord to alleviate the risks or impacts, the capacity and power of the landlord to control or address those risks or impacts and the nature and extent of any expertise or special skill involved.

1. This illustrates the fact, as found by the NTCA in Pepperill at [89], that there is a "distinction between the concept of habitability per se and a breach of the landlord's duty in s 48(1)(a), and that the latter is not established simply by showing the former". In addition to issue of habitability, to establish a breach of section 48(1)(a) the Applicants must show that the Respondent failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that the premises or ancillary property were habitable.

1. The Applicants submitted that, in relation to Ms Young's premises, the following items constituted a stand-alone breach of section 148(1)(a) of the RTA: no back door; no air conditioner; toilet not flushing properly; non-functioning lights arising from air conditioner installation. It was also submitted that the remaining items noted at [68] above, in conjunction with the stand-alone breaches, constituted a breach of section 48(1)(a).

1. Based on the test of habitability enunciated by the NTCA in Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Young & Anor (2022) 43 NTLR 196 and Pepperill, the Respondent's failure to provide a back door to Ms Young's property constituted a breach of the Respondent's obligation to ensure that Ms Young's premises were habitable within the meaning of section 48(1)(a) of the RTA. The absence of a back door left Ms Young vulnerable to human and animal intruders for an extended period of time. Such failure resulted in Ms Young's premises not being "reasonably suited for occupation for residential use in that condition, whether by reason of safety, health or reasonable comfort".[47]
2. Further, the Respondent failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that Ms Young's property was fitted with a back door. Even when notified of the need for the repair on 22 January 2016, the Respondent still took six weeks to make the repair which the Tribunal in Various Applicants found to be a breach of the Respondent's duty to repair in section 57(1) of the RTA.[48]
3. Regarding the time frame in which compensation should be awarded for the Respondent's breach of section 48(1)(a) relating to the absence of a back door, the Tribunal noted in Various Applicants at [160]-[161]:

Ms Young's evidence regarding the missing backdoor was as follows:

I had no backdoor on the house until about March 2016. When they put a door there, they left a hole on the side between the door and the frame. We had a snake come through the hole, so we had to block off the door.

Ms Young's solicitor noted in his letter of 22 January 2016 that: "There is no backdoor, on the premises, the tenant has installed a mesh-steel door to secure the property. A new door is required." The Respondent submitted that a new door was installed "sometime in March [2016]", however no evidence was led to substantiate this date. The Applicant indicated in their Amended IA that the door was installed in late March 2016. No evidence was led by the Respondent as to why the premises were let without a backdoor, nor did the Respondent lead any evidence to suggest that the backdoor was removed by the occupants of the premises.

1. The Statutory Declaration of Ms Young dated 2 March 2023, annexed to the Unattested Declaration of Daniel Kelly declared on 28 July 2025, addresses matters relating to the backdoor. In determining the time in which Ms Young's premises was without a backdoor, it was not necessary for the Tribunal to rely on this evidence. There was sufficient evidence led in Various Applicants to determine the issue.
2. Based on the available evidence before the Tribunal in Various Applicants, it can be concluded that Ms Young's premises was let without a backdoor, and that no door was installed until late March 2016. This is consistent with the finding of the NTSC in Young and Conway v Chief Executive Officer, Housing (2020) 355 FLR 290; [2020] NTSC 59 at [89] where it was stated: "The relevant period the premises was without a door provided by the respondent was 3 June 2010 until March 2016". This is a period of 2,090 days.

1. In its Response to the Applicant's Amended Initiating Application, the Respondent claimed that, to the extent any of the Applicants' claims related to a period before 5 February 2013, such action was not maintainable pursuant to section 12(1) of the Limitation Act. In Various Applicants, counsel for the Respondent, Mr Littlejohn, advised the Tribunal that such defence was abandoned. In the remitter hearing, Mr Moses for the Respondent advised the Tribunal that the Respondent now intends to rely on the Limitation Act defence.
2. The Respondent submitted that the Limitation Act defence "did not arise at first instance because none of the claims of breach succeeded for the relevant period".[49] The Tribunal does not accept this submission.
3. As evidenced by the current proceedings, the issues on remitter relate to the Respondent's alleged breaches of section 48(1)(a) and 49(1) of the RTA. It is self-evident, therefore, that these issues were before the Tribunal in Various Applicants. Further, as the above discussion of the absence of a back door illustrates, a proper consideration of both sections would have engaged the Limitation Act defence. The fact that the Tribunal erred in its consideration of such sections does not abrogate the fact that limitation issues were before the Tribunal in Various Applicants.
4. The Respondent also submitted that:

Notwithstanding that the issue was pleaded, the applicants did not seek an extension of time and did not adduce any evidence capable of supporting a finding for s 44(3)(b) of the Limitation Act.[50]

1. This submission glosses over that fact that the Respondent abandoned its limitation defence in proceedings before the Tribunal in Various Applicants. Given the Respondent's decision to abandon the limitation defence, there was no onus on the Applicants to seek an extension of time relating to such defence.
2. A question arises as to whether the Respondent can revive the abandoned Limitation Act defence in the remitter proceedings. This question should be answered in the negative.
3. In University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2) (1985) 59 CLR 481, Mr Metwally lodged complaints against the University of Wollongong under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW). An order was made in Mr Metwally's favour by the tribunal established under that Act (the 'ADA Tribunal'). In a subsequent decision of the High Court in Viskauskas v Niland,[51] it was found that Part II of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) was inconsistent with the provisions of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and was, to that extent, invalid. If the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) was invalid at the time the ADA Tribunal decided in Mr Metwally's favour, the ADA Tribunal's decision was invalid. Consequently, on 22 November 1984, the High Court made a declaration in Metwally's case that "the Tribunal had no power or jurisdiction to inquire into or make decisions or orders in respect to either of the complaints lodged by Mr Metwally against the University of Wollongong".[52] In argument before the High Court, Mr Metwally did not seek to reopen the decision in Viskauskas. Further, no arguments were made by Mr Metwally as to the validity of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW).
4. In later proceedings, however, Mr Metwally contented that the decision of the ADA Tribunal should be affirmed on an additional ground not argued before the ADA Tribunal or previously before the High Court. In refusing Mr Metway's application to vary its order made on 22 November 1984, the court stated:

It is elementary that a party is bound by the conduct of its case. Except in the most exceptional circumstances, it would be contrary to all principle to allow a party, after a case has been decided against him, to raise a new argument which, whether deliberately or by inadvertence, he failed to put during the hearing when he had and [sic] opportunity to do so.[53]

1. Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; (1986) 162 CLR 1, involved an attempt by a respondent to raise a new issue on appeal which had not, but could have, been litigated at trial. The majority of the High Court stated at page 11:

The first respondents must be bound by their case at the trial. It would not be fair to the appellants to subject them at this stage of the proceedings to what is virtually a new trial on an entirely different issue to that which has been litigated. In the pursuit of such a course, the interests of expedition, finality and justice are denied.

