(a) unprofessional conduct by the practitioner that amounts to conduct that is substantially below the standard reasonably expected of a registered health practitioner of an equivalent level of training or experience; and

(b) more than one instance of unprofessional conduct that, when considered together, amounts to conduct that is substantially below the standard reasonably expected of a registered health practitioner of an equivalent level of training or experience; and

(c) conduct of the practitioner, whether occurring in connection with the practice of the health practitioner's profession or not, that is inconsistent with the practitioner being a fit and proper person to hold registration in the profession.

1. There are two grounds set out in the application:

2. The Respondent, in her role as a therapeutic specialist with SASS provided counselling services to a client who was a prisoner at Risdon Prison in Tasmania (the client). During the course of the treating relationship, the Respondent failed to maintain professional boundaries with the client by engaging in inappropriate sexual contact.

• 1.1. On 15 March 2018 the Respondent met with [KF], (the client) a prisoner at Risdon Prison in Tasmania for a counselling session. [KF] had been referred to SASS after disclosing that he was a survivor of child sexual abuse.
• 1.2. During the period 15 March 2018 and 22 January 2019 [KF] attended approximately 60 treatment sessions with the Respondent.
• 1.3. The Respondent's last counselling session took place on 22 January 2019 prior to [KF's] extradition to NSW to complete a prison sentence in that State.
• 1.4. During the course of the treating relationship and on or about the time the client was due to extradited to NSW, the Respondent and the client kissed on 2 occasions during counselling sessions.
• 1.5. On 19 May 2022, the Respondent admitted she and the client had kissed on 2 occasions during the course of treating the client at Risdon Prison.
• 1.6. The client was vulnerable, because had had disclosed, amongst other things, to the Respondent that he was a survivor of childhood sexual abuse, aspects of his life including an attempted suicide and the traumatic death of a close family member, and was receiving counselling from the Respondent whilst institutionalised in prison.

1. During the period April 2019 to 25 December 2020 (the relevant period) the Respondent engaged in an inappropriate personal and intimate sexual relationship with a former client shortly after the treating relationship had ceased.

Particulars of Ground 2 > > 2.1. The Respondent's counselling sessions with the client through her employer SASS ceased on 22 January 2019. > > 2.2. Following the client's extradition to prison in NSW, the Respondent gave the client her personal mobile number so that they could keep in contact. > > 2.3. During the relevant period, the Respondent contacted the prison in NSW and discussed provision of medication for him introducing herself as a friend to the prison staff. > > 2.4. During the relevant period, the Respondent telephoned the client and sent letters. > > 2.5. During the relevant period, the Respondent visited the client in prison in NSW (including, from time to time, using her continuing professional development allowances to travel and visit the client). > > 2.6. During the relevant period, and the end of one of the Respondent's visits at the prison in NSW with the client, they kissed in approximately April/May 2019, following the client's release from prison, the Respondent visited him in NSW, every couple of months and engaged in a mutually agreed sexual relationship. > > 2.7. On 15 January 2021, the Respondent made a self-notification reporting sexual misconduct in breach of ethical guidelines. > > 2.8. On 19 May 2022, the Respondent admitted that under the APS Code of Ethics she should not have engaged in a sexual relationship with a client within 2 years of the treating relationship ending.

2. The Board contends that the conduct particularised in grounds 1 and 2 constitutes professional misconduct, or in the alternative constitutes unprofessional conduct or unsatisfactory professional performance.
3. The parties have agreed that the matter should be determined on the papers without a hearing being convened. Both parties made submissions.

1. The parties have submitted a statement of agreed facts.
2. In respect to background, the agreed facts include the following:

a) The practitioner held registration from 10 August 2018 until 10 August 2021 and from 16 September 2021 to the current time as a provisional psychologist whilst completing a Master of Professional Psychology under the 5+1 internship pathway to general registration with the Applicant pursuant to the National Law. > > b) At all material times the practitioner was employed at the Sexual Assault Support Service (SASS). The practitioner resigned from SASS with effect from 30 June 2022. > > c) The practitioner was required to act in accordance with the following professional standards: > > 1. the Australian Psychological Society's Code of Ethics 2007 in effect from 27 September 2007 (the APS Code of Ethics); and > 2. the Ethical Guidelines, in particular ethical guidelines for managing professional boundaries and multiple relationships - revised March 2016 and ethical guidelines on the prohibition of sexual activity with clients - revised February 2017 > > (together, the professional standards).

d) The professional standards are evidence of what constitutes appropriate professional conduct and practice pursuant to s 41 of the National Law.

e) For the period 10 August 2018 to December 2020 the practitioner was undertaking the 'higher degree' or 5th year component of the 5+1 program. She was completing a Master of Professional Psychology and required provisional registration to complete her studies.

f) In December 2020 the practitioner completed her higher degree and then moved into the "+1 internship" component of the 5+1 pathway to general registration.

g) The practitioner was required to hold provisional registration from 2018 when she commenced her master's degree.

h) On 10 August 2018 the Applicant advised the practitioner, by email that the application for provisional registration that she had lodged had been approved and that her details would be available on the public register and that a certificate of registration would be mailed to her.

