40. Part of the first defendant's amended application filed 8 June 2017 seeks to compel the plaintiff to answer a request for further and better particulars that had been first served on 23 December 2016.

41. This aspect of the application is brought pursuant to r 434(1) of the Rules. However, the application must be read in the context of r 430, which sets out the obligation to include particulars:

Pleadings - all necessary particulars must be included

(1) A party must include in a pleading particulars necessary to -

(a) define the issues for, and prevent surprise at, the trial; and

(b) enable the opposite party to identify the case that the pleading requires the opposite party to meet; and

(c) support a matter specifically pleaded under rule 407 (Pleadings - matters to be specifically pleaded).

(2) This rule does not require a party to include in a pleading particulars of any claim for interest up to judgment other than those required by rule 51 (2) (Originating claim - additional matters for claims for debt and liquidated demands) or rule 304 (2) (Third-party notice - additional matters for claims for debt and liquidated demands).

42. Rule 430 reflects the purpose of particulars to a pleading, which is to identify the issues to be decided and ensure that the other party has a fair opportunity to meet the case: see Dare v Pullman (1982) 148 CLR 658 at 664; Helmhout v Apostoloff [2011] ACTSC 2 (Helmhout) at [101].

43. Those considerations have some resonance here, where not only a defence but an amended defence has been prepared. The first defendant has plainly been in a position to identify the issues and respond to the case to be met.

44. Before an order under r 434 would be made, it is necessary for the first defendant to establish that the particulars sought were properly requested, which ought to be determined by reference to whether there has been some failure to comply with the Rules, and in particular r 430.

45. The correspondence relevant to this aspect of the application is contained in the affidavit of Mr Ian Thompson, solicitor for the first defendant, sworn 7 April 2017. In particular, the affidavit annexes letters to the plaintiff dated 23 December 2016 and 6 March 2017.

46. The plaintiff attempted to provide further and better particulars on 25 January 2017 by way of correspondence, although it is apparent from the contents of Mr Thompson's affidavit that the first defendant did not in fact receive them on that date. Nevertheless, the plaintiff's answers have been received (although not filed, as required by r 433) and she submits that she answered the request frankly and to the best of her ability.

47. Having considered the document of 23 December 2016, the plaintiff's response and the further correspondence of 6 March 2017, many of the particulars sought by the first defendant have been answered by the plaintiff, including the provision of emails referred to (although these do not appear to be annexed to Mr Thompson's affidavit).

48. Moreover, much of the information sought under the requests said to be outstanding (as ultimately limited in an Appendix 3 to the first defendant's submissions) does not appear to be necessary for the purpose of proper identification of the issues or pleadings to the case. In Police & Nurses Credit Society Ltd v Burgess Rawson (WA) Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1395 , French J, as his Honour then was, said (at [17]):

What are 'necessary' particulars of any claim, defence or other matter pleaded is a matter of judgment. The underlying principle is that the case of each of the parties is adequately exposed to the other. It is important to maintain a sense of balance in the detail of particulars sought and ordered. The provision of particulars should not be allowed unduly to increase the cost and delay associated with litigation. In contemporary commercial litigation where, frequently, the court will direct the filing of witness statements or affidavits on either side subject to the right to cross examination, the necessity for elaborate particulars and lengthy debates about them is even more questionable.

49. Justice French's comments reflect the contemporary approach to pleadings, referred to by Refshauge J in Hamilton v Australian Capital Territory & Dr Tonks [2011] ACTSC 45, where his Honour set out (at [30]) what fell from Martin CJ in Barclay Mowlem Constructions Ltd v Dampier Port Authority [2006] WASC 281; 33 WAR 82, including at [7]:

In my view, it follows that provided a pleading fulfils its basic functions of identifying the issues, disclosing an arguable cause of action or defence, as the case may be, and apprising the parties of the case that has to be met, the court ought properly be reluctant to allow the time and resources of the parties and the limited resources of the court to be spent extensively debating the application of technical pleadings rules that evolved in and derive from a very different case management environment.

50. I have adopted that approach when considering the particulars sought. It is not necessary for the purpose of resolving this aspect of the dispute to traverse each of the particulars ultimately pressed by the first defendant in Appendix 3, particularly when many of those paragraphs contain sub-categories of particulars sought.