1. It would not be fair to the Applicants to subject them, in remitter proceedings, to a defence which had been expressly abandoned by the Respondent in the original proceeding. Between the hearing in Various Applicants and the remitter proceedings, both Applicants have passed away. Evidence that may have been obtained from Mr Conway and Ms Young in support of an extension to the limitation period is no longer available to the Applicants. To now subject the Applicants to the onus of "demonstrating that the justice of the case requires that extension",[54] when their ability to meet that onus is diminished through no fault on their part, would be unfair.
2. The Applicants in the remitter proceedings were entitled to rely on the fact that the Respondent had waived its right to rely on the Limitation Act defence. The cases of the Applicants and the Respondent on the issues before the Tribunal in Various Applicants were argued on the basis that the Respondent's right to rely on the Limitation Act had been abandoned. To now allow the Respondent to revive its Limitation Act defence would be unfair to the Applicants and contrary to the principles of expedition, finality and justice.

No Air-conditioning and inability to open front window

1. In Various Applicants, the Tribunal found that the absence of an air-conditioner, coupled with the fact that Ms Young could not open her front window, rendered Ms Young's property uninhabitable for the periods of 1 November to the end of January from 13 November 2011 until 31 January 2016.[55] When the broader test of habitability in Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Young & Anor (2022) 43 NTLR 196 and Pepperill is applied, it is clear that the period Ms Young's property was uninhabitable due to the absence of an air-conditioner is longer than that found in Various Applicants. In particular, when reasonable comfort, in addition to health and safety, is taken into consideration, a longer annual period of uninhabitability arises. When considering the length of such period, the Tribunal is cognisant admonition in Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Young & Anor (2022) 43 NTLR 196 at [49] that, "a finding that premises are not fit for habitation should not lightly be made".
2. In Various Applicants, the Tribunal noted that no meteorological evidence was led to establish the day and night-time temperatures in Santa Teresa during time Ms Young's tenancy commenced and the date on which an air-conditioner was installed.[56] In the absence of such evidence, the Tribunal can only take notice of the fact that the temperature varies greatly season by season as evidenced by reputable data.
3. Based on Bureau of Meteorology ('BoM') data from Alice Springs Airport, the mean maximum and minimum yearly temperatures based on all years of BoM data are as follows:[57]

1. From October to March, daytime mean temperatures exceed 30 degrees Celsius. From this data, coupled with Ms Young's evidence that, "[e]very year from November to the end of January, I had to stay at my daughter Claire's house, because the house was so hot",[58] the Tribunal concludes that Ms Young's premises were not habitable within the meaning of section 48(1)(a) from October to March. From November to the end of January, Ms Young's premises were not reasonably suited for occupation for residential use by reason of safety and health, as found in Various Applicants,[59] in addition to reasonable comfort. For the months of October, February and March, the Tribunal's finding is based on a lack of reasonable comfort.
2. No evidence was proffered by the Respondent to explain why Ms Young's home was rented without an air-conditioner.[60] The Respondent must have been, or at least should have been, aware of the fact that the lack of air-conditioning, given the age and nature of the premises and Ms Young's age, constituted a significant risk to the health and safety of Ms Young, and to her reasonable comfort, from October to March each year. Such risk could have been alleviated by the installation of an air-conditioner, which did not occur until 12 April 2016.
3. The time-period during which Ms Young's premises were not habitable within the meaning of section 48(1)(a) due to the absence of an air-conditioner should be calculated based on the period 1 October to 31 March from 13 November 2011 until 12 April 2016. That time-period is 869 days.

1. The Applicants maintain that the Respondent was in breach of section 48(1) arising from its failure to repair the toilet flush mechanism for a period of 534 days. Ms Young's evidence regarding the issues she had with the toilet are set out in Various Applicants at [192]. "The toilet did not flush properly. Often I could not get waste to flush down the pipe". When the problem arose was not articulated.
2. At [193] to [194] of Various Applicants, the Tribunal dealt with the evidence relating to the Respondent's repair of the toilet. From this evidence, the Tribunal concluded at [195]:

From the above-noted evidence, it appears that the Respondent usually dealt quickly with the issues relating to the blocked toilet. No explanation was given by the Respondent, however, as to why no action was taken on the notice [of matters requiring repair] provided on 22 January 2016 until 8 April 2016. In the circumstances I find that the Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence to have the toilet repaired for the period from 22 January 2016 to 8 April 2016. The Respondent was in breach of its duty to repair for this period (s 57(1)).

1. The Tribunal accepts that the inability to flush waste down a toilet in a small home with only one toilet renders the premises not reasonably suited for occupation for residential use in that condition by reason of reasonable comfort.[61] The Tribunal does not accept, however, that the issue persisted for 534 days.
2. The Tribunal in Various Applicants found that, before 22 January 2016, the Respondent acted with reasonable diligence to repair the faulty flush mechanism when notified to do so by Ms Young. This finding was not challenged on appeal. During this period, when this matter arose, the Respondent dealt with the issue in accordance with its obligation to repair in section 57. In the language of Pepperill, the Respondent did not fail to take reasonable steps to ensure that the premises was habitable during this time,[62] at least in relation to the faulty flush mechanism. It was only for the period from 22 January 2016 to 8 April 2016, when the Respondent was in breach of its obligation to repair, that liability for a breach of section 48(1)(a) arose. That is a period of 78 days.

1. In Various Applicants the Tribunal noted at [167]:

Ms Young's evidence regarding the bent perimeter fence was as follows:

The fence around the property was bent to the ground in many places. This was not caused by me - I do not have the strength. I think it may have been caused by roaming wild horses.

1. The Tribunal in Various Applicants went on to note at [170] that, "[t]he Respondent was notified of the need to repair the fence on 22 January 2016. The repairs were made on 15 February 2016."
2. The question arises as to whether the fact that the perimeter fence was bent to the ground in a number of places impacts on the habitability of Ms Young's premises within the meaning of section 48(1)(a). To answer this question in the affirmative, the Tribunal would have to find that the bent fence rendered Ms Young's premises to not be reasonably suited for occupation for residential use given the condition of the fence, whether by reason of safety, health or reasonable comfort.[63] The evidence does not support such a finding.
3. Both before the Tribunal in Various Applicants and in these proceedings, the Applicants' submission that the bent perimeter fence constituted a breach of section 48(1)(a) centred on the fact that the damaged fence could result in wild horses entering the property and, when Ms Young's house was without a back door, the house itself. As noted in Various Applicants at [171], however, "[n]o evidence was led by Ms Young that such an incursion occurred while she occupied the premises".
4. The Tribunal accepts, based on the evidence of Mr Conway and Ms Young, that wild horses were known to roam in the area. Mr Conway gave evidence that wild horses entered his property and ate plants and broke things.[64] While the possibility of such an incursion existed, the fact that there was no evidence of such an incursion occurring while Ms Young was in occupation indicates that the risk to Ms Young's health, safety or reasonable comfort was not such as to render Ms Young's premises uninhabitable. This aspect of Ms Young's claim is not made out. Whether the condition of the perimeter fence, in conjunction with the Respondent's failure to provide a back door to Ms Young's premises for 2,090 days, contributed to a breach of section 49(1) of the RTA is discussed below.