1. On 15 January 2021 the practitioner lodged a self-notification about the conduct which is the subject of Ground 2 of the Board's application with the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (AHPRA). The notification did not include the practitioner's registration number. The practitioner identified herself as a student and did not refer to her provisional registration.

j) By letter dated 27 January 2021, AHPRA informed the practitioner that her self­notification had been reviewed by a delegate of the Board and noted that the notification was deemed not to meet the grounds for notification under s 144 of the National Law. This was on the basis the practitioner was a student. The notification was subsequently closed.

k) On 27 June 2022, AHPRA received a separate confidential notification relating to the practitioner's conduct which is the subject of this Application.

1. On 13 June 2023, the Board determined to refer the practitioner's conduct to the Tribunal under s 193(1)(a) of the National Law, having formed a reasonable belief that the practitioner had behaved in a way that constitutes professional misconduct.

1. The practitioner admits that she engaged in the conduct particularised in grounds 1 and 2 of the application.
2. The parties jointly submit that I should make factual findings in accordance with the above. The proper approach to an agreement between a regulator of professional standards and a practitioner was neatly summarised in Dental Board of Australia v Trijo (Review and Regulation) [2020] VCAT 558 at [34]:

34. The principles concerning the proper approach for a disciplinary tribunal to take to an Agreed Statement of the kind submitted in this case have been discussed in numerous decisions of courts and tribunals. The authorities recognise that ultimately it is for the Tribunal to be satisfied that the findings are appropriate. No agreement between a regulator and the practitioner can supplant that duty. Nevertheless, any agreement between the parties is a highly relevant matter: Medical Board of Australia v McGrath [2014] VCAT 641 at [19]- [21]. See also, in particular, the decision of the High Court of Australia in Commonwealth of Australia v Director, Fair Work Building Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46.

1. The Board carries the onus of proof. The standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities, and given the serious nature of professional conduct allegations, the standard of evidence is that of reasonable satisfaction as explained by Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34.
2. The assertions of fact in the agreed statement of facts were cross referenced to a bundle of documents filed and served by the Board. I make the findings of fact set out above on the basis of the Practitioner's admissions and the corroborating documentation. In respect to the allegations of conduct I am satisfied to the Briginshaw standard.
3. The documentary material filed by the Board is extensive and contains matters that extend beyond the agreed facts and might be aggravating, but given that they have not been included in the agreed facts and the practitioner has not been able to test them I have not had regard to them, except where they are contained in documents authored by the practitioner.

1. The practitioner made the following further admissions:
   1. The admitted conduct was in breach of the APS Code of Ethics in particular:

a) principle B.3 of the APS Code of Ethics which provides that psychologists must provide psychological services in a responsible manner having regard to the nature of the psychological services they are providing. This includes: > > 1. acting with the care and skill expected of a competent psychologist (principle B.3(a)). > 2. taking responsibility for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their conduct (principle B.3(b)). > 3. taking reasonable steps to prevent harm occurring as a result of their conduct (principle B.3(c)). > 4. being personally responsible for their professional decisions (principle B.3(e)); and

1. being aware of and taking steps to establish and maintain proper professional boundaries with clients and colleagues (principle B.3(g)).

b) principle C.4.3 of the APS Code of Ethics which provides that psychologists must:

1. not engage in sexual activity with a client or anybody who is closely related to one of their clients.
2. not engage in sexual activity with a former client, or anybody who is closely related to one of their clients, within two years after terminating the professional relationship with the former client.
3. if they wish to engage in sexual activity with former clients after a period of two years from the termination of the psychological service, first explore with a senior psychologist the possibility that the former client may be vulnerable and at risk of exploitation, and encourage the former client to seek independent counselling on the matter.