51. The conclusion I have reached is that the Claim fulfils its basic function of identifying the issues with sufficient particularity that the first defendant understands what material is said to be defamatory, what imputations the plaintiff seeks to prove, and what harm to her reputation the internet posts caused. Further, the first defendant is alive to the issue that the plaintiff seeks aggravated damages against him, on the basis of knowledge that the imputations were false, and intentional and malicious use of sensationalised internet forums: Claim, item (i) of the heading 'Particulars of Aggravated Damages'.

52. That is not to suggest that the Claim is a model pleading, nor that the rules of pleading should be ignored. Rather, I find that the first defendant has not discharged his onus on this application of demonstrating that any non-compliance with r 430 has rendered him unable to identify the case to be met such as to warrant an order under r 434 in the exercise of the Court's discretion. Nowhere in the letter dated 6 March 2017 (following the plaintiff's answers) is there any indication that such is the case.

53. The following examples are provided to support the conclusion reached. The plaintiff pleaded that she was a self-employed legal practitioner (paragraph 3 of the Claim), and that the published content in Schedule A to the Claim carried, inter alia, the following imputations (see paragraphs 15(a), (c) and (d) of the Claim):

(a) That the plaintiff had faced very great disciplinary action as a result of which she was no longer practising.

(b) That the plaintiff was a person who indulged in abuse of process.

(c) That the plaintiff's conduct was unprofessional.

54. In respect of those imputations alleged, the first defendant sought particulars of:

(a) All professional disciplinary action taken by any regulating body/authority and/or employer bodies; and

(b) All complaints, professional or otherwise, lodged against the plaintiff, that related to the plaintiff's professional conduct or conduct of any legal matter.

55. The request appears to be in the nature of fishing so as to potentially mount a defence, rather than to identify any issue as to the particularity of the imputations pleaded. The pleading of imputations said to arise from the published material does not require the plaintiff to then particularise whether any professional disciplinary action or complaints were in fact taken.

56. The first defendant admits (at [12] of the Defence) to publication in January 2010 of the matters complained of (set out in Schedule A to the Claim), albeit in a different form.

57. However, the first defendant has then requested numerous further particulars related to the material in Schedule A, a small sample of which includes:

(a) the particular items within a webpage that 'suggest, indicate, or otherwise outline issues and aspects related to the identification of the plaintiff specifically';

(b) which system platform was used for software referred to in Schedule A;

(c) which URL was followed;

(d) how the plaintiff established that the website pleaded had a 'varied reputation';

(e) what search parameters were used to find the material;

(f) how the plaintiff came to know of the material;

(g) what make and model of computer was used to access the material;

(h) what was the location of the computer used to access the material; and

(i) how many times the material was viewed by the plaintiff.

58. As to the particulars sought of the make and model of the computer used, when the plaintiff replied that she did not know, the first defendant then asked her to explain why she did not know.

59. Save as to one matter, I do not see how any of the requested particulars still pressed are required for the first defendant to respond to the issues for determination. The particulars sought by the first defendant seek what is tantamount to either proof of facts pleaded or discovery, rather than particulars of the material facts pleaded. While a defendant is entitled to know the case he is called upon to meet, he is not entitled to be told the evidence that will be called to prove the case: Helmhout at [107] following Conway v Mercedes-Benz Australia/Pacific Pty Ltd ACN 004 411 410 [2010] FCA 72; see also Trade Practices Commission v Total Australia Ltd (1975) 24 FLR 413 at 417, which was cited more recently in Oztech Pty Ltd v Public Trustee of Queensland (No 6) [2016] FCA 391 at [43].

60. The one remaining matter is the plaintiff's pleading at [xiv] of the particulars of aggravated damages:

The first and second defendants displayed repeated and public disregard for the plaintiff's well-being and livelihood and that of her family.

61. It is not at all clear how this sounds in aggravated damages and it is a matter that may be of surprise to the defendants if further particulars are not provided. If the plaintiff is asserting some sort of damage payable in respect of her livelihood, and that of her family, then I agree that the first defendant is entitled to know what that damage is, including any damage suffered by particular individuals.