1. The way in which the Respondent installed an air-conditioner at Ms Young's property adversely impacted the lights and fans. When the air-conditioner was installed, the lights and fans were removed. After the installation of the air-conditioner, the lights did not work properly, and the installers left exposed wires.
2. In Various Applicants, the following uncontradicted evidence was given by Ms Young.

The installers [of the air-conditioner/swampy] left a hole between the roof and the swampy. It meant that rain used to come into the house. When we turned the swampy on, the lights wouldn't work in the kitchen, so it was hard to use the swampy at night. The installers also left bare wires hanging from the ceiling.

1. The work to install the air-conditioner in Ms Young's property commenced on 12 April 2016[65] and was completed on 22 April 2016.[66] Ms Young notified the Respondent of the need for repair on 16 May 2016, and the repairs were made about one month later.[67]
2. There is little question that the way the air-conditioner was installed caused considerable inconvenience to Ms Young. It is also evident that it was the contractors retained by the Respondent that caused such inconvenience.
3. The Tribunal is satisfied that issues with the repair identified by Ms Young meant that her premises were not reasonably suited for occupation for residential use in that condition by reason of reasonable comfort for the period from 22 April 2016 to 17 June 2016; a period of 57 days. The repair of the air-conditioner was designed to alleviate an issue which the Tribunal has found constituted a breach of section 48(1)(a). In addressing the air-conditioning issue the Respondent, through the faulty workmanship of its contractors, created the circumstances for a further breach of section 48(1)(a).
4. The Respondent submitted it was Ms Young who requested an air-conditioner and therefore, the breach of section 48(1)(a) was caused by Ms Young's failure to notify the landlord of repairs required to the premises within the meaning of section 48(2)(b). This submission is rejected.
5. As has been noted above, the breach of section 48(1)(a) was caused by the actions of the contractors retained by the Respondent. The issues arising from such faulty workmanship should have been readily apparent to the contractors at the time the work was completed. It was the responsibility of the Respondent to ensure that the work completed on its behalf was competently done. This it did not do until a month of being notified of the problem by Ms Young.
6. With respect to the exposed wires, the Tribunal accepts that the existence of exposed wires was a cause of concern to Ms Young and contributed to the lack of reasonable comfort addressed above. There is insufficient evidence, however, to conclude that the exposed wires constituted a threat to Ms Young's safety and the safety of those who entered the premises.
7. The Applicant led no evidence that could lead to a finding that the exposed wires were live. While such a representation was made by Mr Albert from the Bar table, such a representation is not evidence. Mr Kelly, in his Unattested Declaration of 25 July 2025, provided examples of tragic situations where the existence of exposed wires resulted in the death of public housing tenants. Such evidence, however, does not assist the Tribunal if there is no evidence that the wires left exposed in Ms Young's premises were live.
8. The onus was on the Applicants to prove all aspects of their case. A finding by the Tribunal that the exposed wires were live, in the absence of any evidence to that effect, would be wrong in law and subject to appeal by the Respondent. The Tribunal makes no finding that the existence of exposed wires constituted a threat to the safety of Ms Young.

1. In Various Applicants, the Tribunal noted the following regarding the leak under the kitchen sink.

Ms Young's evidence regarding the leak under the kitchen sink was brief. In her Unattested Declaration dated 6 October 2018 she stated simply, "[t]here was also a bad leak under the kitchen sink". In particular, no evidence was adduced regarding when the leak started, and the impact it had on her occupancy.[68]

1. The Tribunal in Various Applicants found that the only evidence of notice of the leak being given to the Respondent was the inclusion of the item in a letter from the Ms Young's solicitor dated 22 January 2016. The Tribunal found that the Respondent made the repair on 12 February 2016.[69] On a closer review of the evidence before the Tribunal in Various Applicants, however, it appears that an inspection of Ms Young's property by the Respondent identified an issue with the leaking sink on 29 October 2015 which was repaired.[70]
2. The Applicants in the remittal proceedings submitted that, while not a stand-alone example of a breach of section 48(1)(a), the leak, when considered in conjunction with the other breaches of that section, meant that Ms Young's premises were not reasonably suited for occupation for residential purposes by reason of reasonable comfort. This submission is rejected.
3. As has been addressed above at [73]-[74], establishing a breach of section 48(1)(a) involves not only showing that the premises were in an uninhabitable condition. To establish a breach, it must also be shown that the Respondent failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that the premises were habitable. In the case of the leak under the kitchen sink, the Tribunal found that the Respondent acted with reasonable diligence to repair the leak once it was notified on 22 January 2016.[71] The same applies to the identification of a leak on inspection of Ms Young's home by the Respondent on 29 October 2015. This aspect of the Applicants' claim fails.

1. In Various Applicants, the Tribunal noted that the evidence relating to the leaking showerhead and drain cover was "scant".[72] Ms Young's evidence was that the leak was bad,[73] and had been that way since she got the shower.[74] This notwithstanding, the Respondent was not notified of the repair until 22 January 2022.
2. The evidence of when the showerhead and drain was repaired is equally scant. The Respondent in Various Applicants submitted that the repair took place on 10 February 2016.[75] This date seems unlikely given that the work order to assess the shower leak was not raised until 12 February 2016.[76] The Applicants submitted that the repair took place sometime after 12 April 2016, but no evidence in support of this assertion was before the Tribunal in Various Applicants[77] or in the remittal proceedings.
3. At the hearing the Applicants maintained that the shower leak, in combination with the other issues which rendered Ms Young's premises uninhabitable, satisfies the test in section 48(1)(a). Compensation, the Applicants submitted, should be assessed based on 2117 days.
4. Given the nature of the repair, there was an onus on Ms Young to notify the Respondent of the issue (section 48(2)(b) of the RTA) before the Respondent's obligation in section 48(1)(a) was engaged. The earliest date any liability for such a breach of its obligation to ensure that the Ms Young's premises were habitable was 22 January 2016, being the date on which notice of the repair was given to the Respondent.
5. Once notice of the need to repair the shower was given to the Respondent, the onus is on the Applicants to prove that the Respondent failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that the leak was fixed. The Applicants' evidence in this regard was inadequate. In the circumstances, therefore, this aspect of the Applicants' claim is not made out.