1. The conduct brings the psychological profession into disrepute and is detrimental to the reputation of the psychological profession and the confidence of the public in the profession
2. The conduct was conduct substantially below the standard reasonably expected of a registered health practitioner of an equivalent level of training or experience.
3. The practitioner agrees that the conduct admitted by her constitutes professional misconduct as defined in s 5(a) of the National Law.
4. In Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Little (Review and Regulation) [2020] VCAT 687 [41] - [44] it was observed that the duty to characterise the conduct and determine the appropriate sanction is not supplanted by an agreement between the parties, but that "where the Tribunal is persuaded that a penalty proposed by the parties is appropriate, it is highly desirable practice to accept the proposal and there is an important public policy benefit in doing so".
5. The Board contends that I can be comfortably satisfied that the impugned conduct constitutes professional misconduct because: it is objectively serious and involves dishonesty and misusing a position of power and trust; it constitutes a substantial departure from the applicable code of conduct and recognised professional standards; the practitioner had a therapeutic relationship with the client, who was vulnerable, being a survivor of childhood sexual abuse and being institutionalised; and there was a power imbalance between the practitioner and the client.
6. The Board contends that the practitioner made a conscious decision to engage in boundary violations, failed to report the violations to her employer or supervisors or include them in her clinical notes and failed to put in place mechanisms to avoid any further boundary violations.
7. The Board submits that the practitioner's conduct is inconsistent with the expected standards of practice and ethical behaviour, diminishes the good standing of the psychology profession and constitutes a significant breach of trust both as an employee and as a practitioner.
8. The practitioner did not make submissions to the contrary. I accept the submissions by the Board.
9. The gravity of professional misconduct is measured by the extent to which it departs from the proper standards: Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield (1997) 41 NSWLR 630 at 637. Having regard to the agreed facts, the admissions by the practitioner as to the character of her conduct and the professional standards prohibiting sexual activity with patients and recent patients, I am satisfied that the impugned conduct was substantially below the standard reasonably expected of a registered psychologist, even of the practitioner's relative inexperience, and constituted professional misconduct. It is not necessary to consider the alternatives of unprofessional conduct or unsatisfactory professional performance.

1. Upon a finding that a practitioner has behaved in a way that constitutes professional misconduct, s 196(2) of the National Law provides the following range of sanctions:

(2) If a responsible tribunal makes a decision referred to in subsection (1)(b), the tribunal may decide to do one or more of the following -

(b) impose a condition on the practitioner's registration, including, for example -

(i) a condition requiring the practitioner to complete specified further education or training, or to undergo counselling, within a specified period; or

(ii) a condition requiring the practitioner to undertake a specified period of supervised practice; or

(iii) a condition requiring the practitioner to do, or refrain from doing, something in connection with the practitioner's practice; or

(iv) a condition requiring the practitioner to manage the practitioner's practice in a specified way; or

(v) a condition requiring the practitioner to report to a specified person at specified times about the practitioner's practice; or

(vi) a condition requiring the practitioner not to employ, engage or recommend a specified person, or class of persons,

(c) require the practitioner to pay a fine of not more than $30,000 to the National Board that registers the practitioner;

(d) suspend the practitioner's registration for a specified period;

1. The parties have agreed that the following sanctions should result from the admission of professional misconduct, noting that the practitioner is currently registered:

a) A reprimand pursuant to s 196(2)(a) of the National Law; > > b) A period of suspension pursuant to s 196(2)(d) of the National Law; and > > c) The imposition of conditions pursuant to s 196(2)(b) of the National Law requiring: > > 1. supervised practice; and > 2. the undertaking of a formal program of education on topics approved by the Chair of the Board, relating to legal and ethical obligations surrounding professional boundaries, including a reflective practice report, with a review period of 12 months.

2. The Board does not seek a fine or cancelation of the practitioner's registration.
3. The general principles relevant to disciplinary sanctions were conveniently summarised in Medical Board of Australia v Singh (S) [2017] WASAT 33 at [23]- [29]:

23 The Tribunal repeats what it stated in Medical Board of Australia and Myers [2014] WASAT 137 (S). The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is protective rather than punitive, and such protection runs to both the public and the profession (Craig v Medical Board of South Australia [2001] SASC 169; (2001) 79 SASR 545 at [41] (Craig); Re Maraj (a Legal Practitioner) (1995) 15 WAR 12 at 25; Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Love [2014] WASC 389 (Love) at [19]; Law Society of New South Wales v Foreman [1994] NSWCA 69; (1994) 34 NSWLR 408 (Foreman) at 440G‑441A-B; Legal Profession Complaints Committee and in de Braekt [2013] WASAT 124 at [24]- [26]; New South Wales Bar Association v Hamman [1999] NSWCA 404 (Hamman) at [21] and [77]).

24 The appropriate sanction is to be considered at the time of the making of the sanction and not by reference to the date of the unprofessional acts (Legal Profession Complaints Committee and A Legal Practitioner [2013] WASAT 37 (S) (A Legal Practitioner (S)) at [23]; Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Segler [2014] WASC 159 at [7]; A Solicitor v Council of the Law Society of NSW [2004] HCA l; [2004] HCA 1; (2004) 216 CLR 253 (A Solicitor [2004] NSW) at [15]; Love at [16]).

25 It is the practitioner's conduct that attracts any sanction (A Legal Practitioner (S) at [24]; Smith v New South Wales Bar Association [1992] HCA 36; (1992) 176 CLR 256 at 267-268 and 271-272; A Solicitor [2004] NSW).

26 As the Tribunal explained in A Legal Practitioner (S) at [24]:

[I]n determining the appropriate penalty, care needs to be taken that the penalty reflects the matters with which the practitioner is charged and not other conduct including the defence of the action by the practitioner which is ultimately held to be unsuccessful: Smith v New South Wales Bar Association [1992] HCA 36; (1992) 176 CLR 256 (Smith) at 267-268 and 271-272[.]