62. Had I not concluded that the entire claim ought be dismissed, I would have directed the plaintiff to provide the further particulars sought in that regard.

The defendants' applications for either summary dismissal or summary judgment

63. The defendants seek summary judgment, which is a discretionary remedy. The Court ought grant summary relief (of part or all of the proceedings) with the utmost caution and only in very clear cases: O'Brien v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2013] NSWCA 71 at [66]; Young v Hones [2014] NSWCA 337 at [163], citing General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125 (General Steel) at 128-129.

64. In this Court, the applicable principles to applications for summary judgment are contained in Galovac Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory [2010] ACTSC 132 at [5], cited with approval in McColley v Commonwealth of Australia [202] ACTSC 154 and Bolas v Calvary Health Care Limited [2016] ACTSC 58 at [1]:

(1) The party seeking summary judgment faces a "very high threshold" (Financial Integrity Group Pty Limited v Farmer [2009] ACTSC 143 at 12).

(2) The lack of a cause of action must be "clearly demonstrated" (General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129).

(3) The procedure calls for "exceptional caution" (General Steel at 129).

(4) The necessity for argument, even extensive argument, is no bar. However, as soon as it appears that there is a "real question" to be determined on which relief depends, the summary judgment procedure is not available (General Steel at 130 citing Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners [1949] HCA 1; (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91).

(5) Mere implausibility of the claim or improbability of success is insufficient; there must clearly be no real question to be tried in the sense that the claim is bound to fail (Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 4) (2005) 214 ALR 686; [2005] FCA 244 at [14] citing Lonrho Plc v Fayed (No 2) [1992] 1 WLR 1 (Ch D) at 5; [1991] 4 All ER 961 at 965).

(6) The application is to be assessed on the assumption that every fact pleaded by the plaintiff is true (West v State of New South Wales [2007] ACTSC 43 at [9]).

(7) The application must be determined on the substance, not the mere form or expression, of the claim (Financial Integrity Group [supra] at [15]).

65. The defendants put the basis for the summary relief sought in three ways:

(a) The Claim was out of time under s 21B of the Limitations Act 1985 (ACT) (Limitation Act);

(b) The proceedings had been commenced contrary to s 133 of the Civil law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) (Civil Law (Wrongs) Act), without first seeking the leave of the Court; and

(c) The plaintiff is otherwise stopped from bringing the proceedings on the basis of res judicata or Anshun estoppel.

Summary judgment on the basis of s 21B of the Limitation Act

66. Section 21B of the Limitation Act provides:

Defamation proceedings generally to be commenced within 1 year

(1) An action on a cause of action for defamation is not maintainable if brought after the end of a limitation period of 1 year running from the date of the publication of the matter complained of.

(2) However, a court must, if satisfied that it was not reasonable in the circumstances for the plaintiff to have commenced an action in relation to the matter complained of within 1 year from the date of the publication, extend the limitation period mentioned in subsection (1) to a period of up to 3 years running from the date of the publication.

67. The section does not extinguish the cause of action; it merely bars the remedy: Commonwealth of Australia v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471, Brisciani v Piscioneri CA at [12]; Piscioneri v Reardon [2016] ACTCA 33 (Piscioneri v Reardon CA) at [46]; Gabriella Jean Piscioneri v Marek Janusz Michael Reardon [2015] ACTSC 61 (Piscioneri v Reardon) at [54] and the cases there-cited.

68. The application of the section was specifically pleaded at [23] of the Defence filed by the second defendant, and [23] of the Defence filed by the first defendant. Although each defendant mistakenly referred to the Limitation Act as being enacted in 2005, rather than in 1985, the error has no impact on the substance of the Defence. It is therefore an issue properly joined: see Piscioneri v Reardon at [56].

69. The issue was also raised at an appropriate stage in these proceedings, namely, when each defendant first filed a Defence (so no question of waiver arises), and on this application, consistent with the principle that a court would not consider the matter of the limitation period of its own motion: see Piscioneri v Reardon at [60], citing James v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1986] FCA 41; (1986) 64 ALR 347 at 396.