1. While not identified by the NTCA as a matter relating to an alleged breach of section 48(1)(a) remitted back to the Tribunal for consideration,[78] the Applicants submitted that the Respondent's failure to repair the Ms Young's stove and oven for a significant period of time was a stand-alone breach of section 48(1)(a). Submissions on this issue were also made by the Respondent.
2. On 29 October 2015, Ms Young notified the Respondent that there were issues with her oven and stove. In particular, according to Ms Young her oven and griller did not work nor did two rings on her stove.[79] On 3 November 2015, a contractor on behalf of the Respondent attended at Ms Young's home and ascertained that the stove and one hotplate was not working, with the "remainder OK".[80]
3. The Respondent submitted that the entire unit was replaced on either 11 or 12 February 2016. The evidence in support of this submission indicates only that a number of repairs, including the oven replacement, were completed in Santa Teresa between 10 to 17 February 2016.[81] This notwithstanding, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Tribunal accepts the Respondent's submission that the oven unit was replaced by 12 February 2016.
4. It should be noted that the Respondent's evidence in Various Applicants was that Ms Young's oven unit was replaced on 14-16 April 2016. In light of the evidence to which the Tribunal has now been referred, which was included in the bundle of documents before the Tribunal in Various Applicants, it appears the date of repair was in February rather than April 2016.
5. Ms Young was without a properly working oven, griller and two out of four stove hotplates from 29 October 2015 to 12 February 2016, a total of 107 days. Based on the test of habitability in Pepperill,[82] the Tribunal finds that the issues with Ms Young's oven and stove were such that her premises were not reasonably suited for occupation for residential purposes in that condition by reason of reasonable comfort. Further, the Tribunal finds that 107 days for the Respondent to rectify the issue was unreasonable. Santa Teresa is only 80 kilometres from Alice Springs, and it should not have taken 107 days for the Respondent to make the repair.

1. The Applicants submitted that, in relation to Mr Conway's property, the following issues constituted a stand-alone breach of section 48(1)(a) of the RTA: broken back window; missing and broken fly screens; missing front gate; leaking air-conditioner; leaking shower. The remaining items noted at [68] above, the Applicants submitted, in conjunction with the stand-alone breaches, constituted a breach of section 48(1)(a).

1. In Various Applicants, the Tribunal noted at [244]:

At the hearing Mr Conway stated that the window in his daughter's bedroom had been broken since 2010. There was some confusion as to which window was broken because, in his Unattested Declaration, he indicated that it was the toilet window that was broken. There was no evidence before the Tribunal to suggest that the need to repair the broken window was brought to the attention of the Respondent before the item was included in Mr Conway's solicitors' letter of 22 January 2016. The parties agreed that the window was repaired on 15 February 2016.

Given the inconsistent testimony of Mr Conway, and the lack of contemporaneous evidence regarding the state of the premises at the commencement of the tenancy, I cannot conclude on the balance of probabilities that the broken back window predated the commencement of the tenancy.[83]

1. In light of these findings, even if the Applicants were able to establish that the existence of a broken window made the premises uninhabitable by reason of reasonable comfort, application of the test of habitability in Pepperill means that the Applicants' claim fails.[84] The Respondent took reasonable steps to repair the broken window once notified of the need to repair by Mr Conway.

1. In Various Applicants at [248], Mr Conway gave evidence that, "when he moved into the house the flyscreens were missing and broken".[85] No evidence was provided to the Tribunal in Various Applicants or in the remittal proceedings as to which flyscreens were missing and which were broken.
2. The Respondent disputed Mr Conway's assertion that flyscreens were missing and broken at the commencement of the tenancy. Reference was made to an Inspection Report dated 13 June 2014, which was before the Tribunal in Various Applicants, in which the repair items noted were as follows: kitchen sink blocked; B3 door damaged; tiles in bathroom have not been replaced after repairs. The inspection report, which was signed by Mr Conway, makes no mention of any issue with the flyscreens.
3. The Respondent was not notified of the need to repair the flyscreens until 22 January 2016. The Tribunal in Various Applicants found at [249] that the repair was made on or about 12 February 2016.
4. Given the absence of evidence as to which flyscreens were broken or missing at the commencement of Mr Conway's tenancy, coupled with the fact that the issue with the flyscreens was not identified by Mr Conway as an issue requiring repair on 13 June 2014, leads the Tribunal to accept the Respondent's submission that such flyscreens were intact at the commencement of the tenancy. Once notified of the need to repair, the Respondent acted with reasonable diligence to fix the flyscreens.[86] The test of habitability in Pepperill at [96] has not been made out and the Applicants' claim in this regard fails.

1. In his Unattested Declaration dated 25 October 2018, Mr Conway gave the following evidence at [40] relating to the front gate.

Everything my lawyers reported in 2016 is now fixed, except the front gate on our place. It makes us worry, not having a proper fence. Wild horses can and often do get in and break things. When they got in recently, they broke the water metre and ate the plants we bought at the nursery. To stop the horses getting in, we need a taller fence like the fences Housing built for other houses during the recent upgrade.

1. On 12 February 2016, the Respondent issued a Contractors Service Report order no 1077348, which identified the missing front gate as an immediate repair. A HMO Works document entered into evidence in Various Applicants indicated that the work on the front gate was completed on 10-12 February 2016.[87] Based on the available evidence, the Tribunal in Various Applicants concluded at [258] that Mr Conway was provided with a front gate on 10-12 February 2016.
2. The Tribunal is satisfied that the missing front gate may have rendered Mr Conway's premises not reasonably suited for occupation for residential use by reason of reasonable comfort and safety within the meaning of Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Pepperill & ors [2024] NTCA 10 at [34]. Once notified of the need for the repair, however, the Respondent took "reasonable steps to ensure that the premises or ancillary property were habitable".[88] Consequently, in relation to the missing front gate no breach of section 48(1)(a) has been established.

1. The issues Mr Conway had with the air-conditioners in his home are noted at [202] of Various Applicants. The Tribunal stated at [205]-[206]:

Contrary to his evidence in the Unattested Declaration, Mr Conway, in his Amended IA, alleged that notification of the issue with the leaking air-conditioner took place on 22 January 2016, a fact with which the Respondent agreed. Consequently, the date of notification was not a fact in issue at the hearing.

Mr Conway's evidence regarding the issues he and his family experienced with the air-conditioners in his home differ from those discussed above in the case of Ms Young. In Ms Young's case the home was rented without an air-conditioner. In Mr Conway's case the property was rented with air-conditioners, but they fell into disrepair.