27 Where there is a choice of sanctions, the Tribunal will choose that sanction which maximises the protection of the public (Quinn v Law Institute of Victoria [2007] VSCA 122 at [31]).

28 The dominant purpose of the disciplinary regulation of the medical profession is the protection of the public by the maintenance of proper standards within the profession. Hence, the impact which an appropriate penalty would have upon a practitioner guilty of misconduct, and personal hardship to a practitioner, are necessarily secondary considerations (see Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Detata [2012] WASCA 2014 at [47]; Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Masten [2011] WASC 71 at [29]; and Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Leask [2010] WASAT 133 at [54]).

29 There are circumstances in which a 'global' approach to sanction, rather than the imposition of separate sanction for each unprofessional act, may be more appropriate in vocational disciplinary proceedings namely, where the facts of the case are so inextricably woven as to make it difficult to meet a clear standard of prescription (A Legal Practitioner (S) at [5]; Stirling v Legal Services Commissioner [2013] VSCA 374 (Stirling) at [72]‑[75]).

1. In Medical Board of Australia v Singh at [30] the Tribunal identified a non-exhaustive list of twelve interrelated matters that may require consideration, which I set out with citations deleted and some editing:
   1. Any need to protect the public against further misconduct by the practitioner.
   2. The need to protect the public through general deterrence of other practitioners from similar conduct.
   3. The need to protect the public and maintain public confidence in the profession by reinforcing high professional standards and denouncing transgressions and thereby articulating the high standards expected of the profession, such that, even where there may be no need to deter a practitioner from repeating the conduct, the conduct is of such a nature that the Tribunal should give an emphatic indication of its disapproval.
   4. In the case of conduct involving misleading conduct, including dishonesty, whether the public and fellow practitioners can place reliance on the word of the practitioner.
   5. Whether the practitioner has breached any act, regulation, professional guidelines or code of conduct, and whether the practitioner has done so knowingly.
   6. Whether the practitioner's conduct demonstrated incompetence, and if so, to what level.
   7. Whether or not the incident was isolated such that the Tribunal can be satisfied of his or her worthiness or reliability for the future.
   8. The practitioner's disciplinary history.
   9. Whether or not the practitioner understands the error of the practitioner's ways, including an assessment of any remorse and insight (or a lack thereof) shown by the practitioner, since a practitioner who fails to understand the significance and consequences of misconduct is a risk to the community.
   10. The desirability of making available to the public any special skills possessed by the practitioner.
   11. The practitioner's personal circumstances at the time of the conduct and at the time of imposing the sanction. However, the weight given to personal circumstances cannot override the fundamental obligation of the Tribunal to provide appropriate protection of the public interest in the honesty and integrity of practitioners and in the maintenance of proper standards of professional practice.
   12. Any other matters relevant to the practitioner's fitness to practice and other matters which may be regarded as aggravating the conduct or mitigating its seriousness. In general, mitigating factors such as no previous misconduct or service to the profession are of considerably less significance than in the criminal process because the jurisdiction is protective not punitive.
2. The observations above from Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Little concerning agreed positions between the regulator and the practitioner apply to agreed sanctions.
3. The Board contends that a reprimand is appropriate as a serious form of censure and condemnation, which will almost always follow a finding of professional misconduct. However, the Board contends that a reprimand alone is not sufficient for the purposes of protection of the public in this case. It contends that the seriousness of the conduct and the period of time over which it occurred is such that a suspension of registration is required for both general and specific deterrence.
4. The Board contends that the practitioner was dishonest in her dealings with AHPRA, her employer and her supervisors and attempted to downplay her conduct.
5. The Board also contends that it would appropriate to impose conditions on the practitioner's registration to assist and support her to maintain appropriate professional standards.
6. In her submissions the practitioner expresses "utmost remorse and regret with the decisions I made that led to the significant breaches of my professional and ethical duties". She acknowledges the impact of her actions on the client and her workplace. She says that she submitted a self-notification to AHPRA and self-disclosure to her workplace and has since worked to develop insight into the factors that contributed to her conduct. She says that she now has a workplace with appropriate professional supports, processes and procedures and with ongoing professional development and regular supervision.
7. The practitioner says that she self-reported after emerging from an abusive relationship with the client. At that time she says she was experiencing post trauma/abuse symptoms. She says that she has experienced professional uncertainty since the initial report in January 2021, which has had professional, psychological and financial consequences.