70. The onus is on the defendants to prove the limitation defence once raised: Piscioneri v Reardon at [61].

71. The plaintiff deals with the issue by pleading at the outset s 33(1)(b) of the Limitation Act in the relief set out in her Claim. Relevantly, that section provides:

(a) there is a cause of action based on fraud or deceit; or

(b) a fact relevant to a cause of action or the identity of a person against whom a cause of action lies is deliberately concealed;

the time that elapses after a limitation period fixed by or under this Act for the cause of action begins to run and before the date when a person having (either solely or with other persons) the cause of action first discovers, or may with reasonable diligence discover, the fraud, deceit or concealment, as the case may be, does not count in the reckoning of the limitation period for an action on the cause of action by him or her or by a person claiming through him or her against a person answerable for the fraud, deceit or concealment.

(2) Subsection (1) has effect whether the limitation period for the cause of action would, apart from this section, end before or after the date mentioned in that subsection.

72. Section 33 is not a provision which empowers the Court to make an order extending the limitation period. It postpones the operation of the statutory bar: Piscioneri v Reardon CA at [44].

73. The onus is on the plaintiff to prove deliberate concealment such as to enliven s 33 of the Limitation Act: Piscioneri v Reardon at [61].

74. Where there are matters of contested fact that need to be considered when determining as a fact whether the limitation period has expired, this would usually be appropriately determined in the context of the trial itself: Piscioneri v Reardon at [62]; see also Mann v Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (SC (NSW) Master Malpass, 16 April 1996, unreported), cited in Piscioneri v Reardon CA at [44]. Dunstan v Highman and Ors [2010] ACTSC 133 is to similar effect, where Jagot J found (at [17]) that once there was an arguable claim that s 33 of the Limitation Act applies, summary judgment on the basis of s 21B of the Limitation Act was precluded.

75. These authorities are consistent with Wardley Australia Ltd v Western Australia [1992] HCA 55; (1992) 175 CLR 514 where Mason CJ, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ remarked (at 533) on the undesirability that 'limitation questions...should be decided in interlocutory proceedings in advance of the hearing of the action, except in the clearest of cases' (emphasis added).

76. Although the High Court referred to interlocutory proceedings, there seems no dispute that an order for summary judgment is a final order: see Brennand and Naughton v Hartung and Best Practice Education Group Ltd t/as Blue Gum Community School [2014] ACTSC 326 at [51], citing Trade World Enterprise Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2006] VSCA 191; Hunt v Knabe (No 2) (1992) 8 WAR 96; King Investment Solution Pty Ltd v Hussain [2005] NSWSC 1076; 64 NSWLR 441; and Gheorghiu v Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd [2007] VSCA 83.

77. In Riches v Director of Public Prosecutions [1973] 1 WLR 1019 (Riches), Lawton LJ further explained at 1027:

One of the uncontested sets of facts which arises from time to time is when on the statement of claim it is clear that the cause of action is statute barred and the defendant tells the court that he proposes to plead the statute and, on the uncontested facts, there is no reason to think that the plaintiff can bring himself within the exceptions set out in the Limitation Act ... In those circumstances it is pointless for the case to go on so that the defendant can deliver a defence. [Emphasis added.]

78. Riches was cited with apparent approval by Refshauge J in Piscioneri v Reardon at [63].

79. It can be drawn from these authorities that when the facts relevant to the question of a limitation period expiring are uncontested, then that will be a clear case when it is likely to be appropriate to decide the issue in advance of a substantive hearing.

80. Considerations of cost, efficiency and case management (consistent with the application of s 5A of the Act) are also to be borne in mind when determining whether the issue ought be dealt with either on a summary basis or in advance of a trial, as seen in authorities such as Kedem v Johnson Lawyers Legal Practice Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 3 at [95] and Wells v Commonwealth of Australia [2014] NSWSC 148 at [18] and [65].

81. The issues thus arising for determination on this aspect of the application are:

(a) Whether the defendants have proven s 21B of the Limitation Act operates to the requisite threshold of certainty discussed in the authorities set out above; and

(b) Whether the plaintiff has raised an arguable issue as to deliberate concealment sufficient to warrant its resolution at trial.