1. The Tribunal in Various Applicants found that the Respondent repaired the air-conditioners on 10 February 2016.[89] While the faulty air-conditioners rendered Mr Conway's property premises not reasonably suited for occupation for residential use by reason of reasonable comfort within the meaning of Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Pepperill & ors [2024] NTCA 10 at [34], once notified of the need for repair the Respondent took "reasonable steps to ensure that the premises or ancillary property were habitable".[90] No breach of section 48(1)(a) has been established.

1. In Various Applicants, the Tribunal set out Mr Conway's evidence regarding the issue with the leaking shower.[91]

The shower needed tiles. Housing took tiles off when they fixed the taps in 2013 and 2014 but did not replace them.

When someone had a shower, the water dripped down into the wall and through the other side to the toilet and the next room. It was really unsafe and it was really easy to slip. Every time we had a shower, we had to clean up all the water on the toilet floor.

I'm on dialysis and my wife was having cancer treatment, so it was really hard cleaning up water everyday just to stay safe from slipping. It made me really angry that Housing did not fix things to make it safe.

1. The Tribunal in Various Applicants went on to note at [199]:

The respondent was notified of the problem with the leaking shower on 27 October 2015. A Contractors Service Report was issued by the Respondent on 5 November 2015. Given the notice of repair issued on 22 January 2016, it would appear that the Contractors Service report was not acted upon before that date.

1. Based on the evidence before the Tribunal in Various Applicants, a finding was made that the shower leak was repaired on or about 12 February 2016.[92]
2. The Respondent submitted that, when notified of the issue of the leaking shower, the Respondent took reasonable steps to ensure the property was habitable as required by section 48(1)(a). In particular, by directing its contractors in the Contractors Service Report issued on 5 November 2015 to fix the issue, the Respondent met its section 48(1)(a) obligation to ensure Mr Conway's premises were habitable. The fact that the issue did not have a straightforward fix does not, on the Respondent's submission, detract from the fact that it took reasonable steps to make the repair once notified of the problem.
3. The Respondent's submission is rejected. The requirement on the landlord in section 48(1)(a) is to ensure that the premises and ancillary property to which the rental agreement relates are habitable is not satisfied by the mere issuance of a work order to fix an issue identified by the tenant. The obligation on the landlord is to ensure that the issue rendering the premises uninhabitable is fixed. It should not have taken the Respondent 610 days to carry out this obligation.
4. The Applicants submit that, if the Tribunal accepts that the issue with the leaking shower constituted a breach of section 48(1)(a), the length of that breach should be calculated to be 2,380 days. This figure is based on Mr Conway's evidence that the issue with the leaking shower first arose from a renovation of his property in 2011.
5. The evidence indicates that the issue with the leaking shower arose because of the work done by the Respondent's contractors when renovating Mr Conway's property in 2013 and 2014. As has been noted above at [136], the Respondent was aware of the issue arising from the failure to replace tiles on 13 June 2014. It is only from this time that an assessment can be made about whether the Respondent failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that the premises were habitable.
6. Based on Mr Conway's evidence, and the section 48(1)(a) test of habitability set out in Pepperill and related cases discussed above, the Tribunal finds that Mr Conway's premises were not reasonably suited for occupation for residential use in that condition by reason of reasonable comfort. Further, once notified of the problem with the shower, the Respondent failed to take reasonable steps to ensure the premises were habitable for a period of 610 days. Such failure constituted a breach of section 48(1)(a).

Knob on fan missing, faulty electrical outlets and faulty oven and griller

1. Mr Conway's evidence in Various Applicants was that a fan controller knob broke in 2010 or 2011 and was not replaced until 2017.[93] The Respondent maintained that it was not notified of the need to repair the fan knob until 22 January 2016 and that the repair was made on 12 February 2016.[94] The Applicants submit that, in conjunction with the broken back window discussed above, the broken fan controller knob constitutes a breach of section 48(1(a) of the RTA.
2. Even if it could be established that the broken fan controller knob, in conjunction with other issues with the premises, meant that the premises were not reasonably suited for occupation for residential purposes in that condition by reason of reasonable comfort, the Respondent took reasonable steps to address the issue once it was notified of the problem. This aspect of the Applicants section 48(1)(a) claim fails.
3. The same reasoning applies to the Applicants' submission that the faulty electrical outlets in the kitchen and outside the premises, and the faulty oven and griller, taken in conjunction with other issues, failed to meet the standard of habitability in section 48(1)(a). In Various Applicants,[95] the Tribunal noted that the Respondent acted with reasonable diligence in repairing such issues once the need for repair was brought to its attention. Consequently, once notified of the need for repair the Respondent took "reasonable steps to ensure that the premises or ancillary property were habitable".[96] No breach of section 48(1)(a) in relation to these issues has been established.

1. In these proceedings, two issues arise regarding section 49(1) of the RTA. First, what compensation, if any, should be awarded to Ms Young arising from the Respondent's breach of section 49(1) in failing to provide a back door to her premises for 2,090 days.[97] Secondly, can the condition of the perimeter fence on Ms Young's property, in conjunction with the failure of the Respondent to provide a back door to Ms Young's premises for 2,090 days, be taken into consideration when assessing the quantum of compensation arising from such breach. Both issues are addressed below.

1. The question of whether compensation should be ordered pursuant to section 122(1) of the RTA applies to the following breaches by the Respondent of its section 48(1)(a) and section 49(1) obligations:

No air-conditioning and inability to open front window

Approach to an award of compensation under section 122 of the RTA

1. In Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2023] HCA 31; (2023) 278 CLR 208, the majority noted at [25]:

The language and structure of s 122(1)(a) provides no basis for differentiating in principle between the evaluative judgment to be made by the Tribunal in determining the existence and extent of compensable loss or damage suffered by an applicant because the other party has failed to comply with an obligation imposed as a term of a tenancy agreement, on the one hand, and the evaluative judgment to be made by the Tribunal in determining the existence and extent of compensable loss or damage suffered by an applicant because the other party has failed to comply with an obligation imposed directly by force of the Act in relation to a tenancy agreement, on the other hand. To adapt language drawn from judicial descriptions of the evaluative judgments required to be made in determining statutory compensation in other statutory contexts, the task of the Tribunal in each case is to arrive at a measure of compensation which conforms to the purposes of the Act and to the justice and equity of the case, having regard to the nature and purpose of the particular obligation with which there has been a failure to comply and taking into account each of the mandatory considerations specified in s 122(3).