8. The practitioner says that she has now completed the requirements of general registration, and the education, training and supervision involved in that process and has completed online training in respect to professional boundaries. She says that she has addressed the vulnerabilities that resulted in her conduct by undergoing therapy and positioning herself in a supportive and safe employment with continuing professional development.
9. The practitioner says that while there was a power dynamic existing between her as counsellor and the patient, there was also a power dynamic operating in the context of the grooming behaviours of the client who had a history of sexual violence, operating on an inexperienced and relatively naive female clinician.
10. While the practitioner entered into a written statement of agreed facts that included agreement in respect to the application of a period of suspension, in her submissions she opposes suspension. She points to the education and support that she has received in the interim, including her completion of a professional boundaries course. She contends that no one would benefit from the imposition of a suspension. A suspension would interrupt her professional training and experience, affect her position within a healthy work environment and impact on her employer due to the shortage of appropriately qualified clinicians. The practitioner has a case load of approximately 30 clients that would need to be reassigned.
11. The practitioner describes the personal toll of the last four years as immeasurable. She contends that the imposing of a suspension will add further financial stress, the loss of a supportive workplace and colleagues and impact her professional development. She contends that it will result in the sale of her home of 30 years.
12. At the time of the impugned conduct the practitioner was employed by a sexual assault support service. She saw the patient professionally in that context. She held a position of responsibility and had oversight for a prison outreach program and supervised, mentored and trained staff. The patient was 35 years old when the practitioner commenced seeing him. He had been referred to the service because of an assault that he had experienced as a 16 year old.
13. In her statements for the purposes of the conduct investigation and the proceedings, the practitioner described herself as vulnerable due to certain matters in her private life, and described the patient as broadly initiating the conduct, being manipulative and assaulting her. The practitioner uses her professional knowledge of psychology to characterise the patient's behaviour as congruent with a narcissistic personality disorder, but does not show that those professional skills gave her any critical insight into any risk he might exhibit to her, or into her own behaviour at the time that she was engaging in the conduct. She does candidly acknowledge that the patient was vulnerable due to his extensive history of incarceration and his history of trauma and sexual assault. She went to considerable lengths to see him, travelling to New South Wales on a number of occasions both before and after he was released from prison. Documents provided by the practitioner disclose her awareness that her personal relationship with the patient was unethical and put her at risk professionally. Her self-report only occurred after her relationship with the patient ended and he made certain threats.
14. While there is no evidence that the practitioner used her professional insights to manipulate the client into a sexual relationship "it is the potential for harm to the patient that makes a close personal or sexual relationship between a [practitioner] and patient inappropriate in most cases": Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v PBT (Review and Regulation) [2025] VCAT 12 [60]. The practitioner did not use her professional status to gain access to the patient during his period of imprisonment in Long Bay Prison in New South Wales, presenting herself as a friend. The more serious conduct occurred after the clinical contact ceased, but had a close temporal relationship to it.
15. I am satisfied that the conduct was of a serious nature, given her transgression of the professional standards, the period of the professional relationship, the duration of the personal relationship, the endeavour applied by the practitioner in pursuing the relationship interstate and the vulnerable circumstances of the patient.
16. The importance of general deterrence is clear in cases involving sexual contact between health practitioners and patients. Given the experience described by the practitioner, her acknowledgement of wrongdoing and her subsequent engagement in training I do not consider that specific deterrence is a significant consideration in this case, or that the practitioner poses any particular risk to patients in the future. She has identified personal vulnerabilities that she considers contributed to her conduct and has taken steps to address them.
17. I have not been informed of any prior disciplinary matters involving the practitioner. The agreed facts do not disclose any other breaches or relevant misconduct by the practitioner. Her competence is not in issue.
18. There are a number of aggravating factors. The practitioner's failure to disclose her conduct to her employer constituted a breach of trust. Her failure to candidly disclose in her self-report the conduct during the clinical relationship as set out in ground 1 was dishonest. Her remorse is stated candidly, but is tempered by the blame she places on the patient. On the material provided I am not able to determine whether the Practitioner's characterisation of herself as a student in her initial disclosure was intended to deceive or was inadvertent, but she did not rectify that false description when initially advised by the Board that the notification would be closed on the basis of that description.