82. For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that the facts as agreed by the parties are sufficiently certain to permit the resolution of the issue now.

83. The cause of action pleaded against both defendants arose on 11 January 2010, and in respect of the republication pleaded against the first defendant, on 9 November 2014. Both dates are more than a year before the Claim was filed on 10 December 2015.

84. The second defendant's identity was known from 18 October 2013, with time having commenced to run in respect of the second defendant on that day, the Claim was also filed more than a year later.

85. Having read the plaintiff's submissions, including those in reply, there is no other reasonable argument as to the operation of s 33 of the Limitation Act such as to suspend the operation of the statute to include any period after 10 December 2015.

86. Accordingly, the plaintiff has not commenced her action against the defendants within the time permitted under the Limitation Act. I accept the defendants' submission that there is no basis upon which this period could be extended. The trial of the action must be resolved in favour of the defendants. There is no reason not to give judgment at this point when it is known (through the Defences filed) that the defendants will rely upon a limitations defence at trial: see Hillebrand v Penrith Council [2000] NSWSC 1058, cited in Egan-Green v McLean [2017] ACTSC 48 at [37].

Section 133 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act

87. The second aspect of the defendants' application is the application of s 133 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act, which provides:

Leave required for further proceedings in relation to publication of same defamatory matter

If a person has brought defamation proceedings for damages (whether in this jurisdiction or elsewhere) against any person in relation to the publication of any matter, the person cannot bring further defamation proceedings for damages against the same defendant in relation to the same or any other publication of the same or like matter, except with the leave of the court in which the further proceedings are to be brought.

88. When the applications were heard, the plaintiff indicated that she was not aware of this section until she received the submissions of the defendants, nor was she aware that leave was required and that she should have applied for it. She subsequently filed an application for leave, which is yet to be heard.

89. Although the defendants have made submissions in relation to the substance of s 133 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act, they cannot be taken to have fully addressed the matter of the Court's discretion on an application for leave, because none was before it.

90. Given the pending application in the proceedings and the fact that there are two other grounds which are determinative of the result on the defendants' application, it is not necessary to consider this ground of the application.

91. Regrettably, one matter which ought be mentioned is that, with the Court's leave, counsel for the second defendant subsequently filed supplementary submissions. They transpired to be unnecessarily inflammatory and ultimately unhelpful submissions on the plaintiff's belated application for leave. They warrant comment only to the extent necessary to emphasise that the independence of counsel before this Court is a feature of the legal system that is well established, much valued, and must be maintained and protected. It is well appreciated that repeated litigation involving the same parties may be frustrating and indeed vexing. However, the opportunity to file written submissions after a hearing with leave of the Court is not to be misused as a forum through which to ventilate anger at a party, particularly when a party is represented by counsel.

92. The defendants contend that by reason of Piscioneri v Brisciani and Brisciani v Piscioneri CA a res judicata or issue estoppel arises.

93. The requirements for the doctrine of res judicata to apply are (1) that the same question has been decided; (2) that the judicial decision which is said to create the estoppel was final; and (3) that the parties to the judicial decision or their privies were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised or their privies: Carl Zeiss Stiftung and Others v Rayner and Others [No 2] [1967] 1 AC 853 at 935, cited in Kuligowski v Metrobus [2004] HCA 34; 220 CLR 363, at 373. See also Armacel Pty Ltd v Smurfit Stone Container Corporation [2008] FCA 592, 248 ALR 573 at [56]; Dale v Western Australia [2011] FCAFC 46; 191 FCR 521 at [69].

94. The extended doctrine of res judicata, known in Australia as Anshun estoppel, prevents a party to litigation in which a final judgment was given (or that party's privy) from raising in subsequent litigation an issue or cause of action which was, or which should have been, raised in the first proceedings: see, generally, Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 45; (1981) 147 CLR 589 (Anshun) at 597-603 per Gibbs CJ, Mason and Aickin JJ, referred to in Notaras & Anor v St George Bank Ltd & Ors [2005] ACTSC 5 at [8].

95. As was succinctly stated by Handley AJA, with whom Allsop P and Tobias JA relevantly agreed, in Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd v Industrial Court of New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 434 at [60], "[t]he Anshun test is based on the reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct of a litigant in earlier proceedings".

96. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the Court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time: Henderson v Henderson [1843] EngR 917; (1843) 3 Hare 100; (per Wigram V-C at 115; 319), cited in Wagdy Hanna and Associates Pty Ltd v National Library of Australia [2012] ACTSC 126 per Refshauge ACJ at [270].

97. In terms of the ultimate conclusions which have been reached, it is unnecessary to dwell on the distinction between res judicata in the proper sense and issue estoppel, although a helpful discussion of the distinction is to be found in SK Foods LP v SK Foods Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 3) [2013] FCA 526; 302 ALR 260.

98. Applying those principles to this case, the causes of action brought against each defendant will be considered separately. The first defendant was a party to Piscioneri v Brisciani and Brisciani v Piscioneri CA. A comparison of the cause of action here with the cause of action, the issues and their resolution by Burns J at [8] and the appendix to his Honour's reasons, and the Court of Appeal at [9] of the unanimous judgment, leaves me in no doubt that a res judicata or issue estoppel has arisen in relation to the first defendant.

99. It is not to the point that in this cause of action the plaintiff may have selected different posts from the same chain of posts that were the subject of proceedings before Burns J. Their subject matter is so closely related to the earlier proceedings that without doubt they properly belonged to the subject of the litigation, and accordingly, ought to have been brought forward in those proceedings. It was plainly unreasonable not to do so.

100. The same may be said as regards the second defendant, even though he was not a party to the proceedings. The plaintiff well knew his identity at a stage before the hearing of the proceedings before Burns J. The plaintiff contends that she expressly withdrew from the earlier proceedings the posts by 'Sagacious' and 'That-Bloke' with a view to prosecuting them separately. That is the very conduct to which the doctrine or Anshun estoppel is directed to preventing.

101. I have been mindful, particularly with regard to the second defendant, of the caution that the mere fact that the matter could have been raised does not mean it should have been raised (for the operation of the principle). Rather, it has to be so relevant as to make it unreasonable not to raise it: Champerslife Pty Ltd v Manojlovski & Anor [2010] NSWCA 33 per Allsop P (as his Honour then was) at [4].

102. The reasoning of Burns J in Piscioneri v Brisciani at [83] and [90] and of the Court of Appeal in Brisciani CA at [94]-[99] satisfies me to the requisite degree of certainty that the complaints now brought against the second defendant were so relevant as to make it unreasonable not to deal with them in the earlier proceedings.

103. I further accept the defendants' submission that the plaintiff's non-reliance on the very matter now pleaded is properly (and again, without doubt) characterised as a procedural election: Sargent v ASL Developments Pty Ltd (1974) 131 CLR 634; Tropical Traders Ltd v Goonan [1964] HCA 20; (1964) 111 CLR 41.

104. Accordingly, I am satisfied to the requisite level of certainty on a summary basis that in the case of the first defendant, the doctrine of res judicata applies and in the case of the second defendant, the principle of Anshun estoppel is a complete defence.

105. In light of the above reasons on the question of estoppel, it is unnecessary to determine whether the defendants ought be given leave to amend their Defences. The amendment proposed was to plead the defence of estoppel. It ought be clear, from the above references to the remarks of Lawton LJ in Riches and of Refshauge J in Piscioneri v Reardon at [63] that I have taken the view that the defence of Anshun estoppel was so obvious, requiring an amendment to plead the point before the Court would give consideration to that issue on the present application was unnecessary.

106. Costs are in the discretion of the Court under the Rules (and the Act) and where a party has been successful, it is usual to order that costs follow the event. In these interlocutory proceedings which were heard together, the defendants have succeeded both in respect of the plaintiff's application to strike out their Defences, and on the defendants' own application for summary judgment.

107. Accordingly, I consider it appropriate that the plaintiff bear the responsibility for the costs of the applications.

108. Further, as the defendants have succeeded in a substantive manner as to the outcome of the proceedings in their entirety, there is no reason to depart from the ordinary course that costs follow the event.

1. The applications filed by the plaintiff on 7 March 2017 are dismissed.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and nine [109] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of her Honour Associate Justice McWilliam.