1. The High Court in Young also confirmed that, in arriving at such a measure of compensation, the Applicants', "distress and disappointment was compensable on application to the Tribunal under s 122(1)(a) of the [RTA], subject to the Tribunal's consideration of the factors prescribed by s 122(3)".[98] As the NTCA stated in Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2025] NTCA 5 at [32], the majority of the High Court is not importing into a consideration of section 122(1)(a) the common law principles of remoteness in Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon [1993] HCA 4; (1993) 176 CLR 344. The consideration of any distress and disappointment experienced by the Applicants arising from the Respondent's breach of sections 48(1)(a) and, in the case of Ms Young, 49(1), is a matter of statutory interpretation having regard to the purpose of the RTA and the justice and equity of the case.
2. The Applicants submitted that compensation for distress and disappointment for the Respondent's failure to provide a back door to Ms Young's premises should be calculated on the basis of $360 per day.[99] That would constitute an award of $752,400. This amount, the Applicants submitted, would be marginally more that the modest awards made in other cases.[100]
3. The Respondent, by contrast, submitted that it would not be appropriate for the Tribunal to make any further order for compensation.[101] It noted that, based on the decisions in Various Applicants and Young and Conway v Chief Executive Officer, Housing [2020] NTSC 59; (2020) 355 FLR 290, the sum of $19,235.80 has already been paid to Ms Young and $1,000 has been paid to Mr Conway.
4. In Brown & Ors v CEO (Housing) [2025] NTSC 72, Huntingford J noted at [267] that, "[a]ssessment of damages as contemplated by s 122 RTA is an intuitive process and there is not one correct answer". Further, "[t]here is no requirement that the Tribunal calculate compensation by reference to an amount per day, although that approach is not necessarily wrong".[102] Finally, Huntingford J reiterated the approach to the assessment of compensation pursuant to section 122 articulated by the High Court at [157] above.[103]
5. The objectives of the RTA are set out in section 3:

(a) to fairly balance the rights and duties of tenants and landlords; and

(b) to improve the understanding of landlords, tenants and agents of their rights and obligations in relation to residential tenancies; and

(c) to ensure landlords and tenants are provided with suitable mechanisms for enforcing their rights under tenancy agreements and this Act; and

(d) to ensure that tenants are provided with safe and habitable premises under tenancy agreements and enjoy appropriate security of tenure; and

(e) to facilitate landlords receiving a fair rent in return for providing safe and habitable accommodation to tenants.

1. Dealing first with Ms Young, the Respondent's failure to provide a back door to Ms Young's premises meant that Ms Young was not provided with safe and habitable premises for a period of 2,090 days. Due to the Respondent's failure to provide an air-conditioner, coupled with the inability to open the front window, Ms Young was unable to live in her home from November to January, and the Tribunal has found that section 48(1)(a) was breached for a period of 869 days. In addition, during the term of her tenancy Ms Young was without a properly functioning stove and oven for a period of 107 days and had to put up with a toilet which did not flush properly for a period of 78 days.
2. These fundamental failures meant that the Respondent failed to provide safe and habitable accommodation to Ms Young for at least 2,090 days of her tenancy. The Respondent, citing Karpik v Carnival PLC (The Ruby Princess) [2025] FCAFC 96 at [293], submitted that the Tribunal should take into account the fact that its contraventions of section 48(1)(a) and section 49(1) did not diminish all of the value to Ms Young of the tenancy agreement given that she continued to live in the premises. The Tribunal notes, however, that Ms Young was an elderly woman living in public housing in a remote community. Other than moving to her daughter's home for limited periods, Ms Young's options to find alternative accommodation were very limited.
3. Ms Young is entitled to compensation for the distress and disappointment arising from the Respondent's breach of sections 48(1)(a) and 49(1) of the RTA. In relation to section 49(1), the High Court noted that "[t]he feeling of insecurity which Ms Young experienced because of the landlord's failure to provide the residential premises with a back door was the obverse of the security which it was the purpose of that obligation to secure".[104] Adding to such a feeling of insecurity was the fact that the perimeter fence around the property was damaged to such an extent that horses and other intruders could have entered Ms Young's premises unimpeded. While there was no evidence that such intrusions occurred, the Tribunal accepts that the state of the perimeter fence could, and on the balance of probabilities did, exacerbate Ms Young's feelings of insecurity.
4. The Respondent's failure to provide a back door to Ms Young's property until March 2016 also meant that her home was subject to a snake incursion, and dirt and other material which needed to be continuously swept. This, coupled with the other matters constituting a breach of section 48(1)(a) noted above, warrants a substantial award of compensation for distress and disappointment.
5. The Tribunal does not accept the Applicants' submission that an appropriate award for distress and disappointment should be based on the sum of $360 per day. Such a figure is entirely divorced from the value of the tenancy contract which required Ms Young to pay $184 per week in rent. It is inconsistent with the purpose of the RTA and the justice and equity in this case.
6. Equally, the Tribunal rejects the Respondent's submission that no further award should be made for the distress and disappointment experienced by Ms Young arising from the Respondent's breach of sections 48(1)(a) and 49(1). The breaches, as has been outlined above, were substantial. In particular, the Respondent's failure to provide a back door to Ms Young's premises for 2,090 days was most concerning.
7. Subject to a consideration of section 122(3) of the RTA discussed below, given the gravity of the breaches, and the distress and disappointment experienced by Ms Young, the sum of $50,000 should be paid to Ms Young's estate. It is consistent with the purpose of the Act and the justice and equity in this case. While the amount is substantial, particularly when considered in relation to the value of the contract, the breaches of sections 48(1)(a) and 49(1) were both significant and lasted for an extended period of time.
8. Mr Conway is entitled to compensation for the distress and disappointment arising from the Respondent's breach of section 48(1)(a) for failing to repair the leaking shower for 610 days. The leak had a significant impact on Mr Conway and his spouse at a time when both were dealing with serious health issues. When the value of the contract is considered, and taking into account both the gravity of the breach and the time that elapsed before the leaking shower was fixed, compensation in the sum of $6,000 for distress and disappointment is consistent with the purpose of the RTA and the justice and equity of the case. This figure is subject to the consideration of the matters set out in section 122(3) to which the Tribunal now turns.

1. Taking into account the matters set out in section 122(3) of the RTA, the Tribunal notes the following:
   • 171.1. the Respondent has been found in breach of its sections 48(1)(a) and 49(1) obligations to Ms Young and its section 48(1)(a) obligations to Mr Conway. Consequently, the Respondent did not take all reasonable steps to comply with its obligations under the RTA, being the obligations in respect of which the claim is made (section 122(3)(a));
   • 171.2. neither Ms Young nor Mr Conway consented to the Respondent's failure to comply with obligations in respect of which the claims were made (section 122(3)(b));
   • 171.3. money has been paid to the Applicants as identified at [160] above (section 122(3)(c)). How this affects the award of compensation is discussed below;
   • 171.4. the Respondent submitted that it waived substantial sums in rent payable, and either waived or wrote-off substantial outstanding rent balances that the Applicants were contractually obligated to pay. In the case of Ms Young, this amount was approximately $42,000 and in the case of Mr Conway, this amount was $46,000. These amounts, the Respondent submitted, should be considered when calculating the award of compensation (section 122(3)(d)).