1. The parties have agreed that the sanctions should include a reprimand. Any form of official censure for a professional is of consequence and a reprimand may constitute a serious form of censure and condemnation: Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Dutton (Review and Regulation) [2016] VCAT 495 [252]. I am satisfied that the practitioner's conduct warrants a reprimand.

1. I am also satisfied that the seriousness of the practitioner's conduct warrants a period of suspension. In considering circumstances where suspension of a legal practitioner is preferable to striking off in Re a Practitioner (1984) 36 SASR 590 at 593 King CJ, with whom Zelling and Jacobs JJ, agreed said the following:

The proper use of suspension is, in my opinion, for those cases in which a legal practitioner has fallen below the high standards to be expected of such a practitioner, but not in such a way as to indicate that he lacks the qualities of character and trustworthiness which are the necessary attributes of a person entrusted with the responsibilities of a legal practitioner.

That would also hold true for health practitioners The Board does not seek cancellation of the practitioner's regulation, and she falls into that description.

1. The Board referred to a number of cases dealing with similar circumstances of professional misconduct by health professionals engaging in inappropriate personal relationships with patients, some but not all of which included a sexual relationship: Medical Board of Australia v Thompkins [2019] SAHPT 18, Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Welsh (No 2) [2020] VCAT 728, Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Ballarto [2020] VCAT 248, Psychology Board of Australia v White [2020] VCAT 123, Medical Board of Australia v Thompson [2021] TASHPT 1, Medical Board of Australia v Visagie [2013] TASHPT 2 and Medical Board of Australia v Ainsworth [2019] VCAT 734. I have also had regard to Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v PBT (Review and Regulation) [2025] VCAT 12 and the comparative cases discussed in that case. The cases indicate that a period of suspension is generally appropriate, but each case, of course, turned on its own particular facts.
2. Material provided by the practitioner indicates that a period of suspension may result in her losing her employment and cause her financial difficulty. I take that into account, but as disciplinary proceedings are protective rather than punitive personal hardship is a secondary consideration to the public interest and the maintenance of professional standards: Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield at 637-638 and Medical Board of Australia v Singh at [30].
3. I consider that the matters of protection, deterrence and censure are properly reflected in suspension of the practitioner's registration for a period of six months. That period takes into account the steps that the practitioner has taken to regulate and support her professional conduct, but also reflects the seriousness of the conduct, which was plainly and unmistakably in breach of the APS code of ethics and was deliberate, repeated and extended over a significant period of time. A short delay in the commencement of that period will enable the practitioner to make arrangements in respect to her practice.

1. The Board has sought the imposition of conditions of supervised practice on the practitioner's registration. The proposed conditions are set out in the orders below. The practitioner has agreed to the proposed conditions. I consider them reasonable in the circumstances. I am required by s 196(3) of the National Law to set a review period for the conditions, which pursuant to s 5 of the National Law is a period during which the conditions may not be changed or removed. The Board has sought a review period of 12 months. Having regard to the terms of the conditions and in the absence of any submission by the practitioner to the contrary I am satisfied that a review period of 12 months is appropriate.

1. The Board also seeks a condition that the practitioner undertake a formal program of education on ethical practice. Despite her agreement to the proposed sanctions the practitioner now opposes this on the basis that since the disciplinary process began she has completed the requirements of general registration, passed the national psychology exam which has a significant component covering ethical conduct and completed CPD training in professional boundaries. After her relationship with the patient had ended the practitioner completed a course of university study in advanced ethics and professional practice associated with her Master of Professional Psychology degree. I am satisfied that the practitioner has undertaken relevant study in ethics and that the condition of supervised practice is sufficient for the future protection of the public without requiring the practitioner to undertake further education.

1. The practitioner has sought an order suppressing her name in any publication of the proceeding. The grounds for the application are the risk to her of psychological and physical harm and the detrimental impact on her mental health.
2. The practitioner states that she suffered domestic violence perpetrated by the patient, and has also experienced extortion, false accusations, harassment and emotional abuse by him. She says that she has suffered symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) that she manages with therapy and utilising her own training. She believe that publication of her name will detrimentally affect her symptoms and functional capacity and expose her to an ongoing risk of harm from the patient. She does not explain how those effects and risks will manifest.
3. The practitioner provided two brief letters from her GP. They state that publication would adversely affect the practitioner's mental health, but provide no detail of what that adverse effect might be. The practitioner also provided a letter from a clinical social worker who detailed psychological symptoms experienced by the practitioner and expressed a view that the practitioner's compromised mental health is likely to be further significantly impacted by publication.
4. The Board made submissions as to the law, but has taken a neutral position in respect to the application for suppression.
5. Section 30(1) of the Health Practitioners Tribunal Act 2010 provides that hearings are to be open, with a discretion in s 30(2) and (3) to suppress publication of information in respect of the proceedings. Section 51 gives a broad unfettered discretion in respect to publication, and the manner of publication, of a decision:

The Tribunal may, as it thinks fit, publish in the manner it thinks fit, or refuse to publish, a decision of the Tribunal in respect of proceedings under this Act.

1. In a recent decision published only to the parties I considered the discretion to restrict publication where there was an asserted risk to the respondent's mental health. I set out an edited version of that analysis below.
2. In a joint judgment in WEQ (a pseudonym) v Medical Board of Australia [2021] VSCA 343 Kyrou and McLeish JJA explained the importance of open justice both generally and with specific reference to disciplinary proceedings. Their Honours said at [59]-[61]:

59 The principle of open justice is a fundamental rule of the common law, and an essential part of the functioning of the Australian justice system. Its purpose is to expose proceedings to 'public and professional scrutiny' and inform the public how judicial (or administrative) power is exercised, and on what evidential basis. This enhances accountability, and assists in maintaining public confidence in the integrity and independence of courts and tribunals.

60 An aspect of the principle of open justice is that what occurs in open court (or an open tribunal) may be publicised. Persons present in an open court or tribunal may disseminate to others who were not present fair and accurate reports of the proceedings, including the names of the parties and witnesses and the evidence given. It has been said that proceedings must be 'exposed in their entirety to the cathartic glare of publicity', subject only to limited exceptions 'sparingly allowed'.