The basis of the Respondent's submission in this regard is the evidence of Ms Biro. This evidence was not accepted by the Tribunal for the reasons noted above. Section 122(3)(d) does not affect the award of compensation made to the Applicants in these proceedings;

• 171.5. some action was taken by the Applicants to mitigate the loss or damage resulting from the Respondent's breach of its sections 48(1)(a) and 49(1) obligations. For example, Ms Young replaced the missing back door with a mesh door. While more could have been done, the Tribunal is cognisant of the fact that Ms Young was an elderly woman with very limited ability to write or speak English. While Mr Conway could speak and read English, he was dealing with significant health issues both personally and in relation to his spouse. Finally, both Applicants lived in a remote community, which presented its own challenges. Section 122(3)(e) does not affect the award of compensation made to the Applicants in these proceedings;
• 171.6. other than as noted at [160] above, there has been no tender of compensation of which the Tribunal has been made aware (section 122(3)(f);
• 171.7. little if any action was taken by the Applicants to repair damage to the premises at their own expense. This is not surprising given that the Applicants were public housing residents with limited income. Section 122(3)(g) does not affect the award of compensation made to the Applicants in these proceedings.

1. As a result of compensation orders made in Various Applicants and Young and Conway v Chief Executive Officer, Housing [2020] NTSC 59; (2020) 355 FLR 290, the Respondent has paid the following compensation to the Applicants:
   • 172.1. to Ms Young the sum of $19,235.80;
   • 172.2. to Mr Conway the sum of $1,000.
2. Of these amounts, the sum of $18,735 already paid to Ms Young related to the Respondent's breach of sections 48(1)(a) and 49(1). Consequently, this amount should be deducted from the compensation found to be owing to Ms Young in these proceedings pursuant to section 122(3)(c). In the case of Mr Conway, in Various Applicants the compensation awarded related to the distress and disappointment experienced by Mr Conway as a result of the Respondent's breach of its duty to repair the leaking shower.[105] Consequently, this sum also should be deducted from the compensation awarded to Mr Conway in these proceedings pursuant to section 122(3)(c). It follows, therefore, that in these proceedings the Respondent should be ordered to pay section 122(1)(a) compensation to Ms Young's estate in the sum of $31,265 and to Mr Conway's estate in the sum of $5,000.

1. The Applicants seek interest on the compensation awarded in these proceedings calculated from the date when the cause of action arose to the date of the order for compensation arising from this decision.[106] The Applicants cited two cases in support of this claim.
2. In Haines v Bendall [1991] HCA 15; (1991) 172 CLR 60, the High Court dealt with the discretion the New South Wales Supreme Court has under what was then section 94 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) to award interest up to judgment. The equivalent provision applying to the NTSC is the Supreme Court Act 1979, section 84.
3. Also cited in support of the Applicants' claim for interest was the decision of the Tribunal in Unit Plan 92/27 v Tatlock [2016] NTCAT 485, a Small Claims Act action for unpaid levies and accrued interest incurred under the Unit Titles Act 1975 and associated regulations. Such regulations specifically provided for the charging of interest on unpaid levies.[107]
4. The Supreme Court Act 1979, section 84(1), provides that:

In any proceeding in respect of a cause of action that arises after the commencement of this Act the Court may order that there shall be included in the sum for which judgment is given interest at such rate as it thinks fit on the whole or any part of that sum for the whole or any part of the period between the date when the cause of action arose and the date of the judgment.

1. The word 'Court' is defined in section 9 of the Supreme Court Act 1979 to mean "the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of Australia as established by law immediately before the commencement of this Act". It is clear, therefore, that section 84 does not empower the Tribunal to include interest in its order for section 122(1)(a) compensation. Further, there is no provision in the RTA which invests a discretion in the Tribunal to award interest on compensation awarded pursuant to section 122(1)(a).
2. These proceedings are not an action for damages at common law for breach of contract. As the NTCA stated in Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2025] NTCA 5 at [32], the Tribunal would not have jurisdiction to entertain such a common law action. The Tribunal may order statutory compensation pursuant to section 122(1)(a) of the RTA. In the absence of statutory authority to award prejudgment interest on compensation awarded pursuant to section 122(1)(a), the Tribunal declines to award such interest on the amounts awarded in these proceedings.

1. Orders will be made awarding compensation to the estates of Ms Young and Mr Conway. In the case of Ms Young, the amount of compensation is $31,265. In the case of Mr Conway, the amount of compensation is $5,000.
2. No order for costs is made at this time. While the general rule in Tribunal proceedings is that the parties are to bear their own costs,[108] provision is made in the NTCAT Act for an award of costs.[109] There may be matters of which the Tribunal is not aware in these proceedings which may be relevant to a decision on costs. If so, the parties shall have 28 days in which to bring an Ordinary Application for costs.

1. The Chief Executive Officer (Housing) shall pay to the Estate of Kwementyaye Conway the sum of $5,000 by no later than 4.00pm on 13 February 2026.
2. The Chief Executive Officer (Housing) shall pay to Matthew Wayne Young in his capacity as the Administrator of the estate of Kwementyaye Young the sum of $31,265 by no later than 4.00pm on 13 February 2026.
3. A party to these proceedings has leave to bring an application for costs by filing an Ordinary Application within 28 days from the date of this order.

[1] Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Young and Anor (2022) 43 NTLR 196, [53], [68].

[2] Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Young and Anor (2022) 43 NTLR 196, [28].

[3] Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Young and Anor (2022) 43 NTLR 196, [48].

[4] Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Young and Anor (2022) 43 NTLR 196, [49].

[5] Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Young and Anor (2022) 43 NTLR 196, [50].

[6] Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Young and Anor (2022) 43 NTLR 196, [50].

[7] Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Young and Anor (2022) 43 NTLR 196, [68].

[8] Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Young and Anor (2022) 43 NTLR 196, [55].

[9] Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Young and Anor (2022) 43 NTLR 196, [58].

[10] Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Young and Anor (2022) 43 NTLR 196, [58].

[11] After the High Court's reasons had been finalised, the court was advised that Ms Young had passed away. The High Court certified consent orders substituting the administrator of Ms Young's estate as the first applicant: Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2023] HCA 31; (2023) 278 CLR 208, [79].

[12] Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2023] HCA 31; (2023) 278 CLR 208, [22].

[13] Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2023] HCA 31; (2023) 278 CLR 208, [23].

[14] Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2023] HCA 31; (2023) 278 CLR 208, [29]-[30].

[15] Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2023] HCA 31; (2023) 278 CLR 208, [58].

[16] Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2023] HCA 31; (2023) 278 CLR 208, [36].