61 In disciplinary or criminal proceedings, this aspect of the principle of open justice assumes particular importance as there is a special public interest in the community knowing the outcome of such proceedings. The publicity of disciplinary proceedings assists in protecting the public, signals to the relevant profession what is and is not acceptable professional conduct, and serves the purposes of specific and general deterrence.

1. Section 35 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) is similar in purpose and effect to s 30(1) of the Health Practitioner Tribunal Act. In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2009] FCAFC 185 Downes and Jagot JJ considered departure from the general principle of open justice in the context of s 35 at [74]-[75]:

74 Again, we think it is important to emphasise certain aspects of the statutory provisions. Although s 35(1) is subject to the balance of the section, it establishes a norm. The norm is that the proceedings before the AAT shall be in public. This norm is reinforced by the requirements of s 35(3) which expressly confirm the principle that it is desirable that hearings be held in public. It follows that when deciding whether it is satisfied that it is desirable to exercise its powers under s 35(2), the AAT is required to form a state of satisfaction which recognises the existence of the norm and the values it is intended to protect. This, no doubt, is why Brennan J in Re Pochi and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1979] AATA 64; (1979) 36 FLR 482 at 510 described the power in s 35(2) to depart from this norm as one to be exercised "sparingly". It also explains the approach in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v PTLZ (2008) 48 AAR 559; [2008] FCAFC 164 at [6], [41] and [42] (an appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court from the decision of the AAT in Re PTLZ and Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2008) 100 ALD 648; [2008] AATA 106) emphasising that the words of s 35(3) require this principle of the desirability of hearings to be in public to be "the basis" of the AAT's consideration of adopting a different approach (in contrast, for example, to "a basis" for that consideration).

75 Suppression orders are rarely made in courts, even though publicity undoubtedly disadvantages the parties. Criminal proceedings are a good example. In the AAT itself facts which parties would not wish to be published and which may disadvantage them are frequently published. Social security applications are a good example. The reason these matters are not kept secret is the overriding importance of justice being administered openly and in public.

1. In considering the inherent jurisdiction or implied power of courts to restrict publication of proceeding, French CJ said in Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4 at [26] that "the exercise of the power must be justified by reference to the necessity of such orders in the interests of the administration of justice".
2. In jurisdictions where legislation expressly permits the making of a suppression order based on the ground of necessity to protect the safety of a person, a risk of psychological harm may form the basis for a suppression order: for example see Lehrmann v Queensland Police Service & Ors [2023] QSC 238 and Moseley v AB [2017] NSWSC 916. The risk of harm to mental health must be so serious as to threaten the safety of the person: Ferguson v Tasmanian Cricket Association (trading as Cricket Tasmania) (No.2) [2022] FCA 125 at [12].
3. In Walton v Momot [1997] NSWCA 334 the New South Wales Court of Appeal considered a power in cl 6(1) of Sch 3 of the Chiropractors and Osteopaths Act 1991 (Cth) permitting the Chiropractors and Osteopaths Tribunal to restrict the publication of material "if the person presiding thinks it appropriate in the particular circumstance of the case". Handley JA, with whom Priestley JA and Grove AJA agreed, referred to the general principle that the Chiropractors and Osteopaths Tribunal was required to sit in public and observed that:

This being the prima facie method by which the Tribunal should conduct its proceedings as laid down in the Act, it follows that something special, exceptional, or out of the ordinary, must be established before the Tribunal can make an order avoiding such a result.

1. The formulation that something "special, exceptional, or out of the ordinary" is required to justify the making of a suppression order was applied by this Tribunal in UP v Nursery and Midwifery Board of Australia [2023] TASCAT 204 at [56] and in the former Tasmanian Health Practitioners Tribunal in Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v S [2019] TASHPT 4 at [33]. In UP v Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia the Tribunal found that a high risk to the respondent practitioner of self-harm or suicide amounted to circumstances that are special, exceptional, and out of the ordinary.
2. Having regard to these authorities, something special, exceptional, or out of the ordinary, in the context of the interests of the administration of justice, is required to justify suppressing the practitioner's identity. Risk to the practitioner's mental health of a nature serious enough to threaten her safety may be a sufficient relevant circumstance.
3. The practitioner contends that publication would detrimentally affect her mental health. Common experience would indicate that any practitioner might well experience reputational damage, embarrassment, anxiety and depression as a result of the publication of adverse findings.
4. The Practitioner contends that she has symptoms of PTSD. She has not provided any opinion from a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist. She has provided letters from a counsellor and her GP asserting that publication would adversely affect her mental health, but neither explain what the affect would be or identify a risk that could be said to be something special, exceptional, or out of the ordinary. They do not refer to any risk of self harm or suicidality. The counsellor's letter refers to a heightened risk of potential harm from the patient, but that is a bare statement and the counsellor provides no explanation or context for that risk.
5. I am not satisfied that the risk of harm identified by the practitioner is sufficient to warrant a suppression order, having regard to the position of trust held by the practitioner as a health professional, the public interest in the outcome of the disciplinary process and the important functions of open justice in disciplinary matters to protect the public and to deter similar conduct.
6. The practitioner's application for suppression of her name is refused.

1. In the application the Board seeks an order that the practitioner pay the Board's costs of the application. The only submission made by the Board in respect to costs is an observation that the Tribunal has a general discretion to order costs pursuant to s 195 of the National Law. Section 40 of the Health Practitioners Tribunal Act also makes provision for costs. The practitioner did not address costs in her submissions. I will provide the parties with an opportunity to agree on an order for costs or to make submissions in default of agreement.

1. I make the following orders:
   1. Louisa Straatsma is reprimanded pursuant to s 196(2)(a) of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Tasmania).
   2. Louisa Straatsma is suspended from practice as a psychologist pursuant to s 196(2)(d) of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Tasmania) for a period of six months commencing on 9 April 2025.
   3. The following conditions are imposed on the registration of Louisa Straatsma as a psychologist pursuant to s 196(2)(b)(ii) of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Tasmania) with a review period of 12 months:

a) The Practitioner must be supervised by another registered psychologist in relation to ethical practice, with a particular focus on the management of professional boundaries. > > b) For the purposes of this condition, 'supervision' is defined as a professional relationship in which a skilled registered practitioner (the approved supervisor) helps to guide the professional development of another registered practitioner (the Practitioner) to integrate professional knowledge and skills into demonstrated competencies that meet the accepted standard of performance outlined in the Board adopted code of ethics. > > c) The supervision must occur on a monthly basis for a minimum 9 months with each session being of at least 1 hour duration. The supervision must continue until these conditions are removed by the Board. > > d) Within 21 days of resuming practice following suspension, the Practitioner must: > > 1. Provide to the Board acknowledgement, on the approved form (HP13), that reports will be sought from the supervisor(s) approved by the Board and what those reports must contain. > 2. Nominate to the Board, on the approved form (HPN13), the names of three suitability skilled registered psychologists to be considered for approval as supervisors. > 3. Ensure the nominated supervisors meet all the requirements of the approved form. > 4. Ensure the nomination is accompanied by acknowledgement, on the approved form (HPNA13) from the nominated supervisors and by the information and documentation required on the form. > > e) Within 14 days of being advised of the supervisor approved by the Board the Practitioner is to: > > 1. commence supervision with the Board approved supervisor; and > 2. provide to the Board, on the approved form (HPSP13), a supervision plan signed by the approved supervisor. The supervision plan must include the schedule, format and details of how supervision will address ethical practice, with a particular focus on the management of professional boundaries. > > f) The Practitioner is to ensure reports are provided to the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (Ahpra) as follows: > > 1. every 3 months from the date of approval of the supervisor by the Board; > 2. at the conclusion of the minimum period of supervision prescribed in the conditions on the Practitioner's registration; > 3. at any later time that the Practitioner requests the Board to consider reviewing the supervision condition; > 4. whenever the supervisor has a concern or becomes aware of a concern regarding the Practitioner's conduct or professional performance; and > 5. when requested either verbally or in writing by Ahpra. > > g) The Practitioner is to ensure reports provided in accordance with this condition include: > > 1. the format, date, time and length of each supervision session that has occurred since the previous report; > 2. the supervisor's opinion as to whether the Practitioner has satisfactorily participated in, and understood the focus of, the supervision; and > 3. the Practitioner's own reflections on the supervision to date (unless the report is for the purpose of the approved supervisor raising concerns about the Practitioner). > > h) On conclusion of the minimum period of 9 months the Practitioner must provide a report demonstrating, to the satisfaction of the Board, that the Practitioner has reflected on the issues that gave rise to the condition requiring the supervision and outlining how the Practitioner has incorporated the lessons learnt during the supervision into their practice.

1. The Practitioner is to continue with supervision until such time as the Board advises in writing that it is satisfied the reports demonstrate the Practitioner has reflected on and addressed the issues that gave rise to the supervision condition and how the Practitioner has incorporated the lessons learnt in the supervision.

j) In the event the supervisor is no longer willing or able to provide the supervision required the Practitioner is to provide a new nomination to the Board in the same terms as previous nominations. Such nomination must be made by the Practitioner within 14 days of becoming aware of the termination of the supervision relationship. > > k) The Practitioner is not entitled to claim the hours spent with the supervisor or the time spent preparing reports for the Board in compliance with this condition as part of the Continuing Professional Development requirements for registration.

1. All costs associated with compliance of these conditions are at the practitioner's own expense 4. The parties are to file a memorandum of agreed proposed orders in respect to the costs of the application within 21 days from the date of this determination. In the event that proposed orders are not agreed:

a) the Board is to file and serve submissions in support of its application for costs within a further 14 days; > > b) the practitioner is to file and serve any submissions in response within 14 days of receipt of the Board's submissions; > > c) the Board my file and serve a reply within 7 days of receipt of the practitioner's submissions; and > > d) the parties have liberty to apply in respect to this timetable.