[17] Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2023] HCA 31; (2023) 278 CLR 208, [36].

[18] Young and Conway v Chief Executive Officer, Housing (2020) 355 FLR 290; [2020] NTSC 59.

[19] Young and Conway v Chief Executive Officer, Housing (2020) 355 FLR 290; [2020] NTSC 59, [91].

[20] Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2025] NTCA 5.

[21] Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2025] NTCA 5, [32].

[22] Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2025] NTCA 5, [32]. See also Karpik v Carnival PLC (The Ruby Princess) [2025] FCAFC 96, [294].

[23] Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2025] NTCA 5, [36].

[24] BVT20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs and Another [2020] FCAFC 222; (2020) 283 FCR 97, [58]-[59].

[25] See also Sherlock v Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 16, 43-45; O Jones, "When Do Reasons for Judgment Lose Effect as Precedent?" (2023) 32 JJA 91, 108.

[26] Supplementary Submissions - Respondent dated 9 October 2025, [29].

[27] Supplementary Submissions - Respondent dated 9 October 2025, [29(b)].

[28] Barfly's Nominees Pty Ltd v Klinger Partners (A Firm) [2020] VSC 77, [33].

[29] Barfly's Nominees Pty Ltd v Klinger Partners (A Firm) [2020] VSC 77, [33].

[30] Barfly's Nominees Pty Ltd v Klinger Partners (A Firm) [2020] VSC 77, [30].

[31] Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014, s 10(g).

[32] Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014, s 53(1).

[33] Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014, s 53(2)(a).

[34] Unattested Declaration of Tamara Biro dated 28 August 2025, [11]-[12].

[35] Unattested Declaration of Tamara Biro dated 28 August 2025, [14].

[36] Unattested Declaration of Tamara Biro dated 28 August 2025, [15].

[37] Unattested Declaration of Tamara Biro dated 28 August 2025, [24].

[38] Unattested Declaration of Tamara Biro dated 28 August 2025, [25].

[39] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing), Hearing Transcript, pages 121-122.

[40] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing), Hearing Transcript, pages 24.

[41] Supplementary Submissions - Respondent dated 9 October 2025, [24].

[42] Supplementary Submissions - Respondent dated 9 October 2025, [24].

[43] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing), Hearing Transcript, page 122.

[44] Supplementary Submissions - Respondent dated 9 October 2025, [17].

[45] Supplementary Submissions - Respondent dated 9 October 2025, [30].

[46] Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Young and Anor (2022) 43 NTLR 196, [50].

[47] Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Pepperill & ors [ 2024] NTCA 10, [34].

[48] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [164].

[49] Supplementary Submissions - Respondent dated 9 October 2025, [36].

[50] Supplementary Submissions - Respondent dated 9 October 2025, [37].

[51] [1983] HCA 15; (1983) 57 ALJR 414; 47 ALR 32.

[52] University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2) (1985) 59 CLR 481, 482.

[53] University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2) (1985) 59 CLR 481, 483.

[54] Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, 554.

[55] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [181].

[56] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [180].

[57] See https://www.bom.gov.au/climate/averages/tables/cw_015590.shtml (accessed 17 December 2025).

[58] Unattested Declaration of Enid Young dated 6 October 2018 at [1]-[2] under the heading 'Repair Needs', quoted in Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [173].

[59] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [181].

[60] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [181].

[61] Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Pepperill & ors [ 2024] NTCA 10, [34].

[62] Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Pepperill & ors [ 2024] NTCA 10, [96].

[63] Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Pepperill & ors [ 2024] NTCA 10, [34].

[64] Unattested Declaration of Mr Conway dated 25 October 2018 at [40].

[65] S & R Building and Construction Pty Ltd tax invoice no INV-1946 dated 13 April 2016.

[66] S & R Building and Construction Pty Ltd tax invoice no INV-2271 dated 29 August 2016.

[67] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [184].

[68] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [186].

[69] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [187].

[70] Maintenance Request Form re Lot 165 dated 29 October 2015.

[71] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [187].

[72] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [189].

[73] Unattested Declaration of Enid Young dated 5 October 2018 at [7] under the heading "Repair Needs".

[74] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing), Hearing Transcript, page 19.

[75] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [190].

[76] Contractors Service Report Order No 1077263 dated 12 February 2016.

[77] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [190].

[78] Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2025] NTCA 5, [42].

[79] Unattested Declaration of Enid Young dated 5 October 2018 at [8] under the heading "Repair Needs".

[80] Alice Springs Electrical Services attachment to Invoice no 14172 dated 18 December 2015.

[81] CKS Electrical Mechanical Services and Airconditioning Invoice 16783 dated 29 March 2016.

[82] Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Pepperill & ors [ 2024] NTCA 10, [34].

[83] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [245].

[84] Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Pepperill & ors [ 2024] NTCA 10, [96].

[85] Unattested Declaration of Robert Conway dated 25 October 2018 at [36].

[86] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [249].

[87] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [259].

[88] Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Pepperill & ors [ 2024] NTCA 10, [96].

[89] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [203]-[204].

[90] Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Pepperill & ors [ 2024] NTCA 10, [96].

[91] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [198].

[92] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [200].

[93] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [253].

[94] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [254].

[95] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [251], [252], [263].

[96] Chief Executive Officer (Housing) v Pepperill & ors [ 2024] NTCA 10, [96].

[97] The determination that a failure to provide a back door constituted a breach of section 49(1) of the RTA has been established in other proceedings: Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2023] HCA 31; (2023) 278 CLR 208, [6].

[98] Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2023] HCA 31; (2023) 278 CLR 208, [30].

[99] Submissions on behalf of Ms Young's Administrator to the NTCA dated 25 July 2024, [43].

[100] Applicant's closing submissions in lieu of oral reply dated 31 October 2025, [28(c)], fn 36, citing Moore v Scenic Tours Pty Ltd [2020] HCA 17; (2020) 94 ALJR 481, Milner v Carnival Plc [2010] EWCA Civ 389; [2010] 3 All ER 701 and Jackson v Horizon Holidays [1974] EWCA Civ 12; [1975] 1 WLR 1468.

[101] Supplementary Submissions - Respondent dated 9 October 2025, [52].

[102] Brown & Ors v CEO (Housing) [2025] NTSC 72, [266].

[103] Brown & Ors v CEO (Housing) [2025] NTSC 72, [266].

[104] Young v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2023] HCA 31; (2023) 278 CLR 208, [29].

[105] Various Applicants from Santa Teresa v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) [2019] NTCAT 7, [291].

[106] Applicants' closing submissions in lieu of an oral reply dated 31 October 2025, [29].

[107] Unit Plan 92/27 v Tatlock [2016] NTCAT 485, [12].

[108] Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014, section 131.

[109] Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014, section 132.